




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The Venetian Republic

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The
Venetian Republic

Its Rise, its Growth, and its Fall

A.D. 409-1797

BY

W. CAREW HAZLITT

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TO
Gladys Henrietta Catherine Hazlitt
HER LOVING FATHER
INSCRIBES
THIS REVISED LABOUR OF HIS YOUTH

Preface

WHEN the present writer was about three and twenty, as a consequence of having accidentally met with Mr. Smedley's *Sketches from Venetian History*, the adventurous desire formed itself in his mind of contributing to English Literature a work on the same subject, more detailed and more comprehensive. His experience was simply a negative quantity, or the oft-cited *æ*: he knew very little about Venice; he was not conversant with the literature of the Republic or with the available material; he did not understand Italian; and he had never seen the place of which he proposed himself as the historian.

Nothing, however, is impossible, where there is enthusiasm seconded by a strong will. My parents, visiting Paris in 1854, brought back for me a copy of Galibert's *Histoire de Venise*, 1847, which probably tended to confirm my purpose. A first and a very weak essay was published in 1858; it was a mere fragment in two octavo volumes, now (it is to be hoped) forgotten or at least forgiven. A second effort to carry out the idea was made in 1860 in four octavo volumes, which undoubtedly left their precursors far behind in merit and completeness, but were still excessively far, looking at them to-day, from realizing what such a work ought to have been. It is true that since 1860 much has been done toward the formation of additional possibilities for acquiring a full view of the career of Venice, and for measuring and fixing her rank as a European State.

The two-volume essay of 1858 thus, without much delay, or with too little perhaps, developed itself two years later, by the expenditure of no inconsiderable amount of labour and thought, into a book which was held suitable for the public eye by one of our leading firms.

A copy of the latter lay by the author during the succeed-

ing forty years, until, on the one hand, copies had become almost unattainable, and, on the other, the text had profited by the result of maturer experience so far as to be to a sensible extent rewritten. It therefore seemed, looking at the disadvantage attendant on the superintendence of the proofs by any third party, that it would be desirable to commit to the press the fruit of a lifetime, and accordingly a new and enlarged edition made its appearance in 1900, which was the first complete edition of the work, for it had not only profited by the gradual and large accumulation of valuable particulars relative to Venetian history and institutions, but brought down the career of the Republic to the abrupt close in 1797. It is true that the later annals are of inferior interest and importance, but the perfect narrative seemed essential to a full and accurate view of the origin, rise and extinction of one of the most remarkable communities, alike in regard to its political structure and its inner life, which the world has ever beheld.

Since the appearance of the last edition, the process of accretion and revision has been continued, with a view to keeping the work abreast with the results of later research and information, which the author has endeavoured to incorporate in the edition now before the reader.

The most material portion and period of Venetian History is the central one, where we are witnesses to the attainment of unprecedented influence and prestige, by a State of singularly small territorial area and population, by means of a world-wide commerce and a constitutional system perfectly unparalleled. Yet there is undoubtedly pleasure as well as instruction in following the progress onward and upward, not unaccompanied by severe checks and reverses, and there are many who naturally desire to learn how and why a political organization so wise and so excellent was at last, after fourteen centuries, dissolved and effaced. Therefore it seems perfectly necessary to exhibit the whole picture, to have patience to study the drama from the first act to the last, and to have it in our power to see in what way the Venetians won, and kept, and lost a great empire.

The most notable accessions to the printed records of Venice since 1860 are the completed Romanin (*Storia Documentata*), *The Calendar of Venetian State Papers*, the *Diarii* of Marino Sanudo (1496-1533) which are now in type, the illustrated edition, in three volumes, 1905-1908, of *La Storia di*

Venezia nella Vita privata, by Molmenti, with his monograph on the battle of Lepanto, 1899, and *Le Monete di Venezia*, by Count N. Papadopoli, 1893 to 1907, in its amplified form, which awaits the third volume to conclude a monumental work. To these must be added the admirable series published by Ferdinando Ongania of photogravures of the Canals and Calli of Venice, 1890-96, folio, two volumes, which convey a life-like view of the existing city and of some of its outskirts. But the minor or subsidiary aids to a better and truer knowledge of numerous points connected with the successive epochs of the Republic's history and career, made for the first time available since the author's second publication appeared, constitute a perfect library in themselves, and belong to every branch and aspect of the inquiry. Indeed, the steady and striking accumulation of literary essays illustrative of this singular City-Empire bespeaks a very wide and enduring sympathy with its fortunes and vicissitudes on the part of successive ages, and of writers and thinkers outside Italy and beyond Europe. The broad fruit of the labours of so many affectionate and enthusiastic contributors to a seemingly inexhaustible topic has been, and is, the possibility of marshalling an unparalleled series of episodes, many quite dramatic in their complexion, many most instructive in their lessons to us, exempt from countless errors not all ascribable to ignorance. But the Calendars above named form in themselves a stupendous revelation of the extent to which, during centuries, Venice remained the pivot round which the affairs and fortunes of Europe revolved.

A full moiety of the statements and views published concerning Venice and the Venetians may not unfairly be described as both imperfect and false, and some of the misapprehensions or mistakes unfortunately affect vital points. Nor is it to any jealousy or malice on the part of other Italians that we owe so unsatisfactory a state of affairs, but to the superficiality and inaccuracy of the French and English schools of writers. Till the latter half of the nineteenth century, again, the means could scarcely be said to exist of forming a correct and just notion of many leading questions, and even when the present writer, more than fifty years ago, completed his tentative work on the subject, a large body of material remained inaccessible to English students. Now the case

is widely and favourably different ; nearly everything elucidatory of the career of the Republic has been committed to type, and if we do not understand the whole of the strange melodramatic story, the blame is solely ours.

The archives of the Republic are obviously most valuable, most important, most curious, in a manifold respect. But the most prosperous times were those when, at all events, diplomatic correspondence was less copious and constant, for this feature too often betrayed difficulty in external relations and political extremities, and it is a class of authority which deals, as may be supposed, only with facts real or alleged. We are left to institute comparisons, to weigh evidence and to draw conclusions, but, apart from such a body of material, there is an abundant store of anecdotes and inventions for which no valid authority whatever exists.

The editor of the *Venetian State Papers* in the English Roll Series prefaces his Calendar with a descriptive account of these precious remains and evidences, which rise up before us to-day to confute so many accepted beliefs as to facts and circumstances in relation, not merely to Venice, but to Europe and the whole world as it was known to the Venetians ; the principle on which History should be written is at length exhibited to us for our instruction and use. Four centuries of the Venetian archives are open to all, and the luminous subject-matter of Mr. Rawdon Brown's volumes, which began to appear in 1864, reduces to waste paper the entire *corpus* of old-fashioned literature on the history and constitution of the Republic, produced from time to time in Italy itself and elsewhere. Mr. Brown unnecessarily apologizes for having, in his prefatory remarks, sometimes indulged in anecdotal digression, which is not only instructive but delightful, when it is genuine.

These Calendars, with the *Archivio Storico Italiano*, the Diaries of Sanudo, the *Storia Documentata* of Romanin, and the extensive assemblage of miscellaneous studies and adversaria, constitute the basis of any serious attempt to commit to writing an historical and social account of Venice. The first-named authority receives an enormous accession of value from the peculiar care taken to date entries, often to the day of the month, occasionally to the hour. Over and above the material for use strictly documentary or official in its nature,

there are, as will be seen by reference to the text and notes, occasional sources of information of an almost equally trustworthy and valuable kind, derived from writers of monographs and memoirs and records of travel, which preserve the experiences or observations of persons who were eyewitnesses of what they narrate, or actors in the scenes portrayed.

The fortunes and personality, so to speak, of Venice have formed a theme on which Venetian and foreign writers alike have never tired of expatiating. The singularity of the site, the duration of the independence, the splendour of the architecture, the romantic features of the very history, furnish themes for an endless succession of pens. The city of the Adriatic ought, indeed, to be the most familiar to students and readers of every class among all those in the world. Its own citizens have done much toward the illustration of its wonderful career, and have done that much well; from Venetians or from Venetian sources we derive our most precious and authentic material for drawing up an impartial and comprehensive view of the subject, and the Englishman, the Frenchman, the German, the American, has it not in his power to do more than differentiate in conclusion and in estimates. The Republic wrote its own autobiography after a while, from day to day during centuries, and it left to posterity the task only of reducing it to form and drawing the moral. The copiousness of the particulars, the nicety of detail, the evidently genuine literal transfer of the spoken word to paper, where we are dealing with points of time for which the same minutiae nowhere else exist, must strike us with agreeable surprise. The sole parallel which we seem to possess is one nearer home, the splendid Municipal Records of ancient London; and it is a very imperfect one, seeing how infinitely briefer is the space of time covered, and how infinitely narrower the range of influence.

There is no other spot on the earth where, within a radius of a hundred miles, or, if we limit the calculation to the metropolis itself, an infinitely smaller compass, so large a share of the world's business has been directly or indirectly transacted. There were ages upon ages, when the deliberations of the Great Council or of the Council of Ten embraced and affected the whole of the known world, and when the

quick and strong pulse made its vibrations sensible in all cabinets and all markets.

We have left behind us the Makers of Venice when we have seen the wise Doge Mocenigo followed to his last resting place in 1423. Those who had built up the State were men who had done it little by little, almost unconsciously—not the brilliant names which shone in art and letters, nor the great patriotic characters who struggled in the latter days to avert the inevitable climax. These stood on ground and profited by conditions which had been slowly created by other heads and other hands, and which, in spite of the rise of new ideas and new forms around, were found capable of resisting, either by force or by inaction, centuries of hostility and decay.

Whatever may be the desire of an ordinary historian to be exhaustive in his descriptions of the various aspects and branches of his subject, it is generally the case that it is impossible to do justice to every kind of detail, or to introduce more than a sketch of some secondary topics, with an indication of the sources of fuller and minuter knowledge. In almost every European literature, the existence of a not very small library of monographs illustrates and supports my statement; it is a delicate task to curtail the particulars, where it is precisely in their copiousness that the value and charm lie, and, in the case before us, recent years have witnessed the launch into type of so numerous a body of works on almost all divisions of the subject, that a general narrative cannot conveniently aim at accomplishing more than a succinct view of each, based on a collation of authorities. The account by Giustina Renier Michiel of the *Venetian Festivals and Holidays* is alone a publication of considerable bulk, and the same may be said of the *Vita Privata* of Molmenti and of that extremely charming work by W. D. Howells, *Venetian Life*. At the same time, the present writer has never lost sight of the importance of dealing as much at large as possible with topics so peculiarly local and characteristic; to specialists he has been obliged to leave the task of supplying the rest. As far as Molmenti is concerned, his book in its enlarged shape supplies a vast number of details in regard to the life and manners of the latest period, when political decadence co-existed with architectural splendour and social luxury and prodigality, and while the graphic features of his book supersede

the necessity of repetition elsewhere, an appreciable, perhaps even a preponderant share of the illustrations belong to the epoch when there was a decreased speciality of local costume, and a closer approach in many directions to the later French school of decoration, and when the institutions and sentiments of Venice were more or less common to the other Italian States—when Italy was, as it were, preparing to become a nation.

Shakespear speaks of “our tardy apish nation” limping after Italian manners in “base imitation,” and, indeed, if we closely observe the course and progress of usages and sentiments, we perceive more and more how heavily indebted we have been and are to those who were members of the great Italian Republics, when England was at most a second-rate Power. We borrowed all that we could, and were restrained from borrowing more, merely by the exigencies of climate and other local circumstances. It is a tolerably familiar saying that there has been only one Venice, but it is a truth far deeper than the ordinary reader of popular accounts of the place, looking at its situation and monuments, may suppose. For a studious and exhaustive research into the passed annals or life of this almost dead city of the lagoons satisfies us that the world, since its first methodical commencement, or its emergence from archaic barbarism, has not been vigorous or fortunate enough to become the parent of more than three or four such marvellous progenies—not in all the thousands of years the said world itself has existed and has been trodden by human inhabitants.

We turn to the attainable records of the Venetians with a spell-bound attention, kindred to that which draws us toward Carthage, Athens and Rome. All these, originally insignificant in territorial area, grew into great cities, and from great cities became great empires; but Venice was the most modern, the nearest to us, and she was in many things, in many forgotten elements of civilization, our mistress and our teacher. The power of Carthage was chiefly maritime, that of Athens chiefly military; but Rome and Venice obtained supremacy both by sea and land. Marvellously in advance of her contemporaries in all her institutions and ideas, what must be said of some who have mainly identified her name with dark prisons and cruel laws? She was born in the days of dark

prisons and cruel laws, and she saw around her, to the last, nothing else. Nothing else in Italy, Germany, Russia, France, England.

It is surely very interesting to look upon such a pioneer community as this Venetian one, in its arduous and long struggle to become foremost, not only in enterprise, invention and the arts, but in the indispensable science of government, for it was to the early arrival at a mature constitution that the strength and endurance of the State were so immensely due. There is a charm in witnessing how, in the face of the greatest difficulties and discouragements, the national life long waxed stronger and stronger. It is a pleasing study to trace, step by step, the metamorphosis of that poor and barren stretch of sand, by no miracle, but by sheer fortitude and genius, into a political centre of the first rank, into a seat of valuable and humanizing manufactures which forestall us Englishmen at every step, into a home of universal culture, and into the most fascinating of capitals and resorts. How can we blame Vincenzo Quirini who, on his return from his mission to Burgundy, England and Castile in 1506, concluded his report to the Senate by thanking God for being born a Venetian, as all the rest of the world, when compared with the policy and justice of the Signory, is nought?

Amid and beyond the thread of historical detail, we here have in profusion the illustrative and picturesque element arising out of the romantic site of the city, its princely hospitality, its precocious and regal appreciation of all branches of the arts, its anticipation of much in the province of civilization and invention which its successors in Europe have enjoyed, and for which they have not seldom taken unjust credit, its Oriental passion for display and amusement, and the riotous joyousness of those unnumbered holidays, in which religious devotion and effervescent popular licence were curiously blended. Moreover, on the same ground we are able to investigate, as they long existed side by side, the sternest oligarchical despotism and the utmost liberty of action and speech, where no question of public policy was involved, and this is so far material, that it seems to prove that the Executive even erred in the direction of leniency, unless the interest and security of the State were at issue.

Anything approaching a complete view of the social side

of this topic will not be expected in a general account, by those who are conversant with the manifold bearings and aspects embraced in such an enterprise. There is scarcely any branch of the inquiry on which the once prevailing notions have been so gravely modified, and at the same time so beneficially enlarged by modern researches. The result has been, on the whole, to acquit the Republic of the gross and absurd calumnies propagated by ill-informed or ill-disposed writers, and its tardy admission to its just place among the great Powers of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.

The fruit of a rather slow and tedious process of concentrating on this particular object an endless amount of reading and thought is manifest in the work now submitted with diffident satisfaction to the English-speaking public, which may here meet with the means of instituting many comparisons between our own modern practice and opinions, and those previously entertained and carried out at Venice, and may more thoroughly realize to what an extent the Republic was our pilot and our instructor.

A cluster of villages, each village a group of hovels: a bond of townships, each township a seat of clans and a focus of discord: a city richer, more advanced, more enlightened, more powerful than any other then in the world: an empire the greatest and most enduring since the fall of Rome, itself contemporary with the Romans: Venice now lies in state; its voice and pulse are still, and its face is placid in death. Genoa, Milan, Pisa and Florence had gone before. This was another step (the greatest except Rome itself) toward the conversion of Italy into a geographical fact, to which France was so importantly to contribute in the fulness of time.

The neglected appearance of the capital, wherever one directs one's steps beyond the leading thoroughfares, betrays the withdrawal of the old affectionate hand, and the absence of the full purse which responded with alacrity in other days to every need. But in the suburbs and outlying districts the decay and forlornness are far more striking. Chioggia, Torcello, Malamocco, Murano are desolate; villas have been degraded into lodging-houses; the gardens have become wastes. Spots which once formed the site of ornamental grounds, enriched with works of art and honoured by the footsteps of some distinguished owner who hither retired from

the bustle of the city, have been given back to the seaweed and the waterfowl, while others have become nurseries for market produce or the sites of manufactories, and the fisherman's net hangs to dry from balconies which have been trodden by all that was illustrious and fair in the wealthiest and most un-European of European centres. It is one of the penalties which we see Venice paying to-day for having been made by its true children of yore so great and so sumptuous, that no after-dwellers under different conditions can ever hope to maintain an inheritance so magnificent and so costly.

The pathetic view presented, according to an accepted tradition, by one of her foremost statesmen in 1222, of the result likely to arise from the then proposed abandonment of Venice in favour of Constantinople as a capital and a home, has not been realized, because the step was not taken, and it is idle to speculate what might have been the consequences of its adoption. But if the scene of such unparalleled opulence, greatness and glory, magically created out of the poorest and most sorrowful and most tragic beginnings, is not a silent desert, it is a shadow and a wreck, the resort of pilgrims of all nations, who bend their footsteps thither wistfully and wonderingly, as to a house which its master has forsaken.

It has been fairly put that the geographical situation of the Republic, which had proved of such immense advantage so long as the Mediterranean continued to be the great commercial highway, was an insuperable obstacle when the shorter route to the Indies and America was commanded by another Power. About thirty years had passed since the death of the Doge Foscari in 1457, when the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope took place, nor was there any method by which the first deadly blow to Venetian commerce between East and West could have been averted or neutralized.

In times when conservatism was universal, the Venetians carried the principle of commercial protection to the utmost verge. But, beyond the limits of the more modern theory, they established and enforced the Paternal system, under which subjects of the Republic enjoyed as much indulgence and freedom as possible in the exercise of their vocations, but were obliged to look for the most drastic rigour in any attempt to communicate industrial mysteries to foreigners, or even to

withdraw themselves without special licence from Venetian jurisdiction. This antique doctrine and sentiment practically followed the lines of all the trading communities of older Europe, and were the germs of what was subsequently developed into Freemasonry; but they also represented, so far as Venice at all events was concerned, a curious evolution from feudalism. There has been an effort hereafter to shew how that mediæval growth and law betrayed themselves in a State in which they might have been the least expected to take root, and it is probable that many will be forced to conclude that the cliental and gentilitical spirit, which was so helpful to the Republic through the earlier centuries, became, in its maturer and less wholesome development, a prominent factor in her dissolution.

This may be another mode of repeating the opinion that, in the circumstances of its origin, in the natural conditions which afforded its primitive people security, and in the causes which promoted its greatness, Venice carried the seeds of decay—carried them through ages. For it was not the want of perception or even of foresight, or of a desire to keep pace with the course of events and with changed relationships, which proved so disastrous, but a helpless submission to a blessing and a boon, converted into a curse by a combination of incidents utterly beyond effectual control. It was of small avail, when so many puissant monarchies had successively arisen on the Continent, when the Cape route had been found, and when the Mediterranean trade had been crippled, that some lamented the rejection in the thirteenth century of the project for making Constantinople the capital of a new Venice. A step which might very possibly have given a different direction to events throughout Europe was deemed unpatriotic and suicidal; but the Oriental complexion of the Republic, the intimate commercial bond with the East, and the firm grasp which the fifth Crusade had already given her of the Greek Empire, would have aided the movement, and with a fundamental change in situation must have come one co-ordinate in policy. It was not to be so, however; the same soil was destined to see the whole romantic drama played to the end, to see an unbroken continuity of free rule through more than thirteen centuries on the same ground, to see the light kindled and the light extinguished.

The fact is, that all the causes, save one, which conduced to the fall of Venice had been in full existence to her prejudice, and once or twice to her approximate ruin, at earlier stages of her long and great career, before such States as France, Germany, Spain and Portugal in the West, and Turkey in the East, acquired paramount importance. A new Europe grew up, and the Republic was constitutionally incapable of adapting itself to the altered situation. At the period of the League of Cambrai, we remark, only on a somewhat larger scale, the same tactics, the same lines of offence and defence as had formerly been employed and had generally succeeded, in opposing Aquileia, Genoa, Austria (as a Duchy), and Hungary. There had been the same contracted local area, the same limited population, the same absence of a national army, the same imperfect fiscal economy, and the same inability to conduct even a prolonged naval struggle without detriment to trade. But there was this essential difference in later years, that the boundless replenishment of the public purse gradually failed, and the Venetians saw themselves confronted with infinitely more formidable antagonists, and the possessors of infinitely slenderer means of resistance.

But no human foresight could have anticipated the introduction of the Turks into Europe as a new political element and danger both by sea and land, and the advent of Bonaparte on the wings of the Revolution, to complete the ruin already wrought by geographical discovery. Venetian institutions were calculated for old times, and were, relatively speaking, incomparable; but no State which the world had ever seen, or ever will see, could permanently bear the loss of its material prosperity and protect itself against a continuous succession of hostilities, much less a State of which the central germ was so insignificant. The French Revolution, coming like a moraine in the wake of a succession of enfeebling agencies, destroyed Venice; a similar force might have effected the same result a century and a half before. No reforms could have been efficacious in 1797. That ancient fabric, the oldest Power in Europe, older than the Merwing dynasty in France, was ready to fall to pieces at a touch, and it perished unpitied, yet never to be forgotten.

Looking back on that distant historical episode, the proposal in 1222 to transfer the capital to Constantinople, one can

hardly forbear to speculate on the possible difference which the establishment of a Christian State at the Golden Horn might have made in connexion, first with the fortunes of Venice, and secondly, with one of the greatest European problems and difficulties of the nineteenth century. At the date in question, there would have been no serious resistance to the occupation of Constantinople, and in 1219 the Consul-General or Bailo of the Republic is found, in an official dispatch to the Doge, advocating the measure as expedient and easy of execution.

Eventually, it was not the Emperor, nor the Ottoman Porte, nor any other among the old European Powers, that overthrew the mistress of the Adriatic, but her own inherent and chronic weakness, and the force of the French democratic wave which spared so few of the existing nationalities of the Continent. It was, and is, useless to conjecture what might have occurred, had Venice been different from what she was; she had pursued her career, a long and glorious one, a career which taught a unique historical lesson. The geographical site, which had once afforded a precious asylum and had repeatedly averted destruction, became for a modern belligerent State an anachronism. At one period the dominion of the *terra firma* was a necessity; at another it was a burden and an evil. At one period the East was a boundless source of wealth and of the power which wealth confers; at another it became a field where the Republic found herself thwarted in commerce by new competitors and in war by new antagonists. Internal corruption and decay were the corollary of the conditions, which altered circumstances transformed into vices. No more striking evidence of this fact could be adduced, than the contrast between the Great Council at the date of the *Serrav* in the thirteenth century, and its composition in the seventeenth, when the decline of trade had impoverished its members, and a large and influential section consisted of poor nobles whom their financial condition exposed to immoral influences. The original theory had been, that it was a wise step to limit the governing body to those whose stake in the national welfare was largest, and an excellent theory that was in 1297; but, after the lapse of three hundred years or more, the constitutional bar to a parliamentary voice became a disastrous source of weakness, as it excluded the new and healthy blood which might have recuperated the vigour and energy of the Executive and

Deliberative Councils, and have placed Venice in a better state to keep pace with political changes.

But, again, the failures in the field and at sea, even during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, are traceable to the perhaps compulsory or involuntary retention of obsolete and semi-feudal financial principles, and the absence of any efficient system of taxation. The employment of mercenary troops and leaders by land was aggravated by the loss of time and opportunities arising from the military inexperience of the Venetian Proveditors, who often hampered the commander, and robbed him and his and their employers of a victory.

Napoleon came to Venice declaring that he would play over again the part of Attila, but Attila made, did not obliterate, the Republic. It was the Hun who assisted in laying the first stone. The Venetians had already played their part and filled their place, not for a short season, not in vain, not without glory. The great French leader had his drama before him—a briefer one; and then he, too, passed away and left the stage to others. Yet, as there has been only one Napoleon, so there has been one Venice, which must be judged by its relation to its contemporaries, not to us. It represented principles which had grown obsolete; the Hanseatic League did the same, and both fell together. When we look at the luxury and splendour of Venetian society during the last century of independence, we see how the fullest and richest life (in an artificial or conventional sense) resembled that of the prodigal who consumes his capital and shuts his eyes to the day of reckoning.

It is useless to pursue the speculation. Setting aside other aspects of the matter, such a place could hardly have adapted itself to modern conditions, or have resisted during four and twenty hours the engineering resources and appliances of the nineteenth century. The grand pioneer of the dark and renascent ages was destined in its turn to be left behind by its own pupils—by the Portuguese, the Hollander, the Englishman. There have been those who have blamed the thoughtless and suicidal extravagance of Venice, when its sources of supply were ebbing and a national bankruptcy seemed to impend; but, under the most frugal management, a political system as old-fashioned as Rome could not have lasted side by side with new ideas and new methods, any more than one of the

kingdoms of the Anglo-Saxon Heptarchy could have held its ground even in Elizabethan England.

The Great Britain of to-day presents to our view as vast a difference in its constitution and character from that of the eighteenth century, as the latter presented to the country under the rule of the Tudors and Stuarts. The England which Venice knew, and with which it so long maintained amicable relations, no longer exists. In its place, we behold a new people and a new country, fruits of an evolution of incredible magnitude and speculative finality, partly due to a development of the Teutonic spirit, and partly to the reactive force of Transatlantic progress and influence.

The Memoirs of Venice might have been more voluminous even than the Diaries of her own Sanudo, had they been written from first to last at large. She had beheld Vandal, Goth and Hun on Italian soil. In England she had seen Briton, Dane, Saxon, Norman: ingress and egress of Plantagenet, Tudor, Stuart, Cromwell: and nearly a century of the rule of the house of Brunswick. She had witnessed the invasion of England by the Normans, and that of France by the Plantagenets. She had lived through the whole of the Merwing, Carolingian and Capetian times. In Spain the Visigoths, Arabs, Moors, Ferdinand and Isabella, Charles V., passed before her eyes, and she was already a free and autonomous State when the first stone of the Alhambra was laid, and when Portugal was erected by Castile into a self-governing countship. Germany was familiar to the Republic before Charlemagne was born, when Austria was not even a dukedom, before the founders of imperial houses became burgraves of Magdeburg and Nürnberg, and when Prussia was in part Polish and in part a feudal lordship under the Teutonic Knights. She had seen the Magyar, the Greek, the Turk,¹ the Pole, the Swede, the Hollander; she had seen Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and Savoy, Genoa, Milan, Mantua, Ferrara and Florence advance and retire into the background. She had known the day when the voice of Russia was not of greater weight than that of Monaco

¹ Since the edition of 1900 appeared, and indeed within a brief term, vast changes have taken place in Eastern Europe, and the Turkish dominion in that continent, productive from the outset of nothing but bloodshed, misery and destruction, has been reduced within far narrower limits by the victorious arms of the confederate Balkan States.

or San Marino, and when Catherine II. left it a first-rate European Power.

The succession of her Doges was still uninterrupted when, at the close of the eighteenth century, the fortunes of France hung in the balance and those of England were gravely precarious, and when new intellectual forces were shaking thrones and menacing the Apostolic See.

In the East Indies, where they had hastened to ingratiate themselves by every means with the independent princes, and which had been to them a mine of wealth before other countries appreciated their importance, the Venetians beheld the formation of commercial establishments by the Englishman and the Hollander, and the development of those establishments into powerful empires, of which one alone was far larger than the entire European continent.

From a hemisphere unknown to her earlier settlers, but which her later man had contributed to discover, she received the earliest news of Spanish, French and English colonization; advices reached her of the original settlements of Spain in South America, of France in what we now call Canada, and of England in Virginia and Massachusetts, and her independence lasted nearly down to the date of the death of George Washington.

Moreover, it was possible for her to boast that, through fourteen centuries, her capital was the only one in Europe or the world which had never been entered by an invader, and that, within that narrow zone, all the arts which tend to humanize and elevate our species had been in turn assiduously cultivated and royally encouraged. None could say that they had taken sovereign princes into pay, and had not found it amiss to offer to defray the cost of an emperor's coronation, and to entertain terms for his hire in the field. Her people had shewn themselves great alike in war and in peace. No commercial country in history had conducted such costly operations by land or at sea for the maintenance of principles or from motives of chivalrous ambition, and while the Venetian aristocracy could shew genealogies prouder than those of all the royal houses of Western Europe, their wives and daughters emulated, in their demeanour and attire, the gorgeous and stately manners of the Court of the Great Mogul. Even in her ruin and decay, she has a splendour and a fascination

which convert her into a place of pilgrimage and a shrine, and a prestige and an odour which belong to no other spot.

The records of the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom must be treated as a portion of the modern Italian annals: they extend from 1797 to the evacuation of Venice on the rise of the new kingdom of Italy under the house of Sardinia in 1860. Venetian patriots and malcontents were in a position to look back to a time when the Dukes of Austria were third-rate sovereigns, and when they were among the guests whom the Republic periodically received with its profuse hospitality, and dismissed in the Italian fashion with a complimentary largess. They were equally able to establish that, whatever the old system had been from constitutional and inherent causes in point of severity and oppression, the Austrian one was not less despotic and inquisitorial, with scarcely the same justifying pleas.

In regard to the question of illustrating the present work, difficulties and doubts presented themselves, alike in the way of selection, expense and redundancy. Within the last few years, several publications have appeared of which the central or main claim to attraction was the graphic element. These books were, for the most part, devoted and confined to particular aspects of the subject, but one, the enlarged Molmenti, already referred to, which may not unfairly be regarded as on the same lines as the Yriarte series, aimed at covering the entire ground. A plan so ambitious in its scope is usually to be regarded and judged with mixed feelings, and, in the present case, the lavishness of the pictorial feature has, I fear, been reached at the cost of execution, if not of fidelity. The illustrations of the three-volume work are derived from a multiplicity of sources, and in many instances at second-hand; they are strikingly unequal, and the photographic process has not seldom proved treacherous. An appreciable proportion is indebted to paintings by old masters, which represent, as a rule, whatever the subject may be, contemporary costume and life; but there, again, much depended on the individual humour of the artist or of his sitters. A second group of objects delineated may be held liable to the objection that they are not too successful transfers from rudimentary decorations of buildings where they were perhaps viewed as secondary accessories. A justification for such criticism may

be found in the far closer harmony between the representations and their subjects, when we come to the period embraced by the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries—when capable artists portrayed contemporary persons and scenes, even if they not infrequently committed the common anthropomorphous error of making their families and friends pose for Scriptural subjects. A farther point is the deficiency of concentration or synthesis, and the necessity for seeking details belonging to one branch of the inquiry on pages widely apart. Nevertheless the new Molmenti has furnished us with a large, richly varied and extremely valuable body of graphic embellishment, which certainly tends to deter one from attempting anything of the kind on a systematic scale, and I have consequently limited myself to a few special matters of which Molmenti has not taken particular cognizance.

In the present case, the aim has been restricted to the selection of a few objects which appeared on various grounds to possess special interest and even novelty, and the reproductions from Giacomo Franco, so far as English readers are concerned, are entitled to fall under this category. Aloïss Heiss in the fine copies from Tintoretto and other masters, published in his *Médailleurs de la Renaissance*, has furnished a series of facsimiles of the superscriptions of the Doges of this era as accompaniments to their portraits. To his great work we are all under deep and substantial obligations, inasmuch as we are there admitted face to face with the vivid lineaments, not only of actual rulers, but of the masterly and heroic spirits whose names present themselves in these pages, as the leaders of the Venetian armies to victory and conquest.¹

The series of views affording the most realistic conception of many of the leading features in the epoch, when the Venetian power and prestige had not yet sensibly declined, and when the buildings of the city and the life of the people preserved to a large extent their original breadth and propriety of costume, is that engraved by Giacomo Franco, apparently issued for the first time, in a small folio volume about 1609. The earliest issue, at least in book form, does

¹ A volume is devoted to Venice and the Venetians, 1887—the medallie portraits of such personages as Sforza, Piccinino, Carmagnola, Gattamelata, Coleoni are admirably realistic.

not comprise the Rialto Bridge existing since 1585, but that noble historical monument was subsequently added. The contrast between the aspect of some of the public edifices in these plates, and their presentation in modern illustrated publications, is in a notable measure ascribable to the influence of natural decay from atmospheric agencies.

W. C. H.

The Preface is substantially as it left the hands of the Author. It had not received his final revision, but the alterations admitted are very slight, and mainly relate to the remarks on the several editions of the work, in the account of which some connecting links have been supplied. To those who were witnesses of his unremitting enthusiasm and the keenness with which he was looking forward to the appearance of the present edition, there was something tragic in the suddenness of his death within sight of the goal, which made Miss Hazlitt all the more anxious to carry out what she knew to be his wish, and arrange for the immediate publication of the work, an undertaking which she has accomplished with the help of her co-executor, Mr. Alfred E. Thiselton. The whole of the first volume was already printed and three hundred pages of the second volume passed for the press; but in the completion of a work of such compass great care and special knowledge were necessary—a task which, so far as it relates to such portion of the work as had not passed the final proof, has been intrusted to Mr. Francis John Payne, whose varied qualifications in connexion with Italian History and Literature were happily available. He has also made the Index, and attended to several of the incidental details which

are always involved in literary production. It has occurred to the Executors that, as the Preface was not finally revised by the Author, all sources of information may possibly not have received due mention. If such should be the case, they trust that this general acknowledgment, which is all that is in their power, may be deemed sufficient, as they know that the Author was most scrupulous in such matters.

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The Author's Executors regret that they have been unable to find the tracings so kindly supplied by Mr. A. Ryan and referred to in note 2, page 317.

The Venetian Republic

CHAPTER I

A.D. 409-654

Ancient Venetia—Origin of the Veneti—Description of the Lagoon—Spina and Hadria—Aquileia, Concordia, and Altinum—Their Commercial Prosperity—Grado, Torcello, and Rialto—Irruption of the Goths (409)—Fall of the Roman Empire—Irruption of the Huns (421)—Foundation of Venice (421-52)—Consular Government of the New State (421-66)—Administration of the Gastaldi or Tribunes (466-697)—Irruptions of the Vandals and the Heruli (455-76)—Second Irruption of the Goths (489)—Foundation of the Gothic Kingdom of Italy (493)—Reign of Theodoric the Great (493-526)—Letters of Cassiodorus to the Venetian Tribunes (520-3)—Venice under the Goths (493-552)—Destruction of the Gothic Kingdom of Italy (552)—Invasion of the Lombards (568)—Venice under the Lombards.

THE ancient Italian province of VENETIA is of interest to us in the present inquiry as the source to which the first Venetians looked as the home of their fathers or of their own youth. It was a region of Northern Italy, which extended from the foot of the Alps to the Adriatic Sea; but its boundaries seem to have undergone changes. After its subjugation by the Romans, Venetia was considered as forming part of Cisalpine Gaul. The people are described as a commercial, rather than a warlike, community; and it is a curious circumstance that they displayed in their dress, like their insular descendants, a predilection for black. An immense amount of confusion has arisen in the accounts of this country and its inhabitants by a failure to discriminate with proper care between the Veneti of Armorica and their Adriatic namesakes. The former were remarkable for their proficiency in martial pursuits and their brave resistance to the Roman legions and navy; yet it is at the same time questionable whether the trade in amber conducted by Greeks and Phœnicians between Western Europe and the

Baltic does not really belong to the Transalpine Veneti, who are also more likely to be the people among whom Herodotus relates that it was a custom to sell their marriageable daughters by auction.

There seems to be some plausibility in the suggestion that a colony passing in the course of migration from their native soil to Asia Minor, proceeded thence, in process of time, to Northern Italy, on the shores of which they formed numerous settlements. These colonists were called Tyrrhenians or Etruscans; they became the founders, at successive periods, of Spina at the mouth of the Po, and Hadria¹ or Hatria in its vicinity, both of which attained the highest degree of commercial prosperity. No vestiges of the former are now visible, though the name may seem to have survived in the islet of Spinalunga,² a later alluvial formation. The gradual deposits of nature have had the effect of removing Hadria to a distance of more than fourteen miles from that sea on which it once stood, and which still bears its name—the *Hadria iracunda* of Horace. Nor has the decline been recent; for even in the time of the Romans these places presented little more than the shadow of their pristine greatness.

In the Augustan age Venetia and Istria united to form the Tenth Legion; under Constantine, the two districts were reckoned as the seventeenth province of Rome.³ Venetia itself was divided, during the reign of the latter prince, into *Prima* and *Secunda* or *Maritima*, the last of which had long been known to the conquerors as the *Gallicae Paludes*. Venetia Maritima appears to have been bounded on the east by the Adriatic, on the north by the Julian Alps, on the west by an imaginary line drawn between the Adige and the Po, and on the south by the latter river.

The inclining plain of Northern Italy, which verges continually toward the sea, is irrigated by several rivers. Of these, the Livenza and Isonzo take their rise in the Alps; the Brenta, the Musone, the Piave, and the Adige in the

¹ Hieronimi Aleandri junioris de Provincia Venetiarum, deque urbe Venetiarum dissertatio. Published by Morelli: *Operette*, ii. 275.

² The remains of antiquity found at Venice hardly prove, as Galibert supposed (*Histoire de Venise*, 1847, p. 269), that the islands of which it consisted had had earlier and more polished inhabitants. They rather point to the scattered ruins of Hadria. But cf. Molmenti, *Vita Privata*, 1905, i. 19–23.

³ Maffei, *Antica condizione di Verona*, 25. Ven. 1719.

Tyrol; while the Po, after receiving the tributary waters of the Alps and the Apennines, disembogues in the Adriatic at its western angle. That the strength and vehemence of the currents of these several streams would be greatly increased by the sloping nature of the country through which they flow, is sufficiently obvious; and it will also be easy to conceive the process by which, in their passage to the gulf, the force of the tide would loosen and remove the sand and mud accumulated on their shores, and deposit it as sediment at their respective confluences, which lay within a short distance of each other. This fluvial drift, which served to attest the active and unrestricted operations of nature in that quarter, naturally assumed, in the course of ages, the form of mounds, or *lidi*, while many acquired a degree of size and solidity which entitled them to the name of islands. The final result which was to be expected, however, from this large formation of new and artificial soil close to the *terra firma*, was that the whole intermediate expanse of morass, or *lagoon*, would have been girt by an unbroken belt of sand, and that an extensive tract of country would have been permanently reclaimed from the ocean; and this, indeed, was only obviated by the estuaries which along the upper coast of Northern Italy were created by the frequent confluence of opposite currents, and which, by a series of winding and deep channels, divided the *lidi* at irregular intervals, at the same time affording a certain access to the wide and terraqueous tract which had now interposed itself between the true shore and the exterior margin of the Adriatic.

It was on these narrow strips of land, ill sheltered from the waves, yet by them only protected, of which it might have appeared that man would hardly care to dispute possession with the sea-fowl, that a few hundred stragglers, exiles from their native soil, were driven, in the fifth century of our era, by the force of adversity, to seek a temporary home; and on this unique site the fugitives laid the foundations of the proud and powerful Venice, by erecting here and there a few huts of mud and osiers.¹

¹ "That little island in the centre of the Seine, to which a small and limited tribe would flee as a last place of refuge from its enemies, was the nucleus around which after ages would erect the gayest and brightest capital of the civilised world."—Birch's *Paper on Medieval Paris*, 1881.

In the singular encroachment of the land upon the water which was to be observed in the conformation of the Venetian lagoons, and the slow creation of a firm soil, where before there had been nought but liquid expanse, it was not unnatural for the men of that time to see an evidence of preparation for things that were to come. The remarkable changes which had taken place during the lapse of ages in that part of the coast might well seem to a less incredulous age than ours to point to the distant contemplation of a City of Refuge in the midst of the waves.

We are told by Strabo that in his day the country immediately contiguous to the Gulf of Adria was intersected in every quarter by rivers, streams, and morasses; Aquileia and Ravenna were then cities in the marshes; and it appears probable that, had not the inroads of the sea been checked by a circumvallation of dykes, the whole region would have presented the aspect of a salt-lake.

The climate of ancient Venetia was generally tepid, occasionally chilly. In the spring, the atmosphere was gratefully tempered by the sea-breezes; during the summer, the frequent recurrence of storms cleared the air, and deluged the plains; snow was rare and transient. The soil was rich and fertile: it was composed of ashes, dust, and bitumen, varied at certain levels by layers of salt. Salt also formed, with honey, oil, fish, and wine, the staple commodities of the country.

After the successive fall of Spina and Hadria, three other cities, which had remained down to that time in comparative obscurity, acquired in their turn prominence and celebrity. Of these the most conspicuous in wealth and in industry was Aquileia. This place continued, for some length of time, to hold the first rank among the cities of Northern Italy. The river and maritime commerce of the Aquileians was equally considerable. Their traders penetrated by the Danube to Goritz and Belgrade, and perhaps even to Byzantium and the Roman colonies on the Cimmeric Bosphorus and the Black Sea.¹ The Po, the Tagliamento, the Livenza, the Adige, and the Brenta were covered with their cargoes and freights. Their port was regarded as the general emporium of that part of the peninsula.

¹ Marin, vol. i. p. 62.

Other towns of leading importance at the same period were Patavium (Padua)—in the time of Strabo a manufacturing place of some note—Ravenna, Concordia, and Altinum.

The ancient port of Aquileia was the large island which extended along the upper margin of the salt lagoon to the south of Friuli, and which was known as *Grado*. In the palmy days of Aquileia, with which it was connected by a mole of Roman construction, Grado seems to have been a place of some consideration. It is likely that it derived no small advantage from the unceasing traffic maintained by the Aquileians with every part of Italy. In the second century, or even earlier, the island formed a favourite residence of the bishops of Aquileia, who embellished it with orchards, pastures, vineyards, and olive-yards, and, in conjunction with Caprulae, one of the harbours of Altinum, it was frequently chosen as the quarters of the Roman army and the anchorage of the Roman fleet. More northward, and at a somewhat higher level, lay Torcello. In the time of the Romans, Torcello enjoyed considerable eminence. It was one of the ports of Altinum, the aristocracy of which were in the habit of resorting thither in the summer season for change of air. It was full of gardens and country-houses, and it was probably the fashionable watering-place of the day. Within quite recent times vestiges of Roman life and civilisation have been recovered in excavating on the site of Venice for a variety of purposes, and there seems slight room for doubt that in remote ages the coast line was lower, and that the river silt and artificial embankment gradually and jointly buried many of the former human memorials of this locality, and obliterated many landmarks. It has been supposed that a branch of the Via *Æmilia* passed or started very close to this point, and that here in the second century there was a Roman military station, since a grave discovered about six feet below the surface in the Bacino Orseolo bore the inscription: *Milit. Coort. 111, R. Centuria*. The revolutionary changes, however, which have taken place on the present spot posterior to the Roman occupation, render it difficult to speak with confidence or to fix with certainty.

On the demise of Constantine the Great (337), his extensive dominions were divided among his three sons, Constantine,

Constantius, and Constans. In 353 the violent death of his two brothers left the second son sole emperor. In 360, however, Constantius feeling incapable of sustaining the undivided weight of a vast and sinking empire, was under the necessity of decorating his nephew Gallus with the purple, and of entrusting to his care the Eastern provinces. But the feeble and odious character of the new Cæsar speedily procured his deposition and imprisonment in the fortress of Pola, where he died; and by the decease of Constantius himself in 361, the monarchy devolved on the accomplished Julian, who again was succeeded, after a reign of two years, by Jovian (363). The history of Rome from the accession of the last-named prince to the final partition of the empire, forms a well-known page in history. The temporary check which the genius of Theodosius had given to the enemies of his country was far more than neutralised by a variety of influences. The Roman empire was overturned, in 409, by the Goths under Alaric.

Forty-three years later Attila or Etzel, king of the Huns, invaded Italy,¹ where he hoped to find and to conquer a rich and feeble province, which the Romans, disunited by faction and enervated by luxury, seemed unable to protect. The horde of warriors, of whom Attila was the general and the sovereign, and which spread itself from the Caspian to the Danube, proudly traced their descent from the pastoral tribes which, two thousand years before the Christian era, were dwelling beyond the frontiers of China. As the new-comers, who, in the absence of fortified positions, had few or no obstacles to surmount, advanced toward the sea, the whole peninsula was laid waste and desolate; and the level plains of Lombardy, and the smiling fields of Umbria and Liguria, soon became a prey to invaders whose strange and uncouth mien was regarded by their victims with a feeling of pious horror. The maritime districts of Italy underwent, in their turn, a similar fate; and such of the inhabitants of those regions as had the courage and self-possession to effect their escape, sought shelter by a natural impulse in the neighbouring lagoon. The Paduans fled to Malamocco and Rialto; those of Belluno and Feltre commenced the formation of a settlement

¹ Lebeau, *Histoire du Bas Empire*, vol. v. p. 74 *et seq.*; *Histoire générale des Huns*, vol. i. part ii. chap. i.

to which they gave the name of Heraclia. In Grado, which had hitherto been their Wapping or Leith, the Aquileians were happy to find an asylum for their wives and families.¹ Eight miles from their native town of Concordia, in the *Aquae Caprulinae*, whose soil had hitherto yielded only to the footprints of the goatherds and their flocks, another colony founded the modern Caorlo. The inhabitants of Oderzo and Asolo betook themselves in the extremity of their distress to the Lido Cavallino (so called from its celebrated breed of horses), where they became the founders of a city, on which they bestowed the name of Jesulo or Equilo. Lastly, one-third of the population of the once proud and opulent Altinum, unwillingly forsaking the banks of the Silis, set up a memorial of the home they had left behind them, by christening the six islands, on which they planted their new settlements, under the names of the six ports of their old home. Such was the origin of Torcello, Murano, Burano, Maggiorbo, Costanziaco, and Amiano.²

The constituent elements of the new community, while they were slightly varied in regard to the place of immediate origin, bespoke the possibility of the early arrival at some definite scheme of policy borrowed from the system under which they had previously lived. Among the fugitives and exiles were persons of both sexes of the highest birth and of the most distinguished associations; and they brought with them to the lagoons some fruits of political training and some tincture of social cultivation. They were not barbarians or primitive aborigines, who had slowly to acquire the arts of civilised life, but men and women, who saw before them the arduous yet achievable problem of reconstructing on a fresh soil the shattered constitutional and social fabric which they had left behind them.

That the emigrants experienced meanwhile a long interval of wretchedness and poverty is almost unquestionable; and there is, at the same time, room for the hypothesis, that a certain number, to whose original pursuits and experiences their pre-

¹ Blondus, *Ital. illustr.* ed. 1481.

² *Cronaca Altinate*, lib. iii. p. 92. The tradition is, that Venice was founded on the 25th of March 421, at noon. An *Andata* was afterward instituted in commemoration of the day, and it was called, "Andata per la Madonna di Marzo," that day being dedicated to the Virgin. Sanudo, *Vite de' Duchi*, fol. 410, gives the 15th March as the date.

sent home was more than ordinarily ill-adapted, endeavoured, when the danger was removed, to retrace their steps. To what extent a reflux took place, we are left ignorant; and at any rate it was more than counteracted by the periodical succession of fresh irruptions and the slow growth of the insular settlement into habitability even for agriculturists and foresters.

The collapse of the Roman power under Romulus Augustus, numbering among its effects the withdrawal of Britain from imperial protection, may be said to have favoured on the one hand the advance of the Saxon invaders and colonists to the shores of England, while on the other it exposed Italy to the aggression of the Huns and their successors. The incidents which accompanied the downfall of Rome formed the indirect basis of the rise of two empires, which were in turn to occupy a dominant position in the world—first, Venice, then Great Britain. On the ruins of the old Italy was to rise a new and even greater one, composed of different races, and governed by different conditions: not a single State, but a group of States, of which Venice was to become the foremost and almost the most durable, and to approach nearest to the Romans in a progressive policy of conquest and absorption.

It may be judged that in their choice of a government the members of the new commonwealth allowed themselves to be guided by the example of Rome herself, from which they in some measure traced their descent. At the outset the affairs of the exiles remained, it appears, under the management of Consuls elected at Padua; there was a brief interregnum, during which there was a sacerdotal government, presumably having its centre at Grado; and in 466 a convention of the principal citizens, finding, of course, that this species of administration was unsuitable, where the practical concerns of a trading and maritime society began to enter prominently into everyday life, assembled there, and formally constituted themselves into a Republic, with a Tribune for each island or each appointed division of the territory. The first political autonomy was therefore of ecclesiastical type, the consulate leaning on the mother-city, and lying more or less under its influence. The first *Consular Triumvirate*, which is traditionally reported to have been elected at Padua, and to have consisted of Alberigo Faliero, Tommaso Candiano (or Sanudo), and Zeno Daulo (or Dandolo)—names which cir-

cumstances render worthy of preservation—remained in office during three years; under the second, the dignity became triennial; and in 466 the Consuls were supplanted by annual Tribunes, who fluctuated in number, during a period of about 230 years, between one and twelve.¹ Of the nature and extent of an authority which has left few traces of its existence, it is of course difficult to form even an approximate notion: yet it is rational to suppose that at the outset these magistrates were required merely to administer justice and to preserve order; but it is quite worthy of remark that even at this early stage there was an incipient tendency to secure a balance of authority by the principle of nominating two officers either for the whole dominion or for the respective divisions of it, as at Sparta two kings were elected as mutual checks over each other; and this form of rule embraced an unrestricted jurisdiction over Church and State. At that primeval epoch, the general interests of the community were discussed and secured avowedly in periodical conventions (like the Roman *Comitia*), termed in the Venetian dialect *Arrengi*,² composed of the whole adult male population of the islands, and long—indeed for centuries—held in the open air. Of such an assembly the desire to transform the right of public debate into a privilege or monopoly appears at least to be hardly predicable. But it is not difficult to trace in this representative system a fundamental want of compact organisation. The *Arrengo* was manifestly too large and too factious an assembly to act in harmony, or to exercise a due control over public affairs. The weakness of the Legislature naturally strengthened the hands of the Executive; the Tribunes soon felt their power, and soon abused it; ³ each aspired to absolute and undivided authority; and the nation had frequent cause to complain that their confidence was betrayed by a single magistrate who dared to infringe their dearest privileges.

The excesses of these annual magistrates, who indeed seldom bequeathed to those who came after them anything beyond the task of perpetuating civil discord and public

¹ Sabellico, *De Venetis magistratibus liber*, sign. b 2, ed. 1488.

² Ital. *Arrengi*. *Arrengo* in its usual acceptation signifies a tribune or *rostrum*, from which an address is delivered, not the assembly, to which it is addressed.

³ Johannes Sagorninus, *Chronicon Venetum nunc primum editum*, Venetiis, 1765, p. 9.

misery, led, however, as a natural consequence, to several modifications at successive periods in the government. In 503, after forty-six years of confusion and discontent, an intelligent effort was made to centralise authority; one Gastaldo or Administrator was clothed by the national assembly with supreme jurisdiction; and this new form of administration endured through seventy-one years. In 574 the monarchic system fell into disrepute; a fresh revolution was wrought in the government, and the direction of affairs was then entrusted to ten Tribunes. Finally, in 654, two Gastaldi having been assigned to the island of Heraclia, recently colonised by fugitives from Oderzo and other places in the vicinity, these magistrates were added to the existing number, which remained unchanged till the close of the seventh century.

The pressure of misfortune had not produced any impression of an enduring character on the higher, or permanently bettered the condition of the humbler, class of refugees. Sympathy might perhaps level for a while social distinctions: and want of shelter and food might unite men of different ranks, training, and associations, in obviating a common danger. But it is unsafe to believe that such an order of things continued to exist when the little colony grew into a city, and when its origin faded into a tradition.

During a long and peaceful reign of thirty-three years, Theodoric the Great was the lawgiver and the sovereign of a docile people, whose virtue and barbaric pride prompted them to imitate the arts and refinements of the nation which they had vanquished, and for a while, at least, to shun the vices which with those arts and those refinements had insensibly grown up. The Goths, who rapidly acquired the dominion of the vast region extending from Sicily to the Danube, and from Belgrade to the Atlantic Ocean,¹ affected to disguise their power under the pleasing name of alliance or hospitality; and the wise moderation of their king led him to admit the Romans to the civil offices of the government, and not merely to tolerate, but to protect, the established religion of Italy.

Under the successors of this enlightened prince, the rapid decline of the empire which he had created, and the victories of the illustrious Belisarius, lieutenant of Justinian, betrayed the gradual and furtive influence of climate and example

¹ Gibbon, vol. ii. pp. 262-6, 275, 400-2.

over the susceptible mind of the Goth and the partial regeneration of a martial spirit in the breast of the Roman; and although the brilliant achievements of two later monarchs, Vitigis and Totila, shed a parting ray of glory on the horizon, the commanding talents of the Eunuch Narses dispelled for ever the once-cherished hope of restoring to the Gothic kingdom of Italy the vigour and stability which it had possessed under Theodoric.

Among the well-known Letters of Cassiodorus, Prætorian Prefect of this great ruler, two derive a peculiar value from the fact that no other monuments exist of the state of Venice and the adjoining territory during the domination of the Goths in the Peninsula, and they indirectly testify to the recognition of the tribunitial government alike by the Goths and by the Venetians.¹ The first² records a famine which visited the inhabitants about the year 520, and from which it appears that they were relieved by the humane interposition of Theodoric, who not only furnished them in their distress with every kind of provision, but permitted them to convert to their own use the corn and wine which they had collected, according to their annual custom, for the Royal Bouche. The second epistle, which is the more remarkable, was addressed in 523 to the imperial Tribunes of Venetia Maritima, who were therein exhorted not to neglect the transmission of the expected supplies of wine, oil, and honey from certain towns of Istria to the royal palace at Ravenna.

In point of substance and style, the latter exhibits a sense of power, softened by a love of figurative rhetoric; and its tone, though in a few places slightly authoritative, is, generally speaking, that of solicitation and advice. It portrays, in graphic but transparent colours, the delightful simplicity of Venetia and the Islands, whose people the writer fancifully likens to water-fowl passing an amphibious existence among the lagoons of the Adriatic; and on the whole, the letter, while it may be regarded as a fair model of Gothic composition, must be accepted as an unique historical document.³

¹ Sartorius, *Essai sur l'état civil et politique des peuples d'Italie sous le gouvernement des Goths*, p. 297. Paris, 1811.

² Cassiodori *Opera*, vol. i. p. 187, ed. 1729.

³ Tiepolo, *Discorsi sulla storia Veneta dal Signor Daru*, i. 25; Udine, 1828; Marin, *Commercio dei Veneziani*, i. 78; Sansovino, *Venetia descritta*, lib. xiii. p. 528; Salverte, *Civilisation—Venise*, p. 20.

At the same time it cannot but be suspected that, in giving publicity to a production which is certainly far too florid for a letter, far too vague and diffuse for a dispatch, the vanity of the author slightly outran the zeal of the magistrate, and that Cassiodorus was betrayed by a fondness for literary effect into the development of a simple note, until the note became an elaborate epistle.

“You,” exclaims the Prefect, “who own numberless boats on the confines of Ravenna, exhibit, I pray you, your devotion by transporting thither the tributes of Istria. It is added to your other blessings that a path is opened to you which is at all times exempt from danger: for when the winds rage, and the ocean is closed against you, it is left to you to sail up the pleasantest of rivers. Your ships fear not the sharp gusts. Towed by ropes, they skim along, and men assist the progress of the vessels with their feet. It is with satisfaction that I call to mind the manner in which your houses are situated. Venice on the south touches Ravenna and the Po; on the east it enjoys the prospect of the Ionian shore, where the tide in its flow and in its ebb alternately veils and uncovers the face of Nature. Here you live like sea-birds. Your houses are like the Cyclades, scattered over a watery expanse. To the waves of the ocean you do not hesitate to oppose a frail barrier of dykes, flanked by fascines of interlaced vine-stems. Your population knows but one means of subsistence—its fisheries. There the poor man and his rich neighbour live in equality. One kind of nutriment is common to all: one kind of dwelling shelters all. You do not quarrel about your Penates. Your salterns are your sole source of contention. Instead of ploughs, instead of pruning-hooks, you turn cylinders. Thence arises all that you have, and thence you procure the things which you have not. Among you money is struck in any fashion for the purchase of food. Any one is at liberty to seek gold; to find salt, there is no one but desires.”

From the language which the Prefect employs toward the subjects of his and their master, no certain conclusion can be formed as to the amount of deference which the adjacent little State of Venice considered it prudent to pay to so powerful and at the same time so generous a neighbour; but the Prefect's letter has this other sort of value for us that it

sheds a sidelight on the condition of the infant but growing Republic, and the mode of living of her people, just when the faintest glimpses are receivable with gratitude. Nor can there be any doubt that the letter was intended for communication to the Tribunes of the Republic as well as to the Gothic officials. Such a water service as is here indicated was exactly the homage which the first race of Venetians might legitimately offer to the Goths, and perhaps the only tribute which it was in their power to pay. They had already, it may be presumed, gained a celebrity as pilots and mariners, who were known to excel in threading the sinuous and obscure channels of the lagoons; and, while the defence of the frontiers of their extensive dominions engrossed the attention of Theodoric and his successors, the latter not yet aiming at naval preponderance or maritime commerce, were not indisposed, perhaps, to accept the friendship of a small community which was too poor to gratify their cupidity, and too insignificant to tempt their ambition.

Yet, although the policy of the Goths toward the Venetians seems to have been characterised by uniform forbearance, the latter, sensible of their weakness and jealous of their freedom, watched with extreme solicitude the progress of the war which broke out, shortly after the death of Theodoric, between his successors and the Greek Emperor. One instance, indeed, is recorded, in which their zeal carried them so far as to take an active share in the operations. In 550, Narses, the imperial lieutenant, whose headquarters were then at Ravenna, being desirous of effecting a junction with a large body of Lombard mercenaries whom he had received into his pay, and who were detained at Aquileia by a flood, solicited the aid of the Venetians, whose transports readily conveyed that valuable reinforcement to its proper destination. Two churches, one to St. Theodore, who appears to have been chosen by the islanders about this period as their tutelary saint, the other to the martyrs Menna and Geminian,¹ were soon afterward erected at Rialto, on a plot of ground known as the *Bruollo* or *Brolio*, in the district of *Gambarere*, in commemoration of the service of the islanders, and as a token of the gratitude of Narses, by whose munificence Venice was placed in a position to indicate to future ages the origin and

¹ Sanudo, p. 408.

antiquity of her subsequently intimate connection with Constantinople. The character of the requital prepares us to believe that the service was highly appreciated, while the two timber churches probably represented the sole return for it, which was perhaps advisedly put in a complimentary form. The descriptions of costly materials used in these primitive structures are naturally suggestive of salvage from buildings on the *terra firma* either partially destroyed by invaders or partially dismantled by the inhabitants in anticipation of attack; and doubtless the Venetian pioneers acquired much acceptable help in this way, and were enabled by their naval skill and resources to transport the stones to their new destination. But the incident reveals a notable growth of resources on the part of Venice, and Narses learned, from the angry representations of the Paduans, that the colony in the lagoon was in part waxing prosperous and strong at their cost by the absorption of the coast and river trade.

After the death of Tejas, the task of constituting the Italian possessions of the Byzantine Court into a Viceroyalty or *Exarchate* devolved on the victorious general; and Narses, who became the first of the Greek Exarchs of Ravenna, was represented in all the towns or cities which still revered the majesty of the purple by a military Duke, whose authority was subordinate to the lieutenant of the Emperor. The successor of Belisarius governed and oppressed the Peninsula till the year 567, when Justin, alarmed by the murmurs of the Italians, sent Longinus in his stead. The supersession of Narses is said to have been due to the Empress Sophia. The former Exarch had during his term of office engaged in his service a body of Lombard mercenaries, as has been just mentioned; and he signalised his resentment at his dismissal by inciting that people to invade the peninsula, which they successfully did within a brief period.

There is no direct proof that the Prefect Cassiodorus ever paid an actual visit to Venice, although he is shown by his own expressions to have been fairly conversant with the topography of the islands and the condition of their inhabitants. Longinus, however, almost certainly went there,¹ prior to his departure for Constantinople, in order to confer

¹ H. F. Brown, *Historical Sketch*, 1895, p. 15, who transcribes from an ancient chronicle.

with the Emperor and receive general instructions; and the object of the new Exarch, apart from curiosity, was to procure the means of transport, which was readily granted to him, and to prevail on the colonists to admit the suzerainty at least of his master, which the Venetians at first refused to do. For they declared that they had laboriously established themselves, as they had already told his predecessor, in that place, and made it what it was with the work of their hands in spite of all the dangers and hardships from Hun, Vandal, Goth, and Lombard; "and God," quoth they, "who is our help and protection, has saved us in order that we may dwell upon these watery marshes. This second Venice, which we have raised in the lagoons, is a mighty habitation for us. No power of emperor or prince can reach us save by the sea alone, and of them we have no fear." The reception of Longinus in or about 568 must have impressed him as powerfully and pleasantly as it to-day, through the old historian, impresses us. He was met by the people with great rejoicing, to the sound of bells, flutes, citterns, and other instruments, so that you could not have heard the thunder of heaven. The Exarch, so far as he was personally concerned, was favourable to their pretensions, and proposed an equitable compromise, to which the Republic acceded. It was on his return to Ravenna that he wrote to communicate his views. He confessed that he had found them a great and free people, and that they enjoyed perfect security. But let them promise to acknowledge the Emperor as overlord, and they should do so on their word of honour, without any oath of fealty. Which was settled, and representatives accompanied Longinus in the ship lent to him, returning home with the first regular treaty ever negotiated in the name of the people.

The Winili or Lombards (*Longobardi*) present themselves to our view, in succession to the Huns and the Goths, as conquerors and occupiers of the region lying in immediate proximity to Venice. Compared with that of the Goths, the Lombard dominion had a long duration; and during the 206 years which elapsed from the accession of Alboin, their first, to the deposition of Aistulph, their last king, that people gradually achieved the subjugation of Tuscany, Piedmont, Friuli, the Tyrol, the Milanese, Genoa, Mantua, Parma, and

Modena, as well as a large portion of the Ecclesiastical States from Perugia to the Adriatic; and this ample superficies of territory was divided by the prevailing system of feuds into duchies, marquisates, and principalities, which the nobles taught their retainers to till with the plough, and to protect with the sword.

The Republic, on her part, contemplated with inquietude the rise of one monarchy after another on the skirts of the Lagoon; for the Venetians not unnaturally feared that as soon as these fresh usurpers had established themselves, they might form the design of adding the Islands of the Adriatic to their dominion, and thus of acquiring possession of the commercial advantages which belonged to the situation held by the settlers. For the Lombards, though not ranking among maritime communities, were not absolutely strangers to the laws of navigation, or to the use of ships, which might place them in a position to reduce to their sway a small, feeble, and sparsely populated area, separated from their own territories only by a narrow and terraqueous strait. Moreover, the predatory visits of Lupus, Duke of Friuli,¹ whose followers traversed the Canals at low tide on horseback, and despoiled the churches of Heraclia, Equilo, and Grado,² soon afforded sufficient proof that the equestrian skill of the strangers was capable of supplying to some extent any deficiency in nautical knowledge.

Venice at present formed a Federative State, united by the memory of a common origin and the sense of a common interest; the Arrengo, which met at Heraclia, the parent capital, at irregular intervals to deliberate on matters of public concern, was too numerous and too schismatical to exercise immediate control over the nation; and each island was consequently governed after the abolition of the primeval Consulate, in the name of the people, by a Gastaldo or Tribune, whose power, nominally limited, was virtually absolute. This administration had lasted nearly two centuries and a half, during which period the Republic passed through a cruel ordeal of anarchy, oppression, and bloodshed. The Tribunes conspired against each other; the people rebelled against the Tribunes. Family rose against family, clan

¹ Muratori, *Dissert.* vol. i. p. 61.

² Paulus Diaconus, p. 482. Dandolo, lib. vi. c. 18.

against clan. Sanguinary affrays were of constant occurrence on the thinly-peopled *lidi*, and amid the pine-woods, with which much of the surface was covered; and it is related that in one instance at least the bodies of the dead were left to be devoured by beasts and birds of prey, which then yet haunted the more thickly afforested parts. In all parts of Italy, down to much later days, while the country remained more or less densely wooded, local and intertribal warfare in the forests was frequent and general, and one of the sources of sanguinary differences was the title to the uncleared and unappropriated areas.

Jealousy and intolerance of the pretensions of Heraclia to a paramount voice in the policy of the community may be securely assigned as the principal and permanent source of friction and disagreement; but the predominance of that township seems to have resisted every effort of the others to supplant its central authority and wide sphere of influence; and during centuries it preserved its power through its ostensible choice as the residence of the most capable and influential citizens.

The scandalous and destructive outrages attendant on the sway of the Tribunes had become a vast constitutional evil. They sapped the general prosperity; they obstructed trade and industries; they made havoc on public and private property; they banished safety and repose; and they impoverished and scandalised the Church.

At the same time the depredations of the Lombards, which grew in the course of time bolder and more systematic in their character, certainly indicated great weakness on the part of the Government. Yet it was equally certain that that weakness proceeded less from the want than from the division of strength.

CHAPTER II

A.D. 654—787

Tyranny of the Tribunes—Change in the Government—Election of the first Doge, Pauluccio Anafesto, of Heraclia (March 697–8)—Authority of the Doge—Reign of Anafesto (697–717)—Conclusion of Peace with the Lombards—Succession of Marcello Tagliano (717–26)—Orleo Orso, Doge (726–37)—Co-operation of Venice with the Greek Exarch in the Recovery of Ravenna—Tyranny and violent Death of Orso (737)—Another Change in the form of Government—Appointment of the *Magister Militum*—The nature of the new Office—Domenigo Selvo, first Master (737–8)—Felice Cornicola, Diodato Orso, Giuliano Cepario, Gio. Fabriciaco, successive Masters of the Soldiers (738–41)—Revival of the Ducal Office in favour of Diodato, son of Orleo Orso (742)—Tragical end of Orso II. (755)—Usurpation of Galla Catanio—His Deposition and Death (756)—Domenigo Monegaro, Doge (756–65)—His bad Administration—His Excesses and Assassination—Maurizio Galbaio, Doge (764–87)—His long and happy Reign—Association of his son (778)—Considerations on the principle of Association—Death of Maurizio Galbaio (787).

THESE sacrilegious inroads were not without their beneficial result; for they afforded those who might be disposed to institute reforms an admirable ground not only for bringing the matter more closely and immediately under the public observation, but they enlisted in the cause the foremost ecclesiastics, who might recognise in this internal disunion a danger of interminable attacks and depredations from without, if not an eventual loss of political independence; and accordingly, in the course of the spring of 697–8, the Patriarch of Grado himself submitted to the Arrengo at Heraclia a scheme, which had been formed by him and his friends, for changing the government. The proposal of the Metropolitan, which was, to a certain extent, a return to the principle adopted and tolerated from 503 to 574, was to divest the Tribunes of the sovereignty, and to have once more a magistrate (*Capo dei tribuni*), in whom all power might be concentrated. His title was to be Duke. His office was to be for life. With him was to rest the whole executive machinery. He was to preside over the Synod as well as the Arrengo, either of which it was competent for him to convoke or dis-

solve at pleasure; merely spiritual matters of a minor nature were alone, in future, to be entrusted to the clergy; and all acts of convocations, the ordination of a priest or deacon, the election of a patriarch or bishop, were to be subject to the final sanction of the Ducal Throne.¹ In fact, the latter became virtually, and in all material respects, Autocrat of Venice, not merely the Tribunes, but even the hierarchy, which was so directly instrumental in creating the dignity, having now no higher function than that of advisers and administrators under his direction; and it was in matters of general or momentous concern only, that the Republic expected her first Magistrate to seek the concurrence or advice of the National Convention or Folk-moot.

In a newly formed society, placed in the difficult situation in which the Republic found herself at the close of the seventh century, and where also a superstitious reverence for the Pontiff might at present exist, apart from considerations of interest, it ought to create no surprise that the Patriarch and his supporters should have formed an unanimous determination, and have taken immediate steps, to procure the adhesion of the Holy See, before the resolutions of the Popular Assembly were definitively carried into effect. It was a part of the incidence of succession to temporal authority, not a mere ceremonial or complimentary form, in all parts of Europe down to an infinitely later date. The Holy See was solicited, prior to the coronation of Henry VII. and his union with Elizabeth of York, to grant its sanction, and to recognise the change of dynasty.²

This measure simply indicates the character of the opinions which were received at the time in Europe, as well as the strong consciousness on the part of the Patriarch and those who acted with him, of the expediency of throwing the voice and countenance of the Church into the scale alike against the Tribunitial Oligarchy and against local jealousies and prejudices. There was perhaps in this case the additional inducement that the proposal to invest the Doge with supreme power and jurisdiction over the Church as well as over the State might seem to involve an indirect surrender, either

¹ Sandi, vol. i. lib. i.; Marin, vol. i. lib. iii.; Dandolo, lib. vii. ch. i.

² Proclamation of Henry VII. of England, 1487, citing the Bull of Innocent VIII. which, so far as the marriage was concerned, was confirmed by Alexander VI. in 1492.

now or hereafter, on the part of the Holy See of some of its power, as a High Priest or Grand Pontiff, who was also a secular prince, might prove less pliant than an ordinary liegeman of the Church. But the men of 697 acted, as we must allow, sagaciously enough, when they presented their young country to the consideration of the Papacy as possessing a party of order, into which the Church entered, and from which it now stood conspicuously and courageously out to take this very momentous initiative. The creation of an ecclesiastical system had been one of the foremost aims of the first founders, who discerned in the transplantation of the churches of the *terra firma* and their familiar pastors to the islands the most persuasive reconciliation of the fugitives to a hard and precarious lot; and after all the intervening years it was the elders of the Church who once more stepped forward and delivered their views on the best plan for healing discord, and making life in the lagoons tolerable for all. They sought some system of rule, after trying several, which would enable them to live in peace at home, and to gain strength to protect themselves from enemies. They would have been the most far-seeing of human beings, if they had formed a suspicion of what kind of superstructure they were laying the foundation. The nearest model for their adoption or imitation was the Lombard type of government almost under their very eyes; and so far as the difference of local postulates suffered, it was that to which they had recourse, when they vested in their new chieftain undivided jurisdiction, but primarily military attributes and a title then recognised as having, above all, a military significance. The signal prominence of the ecclesiastical element in the early government of Venice was an exact counterpart of what we find in the annals of other European States, England included, in primitive times.

On the receipt of the desired reply, the Patriarch lost no time in calling on the National Assembly to follow up their late vote to its legitimate consequences; and the choice of the people fell on Pauluccio Anafesto, a native of Heraclia, whose name occurs here for the first time, but who may be supposed to have had some prominent share in promoting the late revolution. Anafesto was conducted to a chair which had been prepared for him in his parish church, and solemnly invested by the Metropolitan with the insignia of authority,

one of which is said to have been an ivory sceptre—a symbol and a material borrowed from the Romans, and at a later period in use in England at the coronation of a Queen.¹

This organic change in the government by no means involved the simultaneous extinction of the tribunitial office and title. But the truth is that the Tribunes continued (as in 503) to exercise municipal and subordinate functions many generations after the revolution of 697; each island of importance, such as Malamocco and Equilo, had its own Tribune, while of the smaller islands several contributed to form a Tribunate or Governorship; and the office, though neither strictly nor properly hereditary, still preserved its tendency to perpetuate itself in a limited number of families. It is only subsequently to the twelfth century that less is heard of the Tribunes; and the progress of administrative reform led to the gradual disappearance of this old federal element in the constitution.

In the time of Anafesto, the larger islands of the Dogado formed the seats of powerful factions; the disproportion in point of influence between the Crown and the Tribune of Malamocco or the Tribune of Equilo was but slightly marked; and the abolition of that magistracy was a much more sweeping measure than the first makers of a Doge would have dared to propose.

The military complexion of the Ducal authority was not confined to the personal character of the supreme officer of State, for under him, not as a novel element in the constitution, but as one which pre-existed side by side with the tribunitial system, served a Master of the Soldiers, whom there is a fairly solid ground for regarding as second to the Doge or Duke in precedence and above the civil Tribunes of the respective townships. To find in so small and imperfectly developed a State the two leading functionaries or ingredients deriving their appellations from a command and control over the rude feudal militia, might alone warrant the conclusion, that the most essential requirement of Venice, even when it had so far modified the form of administration, was felt to be the possession, under responsible direction,

¹ Blount's *Tenures of Land*, by W. C. Hazlitt, 1874, p. 226, where a tenure of 24 Henry VI. is cited. But the ivory sceptre or rod with a dove formed part of the ceremony of the Queen's coronation in 1685.

of a means of securing internal order and withstanding external aggression, if it were not the case that from the Gothic era onward we hear of "scholae militiae cum patronis," manifestly the schools of instruction for the body over which the *Magister militum* presided. These seminaries existed in the days of the Exarch Narses, generations before a Doge was given to Venice. Yet, through all the time which has now elapsed since the first erection of a separate political jurisdiction, not only the Church, on which such stress was at the very outset laid, but a civil government, and regulations for trade and shipping, must have been active forces always tending to grow in strength and coherence. The Venetians, in constructing by degrees, and even somewhat at random, a constitutional fabric, very naturally followed the precedents and models which they found in the regions which bordered on them, and from which their forefathers had emigrated. The Lombard system, which was of far longer duration than its predecessors on the same soil, borrowed as much as possible from that which the invaders saw in use and favour among the conquered; and the earliest institutions of the only community not subjugated by their arms were counterparts either of the Lombard, the Roman, or the Greek customary law. The Doge in some respects enjoyed an authority similar to that which the Romans had vested in their ancient kings; but, while he was clothed with full ecclesiastical jurisdiction, he did not personally discharge the sacerdotal functions or assume a sacerdotal title. The Latins had had their *Magistri populi*; and in the middle ages they recognised at Naples and at Amalfi a *Master of the Soldiers*: at Lucca, Verona, and elsewhere, a *Captain of the People*. But all these magistrates were in possession of the supreme power, were kings in everything save the name; and the interesting suggestion presents itself that in the case of Venice the Master of the Soldiers, of whom we are to hear a good deal more hereafter, had been part of the tribunitial organisation, if not of the consular one, and that one of the Tribunes officiated by rotation, bearing to the Republic the same sort of relationship as the Bretwalda bore to the other Anglo-Saxon *reguli*. There can be no doubt that Venice kept in view the prototypes transmitted by Rome, and learned at last to draw a comparison between

the two empires; and down to the fifteenth century the odour of the Conscript Fathers lingered in the Venetian fancy.

Subsequently to the entrance of the Dux, Duke, or Doge on the scene, and the shrinkage of the tribunitial power to more departmental or municipal proportions, the Master of the Soldiers, whatever he may have been before, became a subordinate element in the administration. His duties almost certainly embraced the management of the militia and the maintenance of the Doge's peace within the always widening pale of the Ducal abode. He appears to have held the same station here as the Tribune of the Celeres held in regal Rome and the *Magister equitum* under the Dictator. He was next in rank to the Crown or Throne.

Thus we perceive that, after a series of trials, the Venetians eventually reverted to the form of government which appeared to be most agreeable, on the whole, to their conditions and genius. The consular triumviri, not perhaps quite independent of external influences, were originally adopted as a temporary expedient. The Tribunes, who next succeeded, had a duration of two hundred and fifty years. Their common fasti are scanty and obscure; and we gain only occasional glimpses of a barbarous federal administration, which barely sufficed to fulfil the most elementary wants of a rising society of traders. They were alike, more or less, a machinery of primitive type, deficient in central force, and without any safeguards against the abuse of authority, without any definite theory of legislation and police. The century and a half which intervened between the abrogation of monarchy in the person of a tribune, and its revival in the person of a Doge (574-697), beheld the Republic labouring under the feeble and enervating sway of rival aristocratic houses, on which the sole check was the urban body subsequently to emerge into importance and value as the Militia of the six wards and its commandant, the Master of the Soldiers.

But while the institution of the Dogeship brought with it a certain measure of equilibrium and security, it left the political framework in almost every other respect untouched. The work of reform and consolidation had merely commenced. The first stone only had been laid of a great and enduring edifice. The first permanent step had been taken toward the

unification of a group of insular clanships into a homogeneous society with a sense of common interests.

The late tribunitial ministry has transmitted to us as its monument little beyond the disclosure of a chronic disposition to tyranny and periodical fluctuations of preponderance. The so-called Chair of Attila at Torcello is supposed to have been the seat where the officer presiding over that district long held his court *sub dio*, while the Anglo-Saxon kings were being crowned in the open stone seat still preserved at Kingston-upon-Thames.

The Doge Anafesto appears to have pacified by his energy and tact the intestine discord by which his country had suffered so much and so long, and the Equilese especially, who had risen in open revolt, and had refused to pay their proportion of tithes, were persuaded, after some fierce struggles in the *Pineto* or Pine Woods, which still covered much of the soil, to return to obedience. The civil war which had lately broken out between Equilo and Heraclia, was terminated by the influential mediation of one of the Tribunes; and the Lombards now condescended to ratify a treaty assigning to the Venetians the whole of the territory lying between the greater and the lesser Piave, empowering the Republic to erect boundary lines, and prohibiting either of the contracting parties from building a stronghold within ten miles of those lines.¹ A settlement of confines between two such close neighbours was of the highest importance and utility. But a still more momentous principle was here involved. The Republic had exercised a clear act of sovereign independence. It had made its first Italian Treaty. This was a proud step and a quotable precedent.

At the same time, the long reign of Anafesto, which extended over twenty years (697–717), indicated the vacillating state of the public mind, still unprepared, as it seemed, to determine what form of government was most closely adapted to the nature of the country and the character of the people. Democracy had been a natural, almost an intuitive, tendency: monarchy can only be regarded as an equally

¹ Dandolo, lib. vii. ch. i.; Sanudo, *Vite de' Duchi*, p. 443; Marin, vol. i. pp. 154–5. "Cum Luitprando vero rege inconvulsae pacis vinculum," says Sagorninus, "confirmavit, apud quem pacti statuta quae nunc inter Veneticorum et Langobardorum populum manent, impetravit." See also Muratori, *Dissertationes*, vol. i. p. 56.

natural experiment. Marcello Tagliano, Master of the Soldiers during the previous reign, was the next Doge, an Heraclian chosen at Heraclia; and he appears to have governed satisfactorily till 726.

The third of the Doges, Orleo Orso of Heraclia, offers himself to our view as a man of intelligent ambition, who understood the multiplying wants and interests of a growing State. He had seen commerce and population increase within his memory greatly; he discerned a life and a spirit awakened everywhere, yielding good promise for the future. But he knew that the Republic had many powerful and unscrupulous neighbours, and that it could not be prosperous, unless it was secure. Venice appeared to him to have reached a stage in its progress, when its welfare, if not its actual existence, as a State must depend not alone on the resources which it had learned to create, but on its ability to protect and extend them. The Doge Orso comprehended his mission and his time. He improved the military schools, where the Venetian youth were instructed in the use of weapons and in the manipulation of projectiles and artillery; and there is an indication of an arsenal and of a palace at Heraclia, enclosed within a fortified pale,¹ and devoted to official purposes as well as to the residence of the Doge.

In 735, Ravenna, which the successors of Narses still retained as their place of residence and as the seat of their Viceregal government, fell into the hands of Luitprand, who confided the defence and preservation of the conquest to his nephew Ildeprand, and to Perideus, Duke of Vicenza.² The Exarch, Paul Euty chius, finding safety only in flight, met with a hospitable reception in the neighbouring Lagoon; and his application to the Venetians for assistance was promptly seconded by a letter from the Roman Pontiff, who implored the Doge to co-operate with Euty chius in rescuing Ravenna from the Lombards.³ The visit of the Exarch was certainly such as might tend to give a new turn to men's thoughts, for a stranger of such distinction had not set his foot in the city, so far as is known, since 568, when his

¹ See Dandolo, viii. 134: "hic nobilis Heraclianus, incola in Heraclia, Dux concorditer factus, decus patriae in clytis actibus plurimum auxit."

² Sagorninus, *Chron.* p. 12.

³ "Gregorius episcopus, servus, etc. Dilecto filio Urso duci Venetiarum, salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. Quia peccato," etc.

predecessor Longinus was there. The Doge was naturally ambitious; a prospect now seemed to be opening before him of acquiring a reputation among his fellow-citizens, of which his tranquil reign had so far excluded the possibility; and he¹ determined to advocate a compliance with the joint prayer of the Pope and the Exarch. His appeal was powerfully supported by the growing uneasiness with which the Republic regarded the preponderant power of the Lombard kings; and after becoming deliberation the Folk-moot decided on espousing the cause. In taking this adventurous step, by which it was exceedingly likely that they would incur the vengeance of a neighbouring Power and a nominal ally, there can be no doubt that the Venetians were chiefly actuated by a desire to ingratiate themselves with the Court of which the Exarch was the representative: a people wise in their generation were sensible that it was of the utmost consequence to a community, to whom commerce was vital, to cultivate the friendship of the masters of Constantinople and the Euxine; and it was now, scarcely forty years after the establishment of the Dogeship, that the Republic contracted its first offensive alliance against the same Lombards whom a prior generation had been so anxious to conciliate, not only with the Greeks, but with the Pontiff, who forgot religious differences in the presence of a common enemy.

In the meantime, the Lombard king, having left a numerous garrison in Ravenna, under the joint charge of his nephew and of the Duke of Vicenza,² had drawn off his troops from that place, and lay at present encamped at some distance. The moment was therefore favourable to the prosecution of the enterprise. Still the prudent Doge determined to proceed with wary steps, and to have recourse to a stratagem. His design consisted in circulating a report that Euty chius had failed to carry his object, and, at the same time, in favouring a supposition that the small fleet, which was soon in course of preparation, was destined to sail on an expedition to the East;³ while, in reality, the Exarch proceeded to Imola, with the intention of raising an auxiliary corps, and the Doge was exerting every means in his power to be in readiness, on a given night, to act in concert with his new ally before the

¹ Dandolo, lib. vii. ch. iii.; Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 444.

² B. Giustiniani, lib. x. ed. 1492.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

walls of Ravenna. The feint was ingenious, well executed, and successful: at the same time that a few troops, under Euty chius, invested Ravenna on the land side, a small squadron under the Doge blockaded Classis (the part which lay toward the harbour) from the sea; and the Lombards, puzzled in which direction to turn their arms, situated as they were between two foes, found it necessary, after a brief though manful resistance, to evacuate the city. The Exarch was immediately reinstated in his viceroyalty; the anger of the Lombard king was mollified by the free release of his nephew;¹ and the services of Orso were inexpensively rewarded by the Byzantine Court with the title of Imperial Consul.

The participation in the recovery of Ravenna, which was ascribed by his partisans in principal, if not exclusive, measure to the valour and ability of the Doge, had a natural tendency to aggravate a certain jealousy, already existing among the other townships, of the political supremacy of Heraclia, which this triumph was calculated to strengthen. There is no real ground for the supposition that the Doge misused or overstepped the authority which his fellow-citizens had reposed in him; but he was firm and energetic, and not only enjoyed the confidence of his friends and clients, but the sympathy and support of an only son, who shared his capacity and enterprising foresight. Some of the other communities, which comprised the Dogado, and particularly the Malamocchese and Equilese, viewed with real distaste and perhaps feigned alarm the absorption of power, not so much perhaps by one township as by one family, and a civil war, which had a duration of about two years, broke out very shortly between the Heraclians on one side, and Malamocco, succoured by Equilo, on the other. Of the particulars we know next to nothing; but the result was, that Heraclia was vanquished, the gates of the palace forced, and the Doge assassinated (A.D. 737-8).

The unhappy end of Orso, accompanied by a sentence of perpetual banishment against his son, speaks more eloquently to us than any explicit document which we possess of the attitude and relation of parties in the Republic, speaks of a city already divided between two or three great feudal unions at a period when the islands were thinly peopled, and when

¹ Caroldo, *Historia di Venetia*, p. 50 (Harl. MSS. 5020).

much ground was covered with forest and underwood, and what we shall hereafter call Venice was almost uninhabited. The fate of the Orsi was no passionate outburst of popular resentment, but a deliberate effort to wrest the sovereignty from a single township and a single member of it. It was a commencing struggle for the mastery between Heraclia and its rival Malamocco, and the latter for the present, at least, had gained the upper hand.

But the victorious side had to justify its policy by some reform, and a change in the name as well as in the duration of the supreme authority was proposed and carried, by which in the person of the Master of the Soldiers there should be a president of the Republic chosen for one year only. The Malamocchese carried their candidate on the first and second elections, Domenigo Selvo and Felice Cornicola; and the conduct of the latter gained for him so much influence and favour, that he prevailed on the people to rescind the sentence of exile against the late Doge's son. In the same year Cornicola resigned his functions, and Diodato Orso, who had made himself popular, was chosen to replace him (739). Orso gave the electors no reason to regret their preference; and, on the expiration of the twelfth month, the Master vacated his seat in favour of Giuliano Cepario (740), whose zeal and good fortune in achieving a second recovery of Ravenna from the Lombards were recompensed, as in the former case, with the title of Imperial Consul. The successor of Cepario, and the fifth of the Masters of the Soldiers, was Giovanni Fabriciacio, who was called to the magisterial chair in 741.

But Orso, the late Master, had been frustrated in his repeated attempts to procure re-election, a not unusual stepping-stone to permanent power; and the prospect of fresh intestine disorders grew more and more imminent. It is averred that Fabriciacio was ruined by his own misconduct, which may have been in a degree true; but the ingratiating manner and acknowledged efficiency of Orso, with perhaps a recollection of the services of his father so poorly requited, influenced public opinion, which was beginning to assert itself outside Heraclia. Men could hardly fail to see, besides, that these annual re-elections deprived the Executive of a considerable share of its stability, and that, while they offered no

new safeguards, they tended still farther toward militarism. At all events, before his term of office had expired, there was an insurrection, his eyes were put out by applying live charcoal, administered from a brazier or pan, and he was driven into exile.¹ At the same time, the institution of which such good hopes had been entertained, and to which his tyranny or his weakness had contributed to attach odium, was abolished, and Orso II. was installed as Doge at Malamocco, probably in the tribunitial residence (742).² The barbarous process of destroying the visual nerve was not unfrequently employed as a punishment or a revenge. It was a practice which the Venetians might not improbably have inherited from their forefathers the warlike Northmen, who thus effectually disabled their foes from returning to the battlefield. We meet with it in the Sagas, in the Annals of the Anglo-Saxons; and it was common throughout the East, where it is not at the present moment unknown. It was a general expedient for incapacitating a political adversary or a troublesome ruler. But at a later period we find it to have been carried out in the case of coiners and even utterers of false money.

The people of Malamocco had won a signal political triumph over Heraclia by placing a ruler of Heraclian blood on the throne in their own township. Orso himself was recommended by his personal qualities; but the original capital of the Dogado could scarcely expect to command the election of his successor on other ground. It seemed as if the Heraclians had parted with their long supremacy.

To his reign of thirteen years, which must by implication have been remarkably tranquil and prosperous, three events only are assigned: the renewal of the old treaty with the Lombards, now drawing toward the close of their protracted rule; an earthquake, which inundated parts of the territory; and a plot, which proved fatal to the life of the Doge.

The removal of the seat of government to Malamocco had been dictated by motives of general public expediency, for it was felt that, as the country progressed, and the metropolis grew in wealth and importance, the new centre offered a situation less open to attack on the side of the *terra firma* and altogether more advantageous. The declining power of the Heraclians might have seemed to manifest itself in their

¹ Sagorninus, 13; Marin, i. 187.

² *Ibid.*, 16; B. Giustiniani, xii. 119.

ostensible submission to the change and to the investiture of a townsman with the sovereignty in the very heart of the enemy's land and influence. But while the Doge experienced no molestation or trouble from his own people, an unexpected danger arose in Malamocco itself, where his protracted and peaceful rule began to excite impatience and discontent, and where his popularity was turned to his disadvantage.

The leader of the Opposition was Galla Catanio, son of the Tribune of Malamocco, and evidently a man of considerable strength of character and purpose. Catanio, who aimed at the Ducal office, possessed an influential following, and enjoyed many local facilities for carrying out any project likely to promote the views of himself and his friends. Nor was it long before a favourable opportunity occurred.¹

The islands, on which Chioggia is built, had been divided at a remote period into Great and Little Chioggia. The latter was also known as Brondolo, which in fact was immediately contiguous to it. Brondolo, from its close proximity to the outfall of the Adige, was regarded by the Doge and his supporters as a point where the Republic might expect, and must repel, an invasion on the side of the land; Orso obtained leave to strengthen this important outpost, and the progress of the fortifications was observed by Catanio with real gratification and feigned distrust. A report was circulated that the man who affected a desire to secure Venetian independence, harboured an infamous project for destroying it, and that the patriotism which the people might be disposed to admire, was nothing more than a mask which served to disguise the ambitious designs of a crafty tyrant. Nor was this interpretation of the policy and plans of the Doge rejected by the majority: in his suspicions and denunciations, Catanio was believed to be just and honest; and on one occasion, as Orso was surveying the works at Brondolo, he was surprised and cruelly butchered by the conspirators, who precipitately returned to Malamocco and proclaimed their leader Doge (755).²

Catanio, the first Malamocchese Doge elected at Malamocco,² ascended the throne as the champion of republican

¹ Dandolo, lib. vii. ch. ix.; Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 446; B. Giustiniani, lib. xi. pp. 124-5; Filiassi, vol. v. p. 24.

² Sagorninus, 16.

liberty. But the same love of power which had led the successor of Orso to usurp, led him also to abuse an authority which, it was already beginning to appear, recognised no other limit than the will of the prince and the patience of the people; and at the end of fourteen months, during which his excesses had excited the mingled dread and aversion of all classes, the people rebelled against their Government, seized the person of Catanio, deprived him of sight, and drove him into banishment.¹

The lesson of caution thus administered led the national assembly to assign to the next Doge, Domenico Monegaro of Malamocco (756), as advisers and controllers, two of the Tribunes, Candiano of Malamocco and Angelo Badoer of Rialto. But the firm and stubborn character of Monegaro rendered the innovation abortive; and at the same time it denoted his paramount influence over a weighty section, that during eight years he obeyed without reserve the dictates of a ferocious and sensual disposition. But in 764 the Ducal palace witnessed another tragedy and another change. The Venetians began to grow rather too familiar with scenes of anarchy and bloodshed.

The misgovernment of the two Malamocchese Doges created a powerful reaction in favour of the Heraclian party, which now succeeded in procuring the elevation of its representative Maurizio Galbaio or Calbani.² The choice was a fortunate one.

It was in 766, two years after his accession, that Galbaio, having convoked the clergy, persuaded them to take a step which indirectly tended to weaken the political opposition. Hitherto the Venetian hierarchy seems to have been limited to the metropolitanate of Grado and the extensive episcopate of Malamocco. The spiritual welfare of an increasing population might form a plea for the reform; and the erection of Rialto, Gemelle or Zimole, Luprio, Dorsoduro, and Olivolo into a separate jurisdiction under Obelalto di Antenori, son of the Tribune of Malamocco, and nephew of the Tribune of Equilo, who became first Bishop of OLIVOLO, was a dexterous and successful piece of diplomacy.³

¹ A tragedy was founded on this episode in 1797 by Gio. Pindemonti; and it enjoyed some popularity.

² "Genere nobilis, inclytis gestis nobilior."—Dandolo.

³ *Cronaca Altinate*, ii. 47; *Arch. storico Italiano*, p. 98.

During the ensuing fourteen years, the intestine feuds, which had so long been a burden and a reproach to the country, were pacified by a just and temperate rule; commerce and navigation revived, and a fresh impulse was given to public affairs. It became the natural wish of the Venetians to do some signal honour to a man who displayed such constant and earnest solicitude for the general welfare, and the method by which this object was achieved, had in view the maintenance of the public repose and the removal of the question of succession from the atmosphere of factious and turbulent controversy. In 778, Giovanni Galbaio, the good Doge Maurizio's only son, was invited to divide with his father, now advanced in life, the power, which the latter had so well used.¹

It is easy to detect many obnoxious features in the custom, which had thus originated, of associating the son with the father in the sovereignty, in imitation of the practice which the Republic saw in force among the Lombards and the Franks, as well as the Britons, as it had previously been among the Roman and Byzantine Emperors. That unity of purpose and action which it had been the leading aim of the men of 697 to establish, the system of coparceny was calculated on every account to destroy; and while it afforded the reigning House still ampler means than at present of indulging private pique or personal ambition, it prepared the Republic to conceive a distaste for a form of government which otherwise seemed tolerably suitable to her character and wants.

The evils of the new institution did not obtrusively manifest themselves, however, during the lifetime of the elder Galbaio. But in 787, after a beneficent reign of three-and-twenty years, that exemplary prince died, leaving the sole government in the hands of his son.

The questionable principle of Association thus carried with it a second, even more open to unfavourable criticism, that of hereditary succession. The Ducal office had ostensibly ceased to be elective. Venice had become, it seemed, a Republic merely in name.

¹ "Eodem anno (778), Veneti avidi Mauricio Duci satisfacere, qui in negotiis publicis laudabiliter se habuerat, Joannem, ejus natum dignitatis consortem, et postea successorem collaudârunt; duosque Duces eodem tempore Veneti habere coeperunt, perniciosae rei exemplum successoribus relinquentes."—Dandolo, lib. vii. p. 147.

CHAPTER III

A.D. 787-809

Excesses of Galbaio II.—Association of his Son Maurizio (Galbaio III.), 796—Murder of the Patriarch of Grado—Profound Sensation throughout Venice—Conspiracy of the Antenori and others against the Galbairi—Civil War—The Antenori Faction invokes the Aid of the Franks—Banishment of the Galbairi, and Elevation of Obelerio di Antenori to the Throne (804)—Association of his Brother Beato—Internal Dissensions—Destruction of Heraclia—Co-operation of Venice with the Greeks in the Siege of Commacchio—Failure of that Undertaking—First Venetian Embassy to Constantinople—Disagreements in the Family of Antenori—Association of Valentino di Antenori (808)—Pepin solicits the Assistance of the Republic—The Venetians decline to accede to his Proposal—Exile of the Antenori—Pepin declares War against Venice—The Franks attack the Islands with a Fleet—Their complete Discomfiture (809).

GALBAIO THE SECOND possessed not that wisdom¹ which had in so marked a degree distinguished the late Doge, and a systematic course of gross misconduct gradually estranged from him the affections of the people. Galbaio was licentious, profligate, and cruel; and while he wanted that commanding genius which sometimes makes great rulers of bad men, he was destitute of the milder virtues by which men of more moderate capacity may win confidence and favour. Nine years of oppression were not only insufficient, however, to exhaust the popular forbearance; but when the tyrant, in 796, prevailed on his political friends to support him in soliciting that privilege, the Convention made no attempt to oppose the association of his only son Maurizio, who had down to this time dissembled his vices with difficulty and care. It was not to be expected that a prince who from his youth had been accustomed to witness deeds of violence sanctioned by impunity, and even applauded by servile adulation, would afford an example worthy of imitation, or exert a beneficial influence; and during a second term of nine years the two Galbairi seemed

¹ Dandolo, lib. vi. p. 148.

to vie with each other in setting at nought all principles of right and propriety.

On the death of the first Bishop of Olivolo in 797, the Byzantine Court prayed the elder Galbaio to nominate as his successor Christophorus Damiatos, a young man of five-and-twenty,¹ and a relative of the Exarch of Ravenna. The Doge, who, in common with the Heraclian faction, to which he belonged, was possessed by a conviction of the high importance of adopting a conciliatory policy toward the Lower Empire, offered no objection; and Damiatos merely awaited consecration at the hands of the Patriarch of Grado. The latter, however, refused to bear a part in casting a blot on the honour of the Church; in the vehemence of his indignation he even proceeded to launch a sentence of excommunication against the two Doges and Damiatos; and Maurizio, thereupon hastening, with his father's concurrence, to Grado, entered that town without opposition at the head of a few troops, and, seizing the unfortunate prelate, caused him to be hurled from the tower of his own palace.

The report of this atrocity flew from island to island, until the sad truth became generally known in Venice; and the Galbani, perceiving that they had gone somewhat too far, made an attempt to avert the gathering storm by offering the vacant pallium to the late Primate's nephew, Fortunatus of Trieste. But the late catastrophe was one of a kind which, in an age when the priesthood was in such high repute, amounted to a sacrilegious enormity. Independently of his sacred character and of his holy office, the Patriarch had rendered himself by his gentle manners and amiable disposition universally acceptable; his cruel and melancholy fate was therefore deplored by all classes of the community; all joined in reprobating his murder as a horrible outrage on religion and humanity; and while Fortunatus, too ambitious to have a delicate sense of honour, accepted the proffered dignity, he neither renounced the desire, nor relinquished the hope, of obtaining ultimate satisfaction for the injury which his family had sustained.

In the relations which subsisted in the eighth and ninth centuries between Venice and the Empire of the West, there appears to have been little cordiality. Yet at the same time they were friendly and almost uninterrupted; and while the

¹ *Cronaca Altinate*, lib. ii. p. 47; *Arch. stor. Ital.* viii.

Republic persevered through every phase of fortune in the design which she had formed of securing at any cost the exclusive patronage of the Byzantine Court, the Venetians, judging wisely that their rank as an Italian State must largely depend on their progress as a trading community, hesitated not to solicit, at the hands of the successors of Alboin and Clovis, the valuable right of commerce and of way on the rivers which irrigate the plains of Lombardy and Gaul.¹ Still, in the estimation of many, the Franks and the Lombards stood almost as low in the scale of civilisation as the Huns and the Vandals. They might certainly be less ferocious and blood-thirsty in character, in condition somewhat more refined and enlightened. But their language seemed to be equally barbarous, their manners equally rude, their dress equally uncouth; and a people who prided themselves especially on their direct descent from the Romans, and whose habits of life brought them in closer contact than any other European nation of that day with the politer inhabitants of the Levant, were apt to contract disrespect for the less advanced settlers in Western Europe. Moreover, the Venetians, considering that so many races and dynasties had since the fifth century supplanted each other in Western Europe, thought themselves entitled to doubt, whether an adhesion to Charlemagne afforded any lasting security for the national independence; while they were well aware that to break off their connection with the Court of Constantinople was to strike at the root of their rising commercial prosperity.

Such, at least, were the sentiments and doctrines openly professed by the Doges and their Heraclian constituents. It may be worth while to notice an obscure tradition, that Charlemagne had recently thought proper to resent some real or imagined affront on the part of the Venetians by confiscating the whole of the property which the Heraclian men owned within his territory, since it may, if true, assist in explaining their hostility to that prince.

But, on the other hand, those of Malamocco and Equilo, perhaps actuated by a reasonable disgust at the conduct of the Galbani, began to raise a new party-cry in favour of a more intimate alliance with him. The anti-Ducal faction viewed as its leaders Obelerio di Antenori, Tribune of Malamocco, and

¹ Allou, *Monumens des différens âges observés dans la Haute-Vienne*, 1811.

brother of the deceased Bishop of Equilo, Giorgio Foscari, and two or three others. It was now at once joined by the new Primate, who here saw an admirable machinery for accomplishing his own private objects. His rank and the amplitude of his fortune rendered Fortunatus an immense accession to the cause which he had thus espoused, and greatly strengthened, both morally and materially, the opposition to the existing Government.

A question indeed had started into prominence, of which no living Venetian was likely to witness a solution. The most far-sighted thinkers of that day were lost in perplexity, when on one side they saw the great Franco-German empire consolidating itself close to the Dogado, and on the other the still powerful masters of Constantinople clinging with tenacity to the slender remnant of the imperial dominion in Italy. On a commercial account the goodwill of both these States was clearly of the highest value to Venice. A wise organisation of markets was her special call. Her mercantile class divided the world into buyers and sellers. But at present her rulers could see before them no middle course. The Republic must choose a side. Of the two political parties, between which she struggled, one besought her to remain steadfast to the Byzantine Court, the more ancient ally and the less dangerous neighbour; the other deprecated a rupture with a prince like Charles the Great, whose friendship was equally important, and whose enmity was far more to be dreaded.

This unhappy schism rekindled the old domestic war. Instead of being rent by numerous factions, as in the past era, the Republic was to become the theatre of a fierce and sanguinary contest between the Greek and Carolingian parties. To attentive and dispassionate observers it was manifest that the change in the Constitution, which introduced the Ducal office and authority as a check on the great feudatories, had succeeded in its aim very imperfectly after the lapse of over a hundred years. When the first Doge was made, his presence was to heal all sores, and to be a noble bond of union and peace. But the cohesion and centralising force so essential to a healthy national life, which the improved political system had been confidently expected to bring, were now proved beyond doubt to exist in mere embryo; the proneness to discord and tumult still survived in an acute form; and

the element engrafted on the administration in the person of the Doge created, under existing conditions, a new class of danger, where the chosen ruler of Venice condescended to throw the weight of his official position and prestige into the scale on one side or the other. In one material respect the Republic was consequently in a less desirable position than when there were Tribunes only; for the result of a political contest no longer depended on the justness of the cause, but on the quarter where the Doge was prompted by his instincts as a partisan to lend and to seek support. If Venice aspired to a strong Government, a consolidating agency was yet to be discovered, and it was highly uncertain whence and whether it would come. Meanwhile, the first stage of the new Civil War had been of comparatively brief duration; for an extensive conspiracy of the men of Malamocco and their adherents against the Galbani was, by the indiscretion of some of its members, prematurely divulged, and the principals consulted their safety by an abrupt flight. The Patriarch himself repaired to the Court of Charlemagne, the bearer of rich gifts; and, accompanied by two illustrious Zaratines, he reached his destination about Christmas.¹ Obelerio established his headquarters at Treviso.²

His sacred attributes, his high station, the wrongs of his family, above all, the position which he occupied as chief and representative of the Frankish faction in Venice, ensured the Patriarch of Grado a gracious reception at the hands of Charlemagne, and in his interview with that great man, the astute churchman failed not to improve the natural advantages which he enjoyed, by offering every homage the son of Pepin le Bref might account due to his rank and genius. Opening the conference with a full and highly varnished relation of the murder of his uncle, the Primate dwelled for some time on the wanton and flagitious character of that act. He next proceeded to expatiate on the injurious effects of the new system of Association, which (he said) was gradually transforming an elective magistracy into an hereditary despotism.³ He then drew the attention of Charles to the present state of public feeling in Venice, to the increasing disgust with which the tyranny of the Galbani was inspiring all classes, and the

¹ Eginardi *Opera*, i. 264.

² Sagorninus, p. 19.

³ Marin, vol. i. pp. 223-4; Filiati, vol. v. p. 293.

consequently growing inclination, on the part of the people generally, to swell the ranks of his own party. Then, in allusion to a recent treaty between Charlemagne and the Byzantine Court,¹ which had declared Venice a free republic, attached by the ties of friendship and interest only to the Eastern Empire, the Patriarch presumed to suggest that such an ambiguous connection was in every point of view detrimental to the welfare of the Empire of the West.² Fortunatus concluded by invoking the vengeance of Charlemagne on the heads of those wicked and impious men who had imbrued their hands in the blood of his uncle.

Charles seems to have long harboured the design of aiming a blow at Venice; and it may be suspected that, while he expressed himself favourable to the cause of his guest, he already speculated on the possibility of securing an invaluable seaport, by annexing the Islands, at the first opportunity, to the dominions of the Iron Crown. The son of Pepin could hardly be insensible to the wonderful facilities which the acquisition of the Dogado would afford to the reunion of the two Empires in his own person: nor is it to be supposed that he was ignorant that in becoming the master of Venice he would become the master of the Adriatic and the possessor of the Key which unlocked the doors of the East. Charlemagne, however, did not duly estimate the difficulties of the achievement. In the eyes of a great military ruler, who was naturally inclined to disparage the importance of a small State, and who had assuredly never paused to investigate the sources of Venetian strength, the conquest of the coveted position might well appear little more than the occupation of a leisure interval. But before the Patriarch had been long absent from his country, the growing unpopularity of the Galbaio family, which he intimated to Charlemagne, reached a sudden climax; the Frankish faction organised a successful revolt; the Doges fled;³ and the Tribune Obelerio, having been proclaimed Doge at Treviso by his friends, was brought back in triumph to Malamocco, where he was crowned amid general rejoicings (804).⁴

The government of Venice was a government by party.

¹ Dandolo, lib. vii. ch. 15.

² Blondus of Forli, *De orig. et gestis Venet.* p. 4, ed. 1481.

³ Sagorninus, p. 20.

⁴ Dandolo, lib. vii. p. 153.

The accession of a new faction inaugurated a new policy. The direction of affairs was secure for the moment in the hands of those whom the Emperor had substantially assisted, and on whose gratitude and tractability he relied. The Doge, again, might feel that he carried to the throne, not only the strength of his own political supporters, but the sympathy and goodwill of Charlemagne and the hearty co-operation of his ally, the rich and influential Fortunatus. The countenance and friendship of the head of the Church, which his predecessors had so unwisely forfeited, were particularly precious to Obelerio, inasmuch as, by his princely benefactions and munificent charities, he had done more to ingratiate himself with the nation than all the Primates before him. He was alike indefatigable in his benevolence and in his intrigues.

The visit of his Patriarch to the monarch of the West was very encouraging to Obelerio. The account which Fortunatus brought back with him of the temper and disposition of their imperial patron was full of good augury. The views of Charlemagne were amicable and moderate. A compact appeared to be possible, by which, through the friendly offices of the party in power, the Emperor might command at any time the naval resources of the Republic, and by which, on the contrary, the Doge might establish himself on a firmer and surer footing than any of the reigning families preceding him.

The ignominious fall of the Galbairi had of course cast a great temporary discredit on Heraclia, and the paramount ascendancy of Malamocco and the towns in alliance with the capital was too quickly made evident. He had not occupied his dignity a twelvemonth, when the Doge had leave given to him to associate his second brother Beato, and almost immediately after both started on a mission to the Court of Charlemagne, to pay their personal homage to that prince, and to come to a clearer understanding as to their future tactics and the conduct of Venetian affairs. They reached their destination shortly after Christmas, 805. There can be little or no doubt that this extraordinary step, which indicated unmistakably the complete prostration of Heraclian influence and a corresponding confidence in his own friends, was taken with the cognisance and approbation of the whole party; but we hear no farther of the matter, except that a

Frankish marriage contracted by Obelerio was clearly an incidence of the Ducal pilgrimage. The Dogaressa, it is said, was one of the ladies of the Court of Aix-la-Chapelle, and it seems to be suggested somewhere that she had sufficient force of character to sway the fortunes which she had been invited to share. Imagine the noble bride alighting with her luggage and a German attendant or so, at the old-fashioned little palace at Malamocco, among a people whose language and manners were alike strange to her! She was the first Dogaressa, and hers the first female influence, whereof we become apprised. Yet how much that influence, for instance, must have entered into the daily life of Venice in about 400 years! But the Civil War was shortly to recommence under changed auspices and on a more serious scale.

Down to a far later date than that to which we have brought our narrative, the insular group on which Venice was slowly established, remained in its primeval condition to a very large extent, and the population comparatively scanty. The wooded state of the outlying parts of the city, of nearly all portions beyond the capital, had favoured indeed the continuance of the civil wars; and the process of reclamation was very gradual. On the *lidi* near Pigneda, at the mouth of the Piave, toward Heraclia, some noble citizens of Malamocco, however, had recently founded a new colony, which they endowed with a church, and planted with orchards, oliveyards, and vineyards; their position afforded them a free access to the neighbouring cities; and under the auspices of commerce and the industrial arts the settlers gradually became a thriving community. Their progress was watched with a jealous and intolerant eye by their political adversaries, who might not unnaturally resent the intrusion on their frontiers, and might treat it as a symptom of their loss of weight and estimation; and in course of time the secluded retreat on the banks of the Piave was constantly exposed to predatory visits from the Heraclians. The natural consequence was, that collisions, sometimes attended by fatal results, were of frequent occurrence between the colonists and the aggressors; in one of them were slain the four brothers of Galla Catanio, a noble Equilese; and Catanio, disconsolate at the loss, at once repaired to Malamocco, and preferred his complaint before the Doges Antenori. "The Heraclians,"

exclaimed Galla, when he had unfolded the circumstances which brought him to Malamocco, and had demanded reparation,—“the Heraclians are the most unjust of men; they never cease to conspire against the Commonwealth; they spurn and defy the laws, and violate the most sacred rights of individuals.” The charge of Catanio, whose presumable ancestor of the same name had not left a very favourable reputation behind him, was partly true: his complaint was perfectly just. The plea and the temptation were equally strong; and after a becoming hesitation the Doges consented with secret alacrity to avenge the wrongs of a bereaved brother on the members of an obnoxious and troublesome faction. A few light barks proceeded to Heraclia, and slew all those who were known or thought to be implicated in the death of the Catanii: while, as some slight indemnity for the terrible loss which he had sustained, Galla himself was at once appointed to the vacant tribuneship of Equilo.¹

Yet even the retribution, which they had thus exacted, did not slake the thirst of the Malamocchese and their adherents for revenge; and, on the return of the expedition, the Doges, in the intoxication of success, suggested, as a pledge of future security, the complete destruction of Heraclia itself, the hotbed of disaffection, and, as it was now said, the spring of well-nigh all the misfortunes which had of late befallen the Republic. The Doges reminded the popular assembly that it would be easy to provide for the inhabitants by transferring them to the other islands; the influence of the party to which the Antenori belonged commanded a large majority; and those who still beheld with sorrow a flourishing town disappear, were asked to seek consolation in the doubtful assurance, that the seeds of disunion were buried for ever in its ruins.²

The destruction of that once strong political centre, the first capital of Venice known to history, bespeaks the rapid development of life and activity in Malamocco and Equilo, to which the chief political power at present seemed to have gravitated; and it afforded satisfaction to the party in office; but it produced an uneasy and painful impression in the minds of many influential and prominent citizens in other

¹ *Cronaca Altinate*, lib. iii. p. 78.

² Sagorninus, p. 20; Dandolo, lib. vii. ch. xv.

parts of the city now growing up into habitability and importance, and so far from having crushed the opposition to Obelerio and his supporters, it prepared the way, with the aid of unexpected collateral circumstances, for a new and stronger movement in another direction. It imparted increased vitality and solidity to a rising constituency in Rialto, of which the great house of Particiaco or Badoer was the soul and the hope. The desertion of Heraclia as the capital in 742 was bound to be fatal, sooner or later, to its prosperity and rank; during nearly three centuries it had been what Malamocco now was, and already the hitherto almost unheard name of Rialto is more and more often rising to the lips. The abruptness of the prominence gained by this tribunitiate, however, is, no doubt, to be understood in the sense of our inability, from a deficiency of information, to trace its gradual approach to the front.

Nevertheless, under the Obelerio government Venice continued for some little time longer to enjoy comparative repose; the Byzantine Court evinced no inclination to challenge the pretensions of the Republic; and the excellent terms on which the Doges stood with Charlemagne seemed to remove all immediate peril on that side.

By the treaty which had been concluded in 803 between the Eastern and Western Empires, it was expressly stipulated that the maritime towns of Istria and Dalmatia should thenceforth be considered as forming an integral portion of the former; but in 808 the Emperor Nicephoros, viewing with increasing anxiety the policy of Charlemagne toward the Illyric Provinces, despatched a squadron of observation to the Adriatic under the command of the patrician Nicetas,¹ who was instructed to offer the title of Imperial Consul to the elder Antenori, and (should he judge fit) to enlist the services of the Republic in the cause of his master. Nicetas, after the sack of Piombino and a desultory cruise along the Tuscan coast, pointed his course toward the Lagoon, and disembarked at Malamocco. He intimated to the Antenori that it was shortly his intention to commence operations on a more extended scale against Pepin, the young King of Italy; and before he resumed the offensive, he was exceedingly desirous of securing the cohesion of the Republic. The

¹ Blondus, *De origine et gestis Venetorum*, 1481, p. 4.

proposition of Nicetas was one which, as the Doges said, required mature deliberation; the Greek commander was not perhaps fully aware of the state of parties and the division of feeling among the people whose succour he was soliciting. His demand put the Venetian policy to a crucial test. It was one on which there was the widest possible divergence of opinion, not only in the Folk-moot, but at the Palace. Obelerio and his consort were adverse to an active alliance with Nicetas. Beato supported it. The question was referred to the Legislature, and the younger Doge carried with him the national suffrages. Commacchio, which had been selected as the first point of attack, resisted, however, the united forces of the Greeks and Venetians,¹ who were compelled to withdraw from the siege after sustaining a heavy loss; and Nicetas returned home without having achieved anything beyond a diplomatic victory in obliging the Republic to declare herself; while he adroitly averted the displeasure of Nicephoros by bringing with him the phil-Hellenic Doge ostensibly on a mission of friendship and compliment.

The relations of Beato di Antenori with his brother and his German sister-in-law the Dogaressa had become somewhat cold and strained since the notable disagreement on a matter of high policy, and his return with the dignity of Imperial Consul,² and his Greek convictions, strengthened by personal intercourse, greatly increased and embittered the estrangement. To counteract the preponderating and vexatious influence of the junior Doge, Obelerio conceived the idea of proposing to associate their youngest brother Valentino, of whom all that the nation knew was that he had commanded the troops at Commacchio. The necessary sanction was, however, procured for this constitutional innovation,³ and Venice saw herself for the first time, since the days of the old Consulate, ruled by Triumviri.⁴ The Dogate had become a select committee. It seemed a desperate sort of expedient, a resource which betrayed the growing dismemberment of that large constituency which had hitherto kept the Antenori in power, and which promised to go still farther in trying its temper and thinning its ranks.

¹ Eginardi *Opera*, vol. i. p. 278.

² Dandolo, lib. vii. p. 157; Laurentius de Monachis, *De rebus gestis Venetorum historia*, Add. MSS. 8574.

³ Dandolo, lib. vii. p. 158.

⁴ Sandi, *Storia civile di Venezia*, vol. i. p. 273.

In the meantime, Charlemagne, fairly considering that the late attempt on Commacchio altogether absolved him from his engagements with Nicephoros, had ordered his son Pepin to invade Dalmatia, and (although they had borne so unequivocal a part in the late undertaking) to solicit, perhaps experimentally, the concurrence of the Venetians. A prompt refusal on the part of the deliberative body to meet the wishes of Pepin supplied a conclusive indication of the collapse of the Carolingian faction, and the King, possibly not displeased at the pretext, at once resolved to turn the forces, which he was alleged to have levied for Dalmatia, against the Republic herself.

The very existence of the country thus appeared to be in jeopardy; and the National Convention was invited to assemble at Malamocco. The proceedings were unusually tumultuous. Obelerio and his friends recommended those present not to listen too readily to interested accusers. They advised that steps should be taken, before it was too late, to propitiate Pepin. They offered their own services. Because the forces of the Frankish King were hovering on the skirts of the lagoons, was it to be inferred that they were in collusion with him—that a treasonable correspondence had been exchanged with the son and lieutenant of Charlemagne?

But the people did not stay, in their passionate excitement, and with a crisis in their face, to discriminate between partisans; the Antenori were dethroned; the German Dogaressa, after four years' experience of Venetian life, had to try the air of Constantinople; and the provisional government of the Republic was entrusted to Angelo Badoer,¹ one of the Tribunes of Rialto, but an Heraclian by birth.

This spasmodic, yet apparently bloodless, revolution, the second within five or six years, was fatal to the prestige of Malamocco; but it shewed that, behind all their local cabals and quarrels, there was something higher and more durable, a pulse and a germ, the material of which nations are made.

By the direction of Badoer, chains were thrown, without loss of time, across the canals; hulks were sunk at their mouths; and the rows of piles, which usually indicated to mariners the navigable passages, were carefully removed. No contrivances were omitted which might help to impede the

¹ P. Giustiniani, *Chronica di Venetia*, p. 21 (King's MSS. 148).

progress of the enemy; and so soon as it was understood that the latter were already approaching Brondolo, the whole Venetian population, abandoning the outer holms, withdrew, at Badoer's command, into the central group of islands, which formed his tribunitial province.

Meanwhile, the Frankish commander, led by the wording of a message,¹ which the late Doge Obelerio had addressed to him shortly before his deposition, to infer that a change of views on the part of the besieged was far from unlikely, had determined to test, for some time, the effect of a temporising policy, and the flotilla lay for some time outside the city to establish a blockade, and await a surrender.² But perceiving that it was useless to look for any pacific proposals, he decided on advancing with his fleet. The Franks gained and invested in succession Brondolo, Pelestrina, Torcello, Equilo, and Malamocco; and, the tide being still full, the invaders ascended so far as Albiola,³ near which the forces of the Republic were arrayed under the command of Victor, a citizen of Old Heraclia, and a man thoroughly conversant with the intricacies of his native lagoons. At this point the progress of the enemy was arrested by a natural, yet unforeseen, difficulty; the water was becoming at length too shallow to admit the somewhat heavy draught of the vessels which conveyed the invaders from Ravenna, or to allow their retreat. There was no possibility of reaching the central island, over which the Venetians had concentrated themselves, except by constructing an artificial causeway. This clumsy structure, which the Franks hastily composed of tubs, planks, and the intertisted boughs of vines and olives, was soon ready for use; and the enemy, full of confidence and enthusiasm, rushed blindly forward, alike without discipline or caution, to their intended prey. The step was a foolish and a fatal one. The rude and incongruous materials yielded, in a few moments, to the pressure brought to bear upon them; many human beings were precipitated into the soft ooze, where they were drowned or suffocated, while the rest were soon overtaken and slaughtered by the alert and relentless islanders, who could

¹ Eginardi *Opera*, vol. i. p. 286. This writer alleges that Pepin was "perfidia ducum Veneticorum incitatus."

² It is upon this episode of Venetian history that Falconetti founded in 1830 his novel, entitled *La naufraga di Malamocco, ossia i Galbaj e gli Antenori*, 1830.

³ Sagorninus, *Chron.* 24.

easily, amid the prevailing confusion, take them both in front and rear. The blow, although it had been so providentially averted, was long and severely felt by the Venetians; and it unquestionably brought misery and affliction into many families. But it had baffled completely the aim and falsified the calculations of the Franks and their Lombard allies; and, from motives of mutual interest, peace was shortly re-established.¹

The events of 809, and the acts of national as well as individual heroism, by which the Battle of Albiola had been distinguished, were thought at a later epoch to deserve a leading place on the walls of the Sala dello Scrutinio, where the greatest names in the annals of Early Art were employed to give immortality to the noble achievements of the Venetian people; and on the side of the hall which looked toward the sea, two compartments were assigned by the Signory to this most striking, though perhaps semi-legendary, episode of history. In the first panel, which was executed by Jacopo Palma, and which represented the Blockade of the Islands by the Franks, prominence was given by the painter to the popular tradition respecting the projection of loaves into the camp of Pepin by the islanders in ridicule and defiance of the design which he was reputed to have conceived of reducing them to submission by famine—a tradition which must be accepted with as much reserve as the well-known story of the Old Woman² of Malamocco. In the second panel, the Battle of the Canal Arco was depicted with all its stirring incidents by Francesco da Bassano, whose production, having been completely destroyed by damp, was subsequently replaced by a painting on the same subject from the brush of Andrea Vicentino.³

The invasion of the Franks taught the Republic one

¹ Muratori, *Dissertationes medii ævi*, vol. i. pp. 61–3.

² “E tutti abbandonarono Malamocco, eccetto una vecchia, la quale rimase in Malamocco. E l’armata del Re Carlo si presentò a Malamocco, volendo combattere il luogo, ma non trovò contrario alcuno. E l’oste entrato nella detta città, trovò solo quella vecchia, e le dimandò, che era delle genti, e dove fossero andate. Ella rispose, *Io sono una povera vecchia; se mi volete dare qualche vrenio vi darò avviso di tutto.* Le risposero, ch’erano contenti di darle ciò, ch’era onesto. Essa disse loro: *Il Doge è andato a un luogo, che si chiama Rialto, colle barche, perchè è picciola acqua. Ma andate a Poveja, dove sono i miei parenti, che vi daranno buon’ avviso, perchè cglino sanno il tutto, e vi daranno consiglio perchè sanno tutti que’ luoghi, come vi si passa andare.*”—Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 450.

³ Sansovino, *Ven. descr.* viii. 347.

serious lesson—the necessity for more efficient naval defences; and the ninth century saw some progress made in the development of a marine calculated on the one hand to protect the islands from external attack, and on the other to command the rivers debouching from the *terra firma*. So far as the visit and defeat of the Franks in 809 are concerned, it seems natural, when we have given the Republic the fullest credit for her patriotic bravery, to set down the happy result, in a certain not inconsiderable degree, to the inexperience and local ignorance of the enemy, their imperfect preparations, and the want of a capable leader. It is a question whether, after all, the Republic was a heavy loser. The capital was uninjured; the loss of life on the Venetian side must have been relatively small, and the booty and prizes probably outweighed any damage to the olive and vine yards. Some of the periodical conflagrations and civil commotions had done greater mischief.

All the portable secular property would, of course, be removed to Rialto, and the Franks do not appear to have touched the churches, where the greatest treasures were deposited; for from the will of Fortunatus, Patriarch of Grado, several years later, it is clear that all his costly and valuable effects were then intact, and his wealth was too notorious to have escaped the invaders, had their project not been political rather than predatory.

But, again, it is excessively doubtful, whether under any circumstances the enterprise could have succeeded, when we look at the physical difficulties by which Pepin was surrounded, the manifest poverty of his naval equipment, and the depth to which the national feeling in Venice had been stirred. And another point is abundantly manifest. The crude and slovenly scheme framed by the Franks for the subjugation of the Venetians and the reduction of a free State to a Lombard port, did marvellously much to consolidate the great work begun by the Huns and their followers. Pepin was the co-founder, as it were, of the actual Venice which we know, the superb and powerful city, born in sorrow and indigence, and baptized in blood and fire.

The numerical importance of the expeditionary force sent from Ravenna, no less than the gravity of the disaster to the conquerors, has, no doubt, been overstated. But under any

circumstances, the event in its gratifying result was an astonishing output of strength, an impressive manifestation of national life, a stout and manful repulse to the ambitious stranger, who sought to wrest from Venice the ripening harvest of centuries of toil and the coveted ladyship of the sea.

CHAPTER IV

A. D. 809-864

Angelo Badoer, Doge (809-827)—His long and peaceful Reign—Successive Association of his sons Giovanni and Giustiniani—Badoer II., Doge (827-29)—Association of his brother Giovanni—Translation of the Body of St. Mark from Alexandria (829)—Death of Giustiniani—Giovanni Badoer (Badoer III.), sole Doge (829-36)—Return of the Exile Obelerio to Venice—His Conspiracy, Capture, and Execution—Destruction of Malamocco—Deposition of Badoer III.—Pietro Tradenigo, Doge (836-64)—His long and eventful Reign—His Tragical End (864)—Short Interregnum.

THE magnitude of the evil, which had been averted by so timely a victory, appeared to manifest the high claims of Angelo Badoer to the consideration of his country; and the Tribune of Rialto¹ formed in his own person the first of a long and honourable dynasty.²

By his energy and example the successor of the Antenori encouraged the citizens, many of whom were destitute alike of shelter and sustenance, to restore their dwellings and resume their vocations, which they had hurriedly left on the approach of the Franks; at the private cost of the Badoeri and other noble families belonging to that ancient seat of the Doges, a New City (*Citta Nuova*) rose on the ruins of Heraclia; Olivolo was at the same time endowed with a church in honour of St. Peter; and another church, dedicated to SS. Lorenzo and Severo, was founded on the islet of Zimole (Gemelle). The metropolis of Venice, which had originally been at Old Heraclia, was transferred from Malamocco by the sagacious Doge to his own Rialto, where he laid the foundations of a new palace; and the capital and its suburbs were now for the first time connected by wooden bridges, of which the present Ponte della Paglia was evidently one. That over the Grand Canal, which demanded a wider span, was in the

¹ Dandolo calls Badoer *virum strenuosum et catholicum* (viii. 161).

² At the same time his brother Orso, who had taken holy orders, was ordained Bishop of Olivolo; and his second son, Giusto Badoer, Bishop of Torcello.—Dandolo, lib. viii. p. 168.

beginning a sort of wooden pontoon laid on barges or hulks, and one or two timber structures, each somewhat more artistic and picturesque than its precursor, succeeded each other prior to the noble one erected by Antonio da Ponte three hundred years ago, and yet pressed by the feet of every visitor to the city. It is in this era that we have to place the upgrowth of Venice into a primitive, but picturesque, agglomeration of wooden and stone fabrics, which perhaps bore the same relation to the queen of the Adriatic as the first Dutch settlement on the Hudson bore to the modern city of New York.

All these public improvements were carried out in pursuance and by virtue of a special authorisation, which Badoer had received at the hands of the Popular Convention, "to enlarge, amplify, and embellish the island of Rialto, to fortify and strengthen its various positions, and to furnish the *Lidi* with shelter and protection against the inroads of the sea at high tides"; and their execution necessitated the creation of a Board of Works. The business of this office was conducted by three members, to one of whom (Pietro Tradenigo) the *Cronaca Cornaro* states that the task of increasing the accommodation and improving the architecture of the city was confided, while on another devolved the important duty of fortifying the lagoons.¹

The accession of a Doge, who represented a fusion of the political views and voices of Heraclia and Rialto, promised at least a respite from civil war; and it is indeed justifiable to look on Badoer as a rich and responsible citizen of the Republic, who could rise above party and initiate a broader and more generous policy, adapted to the circumstances, which he was able to realise; and although his scheme for laying out the site of the new capital was by comparison with the ultimate result almost inconceivably humble and imperfect, his name remains associated with the first attempt to sketch, as it were, a rough outline of the final Venice. The city lived to outgrow his conception of its most distant possibilities; but the mediæval Badoer germ was never quite obliterated.

It was at the present time—in the period between 809 and 827—that measures were taken to transform the original

¹ Temanza, *Antica pianta di Venezia*, 1781, p. 6.

tribunitial residence at Rialto into the semblance of a Ducal palace on a strictly feudal and military basis, with all the customary adjuncts of offices, magazines, stores, and guards. The term which is commonly applied to the ancient seat of the Doges is a somewhat misleading one, inasmuch as it demands reflection and comparison to disconnect it from the grand pile yet before our eyes. An opportunity will be taken to prove that it was utterly dissimilar.

Beyond an obscure conspiracy and certain dissensions in the now supreme Badoer family,¹ arising out of the troublesome system of Association, the reign of the Doge Angelo possessed no feature of public importance except the works of defence and utility which had been undertaken after the Frankish irruption, and a second partitive treaty in 813 between Charlemagne and the successors of Nicephoros, in which the Republic was so far ignored, that the Doge is found dispatching one of his sons to Constantinople to ascertain its terms. It, however, confirmed the Republic in the possession of the territory between the two Piaves, which she had acquired in the time of the Doge Anafesto. It also recognised her liberty and independence.² A single constitutional point in connection with the family quarrel just noticed demands a passing mention; and it is that the Doge, when one of his sons left home and took shelter at the Court of the Western Emperor, demanded his extradition, and forced him to remove himself to Constantinople, where his intrigues might possibly be less mischievous.

His reign of nearly twenty years was a precious repose from wars without and disorders within, and the breadth and magnanimity of his administration fostered the public happiness and prosperity. The ex-Doge Obelerio and his friend Fortunatus were at present residing at Constantinople, and one of the earliest acts of Badoer was to recall the latter and reinstate him in his dignity. He thus proved himself more generous to an adversary than Obelerio had been to an ally; but the step divided the strength of the Antenori party, already sufficiently broken. The old Doge was succeeded in 827 by his son Giustiniani, who immediately associated his younger brother; and in 829 Giovanni Badoer became sole Doge. But during the joint reign a very remarkable cir-

¹ Sagorninus, p. 28.

² Dandolo, lib. viii. ch. i.

cumstance, on which there will be a fitter occasion to dwell, occurred. The remains of St. Mark were removed from Alexandria in Egypt, where that evangelist enjoys the credit of having introduced Christianity, in 829 to Venice.

With Obelerio expired the hopes of the party, of which he had so long been the recognised leader; nor did Malamocco ever regain its former consequence. The modern traveller, unaided by historical lights, would not identify an insignificant hamlet with the old capital of the Republic and a walled and fortified position.

The days of Badoer III. (829-36) were singularly turbulent and disastrous. For the exile Obelerio, jealous of the Badoeri, and confident in the goodwill and support of the old Frankish party, the members of which, he felt assured, merely waited the signal to range themselves round his standard, now ventured to return from Constantinople, and to settle at Veglia, a fortified town¹ on the skirts of Malamocco; and here he designed to work, with as much speed and secrecy as possible, the overthrow of the reigning dynasty. But the Doge was too keenly sensible of the potent and pernicious influence which the Antenorists might exert over popular credulity or discontent, to suffer the conspirator and his adherents to mature their plans; and so soon as he had armed and equipped a few vessels, he set out for Veglia. Immediately on his arrival, however, Badoer, having been apprised of the outbreak of a riot in favour of Obelerio at his native city, detached a sufficient force to keep the Veglians in check, or to prevent the escape of the outlaw, and pointed his course with the rest of the squadron toward Malamocco, which underwent the same terrible fate as had befallen Heraclia twenty years before.

In the meantime Veglia had surrendered, and was in the hands of the Venetian detachment; the old leader of the Carolingians was among the prisoners; and the Doge, acting on a persuasion, that the death of Obelerio was a necessary guarantee for his own and the public security, caused his unfortunate rival to be hanged at Campalto, on the banks of the Silis,² near the spot where Fortunatus had resided before his exile. His head was afterward severed from his body,

¹ Sagorninus, p. 32.

² Dandolo, lib. viii. p. 173; Da Canale, *Cronaca Veneta*, s. ix.

and brought to Malamocco, where it was displayed as a warning to all traitors in the Strada of San Martino.¹

But the execution of the ex-Doge placed a weapon in the hands of those, who began at this time, from various motives, to regard with dissatisfaction and alarm the already preponderant and despotic influence of the Badoeri. The malcontents, the most prominent of whom was a certain Carosio Nastalione, a personage of tribunitial rank,² contrived to organise a powerful conspiracy against the life of the Doge; and the latter, taken completely by surprise, escaped capture only by a precipitate flight from Venice. He sought a temporary shelter at the Court of Louis le Debonnair;³ while Nastalione immediately caused himself to be proclaimed Doge in his room.

The extensive area, strong fortifications, and isolated site of the palace of these days serve to explain how a hostile movement, skilfully and expeditiously conducted, might at first escape public observation, more especially where a political chief, apparently a holder of the functions of a Tribune, such as this Carosio, had official facilities for choosing his opportunity. But it must seem extraordinary, that the usurper should have remained master of the stronghold during six months, and that even then it was not a national movement, but the action of a small knot of men friendly to the Badoeri, which led to a successful assault on the palace, the violent death of Carosio, and the recall of the legitimate Doge. We here encounter the earliest recourse to a constitutional exigency, which grew tolerably frequent. Till Badoer reached home, it seems to have been deemed a requisite precaution to install a provisional government—a triumvirate, of which one member was his kinsman Orso Badoer, Bishop of Olivolo,⁴ and a second individual named Baseio Storlado.

But Badoer escaped from one dilemma only to fall into another still more serious. While he was still an exile at the Carolingian court, and before the intelligence of his restoration could have arrived, one Giovanni Baseio, who may have been related to the aforesaid Baseio Storlado, or have even been identical with him, conceived the idea of placing the crown on his own head; his ambitious views were,

¹ Sagorninus, *Chron.* 32.

² Dandolo, viii. 174.

³ *Cronaca Altinate*, lib. ii. p. 51; Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 415.

⁴ Sagorninus, p. 33.

of course, completely thwarted by the unexpected restoration of the Doge; and Baseio had therefore the strongest motives for regarding Badoer thenceforward with bitter and implacable hatred. The kindred and adherents of the disappointed nobleman fully echoed his sentiments, as they had shared his hope; and an opportunity was soon found for indulging their common resentment. On the evening of the 29th June 836, as his Serenity was on the point of quitting the church of San Pietro at Olivolo, where he had been attending vespers, he was seized by hired emissaries of the rival faction: Badoer was, according to his usual practice, unattended; the *bravi* were numerous and inexorable; and having compelled him to undergo the process of tonsure, they hurried him to a neighbouring convent, where he was lodged in security. Having thus removed the sole obstacle which lay between him and the throne, Baseio might have reasonably expected to reap the reward of his patience and exertion. But he was again doomed to disappointment. For the popular assembly, perhaps awakened to a sense of its duty and dignity, and possibly weary of the feeble and unfortunate Badoer, unanimously elected to the vacancy his kinsman Pietro Tradenigo of Rialto, Primicerio of St. Mark¹ (July 836), an ecclesiastical officer of high distinction, who may be regarded as the prototype of the Metropolitan of Venice, and who exercised by virtue of his appointment special jurisdiction over the Ducal Chapel.

The committal of a sovereign to cloistral seclusion, either of his own accord or by compulsion, is a common political phenomenon of the middle ages, and, for example, we cannot help noting its perpetual recurrence in the annals of Northumbria. Nor of course is the reason far below the surface, where the insecurity of secular life in all grades was so complete, and even the holy oil afforded no safeguard from factious violence or personal revenge. The sacred precincts of a monastic establishment formed the only sure asylum for a prince, who sought at once protection from the dagger and repose for religious preparation.

The reign of Tradenigo,² whom we recollect as one of the commissioners intrusted about 810 with the embellishment of

¹ *Storia della chiesa di San Marco*, p. 81.

² The Tradenigi became extinct, according to Sanudo, p. 428, in 946. See Dandolo, viii. 174, and *Cronaca Altinate, juxta codicem Dresdensem*, pp. 25, 60, *Arch. Stor. Ital.* v., and the same, *juxta alteram lectionem* (*ibid.* viii. 185).

the city, though still more turbulent and still more disastrous than that of his predecessor, and though marked by the first battle of any magnitude which the Republic fought, as well as by the first grave defeat which she suffered on her own element, was at the outset sufficiently tranquil, and was in fact disturbed only by expeditions¹ to check the operations of the pirates of Narenta² and of certain lawless trespassers on the Lago di Garda, who appear to have proved troublesome to the Veronese, or perhaps to the imperial court at Verona. They are stigmatised as brigands. The help rendered by Venice may very well have been solicited by the emperor or at least an effort to please him.

But a wider field of operations was about to open. So far back as 827-28 the Republic, at the solicitation of the Greek government, had fitted out a small expedition against the Saracens who, in common with the Narentines and other freebooters, were beginning to be a chronic source of trouble and loss by their bold and skilful depredations both in the Adriatic and the Mediterranean. In 840 Venetian aid was again sought on the same account;³ and the failure of the former enterprise induced the Doge to make preparations on a scale, which is at present of chief interest, because, if the received figures are correct, Venice had been making in the passed quarter of a century a prodigious advance almost unobserved. A fleet of sixty *Dromoni*, vessels of heavy build and draught, capable of carrying a force of 12,000 men,⁴ was appointed to act in concert with the admiral of the Emperor Theodosius; and it is politically significant, that the command was given to Pietro Badoer, whose goodwill the Doge was probably bound to secure. The allies met the enemy at Crotona, on the Gulf of Tarentum; the engagement was obstinate; and during some time neither side was seen to flag in energy or resolution. But the Venetian commander, deriving no support from the Greeks, who are said to have fled in panic disorder at the first encounter, was ultimately forced to succumb after the experience of a severe loss in men as well as in ships; and the Saracens engaged in the pursuit with such relentless diligence, that a very slender

¹ Dandolo, viii. 175; Sanudo, p. 454; Navagiero, *Storia*, p. 946.

² Marin, ii. 43.

³ Blondus, *De gestis Venetorum*, p. 4.

⁴ Sagorninus, p. 36; Filiasi, *Ricerche*, p. 200.

remnant of that superb marine which had left the port of Olivolo a few months before, so full of confidence and enthusiasm, survived to announce to the country the unhappy result.

The large armament, which the Republic had equipped either partly or wholly at its own cost, was far in excess, both as to ships and crews, of any former undertaking; the comparative immunity from war, which Venice had enjoyed since 809, might have promoted the development of power and wealth; and the destruction of such a noble fleet, coupled with the severe loss of life and the sense of national discredit, formed altogether a terrible blow. The alleged defection of the Greeks at the critical moment is corroborated by their frequent repetition of the same treachery and cowardice. But while the public mind was busied with a variety of speculations, an alarm was given, that the corsairs of Narenta, hoping to profit by the general confusion and distress, were approaching in considerable force, and that they had already reached and ravaged Caorlo.¹ The imminence of the new danger at once banished all other thoughts; the naval resources of the State were thoroughly crippled; and there was a panic. The only vessels available for active service were two large sailing crafts without oars, which had just been completed; the government fitted them up in haste, and sent them out in search of the enemy. But it was a mere predatory reconnaissance; the Narentines were satisfied with their plunder; and they disappeared without waiting an attack.

The two vessels, which were employed in the last instance, were termed *palanders*; and it was the earliest occasion, on which we meet with them. They were not originally designed as men-of-war; but they were eventually brought into use as transports both for horses, men, and stores.² The Republic, in common with other rising commercial States of the middle ages, was beginning to experience the same grave trouble from piracy as the Romans had done in and before the time of Pompey the Great; and of course the formation of the coasts of the Adriatic and Mediterranean afforded the same facilities.

¹ Diedo, lib. ii. p. 31.

² Formaleoni, *Saggio sulla nautica antica dei Veneziani*, p. 20; Filiasi, *Ricerche storiche*, p. 215.

The perils of commerce and traffic on these seas are particularly noticed by Strabo. It had been much the same during the era of Greek independence. Venice did her part in course of time in extinguishing this grave evil. But even down to the fifteenth century the English ports were not free from the inroads of the Northmen and other lawless assailants.

It was to be expected that an event of so grave and unparalleled a nature as the late catastrophe at sea, would raise a storm of rage and discontent against those who might be considered open to a charge of indiscretion or incompetence: and that it would also afford a pretext for the revival of civil dissension. In fact, it was not long before six noble families, of whom the Polani, Baseii, and Giustiniani ranged themselves on one side, the Barbolani, Iscoli, and Selvi on the other, took advantage of the circumstance, and profited by the general distress which prevailed in Venice to assemble in the broad daylight, on the public thoroughfares, with the avowed object of deciding their private differences by force of arms. In a country divided, like Italy, into so many separate self-governed municipalities, these civil disturbances were unhappily growing more frequent and serious. Every one has heard of the sanguinary conflicts between the Montacutes and the Capulets; and it was the same at Mantua in the last days of its republican rule. These disgraceful feuds, for the rise and continuance of which no one has to look beyond the political temperament of Venice with its circumscribed area, extended at broken intervals over a considerable period; they form the chief feature in the sterile annals of the reign of the Doge Tradenigo; and they clearly merit attention, because they reveal, in an instructive and a rather startling way, the growth of a grave constitutional distemper. The violent and bloody scenes, which we have witnessed almost from the commencement of this story, have furnished us with glimpses of a certain radical tendency on the part of the great Venetian families to introduce a species of clanship; and it happened during the exceptionally protracted reign of Tradenigo, that two or three circumstances occurred to develop and stimulate the movement. An aristocracy was slowly arising, with a jealousy of popular rights and pretensions surpassed only by the jealousy which its members entertained toward each other. But at present its organisation was not sufficiently consolidated; we

are yet in the middle ages; the feudal element was predominant; and Venice was split up into political cliques, which fought, with their armed retainers at their backs, for pre-eminence and office. Neither of the contending parties, in the present instance, appear to have derived any direct countenance from the Doge, whose interests were bound up with those of the ancient and influential house of Badoer. But Tradenigo was either unable or unwilling to restrain the disorderly spectacles, which were of more or less frequent occurrence in the streets; within the fortified lines of his palace, the Doge and his political allies, confident in the loyalty of the domestic guard and in the strength of the gates, beheld for some time with complacency, perhaps, two unfriendly factions weakening each other; and at length the unseemly struggle was brought to a climax by the expulsion of the Barbolani and their confederates with the aid or acquiescence of Tradenigo.

But the triumph of the Polani party was of short duration. For, their rivals having sought an asylum at the Court of the Emperor Lothar, son and successor of Louis, that prince successfully tendered his intercession. It seems to have been shortly after their recall, that an incident occurred which, though of an unimportant character, had the effect of hurrying the lengthened and singularly obscure career of the Doge Tradenigo to an abrupt and ignominious close.

On the decease of Maurizio Vicenzi, Bishop of Olivolo, in 862, two members of the Venetian priesthood offered themselves as candidates for the vacant see. The Sanudi or Candiani, of whom one was at present Tribune with Giovanni Badoer, and who were next to the Badoeri the most powerful clan in Venice, nominated their relative Zaccaria Sanudo. But his Serenity thought proper to induct his own kinsman Domenigo Badoer.¹ The Sanudi vowed that they would not forgive the insult which had been offered to their House; and, although a considerable period elapsed before a suitable occasion presented itself, they ultimately carried their design into execution. On the 13th September 864, as the object of their resentment was crossing the Ponte della Paglia,² to

¹ Filiasi, vi. p. 44; Sanudo, *Vite*, pp. 415, 435. Compare also Sansovino, lib. xiii. 543, with Marin, ii. p. 46.

² Dandolo, lib. viii. p. 181; Sansovino, lib. xiii. p. 543; Mutinelli, *Annali urbani*, p. 21.

attend vespers at the church of San Zaccaria, he was suddenly assailed by Pietro Sanudo at the head of a large body of friends and retainers; the Excusati and other attendants of Tradenigo were overpowered, after an obstinate and manful resistance, and the old Doge himself was stabbed to death at the foot of the Bridge. His guards and servants, so soon as they perceived that all hope had gone, hastily retraced their steps under cover of the darkness, and took refuge in the Ducal Palace, where they prepared to defend themselves against all comers,¹ until their prayer to the Legislature for the condign punishment of the assassins had obtained a favourable hearing.² This proceeding, for which no precedent is known, discloses a singular phase of ancient palatial life, and seems to be referable to the character of the ducal coronation-oath or promise, which demanded renewal on each vacancy of the throne. The sudden and violent termination of the late reign presumably suspended the guarantees under which the Excusati took service, and exposed them to the fury of the insurgents, as they were probably selected, or might be wholly so, from the dependents of the Tradenigo and other confederate families.

We observe throughout these intestine disturbances in mediæval Venice a similarity, with a difference occasioned by local conditions, to the affrays in other countries arising out of feudal jealousies and antipathies. In the case of the Republic the narrowness of the area had perhaps a natural tendency to curtail the duration of those scenes of anarchy, as the same cause eventually contributed to produce constitutional measures for their suppression.

At any rate, this is by no means a solitary indication that, during the middle ages and later, the abode of the chief of the State and its precincts were regarded as privileged, just as offences committed within the verge of the Court were treated in England, down to a comparatively recent date, as of special gravity. It became usual by degrees in the Republic, immediately on the death of a Doge, that the palace should be occupied by some representative or representatives of the Government, till the vacancy of the Ducal throne was supplied.³ The same natural and inherent importance was

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 455; Navagiero, *Storia*, p. 948. ² Dandolo, *ubi supra*.

³ *Ducale thronum* was understood in the same sense as in England the Crown.

attached to this spot among the Merwings, among the Greeks of the Lower Empire, among the Turks, and among the Mahrattas; and it is to be remembered that, while Peter the Great of Russia was on his death-bed in 1725, the imperial residence was held by some of the Senate, waiting the close of the scene, in order to secure a peaceable succession. A contemporary engraving represents the royal abode at Paris even in the sixteenth century as quite a little town in itself.

Fresh proof of the strongly fortified condition of St. Mark's palace is afforded by the reported fact that, during a whole month,¹ the Excusati and other adherents of the deceased Doge held (possibly with the collusion of the Badoeri) that position against all comers; and even then they surrendered the place to the provisional government only on the stipulation that a free settlement was to be assigned to them in the island of Poveja, and that they should enjoy in perpetuity the faculty of choosing their own judges and gastaldi; while, on the part of the throne, the Tribunes stipulated merely that a deputation of the gastaldo and of seven of the oldest inhabitants of Poveja should, as a token of fealty, bring to Rialto on the first Friday in each succeeding November an offering of fish to the reigning Doge, who was pledged to provide, in honour of the delegates on every anniversary, a public repast. Sanudo and his colleague resigned their functions at the close of October 864, when Orso, son of the former Doge Giovanni, and grandson of Badoer I., was declared the successor of Tradenigo.

There was a political drift in the direction of hereditary monarchy. Since 809, a period of fifty-five years, the country had been ruled by the Badoer family, of which Tradenigo, a connection by marriage, represented the influence and opinions. The severe internal distractions which marked the greater portion of the eight-and-twenty years during which Tradenigo had reigned, were indirectly favoured by the prevailing absence of foreign troubles; and perhaps the spirit of faction was momentarily allayed, while a pope and an emperor pressed the yet unpaved area of the Piazzetta. In 856, the Emperor Louis II., when he affixed his seal at Mantua to the ancient charter, under which the Venetian merchants traded in the ports of Lombardy, expressed a wish, and accepted an

¹ *Cronaca Altinate*, lib. ii. pp. 49-50.

invitation, to see Rialto. The Doge and a select deputation went to meet his majesty as far as San Michele di Brondolo; he remained the guest of Tradenigo three days, during which period he held at the font the infant daughter of his host.¹ Two years before the visit of Louis, Pope Benedict III., driven from the chair of Saint Peter by his rival Anastasius, had sought an asylum in the lagoon (854);² and during his stay at Venice, Giovanna Morosini, Sister-Superior of the Abbey of San Zaccaria, succeeded in eliciting from his Holiness a promise of a variety of prized relics. Shortly after their transmission to their new destination, Tradenigo, allured by the odorous sanctity which the posthumous abode of so many saints shed around the favoured abbey, paid a devotional visit to San Zaccaria; and the Abbess, anxious to afford a convincing proof of the opulence and loyalty of the sisterhood, is said to have presented to her illustrious guest, on the latter taking leave, a head-dress, perhaps worked in the house, studded with precious stones.³ Tradenigo accepted the gift with profuse acknowledgments; and, as a lasting token of his gratitude and approbation, he pledged his word that the Doges of Venice should repeat the visit and the ceremony in each succeeding year.⁴

The fate of the last Doge of the Badoer line had not yet been forgotten. It was noted that this was the second instance within a few years, in which the first magistrate had fallen a prey to the violence of partisanship; the popular assembly met in the latter part of September amid a general outcry for justice; and the Judges of the Palace were directed to institute a searching investigation into the circumstances. Meanwhile, no steps were taken to elect a successor; and the two Tribunes, Giorgio Sanudo and Giovanni Badoer, were clothed with full vicarious powers.⁵

¹ Sagorninus, *Chron.* 38.

² Dandolo, lib. viii. p. 180; Muratori, *Annali d' Italia*, v. p. 46; Marin, vol. ii. pp. 44, 45.

³ Maffei, *Verona illustrata*, ii. p. 219. G. R. Michieli, i. p. 123 *et seq.*

⁴ Sansovino, lib. xii. pp. 494, 495. Mr. Howells, *Venetian Life*, 2nd ed. ii. 74-75, seems to identify this as the prototype of the corno worn by the Doges.

⁵ Dandolo, viii. 181.

CHAPTER V

A.D. 864-912

Orso Badoer, grandson of Badoer I., Doge (864)—Defeat of the Saracens—Schism with the Holy See—Giovanni Badoer (Badoer V.), Doge (881)—Sack of Commacchio—Pietro Candiano or Sanudo, Doge (887)—Battle of Mucole and fall of the Doge—Giovanni Badoer, again Doge (888)—Pietro Tribuno, Doge (888-912)—Defeat of the Huns at Albiola (906)—Orso Badoer (Badoer VI.), Doge (912).

WE seem at this stage to begin to emerge a little from the obscurity and silence, to which the deficiency of documents and trustworthy authorities reduce so many centuries of undoubted life and progressive activity. We are even already able to feel a quicker pulse, to discern a stronger grasp and a more audible voice. The footsteps of the next line of Doges are somewhat more distinctly traceable, their personality somewhat more vivid. Men with some tangible properties are moving about, with ideas enlarged by contact with foreign regions, and antagonistic to suicidal discord at home. But we have yet to traverse almost as long a space again, before we shall arrive at an approximate realisation of what time was destined to accomplish on this ground, of the leisurely and unexpected rise of the first durable empire since the fall of Rome, of one, which was to last longer than Rome, longer than any, which had ever been in the world.

The Report of the Judges of the Palace implicated in the murder of the late Doge the Sanudi and others of the highest families in Venice. Some were executed; others were banished to the hitherto unsettled portion of the island of Spinalunga, and one, who was acquitted, dying shortly after under suspicious circumstances, the popular tale ran that he was visited and worried by an evil spirit.¹ The comparative lenity of the sentence was due to a reasonable anxiety not to irritate still farther the spirit of faction, for although the

¹ Lorenzo de Monacis, Add. MSS. R.M. 8574 and 8578.

Sanudi were spared the ignominy of a public execution, an inquiry and sentence, which tarnished the fame of so many noble families, was calculated in any case to involve the house of Badoer in a certain measure of odium. Yet that puissant family was able to maintain its representative in office against all opposition during seventeen years.

The Narentines and Saracens, however, again proved a source of annoyance and unremunerative expenditure. The former, if not both, discovered that in proportion as the Italian Republics became more wealthy, piracy became more advantageous as a profession; and with the most provident and circumspect of Powers the mischief usually lived long enough, before the remedy overtook it. In reading these accounts of the devastation of parts of early Venice by all the local or adjacent plunderers, we are reminded of the incessant sufferings of mediæval Paris from a similar cause, and of the bridge built across the Seine about 880 to render the ascent of the river by the northmen less easy of performance. The Englishman must always recollect with shame, that the Dutch infested the Thames with impunity as recently as 1666, while Charles II. was striking coins with the legend: *Quatuor Maria Vindico*. We are all aware that our most precious reforms in England have been owed to repeated demand and even repeated disaster and disgrace. They have never been the spontaneous offering of any government or any crowned head; nor were the mediæval Venetians particularly deliberate in their acquisition of wisdom. But an incomplete development of national life, and a prevailing ignorance of financial and political economy, made it necessary for those few, who saw evils and dangers like these, and perhaps also saw the true cure, to wait with patience, while the ancient federal system was being slowly superseded by a central unified executive.

A Venetian squadron chased the enemy out of the gulf; but it does not appear, that the expedition brought any permanent fruits.¹ Three years later, Basilios I., successor of the Greek Emperor Michael III., anxious to restore the empire of Rome in Italy, concerted with the Western Emperor Louis a plan for the expulsion of the Saracens from the Peninsula. But the maritime power of the latter, and

¹ Sagorninus, *Chron.* 42. · Anonymus Salernitanus, *Chronicon*, p. 8.

the enfeebled condition of his own navy, led Basilios to the conclusion, that the co-operation of Venice would importantly promote the success of the undertaking; and he judged rightly that such a proposal would touch a sympathetic chord in the heart of the Republic. A sea battle between the Venetians under the Doge's son and the Mohammedans in the gulf of Tarentum ended in the defeat of the latter; and although the vanquished subsequently formed a junction with a small Arab squadron belonging to Candia, and sailed up the gulf a second time, they did not venture beyond Grado, whence they retired with considerable spoil. Many lives and much property were thus sacrificed year by year to this growing evil; and we shall find the Venetians shortly awakening to the cogent expediency of maintaining a flotilla in the gulf for the protection of commerce and as a barrier against surprises.

The participation of the Greeks in this expedition had been feeble and insincere; their share of the glory was proportionately slender; and Basilios, who had furnished his lieutenant with secret instructions to negotiate a matrimonial alliance between the daughter of Louis and his son, the Valet of Constantinople, was so much piqued at the failure of this intrigue, coupled with the single-handed triumph of Venice, that he abruptly recalled his squadron to the port of Corinth.¹ It was the second case, within a very brief period, in which the Greek alliance had proved illusory and worthless.

The nomination by the Doge to the vacant see of Torcello of a churchman, whom the primate declined to consecrate, on the ground that he was an eunuch,² resulted about the same time in a personal appeal by the Metropolitan to the Holy See for support and redress. The Pontiff immediately directed a message to the obnoxious prelate Caloprini, enjoining him, with the Bishop of Equilo and Malamocco, to repair to Rome, where his Holiness signified an intention of inquiring into the circumstances of the case. Neither Caloprini, however, nor the other two bishops, who seem to have been in his interest, answered the summons; and the Pontiff was informed that, while the presence of Pietro of Equilo was required elsewhere

¹ Sagorninus, p. 44.

² Lupus Protospata, *Chronicon rerum in regno Najoletano gestarum*, p. 1; Sagorninus, p. 42; Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 456.

on matters of urgency, Felice of Malamocco was incapacitated by sickness from undertaking so long a journey. But the Pope was not so easily thwarted; and, in a second communication addressed to the Doge himself, Badoer was conjured to facilitate, or, if it were necessary, to enforce, the compliance of these refractory churchmen, whose dioceses might be given in charge, as his Holiness suggested, during their absence, to the Bishops of Caorlo and Olivolo. The injunction and advice were alike disregarded. No bishops presented themselves; and his Holiness was placed in a most delicate predicament. He determined, however, to make one more effort; and the prelates were now invited to appear before a synod, which the Pontiff purposed to hold at Ravenna on the 22nd July 877.¹ In this instance the Doge affected to give way; but unfortunately the bishops did not reach their destination, till the Council had risen, and John VIII. was persuaded to withhold his anathema only by the personal intercession of Badoer. This was altogether a rather memorable affair; for it was the first occasion on which the Venetians assumed that firm attitude toward Rome, from which they never swerved even under the pressure of the heaviest adversity.

Caloprini enjoyed the title and the revenues of the see during the lifetime of the recusant patriarch Marcurio; and when the latter was succeeded in 874 by a son of the Doge, subject to his engagement to administer the holy oil to the eunuch, the patriarch Badoer did not omit, in performing the ceremony, to allude to the anomalous circumstances, which, taken in connection with the Ducal persistence, raises a doubt whether the personal blemish of the ecclesiastic would be viewed by the men of that day as a scandal, and whether the controversy does not belong to the province of politics.

The difficulty in the church was more easily settled than the Narentine question, which had become complicated by the more than suspected collusion of the patriarch of Aquileia. That potentate began to find that the sea-robbers were useful instruments in harassing the Istrian dioceses comprehended within the Venetian primacy. An expedition, which the Republic fitted out about 878, had therefore a twofold mission; and having disposed of the pirates for the time, it

¹ Sagorninus, *Chronicon*; Dandolo, lib. viii. p. 185; Romanin, i. 195.

proceeded to chastise their employer. By the Doge's command, all commercial intercourse with Aquileia was suppressed; and the patriarch Walpert soon humbly solicited the revocation of the order. On the one hand, Walpert engaged to desist from molesting four mercantile emporia belonging to the Doge in the market-place of Aquileia; and on the other the Aquileians were again left at liberty to trade as heretofore on easy terms with Pilo and the other ports of Venice.¹

It was during the lengthened administration of Badoer IV. that the first step was taken in the direction of financial reform. Down to the present time there had been nearly as entire an absence of artificial elaboration in this department of the government as in the earliest days of Venetian liberty, and the nature of the taxes which composed the public revenue was so loose, and their levy so irregular, that Badoer came to the resolution, some years after his accession, of proposing to the National Assembly the establishment of the Ducal exchequer on some footing of stability. The payment of tithes was a usage of high antiquity. Posterior to 697, it was customary for each House to lay at the feet of the Chief Magistrate its proportionate oblation of fish, bread, oil, honey, wine, and the other necessaries of life. But time had tended to impair the efficacy of this barbarous and imperfect machinery rather than to improve it. When the increasing importance of the Republic began to render the calls on the national purse heavier, as well as more frequent, it too often happened that a sudden and untoward emergency betrayed the nakedness of the Treasury, and exposed the fallacy of the system; and the feeling had become general that some cure ought to be found for such a grave constitutional anomaly. The long unproductive condition of certain portions of the Dogado had led to their periodical colonisation under various circumstances on a feudal basis; and it was thought that an occupation of the waste lands of Murano, San Nicolo, and Dorsoduro by tenants on the footing of a payment of tenths and service at fixed periods in the ranks of the Excusati or in the other departments of the Ducal household and staff, might tend to swell the revenue, and to strengthen the municipal soldiery.²

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 457; Dandolo, lib. viii. p. 188; Filiati, vi. p. 120.

² Dandolo, lib. viii. p. 188.

While, however, a feeble and imperfect attempt was thus made to expand the resources of the State, an apparent blow was dealt at Venetian commerce in the shape of an edict against the traffic in Christian slaves, which was, no doubt, lucrative enough, but which was constantly involving the Republic in remonstrances and reproofs from the Papacy. A Ducal edict was now launched against this abuse; and a heavy fine, or the amputation of a limb, or in extreme cases death, was the penalty attached to transgression. The spirit of Christian legislation, like that of other mediæval codes, was vindicatory rather than remedial. Every crime bore its price, and where resort was had to capital punishment, it was more frequently on political than on judicial grounds. An age which possessed imperfect notions of the connection between law and morality, and in which there was a strong tendency to reduce human obligations to a standard of commercial fitness, was precisely an age which might be expected to view with favour a system of pecuniary atonements, forming the most simple species of direct taxation. For there is no question whatever, that the slave-trade continued to flourish in spite of all repressive enactments, and that the penal consequences, if any, were as a rule financial gains. The profits of the traffic allowed occasional fines. In cases where an accused pleaded innocence, the trial of the question of fact was appointed to fall on a jury of twelve persons, who were bound to deliver a verdict upon oath. The decree of 878 was the earliest movement of that nature; but it was followed, at intervals, by laws of a more severe and binding description. Ecclesiastics were not disposed to eye with much indulgence an abuse, from which they derived no temporal gain; for among that body the only class to which the slave-trade formed a source of income, was the clerical notary, who drew up the contracts of sale between the dealer and his customers; and, besides, persons in a servile condition, both male and female, were, centuries later, employed in monastic establishments as well as in secular households. But the Venetian attempt in the ninth century to extinguish Christian slavery was almost as premature as it was laudable: for it was an attempt directed not only against interests which were too valuable to be promptly surrendered, but against a principle which, though abhorred by a few advanced spirits,

and though denounced from a few pulpits, had not yet been condemned by the voice of public opinion; and it was public opinion alone, seconded by a progressive civilisation, which possessed the power of remedying an evil rooted so deeply in the strongest of human instincts.

The crown of Badoer IV. descended in 881, without any opposition, to his eldest son Giovanni (Badoer V.), whom he had associated in 867-8. Besides the new Doge, Vettore, patriarch of Grado, and three other sons, his late Serenity left two daughters, Giovanna, abbess of San Zaccaria, and Felicia, wife of Rodoald, Duke of Bologna.¹

Two centuries had elapsed since the termination of the tribunitial system as a supreme jurisdiction, and thirteen Doges had already reigned in Venice. Yet these magistrates, at first content to fulfil their primary mission by delivering their country from anarchy, and then absorbed, for the most part, by a variety of conflicting domestic interests, had never heretofore found the opportunity, or felt the desire, of extending the Venetian dominion beyond the lagoons; and it consequently remained for Badoer V. to furnish that proof of ambition, and to set that example of conquest; and we are enabled to perceive that the preponderant weight which his family had established was not yet impaired, and that the dual office was growing more and more autocratic in its attributes and range.

The town of Commacchio, situated on an inlet of the Adriatic, several miles below Brondolo, and the seat of a flourishing salt and fish trade, had been in the opening years of the ninth century part of the Greek empire in Italy, and one of the earliest exploits of Venice was an unsuccessful effort in concert with the imperial commander to recover it. But it was held in fief of the court of Rome at this period by a son of one of the followers of Louis the German. His name was Marino d' Este;² and a repeated refusal on the part of the second Count of Commacchio to recognise the obligations of a vassal, had gradually engendered a feeling between him and his suzerain, which was highly favourable to the views of the Doge. The latter at once conceived the idea of turning this disagreement

¹ Sagorninus, *Chron.* 50.

² Morosini, lib. iii. p. 70; Navagiero, *Storia*, p. 950.

to his own advantage; and while he expressed an anxiety to get rid of a troublesome rival, the Doge secretly harboured a desire to annex the property of d' Este to the feudal patrimony of the House of Badoer. At the same time, however, he was reluctant to prefer a personal claim; and he therefore resolved to send his brother, Badoer Badoer, to Rome, to treat with the Pontiff on his behalf for the transfer of the coveted fief.¹ His Holiness acquiesced in the proposal. But, meanwhile, the Count, duly apprised of this intrigue, had organised in concert with the Ravennese a plot against the unsuspecting and unwary Badoer; and as the latter was proceeding homeward through Ravenna, he was caught in an ambuscade, wounded in the leg² in a desperate scuffle with his captors, and conducted to Commacchio, where he was detained by his rival in close confinement, till the poignancy of suffering and the sense of approaching dissolution wrang from him an unwilling promise that, as the condition of his immediate enlargement, he would forgive the injury, and forget the hand which had done it. The unfortunate prince returned to his native city to die; in his last moments he half unconsciously denounced Marino d' Este as the perpetrator of the deed; and his brother lost no time in appearing with an armed squadron before Commacchio. D' Este had fled; his domains fell an easy prey to the sword of the invader; and the authority of the magistrates whom the Doge left in charge of the place, was seconded by the presence of a Venetian garrison.³ Nor was Badoer disposed to pardon the collusion of Ravenna in the recent misadventure; and that ancient capital of the Greek Exarchate was compelled to atone cruelly for the succour which she had afforded to her feeble neighbour. Still the object which the Doge had had in view was entirely thwarted by the death of his brother; and while it might be considered expedient to abandon the design of erecting Commacchio into a heritage for the Badoeri, or of embodying it with the Republic, the failure of the scheme was not less mortifying to the proud and sensitive spirit of Badoer: nor is it unlikely that it was instrumental in hastening a half-formed determination to withdraw from public life.

His health had indeed been long ailing.⁴ He began to

¹ Sagorinus, *Chron.* 51.

² *Ibid.* 52.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.* 52-3.

feel the cares of government irksome and oppressive. The undivided weight of the berretta produced a growing sensation of lassitude; and the natural asperity of his temper was increased by the thought that he had no son to whom he might secure the succession. His brothers, Pietro and Orso, were both till recently still living; and shortly after the miscarriage of the attempt on Commacchio, the Doge had designed to associate the former. But the sudden death of Pietro, who had only just attained his twenty-fifth year, forestalled him in his purpose; and, his remaining brother having declined the proffered trust, and his nephew Orso being a mere boy, Giovanni hesitated no longer in declaring his wish to abdicate.

He was evidently, like all his race, a man not only of the highest character, but of an unusually impartial temperament; for, at his personal recommendation, Pietro Sanudo, a citizen of Rialto, and a member of a family politically unfriendly to the Badoeri, was summoned from his private house to the Palace (17th April 887),¹ where Badoer delivered to him with his own hand the sword of State, and placed on his brows the Ducal berretta. The new Doge, whose election by its singularity formed at once a tribute to his predecessor and himself, was a nobleman of bold and enterprising character, and in point of worldly means of considerable affluence. He was no less distinguished by the punctilious strictness with which he followed his religious observances, than by the princely munificence which he displayed in relieving the necessities of the poor. In person Sanudo was of the middle height, and at the period of his election he was in the forty-fourth year of his age. His accession to the throne in the healthy prime of manhood gave his subjects and kindred every promise of a long reign.²

On the receipt of intelligence, however, in the following August,³ that the Corsairs of Narenta were again hovering on the skirts of the Lagoon, the Doge took twelve galleys,⁴ commanded by twelve *sopracomiti* of noble lineage, and sailed

¹ Sagorninus, *Chron.* 54.

² Dandolo, lib. viii. p. 192. He adds, in reference to the family, "benevoli omnes, sed in bello potentes, et de personis magni."

³ Sagorninus, *Chron.* 54.

⁴ *Chroniche Veneziane*, fol. 67 (Add. MSS. Brit. Mus. 8579). We find in the list a Dandolo, a Morosini, a Contarini, a Zeno, a Cornaro, an Orseolo.

along the coast. The Pirates were at length descried in the bosom of a bay off Mucole,¹ near Zara; he instantly directed his course toward them; and the approach of the Venetians served, by cutting off the retreat of the Narentines, to animate their courage. After a severe struggle, in which the Doge did his utmost to hearten his forces, the buccaneers were compelled to acknowledge the superior prowess or fortune of their opponents by retreating in disorderly haste to the shore. The Doge, having secured a portion of the enemy's fleet, determined to destroy the remainder; and he bore an active and prominent part in the operation. While he was thus absorbed, heedless of the Pirates who were watching his movements from the land, a well-directed shaft pierced his breast; he fell without a groan; and his troops, panic-stricken at the sight, set all sail for Grado, abandoning the trophies of their success. But the Corsairs were soon on the alert; and they ceased not to harass the flight of the islanders until the latter had entered the lagoons. There the half-superstitious dread of becoming entangled in a labyrinth of sand dissuaded a nearer approach; and the Narentines, fortunately unconscious of the splendid success which might have crowned an inroad at that conjuncture, leisurely retraced their steps seaward. Such was the earliest instance in which a Doge of Venice had died for the Republic.²

Meanwhile, the news of the battle, and the remains of Sanudo, had reached home; the apprehension became rife that the enemy might soon be at the very stair of the Broglio, and the people felt that the choice of a new sovereign was a question which demanded riper consideration than the pressure of existing circumstances seemed to allow. In this exigency they formed the resolution of soliciting Giovanni Badoer to return to the throne which he had so recently vacated; and, although the health of the ex-Doge had become exceedingly infirm, he consented to resume the government, until they had finally decided on the succession. No steps, however, appear to have been taken in the matter, until Badoer had already reigned provisionally almost seven

¹ Sagorninus, *Chron.* 54.

² Pietro Giustiniani, *Chronica di Venetia*, p. 4 (King's MSS. 148); Caroldo, *Historia di Venetia*, p. 7 (King's MSS. 147).

months; and then only, at his earnest desire, Pietro, son of Domenigo Tribuno, by Angela or Agnella, niece of the Doge Tradenigo, a kinsman of the Doge Sanudo, relieved him of his functions (April 888).¹ Thus it seemed as if Venice had become the political patrimony of two dominant Houses. That of Badoer had at present no eligible candidate for office; and the Sanudi were enjoying a rather long lease of power.

A rather peculiar, if not very important, difficulty confronts us at this point in the occurrence of the name of Domenigo Tribuno himself as a contracting party to a charter or franchise executed, posterior to the installation of his son, in favour of Chioggia; and conflicting theories have been held as to the true cause of such an apparent anomaly. It is, on the whole, most probable, that the elder Tribuno, one of those patronymics of official origin not unfrequent in mediæval annals, exercised vicarious functions during the absence of the Doge on some naval expedition or in the course of the evidently prolonged and elaborate measures of defence about 906 against the anticipated Hungarian invasion.

So far, nevertheless, the internal condition of the Republic was uniformly peaceful and thriving; and under the auspices of commerce and industry the country began to flourish and increase. Still the Doge and his subjects were regarding with a watchful and anxious eye the progress of events in the Peninsula. Although, amid the violent changes which had supervened in the government of Italy since the death of Charlemagne, they had hitherto succeeded in maintaining their neutrality without compromising their freedom, the Venetians were too wise to conceal from themselves the likelihood, that they might ultimately be obliged to deviate from that pacific policy, that it might become necessary for them to interpose a barrier of steel between their homes and a foreign invader; and they prudently determined not to neglect the present opportunity of forearming themselves to the utmost possibility against any emergency. The exterior fortification of the Dogado, which, with the single exception of the Fort erected at Brondolo in 750, and the works carried out at the

¹ Sagorninus, *Chron.* 5; Dandolo, lib. viii. p. 192; P. Giustiniani, *Chronica di Venetia*, p. 28 (King's MSS. 148); Pietro Dolfino, *Annali Veneti*, p. 25 (King's MSS. 149); Lorenzo de Monacis, fol. 36 (Add. MSS. 8574).

beginning of the century, was still wholly defenceless, therefore engaged immediate attention; booms of great strength, removable at pleasure, were prepared to span the mouths of the canals, and to be secured at either side by stakes firmly planted in the ground, or by staples fixed in the walls of adjacent buildings; from the Rio di Olivolo to Santa Maria Jubenigo was begun the erection of a lofty and massive wall;¹ and the fortified part of the islet of Olivolo, girded by a broad and high rampart, assumed the name of Castello. The sombre and threatening aspect of affairs in Italy fully warranted these precautions; and even the deposition of Charles le Gros in 888, which had been hailed by all classes of his subjects as an augury of peace, was merely the signal for a War of Succession between Berenger, Duke of Friuli, and Guido, Duke of Spoleto. In the same year, however, the former received the imperial crown from the Pope, Stephen V.; and in 892 he was succeeded by his former competitor, who resigned the throne of the West two years later to his own son Lambert.² These frequent changes did not escape the notice of the Venetians. In May, 883, Badoer V., through his ambassador Lorenzo Barbarotello, Bishop of Olivolo,³ had obtained from Charles le Gros the quinquennial⁴ renewal of the treaty, originally accorded to the Republic by the first race of Lombard kings; and in 889, the present Doge easily prevailed on Guido, whose friendship he appears to have judged more practically useful than that of the Papal Emperor, to endorse the terms of that compact.

Under these circumstances the Republic entered on the fifth century of her existence; and, notwithstanding the forebodings of the Doge and his people, partly in consequence of rumours from the inauspicious North, and partly by reason of the prevalent notion at this time that the end of the world was at hand, everything seemed to prognosticate a

¹ Sagorninus, *Chron.* 57. It seems to have never been completed. Temanza says, that when in 1174, or thereabout, the Doge Seb. Ziani erected the *Red Columns* on the Piazza of Saint Mark, no part of this wall was in existence. It had probably fallen to decay, and had never been restored (*Antica pianta di Venezia*, p. 27). Arrigo Contarini, in 1091, was the first bishop who changed the title of the diocese from Olivolo to Castello. See Sansovino, lib. i. p. 5.

² Luitprand, Bishop of Pavia, *Hist.* lib. i. ch. x., and lib. ii. ch. xiii.; Muratori, *Annali*, v. p. 273.

³ *Cronaca Altinate*, lib. ii. p. 49; Dandolo, lib. viii. pp. 188-9.

⁴ The system of renewing the charter every five years was introduced, according to Dandolo, by Lothair, son of Louis the Pious, in 840.

long continuance of that tranquillity which they had enjoyed, with very few interruptions, since the events of 809, when it was suddenly announced that a large horde of Huns, allured by the prospect of an easy conquest and of a rich spoil, were approaching Lombardy, spreading havoc along their whole line of march (906).

That extensive tract, lying between the Adriatic and the Alps, which had once been so wealthy and so powerful, was now, however, too feeble to stay the progress, too barren to appease the avarice, of an invader; and a report reached the ears of the barbarians, that on the shore of the gulf dwelled a people, whose opulence surpassed their wildest visions of gain.¹ It was consequently soon known that the Huns were contemplating a descent on the City. The intelligence diffused the greatest agitation and terror. The feeling became general that a new crisis was forthcoming for Venetian independence; and Tribuno, justifying by his collected bearing in that trying moment the choice of his fellow-citizens, lost no time in awakening the people to a sense of their duty as well as of their danger. Addressing the Arrengo, the Doge appealed, in few but impressive words, to the noble origin of the Venetians and the immemorial freedom of the Republic; he recalled to their recollection the deeds and misfortunes of their progenitors, and the terrible sacrifices which the First Founders had made to liberty; he exhorted them, above all, not to forget the glorious victory in former days over the Franks; and (by a pardonable hyperbole) he declared that, should their efforts not experience success, they would not be slain only, but devoured, by a horde of ferocious cannibals. Who, he asked, would not draw the sword in defence of his hearth and his country against such a foe?²

In the meantime, several of the places along the coast from Chioggia were laid in ruins, and the invaders had approached almost so far as Albiola, before the Doge advanced with his fleet to bar their farther progress. Happily for the Venetians, the Huns, imagining that an attack on the side of the sea would be most effectual, had rashly undertaken

¹ "I Veneziani seppero fino da secoli più lontani riunire nelle loro lagune la massima possibile popolazione, il massimo possibile de' comodi, e la massima possibile ricchezza."—Filiassi, *Ricerche storiche*, 7.

² *Chron. Venez.* (Add. MSS. 8579, fol. 69, vol. i.).

the management of some ships which they found in the ports of the deserted cities of Padua, Concordia, and Aquileia; and thus the enemy, unversed in the art of navigation, unconsciously placed in the hands of their intended victims a weapon which the latter knew well how to turn to the best advantage. The countrymen of Attila were, in all probability, unaware of the close proportion which subsisted between the wealth and the power¹ of the Republic; that, while the Venetian State became more worthy, it also grew more difficult, of conquest; and they expected, perhaps, to subjugate with ease that little community whom their great king had spared in 452. This illusion, however, was quickly dissipated. Conducted by their Chief Magistrate himself, to whom it was no novelty to exchange the sceptre and the ducal bonnet for a sword and a casque, the Venetians glided softly forward in their flat vessels over the shallow waters; and those nimble and expert mariners, profiting to the utmost extent by their local knowledge, easily succeeded in dispersing and destroying the frail and clumsy barks of the Huns, the greater part of whom were suffocated beneath the yielding surface of the Lagoon. The remainder effected a precipitate retreat to the mainland; and even of these, few were fortunate enough to regain their native homes on the banks of the Sea of Azof or on the shore of the Caspian. The rout was rapid and complete; and it afforded the second instance in which the Republic was indebted for her very existence to her insular situation, to the dangerous intricacy of the narrow and serpentine channels, which alone gave access to her capital, and to the extraordinary resolution which the threatened loss of independence had inspired in the mind of a free people.²

¹ The population of the island in 906 may be estimated at between 35,000 and 40,000 souls: in 1170, it had reached 64,000.

² Sagorninus, *Chronicon*, p. 57; Dandolo, lib. viii. p. 197; Blondus of Forli, *De origine et gestis Venetorum*, pp. 7-8.

CHAPTER VI

A.D. 912-991

Badoer VI., nephew of Badoer V., Doge (912-32)—Feud with the Marquis of Istria—Sanudo II., Doge (932)—The Brides of Saint Mark—Badoer VII., Doge (939)—General Character of the Badoeri—Sanudo III., Doge (942-59)—Associates his Son Pietro (948)—Excesses and Banishment of the latter—His Recall and Accession (959)—His Reign, Tyranny, and Violent Death (976)—Orseolo I., Doge (976-7)—Sanudo V., Doge (977-8)—Tribuno Memo, Doge (978-91)—Feud between the Republic and Otho II.—Conspiracy of Stefano Caloprini—Deposition of Memo (991).

THE first act of Badoer VI., who succeeded that excellent and brave Doge Tribuno in 912, was the notification to the Eastern Emperor of his elevation to power; and his son Pietro was the person whom he selected to represent him. The noble Envoy was received by Constantine IV. with every mark of consideration due to his rank and character; he was created a Protospatarius: and on taking leave of his august host, he was loaded with gifts and compliments. In those days, the shortest and safest route from Constantinople was by sea. The passage usually occupied from twenty-five to thirty days.¹ But Pietro who, in proceeding from Venice to the Chrysoceras, had merely availed himself of the casual departure of some outward-bound merchantman, was weary of the long voyage and desirous of a change; the novelty and risk of the overland journey excited the love of adventure; and, contrary to the advice of the Greeks, who strongly dissuaded him from traversing an unfrequented and dangerous tract of country, he resolved to return home through Dalmatia. His temerity cost his father dear; he had scarcely accomplished the moiety of his journey, when he was taken in an ambuscade, robbed of his presents, and conducted to the Court of Simeon, King of Bulgaria. To that monarch, who looked on the offer of a profitable exchange as tolerably certain, the capture was

¹ Luitprand, "Legatio ad Nicephorum Phocam imperatorem, A.D. 940," *Rerum Italicarum scriptores*, vol. ii. p. 417.

particularly acceptable; and the luckless youth was detained a close prisoner, until the Doge, hearing of his fate, and learning his place of confinement, dispatched Domenico Flabénigo, Archdeacon of Malamocco, with a heavy ransom to purchase his release. Badoer recovered his liberty; and the vacant see of Malamocco was not considered too high a recompense for the services of Flabénigo.¹ In 921, the man who thus owed his bishopric to a happy stroke of diplomacy, was sent to Pavia, in conjunction with Stefano Caloprini, to procure from Hugo, King of Italy, the quinquennial renewal of the mercantile charter of the Republic; and five years later, they were again jointly accredited to the court of Hugo's successor, Rodolph, from whom they elicited, in addition to the usual immunities and privileges, the declaration that the Doge of Venice was entitled to strike money, because it appeared that the former Doges had enjoyed this right without interruption. In 932, after a reign of twenty years, which had been almost devoid of incident, the Doge, sensible of the approach of death, withdrew into the monastery of San Felice, on the isle of Amiano. He was succeeded by Pietro,² son of Sanudo I., who had fallen at Mucole in the service of the Republic.

The ecclesiastical establishments, with which Venice gradually enriched herself, formed during the mediæval period the most secure and agreeable retreat for those persons who, in the decline of life, wished to enjoy an exemption from political vicissitudes. The rude, turbulent, and unsettled condition of civil society afforded no guarantee for repose and few temptations to educated minds. The monastic fraternities and sisterhoods were the only places of refuge from the cares and perils of secular life and the only seminaries of literature and refinement. The position which the clergy occupied, at the revival of knowledge and culture, was a prominent and an honourable position, and down to a certain era their policy was a policy of progress and intellectual improvement.

The disruption of the fabric of society by the Northern barbarians had favoured the rise and growth of several petty principalities in the ancient Illyria; and among other minor potentates, Wintker, a Slavian chieftain, had assumed the title and rights of Marquis of Istria. But the inhabitants of that

¹ Sagorninus, *Chron.* 58; Dandolo, viii. 198.

² *Ibid.* 62. *Lettera di Agostino Gradenigo sulla famiglia Candiana*, 1760.

Province soon found their new and self-elected sovereign a despot; and the Venetian merchants, who had formed settlements at Justinople and in its neighbourhood, taking advantage of the feeling of disgust, which the conduct of Wintker was diffusing, prevailed on that and several other towns to raise the standard of revolt against the oppressor, and to transfer their allegiance to the Doge. The offer was accepted. Justinople became a fief of the Republic; and the protection of the Venetian flag was bought with an annual tribute of 800 gallons of wine. The wrath of the Marquis was unbounded; but an edict of non-intercourse with Istria soon constrained him, by the want of certain staple commodities, which he was unable to procure from other markets, to accept the clemency of Venice. An event of a more romantic nature, which was almost contemporaneous with the acquisition of Justinople and other places in fief, afforded the Doge an ample opportunity of shewing his courage and self-possession.

It was an ancient usage among the Venetians, that every year, on Saint Mary's Eve, twelve poor virgins, endowed by the State, should be united to their lovers in the old cathedral church of Saint Peter the Apostle at Olivolo. On this auspicious day (January 31), the parents, friends and kinsfolk of the betrothed used to assemble on that island; and from an early hour, barks gaily dressed with flowers and flags, might be seen skimming the canals, bearing the happy couples, their dowers, and marriage presents, to San Pietro. It happened on the anniversary of 939, that the Corsairs, who were well acquainted with the annual custom, resolved to profit by the helpless state of the joyful train, and to carry off the Daughters of Saint Mark. With this object in view a party of these outlaws under the conduct of their chief Gaiolo,¹ a renowned freebooter of that time, concealed themselves, on the eve of the festival, in a portion of the quarter of Olivolo, which was then thickly wooded, and on the following morning, so soon as the solemn procession, followed by a crowd of women and children, had entered the church, they quitted their hiding-place, crossed the narrow Canal, and leaped ashore. The hymeneal rites had already commenced, and the brides were about to be given away, when the doors of San

¹ Cronaca di Marco. . . ., *Arch. Stor. Ital.* viii.

Pietro were suddenly burst open, and the place was filled with armed men who, tearing the terrified maidens from the foot of the altar, lifted them across the sacred threshold, deposited them, almost bereaved of sense, in their barks, and set all sail for Trieste. The Doge by virtue of his office was acting on that memorable occasion as the proxy of the Patron Evangelist. He hurried from the building, followed by the injured lovers, and all, hastening through the streets, summoned the people to arms. In this emergency, a few vessels belonging to the Corporation of Trunk-Makers, who occupied a quarter in the parish of Santa Maria Formosa, were offered to the Chief Magistrate and his companions; and the latter grasping their oars with that strength which men borrow from despair, were soon lost to sight. The pirates, on their part, were still in the lagoon of Caorlo, when they beheld their pursuers close behind them; and the Venetians, availing themselves of their local experience, quickly overtook the ravishers in a creek, which is still known as the *Porto delle Donzelle*. The contest was long and sanguinary, but the vengeance of the bridegrooms was complete; hardly an Istrian escaped; and the girls were led back in triumph to Olivolo, where they endeavoured to forget their fright and alarm in the usual festivities, to which it may be believed that the recent misadventure gave peculiar zest. For a short time it was a practice to array twelve wooden dolls¹ in bridal costume, and to carry them in triumph round the Piazza; and those figures were called by the people *Marie*, in consequence of the occurrence having taken place on the day specially dedicated to Our Lady. But this dumb-show fell into disuse; and for the images was then substituted a solemn procession² of twelve young virgins, who, attended by the Doge and the clergy, paid a visit of ceremony to the parish of Santa Maria Formosa, where they received a hospitable welcome from the Trunk-Makers. The tradition is, that when the latter waited on the Doge after the event, and solicited his Serenity to originate the *Andata*, Sanudo good-humouredly remarked: *And what, if it should rain?* The Trunk-Makers made reply: "We will give you hats to cover your heads, and if you are thirsty, we will give you drink." In

¹ "Fecerunt construi ymagines formosas duodecim."—Cronaca di Marco. . . ., *Arch. Stor. Ital.* viii. 236. See also Morelli, *Delle solennità e pompe nuziali presso il Veneziani*, Ven. 1793.

² Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 461; Mutinelli, *Annali urbani di Venezia*, p. 23. Ferrucci's novel is founded on this subject.

commemoration of this circumstance, the Doge was presented on each succeeding occasion with two bottles of wine and two hats, on one of which were his own armorial bearings, on the other those of the reigning pontiff. Those hats, which in the traditional account the Trunk-Makers offered in case of wet weather to the Doge and his party, were doubtless, since the visitors would not anyhow go bareheaded, umbrellas of some sort, appliances, with which their Oriental trade and connection must have very soon familiarised the Venetians. Nor is it unlikely that the Trunk-Makers themselves imported such articles, or even manufactured them; and at a later time, when the umbrella grew commoner, ordinary hats with heraldic bearings might have been thought more acceptable gifts.

Toward the close of this reign, some Venetian vessels, which were trading in the port of Commacchio, having been detained by the treachery or caprice of the inhabitants, Sanudo determined to demand restitution in person, and he accordingly appeared before that place with a fleet of armed galleys. The vessels were speedily recovered; a considerable portion of the town was destroyed; and not only were those found to be implicated in the outrage put to death, but the sons of the principal citizens were selected by the Doge to be kept as hostages, until their parents should agree to recognise the sovereignty of Venice. A deputation was soon afterward dispatched to redeem the security; and thus Commacchio actually became a Venetian fief, sixty years after its nominal annexation to the Republic by Badoer V.

Sanudo II. was replaced in 939 by Pietro Badoer, only son of Badoer VI., and in his earlier years a prisoner in the hands of the King of Bulgaria. The reign of Pietro Badoer was brief and obscure: and he was the last of his illustrious race, who ascended the Venetian throne. Pietro Sanudo III., son of the second of that name, succeeded him in 942.

One hundred and thirty-three years had elapsed since the Ducal crown was accorded to Angelo, the first of the line, as a tribute of public gratitude for his services at Albiola; and during the greater part of that period, his descendants (seven in number) had held, for and by the people, an authority not less absolute, so long as it lasted, than that of the English royal Houses of Plantagenet and Tudor. Yet while they were sometimes driven to commit acts of an unwarrantable nature, they

exercised their authority, for the most part, with wise forbearance and rare tact; and under their rule Venice enjoyed in an unprecedented measure tranquillity both at home and abroad. Among those princes a powerful and striking resemblance is discernible. We observe the same gifted understanding swayed by the same ungovernable choler; the same irritable, impetuous and headstrong temper; the same freedom from meanness and profligacy; the same keen sensitiveness to insult and fierce impatience of control. In their calm moments, few men acted with more judgment than the Badoeri; few wandered farther from the path of reason, when they obeyed some strange impulse or some ruling passion. With all the faults, however, which they had in common with other men of a noble nature, the Badoeri, by their high sense of honour, by their general integrity, by their unselfish patriotism, by their watchfulness over the glory and advantage of their country, and, at last, by their long public services, won the hearts of the Venetians; and in a State, where so much stress was laid on nobility of birth, the people were always disposed to eye with indulgence the conduct of a magistrate, whose fathers were Tribunes of Rialto in the time of Theodoric the Goth.

Not many years after, the Emperor Berenger II. made important concessions to the Venetians trading throughout his dominions in Italy and Dalmatia as his quota to the cost of keeping the waters of the Gulf open (948); and cruisers with that object began to leave Venice almost every season. The operations of the Pirates had assumed, to some extent, a new character. They had now for some time hired themselves out to the enemies of the Republic, instead of waging war on their own account; and the Venetian expeditions consequently laid a heavy hand on the employer as well as on his mercenaries. At the same time the imperial grants to Venice were acquiring a basis of at least mutual profit, for the subjects of the western empire, who were unprovided with facilities for disposing of their exports and for producing many domestic requisites, were at present more dependent on the friendship of commercial States than the latter were on them; and the withdrawal of intercourse became almost as serious as a declaration of war.

By his wife Archielda Sanudo III. had four sons. Domenico, the eldest, already enjoyed the see of Torcello;¹ Vitali

¹ Lettera di Gradenigo, 1760; Litta, *Celebri famiglie Ital.* sub voce *Candiano*.

Ugone had married Imilia, who brought her husband the countships of Padua and Vicenza. The remaining two were named Pietro and Vitali, the latter being still a youth. Pietro, however, had reached years of manhood; and in 948, his father, considering his own not very robust state of health and the importance of maintaining the line of succession, admitted him to a share in the government. But the misconduct and excesses of the younger Doge soon led to a recommencement of the domestic troubles of Venice on a scale of unexampled severity, and the country beheld with deep and painful emotion the revival of that shameless libertinism which had branded with infamy the old dark days.¹ Sanudo continued to supply to the Republic the unique spectacle of a Doge vying with dissolute associates in acts of violence and immorality, until the Arrengo, arriving with that slowness common to all large deliberative bodies at the conclusion that these scenes were a blot on the national honour, determined to endure no longer an evil which they had endured already too long. The reprobate was consequently taken, arraigned, and convicted; and the flagitious nature of the charges, which were preferred against him, seemed to be inexpiable by any milder punishment than death itself. The tears and intreaties of the elder Doge, however, who, in the first burst of indignation, had stoically resolved not to shield the guilty from justice, but whose courage failed him at the last moment, saved his son and the name of Sanudo from the unparalleled ignominy of a public execution,² and the harsher sentence was accordingly commuted for one of perpetual banishment.³ Ravenna was the spot, which was chosen as the place of retirement; and as an indulgence he was allowed to select from the friends of his youth the companions of his exile. But the attractions of an idle and sedentary life soon palled; and, after a brief stay at Ravenna, Sanudo joined the standard of Hugo, Marquis of Tuscany, who was waging at that conjuncture a war against Theobald, Marquis of Spoleto. In a calling, where his talents were more conspicuous than his vices, the Venetian prince displayed merit, and might have attained distinction, had he

¹ Marin, ii. pp. 155-6.

² Nevertheless, two scions of that family had narrowly escaped the scaffold in 864 for their share in the murder of the Doge Tradenigo.

³ "Deinde omnes Episcopi, Clerus, et Populus, unanimiter juraverunt, quod nunquam nec in vita nec post obitum Patris eum Duceem haberent."—Dandolo, 205.

not quickly forsaken the honourable profession of a soldier for the more congenial trade of a pirate. With six vessels, the fruit of Ravennese jealousy, Sanudo sailed so far as Primiero, where he secured seven Venetian merchantmen, bound for Fano, on the coast of Urbino; the prizes were led back in triumph to Ravenna, where the buccaneer was able to exult in his infamous behaviour toward a country, which had used him too gently; and the search of Marco Zeno, whom the Doge had dispatched in quest of the missing vessels with thirteen galleys, was entirely unavailing.¹ The general feeling and belief were, however, that the younger Sanudo was the author of the outrage; and when this conjecture was verified, his venerable parent, bowed down by years and broken-hearted, was driven, under the galling sense of humiliation and disgrace, to tender his abdication to the people.

The name of Sanudo III. was respectable. The family, to which he belonged, was in the zenith of its power; and while the offer of the vacant magistracy to the representative of some other line threatened to rekindle civil war, the decree which forbade the return of the younger Sanudo, precluded his election. Thus the Arrengo found itself wavering between a desire to maintain the inviolability of its oath and a reluctance to rouse the vindictive resentment of the powerful family of Sanudo: the eventual recall of the exile shewed the great influence of that House, while it betrayed the aristocratic tendencies of that Assembly. Scarcely had his father laid down the insignia of power when a flotilla of barks, gaily decorated with flags, conveyed a deputation of the nobles and clergy to Ravenna, where the pirate and proscrip of yesterday was saluted with the title of Doge, and escorted with every manifestation of pomp and amid transports of enthusiasm to the Palace.

The bell at the Campanile was soon heard to peal; the churches in like manner celebrated the occasion; it was a day of bustle and rejoicing in Venice, and one old man, who lay bedridden in the street of San Severo, not far from the Palace, in a house which his family had occupied through many generations, turned feebly on his pillow to listen to the sounds which proclaimed the national perjury. Too much reason had the dying Doge to predict that the Venetians had sacrificed in vain their honour to a love of peace.

¹ Vianoli, lib. iv. p. 126.

The Republic had chosen what seemed to be the wisest, if not the most dignified, course in avoiding a rupture with the Sanudi. No other family in Venice appeared at the present moment to possess the influence and strength required to counterbalance that of the late Doge and his son, and the choice which had been made in violation of previous engagements was alone supported by the reasonable expectation that his father's death and the sense of personal responsibility might exert a satisfactory effect on one who was not wanting in administrative capability.

Nor were these hopes without a certain foundation. During a few years we hear of little or nothing to disturb a precious interval of profound calm, which left the country at liberty to prosecute its legitimate career as a mercantile power. The occasion for unsheathing the sword had of late arisen comparatively seldom, and it is satisfactory to perceive that, instead of employing this tranquil interval, as in the days of Tradenigo, with family quarrels, and turning the thoroughfares of Venice into skirmishing-grounds, the people and their ruler devoted the sittings of the Parliament and the leisure of the Executive to useful objects of legislation and diplomacy.

The Synod succeeded in procuring just about this time a new statute, declaratory of that of 878, against the traffic in Christian slaves with various countries, including those professing the Mahomedan faith, and the Venetians, under the new law, were not only precluded under penalties from direct transactions of that kind, but were forbidden to make pecuniary advances to others, particularly Greeks and Jews, for the purpose. These restrictions, where no adequate machinery existed for enforcing them, and the strongest inducements to evasion or infringement were always present, remained, notwithstanding the persevering and humane efforts of the benevolent, a dead letter; and, with two or three statutes in force, each of which was textually more stringent than its predecessor, hundreds of slaves were annually imported into the Venetian territory in a more or less clandestine manner. They were brought from Turkey, Circassia, Russia, and elsewhere, and were almost exclusively females between twelve and sixteen years of age. On disembarkation at Venice they were sold to the highest bidder, the agreement for the purchase being drawn up by a clerical notary; and the unfortunate girls who were chiefly

used, as in the East, as concubines or prostitutes, though sometimes as mere domestic menials, became for a handful of money the absolute property of the purchaser.¹

The suppression of the slave trade was a piece of in-operative legislation now, before and after. The same may be said of the formal undertaking of the Government on the part of its subjects to desist from commercial intercourse with the Saracens, in order to please the Byzantine Court, and to discontinue the carriage of letters between Constantinople and Germany, to please Berenger II., who had granted the Venetians a renewal of their charter, and whom the intrigues of a competitor for the Iron Crown in the person of Otho I. were inspiring with uneasiness. The carrying business was too advantageous and too difficult of detection to make its complete relinquishment possible, even if the Government of the Doge had been perfectly sincere in its professions; but while it was not prudent to shake the confidence or goodwill of Berenger, so long as his authority was recognised, the Venetians, unless their information and foresight were singularly at fault, could not help being aware how precarious that authority was as to its duration; and in point of fact in 962 the crowns of Germany and Italy were reunited on the brow of Otho. The Venetian resolution was promptly taken; and Otho had not quitted Rome, when he was solicited on the part of the Doge to renew the privileges which the Republic had enjoyed in the Peninsula since the days of Alboin. The mission to the Court of Rome, in addition to its practical business, was charged with a message of congratulation and compliment; the courtly and deferential attitude of the Doge's son and his companion Pietro Orseolo were very apt to be misconstrued by the German Sovereign; and the latter is alleged to have acceded to the prayer of the envoys with very indifferent grace.² The time-serving circumspection, which entered as a necessity into the Venetian policy, was probably distasteful to him, and he must have known, that the present propitiatory overtures were rather a homage to his success than to his august person. Otho had a son, who was as lukewarm toward

¹ Filiasi, *Memorie*, vi. 186; idem, *Ricerche*, 109; idem, *Saggio sul antio commercio dei Veneziani*, 129; Marin, ii. 162. This was as it had been at Rome. See *Letters of Eminent Literary Men*, Camd. Soc., 371.

² Denina, *Revoluzioni d' Italia*, ii. 69; Sandi, *Storia civile*, i. 324; Sanudo, p. 414.

Venice as himself, and a grandson, who was more sensible and more friendly.

So far, then, the Republic had been led to hope that in the Doge of Venice she had lost the pirate of Ravenna and the bravo whose wild frolics were once the terror and the disgrace of the capital. But such an anticipation was too sanguine; and although in foreign affairs, where his personal interests were not affected, his administration had been energetic and popular, Sanudo IV. proved, when the first serious difference in domestic politics arose, that his temper was as unbridled and arbitrary as ever.

Domenigo Sanudo, Bishop of Torcello, elder brother of his Serenity, having died in 964-5, the Synod chose, as his successor, Matteo Giagi.¹ The Doge, however, with whom the final decision rested in such matters, expressed a dissent, and conferred the vacant surplice on his own son Vitali. But this mere legitimate exercise of the Ducal prerogative did not satisfy Sanudo, who caused the unfortunate Giagi to be seized, deprived of sight, and removed from the public eye by death or imprisonment. The only symptoms of popular displeasure, which visited such an outrage, were low murmurs and timid reproaches; and when the patriarchal see of Grado fell vacant, in 969,² by the death of Vitali Barbolano, the Bishop of Torcello was elevated to the primacy without opposition.

Shortly afterward the Doge, inspired by the example of an elder brother, who held considerable property in Padua and Vicenza in right of his wife, an Italian heiress, repudiated, on some feigned pretence,³ his consort Giovanna, and, having immured her in the abbey of San Zaccaria, obtained in marriage Gualdrada, sister of his old ally Hugo, Marquis of Tuscany, with whom he received on the day of their espousal a portion of 400 pounds of silver, and certain estates in Oderzo, Ferrara, Treviso, and Adria.⁴ By this stroke he became the master of an ampler revenue and of a numerous body of retainers; and having thus attained a favourite object he determined to indulge to the fullest extent a secret love of grandeur and show. It was not long before the people witnessed the introduction of an order of things strangely con-

¹ Vianoli, *Historia Veneta*, lib. iv. p. 130.

² Dandolo, lib. viii. p. 209. ³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Sandi, i. p. 324; Romanin, i. p. 249.

trasting with that simplicity, which the members of a Republic still prized as the distinctive costume of their particular form of government; Saint Mark's soon afforded the novel spectacle of a Ducal Court; the satellites of Sanudo borrowed their dress, their manners, their behaviour, from the courtiers who kneeled at the feet of the Greek and German autocrats; and this display of regal pomp, which in the abstract might have been not displeasing to the popular eye, was accompanied by a despotism, more absolute than that of the House of Badoer, more terrible than the despotism of the two Galbani. Yet the Venetians, from the nature of their constitution, were singularly phlegmatic under oppression; and not only did they tolerate during some time without much perceptible emotion the tyrannical conduct of their sovereign, but they suffered the Excusati, who had now been, since 836, the bodyguard of the chief magistrate, to be supplanted by a mercenary corps, which his Serenity had partly raised on his new estates, and partly in Tuscany. The admission of foreign troops into the capital, without the consent of the Parliament, was generally considered an arbitrary stretch of the Ducal prerogative. Some, however, who were secretly inclined to view that extraordinary step as a measure of precaution, dictated by a growing distrust of the goodwill and affection of his subjects, derived consolation from the thought, that it might be the forerunner of a great and favourable change.

That change, indeed, was much nearer at hand than the most hopeful might have ventured to prophesy. A few years after the second nuptials of Sanudo, the Ferrarese, having made an incursion on that part of his estates which lay in the vicinity of their town, the Doge sent a strong force up the Po to vindicate his rights; the aggressors were sharply chastised; the citadel of Ferrara was taken and destroyed; the environs were laid waste; and a second attempt of a similar character in another quarter was followed by the dismantlement of Oderzo. On the part of the Venetians, the attendant losses were trifling; and in ordinary times the circumstances of the expedition might have been gradually forgotten. But in the present distempered state of the public mind the slightest additional irritation sufficed to goad it to phrenzy. The scene, which ensued, was that identical scene of tumult and anarchy which had already more than once prognosticated a crisis in

the government. Again, after the lapse of two centuries, a rampant multitude, exasperated by a long course of oppression, was seen to assemble on the Square of Saint Mark, clamouring for vengeance and thirsting for blood; and once more a cowardly tyrant, awakening only at the last hour to a full sense of his folly and his danger, was seen to quail before a people, whose highest privileges he had dared to set at nought. Sanudo was, perhaps, hardly aware of the full extent to which he had weakened his authority by the recent disembodiment of the *Excusati*. In offending the latter, he had incurred the enmity not merely of a military corps, but of a vested interest. In those days, when a considerable space was still left open to the labours of the agriculturist or woodman, the class which principally contributed to the Ducal Bodyguard was the small proprietary of some of the outlying islands; and its influence was now thrown into the scale against him at a moment when he was peculiarly in want of support.

Yet, as the Doge glanced from a casement of his palace at the crowded space below, he might almost have imagined that after all his fears were about to be falsified. The insurgents, doubtful how to act, though appearing to be inwardly bent on achieving some great end, had already dispersed in groups to debate what course it was best to pursue, or to listen to the views of some favourite orator on the point in agitation. Even should they persist in their original intention, and ultimately have recourse to extreme measures, there still hardly appeared to be any valid ground for apprehension. On the sworn fidelity, steady discipline, and intrepid courage of the mercenaries, who were well aware that his fate would be theirs, Sanudo felt that he might safely place implicit reliance; and in such hands a walled and solid structure such as Saint Mark's was assuredly capable of offering a long resistance to assailants. But, on closer observation, a movement in which the noblest of the citizens seemed not ashamed to join—to which those, who held the largest stake in the welfare of their country, were found willing to lend their countenance and aid—was not long to be misinterpreted; and, although the repeated attempts of an undisciplined body without the aid of artillery to force the approaches to the

Palace proved ineffectual, it soon became manifest that measures of a different nature were contemplated. In fact, at the suggestion of one of the leaders of the movement, orders were given to set fire¹ to the buildings through which lay the access to the Palace. The conflagration spread with a rapidity which was calculated to shock the incendiaries themselves. In the course of a few hours, the flames touched the chapel of Saint Mark, which adjoined the Ducal residence, and broken columns of smoke, driven by gusts of wind against the casements of the latter building, diffused a panic terror among the unfortunate inmates. Amid the horror and confusion of such a scene, Sanudo, bearing his child² by Gualdrada in his arms, was seen to rush out of St. Mark's chapel, to crouch before a group, in which he recognised a few of his friends and relatives, and to implore their compassion, promising to redress every grievance, to undo every act of injustice.³

But it was too late. The moment had now arrived when repentance was no longer of use; and while the general voice upbraided him with his crimes, a few of the bystanders, more resolute or more impatient than the rest, plunged their daggers into his bosom. The little child, whose innocence might have moved the people to compassion, was the partner of its parent's fate; and it was not till the tempest had subsided, that Giovanni Gradenigo⁴ ventured to claim for the remains the rites of interment, and conveyed them to the monastery of San Ilario, near Fusina. They had at first been cast into a boat, and carried to the common shambles to be thrown to the dogs. So blind and ungovernable was the popular phrenzy.

This termination of the career of Sanudo IV. was not apt to create a feeling of surprise; the sole ground for wonder seemed to be that the nation should have borne so long a yoke which it could so easily break, and that the elective magistrate of a free commonwealth should have been suffered, during the greater part of seventeen years, to exercise under the thin disguise of liberty and equality

¹ Sagorninus, *Chron.* 69.

² *Lettera di Agostino Gradenigo sulla famiglia Candiana*, 1760.

³ Sagorninus, *Chron.* 70.

⁴ Giustiniani, *Chronica di Venetia*, p. 31, King's MSS. 248; and Mutinelli, *A.U.* pp. 26-7.

a power hardly less unfettered than that which was held at that period by the descendants of Constantine and Charlemagne. The terrible misrule, however, of the Tribunitial Oligarchy, the ferocious despotism of some of the earlier Doges, the tyrannical sway of the Galbani, and, lastly, the autocratic rule of the House of Badoer during a period of seventy-four years, are exemplifications of one and the same doctrine; and the long reign of the fourth Sanudo formed another clue to the tendency of the government and another satire on the character of the people.

The death of Sanudo glutted the vengeance and assuaged the passion of the multitude; and the Venetians had now leisure to perceive¹ that three hundred houses, the churches of San Teodoro and Santa Maria Jubenigo, and the Ducal residence and Saint Mark's itself, were severely injured by the flames. It was while a few were still lingering over this distressing scene, that a large concourse of persons assembled in the church of Saint Peter the Apostle at Olivolo, and acclaimed Pietro Orseolo² chief magistrate of the Republic (12th August, 976).

Orseolo, who has been already seen officiating in a diplomatic capacity as the ambassador of the Republic at the Court of Otho I., and who was now in his forty-eighth year³ and in extremely affluent circumstances, belonged to an ancient Roman family of some consideration, who had left their native city of Altinum in the time of Attila, and had settled at Torcello; and although their descendant had no claim to a place in the first order of the aristocracy, he enjoyed to the fullest extent that social and popular pre-eminence to which his large fortune, his amiable character, and his manly presence entitled him.

In a city composed of wooden buildings, and where the liability to destruction by fire was consequently extreme, a simple act of arson, committed in one of the leading thoroughfares, was one of the gravest offences of which a person could be guilty; and how much more heinous and capital became the crime when the match of the incendiary aimed at reaching the principal edifices in the metropolis, structures on the development and gradual amplification of which more than

¹ Morosini, lib. iii. p. 77; Filiasi, vi. p. 204; Marin, ii. p. 170.

² Sagorninus, *Chron.* 71.

³ Dandolo, viii. 212.

one private fortune had been expended, which had been slowly brought to their present condition by the intermittent labours of 250 years: one a building, in which were stored all the public muniments, and which stood in an altogether more important relation to the State than the palaces of times with which we are acquainted.

The serious damage which had been inflicted on this block of buildings was the least easily repaired; and the Doge, reluctant under the circumstances to aggravate the public distress by calling on the popular assembly to furnish the necessary funds, determined with equal piety and patriotism to execute the work at his own expense. A curious legend is extant that, while it was still a question to whom the commission should be given, an unknown person, of singular appearance and lame in both legs, presented himself, and offered to render Saint Mark's the most picturesque and beautiful edifice imaginable, upon the understanding that, on its completion, his statue in marble should be placed in the most conspicuous part of the building. The Doge, who might well smile at the whimsical request of the cripple, acceded, it is said, to the stipulation; and, for awhile, the operations progressed favourably enough; but it seems that the stranger confessed to Orseolo, one day, his inability to complete the contract, and that consequently he lost his statue. Some connection has been traced between this story and the deformed figure, with his finger to his lips, in one of the archivolts of the church. The design for the Basilica was ultimately delivered to the government by a Byzantine architect, who had found his way to Venice from Constantinople; and the building would naturally partake of the Moorish or Arabian character, which distinguishes its successor. Comparatively humble as the tenth-century church was, it asked more than one hand and one lifetime to complete it; but so soon as the cathedral was ready for its reception, the pious founder placed on the altar a slab of gold of Greek fabric. In the meantime much of the palace and the range of buildings, which were devoted to official purposes, remained in a dilapidated condition; and Orseolo procured leave, for the present, to transfer the seat of government to his own house in the street of SS. Filippo e Giacomo. Sagorninus, who was living at this time, and put his account of the Republic into

writing under the next reign, leads us to conclude that the common accounts greatly exaggerate the losses from the fire generally and the extent to which the palace suffered. For he refers to the latter as the same which had stood there since the first establishment of the metropolis in Rialto about 810, and does not consequently authorise the ordinary idea that it was reduced to ruins.¹

While these events were passing at Venice, Gualdrada, having succeeded in escaping the popular vengeance during the insurrection, had joined Adelheid, consort of the late Emperor Otho I. and empress regent, at Verona; and, at the same time, the Patriarch of Grado, exasperated beyond measure at the elevation of a man, on whose head rested, in his opinion, the blood of a murdered parent, had quitted his see and his country, by the advice of his political friends,² in order to expose at the court of Verona the turpitude of the Venetians, and to seek in Otho II. a vindicator of the wrongs of the House of Sanudo. But the Doge and his advisers, not ignorant of the feeling of friendship and sympathy³ which existed toward the Sanudi, and aware that with his crown Otho had inherited the sentiments, which the first of his name entertained toward the Republic, were perfectly sensible of the pernicious consequences which might accrue if they allowed the Patriarch time to extend his intrigues to the court of Verona, and to enlist in his cause the Empress as well as her son; and it was therefore determined to counteract his probable success in that quarter, by removing, to some extent at least, the injurious impression of recent events. Accordingly, a few months after his accession, Orseolo furnished Domenigo Grimani⁴ with instructions to proceed to Verona, to ascertain the temper and views of the Court of Adelheid, and to endeavour to pacify Gualdrada by the offer of a liberal indemnity for the losses, which she had sustained by the sudden death of her late husband. The execution of Grimani's mission was attended by no common difficulty. For, although Gualdrada herself was inclined to be reasonable in her demands, the Empress, who pointed to the ruined walls of Oderzo and Ferrara, seemed disposed to insist, as a preliminary step, on the full reparation of the damage which the

¹ Sagorninus, *Chron.* 71.

² Sagorninus, *ubi supra.*

³ Filiasi, vi. 214.

⁴ Caroldo, *Historie Venete*, p. 37, Harl. MSS. 5020.

Venetian troops had inflicted on those parts of the imperial dominions in the time of Sanudo IV. More moderate counsels, however, prevailed in the end; the tact or importunacy of Grimani induced Adelheid to waive her exorbitant claim; and so soon as the 400 pounds of silver, which Sanudo had received on the day of his union with the sister of Hugo, had been returned to the widowed Dogaressa, the Empress consented to join with the latter in a solemn declaration, that the Republic should receive no prejudice whatever from passed occurrences, and that any subject of the empire who molested Venetian merchants in the pursuit of their calling, should be punishable.¹ It is said that the Republic experienced the utmost difficulty in collecting the amount required, and that arrears of taxation were not obtained without an appeal to force. The system, under which the revenue was levied, preserved its ancient simplicity.

One of the State Papers lost in the late fire was the treaty of 932 between the Republic and Capo d'Istria, and, the Duke of Beneventum² having attempted to tamper with the fidelity of the fief, the Doge insisted on a renewal and recognition of the charter.

It was shortly after that a stranger landed at Venice. He announced himself as Father Warin, Superior of the Abbey of Saint Michel de Cuxac, in Aquitaine, who was on his return from Rome, and was animated by pious curiosity to inspect the new temple and shrine of the Patron Evangelist.³ Orseolo received his holy guest with marked distinction; and during the brief sojourn of the abbot the intercourse ripened into intimacy. The conversation turned on the goodness of the Maker, the reward of virtue, and the vanity of human ambition.⁴ The monk talked with captivating fluency: the Doge listened with entrancement to the words which fell from the man of God. A discourse grew into a controversy; the controversy subsided into a lecture; and, in the course of a few days, Orseolo (like good King Ceolwulf of Wessex) was fully persuaded that a monastic life afforded the greatest facilities to pensive minds and the nearest approach to the perfection of sublunar happiness. Warin was even in favour

¹ *Quæstio Dominae Valdradae olim Ducisse, Consortis Petri Candiani IV. Ducis, Petro Orseolo Duci et successoribus.*—See Marin, ii. 175.

² Dandolo, lib. viii. p. 213.

³ Sagorninus, *Chron.* 72.

⁴ *Ibid.* 73.

of an instant renunciation of the world and its paltry grandeur; but, whatever may have been the strength of his convictions or the force of his enthusiasm, the Doge calculated that a certain time was absolutely necessary to arrange his private affairs, and otherwise to prepare himself for his new mode of life. Orseolo asked, for this purpose, the delay of a twelvemonth. On the expiration of that term, the abbot of Saint Michel was invited to return to Venice, and to claim his illustrious proselyte.

Meanwhile, the Doge continued to discharge his duties with unremitting zeal; his design of relinquishing the cares of government, and of spending his declining years in the tranquil seclusion of a French convent, remained a close secret; and the people at large were wholly ignorant of the powerful effect, which his mysterious visitor had exercised on the mind of their Prince. Distrustful of female discretion, he determined not to unfold his intention even to his wife,¹ who had enrolled herself some time since, with his approval, among the nuns of San Zaccaria; the only partners of his confidence were his son-in-law, Giovanni Morosini,² and his intimate friend, the excellent and humane Giovanni Gradenigo,³ and these were the chosen companions of his flight.

Accompanied by two of the Brethren, named Romoaldo and Marino, the Superior of Saint Michel returned to Venice with scrupulous punctuality on the evening of the 1st September 978,⁴ and repaired according to previous arrangement to the monastery of San Ilario, in Rialto, where they were speedily joined by the Doge and his two associates. Orseolo having assumed the garb of a pilgrim, the whole party, anxious to escape detection and elude pursuit, quitted San Ilario at midnight, mounted the horses, which awaited them in the immediate neighbourhood,⁵ and traversing the shallow canal, rode at full speed across the country. The fugitives reached their destination in safety; and when he had received the hospitable welcome of the abbot, Morosini bid farewell to his father-in-law and to Gradenigo, and retraced his steps homeward. The noble recluse survived his strange resolution nineteen years; more than once during that long period he

¹ Sagorninus, *Chron.* 71; Caroldo, *Historic*, p. 25; King's MSS. 147; Mutinelli, *A. U.* p. 29.

² L. de Monacis, fol. 38.

⁴ Sagorninus, *Chron.* 74.

³ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

was visited by his youthful son Pietro, to whom it is gravely alleged that he foretold his future fame; and it was indeed whispered, that Orseolo the Holy had then lived long enough¹ to repent the vow,² which he somewhat too precipitately made to Father Warin.³ For one of the associates of his design, Romoaldo, who subsequently founded the Camaldolite order, was a disciplinarian of the most austere type, and enjoined on all under his direction the strictest asceticism. The labour, which Orseolo was required to perform in common with the rest of the brethren, was too exacting for a man, whose frame required a more generous diet than that in vogue at Saint Michel; and a story has come down that it was necessary for the convert to appeal to the man, who had been instrumental in weaning him from a home where abundance reigned, before his daily rations could be somewhat enlarged. Let this tradition stand for what it is worth. The original motives of the stalwart sea-bred Venetian were alike excellent; whether he regretted what he had done, we are never to know.

The Doge's flight was not disclosed till the morning of the 2nd of September. The house which Orseolo had occupied in the street of SS. Filippo e Giacomo, at once became an object of general attention and curiosity. A large number of persons was naturally anxious to ascertain the truth of the strange story, which was now gaining currency in the city. The unexpected intelligence gave rise in the public mind to a mixed feeling. That his Serenity would ultimately lay aside the sceptre, was a contingency which had not perhaps been unforeseen by those who knew the man and the bias of his mind. But no one had imagined that the period of his abdication was so near, or that the place of his retirement would be so distant; and even the Dogaressa Felicita Malipiero,⁴ while she consoled herself for the loss of her consort by admiring the wisdom of the vow, could not refrain from expressing her surprise, that the Doge should have chosen to fix his last earthly abode in a French convent instead of passing a life of sanctity and ease among his own people. His fame long survived him. Numerous publications during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries discussed the story, or

¹ Lorenzo de Monacis, fol. 39.

² *Vitae SS. ordinis Sancti Benedicti*, sec. v. p. 855.

³ See Foscarini, *Letteratura Veneziana*, 323, edit. 1854.

⁴ De Monacis, fol. 38 (Add. MSS. B. M. 8574).

eulogised the hero of it; in 1731 the Doge was canonised by the Holy See, and in the following year Louis XV. sent his remains to Venice.¹ Still, although there might be many who regarded with unfeigned sorrow the loss of so pious and so amiable a prince, the departure of Orseolo was not to be considered as a public misfortune. The insolvent state to which the Ducal Fisc had been reduced by recent disbursements, the restless ambition of Otho II., the covert jealousy which he nourished of Venetian independence, and the manifold causes which they had to dread his animosity, led many to own the expediency of having as their chief magistrate at that juncture a man who, even in preference to other recommendations, was acceptable to Otho II. The Candiani or Sanudi, on whom the excesses of the last Doge of the name had brought such opprobrium and obloquy, were known to possess greater influence over the present Emperor of the West than any other family in Venice; and the people consequently felt that, by seeking the successor of Orseolo among the members of that illustrious house, they were best consulting the common interest. Their choice fell on Vitali, uncle of the Patriarch of Grado, and younger brother² of the late Sanudo IV. who, since the palace was still uninhabitable, made his own house at San Ponal his headquarters.³

Even at this distance of time we can picture Orseolo, half Doge, half monk, now addressing the Arrengo on some current topic of public concern; now conversing in a low and subdued voice with some meanly clad pilgrim, newly arrived from Rome or the East: at one time performing some strange penance in his private chapel; at another, coming forth from the inner apartment of his house, the prince's abode for the time being, to receive the ambassador of an emperor. Among the papers which he left behind him was a short will, which he had prepared on the evening of the 1st, just before his departure. This instrument, by which the bulk of his extensive property was bequeathed to his only son and heir, provided funds for the erection of a new Ducal chapel, the building of a public hospital, and for other noble and useful purposes.⁴

The offer of the crown to Sanudo V. had been prompted

¹ *Relazione della reliquia di S. Pietro Orseolo*, 8vo, 1735. See *Contemporary Review* for August 1886 as to this incident.

² Gradenigo, *Lettera a Brunacci*, 1760.

³ Harl. MSS. 4820.

⁴ Sagorninus contemp., *Chron.* 75.

by the double consideration, that he was childless, and that his good offices with Otho might be valuable at a juncture, when a certain soreness of feeling still lingered behind in connection with the late Dogaresa Gualdrada and the tragical end of his own brother. That the nation had exercised a wise discretion in recalling the Sanudi to the head of affairs was made particularly clear by the demeanour of the Emperor toward the Venetian representatives, who came, on the part of Sanudo, to solicit his friendship and commercial protection; for his Majesty, in granting the request of the Republic, declared himself actuated solely by a wish to please his mother Adelheid and his consort Theophano, coupled with a desire to merit the Divine clemency by compassionating the forlorn state of the people in the Salt-Lagoon.¹ It was as if the Doge had merely come forward to negotiate this reconciliation, imperfect as it appeared to be, with Otho; for, at the end of fourteen months, on the plea of failing health, he withdrew, without ostensibly performing any other public act, into the monastery of San Ilario, at Lizza Fusina.² Thirty-seven years only had elapsed since, in 942, the House of Badoer ceased to reign; and now the other great dynasty of Sanudo or Candiano which, with that of Badoer, had enjoyed during two centuries the largest share of political influence in the Republic, beheld its last crowned representative in the successor of Orseolo the Holy.

Marina Sanudo, niece of Sanudo V., and daughter of his elder brother Sanudo IV., was united at this time to Tribuno, son of Andrea Memo, of San Marcuola, in the district of Canalreggio, a man of ample fortune, and the owner of another large estate near Malamocco,³ but of mediocre capacity.⁴ Yet his wealth, his alliance with the Doge's kinswoman, and his connection with the very influential House of Caloprini, appear to have rendered merit a secondary consideration; and when, in November 979, Sanudo expressed his strong desire to abdicate, Memo was chosen to succeed him. The new Doge is said to have been excessively fond of flowers and shrubs, which he cultivated with much assiduity and success.

When the Doge Orseolo ascended the throne in the

¹ Muratori, v. p. 450; Filiasi, vi. p. 213; Marin, ii. p. 188.

² Sansovino, lib. xiii. p. 531.

³ Cigogna, *Iscrizioni*, v. 4, p. 404; Litta *in voce* Candiano.

⁴ Sagorinus, *Chron.* 76; Mutinelli, *Annali*, 39.

autumn of 976, the Ducal Palace and the Basilica had suffered considerable injury. The restoration of these buildings, which had been at once commenced by the then new ruler, made very little progress, however, during his short reign, and throughout his continuance in office Orseolo appears to have resided exclusively at his own house. The feeble health and brief administration of his successor left him very little taste and very little time for the active prosecution of public works; and, even when Tribuno Memo was elected in 979, the arrangements at Saint Mark's were still so incomplete, that the ceremony of the coronation was performed at the private residence of Memo at San Marcuola,¹ near the church of SS. Ermacora and Fortunato, of which the Memi were the founders and patrons.

During the earlier part of his reign, the attention of Otho II. had been mainly occupied by the affairs of Germany; and it was not till toward the year 982, that he found himself in a position to carry into execution his favourite plan for the recovery of Southern Italy, to which his union with Theophano, niece of Basilios and Constantine, and heiress of Apulia and Calabria, gave him in his own estimation a just and exclusive right. His success in the Peninsula, however, was far from corresponding to his expectations; the hope of winning back the triple crown of Charlemagne was dispelled by the firm and hostile attitude of the joint successors of Constantine the Great; and the real weakness of the Byzantine Court was disguised by the prompt co-operation of Venice and the Saracens. The former was actuated in this instance by a twofold motive. Firstly, the Republic had no object in deviating from her traditional policy toward the Lower Empire; in the second place, she had every inclination to resent the support which Otho had lent to the Dogaressa Gualdrada and the Patriarch Sanudo in the affair of 976. The Saracens, naturally anxious to prevent the invader from establishing himself in the south of Italy, speedily recruited their ranks by levies from Sicily and Algiers; a Greek army was conveyed in Venetian transports to the shores of Calabria; and the forces of the Emperor, who had fearlessly advanced to meet his opponents, were almost annihilated by the con-

¹ *Chronica delle casade di Venezia*, p. 215 (King's MSS. Brit. Mus. No. 150); Pietro Giustiniani, *Chronica di Venetia*, p. 32 (ibid. No. 148).

federates at the battle of Basentello. Otho himself, who was obliged to seek safety in flight, narrowly escaped falling into the hands of the Greeks; and he succeeded with difficulty in regaining Verona, where he convoked a general Diet of the empire. This assembly was composed of the great vassals of the realm, the high dignitaries of the church, and the deputies from foreign courts; and the ranks of the latter body were unexpectedly swelled by the arrival of the envoys of the new Doge Memo. The Venetians were still unaware to what extent their co-operation with the Greeks had attracted his notice, and had incurred his displeasure; and they felt that, should any animosity really exist in the mind of Otho on this ground, it was expedient to remove or mitigate it on the first opportunity.

With this important mission it was, that Morosini and his two companions had been charged. Although Otho II. made no explicit allusion to the part which the Republic had borne in the late campaign, it was evident that the fact of Venetian transports having been placed at the disposal of the Byzantine Court had comè to his ears. Their charter, however, which bore the seals and signs-manual of Luitprand the Lombard, of Charlemagne, of Pepin le Bref, of Lothair, of Louis le Debonnair, of Charles le Gros, and, lastly, of Otho the Great, was demanded; and after some demur the commercial privileges of Venice were confirmed, subject to an annual payment to the imperial treasury. This annual tax was usually tendered in the form of a robe of cloth of gold of the prescribed value. It is doubtful whether the custom of purchasing the privilege of free trade was introduced by Otho II., or whether it dates from an earlier period. We do not, however, observe any such stipulation in the ancient treaties of the Republic with the successors of Alboin and Charlemagne, and are therefore disposed to conclude that it originated only in the tenth century, when the trade of the Venetians with the Peninsula had become more extensive and valuable, and that it was most probably an innovation made by Otho himself. The community, toward which so many sovereigns and dynasties entertained such mingled sentiments, had already seen a long procession of figures cross the stage, play their parts, and disappear.

But while the Republic was viewed by her powerful neigh-

bour with such a jealous and resentful eye, she was far more keenly sensible of the danger which might arise from the shameful and treacherous discord of her own citizens. The capital, which had enjoyed undisturbed tranquillity since the revolution of 976, was plunging once more into strife and dissension. Public order was violated, public opinion divided, by a feud between the Morosini and the Caloprini,¹ originating in the old question, whether an adhesion to the Eastern or Western empire was more conducive to the welfare and prosperity of their country. The Morosini were in favour of the Byzantine Court; their rivals declared for the Germans. The former, who echoed the sentiments of the people at large, were the more numerous; the latter, who counted on the support of the great houses of Memo and Sanudo, were at first the more influential party. But they speedily lost that influence through their own violence and indiscretion. One day, a naked corpse was discovered in a small boat, near the water-gate of the Abbey of San Zaccaria; it was immediately identified as the body of Domenigo Morosini, a man universally esteemed for his piety and virtue; and a report was soon rife that this unfortunate victim of party had been seized, as he was leaving the church of San Pietro in the same district, by the satellites of Stefano Caloprini, leader of the opposite faction, and had been beaten to death. It was supposed that the assassins, having accomplished their purpose, had stripped the body and thrown it into a boat which happened to drift to the door of San Zaccaria.² This intelligence produced a general sentiment of indignation and horror; and Caloprini, anticipating the consequences of the disclosures which were being hourly made, lost no time in providing for his own safety and that of his connexions and accomplices. The fugitives directed their steps to Verona, where an asylum was not refused to them.

At the commencement of the quarrel between the Caloprini and their rivals, Tribuno Memo had instinctively attached himself to the former, with whom he acknowledged the double tie of marriage and friendship. The deplorable tragedy at Olivolo, however, led the Doge to change his views and his party; the family and kindred of Domenigo Morosini were now in their turn caressed, and the Caloprini fell into

¹ Sagorninus contemp., *Chron.* 76-77.

² Sagorninus, *Chron.* 77.

odium. Facing the Ducal Palace,¹ lay the small island of San Giorgio Maggiore, so called from a cognominal church which had been founded on that site. At this time San Giorgio, though celebrated for its vineyards, its oliveyards, and its avenues of cypresses, was uninhabited; and Memo, whose progenitors appeared to have purchased² the manorial rights, at some period antecedent to the present, of the Badoer family, the more ancient proprietors, determined to confer the islet as a peace-offering on Giovanni Morosini, son-in-law of the late Doge Orseolo, who was desirous of establishing a monastery of the Order of Saint Benedict.³ The act of donation, which bore date the 20th December 982, was subscribed by the Doge himself, the Ducal Notary, and 130 of the principal Houses in Venice; and in the conditions attached to the grant was included the important stipulation, that the founder of the new institution and his descendants should drain the marshy ground on the estate, or in the vicinity, and should bring the soil under cultivation.⁴

In the meantime, the exiles had found ready admittance to the presence of the Emperor; and Otho listened with attention to the words which fell from Stefano Caloprini. "Sire," cried the latter, "it is at the feet of a Prince, who is the idol of his subjects, the cynosure of the Universe, that the victims of tyranny and misfortune have come to throw themselves. Banished from a country, toward which we have given so many proofs of our love, our sole safety is in your protection; and we rise not till you have deigned to commiserate our lot. We assure you, Sire, that we have had no share in the death of the excellent Doge Sanudo; nor in the infraction of the treaties which attached our State to your empire; neither have we courted an alliance with the Greeks, your inveterate enemies. I speak not" (continued Caloprini) "in the name only of those whom you behold prostrate at your feet, and who are themselves persons of no small consideration, but in the name of all who detest, as we do, the despotism of a faction, and that of a Doge, who lends to it his aid and countenance." The speaker concluded by offering to Otho the sovereignty of Venice and the Adriatic, with the suggestion that, so soon as the matter came to a successful

¹ Sansovino, lib. v. p. 218.

² De Monacis, fol. 38; Sanudo, fol. 465.

³ Gallicioli, lib. i. c. 5.

⁴ Romanin, i. 263.

issue, he should feel a pride and a pleasure in administering the new province in the imperial name.¹ An annual tribute of one hundred pounds of gold should attest his devotion and allegiance; and the Venetian Marine, placed at the disposal of his Majesty, might materially assist in the expulsion of the Saracens and Greeks from Italy, and in avenging Basentello. The specious eloquence and plausible manner of the emigrant produced the desired effect; in his expression of loyal affection and fidelity Caloprini was believed to be honest; and Otho agreed, after some hesitation, to the plan for annexing the Dogado to Lombardy, and appointing him imperial governor of the new Venetian Province.²

An edict, suspending all commercial intercourse between the Republic and the empire, and declaring the islands in a state of siege, promised a speedy attainment of this double object; and the conspirators were not ashamed to accept the task of superintending in person the blockade of the rivers, whose waters usually poured into the lap of Venice a bountiful supply of the necessaries of life. At the same time, Cavarzero (*Caput Aggeris*), situated within a short distance of Commacchio, sold herself to the enemy for a promise of the municipal franchise; and the Bishop of Belluno, availing himself of the embarrassed state of the Republic, made an inroad into Citta Nuova, from which he returned with an ample booty.

On the other hand, the Government lost no time in marking its strong sense of the treachery of the fugitives. A decree was published, in the name of the Doge, launching a sentence of outlawry against the three Caloprini and their accomplices, declaring their lands and effects confiscated, and their families the hostages of the State. This edict, however, while it served to gratify the popular pride and resentment, did not contribute to extricate the besieged from their difficulty. By the abrupt discontinuance of their intercourse with the ports of the Adriatic, which were now unexceptionally closed against the Venetian flag, all communication with the mainland was suspended; and while their internal resources were approaching exhaustion, the hope of external relief was dissipated by the presence of an imperial squadron,³

¹ Caroldo, *Hist. Venete*, p. 39.

² Mutinelli, *Annali*, pp. 30-31.

³ Romanin, i. 263.

which had received orders to cut off any supplies from Dalmatia or the East. It must necessarily appear singular that a maritime country was unable at such a conjuncture to produce a naval force capable of meeting that of Otho; the private contributory principle which prevailed in the ancient naval system, and the constant absence of a large proportion of vessels abroad, were perhaps operating causes; but at all events the dilemma seemed hopeless, and the voice of distress was soon heard above that of indignation. At this critical juncture, however, when the Republic was almost reduced to a cruel alternative, the news reached Venice, that Otho had died of an ague at Rome, leaving the reins of government during the long minority of his son in the joint hands of Adelheid and Theophano.¹ The joyful tidings were substantiated by the removal of the interdict and by a message of sympathy from the Court of the Regency (December 983).

Caloprini found himself thrown by the death of Otho into a position of peculiar embarrassment. He justly feared that while he was an object of aversion in the eyes of his own countrymen, the views of the Court of Verona toward him would undergo a serious change. It was barely likely that the former would now listen to terms of accommodation: the latter might even refuse to shield the rebellious subjects of a friendly State; and should his overtures to the government be more successful than he expected, the exile felt a natural repugnance to humble himself before a people, over whom he had so lately hoped to rule with dictatorial power. Yet he appears to have deferred in the end to the wishes of his children and adherents, who were anxious to be restored to their homes. At his solicitation, Adelheid consented to undertake the task of intercession; and the Republic, unwilling to displease such good friends as the Greek princess and herself had proved throughout, acquiesced in the return of the traitors. The elder Caloprini, however, was not spared to avail himself of the clemency which he had sought; and his two sons were forced to return fatherless to a country of which they had so ill deserved.

On their arrival at Venice, the two brothers found that their antagonists had turned the unfortunate affair at Olivolo

¹ Muratori, v. p. 464.

to the best account, and that, while the enlistment of the Doge and his kindred in the ranks of the Morosini rendered that family one of the most powerful in the Republic, the same cause crippled the influence of their own. It was with anger and chagrin, that the latter noted the triumphant insolence of the faction which had thus usurped their place in the confidence and goodwill of Memo, and the impunity with which the new favourites of that fickle and weak prince committed acts of the most unwarrantable nature: nor could they conceal from themselves the mortifying fact that, although their countrymen might have been led to acquiesce in their recall by motives of policy, they were still regarded by every class of the community with secret dislike. When the state of feeling between the two leading families in Venice was such, it can hardly be accounted strange, that the civil war burst out with more violence and acrimony than ever. The disgraceful contest endured through several years, and to such a degree, at last, was the spirit of partisanship inflamed by open hostilities and petty annoyances, that one day, as Marino and Stefano Caloprini were returning homeward, and were on the point of entering their gondola, they were overtaken and stabbed by four of the adverse faction. The corpses, which had dyed with their gore the margin of the canal, where the tragedy took place, were secured by some of the servants of the fallen noblemen and conveyed to their homes.¹

This catastrophe brought the struggle to a climax. The whole capital was resonant with cries. All demanded justice; some clamoured for blood; and in the poignancy of her grief the mother of the Caloprini was heard to invoke the curse of Heaven on the heads of the murderers. It was in vain, too, that the Doge disclaimed any cognizance of the authors of the recent outrage; some² pronounced it intolerable, that their lives and their liberties should be placed at the arbitrament of a profligate faction and of a prince who stooped to connive at its worst acts; and the hostile agitation gathered strength sufficient to render a longer tenure of power by Memo a matter of doubtful expediency and safety (991).

¹ Sagorninus, *Chron.* 24; Dandolo, lib. viii. p. 221.

² "A quo tamen facinore licet Dux se inculpabilem redderet, nonnulli tamen eum conscium affirmabant."—Dandolo.

Not very agreeable, perhaps, were his reflections as he returned to catch a final glimpse of that smiling garden, those shaded grounds, and that tranquil retreat at San Marcuola, which he left to mount a throne.¹

The Doge had perhaps been in broken health, when he formed the design of renouncing power; and a cloistral life afforded the greatest facilities to those who were afflicted in body as well as to the holy or penitent in spirit. But Memo did not very long enjoy his retirement. As lately as 1610, his bust, placed on a pedestal in San Giorgio Maggiore, shewed that the monks of Saint Benedict had not even then forgotten how much their order was indebted to the patron of Giovanni Morosini.

That house is seen, as time proceeds, to grow more and more conspicuous and powerful; the Caloprini soon disappear from history.

Memo was succeeded by Pietro, only son of Orseolo the Holy, who was still living in religious seclusion in Aquitaine among the brethren of Saint Michel. Perhaps, by remaining abroad, and resisting the temptation to forsake for more cheerful scenes the ascetic and laborious life of the cloister, the father contributed not a little to seat the second of his dynasty on the throne. But this class of incident remained of more or less customary occurrence down to the sixteenth century; and the cases of Cosmo de' Medici and Charles V. naturally occur to recollection. Where the Orseolo affair differed from others was in the hardships and privations, to which his spiritual superiors subjected the ex-Doge; for this kind of voluntary seclusion we find as a rule mainly a vehicle for physical repose or intellectual enjoyment.

¹ Sansovino, *Ventia descritta*, 1663, p. 220.

CHAPTER VII

A.D. 991-1084

Orseolo II., Doge (991-1008)—Acquisition of Dalmatia and Assumption of the Title (998)—Orseolo III., Doge (1008-25)—Pietro Barbolano, Doge (1026)—Orso Orseolo, Vice-Doge (1025)—Orseolo III., again Doge (1026-33)—Domenigo Flabenigo, Doge (1033-43)—Abolition of Hereditary Succession and Association—Domenigo Contarini, Doge (1043-71)—Revolt of Zara (1050)—Domenigo Selvo, Doge (1071-84)—Battles of Durazzo and Corfu (1081-4)—Deposition of Selvo (1084).

THE energetic foreign policy of Orseolo II., promptly re-establishing the relations of his country with both empires and with Belluno, supplies a testimony that in the present state of the constitution a vast influence for good or for the reverse centred in the Doge. It lay completely within his capacity, sometimes during a generation, to apply the moral and material resources of Venice to the best advantage, or to neutralise them: and it is assuredly honourable to the Republic, her peculiar tendencies considered, that as a rule her choice of rulers was sagacious and happy. In the structure of Venetian greatness the early Doges claim a rich share.

The evidence adduced before the imperial court at Pavia in the case of the Bishop of Belluno, who had some years before been guilty of acts of brigandage in the direction of Citta Nuova, was clear and circumstantial; and the good prelate, on whom the government of the Regency brought its influence to bear, was obliged after a great deal of demur and difficulty,¹ to submit to the terms of compensation dictated by Adelheid and Theophano.

The protective duties charged at the Greek ports on Venetian merchandise had been for some time passed a subject of complaint, and a new commercial treaty had been partly concluded, before Orseolo entered upon office. The

¹ Marin, ii. 233; Sagorninus, *Contemp.* p. 86; Dandolo, lib. ix. c. 1.

early settlement of so momentous a question was naturally much desired, and in 991 Basilios and Constantine granted a chrysobole,¹ in which the exemptions already enjoyed by the Venetian traders in Constantinople, and throughout the realm, were confirmed, and the duty, chargeable on each cargo of Venetian produce or merchandise in Greek ports, was reduced from twenty-five to two soldi. The former rate was of course designed by the Imperial Government to be protective; but the new tariff, which very nearly approached free trade, was, on the contrary, calculated to throw open the advantages of commerce to more general enterprise and competition.

The relations with the German empire of the West were formally renewed in an interview, which Otho III. granted at Mühlhausen in Elsas to Giovanni the Dean,² on the 19th July 992; and those relations were still farther improved in a second audience, to which the Emperor admitted the Dean and Pietro Gradenigo, on the 1st May 996. By these two treaties: 1. The grants of Otho II. and his predecessors were confirmed. 2. The right of the Venetians to hunt and fish, on certain easy conditions, in the woods and rivers of Lombardy was also recognised. 3. A treaty was approved with the Bishop of Treviso, by which the duty payable on each gallon of wine imported by Venetian traders into that diocese, was fixed at half a denaro, and on the salt and other commodities, at a fortieth part of the whole,³ provided that the salt exceeded 300 bushels, otherwise it was to be free. 4. A similar treaty was sanctioned with the Bishop of Ceneda, by which it was stipulated that Porto Gruaro, on the Livenza, ten miles from Aquileia, should belong to the Republic, in consideration of a certain sum of ready money, an annual tribute of sixty pounds of oil from the Ducal Fisc, and an oblation of equal value to the church of San Tiziano by each Venetian resident. 5. The port of San Michele del Quarto, on the Silis, was opened to the Republic. 6. All runaway serfs, who might take refuge in the imperial dominions, were to be restored to their Venetian owners. 7. The claim of the

¹ Sagorninus *ubi supra*; Marin, ii. p. 211; Depping, *Commerce du Levant*, i. p. 151.

² He was accompanied by Giovanni Orseolo, eldest son of the Doge, yet still of tender years.

³ Marino Sanudo, *Itinerario*, 145.

Republic to any property, which her citizens might have acquired in Lombardy, was fully allowed. 8. Any Venetian, who was guilty of a crime or offence of whatever nature, was to be amenable only to a Venetian tribunal.¹ A fine of 500 pounds of gold, one moiety of which was payable to the imperial treasury, the other to the aggrieved person, was incurred by any subject of Otho, who should violate the provisions of the new international treaty.

The compacts, which he had thus made with the two empires, did not satisfy the ambition of Orseolo; that patriotic prince, anxious to afford Venetian enterprise a wider sphere of action, determined to enter into negotiations of a similar character with the rulers of Barbary, Egypt, Syria, and Tartary, although even in 829, at the period of the translation of Saint Mark, two merchants belonging to the Republic were trading in the port of Alexandria with ten galleys. A contemporary writer affirms that the Doge succeeded in establishing relations of a friendly and favourable character with the Saracens of Italy, Sicily, and Algiers; and history also speaks with some confidence of the treaties,² which his envoys concluded with the khan of the Crimea and the petty princes of Cairo, Damascus, Medina, and Tunis.³

But while the perspicacious policy of the Republic was thus directing itself to the extension or improvement of her commercial relations with various European and Asiatic powers, an event occurred, which might well tempt men who remembered the bad times, to imagine that Fortune had been hoarding her favours of late years, in order to lavish them more prodigally on the country of the Doge Orseolo. About a century before his time, the Venetian traders, seriously annoyed and alarmed by the piratical and predatory incursions of the Narentines, had entered⁴ into a private arrangement by which they consented to purchase a security for their vessels and merchandise with a yearly tribute. Orseolo, considering that such a compromise, though not unusual, provided no durable remedy for the evil, refused, shortly after his entry

¹ Filiasi, *Ricerche storiche*, 45; and *Sul antico commercio*, pp. 27-32.

² Foscari, *Dei viaggiatori Veneziani*; *Arch. stor. Ital.* iv.; De Monacis, fol. 41, Add. MSS. 8574.

³ Filiasi, *Memorie*, vi. 241; *ibid. Ricerche*, 37.

⁴ Sandi, i. 330; Tiepolo, *Discorsi*, i. 64-65. "Comme de nos jours," observes Salverte, 61, "les puissances européennes en payaient un aux nations barbaresques." Cf. my volume, *The Hazlitts*, 1911, p. 49.

into office, to sanction any future remittances; the tax was consequently discontinued in 996; and such a courageous step necessitated a provision for reprisal. Six galleys were accordingly despatched to protect the Venetian flag, and to clear the Gulf.¹ That small squadron, as it cruised along the opposite shore, met and defeated a Narentine fleet of greatly superior force, and after taking by storm the citadel of Lissa, one of their strongest fastnesses, returned to the Lagoon with an ample booty and a considerable number of prisoners.

By a somewhat curious coincidence a deputation from the maritime towns of the opposite coast had lately waited on Orseolo,² partly at the suggestion of the Venetian residents of Zara and Justinople, and having represented to him the cruel and intolerable nature of the tyranny, which they were at present suffering at the hands of the petty sovereigns of Dalmatia and Croatia, as well as the heavy losses which, to some extent in common with the Republic, they continued to experience from the inroads of the pirates, had expressed a wish to ameliorate their condition by changing their masters. This manifestation of the good-will of the Dalmatians and Istrians,³ and the important successes of his little squadron, brought the Doge to the natural conclusion that the conquest of the whole line of coast might be compassed without much difficulty. The Deputies were consequently dismissed with the confident assurance of early relief. In the Popular Assembly, a proposition, on which much diversity of opinion might reasonably exist, was received with general favour and enthusiasm; and some months after the departure of the Dalmatian delegates, 200 vessels of all sail might be seen moored among the shallows of Malamocco and Caorlo, awaiting the signal to weigh anchor for the Dalmatian expedition.

It was on Ascension Day, 998, that the fleet left its moorings, and pointed its prows towards Olivolo, where the Doge was received by Bishop Gradenigo, and conducted to the church of San Pietro. There, after the usual preliminary of mass, the blessing of Heaven was invoked on the new undertaking; and, at the conclusion, Gradenigo delivered to Orseolo, with a few words of encouragement and flattery, the great

¹ Harl. MSS. No. 3549; P. Giustiniani, King's MSS. 148, fol. 33.

² Sagorninus, 93.

³ Lucius, *De regno Dalmatiae et Croatiae*, lib. iii. ch. ii.

standard of Saint Mark.¹ The Doge then re-embarked, and proceeded to Grado, where he was met by the Patriarch, followed by a solemn procession of the clergy and the people: and where his Serenity received the sacred banner of San Ermacora. From Grado the whole armament sailed successively to Pirano, Omago, Emonia, Parenzo, Rovigno, Pola, Zara, Spalato, Trau, Ossero, Arbo, Veglia, Sebenigo, Belgrado, Lenigrado, and Curzola. All those places appeared to welcome the Venetians as their deliverers, and each readily took an oath of allegiance to its new suzerain. At Zara, where the merchants of Venice had formed their earliest settlements, and where the people had exhibited the most effusive fervour, Orseolo spent six days; and during that period arrived a deputation from Dircislaus, King of Croatia, whose alarm at the successful progress of the expedition rendered him desirous of conciliating the Republic. At Trau,² he found the brother of the King, Cresimir by name, who implored his Serenity to aid him in establishing a joint claim to the throne of his father, from which he stated that he had been recently driven by the perfidy of Dircislaus. Orseolo entertained the matter favourably, and even consented shortly afterward (998), as a mark of his friendship and esteem, as well as on grounds of commercial policy,³ to the union of his own daughter Hicela with the son of the Croatian prince.

So far the enterprise had amounted scarcely to more than a triumphal procession. Everywhere, excepting at Curzola, which offered a temporary opposition to the Venetian arms, the same readiness and even alacrity had been displayed to bow the neck to the yoke of the Islanders; and certainly, if a deduction may be formed from the joyous reception, which awaited Orseolo at all the places which he visited along the coast, it may be inferred that the annexation of the maritime towns of Istria and Dalmatia to the Dogado was felt at the time to be a measure of mutual advantage.

But the campaign was far from being at a close. A great impediment was still to be conquered. Lesina, the principal member of the Illyric group, and the chief resort of the Pirates, still remained untaken; and the Doge, having sent ten galleys

¹ Sagorninus, 95.

² Lucius, *Memorie storiche di Trau*, p. 11.

³ Mutinelli, *Del commercio dei Veneziani*, p. 18.

from Trau¹ to ravage the coast of Narenta, hastened with the main squadron to accomplish that object. The position of Lesina, which lay about midway between Brazza and Curzola, was rendered almost inaccessible by the crags, which jutted out in all directions from the shore, and obstructed in a large measure the navigation of the Gulf; the town itself, which was strongly fortified, was approachable on the side of the sea only by a steep escarpment; and the inhabitants, while they half inclined to the general superstition that the place was impregnable, were fully prepared, should the Venetians persist in their undertaking, to sell their liberties and their lives at a dear rate. We learn from Cicero² that this very fastness had defied, one thousand years before, the utmost efforts of the Roman general Vatinius, who was obliged to raise the siege, after taking four towers. Dalmatia itself, we know, gave the greatest trouble to Augustus, and the war, which resulted in its subjugation, was thought to be an enterprise of the most dangerous and difficult character. It was here that Germanicus won his fame.

Orseolo entered the harbour without hesitation; and, the usual summons to surrender having produced no effect, an order was given to commence the assault. In a short time, every element of mediæval warfare was brought into play; volleys of stones and clouds of arrows darkened the air; and while the arbalisters and engineers took more deliberate aim at the enemy with their cross-bows and mangonels, the citizens themselves, gathering courage from despair, hurled from the heights every missile which yielded to their strength. But the steady discipline of the besiegers overcame every difficulty; the Lesinese shrank in dismay from the tempest of stones and darts, which poured without cessation over their walls; the escarpment was scaled; a tower was invested and taken; the Venetians entered the town; and, after a brief interval of licence and confusion, the arrival of the Doge restored order. The judicious clemency of Orseolo conciliated the esteem of the vanquished; and such was the powerful effect, which the reduction of a place, generally thought to be unassailable, produced on its neighbours that, so soon as it heard of the fall of Lesina, the little republic of Ragusa, built on the site of the ancient Epidaurus,

¹ Sagorninus contemp., *Chron.* 97.

² *Epist. ad familiares*, v. 10.

dispatched an embassy to offer her allegiance to the conqueror, by whom the formal submission of the archbishop and his fellow-citizens was subsequently received.¹ At the same time, the ten galleys which had undertaken to lay waste the coast of Narenta, rejoined the main squadron with forty Croatian prizes; and this collateral success, which might be partly instrumental in humiliating King Dircislaus, afforded no slight satisfaction to Orseolo. Having thus, in the course of a few months, completed the object of his expedition, the Doge concluded the campaign* by dictating terms to the sea-robbers of Narenta; and Orseolo, having at length returned to the capital, and communicated to the Arrenge the wonderful success which had attended the arms of the Republic, was solemnly proclaimed DOGE OF VENICE AND DALMATIA (998).

The assumption of this lofty and ambitious appellation seems to have been entirely in harmony with the notions of sovereignty generally prevalent at that epoch. The incomplete conquest and precarious tenure of a few hundred miles of the Dalmatian sea-board sufficed, in the eyes of the Venetians, to constitute Dalmatia itself an integral portion of their dominions; and it is a circumstance strikingly characteristic of the age, that in conferring new honours upon the Crown, no attempt was made to discriminate between an immense tract of country in which the Republic had little or no territorial interest, and the Islands, to which she enjoyed the fullest prescriptive and possessory title. During a considerable length of time the lordship of the Republic was purely feudal, and the towns continued to be under the government of their Priors. But henceforth the Doge paid on Ascension Day, on which the expedition had started, a visit to Lido and performed a ceremony known as the *Blessing of the Sea*.

A wide discrepancy existed in the disposition, which the several towns of Dalmatia had exhibited toward the Republic: but the same yoke was riveted on all. The government of the new province was assigned to a certain number of Venetian citizens, who were nominated by the Doge, and on whom his Serenity in some cases conferred, besides the official designation of Podesta, the honorary title of Count. His son, Ottone Orseolo, although he had reached only the age of eight years, became Podesta and Count of Ragusa; and other

¹ Luccari, *Annali di Ragusa*, p. 7; Romanin, viii. 455-65.

functionaries were distributed with a similar object among the rest of the dependencies. Each fief was required to bring a yearly subsidy to the treasury of Saint Mark. Pola engaged to send two thousand pounds of oil, as well as a free gift of cotton to the reigning Dogaressa;¹ Ossero, forty sables; Veglia, fifteen sables and thirty fox-skins; and Arbo, ten pounds of silk. Moreover, Pola undertook to guard the Dalmatian coast between her promontory and Rovigno; and Spalato was bound to furnish three vessels of war which, in ordinary times, might be applied to a like purpose, and at seasons of exigency form part of a contingent. The amount and character of the tribute were necessarily regulated by the industrial and other capabilities of the tributary.²

In the following year (999) the forty Croatian galleons, which the Venetians had taken in the late campaign, were restored at the repeated intreaty of Dircislaus, with the exception of six which the Doge chose to reserve as a material guarantee. At the same time, the pretensions of Cavarzero to the conterminous territory of Cervia and Loredo, which had been unjustly assigned to her, in 982, by Otho II., were annulled; and the close of the century was also marked by the acquisition of the town of Piove di Sacco, situated near Padua, twenty-five miles from Venice,³ which tendered her allegiance to the Republic with an engagement to remit to the Ducal Fisc an annual tribute of 200 pounds of cotton, on the express condition of total exemption from the ripatico, teloneo, and other dues of the Dogado.⁴

The year 998, which witnessed the triumphal entry of Orseolo into his capital, was also marked by the arrival of Otho III. in Italy. The prodigious successes of the Doge and the fame of his exploits had found an echo throughout the Peninsula; and the Emperor was possessed by a strong desire to enjoy and cultivate the friendship of the man who had raised his country to such a conspicuous position in so short a time. Accordingly, when the diplomatic agent of the Republic presented himself at Ravenna, to communicate the changes which had taken place in Istria and Dalmatia, Otho handed to the envoy a letter addressed to Orseolo, in which he unfolded his

¹ Martino da Canale, *Cronaca Veneta*, ch. v.

² Dandolo, lib. ix. ch. i.; Filiassi, vi. pp. 262-3.

³ Sanudo, *Itinerario*, 1483, ed. 1847.

⁴ Marin, ii. 219.

intention of paying a secret visit to Venice, adding, that a solicitude to drink the waters of Pomposa would be the ostensible object of his journey. With six companions, habited like himself in the weeds of pilgrims, the Emperor started from Ravenna in a bark, which conveyed him so far as the harbour of Goro on the Adriatic; and thence he repaired to the Abbey of San Servolo in Rialto, where the Doge was holding himself in readiness to receive his distinguished guest, and to escort him to the Palace. Four days formed the period of the Emperor's stay. During that brief space, Orseolo dined at noon in public as usual, to avoid suspicion, his Majesty remaining in the private apartment, which had been prepared in the eastern tower (Torricella) of the new palace now in course of construction.¹ The remainder of the time was spent in discourse and devotional exercises, and the Emperor and his Serenity partook together of the evening meal. When the fourth day arrived, and Otho prepared to take his leave, the Doge presented to him, as a farewell gift, a costly silver chalice and an ivory chair. So early as 992, even before the acquisition of Dalmatia added so largely to the glory of Orseolo, the Emperor had exhibited his personal esteem for him by requesting leave to re-christen the Doge's second son Pietro after himself Ottone. On parting, the two friends kissed and embraced each other, and, says a contemporary, "both wept."² Shortly after his departure, Orseolo convoked the Popular Assembly; and having disclosed the rank and name of his recent visitor, his Serenity announced that, at his solicitation, the Emperor had consented to waive the tribute of cloth of gold, with which the Republic was accustomed, since 982, to buy the privilege of free trade in the ports of Italy.³

These imperial visits from sovereigns of more purely German blood than those who had ruled in the peninsula not very long since, deserved encouragement at the hands of the Republic; for it made those princes personally familiar with a State of which their knowledge had hitherto been alike imperfect and inaccurate. When Otho I., in 962, received so coldly and superciliously the father of the present Doge, who went to Rome to congratulate him in the name of his country, he did not imagine that the third in succession

¹ Sagorninus *ubi supra*; Mutinelli, *Costume Veneziano*, p. 52.

² Sagorninus, *Chron.* 107.

³ *Ibid.*

from him would invite himself to Venice, and meet the son of that very ambassador as a friend and an equal. Such a change of estimate and force was the growth of six-and thirty years; and the conclusion comes, that the great rise in the fortunes of the Republic had been favoured and fostered quite as much by the weakness of the two empires and the divisions among the Carolingians from the death of Charlemagne to that of Louis V. (987), as by internal causes. Of all the States between the Pyrenees and the Danube, Venice and the Duchy of Beneventum were the only two which never yielded to the Franks; and it was at the hands of such apparently insignificant Powers that Charles the Great himself sustained the most signal defeats which ever attended his arms.

Nor were the exertions of Orseolo confined within the narrow compass of Dalmatia. In the month of April 1004, the Saracens laid siege to Bari in Apulia;¹ the city was reduced, during the whole summer of that year, to a state of strict blockade; and the Barese were already beginning to yield to the slow influence of famine when, in the middle of October, a powerful squadron commanded by Orseolo in person entered the port without the cognisance of the enemy, and threw a large body of troops into the place.² On the following day (Oct. 16), the confederates, led by the Doge and the imperial Catapan, made a sudden and successful sally; and the Saracens, who were completely taken by surprise at the arrival of so great a reinforcement, found themselves under the necessity of raising the siege. It is easy to conceive that this important service was gratefully acknowledged by the Byzantine Court, which still asserted a right of sovereignty over the south of Italy. But, although the successor of Otho III., who had died at Rome in the preceding year, ratified without comment the commercial charter of the Republic, and recognised Orseolo as Doge of Venice and Dalmatia,³ it becomes a question whether that prince was not more vexed by the participation of the Venetians in the triumph of the Greek Emperor, than he was pleased by the share which they bore in the discomfiture of the common enemy.⁴

¹ Sagorninus, *Chron.* 110.

³ Dandolo, lib. ix. p. 232.

² Filiasi, *Ricerche*, p. 200.

⁴ Lebeau, xiii. p. 200.

It has now been seen how Orseolo II. subjected to the sway of the Republic the towns on the Dalmatian littoral, and the Illyric Islands, which at least exchanged an equable and constitutional tyranny for the multiform and capricious oppression of the pirates of the Adriatic and of the petty despots of Croatia; how, in his time, the Republic not only acquired the sovereignty of that sea, of which her position seemed to point her out as the Mistress and the Guardian, but became a distinguished member of the European Confederacy; and how the Doge curbed the inroads of the Narentines, and taught them to tremble at the name of Venice. It is time to turn to his works of peace.

The restoration of Saint Mark's and the other buildings, which had perished in the fire of 976, was still very incomplete, and a considerable period was likely to elapse, before the palace was thoroughly completed in all its component parts. The first care had been to replace the walls and battlements in a condition of efficiency, and the Basilica had been rebuilt at the cost of the Doge. But much remained to be done; portions of the old timber structure survived; portions were renewed in stone; the entire supersession of wood was to be among the schemes of the future; and the prevention of any recurrence of those fatal tumults and that lamentable incendiarism became an important question of the day. It was a class of mischief and danger, with which the mediæval legislators were not unfamiliar. In February 997-8, a chartulary, by which the leading men of Venice bound themselves and their heirs toward the Doge and his successors, prescribed that all persons who should be convicted henceforth of creating or conniving at disorders and riots within the circuit of the Ducal residence, or of taking part, directly or indirectly, in any movement which might bring damage to that extensive range of premises, should be liable to a fine of twenty pounds of gold.¹

In the course of two centuries, a large portion of the town of Grado had fallen in ruins, partly owing to the gradual process of natural decay, and partly to the deleterious atmosphere of the Lagoon. The Doge entirely rebuilt and refortified the town at his own expense, and under the western tower he chose a suitable plot of ground, on which

¹ Romanin, i. 385.

he erected a residence for himself. To the same munificent hand several of the public edifices in the other islands were indebted for their restoration or embellishment. At Citta Nuova the profuseness of Orseolo displayed itself in the construction of another house for his occasional occupation, with a private chapel adjoining. It was by these means that the family to which this prince belonged acquired power and popularity in their native city, and that the Republic won that renown which led foreign potentates to seek alliances with Venetian citizens. In 998, one of the Doge's daughters had wedded the heir to the Crown of Croatia; his second son Ottone was betrothed to the sister of the King of Hungary; and his eldest son Giovanni was united, about the year 1005, to Maria, daughter of Romanos Argyros, and niece of Basilios and Constantine, joint Emperors of the East.¹ The nuptials of Maria Argyra and Giovanni Orseolo were solemnised at Constantinople with the same pomp and splendour as was customary at the bridal of the Cæsars; the Patriarch of the Greek Church, having pronounced his blessing on the youthful couple, placed on the brows of each a golden diadem; and the Emperors made their nephew a Greek patrician. After the celebration of the ceremony, and the accompanying festivities, which were extended over a term of three days, the Prince returned with his wife to Venice, where, amid the general enthusiasm, the Doge was invited by the people to admit his eldest son to a share in the chief authority, and to declare him his successor.²

In 1006 a comet appeared, and the Islands were desolated by the simultaneous ravages of plague and famine which, in the course of a few weeks, decimated her yet scanty population:³ and among the victims of the epidemic were the newly-wedded pair. The private loss, aggravated by the general misery, was a cruel trial of the fortitude of the bereaved parent; and although the Venetians prevailed on him to associate his second son, the Count of Ragusa, the illustrious Orseolo survived Giovanni scarcely more than a twelvemonth. This eminent man was, at the time of his death (1008), only in his forty-seventh year; and so deep

¹ Sagorninus, *Chron.* 113.

² Sansovino, lib. xiii. p. 552.

³ "Quinto decimo Ducis anno," says Dandolo, lib. ix. p. 47, "fames et mortalitas tanta fuit in Venetia, et per totam paene orbem, ut vacantes sepulchris cum mortuis obruerentur."

were the reverence and love which were borne to him by every class of the community, that his son Ottone, who was not more than two-and-twenty,¹ was allowed by general acquiescence to remain in sole possession of the chief magistracy. A youth who had scarcely completed his education was placed at the head of affairs over hoary-headed senators and veterans of long service. But it was the heroic age of Venice.

It must appear strange that, by the will of the late Doge, an entire third of his large property was declared applicable to the support of the *Feste Delle Marie*,¹ which had now acquired considerable importance and popularity. Another portion was divided among his six children, his consort Maria, who survived her husband, having taken the vow of chastity, and become a recluse in one of the Venetian convents. The residue was distributed among several churches and charitable institutions. This testamentary record, considered in connexion with the large sums which he had expended in works of utility and charity during his lifetime,² will enable us to appreciate the amplitude of the private means of the second Orseolo, and by analogy of not a few other rich Venetians of those days. To the poor of Venice he had given before his death the yearly interest of 1250 *lire di piccoli*, or upward of 400 gold ducats.

Upon his accession Orseolo III. espoused the sister of the King of Hungary; and on the decease of the venerable Vitale Sanudo in 1019, Orso Orseolo, Bishop of Torcello, was raised to the Primacy, the vacant see being allowed to devolve on their younger brother Vitali. Hicela was already united to a prince of Croatia; her sister Felicia became shortly afterward superior of the Abbey of San Antonio di Torcello. The families of Badoer and Sanudo had risen and disappeared after an aggregate sway of about a century and a half. The fortunes of the Orseoli seemed to be in their zenith.

Cervia and Loredò, which were unjustly transferred by

¹ Sagorninus contemp., *Chron.* 110.

² "Hanc meam dispositionem," says the testator, "firmam et inconvulsam stare perpetuis temporibus volo, ita ut nemo successorum meorum Ducum, neque subditus sibi populus, temeraria voluntate de praedicto numero diminuire praesumat, neque aliud, quam a me constitutum est facere. Si quis hoc facere praesumpserit," he continues, "habeat sibi in contrarium Patrem, Filium, et Spiritum Sanctum, et sub anathemate 318 Patrum constitutus permaneat, et cum improvido Christi proditore *infernali damnctur incendio*, et nunquam suam mereatur implere voluntatem."—Sansorino, *l. D.* xi. 482.

Otho II. in 982 to the adjoining town of Cavarzero from the Republic, of which they had formed an integral portion since the days of the Lombards, had, it will be remembered, been recovered by Venice toward the close of the last century, and, at the same time, the pretensions of the Cavarzerese had been declared wholly groundless and void. Yet in 1016 a similar claim was advanced by Peter, Bishop of Adria; and he supported it by taking military possession of the places in question. Venice at once assumed the offensive. A town that had once held the dominion of the Gulf, which still bore its name, was all but levelled with the ground; the whole vicinity was abandoned to pillage and sack; and the warlike churchman who, on the approach of the troops, had endeavoured to effect his escape, was captured and conducted to Venice, where, in the presence of the Arrengo, he humbly abjured all intention of repeating the outrage.¹

Two years later Orseolo III. was forced to mediate between the Dalmatian Colonies and his relative the King of Croatia, who had begun to make inroads in the direction of Zara. A strong Venetian force under Orseolo in person surprised and repulsed the Croatian troops, and the summer of 1018 was devoted to the exaction of fresh homage and to a cruise of observation along the coast.²

Ragusa alone dared to reject the yoke which it had been persuaded to accept, or even to solicit, at the hands of Orseolo II. in the preceding century (998); and the Doge thought it prudent to accede to the recognition of its municipal independence, with the simple reservation of a right to the triennial nomination of the Podesta or Count (1017). Owing their origin, like Venice, to the irruption in the seventh century of the northern hordes: swayed, as Venice was herself swayed, by an aristocracy: resembling, perhaps unconsciously imitating, the latter in many of their political institutions,³ the Ragusans prided themselves on an enjoyment of liberty, extending indeed, like that of the Venetians, over a long series of years, but subject, like that of the Genoese, to frequent checks and interruptions. Exposed to

¹ Dandolo, lib. ix. ch. ii.; Muratori, *Dissertationes Medii Aevi*, vol. i. pp. 241-2, who publishes the text of the instrument which was signed by the Bishop; it bears date the 7th June 1017.

² Lucius, *De regno D. et C.*, lib. ii. ch. vi.

³ Salvete, *Civilisation: Raguse*, p. 253 *et seq.*

factionous jealousy within and to hostile jealousy without, the internal condition and external relations of this republic were constantly undergoing change and modification; now she contrived to shake off for a moment the yoke of the Signory, and to feel a spasm of freedom; now again the weaker yielded to the stronger, and the Signory fitted the yoke with new rivets to her chafed neck.

On the decease of Domenico Gradenigo, Bishop of Olivolo, in 1025, his House prevailed on the Synod to nominate as his successor his nephew and namesake, who had scarcely attained his eighteenth year;¹ but the Doge and the Patriarch of Grado expressed the strongest disapproval of the election. The Gradenigi determined to leave no means untried of marking their resentment, and henceforth to treat all other objects as subsidiary to the humiliation of the too-powerful House of Orseolo. With this object, they naturally hastened to canvass and conciliate every serviceable influence. The Flabenigi and several other families of high station were successively induced by various motives to join the ranks of the new Opposition. Pepo, Patriarch of Aquileia, and the avowed enemy of the Patriarch of Grado, promised to give them his support; and the intimacy of the latter with Conrad II. encouraged a hope that the Court of Pavia would lend the partisans of Pepo its potent aid. At the same time, the factious agitation from which the Badoeri and Sanudi had successively suffered, recommenced; the most uncharitable construction was placed on the past conduct of the Orseoli; the worst views were taken of their ulterior designs. One of the most liberal and moderate of Venetian princes was represented as meditating the subversion, at no distant period, of republican principles and popular freedom. It was found intolerable that, in a free commonwealth, a single family should be allowed to exercise so much influence; and it was said that the time had arrived for abolishing a system which was gradually changing the government into an hereditary monarchy. The aspersions which the Gradenigi cast upon the Doge and his brother gained general credit; and the two Orseoli, driven by the fear of an insurrection from a country where they had fallen into such sudden and

¹ *Cronaca Altinate*, lib. i. p. 18; *Cronaca Altinate juxta codicem Dresdensem*, p. 20; *Arch. stor. Ital.* v. 5; Caroldo, *Historie Venete*. p. 51.

unmerited odium, were forced to take refuge in one of the maritime towns of Dalmatia.¹ Their departure enabled the Gradenigi to induct their relative into the see of Olivolo.

Assured, in a recent interview with Conrad, that his Majesty was too favourably disposed toward the unfortunate House² to countenance the adoption of any hostile measures against the Republic on account of the metropolitanate; and fully conscious of the impossibility of maintaining himself without external support in a State where he commanded no real sympathy or influence, the Patriarch of Aquileia, however, determined to confine his attempts, for the present at least, to a predatory inroad into the Dogado; and a few days after the flight of Ottone and Orso Orseolo, he appeared before the walls of Grado, demanding in a loud voice justice for his brother the Primate and for his friend the Doge. The tone and attitude of Pepo might surely have excited some misgivings in the mind of the citizens. Yet the Gradese consented, after some hesitation, to open their gates to his troops. The foolish mistake cost them dear. Their town was condemned to spoliation, their walls were levelled, their altars were violated. The soldiers of Aquileia spared neither God nor man; the treasures, which the wealthy Patriarch Fortunatus had, in the beginning of the ninth century, lavished on the church of Santa Eufemia, narrowly escaped their sacrilegious rapacity; and Pepo, having collected the booty, and established a garrison in the place, returned to Aquileia in triumph.³ The news of this outrage soon reached Venice. The leaders of the Opposition, who were generally, though perhaps unjustly, accused of instigating Pepo to the act, were forced in their turn to fly to Treviso. The Orseoli were recalled; and the first care of the latter was to drive the Aquileian troops from Grado.

But the faction on whose expectations the triumphal return of Orseolo III. and his brother inflicted so severe a blow, had now for some time acknowledged as its leader⁴ Domenigo Flabenigo, a man of superior parts, and possessing in an eminent degree the two essential attributes of a good partisan, extreme tenacity of purpose and extreme narrowness

¹ Romanin, i. pp. 296-7.

² Filiasi, vi. p. 309.

³ Rubeis, *Monumenta ecclesiae Aquilejensis*, ch. lv. p. 526; *Vitae Patriarcharum Aquilejensium*, p. 11.

⁴ P. Giustiniani, *Historia*, King's MSS. 148, fol. 36.

of view. Flabenigo was, from interest or inclination, inveterately hostile to the engrossing policy of the Orseoli; and under such a chief the party adverse to the reigning family speedily became more violent and formidable than ever.

It was true that the original ground of quarrel between the Houses of Orseolo and Gradenigo had been abandoned; the right of the nephew of the late Bishop of Olivolo to his uncle's surplice was now tacitly at least recognised, and many were doubtless of opinion that the continued clamours of the Opposition sprang merely from a capricious spirit of resistance to lawful authority.

But the fact was that, out of an incident in itself comparatively trivial, had arisen a question of infinitely graver importance. The disputed succession to the see of Olivolo, and the violent dissensions which it ultimately bred, had given a new turn to the current of public thought; and the subject, which was at present occupying in reality the attention of Flabenigo and his party, was nothing less than the necessity of placing some severe and permanent curb on the Ducal authority. Still, although it was now beginning to attract more general notice, the revision of the Constitution was scarcely to be considered an untouched point of debate. It was, on the contrary, a question which, though it had never yet been thoroughly ventilated, had been probably mooted at intervals since the commencement of the autocracy.

At the period when the first Badoer was placed at the head of affairs in 809, the Republic had just emerged from a great crisis. A struggle of life and death had taken place. A battle obscure to our vision, but of immeasurable consequence and value to the men of those days, had been fought and won. The victory at Albiola was supreme in everybody's thought. The nation was overflowing with gratitude to the conqueror of the Franks. Besides, very evil times were then still fresh in the recollection; and the Venetians, happy to escape on any terms from fifty years of feeble and odious tyranny, gladly and fearlessly reposed their confidence in the House of Participazio. Nor was that confidence misplaced. The Badoeri might have been guilty, in a few instances, of arbitrary acts; but their policy was, generally speaking, singularly equitable and energetic; aiming always at the promotion of the national prosperity, and tending to exalt

the national renown. Thus those princes became popular and powerful. But their generation had now passed away. Two centuries had elapsed since Angelo Badoer, the founder of a dynasty, was laid in the vaults of San Zaccaria; and in that long interval a wonderful change had been wrought in the condition of the people whom he once knew. In that interval Venice had increased largely in wealth, population, and territory, in spending and organising power. Places, which were familiar to the Badoeri only as the resorts of outcasts and freebooters, had become her fiefs and her tributaries; the few hundred fugitives who, in the fifth century, found a precarious shelter in the Lagoon from the fury of the Huns, had multiplied a hundredfold; and the Venetian dominion, which even in the tenth century comprised merely the Dogado itself, now extended in the form of an irregular triangle from Cervia to Primiero, and from Primiero to Curzola, the last of the Illyric group. There was the same relation between the Venetians of the eleventh century and those Venetians whom the hero of Albiola knew, as there had been between the latter and that primeval society of fishermen and salt-gatherers, which enjoyed an obscure freedom, and earned a meagre subsistence, among the marshes of Caorlo, before the Lombard name was heard in Italy.

Yet, while it may be perhaps expected that the entire community would have benefited by this change, the truth was that the only class which gained by it in reality was the patrician order. The *Maggiori*, as they used to be termed, had indeed gradually assumed the appearance of a numerous, intelligent, and wealthy body; the political schism which had taken place at an early period between them and the lower Estates (*Mediocri* and *Minori*) was gradually widening; and by a similarly steady though slow process the latter were losing influence and relatively caste.

This apparent problem admits an easy solution. To that exclusive policy which the original settlers in the Lagoon were led by the unique configuration and narrow area of their new country to adopt, their descendants had closely and systematically adhered. Nor did that conservatism cost them much labour. In a State like Venice, where navigation supplied, in a large measure, the place of agriculture, and where the attention of the multitude was regularly diverted

by their callings as pilots, mariners, and fishermen, from the management and progress of public affairs, it was not difficult for an oligarchy, so long as it was true to itself, to retain the governing prerogative and the succession to the Ducal office in its own hands; and it is accordingly found that the very tribunitial families which ruled the Republic in the sixth and seventh centuries, still preserved in the eleventh their political ascendancy. A few of the *Mediocri* might have risen to the higher Estate; it is imagined that many more had lost their social standing, and had merged in the lower one. While the commonalty were forced to confine themselves to subordinate or menial vocations, the trade, the property,¹ and the honours of the State were still enjoyed as a monopoly by the Memi, the Badoeri, the Sanudi, the Orseoli, and several others; every merchantman which left the harbours of Pilo, Goro, and Castello for Dalmatia or the East was fitted out at their expense, and laden with their exports; and it is no exaggeration to say that every building in Venice bore testimony to their wealth and magnificence. They founded churches;² they endowed religious institutions; they established charities of every kind. The two principal monuments in the city—the Basilica and the Public Hospital—were the work of a single member of their order, Orseolo I.; his example was closely followed by his more illustrious son, to whom the Venetians owed the restoration of Grado, the architectural embellishment of several islands, and the erection of new palaces at Grado and Citta Nuova; and it is incontestable that it was the principle of oligarchy, seconded by the love of enterprise and by the spirit of commerce, which formed the basis of Venetian greatness and civilisation.

At first, it is possible that the soil may have been parcelled out among a tolerably large number of small proprietors; but at all events, by process of time, the estates in the Dogado were almost entirely absorbed by a few of the leading families, or became vested, by the piety of landholders, by grant from the Government, or by prescription, in the hands of various ecclesiastical corporations, the greater pro-

¹ Sansovino, lib. xiii. p. 558; Paolo Morosini, *Storia*, lib. v. p. 118; A. Navagiero, *Storia*, p. 963; Dandolo, lib. ix. p. 293; Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 501.

² Sansovino, *Cron. Ven.* pp. 9-12, 15-19, etc.; idem, *Venetia descritta, passim*.

portion of which held their possessions by a species of tenure similar to that known in the English law as frankalmoign or free alms. San Giacomo della Palude anciently belonged to the House of Badoer. The Memi possessed large estates in Canalreggio and elsewhere. The streets of San Moisé, San Bragolo, and San Pantaleone, formed part of the patrimony of the House of Michieli. At San Silvestro the Cornari were extensive proprietors. The Marcurii or Quintavalle owned a large portion of Olivolo; while the Polani were in possession of the whole of Gemelle or Zimole. A portion, at least, of the Ziani estates is known to have consisted of houses at San Giuliano in the Merceria.

As a body, the patricians eyed with increasing disgust a monarchy established on a popular basis and decorated with a popular title. They were growing more and more estranged from a form of government which, under the best auspices, acknowledged no distinction between a Morosini and the rower of his gondola, and which ended too often in faction or in despotism; and it was with greater envy than pride that they saw men who were yesterday members of the same class and of the same commonwealth, affect to-day regal pomp and magnificence, and ally themselves in marriage with the daughters of kings. Nor was it unnatural, that a section of the community, which had always done so much to advance the national welfare and glory, should thus desire to arrogate to itself the sovereign power, to transfer the reins of government from the hands of an individual to those of the order to which he belonged, and to get rid, by degrees at least, of a system under which six or seven families¹ were controlling the destinies of the Republic from one generation to another with all but royal authority and by all but hereditary right.

These or similar views were entertained by Flabenigo and his coadjutors, who were content to barter for the privilege of governing as a body the more or less remote chance of governing alone. But they were, like all views which were brought to a precocious maturity in the hotbed of faction, and were shaped by a party to its own private and immediate

¹ The reign of the Houses of Badoer, Sanudo, Memo, Orseolo, Tradenigo, Galbaio, and Anafesto, extended over a period of 267 years; and the two first-named families, at least, had previously been Tribunes.

ends, exaggerated, violent, and malignant. The opinions held by this patrician cabal were indeed rational as well as rising opinions; but the fulness of time had not yet come. The popular element was still too strong; the aristocratic element was still too incompact. Nevertheless, a discerning eye might have recognised in this incipient movement the first stage of a great social and political revolution. The symptoms of such a change were not to be detected perhaps by careless or superficial observers; for the external aspect of things remained nearly unaltered. The forms of election and deliberation had not lost their republican attribute. The meetings of the Arrengo were not less frequent, its authority was not less respectable, than in the days of Anafesto. The State which his successors were called to govern, continued to be styled a Commonwealth; and the people over whom they were placed in authority were still honoured by the name of Fellow-citizens. Their approbation and sanction continued to be sought, and continued to be essential, not only before a Doge was crowned, but before any legislative enactment became law; and then, and indeed long after this immediate time, whenever a statute had been framed by the Crown and its advisers, the great bell of Saint Mark's was heard to peal in due course, summoning those together whose ratifying voice was demanded by the Constitution. But while the surface was so smooth, and so excellently calculated to soothe prejudices and to disarm suspicion, there was a strong and steady under-current which was slowly running in a widely different direction. That direction was toward Aristocracy—toward a form of government which would admit the concurrent rule of a certain circle of families, instead of that which placed one patrician alike over patricians and plebeians.

The extravagance of their views and arguments, however, did not prevent the Opposition from carrying their proximate purpose. The portion of the community, which it was the interest of Flabenigo and his party to win over to their side, was not apt to examine too narrowly the soundness of the opinions which they received among them, or to weigh their value too nicely in the scale. At the same time, experience had shown that, in an almost equal contest between two adverse factions, the bias of the populace to either was

sufficient to turn the balance of power; and the patrician Flabenigo, aware of the necessity of having this advantage on his side, determined, after the recall of the Doge and the Primate to enlist every means within his reach of envenoming the public mind against the Orseoli and their supporters, for whom he had now imbibed such a hatred as men only, whose lot is cast in societies perpetually rent by intestine discord, can feel without compunction, and avow without a blush.

The intrigues of Flabenigo had a more favourable result in some points of view than even he himself might have anticipated. The desired impression was conveyed to the mind of the majority. Ottone was accused of aspiring to absolutism on no better ground than his father and his grandfather could have been accused; and that prince, who had just reason to upbraid with ingratitude a nation which his family had so well served, was once more constrained to seek among strangers the safety and repose which were denied to him in the country of his birth. The exile found an appropriate and welcome reception at the Court of the Emperor Constantine Ducas IX.,¹ whose sympathy was enlisted by the youth of his unexpected guest, his unmerited trouble, and his ancestral associations.

Singular as it may seem, however, Flabenigo failed to attain his great end, which was, of course, nothing less than the succession to the vacant magistracy; that high office was bestowed on Pietro Barbolano or Centranigo (1026), a nobleman whose family,² of Cesenese origin, had settled in the Lagoons at a very early date, and Flabenigo even thought it judicious to withdraw himself for a time from public life.

The fact was that he was not generally liked. His violent politics were not improbably distasteful to all men of independent views and moderate opinions. Besides, there were many quarters, in which his opposition to the Orseoli was exclusively ascribed to motives of private pique and personal ambition; and this grave imputation, which was not groundless, had naturally rendered him obnoxious, not only to the family and kindred of the banished Doge, but to all those who, in condemning the existing form of government, were

¹ Dandolo, lib. ix. ch. ii.; Lebeau, xiii. p. 234.

² Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 421, calls them Centranici, olim *Cenanii*.

actuated by a pure and conscientious patriotism, and whose attacks were, in consequence, directed against the system which he represented, and not against any individual.

A parallel between Orseolo III. and Richard II. of England may be perhaps accounted fanciful: yet it is curious to remark the resemblance which those princes bore one to the other, in the circumstances which attended their accession, and in the character which marked their reign. Both were called to the management of affairs at a very early age, and both were carried to the throne by the respect due to the memory of a father and a grandfather. The son of the Black Prince and the grandson of the greatest of England's herokings, Richard, by his youth and inexperience, unconsciously gave the first decided impulse to the progress of political liberty in his own country; at Venice, the youth and inexperience of the third Orseolo led the first perceptible step to the downfall of that liberty. In the latter case, it was during the six-and-twenty years embraced between 1008 and 1034 that adventitious causes laid the foundation of an Aristocratic government and narrowed the basis of the Constitution; in the former, it was during the two-and-twenty years between 1377 and 1399 that the English Commons began to insist somewhat loudly, in consequence of similar causes, on their recognition as a co-ordinate estate in the body politic. In the constitutional history of the respective countries these epochs become, on such account, particularly interesting and important.

A curious account has been preserved of a transaction in which Pietro Barbolano had been concerned a considerable time before his accession to power. It appears that so far back as the year 992, having been entrusted, in conjunction with another nobleman, with a diplomatic mission to the Byzantine Court, the future Doge there saw the holy remains of San Saba, and was filled by an instantaneous desire to secure for his own country such an invaluable prize. Barbolano accordingly entered into conversation with the officials who had charge of the saint, and eventually concluded a bargain with them for the transfer. On the night which had been fixed for taking the remains down to the ambassador's ship, which was then about to leave the Horn, it was unusually stormy, the rain falling in torrents; and the priests,

alarmed at the omen, or perhaps not displeased at the pretext, demurred to the removal, under such circumstances, of the chest which contained the sacred bones. But Barbolano, who was on the spot with his two sons and several servants, soon overcame this difficulty, by ordering the load to be raised and carried down to the water-side. Having safely arrived aboard, the anchors were weighed; and, the wind being favourable, the happy possessor of San Saba soon descried the Venetian shores. On reaching Venice, Barbolano immediately ordered the chest to be transferred from the ship to a boat, and to be conveyed to his own house, next to the church of San Antonino at Olivolo. But so enormous had become the weight of the load, that no human means were found to lift it; and, at the same moment, the bell at the Campanile began to peal with such extraordinary violence (in the absence of any visible agency) as to threaten destruction to the very tower. Hereupon, the people assembling in large numbers to ascertain what had happened, the devout Barbolano, and those who were with him, fell on their knees, praising God, and exclaiming, "We will carry it into the church; for the will of the Saviour of Mankind has been declared that the body shall be located in the shrine dedicated to His servant Saint Antoninus." The chest, which was now as light as a cork, was hereupon forthwith deposited in the boat, and conducted to San Antonino, where it was laid on the altar. Then, and then only, the bell of the Campanile desisted from its spontaneous activity; and over the remains was seen to hover a Dove of miraculous whiteness of plumage, which, after the celebration of *Te Deum* and the other services, vanished from sight. A new altar for San Saba was erected behind the choir, near that of San Antonino, and the bones were placed in the reliquary of the church. It is added, that on the evening of this auspicious day, the *piovano* of San Antonino, happening to walk in his garden, in which he had not long since planted some rose-trees, marvelled not a little to observe among the flowers a rose of surpassing beauty; and the good man hesitated not to associate the fair vision with the miracle of which he had just been a witness, looking upon it as a symbol of that yet fairer flower, which had been so recently transplanted from the soil of Constantinople to the soil of Venice.¹

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, pp. 470-1.

The Doge Barbolano probably owed his present elevation to a faction of which he was the organ and the chief. He succeeded to the throne at a moment of unusual difficulty. The whole nation was in a ferment. The violence of party-spirit was at its height. A peevish and refractory humour pervaded all classes of society. A general feeling was gaining ground, that a grievous wrong had been done to the son of the illustrious Orseolo. Many regretted, on calm reflection, the course which they had taken, in the heat of passion, toward Ottone; and there was already, in several influential circles, a secret longing for the restoration of that prince. It was in vain that Barbolano endeavoured to conciliate esteem by a just and energetic rule, or that he twice repelled the predatory inroads of the Patriarch Pepo of Aquileia; the people were angry and dissatisfied; and some even went so far as to taunt the Doge with being privy to the recent plot against his predecessor. It was equally in vain that, to flatter the Opposition, he recalled Flabenigo from exile. The Opposition was in no want of a leader; nor was that leader tolerant of a rival. This wavering and unsettled state of the public temper, which was eminently propitious to the Orseoli, was due to causes which are constantly arising among a jealous aristocracy. It sprang in some degree from the coexistence of three turbulent factions. But it was mainly attributable to the foretaste of the serious perplexity in which the continuance of Barbolano in power threatened to involve his country. On the one hand, it was announced, that Conrad II. had declined to renew the commercial charter of the Republic, unless Ottone Orseolo was recalled. The Venetian flag was, in consequence, excluded from Padua, Treviso, Concordia, Aquileia, and many other sea and river ports of the Peninsula; and the bold and menacing attitude of Pepo, who still hovered on the skirts of the Lagoon,¹ bred a suspicion that the sentiments of his patron toward the Venetians were undergoing a complete change. At the same time the Byzantine Court, with which the Orseoli had lately established relations of such intimate friendship, and where their cause was still farther strengthened by the elevation of Romanos Argyros to the throne in 1026, assumed an equally peremptory tone. The chrysoboles of 998 were

¹ Paolo Morosini, lib. iii. pp. 87-8; Muratori, vi. p. 84; Filiasi, vi. p. 311.

declared to be revoked. The ports of the Euxine and the Archipelago were closed against the standard of Saint Mark. These coercive measures led the Venetians to the adoption of a course consonant with their wishes no less than their interests. A fresh revulsion of opinion succeeded. Barbolano was compelled to abdicate, and to take the cowl (1026).¹ Vitali Orseolo was sent to Constantinople in quest of Ottone, and his elder brother the Primate, having been declared in the interval Vice-Doge of the Republic,² the unfortunate Flabenigo, who had hoped at length to profit by his machinations, found himself once more under the necessity of retiring to Treviso.

But before the Bishop reached his destination, Ottone had expired, a prey to grief and mortification. The Doge was scarcely in his fortieth year; and it was to be remarked as a circumstance equally mournful and strange, that he was the second of his family who, within a comparatively short period, had ended his days in a remote region. It was little imagined that the day would come when the House, which the glorious achievements of Orseolo II. had rendered incomparably the most powerful in the Republic, would be persecuted and proscribed; and anyone who should have affected in 998 to prognosticate that his son would be driven in 1030 from his native land by a large and influential faction, and that he would die in exile on the shore of the Bosporus, would have merely excited ridicule or merriment. Ottone was buried at Constantinople, his brother the Bishop of Torcello assisting at the obsequies; and fully eight weeks elapsed before his countrymen were made aware of the heavy loss which they had sustained. Amid a general and continued reaction in favour of the House of Orseolo, the Primate was invited, as an extraordinary mark of public confidence and sympathy, to retain office; and during the succeeding fourteen months he united in his own person the secular and spiritual dignities. But at the close of that period the churchman found the unique double trust too arduous.

His resignation was treated by his youngest brother

¹ Barbolano was buried, by his own special desire, in the church of San Antonino, with which the Doge had such peculiar associations. His tomb was in front of the door of the *sacrum*.—Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 471.

² Dandolo, lib. ix. ch. iv.; Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 474; Muratori, vi. p. 84.

Domenigo, who was at this time the leader of a small, yet influential, faction, as a favourable opportunity for realising his ambitious dreams; and without pausing to procure the popular suffrages, he summarily declared himself Doge, and entered into possession of the Ducal prerogatives and stronghold.

The friends of Flabenigo might reasonably feel that their opportunity had now at last come. They solemnly denounced the unconstitutional proceeding. They clamoured for the deposition of the usurper. A message was sent to Flabenigo to be in readiness at the shortest notice. "The chief magistracy of the Republic was not," they cried, "to be converted into a patrimony for the Orseoli"; and the Doge of a day, having vainly essayed to make a stand against immeasurably superior numbers, was ultimately forced to escape from the Palace by stealth, and to seek shelter at Ravenna.¹ The indiscretion of Domenico Orseolo completely marred the fortunes which he had intended to arrest in their fall, and to re-establish in his own person: for, under the influence of a mixed impulse of alarm and disgust at the arbitrary usurpation of the Dogeship, the Arrengo acquiesced in the succession of Flabenigo, who was escorted from Treviso to Venice by a solemn deputation of the nobles and the clergy (1033).

Flabenigo failed in carrying out his long-mooted design of endeavouring to procure a sentence of proscription against the Orseoli. But at the same time a strong anxiety was awakened to apply some enduring remedy to an evil, the growth of which had been brought by recent events so prominently before the public eye.² This evil, however, which was the almost perfect resemblance of the Dogeship to an hereditary monarchy, and the gradual, though almost complete, absorption of all political influence by an oligarchy of six or seven families, was neither easily nor promptly curable. It was a distemper which the State had been slowly contracting during several centuries; it was felt and feared that several centuries must elapse before it was wholly subdued; and the utmost remedy, which men were able to suggest at present, was a curtailment of the Ducal authority.

¹ *Cronaca Altinate juxta codicem Dresdensem*, p. 61; *Arch. stor. Ital.* App. v.; Dandolo, lib. ix.

² Sanudo, *Vite*, pp. 475-99; Dandolo, lib. ix. p. 290; Romanin, i. 303-5, 373-8. 392-5, 401.

It may be hard to believe that the Doge himself took the initiative in a question which affected him personally, no less than those who came after him, and which must, of necessity, detract from the splendour of the dignity which it had cost him such infinite labour to attain. Yet Flabenigo might not improbably deem himself pledged by the circumstances under which he had accepted office, to espouse the cause of political reform even when the pursuit of such a course became altogether antagonistic to his own interests. Besides, there is strong reason to doubt whether the Doge had either any children or any near kindred, whom he might associate, and to whom he might bequeath the crown; and if this was really the case, it is not unlikely that he may have acted under a feeling that it was placed within his power to earn a reputation for patriotism by introducing a law which should impose on his successors the same restraint which nature had imposed on him. It was resolved, however, in Arrengo at his suggestion, that Association and Hereditary Succession, which were equally mischievous outgrowths from the Dogate, should be abolished, and that the Tribunitial Duumvirate, eligible by the Doge, should be restored in the persons of Domenico Selvo and Vitali Faliero Dodoni, whose sanction and concurrence were pronounced essential in future to the validity of all public acts.¹ His Serenity was, besides, strongly recommended in any intricate matter of statecraft to seek the advice of a Giunta of *Pregadi* or *Rogati*.²

The other innovations were, in reality, of very secondary importance. For, so long as the election of the council of Tribunes, which was thus once more reconstituted after long disuse, was suffered to depend entirely on the Crown, it is sufficiently patent that they would hardly be allowed to exercise in general any influence over his conduct or policy, which they might not otherwise have exercised as members of the same family or of the same faction; and so far as the third point is concerned, the recommendation to take counsel at all seasons of peril or difficulty with those, who by their wisdom and experience were most entitled to credit, was much less binding in its nature and much more nominal.

It has already been pointed out that the principle of

¹ L. de Monacis, fol. 42; Sandi, ii. 378.

² Similar to the *Richiesti* of Florence.

association, now at length, after a duration of about a century and a half, ostensibly suppressed, had been carried into practice among the Romans, the Greeks, and the Carolingian and Capetian dynasties in France. It had not been carried into practice by any of these, as a rule, with very happy results. But in a circumscribed area like the earlier Venice, whose outlet and vent were so cramped, the presence of two or three concurrent rulers, seated side by side or accolated on the same throne, might be expected to involve inconvenient friction and dangerous rivalry. The system, so far as the Republic was concerned, was surely doomed, so soon as a concrete central administration should supplant the ancient gentilitial government.

The reign of Flabenigo afforded the Republic ten years of profound calm at home as well as abroad; during that space of time the Venetians were indebted to him, in addition to the changes which he wrought in their political system, for several useful and salutary measures of ecclesiastical reform. These valuable services, and the enjoyment of a blessing which they had scarcely known since the days of Orseolo II., and which was unquestionably due in some measure to the justice and moderation of his government, must have gone far to reconcile the people at large to a man whom they long viewed with no favourable eye, and whose elevation had been a matter of policy or impulse, rather than of inclination. He was succeeded in 1043 by Domenigo Contarini,¹ whose reign of nearly thirty years presented no feature of permanent importance except a second attack on Grado by the Aquileians and another revolt at Zara. Yet how much must have been going on all that silent time among a people so busy, so restless, so acquisitive!

On the demise² of the Doge Contarini in 1071 a large crowd assembled in their gondolas and armed galleys at Lido, where the bishop and his canonici were celebrating a mass for the soul of the departed, and gave their suffrages to the patrician Domenigo Selvo, one of the Tribunes, crying: *Noi volemo Dose Domenigo Selvo, e lo laudiamo*. The declared object

¹ Contarini obtained the renewal of the mercantile charter from the Emperor Henry III.

² Domenigo Tino, *De electione Domini Dominici Silvii Ducis Venetiarum*, quoted by Sansovino, *Venetia descritta*, lib. xii. p. 477; Galliccioli, *Mem.* vi. 123, *in extenso*, and Romanin, vol. i. p. 309.

of the national choice, who was returning from the late Doge's funeral, was immediately raised from the ground, and carried on the shoulders of some of his political friends to a gondola, which was in waiting at the water-side, and in which he was conveyed to Venice. On landing, the Doge and his partisans at once directed their steps toward Saint Mark's; at a short distance from the latter, Selvo was met by the members of the Provisional Government, who embraced and congratulated him; and near the portal of the church he was received by the ministers of the Ducal Chapel, who joined in procession. On entering Saint Mark's, Selvo, having unsandalled his feet, threw himself on his knees, and remained for some time in an attitude of prayer. Rising at length from his genuflexion, he advanced to the principal altar, where he subscribed the Promission, and accepted the great standard of the Republic. This part of the ceremonial having been completed, his Serenity was escorted by Domenico Tino and the other chaplains to the Palace, where the oath of allegiance was tendered to him in the name of the people.

The new Doge belonged to a family from Dorsoduro or Spinalunga, to which his ancestors were exiled as far back as 864 as a punishment for their complicity in the violent death of the Doge Tradenigo. This long interval equally sufficed to render their place of banishment a more eligible residence than it at the outset was, and to obliterate the odium of an incident which had become merely historical. A personage of both his names, possibly his father, had been implicated, however, in the civil war between the Morosini and Caloprini in the last century.

Fifty years before the accession of Selvo, a colony of Northmen had founded in the Italian peninsula a new dominion and a new dynasty; and the growth of the Norman power was so rapid that, in 1080, Robert, brother of Unfroi Guiscard,¹ first of the Dukes of Apulia and Calabria of that line, found himself the protector of the Roman Pontiff and the successful rival of the German Emperor of the West.² But the ambition of Robert Guiscard soared still higher; the effeminate languor of the Greeks and the perturbed state of Italy inspired him with a belief that it was within his

¹ *Chronique de Robert Viscart*, lib. i. p. 277. Paris, 1835, 8vo.

² Denina, *Revoluzioni d' Italia*, ii. p. 7.

power to restore, in his own person, that unity to the empire which it had possessed under Augustus; and with this scheme in contemplation it was that he entered the Mediterranean in the early part of the following year, with a large fleet at his disposal, took Butrinto and Corfu, and laid siege to Durazzo.¹

The ostensible object of the Duke in invading the Greek territories, which was the reinstatement on the throne of the lawful Emperor, Michael Ducas,² had, however, in the meantime, been regarded with the most unfeigned alarm and anxiety by the usurper, Nicephoros Botoniates; and the latter, finding in the scanty resources of the Byzantine Court no adequate means of warding off the threatened danger, had invoked the protection of the Republic; while he offered to the Doge, as a particular mark of his esteem, the hand of the Princess Theodora, daughter of the late Constantine Ducas XI.³ Selvo, on his part, accepted with pleasure the offer of so honourable a marriage; and the Venetians, who from other causes, viewed not with less apprehension the movements of Guiscard, and whose present interest it was to prop up the tottering throne of the feeble successors of Valens, were naturally predisposed to lend a favourable ear to the request of Botoniates. The betrothal of Theodora Ducas to their Chief Magistrate, and the receipt of intelligence that Robert had attempted by various artifices to wean from their fidelity the fiefs in Dalmatia,⁴ which they already held by such a precarious tenure, conduced to strengthen a half-formed determination; and in the month of August 1081 a fleet of sixty-three sail,⁵ under the personal command of Selvo, left the Lagoon for the Mediterranean, to raise the siege of Durazzo, and to protect the maritime frontier of the empire.

Selvo passed the Ionian Isles without experiencing the slightest opposition, and arrived at length off Cape Pali.⁶ Here the squadron was becalmed. A few light barks were sent forward, however, to reconnoitre; and these scouts announced that the Norman fleet under Guiscard himself

¹ *Chronique de Robert Viscart*, lib. ii. c. 1.

² *Ibid.*

³ *L'Art de vérifier les dates*, xvii. p. 449.

⁴ *Filiassi*, vi. p. 349.

⁵ *Marin*, ii. p. 290.

⁶ *Anna Comnena, Histoire d'Alexis traduite par Cousin*, lib. iv. p. 150; *Malatterra, Hist. Sicula*, lib. iii. ch. xxvi.; *Gulielmus Apulus, De Northmannorum gente poema*, lib. iv.; *Chronique de Viscart*, lib. i. c. 2.

was floating at anchor in the bay of Durazzo, eight or nine miles distant. But so soon as he was apprised of the near approach of the Venetians, the Duke of Apulia, altogether unprepared to receive a sudden attack, and wholly unconscious of the helpless condition of his antagonist, resolved to have recourse to a temporising policy, and his son Bohemond, to whom he confided the task of opening negotiations with Selvo, having protested to the latter that Guiscard was actuated by no feeling of ambition or hostility toward the empire, and that his sole object in invading the Greek frontier was the restoration of Michael Ducas to the throne, concluded by praying in this undertaking the concurrence and aid of the Republic. The Doge, who perhaps felt that, in his present dilemma, he could barely afford to be candid, affected to entertain the insidious proposal; he ultimately begged that night to reflect on the matter; and the ship, which had brought Bohemond to Pali, was no sooner lost in the dusk of evening, than Selvo directed the lighter vessels to tow the men-of-war into the bay of Durazzo, where the whole fleet was drawn up, under his eye, in the form of a crescent, the carricks being placed in the front, and the smaller frigates in the rear. On the former might be seen lofty and storeyed castles of wood; and in each of these floating fortresses was stationed a large body of soldiers and marines who, in addition to the ordinary weapons used in mediæval warfare, were provided with a supply of huge fagots tipped with iron, which they might let drop from that elevation with fatal accuracy on the decks of the enemy's ships. All the arrangements preparatory to an action were completed in the course of the night; and at daybreak, the forces of Selvo were seen lying in excellent order within a short distance of the mouth of the bay; while it was found that the Normans had taken up a position between the Venetian squadron and the shore. But the former had been outmanœuvred; the rapid and masterly movement of the Doge had been wholly unexpected; and although the Duke of Apulia had at once perceived that a battle was inevitable, and had in like manner made all the necessary dispositions during the preceding night, it was clear that he had little counted upon being cooped up in such a manner that his superiority of numbers would prove an incumbrance.

Under these circumstances, which Selvo had rendered by his able tactics so favourable to himself, the struggle commenced with the daylight; and it was maintained for some time on both sides with equal vigour and equal success. Guiscard himself was foremost among the combatants; and his son narrowly escaped capture in conducting an attack on the Venetian line. But the steady and unyielding valour of the Islanders, combined with their tried discipline and consummate dexterity, was not to be withstood; their opponents, who might own that they had at last found a foe worthy of their arms, gradually lost ground; and after a strenuous but futile endeavour to regain his position, the Duke of Apulia was forced to acknowledge the superior fortune of Venice. His discomfiture relieved Durazzo; the conqueror, after giving audience to an embassy from Botoniates, who was anxious to congratulate Selvo and his officers on the satisfactory result of their exertions, entered that town in triumph; and, having placed his son in command of the garrison, which was already composed, in principal measure, of Venetian residents,¹ he returned home (1081). Toward the close of the same year, Botoniates was deposed and succeeded by Alexios Comnenos.

But the genius of Guiscard speedily retrieved his disaster; and, two months after the naval battle of Durazzo, he met and defeated a Greek army, commanded by the Emperor in person. It was then already November; the enemy was in full retreat; and the Duke, desirous on his part of reposing on a victory, resolved to fix his quarters for the winter at Joannina, where he might keep a watchful eye on the works which he had thrown up during the campaign round Durazzo, and on which the operations in the following year largely depended.

On the approach of spring (1082) the place was invested anew; and the formidable nature of the artillery, of which Guiscard had formed his besieging train, seemed to insure a successful result. Yet, if the issue of the undertaking was still in any degree doubtful, that doubt was quickly dissipated by a strange and unforeseen contingency. A Venetian noble, who resided at Durazzo, and who commanded one of the principal towers, had been recently piqued at some slighting expression of the Governor; to repair his honour, or to indulge

¹ Anonymus Barensis, p. 6, notes 42-3; Lebeau, xv. pp. 144, 145, 179.

his resentment, the Venetian conceived the design of betraying his trust; and three days after his arrival at Durazzo, Guiscard was secretly informed that, provided he was willing to requite the service in a suitable manner,¹ that part of the fortress over which the traitor was placed in charge should be left purposely defenceless and accessible on the night of the 22nd February 1082. Robert embraced this proposal with avidity; assurances of friendship and fidelity were exchanged; and at the specified hour the Norman troops, having entered the open tower in silence, surprised the citadel, and ultimately forced the Venetian garrison to evacuate the town.²

The campaign of 1082, which had been thus inaugurated by the fall of Durazzo, was also distinguished by the reduction of Castoria³ and several other towns in Thessaly; and had not the terrible reverses of his son Bohemond in the Italian peninsula, and the solicitations of the Holy See, recalled him at that juncture from the East, the Duke of Apulia might have shortly placed on his own head the Crown of Romania.

The multifarious concerns of his kingdom detained Robert in Apulia till September 1084, when he once more quitted the port of Otranto with a powerful fleet, and directed his course toward Corfu. But, in the meantime, the new Emperor Comnenos, alarmed by the recent successes and the fresh preparations of his indefatigable foe, intimated to the Republic his readiness to purchase her alliance and substantial aid once more with increased commercial privileges; he even added, that he would endeavour to raise a naval contingent. Those conditions were accepted, and in the early part of October the Doge set sail a second time for the Ionian Isles. He found himself confronted with the enemy of whom he was in search between Corfu and Cephalonia.

On this occasion, Selvo was placed in command of nine castellated ships of extraordinary size, carrying a force of about 13,000 men, thirty-six *dromoni* or *navi grossi*, whose complement reached 10,000, fourteen long galleys, and nine vessels of smaller proportions and lighter draught. The fleet of the Normans was composed of 120 sail.⁴ In point of numbers

¹ Gibbon (ch. lvi. p. 332) says positively that a rich and honourable marriage was the price of the service. But he cites no authority for this, and I have not seen such a statement in any other writer.

² Gulielmus Apulus, *Poema*, lib. iv.

³ *Chron. de R. Viscart*, loco citato.

⁴ Filiasi, *Ricerche storiche*, p. 201.

therefore the advantage was greatly on the side of the enemy; but the Venetian squadron seems to have been superior in strength and efficiency. At all events, the battle which ensued terminated speedily in favour of the latter, and Guiscard was under the necessity of ordering a general retreat. A second engagement took place three days later; it was followed by a similar result; and the victorious Doge, acting on the reasonable belief that the enemy was too much discomfited to rally, sent back to Venice all the vessels which appeared unable to contend against the increasing rigour of the season, and retired with the rest to the coast of Albania, where he intended to watch the movements of the Normans, and to await their departure.

Guiscard wisely determined not to neglect so auspicious an opportunity of renewing hostilities; and this determination was strengthened by the statement of Pietro Contarini, a Venetian deserter of rank,¹ that the Doge was altogether ignorant of the temper of the Normans, and unprepared for action. The information was perfectly correct. The sudden and impetuous attack of Guiscard took the Doge completely by surprise, and threw his forces into irrecoverable confusion. The carracks became all but useless. The frigates and a large proportion of the galleys were absent: and, to add to his distress and perplexity, the Greek contingent, smitten by a panic fear, fled in dismay, having scarcely exchanged a blow with the enemy. Still the courage and self-possession of the Doge did not forsake him in that trying moment. On the contrary, every effort which might help to extricate his fleet from the perilous position, in which it was placed, was exerted by Selvo; and had the vessels, which were now directing their course toward the Lagoon, been at his disposal, or indeed had he at all anticipated the attack, he felt that, even under such disadvantages, he would have easily achieved a third triumph. But the enemy was pressing forward on every side. His line was outflanked and overwhelmed. Two of his carracks foundered; seven fell into the hands of the Normans; and of the Venetians 3000 were killed, and 2500 were taken prisoners.² The Doge himself barely succeeded in effecting

¹ Romanin, i. 324.

² Romoald of Salerno, *Chronicon*, p. 175; Pietro Giustiniani, lib. i. p. 19; Dandolo, lib. ix. ch. viii.; Filiasi, *Memorie*, vi. 369-370; idem, *Ricerche storiche*, p. 201.

a disorderly retreat with the remnant of his shattered squadron (November 1084).¹

It was toward the close of that year that the Venetians beheld the wreck of their fleet, and learned the disastrous result of the battle of Corfu; and a reverse which spread such terrible havoc among a sparse population, naturally bred great discontent and repining. There was no unwillingness to believe that Selvo had exerted his best efforts to avert the calamity; and those who had been present at the battle were able to bear testimony to the energy and skill which he had shown to the last moment in the face of vastly superior numbers. But the general opinion was that, apart from those two considerations, the conduct of the Doge was justly open to animadversion. In the first place it was urged that, although he defeated the Duke of Apulia twice in the course of four days, he had neglected to use that double victory; secondly, it was said that, in suffering Guiscard to take him by surprise, he had exhibited too little circumspection. It also unfortunately happened that there was, at that time, a large and influential Faction, whose interest and aim it was to foster the incipient belief in the negligence and incapacity of their chief magistrate; the leader of this party was the Tribune Vitali Faliero Dodoni,² a member of one of the oldest Venetian families, and an avowed candidate for the vacant berretta. Yet such was the success with which he operated on the public feeling, that Selvo was forced, in the course of December 1084, by the dread of a popular tumult, to tender his resignation; and thus the crown, which he was suspected of having won by intrigue, was wrested from him by intrigue.³

With the exception of Pietro Tradenigo, the Doge Domenico Contarini, who immediately preceded Selvo, had occupied the throne during a longer period than any of his predecessors. Fifty-one years had seen only three Doges: and as at Venice the lengthened duration of a reign carried with it the lengthened ascendancy of a party, a natural feeling of impatience was apt to arise, when one man remained at the head of the government nearly thirty years without the prospect even then, in the ordinary course of events, of an early change. For here was

¹ Romanin, i. p. 324, says that the prisoners were afterward released.

² The name Dodoni or De Donis was probably derived from the Castle of that name in the Cremonese territory.

³ Romanin, i. p. 325; *Cronaca Altinate*, lib. iii. p. 84.

the second instance in which the administration had continued in the same hands during a term of eight-and-twenty years; and the chances of many contemporary aspirants were narrowed or destroyed.

Shortly before his deposition, Selvo had lost his consort, the Greek princess Theodora. The luxurious extravagance of this lady forms a favourite theme with the chroniclers of those times; and the narrative of Petrus Damianus especially presents an amusing sketch of her fashion of life, which contributes to illustrate the manners of the period. Her Serenity's sinful voluptuousness and inordinate indulgence brought with them (continues Damianus) their own punishment. About two years after her marriage with Selvo, the Dogaressa was attacked by a putrid fever; the malady became at last (we are told) insufferably distasteful; and the daughter of Ducas, an object in her latest moments of mingled compassion and abhorrence to all around her, was left to die almost in solitude.¹ The student of modern Eastern manners will probably be at no loss to comprehend how it may have happened that the unhappy Theodora was hurried to an untimely grave, in spite of her profuse employment of perfumes and cosmetics. The Orientals of all ages have been remarkable for the union of outrageous splendour with outrageous uncleanness.

The language of Damianus favours a supposition that the Greek Princess was guilty of introducing into the Republic many false refinements and fantastic notions, which were till then unknown to the daughters of the Contarini and the Morosini. That the Venetian ladies of the eleventh century were too simple in their tastes to copy the fashions of the Greeks, is possible;² but there is no ground for the belief that that simplicity proceeded from their ignorance, rather than their virtue. We want, no doubt, more technically accurate details of a tragedy, which may have been due to some malignant disorder.

There is irrefragable evidence that the Venetian traders frequented Constantinople so early as the year 800; toward the close of the following century they had established a regular commerce with the Levant; and even in 940, when

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 477; Dandolo, lib. ix. p. 247.

² One of Selvo's successors, Vitali Michieli, enumerated among the virtues of his consort Felice, who died in 1101, and was buried at Saint Mark's, a detestation of luxury. *Calcarit Luxum*, it is written in the epitaph. Sansovino, ii. 95.

the envoy of Berenger II., King of Italy, passed through Venice, he could not help remarking the strong contrast which the rich costumes and polite carriage of the citizens offered to the rude attire and ruder manners of the Franks and Lombards of his day.¹ In the long interval, the genius and enterprise of the great mercantile houses of Venice had developed and promoted to a wonderful extent the national civilisation; in this interval Orseolo II. had reigned; and we are led, on the whole, to incline to the view, that the Venetians of the age of Selvo were as familiar with the customs of the people who dwelled on the shores of the Euxine and the Archipelago, as with the cotton that was spun at Pola, or with the wine which was brought from Justinople.

The nuptials of Maria Argyra and Giovanni Orseolo have been recorded in the annals of the tenth century; those of Theodora Ducas with Domenigo Selvo consequently offered the second instance, in which a princess of the royal blood of Constantinople had been united to a scion of the Venetian nobility. These dynastic alliances were gratifying enough to the national vanity and the popular imagination; but they had lost much of their political significance. At Venice the succession had ceased to be hereditary. At Constantinople it was beginning to be precarious. The day had gone by, when the Doge could levy war to serve his own interests, or to carry out a family compact. The Byzantine Government was already growing too feeble and disorganised to render active aid to a distant Power in case of need.

But there was still another feature in the reign of Selvo, which sheds a certain lustre over his memory. The Ducal Palace, which had been consumed so far back as 976, was not wholly completed until the reign of Domenigo Contarini (1043-71). Yet, although the principal and more conspicuous portions of the new edifice were built of stone, much had been left, or perhaps even reconstructed, in the ruder material. It was the taste and munificence of Selvo, which removed this blemish; while he rendered the form of the building infinitely more beautiful, and its proportions more striking, by the addition of marble columns, and commenced the decoration of the walls of the interior with painting and mosaic.²

¹ Luitprand, *Legatio ad Nicephorum Phocam: Rerum Italicarum scriptores*, vol. ii. p. 417.

² Cicognara, *Monumenti*, i. p. 19.

CHAPTER VIII

A.D. 1084-1128

Faliero I. Dodoni, First Doge of Venice, Dalmatia, and Croatia (1085)—New Treaty with the Byzantine Court (1085)—The Emperor Henry IV. at Venice—Restoration of Loredo (1094)—Plague and Famine at Venice—Death of Faliero I.—Vitali Michieli, Doge (1096)—Participation of Venice in the Crusades (1099)—Recovery of Ferrara by the Venetians on behalf of the Countess Matilda (1102)—Death of Michieli I. (May 1102)—Faliero II. Dodoni, Doge (1102-17)—War with Padua (1110)—Fresh Expedition to Syria (1111)—War with Hungary (1115-17)—Battle of Zara (1115)—Visit of Henry V. to Venice (March 1116)—Renewal of the war with Hungary—Second Battle of Zara (June 1116)—Third Battle of Zara—Fall of the Doge—Rout of the Venetians—Five Years' Truce with Hungary—Domenigo Michieli, Doge (1117-28)—Fresh Expedition to Syria (1123)—Battle of Jaffa—Siege of Tyre—Treaty between the Republic and the King of Jerusalem—Triumphal Return of Michieli to Venice (1124)—Sack of the Ionian Isles—Recovery of the Dalmatian Colonies from Hungary—Occupation of Cephalonia by a Venetian Fleet (1118)—Abdication of Michieli II. (1128).

IN the spring of 1085, arrived at the Golden Horn the Venetian deputies, who were charged with the task of reminding the Emperor of the promise made to the late Doge shortly before the disastrous battle of Corfu :¹ and it was intimated, that the formal cession of Dalmatia and Croatia was a necessary prelude to the renewal of the campaign. Alexios deplored, perhaps, the weakness which precluded him from resisting or resenting the demands of his insular allies: yet he might recognise in them the stipulated price of services rendered to his empire in a season of urgent distress. In the presence of the deputies, his Majesty relinquished all right to a province, which one of his predecessors had refused to resign to the greatest of the Carolingian kings. He exempted the Venetian traders in all parts of the empire, excepting in Cyprus, Candia, and Aphrodisias (Megalopolis), from all duties and imposts whatever. On the new Doge Faliero, whom he acknowledged as Doge of Venice, Dalmatia, and Croatia, he conferred the titles and revenues of a Protosevastos; and the church of Saint Mark

¹ De Monacis, fol. 43; Mutinelli, *Del commercio dei Veneziani*, p. 22.

was endowed with several houses in Durazzo and Constantinople.¹ But the clearest testimony of the necessities of the Byzantine Court, as well as the best monument of the growth of the Venetian power, was that clause in the new chrysobole which adjudged each Amalfitan merchant, resident in the Eastern capital, to pay to the Ducal Fisc an annual tribute of three perperi.²

Alexios had thus redeemed his pledge; and Faliero proceeded, on his part, to open the campaign of 1085. The operations of the fleet were of a languid and unimportant character; a few engagements took place in the Gulf of Tarentum between the Normans and the allied forces of the Greeks and Venetians, in all of which the former had the advantage; and in the course of May, Dodoni determined to withdraw from the contest. A few months later, the illustrious Guiscard died at Cephalonia, where he was projecting a fresh invasion of the empire;³ and his death relieved the Byzantine Court from all apprehension in that quarter.

The Doge, on his return with the fleet to Venice, was surprised to find the capital a scene of consternation and sorrow. Saint Mark had disappeared. The search and inquiries of the priests had been fruitless. The citizens had had recourse to fasting and prayer, but in vain. The Saint was inexorable; till, on the 6th of June 1085, as one of the officials was performing some service in the chapel, he became sensible of a sweet perfume, and turning round in astonishment, he beheld an arm protruding from one of the columns of the porch. The man was dumb with fear, till he was reassured by a voice which said to him: "I am Saint Mark; go, and announce my return in the city." In obedience to the Saint's instructions, the favoured ecclesiastic communicated to the Doge and the Patriarch what he had witnessed. The whole capital was soon thrown into a state of effervescence. Every one became anxious to examine with his own eyes the spot, where the hand of Saint Mark had been first seen; and so widely spread was the reputation of the Patron-Evangelist in those days throughout the neighbouring provinces, that a great number of devout persons were attracted to Venice by the

¹ Dandolo, lib. ix. ch. ix. ; Filiasi, vi. p. 382.

² See Leber, *Essai sur la fortune privée*, p. 103.

³ Gul. Apulus, *Poema*, lib. v. ; and Mutinelli, *Commercio dei Veneziani*, p. 22.

joyful intelligence.¹ Among others, the Emperor Henry IV., who was then at Treviso, when he was apprised of the circumstance, informed the deputies, who had just obtained from him the renewal of the mercantile charter, that it was his intention shortly to visit the theatre of the late miracle; and on that occasion his Majesty was suffered to indulge his pious curiosity. But the imperial visit was opportune; for in the October of the same year the Saint was placed under stricter confinement, and the Doge and the Primicerio, to whose care he was now jointly confided, were thenceforward the only persons to whom his precise position was not a secret.² In this traditional story, which reminds us of the somewhat similar legend of Saint Peter and Edric the Lambeth fisherman, when Westminster Abbey was to be dedicated, we merely recognise the politic aim of the Church to associate with ecclesiastical occurrences and foundations myths in harmony with the ignorant credulity of the age, and now no longer of any concern to us except as part of the romance of history.

In the year 1094, a grant was obtained from the government to defray the expense of restoring the ancient fief of Loredo between Adria and Cavarzero; and in the compact into which the Republic thought fit to enter with the municipal authorities, it was stipulated that the legal and commercial franchises enjoyed by Venetian citizens should be extended without exception to the Loredese; that they should exercise the privilege of choosing their own *gastaldo* or tribune; and that they should pay to the Bishop of Olivolo the annual poll-tax of three fowls, as well as a fee of three denari to the collector. The Doge reserved to himself the right of hunting in their forests, and fishing in their streams.³

A financial difficulty in 1094 was followed in somewhat less than two years by a visitation of plague and famine; and in the number of those who succumbed to the former was the venerable Dodoni himself, whose fate might have been viewed perhaps with more sympathy, if the scarcity had not been thought to be chiefly due to his personal improvidence.

¹ It forms a curious illustration of the manners and religious tone of the period that an *andata* was instituted in eternal commemoration of this circumstance, known as the "Andata per l' inventione del Corpo di S. Marco." See Sansovino, *V. D.* xii. 515.

² Dandolo, lib. ix. p. 251; Pietro Giustiniani, lib. i. p. 28.

³ Dandolo, lib. ix. p. 251, quotes the treaty between Venice and her dependency textually: it bears date December 1094.

In its periodical recurrences, the epidemic was naturally apt to exhibit more than usual virulence in a city which, in addition to imperfect sewage, ventilation, and light, was exposed to three evils from which its neighbours were for the most part exempt: the noxious vapours of the lagoons, the dampness of the soil, arising from constant inundations, and secondarily, at least, the scanty space disposable for purposes of sepulture within so limited a territorial area. On the other hand, indeed, the population of Venice was comparatively sparse and singularly fluctuating; and there is no valid reason to suppose that even the less aristocratic localities were crowded to excess. The callings of the lower orders were generally healthy and invigorating; their habits were cleanly; their diet was simple; and frequent voyages to distant countries, or excursions to the *terra firma*, afforded changes of air and scene of which the corresponding class in many other States, and even in many other Italian cities, knew very little or nothing whatever.

The Doge Vitali Michieli, who succeeded Faliero in 1096, found on his accession that the pious declamations of Peter the Hermit and other fanatical propagandists were infusing a new spirit into mankind. The ages which immediately succeeded the irruption of the Northmen had been ages of darkness, confusion, and ignorance. The torrent of invasion, which had swept away the last remains of Roman grandeur, and had effaced the landmarks of kingdoms, created a chasm between the past and the future; and when the flood subsided, a colony of Scythians and Tartars had settled on the beautiful and fertile plains of Umbria, Picenum, and Liguria. The fabulous origin of the strangers was forgotten in the lapse of time, and inter-marriages with the Italians gradually produced a race who might regard their savage ancestors with surprise and contempt. The Goths and the Lombards had quickly yielded to the humanising influence of a softer and more luxurious climate, and they had long acquired the arts of their adopted countrymen, before they began to copy their vices. By example and education, moreover, they had been slowly converted to Christianity; and they were thus led to sympathise with the horror created by the insults which the Turks heaped on the Holy Places. During the early ages of the Church, this feeling manifested itself only in desultory

pilgrimages and pious but feeble vows. In the eleventh century the picture of the desecration of the Temple and the Sepulchre, drawn by interest, superstition, or credulity, had begun to inspire Western chivalry with an extraordinary and widely-spread ardour. The knowledge and judgment of the self-constituted champions of the Cross bore a very slight proportion to their valour and enthusiasm; and their glowing zeal prepared them to regard religion in a point of view widely different from that in which it had been contemplated by the founders of the Apostolic Faith. It ceased to be the rule or example of life: it became a passion and a pursuit. Men defended it with the sword, and polluted it with bloodshed. To have died beneath the Sacred Banner was soon considered the most glorious, if not the most blessed, end of earthly existence; and the extirpation of the misbelievers was accounted the best passport to the kingdom of heaven.

But while the knights and peasantry of France, Flanders, and Germany were sharing the influence of such sentiments, the Republic had begun to perceive the high expediency of joining the general movement. The other Crusaders obeyed the new impulse: the Republic utilised it. The principle, which swayed the policy and inspired the zeal of the Venetians in this class of undertaking, was precisely that which a trading community might be disposed to keep in view as the root and germ of its prosperity: while the almost inseparable connection of their political and commercial systems naturally led them to blend two ideas which had till then remained distinct, and to associate with the pursuit of wealth the acquisition of power. The Venetians had long found that the Mohammedan countries formed an excellent market for the produce and manufactures of the West, and it was consequently not so much the fear of the conquest or recovery of Palestine by the infidels, which operated as an incentive in their case, as that of the foundation of marts and counters by other mercantile communities on the shores of the Holy Land, and of the rise in that manner of a competition, which could not fail to be injurious to the national welfare. It was the aim of the Republic to forestall any such contingency. It was not to be expected that she would denaturalise herself by levying large armies, and by sending them across arid and pestilential regions, or through hostile and barbarous countries, where,

even should they contrive to force a passage, they would almost inevitably fall victims to hunger and disease. It was not within the limits of possibility that Venice should adopt such a course. The part, which she proposed to herself in these distant enterprises, was that of maritime co-operation with the military Powers of Christendom; and for such a part she was perhaps better fitted by her constitution and the peculiar bent of her people than any other European State.

In the early part of 1099, orders were given for the organisation of a Dalmatian contingent;¹ while the Government at home was engaged in preparing the expedition, which by the national consent was to be dispatched without delay to the succour of Godfrey de Bouillon and his companions in arms. This flotilla, which was computed at 207 vessels² of all sail, including 80 galleys, left the gulf in the autumn of 1099, under the joint command of Giovanni Michieli, the Doge's son, and Arrigo Contarini, Bishop of Castello. It shaped its course, in the first instance, for Grado, where the Bishop received at the hands of the patriarch Pietro Badoer the great standard of Saint Mark; and thence it proceeded to Rhodes, where the admiral designed to wait till spring.

Meanwhile, however, Alexios Comnenos, who had been watching the movements of the Republic with growing suspicion, and who considered that a certain deference was due on her part to his wishes, had earnestly exhorted her to refrain from taking any active share in the Crusade; and, the Venetians having turned a deaf ear to the appeal, he had recourse to Pisan jealousy and hatred. His overtures in the latter quarter were more successful; and fifty galleys, which had served under the son of Robert Guiscard in the Holy Land during the preceding summer, readily furlled the Norman colours, and hoisted the imperial flag. The mercenaries, having discovered that the Venetian fleet was at anchor off Rhodes, advanced toward the spot where Michieli had fixed his moorings. The admiral, feigning ignorance of their hostile design, though he had actually at first imagined from the pennon which the stranger carried, that the nation was Greek, sent an envoy under a flag of truce to expostulate

¹ De Monacis, fol. 44, Add. MSS. 8574; Marin, iii. 7-9; Romanin, ii. 14.

² Navagiero, *Storia*, p. 963; G. Diedo, *Storia*, i. p. 54.

with the Pisan commander. But, the enemy having declined to afford any explanation of his purpose, Michieli hesitated no longer in entering into hostilities; and in a decisive though brief engagement with a portion of the Venetian line the mercenaries were defeated with a loss of twenty ships and 4000 prisoners.¹ The former were retained as prizes; the latter, who would have proved a costly and useless incumbrance, immediately regained their liberty, with the exception of thirty officers, whom the Venetian commander thought proper to retain as hostages.²

Shortly after this collision the whole fleet quitted its anchorage, and advanced to the islet of Myra, where Bishop Contarini was gratified by the discovery of the body of Saint Nicholas, Bishop and Confessor, which he had promised to secure for his country. From Myra the fleet proceeded to Smyrna, which was abandoned to pillage as a possession of the Saracens; and at last, in the month of June 1100,³ it entered the Bay of Jaffa. Three weeks after the arrival of Michieli and his squadron, Godfrey de Bouillon expired (18th July 1100); and after participating in the siege of Jaffa, and a few operations before the town of Caiphaz,⁴ the Venetian commander decided on returning to Europe in anticipation of the winter. Michieli had lost sight of the shores of Palestine late in the autumn: he made his entry into the harbour of Castello on the 6th of December 1100.⁵ It happened by possible prearrangement to be Saint Nicholas's day. An enormous crowd had gathered on the quay to welcome the return of the troops, and to hear the news from the East. The Doge himself and a procession of the clergy were also there to receive with due honour the admiral and his squadron; and when a report was circulated that the fleet had brought with it from Myra the body of the saint, to whose memory that day was especially dedicated, the popular ecstasy was prodigious. The whole capital soon presented one scene of ovation: the pious citizens were filled with

¹ Blondus of Forli, *De origine et gestis Venetorum*, sign. f.

² Roncioni, *Istorie Pisane*, lib. iv. p. 139; Paolo Morosini, lib. iv. p. 96; Sandi, i. p. 427.

³ Michaud, ii. p. 12; Lebeau, xv. p. 360.

⁴ The anonymous author of the *Translation of the Relics of Saint Nicholas to Venice*, apud Cornaro *Ecl. Ven. Antiq. Mon.*, and quoted by Filiati, *Ricerche*, 234, states, that the Venetians at this siege had vessels so large, that they were on a level with the towers of the city.

⁵ Dandolo, lib. ix. p. 258.

delight and wonder at the coincidence; and shortly afterward the sacred relics were lodged with every mark of devotion in the monastery which had been founded at Lido in 1044 by the Doge Contarini.¹ Thus terminated the first expedition of the Republic to the Holy Land, which had certainly partaken less of the nature of a military pilgrimage than of that of a predatory cruise.

In the succeeding year (1101) the Venetians, anxious to punish and repress the piratical incursions of the cruisers of Roger Guiscard into their Dalmatian possessions, concluded an offensive and defensive league with Hungary, to whose vengeance the Count of Sicily had earned an equal title by similar operations on her frontier. The conditions of this treaty, which bound King Caloman to afford protection to the Venetian flag, and to provide a military contingent to the naval expedition against Apulia now in contemplation by Michieli, were executed, so soon as the vessels employed in the Syrian campaign had been refitted and repaired; and while the Hungarian forces invaded the dominions of Guiscard on the side of the land, a fleet commanded by the Doge in person descended the Adriatic, sacked Brindisi² and Monopoli, and diffused terror and desolation along the whole seaboard.³

During the same period the Countess Matilda, niece of the Emperor Henry II., comes for a short time on the scene. This great and brave lady, daughter and heiress of Bonifacio, Count of Tuscany, and the most munificent benefactress to the Holy See, who had long been concerting abortive measures for the recovery of Ferrara, solicited the aid of the Republic; and in the spring of 1102 the Doge sailed up the Po with a small squadron, and took possession of the city in her name.⁴ So material a service was not left unrequited, and the Venetians were placed in the enjoyment of many valuable privileges of a commercial character in Ferrara. The story of the Countess Matilda, to whom the Papacy actually owed the Patrimony of Saint Peter, her strange marriage, and her devout end, are familiar to the readers of the *Pecorone* of Ser Giovanni Villani.

In the following May (1102) Michieli I. closed his days

¹ Sansovino, lib. v. p. 230.

² Monaca, *Memorie storiche della Città di Brindisi*, lib. iii. ch. vii.

³ Dandolo, lib. ix. p. 259; Pietro Giustiniani, lib. i. p. 21.

⁴ Donizone, *Vita Mathildis Comitissae*, lib. ii. ch. xiii. ap. Murat, v.

in peace, after a reign of five years and five months not inglorious according to the ideas of that age. During much of the time, the Doge was on shipboard, engaged in a succession of warlike expeditions, of which it was at least to be predicated that the result was uniformly fortunate. He was replaced by Ordelafo, son¹ of the former Doge Faliero I. Dodoni, who had so miserably perished during the pestilence of 1096. The unusual name Ordelafo, which suggests an alliance with the Ordelafo of Forli, presents itself here in an indirect way some generations prior to its rise to eminence and popularity in the Romagna.

In the construction of their larger and their more important buildings, such as the Basilica, the Ducal Palace, and the cathedral of San Pietro di Castello, the Venetians had been accustomed from the most remote times to introduce stone and marble, which they procured, at a comparatively cheap rate, from Italy and Dalmatia. But the material almost universally employed in parish churches and private dwellings till the reign of the second Faliero,² was wood, which was also imported from the latter country, as well as from Istria, and during centuries obtained in large quantities from the forests of the Dogado itself. The remarkable change, which was effected in this respect at the commencement of the twelfth century, was the immediate consequence of one of the most destructive visitations by which the Republic was ever afflicted.

Old men, whose memory carried them far back into the past, owned that they had never witnessed such a dreadful year as 1106. It eclipsed in horror even the too memorable 1006, of which it was to be remarked, not without some superstitious awe, that it was exactly the centenary. The heavens were overcast with an angry gloom. The strength of man and beast was alike prostrated by the suffocating heat of the atmosphere. Strange and portentous sounds were heard to issue from the canals; and the fish leaped in terror out of the water. The lagoons emitted sulphureous and inflammatory vapours. It lightened and thundered at unusual seasons; and men observed that the flash of the electric fluid was more vivid, and the roll of the thunder more deep, than

¹ *Cronaca Altinate*, lib. v. p. 152; Caroldo, *Historia*, p. 4. Harl. MSS. 5020.

² Temanza, *Antica pianta di Venezia*, p. 7.

ordinary.¹ Shocks of earthquake were felt at short intervals. A meteor shot from time to time across the dark masses of cloud. The tide of the Adriatic was swollen to an unexampled degree, and the shops and houses of the citizens were overturned and flooded. Nor was this the whole extent of the evil. On the first day of the year, a fire, attributed to the volcanic exhalations from the lagoons, broke out in the dwelling of Arrigo Zeno, in the street of SS. Apostoli,² and the flames were not quenched until they had consumed six churches and the whole body of contiguous building. On the 6th of April following, a second conflagration originated in the street of San Lorenzo, the ravages of which extended over both sides of the Grand Canal. It engulfed no fewer than twenty-four churches, among which were San Lorenzo, San Severo, San Zaccaria, Santa Scholastica, and San Basso, carried havoc and ruin in every direction, and again damaged the Palace. In 1110, a terrible fire broke out at New Malamocco, followed by a disastrous inundation.³

These accumulated disasters were obviously due in some measure to causes over which there was no human control; yet it was considered at the same time that they had chiefly arisen from the too general employment, in the construction of the capital and its suburbs, of the most combustible of all substances; and as the islands became more densely populated, and localities, once wholly uninhabited, were metamorphosed into busy scenes of life and industry, the necessity of making better provision than heretofore for the public security became more patent. It was felt to be of vital consequence that the most sedulous care should be taken to guard against a return of the late calamity. A general resolution was formed to restore the more important buildings, which had been burned, in marble or stone, and, for the future, to adopt in the better class of houses those materials, which were not only far less inflammable than wood, but far more durable and picturesque; and in this manner the Great Fire of 1106, though regarded at the time as a heavy and severe mis-

¹ Sanudo, fol. 486, who quotes the Chronicle of the Monastery of San Salvador.

² Dandolo, lib. ix. p. 260. "The Venetians of that day," writes Mutinelli, *Annali Urbani di Venezia*, p. 40, "were inclined to suspect that their troubles were attributable to the Narentines, who stirred up the elements by invoking their demons for conjuring and necromantic purposes."

³ *Chronica di Venetia*, Harl. MSS. No. 4820.

fortune, was, like an event of a similar character in the English annals, productive of vast ultimate advantage. It appears that, although stone or even marble was now brought into use, the Republic chiefly employed small bricks, and Temanza bears witness that he had in his time (1740–80) seen many houses demolished, the walls of which were composed of these bricks, which were called, he says, *Altinelle*. The walls are said by the same writer to have decayed prematurely, because the mortar with which they had been laid was made of bad lime. He does not suggest that the name *Altinelle* was probably derived from Altinum, the ruins of which, as we are informed by himself, supplied Venice with a vast store of building material, including, perhaps, the prototypes of these little bricks of Roman fabric; yet we know that down to a far later date not only wooden houses, but wooden churches, were to be seen.

The citizens repaired their losses with that alacrity and resignation which the Venetians were accustomed to exhibit under the pressure of adversity. Among other examples of piety and patriotism, a Gradenigo¹ devoted a part of his fortune to the erection of a church at Murano in honour of San Cypriano. The Badoeri founded a second at Luprio, which they dedicated to the Holy Cross. The see of Malamocco, which had been devastated by fire and water, was transferred to Chioggia;² and it was to the same circumstance that the monks of San Leone owed their removal to San Servolo in Rialto. Yet so strong was the natural predilection which the wealthier population of Malamocco entertained for the place of their birth, that they determined, a few years later, to defray out of their private resources the cost of its restoration; and, about the year 1120, a new town might be seen gradually rising at a short distance to the left of the second Malamocco, in a position where it was less apt to suffer from the future inroads of the sea.³ The place, however, never regained its ancient rank, and has now sunk into insignificance.

The divorce of Robert Guiscard having cast on the

¹ Dandolo, lib. ix. p. 258.

² Flaminio Cornaro, *Ecclesiae Venetae et Torcellanae antiqua monumenta*, iii. p. 158.

³ The great fire of 1106 was followed by four others of a less destructive character in 1115, 1120, 1149, and 1168.

offspring of his first marriage the stain of illegitimacy, Bohemond, his son by that union, had striven to conceal his shame and indignation beneath the sacred banner of the Cross. The equivocal success of the first Crusade, however, and the death of Godfrey de Bouillon, which occurred shortly after his arrival in the Holy Land, had disappointed the ambition of the Norman Prince, and directed his enthusiasm into a different channel; and in 1105 he returned to Apulia, bringing with him an acute sense of his own wrongs and a determination to retrieve the fortunes of his House.

During the campaigns of the two preceding years, victory crowned the patriotic exertions of the Greeks, and the admirals of Alexios Comnenos crushed the mercenary fleets of Genoa and Pisa,¹ which had carried Norman colours. But the representations of the titular Prince of Tyre, whose misfortunes had not impaired his powers of intrigue, speedily induced the potentates of Europe to look on him as the Champion of Christendom, while they began to consider Comnenos as the close ally of the misbelievers;² and Bohemond was even so far successful as to prevail on his hearers to believe that there was meagre hope of delivering Jerusalem, until a new dynasty had been established at Constantinople. Nor was the Pope, on his part, indisposed to eye with favour a design which might have the effect of restoring the authority of the Holy See over the Greek Church—a hope, which revived with every change in the political horizon in the breast of the successors of Saint Peter. Guiscard was therefore advised, and even urged, to make personal overtures to the French King for a fresh levy of Crusaders; and the Prince of Tyre repaired accordingly in 1106 to the court of that monarch, for the purpose of entering into negotiations, and of ascertaining how far his Majesty was willing to support the object which he now had in prospect.

It was not strange that the Byzantine Court should view the progress of the Crusades with a less favourable feeling than the Vatican: for, while the former had everything to fear from those expeditions, the latter had everything to hope. Even should the Greek heresy have taken too deep root to be easily eradicated, the triumph of the Latin pilgrims over the enemies of Rome and the Faith could not fail to extend

¹ Lebeau, xv. pp. 373-5-9.

² *Ibid.*, xv. p. 401.

and augment to a very large extent the Papal influence in the East. But Alexios began to perceive that the Crusades were wholly at variance with the true interests of his empire; he began to feel that these distant enterprises, conducted by able and ambitious adventurers, were menacing the stability of his own throne; and he was therefore naturally anxious to stem and turn the tide of enthusiasm, which might, at no distant period, be diverted into other channels, until it reached the walls of Constantinople.

The apprehensions of the Emperor were more than realised by the subsequent manœuvres of Guiscard at the Courts of Rome and France; and so soon as he was informed that a new Crusade had been published, and that the levies of Bohemond in France and Spain were almost complete, Comnenos proceeded without delay to make the requisite dispositions for meeting the impending danger, wherever it might threaten. At the same time he sent the Republic an invitation to co-operate with the fleets and armies of Greece, in repelling the torrent of invasion which the plausible appeal of the Prince of Tyre was about to direct against her shores.

Bohemond crossed the Pyrenees with his new levies in the summer of 1107. On the 9th October he reached Valona, on the coast of Illyria; and six days later he encamped under the walls of Durazzo, where he purposed to wait till spring. The winter of that year was spent in unceasing but futile negotiation; and in the early part of 1108 the powerful artillery of engines and projectile batteries, which formed the besieging train of the Prince, was drawn up round the City. But the enormous strength of the fortifications, and the ample resources of the garrison, set all the exertions of the Norman engineers at defiance. The latter discovered that the balists, catapults, and mangonels, on which they had counted so largely, were, from the unwieldiness of their dimensions, clumsy and useless. Reports reached the Prince that Alexios had already gained Deapolis, on the borders of Illyria. He attempted to tamper with the Governor of Durazzo, but found him incorruptible. Provisions began to be scarce in the camp, and disease began to lay its hand upon the troops.¹ All these circumstances tended to darken the hopes and moderate the views of Bohemond; and when Comnenos had

¹ Wilken, *Gesta Alexii Comneni*, p. 398.

advanced within a few miles of the place, his opponent made suggestions for a parley, and obtained a private interview, in which he condescended to purchase the Duchy of Antioch and an annuity with an oath of fealty to the empire. The complexion of affairs might have certainly altered in some slight degree since his father's death, and the resources which had been at the disposal of the late Duke of Apulia were in some cases beyond his own reach. The Byzantine Court, on its part, was far more favourably situated in regard to the conduct of a war than it had been in 1081. In the room of Botoniates, the Greeks had now a prince who was capable of leading them to battle and to victory; and the fiery energy of Comnenos was breathing a new spirit into the corrupt and degenerate nation over which he ruled. Still, to stoop to be the recipient of alms and a title from that very Power which his great parent had taught to tremble at the Norman name, was hardly worthy of the son of Robert Guiscard.

The ambitious designs of the Prince of Tyre had, however, been signally frustrated in this manner almost without a struggle; and even the first languid operations before Durazzo were purely of a military nature, and consequently such as placed it almost out of the power of the Republic to afford any assistance beyond the supply of necessaries to the besieged. Nevertheless, to the pressing message which Comnenos had addressed to the Doge in the preceding autumn, he at once replied in the affirmative; and in the early part of 1108 a fleet was actually prepared for the purpose, and was held in readiness to act, at any given moment, with the forces of the Emperor.¹ That moment, as it has been seen, never arrived.

While the pace of Venetian progress in Italy and the East was becoming so rapid, the power and glory of the Parent City had suffered a proportionate attenuation; and envy prompted the Paduans to view with soreness and intolerance the growing prosperity of the Dauli and the Candiani. The relations of amity, however, which the Republic had established with her neighbour in 550, are not known to have been actually interrupted till the month of September 1110, when a difference arose between the two States respecting frontiers. At the secret instigation of Ravenna and Treviso, which engaged to

¹ Dandolo, lib. ix. p. 261; Marin, iii. p. 26.

lend their active support in case of necessity, the Paduans decided upon enforcing their own interpretation of the contested point, and in a spirit of audacious temerity the confederates proceeded to make an inroad into the outskirts of Venice toward San Ilario. It was in vain that Faliero sent a message of remonstrance and admonition; the message of the Doge was treated with insolence and contempt; and, the Republic having reluctantly decided on resorting to coercive measures a naval engagement took place on the Brenta, near Bebe, on the 4th of October (1110), in which the allied forces were defeated with heavy loss.¹

It was apprehended at Padua that the conquerors might seize so auspicious an opportunity of incorporating the City with the Republic; and no disposition was exhibited either by Ravenna or Treviso to render the promised succour in the hour of distress. Under these circumstances, it appeared that the sole course which remained open was an appeal to the Emperor for his intercession. The appeal was favourably received; his Majesty consented to mediate between the two States; and both were accordingly required to send their deputies to Verona, in order to accommodate the pending differences in the august presence of Henry V. (1111). The latter opened the interview by exhorting the disputants not to forget that, if the Republic ought to be attached by the ties of natural affection to Padua, the same bond of connection should lead Padua to gaze with pride and without jealousy on the glory and greatness of her offspring. But Padua could not forget that it was Venice who encroached on her lagoons and on her rivers,² who paralysed her trade, and destroyed her independence; and it was with slender grace that she acquiesced in the decision of her self-chosen arbitrator in favour of the just demands of the Republic. On the one hand, the Venetian delegates agreed, on behalf of the Republic, to liberate the prisoners: on the other, Henry awarded compensation for the damages inflicted during the recent aggression. The new Treaty, which was simultaneously framed (20th May 1111)³ between Venice and the Emperor, acknowledged the Venetian right of sovereignty over certain parts of Istria, Dalmatia, and

¹ Da Canale, *Cron. Ven. stor. Ital.* viii. 297; Lor. de Monacis, fol. 50, Add. MSS. Brit. Mus. 8574.

² Sandi, ii. p. 432.

³ Romanin, ix. p. 27.

Croatia; it augmented the trading privileges, which Henry IV. had accorded in 1094 to the father of the present Doge; and it ascertained with greater clearness and precision the boundary-line of Padua. But, his Majesty having decidedly refused to dispense with the annual robe of cloth of gold, which his predecessor Otho III. in 998 consented to waive at the solicitation of the Doge Orseolo, it was agreed, that the tribute should be remitted on the 1st of March in each succeeding year.¹

In 1110, the Mohammedan dominion in the Holy Land had shrunk within the narrow limits of Ascalon, Tyre, and Sidon;² the Cross again floated over the principal cities of Palestine; and Baldwin I., successor of Godfrey de Bouillon, was now anxious to complete the conquest by annexing these important harbours to the new kingdom of Jerusalem. The Republic agreed to come once more to the succour of the Pilgrims, who proved good customers both for freight and commissariat; and towards the close of the year 1111 a fleet of one hundred galleys, exclusively of transports, set sail for the East, accompanied by the Doge. The squadron, however, did not reach the Holy Land until the Crusaders, in concert with the Prince of Norway, had overcome the obstinate resistance of the Mussulmen of Sidon; and it was consequently present only at the capitulation. Yet so much weight was attached by Baldwin to the maritime co-operation of the Republic with his own troops, that he readily purchased a promise of her future services with the cession of a part of the town of Saint Jean d'Acre, and the right of having a local Magistrate, a Church, a Street, a Mill, a Bakery, a Bath, and the use of her own weights and measures, in each of the Oriental possessions of Christendom.³ These privileges were of high value to a trading community. Had they merited the name of monopolies, they might have been accounted infinitely more precious. But the same stern necessity which accorded immunities of such a liberal character to Venice, extended them to Pisa and Genoa, and the Republic was almost led to forget in the favours which Baldwin showered on her rivals, those which he granted in equal profusion to herself.

A century had now elapsed since Orseolo II. annexed to

¹ Romanin, ix. p. 27.

² William of Tyre, lib. xi. ch. xiv.

³ Dandolo, lib. ix. ch. xi.; Michaud, iii. p. 209.

the Dogado the Istrian and Dalmatian seaports; and, during the interval, the kings of Hungary, gradually emerging from barbarism and obscurity, had frequently endeavoured, with a view of incorporating with their Crown a large and fertile province, to tamper with the fidelity of a people whom they professed a desire to emancipate from the yoke of a Petty Community of Fishermen.¹ The Venetian Fiefs, on their part, seconded these ambitious designs by the vacillating policy to which they had of late resorted in the hope of ultimately forming themselves, like Amalfi, Venice, Genoa, and Pisa, into independent States; and the revolt of Zara in 1050, at the instigation of Solomon, King of Hungary, had already inspired the Republic with a fear that, at no distant period, she would be obliged to dispute with her powerful neighbour the possession of her maritime colonies. Yet, although nearly sixty years had elapsed since Zara was recovered, this apprehension still remained unrealised; and one of Solomon's immediate successors, Caloman, had in the interval even established relations of amity with the Venetians whom he consented, in 1102, to join in an expedition against their common enemy, Count Roger of Sicily. In 1114, however, King Caloman died;² his son Stephen succeeded him; and, in the second year of his reign, the latter prince invaded Dalmatia, where he experienced little difficulty in reducing by force, or intimidating by menaces, the garrisons of Zara, Spalato, and Sebenigo.

There was every reason to forebode that, unless a remedy was speedily applied, the contagion would spread to the whole Venetian dominion on the Dalmatian coast; and the Doge hastened in August 1115, with a powerful squadron, to the succour or subjugation of his continental subjects.³ The repulse of an Hungarian force, sent forward to oppose his advance,⁴ and the recovery of the various places which had fallen into the hands of the enemy, with the single exception of the citadel of Zara, which an Hungarian garrison held against all the efforts of his troops, involved neither difficulty nor loss: nor was the Doge inclined, in guarding against a recurrence of the evil, to proceed beyond the exaction of a few

¹ Lucius, *Del Regno Dalmatiae et Croatiae*, lib. iii. p. 113; Bonfinius, *Res Ungaricae*, decad. ii. lib. v. p. 245.

² Wilken, *Gesta Alexii Comneni*, lib. iv. c. ii.

³ *Cronaca Altinate*, lib. v. p. 152; *Arch. stor. Ital.* viii.; Dandolo, lib. ix. 226.

⁴ *Cronaca Altinate*, *ubi supra*.

hostages from each colony and the repetition of the oath of fealty. In the following spring, however, Faliero contemplated a return to Dalmatia and the final reduction of Zara (October—November, 1115).

During the interval, the Emperor Henry V., allured by the sanctity and splendour of the shrine of the Patron-Evangelist, paid a devotional visit to Venice (March 1116),¹ where he professed to be much struck by the situation of the city, the beauty of its buildings, and the excellence of its government; and the Doge, who had previously obtained a promise of assistance against Hungary from the Byzantine Court, was tempted by his success in that quarter to communicate to Henry the cause and plan of the approaching campaign.² His Majesty lent an attentive ear;³ he discovered a strong and lively interest in the welfare of the Republic; and, before he took his departure, he even declared a willingness to participate actively in the undertaking. Faliero, however, reopened the siege of Zara in the May of that year⁴ without receiving, or perhaps expecting, any support from his allies. A month after his arrival (June 30), an Hungarian force advanced to raise the blockade, and its approach afforded equal relief to the Doge and the Zaratines, of whom the former was burning with impatience, and the latter were exhausted by want and hardship. The Doge hastened to oppose the progress of the enemy. The Hungarians were completely routed; and Zara, succumbing at last to the pressure of famine, was forced to capitulate. The walls and bulwarks of Sebenigo, which had refused to admit the conqueror, were levelled with the ground; at Trau and Spalato the people anticipated his approach by expelling their Hungarian governor and returning to their allegiance; and the Doge, having taken fresh hostages, returned a second time to Venice in July 1116, with an ample booty and a numerous train of prisoners.

This new victory reflected equal credit on the moderation of the Doge and on the gallant behaviour of the troops under his command; but it was so far from accelerating the return of peace, that it had, on the contrary, the unfortunate effect of converting a jealous rival into an implacable enemy. No

¹ Agostino Macedo, *Pittura Venetiae*, 1670, p. 120.

² Wilken, lib. iv. ch. ii.

³ Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 485; Sandi, ii. p. 436; Marin, iii. p. 37.

⁴ Dandolo, lib. ix. p. 266.

sooner was the King apprised of the unexpected issue of the late contest, and that the flower of his nobility was exposed to the inquisitive gaze of a Venetian populace, by whom the Hungarian standards taken in the battle were regarded as the proudest monuments of their triumph, than he dispatched a third army into Dalmatia. That army was allowed to approach without opposition within a few miles of Zara, at which point the Venetian forces, commanded as before by the Doge in person, were holding themselves in readiness to bar its farther passage. The struggle which ensued was bloody and protracted; each foot of ground was fiercely disputed; the tide of fortune fluctuated terribly; and the Doge, forgetful of his duty and station, plunged with the ardour of a paladin into the heart of the fight. His culpable temerity was productive of the most deplorable results. As he was leading a final charge, the breast of Faliero was pierced by an arrow. He fell mortally wounded. His fall produced a panic among his followers; and the ruin of the army was involved in the death of the general. Wholly unnerved by the loss of their noble leader, the Venetians abandoned the contest; the enemy engaged hotly in the pursuit; and so frightful was the carnage, that few succeeded in regaining their vessels, and in bringing the disastrous intelligence home.

The circumstances which had accompanied the rout at Zara were exactly of such a complexion as to enhance the apparent magnitude of the peril. The Republic took alarm. The necessity was generally acknowledged of adopting measures of a propitiatory nature toward the conqueror; and the same embassy, which had negotiated with the Emperor Henry V. in 1111,¹ was at once dispatched to procure from Stephen a permanent, or even a temporary, suspension of hostilities. A matter, wherein they were anxious to employ a tone consistent with the safety of their country, yet not repugnant to her pride, required on the part of the Deputies the exercise of considerable address. The crafty eloquence of the orator Giustiniani who, instead of appealing to the doubtful lenity of the King, urged the expediency of terminating an unseemly difference between two Christian Powers, fellow-labourers in the same holy cause, won for a pious associate what might have been denied to a fallen enemy.² A truce of

¹ Marin, iii. p. 31.

² Bonfinius, *Res Ungaricæ*, lib. v. p. 247.

five years was concluded between Venice and Hungary; the former was allowed to retain or resume possession of her colonies; and the body of the fallen commander, which had been secured by some Hungarian soldiers during the engagement, having been restored to the Republic, was consigned to the vaults of the Ducal Chapel¹ (1117).

In addition to his other public services, which were certainly most meritorious, the late Doge left to posterity two splendid and lasting monuments of his administration. In 1106, the year of the memorable fire, the celebrated *Pala d'Oro*, or carved slab of gold, which had been placed by Orseolo I. on the great altar in Saint Mark's, was enlarged at the cost of Faliero, and inlaid with gems; and it was during his reign, that the marshy ground, in that part of the City adjoining the islet of Gemelle or Zimole, was converted into Public Docks for the reception of shipping. Those docks formed the nucleus of the famous Arsenal, which was long unsurpassed in Europe for beauty and excellence in its kind.

The successor of Faliero was Domenigo, grandson of Michieli I.² The father of the present Doge had commanded the flotilla which took part in the Crusade of 1099, and he acquitted himself of the duties attached to that high post with considerable credit. The *Cronaca Altinate* tells us that Michieli II. was full of years and "vir bellicosus"; and this description makes us pause to think that we have at this juncture passing before our eyes Doge after Doge, whose genius seemed specially adapted for the part which he had to play as a leader of his people to battle. But the devolution of the command-in-chief on the Doge in the earlier foreign wars of Venice arose to a large extent from the immense advantage, while communications were so slow and imperfect, of having at hand a personage who carried with him, wherever he went, a discretionary faculty and a final decision.

In the East, the tide of fortune had again turned; the Mohammedan power was once more in the ascendant; and the Christians, whose ranks had been thinned by famine and disease, feebly though gallantly withstood the attacks of the Emir of Damascus.³ A handful of men was powerless before

¹ Paolo Morosini, lib. iv. p. 103; Pietro Giustiniani, lib. ii. p. 23.

² Cigogna, *Iscrizioni Veneziane*, vol. iv. pp. 515-25; *Cronaca Altinate*, lib. v. 153; *Arch. stor. Ital.* viii.

³ Michaud, iii. pp. 47, 48; Lebeau, xvi. p. 8.

a host; the infidels pursued their conquests with vigour and success; and the banners of the Cross, beneath which so many brave warriors had fought and bled, disappeared in rapid succession from the ports of the ocean and the cities of the plain. This sombre prospect, while it shed a gloom over the most mercurial enthusiasm, prepared the Christian Commonwealth to appreciate to a fuller extent the value of Venetian co-operation; and in 1121 the Republic was conjured by the Courts of Rome and Jerusalem to participate in a new Crusade. The pontifical letter which was addressed to the Doge on this occasion, and in which the extreme necessity was urged of rendering prompt aid to the Pilgrims,¹ was read by him in the Arrengo; and the manly eloquence of Michieli II. gave colour to the picture, and weight to the testimony, of Calistus. He represented to his hearers, in the language of piety and patriotism, the dwarfish proportions to which the triumphs of the misbelievers had of late years reduced the Christian kingdom of Jerusalem, the low ebb to which the resources of the soldiers of the Cross had consequently sunk, and the despondency to which such a condition of affairs was gradually giving rise in every quarter. He recalled to their memory the former exploits of the Venetians in those distant countries, the fall of Jaffa and the siege of Caiphaz; and he shewed them how much it concerned their honour and advantage to respond to the present appeal of Christendom. "Venetians," concluded the Doge, "what splendid renown will your country acquire by bearing a share in this holy enterprise? You will be the admiration of Europe and Africa. The standard of Saint Mark will float triumphantly over the cities of Palestine; and by the extirpation of the infidel you will spread throughout the East the power and glory of your name!"²

Yet it was not to be concealed that, in some respects, the proposed expedition was wholly antagonistic to present interests. Thinking men bore in mind, that the five years' truce with the King of Hungary had almost expired. They perceived with anxiety that their dependencies on the opposite coast were in a more than ordinarily discontented and unsettled mood; and it was to be seriously dreaded that while

¹ *Cronaca Altinate*, lib. v. 153; *Arch. stor. Ital.* viii.

² Romanin, ii. p. 36.

the flower of their Navy was engaged in a distant and arduous enterprise, Dalmatia might revolt, and Stephen might even attempt a descent on the Lagoons. Setting aside these ultra-politic considerations, however, Venice ultimately determined to lend the required support: nor is it improbable that some precaution was taken against contingencies by the formation of a naval reserve. The whole of that year and a portion of 1122 were devoted to the equipment and organisation of the new armament,¹ the principal command of which was to be intrusted, as usual, to the Doge himself; and during his absence his son Luchino and another relative were appointed commissioners for carrying on the Government. This was a novel departure from the ordinary custom of nominating a vice-Doge.

On its outward passage,² the fleet, which consisted of forty galleys, eight-and-twenty palanders and transports, four large carricks, and other lighter craft, cast anchor off Bari, where the Doge relieved the alarm of the inhabitants by an assurance of friendship and protection, and where the report reached him of an interdict, recently published by the son and successor of Alexios Comnenos against the commerce of the Republic with the Lower Empire. From Bari Michieli repaired to Corfu, where he had an intention of spending a portion of the winter; and in the early part of 1123, the fleet having quitted its moorings, set sail for Cyprus, at which point the Venetian commander expected to procure exact information touching the position and movements of the Egyptian armament, which was affording maritime co-operation with the land forces of the Emir of Damascus.

In the meantime, while the second Baldwin had fallen, after a short and inglorious career, into the hands of his enemies, the Pilgrims, commanded provisionally by Eustace, Count of Sidon, were cooped up within the walls of the Holy

¹ Da Canale, sect. 19; Dandolo, lib. ix. p. 270; Sanudo, fol. 488.

² Itinerary from Venice to Jaffa:—

From Venice to Parenzo are	100 Italian miles.
From Parenzo to Corfu	700 "
From Corfu to Modon	300 "
From Modon to Crete	300 "
From Crete to Rhodes	300 "
From Rhodes to Cyprus	300 "
From Cyprus to Jaffa (three days' sail).	

City, where they were propitiating Heaven with fasting and prayer. Presently the tocsin was heard to sound; the gates of Jerusalem opened; and 3000 men headed by the Patriarch, who bore aloft a portion of the true Cross, issued forth into the plain of Ascalon. The fewness of their numbers was, to some extent, supplied by the fulness of their faith; their slow and measured pace, their solemn and imposing bearing, their seeming reliance on a higher Power, produced in the breasts of the Mussulmen an involuntary sensation of wonder and awe; and as the Pilgrims advanced, half in order of battle, half in attitude of prayer, the foe stood motionless and passive spectators of the scene. Suddenly a flash of the electric fluid, more than ordinarily vivid, lighted up the heavens; the misbelieving host was struck by a panic terror; and with mingled feelings of delight and astonishment the Christians beheld them retreat in precipitate confusion on Ascalon. Still the Crusaders could hardly be unaware that the advantage which they had thus gained was purely ephemeral; and there was too much reason to fear that, so soon as the Mohammedans recovered their composure, they would not fail to construe a natural phenomenon into a feint or an artifice of the enemy. It was at this momentous crisis that the Venetian fleet hove off Cyprus.¹

On being interrogated by Michieli, the Cypriots stated that the lieutenant of the Sultan of Egypt was at present proceeding with his squadron, amounting, it was said, to upward of a hundred sail, in the direction of Jaffa, of which they conjectured that he intended to form the siege; and his Serenity had nearly resolved to act on this information, when other and more recent tidings arrived, that the Egyptian commander, altering his course, was now on his way to Ascalon,² where the Emir Balac more urgently required his support. The Doge determined to lure him from his design; and, in order to make his final dispositions for the battle which was evidently at hand, he summoned a Council of War. In that Council he expressed his decided opinion in favour of a division of the armament into two parts, one of which, comprising the flower and real strength of the fleet,

¹ Sanudo the Elder, *Secreta*, xi.; Bernard, *De acquisitione Terrae Sanctae*, ch. 117-9; Sicard, Bishop of Cremona, *Chronicon ad annos 1122-4*.

² Guillaume de Tyr, *Hist. des croisades*, lib. xii. p. 234 et seq.

should retire on Jaffa, and should lie under the coast in a position where it might be concealed from immediate observation; while the other, consisting merely of transports and vessels of burden, should put out to sea, as though engaged in conveying pilgrims from Cyprus. The proximate object of this stratagem was to create a diversion from Ascalon. It succeeded admirably. The enemy no sooner descried the fictitious convoys in the misty twilight of a January morning, than they were naturally prompted by the hope of plunder, and by the prospect of an easy prey, to enter into the pursuit; the transports, agreeably to orders, fell back on the main squadron, to which, by an adroit method of retreat, they served to form an excellent cover; and the moment of junction was the preconcerted signal for the general advance. As the two forces approached each other, the day broke; a rosy purple tint suffused the eastern sky; and the sea beneath, unless where a gentle breeze slightly ruffled its glimmering surface, was calm and glassy. At the same time, the gradual dispersion of the false front revealed the Venetian fleet drawn up in order of battle; and before the Mussulmen had leisure to complete their preparations the action had commenced. The flagship of Michieli, an exceedingly swift and strong vessel, which moved somewhat in the van of the rest, opened the attack by bearing down on that of the Egyptian commander and striking it with such violence that the latter foundered with the admiral and the whole crew. This bold and successful manœuvre decided the fortune of the day. The enemy, perfectly disheartened by the loss of their leader, were thrown into inextricable confusion; the Venetians redoubled their efforts; the Egyptian galleys were enveloped and boarded on all sides; and, though dearly bought with the blood of his followers, the victory was soon secure in the hands of the Doge.¹ But the laurels of Michieli were tarnished by the massacre of a large proportion of the enemy's crews and by the execution² of the principal officers. The carnage is said to have been so great that, for a wide space round, the sea was dyed to a deep scarlet hue³ by

¹ *Cronaca Altinate*, lib. v. p. 154; Da Canale, sect. 19.

² Navagiero, *Storia*, p. 968, relates with cold-blooded candour, how the Doge caused the commanders of the Egyptian galleys to be beheaded, "perchè erano Paesani." See also Michaud, *Bibliothèque des croisades*, ii. p. 630.

³ *Cronaca Altinate*, lib. v. p. 154.

the gore of the slaughtered Saracens, whose corpses might be seen floating in every direction; and there is a tradition that, long afterward, mariners, pointing with a shudder to the scene of the battle of Jaffa, spoke of the waters thereabout as still putrid, and as apt to impart a deadly infection to any vessels which might pass over the spot.¹

Yet Michieli was not altogether satisfied with his success. News had reached him that ten Turkish galleons, laden with silks, spices, and other rich and precious merchandise, were riding at anchor off the coast of Egypt, counting apparently on his defeat at Jaffa. The triumph of the Venetian arms removed their sole chance of safety, and destroyed their sole means of escape; and the Doge experienced slight difficulty in securing these valuable prizes.

Meanwhile, however, his prolonged absence had begun to exhaust the patience of his expectant confederates whose position, though momentarily ameliorated by their recent success on the plain of Ascalon, was again becoming daily more critical; and the Venetian commander was still loitering on the scene of his last exploit, when he received a message chiding him for his dilatoriness, reminding him of his sacred mission, and urging him to use all haste in repairing to the Holy City. A solemn deputation awaited the arrival of Michieli in the port of Jaffa; and thence he was conducted in triumph to Jerusalem, where he was welcomed with thanks and congratulations by the assembled chiefs of the Crusade. The rout of the misbelievers at Jaffa had formed an ample source of wonder and delight, and one victory sufficed almost to obliterate the memory of many disasters. Still the Allies were sensible that their present situation scarcely admitted hesitation or repose; the severe check which his lieutenant had lately received at the hands of the Venetians was calculated to stimulate the Sultan of Egypt to fresh exertions; and a report was current that the Emir of Damascus might be expected to reach Jerusalem at no distant period with a

¹ Cigogna (*Iscrizioni*, vol. iv. p. 598) tells us how Marco Barbaro, the lieutenant of the Doge, and Proveditor of the Fleet, cut off the arm of a Saracen, and with the blood which flowed from the wound drew a circle on his banner. "Hence," says the same writer, "that branch of the Barbaro family ever afterward assumed as their arms three roses in field azure, encircled by a vermilion ring in field white. The ring was doubtless due to this cause; but the three roses were specially granted by Queen Elizabeth as a compliment to a distinguished member of the family.

powerful and well-organised army. The Doge, therefore, whose position and personal character gave weight to his suggestions, successfully urged the necessity of having recourse to measures of a prompt and vigorous character; and when he perceived that his companions were wasting time in deliberating whether they should open operations with the siege of Tyre or that of Ascalon, Michieli proposed an appeal to the law of chance. The name of each place was inscribed accordingly on a thin slip of parchment, which was laid on one of the two altars of the Church of Saint Sepulchre; and amid the breathless suspense of the spectators, a young orphan advanced, and selected one of the slips.¹ The action relieved the embarrassment of the pilgrims, and sealed the fate of Tyre.² It was at once decided that the Barons should invest the city by land, while the Venetians afforded, as usual, maritime co-operation. But the habitual caution of the latter had gradually introduced a system which consisted in sharing, before they reaped, the fruits of victory; and anterior to his departure from the Holy City, the Doge insisted upon concluding with his obsequious confederates a treaty of partition and commerce.

By this compact,³ one-third⁴ of Tyre was assigned as a quarter to the Venetians: the two remaining thirds were vested in the King. In their quarter the Islanders were to be under the control of their own Consul, and to be totally independent of Baldwin and his successors. All who chose to reside among them were to be considered amenable to the laws of Venice: yet should any citizen of the Republic batter or maim a subject of Baldwin, it was competent for a royal judge to exercise jurisdiction. The effects of all Venetians who might die intestate, or in shipwreck, were to be restored to their heirs, or to be consigned to the care of their Resident. Lastly, an annual sum of 300 byzants of gold⁵ or 150 Venetian *lire di piccoli*⁶ was to be paid out of the treasury of Tyre to the Ducal Fisc, in consideration of which payment the Republic should contribute to the main-

¹ Bernard the Treasurer, *De acquisitione Terrae Sanctae*, Mur. vii. 757-8.

² Michaud, iii. p. 53.

³ Dandolo, lib. ix. p. 275, where it is textually given.

⁴ *Cronaca Altinate*, v. 154-5.

⁵ Depping, *Commerce du Levant*, i. p. 151.

⁶ Zanetti, *Dell' origine e dell' antichità della moneta Veneziana*, p. 6.

tenance of the garrison. It was stipulated, moreover, that should Baldwin decline on his return to accept these terms, he forfeited *ipso facto* his title to the crown of Jerusalem; and there was also a mutual understanding, that the eventual concurrence of the Republic in the reduction of Ascalon involved the cession of similar rights and privileges in that town.¹ Having formed this sound basis of future operations, Michieli returned to Jaffa, whence he immediately repaired with his squadron to its new destination (January 1123).

The glory of Tyre, founder of Carthage and birthplace of Ulpian, had long departed from her. Yet she was still the same city which, during seven months, had checked in his victorious career the son of Philip of Macedon. She was indeed no longer mistress of the seas; she had ceased indeed to be numbered among the nations. Yet her colossal bulwarks² and battlements rose amid the waves as proudly as on the day when she had defiance to the most successful of ancient conquerors; and, though the resources of her present defenders were straitened, the strength of her fortifications was unimpaired. Moreover, her garrison, of which 700 Knights of Damascus composed the flower, was plentifully victualled, and was supplied with a copious store of munitions of every kind; and the courage and energy of the Tyrians were powerfully sustained by an assurance that, before their means of subsistence were exhausted, they would be relieved by the arrival of the Emir with the Grand Army. It was scarcely conceivable, however, that so strong a place could ever be taken; and those who had seen Biblos, Tripoli, Sidon, Casarea, and Saint Jean d'Acre fall again in succession into the hands of the Crusaders, cherished a confidence that, even if the Mohammedan cause should be ruined elsewhere, the Crescent would still continue to float over the walls of Tyre.³

On the side of the sea, this famous and ancient city was protected by a double line of ramparts, as well as by the breakers and rocky escarpments, which had at all times rendered that coast peculiarly dangerous to any but the most experienced pilots. On the east side, which afforded the sole approach from the land, a triple girdle of walls was

¹ Sanudo Torsello, *Secreta*, ch. xi. p. 159; William of Tyre, lib. xii. xiii.

² *Cronaca Altinate*, lib. v. 154.

³ William of Tyre, lib. xiii.

divided, at close and regular distances, by towers of stupendous size and altitude, and was enfossed by a deep and broad moat, into which the waters of the ocean were readily admissible by sluices. In the northern quarter of the city, and in a situation where it was overlooked and sheltered by the fortifications, lay the *Inner Harbour*, in which the Tyrian shipping usually found convenient and ample accommodation. This capacious basin was now occupied by the Venetian fleet, while the troops of the Regent Eustace, by taking up a strong position on the east side, cut off all communication with the land, and established a complete blockade. The Confederates lost no time in making the necessary dispositions for the approaching struggle; the siege train was prepared; the mangonels and other projectile machines were ranged in order; stations were assigned to the several divisions of the army and the fleet; and, these preliminary arrangements having been concluded, the assault was opened from the north and east walls on the morning of the 16th of February 1123.¹

On both sides the preparations had been of a character which indicated a resolution to neglect no means of ensuring a favourable result; the siege-works had been constructed on a scale commensurate with the magnitude of the design; and the movable towers, erected by the Latin engineers in juxtaposition, enabled the besiegers to fight on an equal footing with the defenders of the ramparts. The first onset was the opening scene of a struggle between men of a different origin, of a different language, and of a different religion. The soldiers of the garrison who distinguished themselves by their martial and gallant bearing, and who exulted in the name of enemies of the Christian faith, vied with their foes in feats of daring and hardihood. The Knights of Damascus were foremost in the fray, and their chivalric example served to stimulate the most timid and effeminate to join in upholding the cause of Mohammed. At the same time, the projectile machines were plied on both sides with untiring energy and terrible effect. Volleys of missiles of every description poured without intermission over the ramparts and against the towers. The air was obscured by a tempest of arrows, darts, stones, and combustible matter; and the monotonous character of the spectacle was occasionally diversified only as some huge fragment

¹ William of Tyre, lib. xiii. p. 240; Dandolo, lib. ix. p. 271.

of granite, launched from one of the siege-batteries, clave with tremendous rapidity the intervening space, and, not without inflicting serious damage, was shivered to atoms by coming into collision with the bulwarks; or else, perhaps, as was by no means of rare occurrence, the ponderous missile, overreaching its aim,¹ alighted with a fearful crash on the roof of some building within the precinct of the walls. The Allies, too, were often constrained on their part by the galling fire of the Tyrian batteries, which were under the superintendence of a celebrated engineer of Antioch, to beat a general retreat, and to suspend hostilities during several hours, while they took shelter and regained breath behind their entrenchments; and during the earlier three months of operations, it not unfrequently happened that, after a momentary and deceptive lull which had almost induced the Christians to believe that the stubborn resistance of the enemy was at last overcome, the latter reopened the attack with greater fury and vehemence than before.

In the course of the same period the fortune of war had been changeful and dubious; and the belligerents were so equally matched that it was difficult to conceive how either party could carry any permanent advantage over the other. Still, at first, victory leaned rather to the Tyrians, whose commanding position and more efficient artillery amply compensated for any shortcoming in point of numerical strength; and this favourable appearance was not a little improved by the propagation of an ill-founded rumour that, while the Emir of Damascus was hastening to the relief of the city with a powerful army, a second fleet had already left the shores of Egypt to shatter or annihilate the squadron of the Doge. But the tide of success was speedily turned into a different channel by the arrival of Pontius, Count of Tripoli,² with a large reinforcement, and by the subsequent announcement of the total defeat of the Emir Balac by Jocelyn, Count of Edessa, in the vicinity of that town.³ The exposure of the head of Balac to the gaze of the Tyrians confirmed in their eyes the latter intelligence, and spread among a population worn out by a lengthened blockade, and at last beginning to be conscious of the pressure of want, a general feeling of

¹ William of Tyre, lib. xiii. p. 263.

² William of Tyre, lib. xiii.

³ Michaud, *Hist. des croisades*, lib. v. p. 55.

despair. Even the Damascene Knights, who had hitherto exhibited such exemplary bravery, began to falter, and all who had regarded the Emir's promise of succour as a certain resource in the hour of distress, no longer hesitated to admit the hopelessness of their cause. These circumstances combined to produce in the minds of the besieged a strong tendency to submission, and a decided resolution to hazard a course from which they had been, in large measure, deterred heretofore by the prevailing superstition that no quarter was to be expected from the truculent and bloodthirsty foes with whom it was their lot to deal. Their pacific overtures, however, were at once reciprocated; and the Allies, having readily acceded to a declaration that, on the cession of the place, the inhabitants would be suffered to remain or depart unharmed, the Tyrian authorities agreed to sign the articles of a capitulation, which took effect on the 29th of June (1123),¹ four months and a half after the commencement of the siege. On the following day² the royal standard of Jerusalem was hoisted over the principal gate of the city; the banner of the Count of Tripoli waved from the Tower of Tanaira, and on the Green Tower was planted the Lion of Saint Mark.³

In connection with the siege of Tyre by the Latins, a fact is related which forms a curious episode in the history of that event. It seems that, a protracted siege having had the gradual effect of exhausting the patience of the soldiery, the latter indulged their spleen by expressing secret mistrust of the good faith of their confederates; the jaunty and contented air of the Venetians, who were more plentifully supplied with provisions than their associates, and less exposed to attack, served to irritate the feeling of impatience, while it gave colour and strength to a suspicion of treachery; and it soon became a common saying in the camp, that when the enemy appeared, the Islanders contemplated the desertion of the pilgrims and a return to their ships. This scandalous insinuation reached in due course the ears of Michieli; the Doge, who was at first inclined to be incredulous, shrewdly surmised that it originated from a higher source than the ranks of the army, and he determined not to tolerate any longer such

¹ William of Tyre, lib. xiii. p. 278.

² Sanudo Torsello, lib. iii. part vi. ch. 12; Dandolo, lib. ix. p. 271.

³ William of Tyre, lib. xiii. p. 276; Bernard, *De acquisitione Terrae Sanctae*, ch. 120; Michaud, *Bibl. des croisades*, ii. p. 632.

injurious aspersions on himself and his countrymen. Accordingly, having given an order to dismantle some of the vessels of the fleet, he repaired with a party of marines, armed with their oars and hatchets, and laden with a portion of the rigging, to the camp of the other chiefs of the expedition. To their look of surprise at the unexpected visit, and the strange demeanour of the visitors, the Venetian prince replied by disclosing the nature of the information which had reached him, and by shewing the method which he had adopted of proving the injustice of the charge. "Those," concluded the indignant Michieli, pointing with energy, as he spoke, to his stern retinue and their burden, "those who share the glory of the enterprise are also prepared to share its perils, and the Venetians will no longer, at least, submit to the odious imputation of indifference or perfidy." The language and air of the speaker produced in the minds of his hearers a feeling of astonishment not unmingled with awe. They endeavoured to calm his emotion. They earnestly ignored any abatement of friendship or confidence toward the Venetians. They unanimously agreed to resume the suspended attack, and they conjured their illustrious ally to return to his position, and to act with them, for the future, in harmonious concert.¹

Michieli allowed himself to be persuaded; and from a wish to conciliate his needy confederates, who were impoverished by the length of the siege, the Doge lent them a large sum of money.² This disbursement, after his long absence from Venice, reduced Michieli himself to the necessity of paying the Venetian troops with leathern coins,³ struck by his private order, and stamped on the obverse with an effigy of Saint Mark, on the reverse with the arms of his own family. The issue of this money of necessity, which is unknown to numismatists, is said to have been accompanied by a guarantee that, on the return of the fleet to Venice, it should be redeemed at once at its full facial value.

In the meantime, the fall of Tyre had become generally known. In the Holy City it soon formed the standard topic of conversation; and there was an ovation throughout Palestine when the people learned that the Sacred Banner of the Cross

¹ Da Canale, *Cron. Ven.*, sect. 20.

² *Cronaca Altinate*, lib. v. p. 154.

³ Pietro Giustiniani, lib. ii. p. 26; Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 424.

floated over the loftiest tower of the city.¹ It was not long afterward that the unfortunate Baldwin was released from his dungeon,² and returned to a capital and a throne which he owed to strangers.

But while the Doge eyed on his part with unfeigned satisfaction the new acquisitions of the Republic, and while he participated in the general exhilaration, the edict of Johannes Comnenos still haunted his thoughts. It was not in the new Kingdom of Judah that a people, whose early associations and growing ambition attached them to the Empire of Constantinople, could be expected to quench their thirst for wealth, or to gratify their love of monopoly. It was true that the ports of Syria presented a convenient and regular market for their cargoes; but they also offered a market for the cargoes of Genoa and Pisa; and the Republic felt that a trade in which her rivals were placed in all respects on a par with herself was a very slender equivalent for the exclusive privileges which she had heretofore enjoyed in the Bosphorus and the Archipelago. At the period when the Venetians first took an active share in the Crusades, they half imagined that they were moving in advance of the other mercantile communities of France and Italy, and that, by forestalling and outstripping competition, they would secure to themselves throughout the Holy Land privileges scarcely inferior in value to those which they already claimed in the ports of the Lower Empire. In this hope or expectation they were disappointed to a considerable extent. In Ascalon, Saint Jean d'Acre, and Tyre they had acquired a preponderance; but Genoese traders were establishing their marts in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Cæsarea, and Ashur; the Pisans had obtained a quarter in Antioch and in Laodicea; and a Pisan churchman was now Patriarch of the Holy City. It was not unnatural that such a complexion of affairs should excite extreme discontent; and the public mind of Venice was already in a predisposed state of ferment, when a confirmation came of the prohibitory edict published by the son of Alexios Comnenos against the commercial intercourse of the Republic with his empire.

At the outset of her career, Venice had sought with

¹ Bernard the Treasurer, *De acquisitione Terrae Sanctae*, ch. 120.

² William of Tyre, lib. xiii. p. 278; Sicard, Bishop of Cremona, *Chronicon*, fol. 593; *ap.* Murat. iii.

avidity, and had preserved with care, the patronage of the Byzantine emperors, from whom certain of her patricians were fond of tracing their lineal descent; and, prior to the commencement of the Crusades, her merchantmen formed, with the exception of Amalfi, the sole channel of communication between Europe and the Levant. This connection was neither disinterested in its nature nor one-sided in its advantages: it was, on the contrary, emphatically one of mutual policy and benefit. To the national resources and industrial wealth of the Islanders the alliance gave an extraordinary and continuous stimulus. From time almost immemorial, the chief magistrate of the Republic had borne, as a peculiar mark of imperial favour, the honorific title of Hypatos, Protospatrios, or Protosebastos; and during the ninth and tenth centuries the flower of the Greek marine was composed of the seamen of Venice and Amalfi. Above all, at a period when the ancient monarchy of Rome was fast sinking, the Venetians had more than once afforded invaluable assistance to their old and, as it seemed, their natural ally. The battles of Crotona, of Taranto, and of Butrinto were always to be remembered with gratitude and pride; and it was generally felt that the defeat of the Normans in 1081 on the Bay of Durazzo had alone averted the imminent ruin of the empire. On the other hand, it was to be conceded that, since their country had acquired importance in the scale of nations, the language and bearing of the Venetians toward the subjects of the Court of Constantinople had undergone a great change. Privilege had begun to wear the form of prerogative. The charter wrung from Alexios Comnenos in 1085 seemed to have made the merchants view with scorn a Power whose weakness was so transparent through its prodigality. When Johannes Comnenos succeeded in 1118 to the throne of his father, he found Constantinople already parcelled out among a wealthy colony of contumelious traders, even among whom it was easy to distinguish the Islanders by their haughtiness and insolence; and in the fourth year of his reign, Calojohannes (as he was satirically named from his unprepossessing appearance) conceived the design of getting rid by one sweeping measure of an evil which was daily growing more insufferable.

Accordingly, in the course of the year 1122, while it was still unsuspected that any such design was meditated, a

decree appeared, commanding the Venetian residents in Constantinople and the other Greek ports to quit the imperial dominions, and declaring the suspension of all intercourse between the Powers. This edict, though to some extent susceptible of evasion, was severely felt by the commercial world of Venice. A transitory sensation of surprise at the abruptness of the step was rapidly succeeded by an unmeasured feeling of anger; the people readily lent themselves to the cause of a large and influential class; the whole capital echoed a strain of invective and imprecation; and the means of reprisal at once became a leading theme of conversation and debate. The fleet under Michieli himself, which had just accomplished, in conjunction with the other pilgrims, the reduction of Tyre, was at present upon its return to Europe in anticipation of the winter: it was now decided that, on his homeward course, the Doge should scour the Greek seas, and make reprisal on Calojohannes.

Charged with that mission Michieli, having taken leave of the Barons in the course of June or July 1123, left behind him the shores of Palestine, and shaped his course for Rhodes, where he expected to procure a fresh supply of stores, of which the troops were greatly in want. The Rhodians, however, pleading their oath of allegiance to the Byzantine Court as a subterfuge, declined to satisfy the demand; the Venetians possessed every inclination to appeal to force; and the island was occupied and laid under heavy contributions.¹ From Rhodes the fleet proceeded to Scio,² where it was the intention of the Doge to establish his quarters for the winter. In the following spring (1124), he successively invested and sacked Andros, Samos, Lesbos, and the peninsula of Modon;³ all the Ionian Isles, and a portion of the Peloponnesus, fell a prey to fire and Venetian steel; and everywhere the youth of both sexes were reduced to servitude. The humiliation of the Lower Empire was speedily followed by the recovery of the Dalmatian fiefs from the Hungarians; Zara, Trau, Spalato, and Sebenigo, which had again renounced, at the instigation of Stephen,⁴ their allegiance to the Republic, were again reduced to submission; and a heap of shapeless and neglected

¹ *Cronaca Altinate*, v. 155; Dandolo, lib. ix. p. 271.

² *Cron. Alt.*, loco citato.

³ Lebeau, xvi. p. 18.

⁴ Bonfinius, dec. ii. p. 249.

ruins was shown by the succeeding generation as a monument of the contumacy of Belgrade.¹ At Zara the Venetians made a division of their spoil; after setting aside a third for the widows, orphans, and poor, they appropriated the residue.² These brilliant exploits brought the campaign to a close; and in June 1124, Michieli returned to his capital, after an absence of one year and ten months. The fame of his victories had gone before him; notice of the valuable treaty, concluded between him and the King of Jerusalem in the preceding year, had also reached Venice; and the day on which the Doge made his entry into the city was a day of jubilee. Michieli had certainly earned a title to the national gratitude by his achievements as a soldier and a diplomatist; his successful negotiations endeared him more particularly to the trading class; and there were few in the community who kindled not into warm admiration at the thrilling recital of the battle of Jaffa and the siege of Tyre.

The trophies which the victor had brought from the East were of no ordinary kind. They consisted of the ten Turkish galleons and their rich freights, the spoils of Tyre, Rhodes, and the Ionian Isles, and other miscellaneous articles of plunder, among which not the least prized were the embalmed remains of Saint Donatus and Saint Isidore.

At the epoch when Venice became an acknowledged nursery of the Arts, the exploits of the intrepid and unconquerable Michieli, presenting a series of striking episodes, naturally suggested subjects for the pencils of the Great Masters, and the leading events of the late reign gradually occupied three entire compartments on the walls of the celebrated Sala dello Scrutinio, the decorations of which have been so minutely described by the pen of Bardi. The first of these panels, painted by Santo Peranda in the beginning of the 17th century, represented all the stirring incidents of the memorable battle of Jaffa (1123), and was substituted for an earlier picture, of which the subject is unknown, by Veronese. The second panel, which was from the hand of Antonio Aliense, is devoted to the siege and fall of Tyre; and in the last, which is purely apocryphal, and which was executed by Giulio Dal Moro, we see the magnanimous Doge declining to

¹ *Cronaca Altinate*, lib. v. 155; Dandolo, lib. ix. p. 272.

² *Cronaca Altinate*, *ubi supra*.

receive the crown of Sicily proffered to him by the people, whom we are taught to suppose that he has just delivered from an invader.

Two years subsequently to these occurrences, the island of Curzola having seceded from its allegiance, and having been recovered by Marsilio Giorgio, a Venetian privateer, was enfeoffed to him; and in 1127 a squadron of fourteen galleys, which had been sent to the Mediterranean to protect the Venetian flag in that sea, took possession of Cephalonia, one of the Ionian Isles, which still belonged at this period to the Lower Empire.

In the following year, the Doge, whose physical strength had been so heavily tasked in foreign wars, formed, like so many of his predecessors, a wish to pass the remainder of his days in privacy; he selected as the place of his retirement the Abbey of San Giorgio Maggiore, which had been founded, a century and a half before, by the monk Morosini. Michieli survived his resolution a few months only; the vaults of San Giorgio were opened to receive his remains; and on his tomb the Venetians truly wrote: *Terror Græcorum jacet hic* (1128). At a later period, a finely executed bust of the Doge in marble, from the chisel of Dal Moro, was placed near his monument.¹

In the case of this heroic and redoubtable ruler, whose exciting career served to recall to mind the exploits of older days, a transition from the scenes of active life to the peace and stillness of monastic existence seems to us singularly violent and contradictory. But we should recollect that at this period the religious houses were not only asylums for those desirous of spiritual meditation and counsel, but presented physical comforts and medical resources which even a Doge might seek in vain at home or in his palace itself. There is little doubt that, when he withdrew from office, Michieli was in broken health, and that under the roof of San Giorgio he looked for secular as much as spiritual doctors.

¹ Cigogna, *Iscrizioni*, iv. pp. 404-6.

CHAPTER IX

A.D. 1128—1172

Pietro Polani, Doge (1128-48)—Acquisition of Fano (1141)—Second War with Padua (1143)—Recovery of Pola from the Pisans (1145)—Coalition of the Republic with Emmanuel Comnenos against the King of Sicily—Siege of Corfu (1148)—Devastation of Sicily by the Venetians—Death of Polani (1148)—Domenigo Morosini, Doge (1148-56)—Michieli III., Doge (1156-72)—General State of Lombardy—Collision between Venice and some of the Ghibelline Cities—Humiliation of the Patriarch of Aquileia (1163)—Formation of the Lombard League (1167)—War between Venice and the Emperor Comnenos (1171-2)—Ravages of the Plague among the Troops of the Republic (1171)—Assassination of Michieli III. (27th May 1172).

THE great services of the Doge Michieli, his eminently successful and patriotic career, and the personal hardships which he had undergone and which perhaps shortened his life, were probably taken into consideration, when the Republic sanctioned a partial return to hereditary succession in the choice of his daughter's husband Pietro Polani,¹ who was only in the thirtieth year of his age, but who is said to have been recommended to the vacant magistracy by his high personal character. His election, however, was by no means unopposed. An influential party, consisting of Arrigo Dandolo of San Silvestro and several members of the Ducal house of Badoer, attempted to resist his pretensions,² and the success of Polani in gaining his object engendered a feeling of ill-will between his family and that of Dandolo, which more than once threatened to endanger the public peace. It was to no purpose that, to conciliate the malcontents, the Doge raised their leader in 1132, on a vacancy, to the metropolitanate, at a time when Dandolo was still young, and his abilities untried; and the wound long remained unhealed.

The Republic, though by far the most important, was not the only State which owed its existence to the fall of

¹ De Monacis, fol. 60 (Add. MSS. 8574).

² *Cronaca Altinate*, lib. v. 156; Dandolo, lib. ix. p. 184.

the Roman Empire in the West. There were several other towns on the Adriatic which traced their independence to the same cause; among the rest were Pesaro, Senigaglia, and Fano. These places had hitherto succeeded in maintaining with each other relations of amity; but in 1141 a secret conspiracy was framed against Fano by her neighbours, to effect a partition of her territory between them. The intended victims of this plot were forewarned of the danger which awaited them; in their predicament they applied for protection to the Republic, and they consented to purchase the boon with an oath of allegiance to the Doge and an annual tribute of 1000 pounds of oil to the Church of Saint Mark. A free trade was, at the same time, instituted between Fano and the Lagoon; and Venice and her new dependency engaged to afford each other mutual support.¹

Two years after the acquisition of Fano, the Paduans conceived (1143) a fresh source of annoyance to their powerful neighbour in the diversion of the Brenta from its natural bed by the creation of an artificial canal² and the consequent danger of the interruption of the Venetian water-supply. A body of troops, jointly commanded by Guido Montecchio, a Veronese,³ and Pietro Gambacurta, was taken accordingly into Venetian pay; and a second battle ensued on the banks of the Brenta, in which the enemy were routed with a loss of between 300 and 350 prisoners. There was no design, however, on the part of the Republic, to press the advantage thus easily gained; the defeat itself was considered a sufficient chastisement; and on the Senate of Padua affording an assurance that it had harboured no intention of giving umbrage to Venice, the captives were restored.⁴ The newly created canal possibly rendered the Brenta too shallow to admit the approach of a fleet; at any rate, this appears to be the first recorded case of a resort to foreign condottieri, who subsequently became so prominent and regular an arm of the Venetian military service. The operations of the Republic beyond the confines of the Lagoon, as her power

¹ Amiani, *Memorie storiche della città di Fano*, pp. 140-1; Dandolo, lib. ix. p. 279; Dolfin, *Annali*, p. 17 (King's MSS. 149).

² Mutinelli, *Annali*, p. 29.

³ Diedo, i. p. 64. The choice of Montecchio was a happy one; for it appears that the Paduans had merited the vengeance of Verona by a similar operation on the Adige.

⁴ Cronaca di Marco . . ., *Arch. stor. Ital.* viii. 259.

and territory increased, necessarily employed from time to time an infinitely larger force than she had at command; and a standing army was incompatible alike with her interests and her wants. Nor were these the only petty wars into which Venice found herself entering at the present time. For in 1145 a collision took place with Pisa, in consequence of an attempt of the latter on Pola; and a war would have followed, had not the Holy See¹ succeeded in restoring amicable relations.

But an important drama was about to open elsewhere. The Emperor Calojohannes was succeeded in 1143 by his son Emmanuel Comnenos, a man of equally strong will, an equally powerful understanding, and a much cooler temper; and concurrently with this change at Constantinople, Roger II., nephew of Robert Guiscard, having brought under his sway the Two Sicilies, was conceiving the grand design formerly entertained by his uncle of reuniting in his own person the Eastern and Western empires. It became plain to the Venetians, that they would very shortly be invited to declare themselves, and to choose their side.

With his great object in view, Roger invaded the imperial frontier in 1147, took Thebes and Corinth, ravaged a large portion of Livadia, and finally obtained possession of Corfu, where he planted a Sicilian garrison. But so soon as he was fully apprised of the plans and intentions of Roger, the Emperor had hastened to prepare for war; and one of his earliest cares was to make pacific advances to the Republic. The bearer of the message of reconciliation was instructed to urge, on his master's behalf, that the son could not be justly accounted responsible for the acts of his father; to intimate that his present Majesty was perfectly prepared not only to re-establish the friendship which had at all times subsisted between the Byzantine Court and Venice, but to throw open to Venetian traders the ports of Cyprus, Candia, and Megalopolis (or Aphrodisias), which had been expressly reserved in the chrysobole accorded in 1085 to the Republic by his grandfather Alexios.² In conclusion, he was charged to represent the severity and imminence

¹ Dandolo, lib. ix. ch. xliii.; Roncioni, *Istorie Pisane*, v. 256; Dolfino, *Annali*, p. 18 (King's MSS. 149).

² Dandolo, lib. ix. p. 282; P. Giustiniani, lib. ii. p. 28 edit. 1576; Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 391.

of the danger, to which the Lower Empire was at present exposed by the Sicilian invasion, and to invoke the aid of the Venetians in the recovery of Corfu, with which undertaking it was proposed to open the campaign of 1148.

It was true, that the long suspension of the chrysobole had not been attended by the ruinous results, which it might have entailed at a period when Venetian commerce was less widely diffused over Europe and Asia. Yet it still remained an evil of no ordinary magnitude; and to whatever extent the measure was possibly mitigated by evasion, the complaint among the mercantile class had become daily more loud. But the Venetians had never dreamed that the Byzantine Court would ultimately condescend to take the initiative, and consequently much less had they imagined that it would be prepared to make such valuable concessions in their favour. Besides, Sicily was a Power which the Republic had reason to regard at this period with peculiar malevolence, her commerce having suffered much of late years from the pirates who, with the assumed collusion of Roger, infested that coast; her aggregate loss from the source in question was estimated at not less than 4,000,000 crowns;¹ and it is natural to conceive that, apart from other considerations, she was far from ill disposed to draw the sword in a cause, which promised to afford the means of reprisal.

Agreeably to an assurance given to the Emperor, a fleet of fifty-four sail, under the Doge in person, left Venice for the Mediterranean in the early part of the year (1148). But the armament had scarcely reached Caorlo, when the sudden indisposition of Polani² obliged him to transfer the command to his son the Count of Arbo and his brother the Bishop of Castello.

The defenders of Corfu, inspired by a just confidence in their advantageous position, and imbued with a deep hatred of Greek tyranny, were fully prepared to resist the efforts of the Allies to the last extremity; three months passed away without producing any result; and it cannot be surprising to find, that the unsuccessful nature of the operations had the effect of breeding disunion among the confederates. In the third month of the siege, a quarrel arose on some

¹ Marin, iii. lib. i. ch. ix.

² *Cronaca Altinate*, v. 157; Da Canale, sect. 24.

slight pretence between a company of Greeks and one of Venetians, who happened to be encamped in contiguous quarters; words grew high: an appeal was made to arms. Gradually the fray thickened; both sides gained numbers and strength, the new comers naturally falling into the ranks of their countrymen; and the active interference of Azuches, the Greek admiral, who arrived after some delay with a strong body of troops to separate the combatants, while it appeased the tumult, exasperated the Venetians who were implicated in the broil to such a degree, that they refused to act any longer with the forces of the Emperor, and withdrew in their ships to the islet of Asteria, situated between Ithaca and Cephalonia.¹ Here they discovered the imperial barge lying at anchor, and the sight suggested to the mariners an expedient for indulging their resentment. Having decked the cabin of the vessel with some arras and finery, which fell into their hands, they procured an Ethiopian, in ridicule of the swarthy complexion of Emmanuel, and, having placed on his shoulders with mock solemnity some temporary substitute for the sacred robe of purple, they placed him on a chair of State, and saluted him with the titles of Cæsar and Augustus. The Emperor felt that it was hardly judicious, in the present aspect of affairs, to endanger the alliance by giving vent to his feelings; and the offenders were easily enticed by the proclamation of an amnesty to return to their post.

Corfu, however, only yielded to the pressure of famine in September.² A division of the Greek army superseded the Sicilian garrison; and the Venetian commanders, considering that the Republic had now acquitted herself of her engagements with the Byzantine Court, determined to direct their course homeward. They had barely lost sight of Corfu, when they fell in with nineteen armed privateers, carrying Sicilian colours; the strangers were on their return from a foraging cruise on the Bosphorus, and were richly laden with booty;³ and they not unnaturally sought to evade a collision with the greatly superior force, which was bearing down on them. The prizes were easily secured; and the conquerors

¹ Filiasi, *Ricerche storiche*, p. 203.

² Nicetas, lib. i. p. 58; Da Canale, sect. 25.

³ Dandolo, lib. ix. ch. xiii.

shaped their course for the coast of Sicily. The whole island was given up to havoc. The orchards and vineyards were stripped. The hamlets were depopulated and burned. In such a manner Sicily was unexpectedly made to atone for the great losses which the privateers of Roger had inflicted a quarter of a century before on Venetian commerce.

During the absence of the expedition, the illness of the Doge had proved fatal (August 1148); his successor was Domenico Morosini, an experienced diplomatist and soldier. But he was advanced in years, and by one of these characteristic irregularities, to which we grow accustomed, as we study the early annals of Venice, he was permitted to delegate to his son, Domenico Count of Zara,¹ those more active and arduous duties which were inseparable from the functions of the Ducal Throne. This was in fact the old principle of association in a new dress.

The family quarrel between the Dandoli, Badoeri, and others on the one side, and the supporters of the late Doge Polani, which originated in the elevation to the throne of a young man of thirty, his predecessor's near relative by marriage, had now lasted more than a quarter of a century, and it at length reached a climax in the departure or expulsion of the anti-ducal party from Venice, and by the demolition of their dwellings either by the order or with the collusion of the Polani Government. To mollify the persecuted faction, and to appease the complaints of the Holy See, the new Doge caused these houses to be reconstructed at the public expense; and the exiles, satisfied by that concession, embraced the opportunity which the change of administration afforded of terminating a scandalous feud; and the happy reconciliation, which had been thus effected, was cemented by the espousal of Andrea Dandolo, the Primate's nephew, with the daughter of Reniero Polani.²

The erection on the ancient duchy of Beneventum of a kingdom, which gradually comprised Sicily and Southern Italy, was an event which tended to complicate to a still farther extent the already somewhat difficult and perplexing relations of Venice, and rendered her foreign policy a matter for constant and anxious consideration. The Republic saw

¹ Lucius, *De regno Dalmatiae et Croatiae*, lib. iii. p. 138; Dolfino, *Annali*, 17; King's MSS. 149.

² Dandolo, lib. ix. p. 248.

before her the Byzantine Emperor, the King of the Romans, and the King of the Two Sicilies, all jealous of each other, all courting her alliance and friendship. Emmanuel Comnenos had come to her as a suppliant, and had surpassed all his predecessors in the generosity of his concessions and the humility of his attitude. Conrad III. in 1137, and now Frederic Barbarossa in 1154, sealed the commercial charter for the Italian ports. William I., successor of that Roger, whom the Venetians so pitilessly chastised a few years since only, inaugurated his reign by casting behind him disagreeable recollections, and assenting to a treaty of commerce and peace (1148-56).

Both Powers now seemed alike content to merge the remembrance of passed injuries in a compact of mutual advantage. On the one hand, William, dreading the collateral hostility of Venice in the war which he was then waging with Emmanuel Comnenos, was anxious to secure at least her neutrality. On the other, the Republic had long desired the faculty of trading on less onerous terms in the ports of Southern Italy and Sicily. So, if the covert machinations or open hostility of Hungary: if the increasing uncertainty, owing to a variety of causes, of their relations with the Byzantine Court¹ notwithstanding the circumstance that those relations had been recently placed on a footing apparently of the friendliest character: and finally, if it had not begun to be evident to careful observers that the Western empire was slowly falling to decay through the diffusion of more liberal ideas: had not also argued the expediency of knitting more closely their connection with the Two Sicilies, a mere regard to their interests as a mercantile community might have tempted the Venetians to welcome such an alliance.

The military and financial necessities of all these Powers had a tendency to make them oblivious and pliant; but the marvellous success of the Republic must be admitted to have been very largely due to the activity and address of her own government. Her administrators and diplomatists seemed to be ubiquitous and sleepless. While one embassy was waiting on his Majesty of the Two Sicilies, a second on Frederic Barbarossa, and a third on Comnenos, even the Duke of Antioch was not thought too insignificant to be courted, so

¹ Bonfinius, *Res Ungaricæ*, dec. ii. lib. vi.

long as he had it in his hands to place Venetians at that port and in the duchy on the same trading basis as at Ascalon and Tyre.

In the conduct of her foreign affairs, the Republic was in the habit of experiencing the largest share of trouble and annoyance from those States which bordered on her territory, either at home or in the Colonies. Aquileia, Adria, Belluno, Padua, Trieste, Narenta, and others have continually occurred, perpetrating aggressions with or without justification. But by far the most formidable of these neighbours was Hungary, which alone appeared as indifferent to the friendship of the Venetians, as it was fearless of their power. Conscious of the elastic strength of a young people, the Hungarians, under a succession of capable rulers, were doing their utmost to obtain a coveted coast line by driving the Republic out of Dalmatia. What they could not accomplish by open hostilities, they achieved by secret intrigue. The harassing depredations of the corsairs and privateers of the Adriatic and the periodical rebellions of Zara and the adjacent towns were ascribed to Hungarian inspiration. In 1150 and the following year,¹ the Government of the Doge was forced to repress with a strong hand some piratical movements at Ancona and to curb the reviving propensity of the Dalmatians to revolt by sending out a large and costly armament, which visited each of the fiefs in turn, and exacted a renewal of the oath of allegiance and an additional tribute by way of feudal acknowledgment.² If there was a consoling side to this endless series of little wars, it was that the almost perpetual maintenance of a more or less considerable force afloat formed a valuable school of discipline and experience, and that the contributory principle accepted among shipowners made it possible for the Government to command a marine without imposing oppressive burdens on the people at large.

The Michieli family had shown themselves lovers of blood and iron in the persons of the first and second Doge of that name, and that they enjoyed great political influence had become apparent by the election of Pietro Polani to succeed

¹ Dandolo, lib. ix. p. 248. See also Cronaca di Marco . . . *Arch. stor. Ital.* viii. ; Paolo Morosini, lib. v. p. 112; Amiani, *Memorie di Fano*, p. 113.

² Rovigno was required to send five *romanati* annually; Parenzo, fifteen pounds of oil and twenty rams; Omago, two *romanati*; Citta Nuova, forty pounds of oil.

his father-in-law in 1128 in the face of a strenuous opposition. The election of a third Michieli to replace the Doge Morosini in 1156 seemed to denote that the Republic was not tired of war, or was not sanguine of her ability to avoid it.

In February 1152, Frederic, Duke of Suabia, was elected King of Germany at Frankfort-on-the-Maine, and afterward invested with the Silver Crown at Aachen or Aix-la-Chapelle, in the presence of the dignitaries of the realm and of the delegates of the Free Towns. The announcement of the succession of Frederic was received with universal joy and satisfaction, and few princes ascended the throne under more favourable auspices than the nephew and successor of Conrad III. He was still in the prime of manhood. His election had been unopposed. He was already the darling of the people, who fondly hailed in him the undoubted descendant of Charlemagne; and the fine qualities of his mind and the manly graces of his person endeared him to the brave German nation. But, unhappily for himself and mankind, Barbarossa had conceived an estimate of the kingly prerogative little consonant with popular freedom. It was his pride and his misfortune to think that the empire of the West was the allotted birthright of his lineage; and, so far from admitting the Papacy as even a co-ordinate Power, he pointed to the Double Key as an exponent of the sovereign and equal authority of the Emperor over the Church and the State. That a prince who had imbibed such sentiments, should view with mingled scorn and astonishment the new and lofty claims of a majority of the Lombard towns to liberty and independence, was not to be accounted strange: he determined to embrace the opportunity which his proposed investiture with the Iron Crown by the Roman Pontiff afforded him, of crushing the insolent faction which had dared to invade his prerogative, and to criticise the doctrine of Divine Right.

The Peninsula was already divided between the two hostile factions of the Ghibellines and the Guelphs. In the words of a poet of the thirteenth century, who wrote five-and-thirty years before the birth of Dante—

De' Guelfi e degli Ghibellini,
I qual per luminosa Italia sparti,
Che fan di lor medessimi tagli e quarti.¹

¹ *Poeti del primo secolo della lingua Italiana*, i. 123.

The former espoused the pretensions of the Emperor to absolutism; the latter challenged the nature and extent of his authority. The Ghibellines professed themselves the zealous supporters of the royal prerogative; their rivals sought to set off the rights of the citizen against the obligations of the subject. The Guelphic cities, which included Crema, Cairo, Piacenza, Asti, Rosate, and Tortona, had concentrated their power and influence in Milan, reputed the strongest fortress in the kingdom; the Ghibelline, among which were Rome, Lucca, Cremona, Treviso, Verona, Padua, and Aquileia, had selected as their headquarters Pavia, the ancient capital of the Lombard kings. It could not be concealed that, even without any external support, the Imperialists were at present by far the more powerful and numerous of the two: the strength of the Popular Party lay in their compactness and unanimity. It was natural under such circumstances, that the arrival of Frederic at Constance in the October of 1154, to take command of his troops, should be regarded alike by his enemies and his adherents in the Peninsula as an event of no ordinary importance. For it was generally felt that a struggle, in which a momentous question was involved, was at hand, and that great national interests were staked on the issue. The eyes of the Guelphic faction were therefore wistfully and watchfully fixed on the movements of the Army of Italy; and when they paused to consider that, in a short time, the whole imperial force might be thrown into the scale against them, and might reduce them to a feeble minority, they naturally contemplated their position with disquietude. It was at this juncture that an incident occurred, which precipitated the impending crisis. During the stay of Barbarossa at Constance, an embassy arrived from Lodi, to beg his aid and protection against the Guelphs at Milan, who had burned the suburbs of the former town, and had grossly maltreated the inhabitants. The Emperor lent a favourable ear to the prayer of the deputies, and sternly commanded the Milanese to make reparation for the damage of which they were the authors. The latter spurned his order, and defied his authority; their consul trampled his letter under foot.¹ Such audacity was unexampled. The report of the deputies on

¹ Otho Morena, a contemporary, and Bishop of Frisingen, *Gesta Frederici* in Muratori, *Rerum Italicarum scriptores*.

their return struck Frederic with amazement. At first, he scarcely credited the news. But he was no sooner assured of its truth, than he decided on having recourse to vigorous measures; and, having abruptly quitted Constance at the head of his troops, the Emperor crossed the Alps, and planted the golden eagle at Roncevalles, near Piacenza, where he awaited the presence of the delegates of the cities and of the vassals of the realm.¹ The Ghibellines promptly responded to the imperial summons; the Guelphs wholly disregarded it; and Milan, not satisfied with observing, like the rest, a cold and contemptuous silence, reiterated her challenge. This fresh indignity gave peculiar umbrage to the Emperor. Still, the difficulties with which he had to grapple were on narrower scrutiny far more serious than he had anticipated, or indeed than he was willing to own. The conviction slowly forced itself upon him, that he had underrated the magnitude of the task in which he was engaged; and from the good understanding which appeared to exist among the Guelphs, he was fain to presage a long and obstinate resistance to his arms. During his stay in the Peninsula, disease had laid a heavy hand on his troops, and the levies, which he expected from the Rhenish Provinces and from Bohemia, were not yet forthcoming. Affairs of urgency, moreover, recalled him to Germany, and, previous to his return, he was anxious to visit Pavia and Rome, in order that he might bind his brows with the Iron Crown and the golden diadem. Under these circumstances, the Emperor resolved to content himself, for the present, with segregating from the League those towns, which lay like a spiked belt around Milan, and served her as outposts and bastions; and, having with this design left Roncevalles with the army, he successively took and garrisoned Cairo, Asti, and Rosate. Tortona was levelled with the ground. Thence he proceeded to the Ghibelline capital, where, amid the popular manifestations of joy, he assumed the Iron Crown of Lombardy; and from Pavia he marched to Rome, where he intimated to the Pontiff Adrian his desire to receive at his hands the imperial diadem. His Holiness indeed had long expected the visit of Barbarossa; Frederic met with a cordial and splendid reception; and after a short stay in the Capitol he traversed the duchy of Spoleto, forced the passage of the Etsch, and ultimately

¹ Sismondi, ii. p. 88.

reached Ratisbon in the course of 1156, leaving the fate of Italy suspended in the balance.

Two years afterward, and while the Emperor still remained in Germany, Adrian IV. was removed by death (1158); and the Electoral College, divided between the two factions, nominated two successors to Saint Peter's chair, the Ghibelline cardinals claiming the vacant tiara for Victor IV., their rivals preferring the Chancellor Roland Ranuci, who assumed the designation of Alexander III. Frederic, on his part, espoused the pretensions of Victor, who shewed himself a better courtier than Ranuci; and, after a brief sojourn in the Campagna, the latter was obliged by the persecution of the Imperialists to embark at Genoa, and to seek an asylum at the Court of Louis VII. (March 1161).

Barbarossa returned to Germany only with the wreck of the army, which he had raised at Constance two years before. But the loyal enthusiasm of the people, and their prompt reply to his call for new levies, speedily produced a fresh force, inferior to the former neither in numbers nor in discipline. With these troops he again crossed the Alps in July 1159, and opened the campaign by laying siege to Crema, one of the principal constituents of the League. Crema yielded to the pressure of famine in the following January (1160). The remainder of this year was spent in negotiations with Alexander, who had already withdrawn from Rome, and in awaiting the reinforcements, which slowly arrived from Suabia, Hesse, the Rhenish Provinces, and Bohemia. The siege of Milan, which had now been so long deferred, was consequently not formed till August 1161; and seven months elapsed before the besieged, reduced to the last stage of misery and distress, were forced to capitulate (March 1162).¹ The conduct of the Emperor toward the vanquished was clement and forbearing; for it must be admitted, that the Milanese had earned a full title to his enmity and vengeance. They had pillaged his treasury at Trezzo. They had beaten his troops at Cassano.² They had sacked and burned Lodi and Castiglione. They had expelled his Podesta, and had ignored his prerogative. Yet the treatment which they received at his hands served to humiliate their pride without disgracing his

¹ Verri, *St. di Milano*, i. 194; edit. Le Monnier.

² Sismondi, ii. p. 127.

humanity. The walls and fortifications of the town were partly levelled. The *palladium*, a tree bearing a cross, was felled with a German axe. The nobles were condemned to march out of the place barefoot, their naked swords dangling from their necks. The lives of the inhabitants were spared. The fall of Milan was followed by the cession or conquest of a large portion of Lombardy: and, having thus obtained an apparently firm footing in the Peninsula, Frederic appointed Reinhold, Archbishop of Cologne, his lieutenant, and returned once more to Germany.

Meanwhile, excepting the marriage of his eldest son Leonardo, Count of Ossero, with the daughter of Dessa,¹ who had lately usurped the Crown of Hungary (1161-2), and that of his other son Nicolo, Count of Arbo, with the daughter of the Hungarian Prince Lladislaus, the early years of the reign of Michieli III. (1156-72) had been uncharacterised by any feature of historical interest; and the Republic, mainly intent on promoting the national prosperity by the expansion of her commerce, was happy in being permitted to continue during that period to preserve an attitude of strict neutrality. At the same time, the good wishes of the Venetians had been, from the very commencement of the war, with the Popular Party, whose policy appeared to be so eminently subservient to their views. The Islanders had long regarded with a wistful eye the contiguity of a powerful monarchy to their lagoons and the union of Italy and Germany in the hands of a single sovereign; it was therefore with more than complacency, that they at present contemplated the prospect of the partition of the Peninsula among a large number of petty States, which they considered it would be at all times easy to overawe, and which they might perhaps eventually incorporate. This natural bias toward the Guelphs soon assumed a more distinct and practical form; and in the early spring of 1162, when the Milanese were almost reduced to the last extremity, a large consignment of supplies was sent to their relief. But the assistance thus rendered was both tardy and insufficient; Milan was shortly afterward (March 6) obliged to yield to the overwhelming force which Frederic had concentrated on the place; and the victor, having in this manner disposed of his most formidable enemy in the Peninsula, determined to

¹ *Cronaca Altinate*, v. 159.

afford the Republic palpable evidence of his resentment at her manifestation of sympathy with the insurgents.¹ Accordingly, antecedently to his departure for Germany in 1162, he appealed to the loyalty and jealousy of Ulric, Patriarch of Aquileia, the old enemy of the metropolitanate, to the Bishop of Adria, and to the municipalities of Padua, Vicenza, Ferrara, and Treviso, which consented to organise among themselves a coalition against the Venetians. Each of the members of this new confederacy bore such a part as was most in consonance with its policy and interest. The Adrians and Paduans seized on Cavarzero; the Aquileians made a descent on Grado; the Ferrarese and Vicentines advanced against Caorlo.² The movements of the League, however, were, fortunately for the Republic, slow and ill-concerted, and its triumph was of short duration. The Caorlese, having hastened, on learning the danger of Grado, to the assistance of their neighbours, the Trevisans also advanced to attack Caorlo during their absence. But such was their ignorance of the channels of the lagoons, that they became entangled in the shallows, and the Caorlese women, witnessing their helplessness, launched boats and took many of the aggressors prisoners.³ The vengeance of the Republic was wreaked on the two principal offenders, the Bishop of Adria and the Patriarch Ulric. The territories of the former⁴ were swept by her troops. Ulric, on his way back to Aquileia in fancied security with the spoils of the metropolitanate, was surprised near Castello, and conducted a prisoner to Venice, where a promise was wrung from him, that the Patriarchs of Aquileia, in celebration of the circumstance, should send to Rialto in perpetuity an annual present of twelve large loaves, together with an ox and twelve boar-pigs,⁵ whose pompous and solemn immolation might indicate to the tributaries the fate which Ulric and the twelve canons, his companions on the occasion, had so well deserved and so narrowly escaped.⁶ The living representatives of Ulric and his canons were conducted round the city in procession, and afterward sacrificed in the presence of the Doge, who caused

¹ Da Canale, *Cronaca Veneta*, ss. 27-8; Dandolo, lib. ix. pp. 287-96; P. Giustiniani, lib. ii. p. 30, edit. 1576.

² *Cronaca Altinate*, v. 161.

³ Cronaca di Marco . . . , *Arch. stor. Ital.* viii. 263; Da Canale, sec. 30.

⁴ *Cronaca Altinate*, *ubi supra*.

⁵ Cronaca di Marco . . . , *loco citato*.

⁶ Giustina Renier Michiel, *Feste Veneziane*, ii. p. 36, edit. 1832; and Cronaca di Marco . . . , *ubi supra*.

the quarters to be distributed among the people. It was in this period of serious history that the feast originated, in which the Nicolotti and Castellani bore so conspicuous a part, and diverted the capital from year to year with mock-fights and feats of strength and agility. These were the braves of Lido and Castello, descendants in name and blood of the hardy fellows, who beat the lordly prelate's men in the old troublous days, when the sword so seldom rusted in its sheath.

In the interval which elapsed between the departure of the Pontiff Alexander from the Gulf of Genoa in March 1161, to the banks of the Loire, and his return from France four years later to the Castle of Saint Angelo, the imperial power had been gradually on the decline; and the Guelphs, who now openly acknowledged Alexander as their leader, had gradually acquired power and importance. Both factions continued to regard each other with unmitigated animosity. Frederic declared Ranuci out of the ban of the empire: Ranuci pronounced Frederic out of the pale of the Church. Milan and Pavia were at open war. Padua and Seprio revolted against their governors. The Ghibellines counted on the support of Germany: their rivals engaged the sympathy of Greece, Sicily, France, and England. Mantua, Vicenza, Ferrara, Cremona, Bergamo, Brescia, Treviso, and Verona, though from motives of prudence they had not yet espoused the popular side, were known to be already less than lukewarm in their attachment to the Emperor; and many other towns, such as Rimini, Parma, Modena, Bologna, Imola, Faenza, and Forli, exasperated at the cruelties and exactions of the Imperial government, merely awaited a suitable opportunity of declaring themselves for Alexander and the League. Such was the posture of affairs, when Victor IV. breathed his last on the 28th of April 1164. The Ghibellines conferred the tiara on Paschal III. But the new pontiff was soon obliged by the predominance of the opposite faction to join the Emperor at Würzburg; and Alexander entered Rome in triumph in November 1165. A year and a half later, after several months of negotiation and delay, a treaty, binding the contracting parties to afford each other mutual support, and to make no peace with his Majesty till they had placed their municipal rights and privileges on a firm and secure footing, was signed at Pontita (May 29, 1167) by

the delegates of Padua, Treviso,¹ Vicenza, Verona,² Ferrara, Brescia, Bergamo, Milan, and Piacenza; and prior to the close of the campaign, the oath was accepted, and the act was subscribed, by Parma, Lucca, Modena, Bologna, Reggio, Vercelli, Lodi, Como, Novaro, and the New Alexandria.³ The Republic, continuing to watch the course of events, still adhered to her neutrality, contenting herself with subsidising the Guèlphs⁴ to the extent of 12,000 marks of silver; and her example was followed by the small, though by no means inconsiderable, borough of Ancona, which occupied at present a somewhat anomalous position, as being the only place in the Peninsula, which remained true to the Court of Constantinople.

The LOMBARD LEAGUE was a Barrier of Steel interposed between the people and their oppressors; and from the moment of its formation may be dated a new era in the history of Italy. It is instructive to observe how, in the course of twelve years, the selfish and unwise policy of Frederic had gradually alienated from him and from his House a loyal and devoted people, and how, in that comparatively short period, his overbearing tyranny constrained those towns and municipalities, which had once been his staunchest adherents, to range themselves on the side of the Revolutionary party.

The attention of the Republic was soon drawn to the state of her relations with the Lower Empire. The Venetians still enjoyed the ample privileges which they had acquired from time to time at Constantinople and the other Greek ports; and the reconciliation effected in 1147 between the two Powers had happily not been disturbed by any ulterior event. But the Islanders, inspired by the spirit of enterprise, and actuated by the growing preponderance of Pisa and Genoa in a capital where Venice was once paramount, had not failed to establish themselves concurrently in the countries which bordered on the Greek monarchy; they had formed settlements on the Black Sea, as well as at Cairo, Tunis, and Medina; they traded on easy and advantageous terms with Sicily; and in 1168 Comnenos learned

¹ Bonifacio. *Istoria di Trevigi*, lib. iv. p. 128.

² Dalla Corte, *Storia di Verona*, lib. v.

³ Sismondi tells us (ii. pp. 131-2) that, a year after its foundation, this town was able to furnish a contingent of 15,000 men to the League.

⁴ *Cronaca Altinate*, v. 161.

with extreme dissatisfaction that Venice had renewed with William II. the treaty of commerce and peace, into which she entered in 1154 with his predecessor, William I. The Emperor had vainly striven to preclude that dangerous alliance: he was equally unsuccessful in his attempt to dissolve it. William declined to accept the hand of Maria Comnena which was offered as a bait to induce him to join his Majesty in a war with the Republic: the Republic, although indeed the advances of Emmanuel to the Doge were of a similarly flattering nature, similarly refused to entertain any proposition, which would lead to an embroilment with the King. The unfavourable result of this twofold negotiation plainly denoted that the connection between Venice and her new ally was too strongly cemented by a sense of mutual interest to be broken, or even to be weakened, by intrigue; and the rejection of his overtures by a Power, which was ordinarily so obsequious, was infinitely more galling to the pride of Comnenos than the cold reception which his ambassador met at the Court of Sicily. When his envoys reported to their master the ill success of their respective missions, the scene in the state-cabin recurred to the mind of Emmanuel; every indignity, which the Greeks had endured in his own time, and during the reign of his father Johannes, at the hands of the Republic, flashed at once upon his recollection; and he determined to wreak his vengeance on those proud islanders by attacking them in that part where he knew them to be most vulnerable. The Emperor was sufficiently collected to conceal his intentions; no word or expression, tending to excite distrust, was allowed to transpire; and the Venetian traders, resident at Constantinople and throughout the empire, were still unsuspecting of danger when, on the 3rd of May 1170, their vessels were suddenly seized, their property was confiscated, and the merchants themselves were committed to close custody. Some idea may be formed of the number of persons who were sufferers by this measure, as well as of the extent of the commerce at this period between Venice and Constantinople, from the fact that, when all the dungeons had been filled to crowding with Venetian prisoners, some still remained, for whom the monasteries were required to provide accommodation.¹

¹ Filiasi, *Ricerche*, p. 206.

Pisa and Genoa also formed advantageous alliances with the Western Empire;¹ the treaty, accorded by Frederic to Genoa, granted Syracuse in fief to that Power, as well as 250 baronies in the Val-di-Nota; it gave her the right of electing her own Consuls, dispensed with her service in the field except in Provence, conferred on her the privilege of trading in all the Italian ports, *and in those of the Republic of Venice*; and, lastly, precluded his Majesty from ratifying a peace with the King of Sicily without the free consent of her Consuls. The Byzantine Court concurrently extended to Pisa and Genoa privileges of an equally valuable and honourable character.

The union of Leonardo and Nicolo Michieli with two scions of the Royal House of Hungary had encouraged a hope that King Stephen II. might become a useful and constant ally. Indeed the amicable relations, which the Republic had maintained with that prince since the Dalmatian Rebellion of 1151, suffered no interruption till the early part of 1170, when an announcement was unexpectedly received that a fresh revolt had taken place in favour of the King of Hungary, and that the Podesta had been obliged to seek safety in flight. At the news of this defection, which created considerable surprise, immediate measures were concerted² for the recovery of the lost fief and for the intimidation of those which might be tempted to imitate its example. A fleet was accordingly gotten in readiness without delay to put to sea; and the Doge, having undertaken the command, was soon on his way to Zara. The Venetians, having succeeded in taking the place by storm, rased a portion of the fortifications, and exacted 200 hostages. The judicious severity of Michieli prevented the disaffection from becoming general. Trau, Spalato, and other towns belonging in fief to the Republic, alarmed by the foretaste of a similar fate, expelled their Hungarian garrisons and governors, and returned to their allegiance. It was shortly after the return of the Doge from this expedition, that the earliest intelligence was received of the misfortunes which had befallen the country in the East; and the coincidence was one which was apt to excite a suspicion that a secret understanding,

¹ Sismondi, ii. p. 142.

² *Cronaca Altinate*, v. 159.

inimical to Venetian interests, existed between Hungary and Greece.¹

A general tendency, which the Doge did not discountenance, manifested itself in favour of an instant declaration of war against the Emperor. But more moderate counsels ultimately prevailed; the mercantile community, who were naturally of a cooler and more calculating temper than the majority, and who usually came forward on the political stage as the advocates of peace, were still inclined to negotiate; and that large and powerful class succeeded in demonstrating that it was far more expedient to seek an explanation of the recent affair, than to plunge rashly into hostilities.

On his part, however, Comnenos was still barely satisfied with the success of his stratagem; the seizure of the property and persons of the Venetian traders was not so comprehensive as he had wished and expected; he was anxious to ensnare the objects of his vengeance still more thoroughly; and he determined to avail himself of the willingness which, as he was assured by his agents at Venice, had been exhibited in many influential quarters to effect an honourable reconciliation with the Byzantine Court. In the autumn of the same year (1170) an envoy was accordingly dispatched to express to the Doge, on behalf of his master, the sorrow of the latter at the passed occurrence, to offer an ample equivalent for the losses which the sequestration of their property had entailed on the Republic,—the natural ally of the Empire,—and to invite the Venetians to resume the position which they had hitherto enjoyed in Constantinople and elsewhere.² The Republic, especially the trading class, was effectually duped. The orders of non-intercourse were cancelled. The captives were liberated from the dungeons. The vessels were released from the embargo. The confiscated property was restored to its owners. In short, the relations between the two Powers were considered in all respects as re-established on their former footing; and a convoy of merchantmen, carrying on the whole 20,000 persons,³ accompanied by two plenipotentiaries, Sebastiano Ziani and Orio Malipiero, at once set out for the East. The Venetian deputies, who had embarked in one of those vessels which were bound

¹ Bonfinius, *Res Ungar.* decad. ii. lib. vi. p. 274; Lucius, *De regno Dalmatiae et Croatiae*, lib. iii. p. 124.

² *Cronaca Altinate*, v. 163.

³ *Ibid.*, *ubi supra*.

for the Greek capital itself, arrived at the Golden Horn in the very early part of 1171, and were received by Comnenos in such a manner as might serve to gratify their pride and to disarm their suspicion.

There was at Constantinople an eminent shipwright, a Venetian by birth, whose skill in his craft had recommended him to the favour of the Emperor. The latter loaded him with honours, admitted him into his confidence, intrusted him with the command of a large three-masted man-of-war which he had built for the Emperor at Venice, or which at least he had sold to Comnenos after its completion, and as a special mark of his esteem allowed him, during the recent proscription, to retain his property and his freedom. This man, whose patriotism was stronger than his gratitude, received an early hint of the danger which threatened his unsuspecting countrymen; and, having waited on Ziani and Malipiero, he disclosed to them the existence and nature of the plot, as well as the date which had been fixed for its execution. The Deputies were assured that Emmanuel had merely varnished his treacherous project with deceitful professions, and he stated that a plan was on foot for seizing their persons and for laying a general embargo on their vessels and merchandise on the 12th of March¹ ensuing. The shipbuilder then proceeded to suggest an ingenious method which he had conceived of extricating them from the difficulty. The vessel of which he was the commander was the swiftest in the Greek navy;² he was willing to place it at their disposal, as well as his own services; and if they approved the scheme, they and all the Venetians residing in the Greek capital³ might anticipate detention by a timely flight. Ziani and his companions naturally hesitated at first to attach credit to the statement of their informant; but, after reflection, they entered into the proposal. The ship was manned and equipped; the sides were coated with felt steeped in vinegar, as a precaution against the Greek fire; and the fugitives, having quitted the Chryso-ceras⁴ at nightfall, reached the Propontis before their absence

¹ *Cronaca Altinate*, lib. v. p. 164; Dandolo, lib. ix. p. 293.

² Nicetas, *De Manuele Comneno*, lib. v. p. 223; Filiasi, *Ricerche storiche*, p. 232.

³ *Cronaca Altinate*, v. 164. "Multum timebat imperator de Venetis, ne se defenderent; et ideo multas in Constantinopoli congregaverat gentes."

⁴ *Cronaca di Marco . . .*, *Arch. stor. Ital.* viii. 260.

was detected. The breeze was propitious; the velocity with which the vessel skimmed the waves soon rendered the pursuit of the Greeks futile; the fire, which was occasionally launched at her stern and sides, dropped harmlessly into the sea; and after a rapid voyage of twenty or five-and-twenty days, the Deputies and the companions of their flight reached the Lagoon (April 1171). Previously to their arrival, however, several merchants having been forewarned of the plot, and having eluded in like manner the sequestration, had brought home the intelligence. There was a general outcry of vengeance; every hand offered to bear a part in a war against Emmanuel; and such was the unmeasured vehemence of their wrath, that the Venetians cropped their hair, and shaved their beards close, in order not to present in their personal appearance any similarity to an odious race.¹

Michieli, who was entering on the sixteenth year of a comparatively uneventful administration, was not on his part otherwise than content to embrace such an unexpected opening to popularity and distinction; the thrilling narrative of the events of 1123, which had been familiar to him from his boyhood, long before he dreamed of ascending the steps of the throne, naturally awakened in his mind a strong spirit of emulation; and it seemed quite within possibility that Constantinople and the Archipelago might witness exploits which should transmit his name to posterity with that of the hero of Jaffa and Tyre. The Doge therefore exhibited an entire sympathy with the public emotion; war was at once resolved on; measures were taken to organise a powerful fleet;² and all vessels, which might be trading or waiting for cargoes in the ports of Syria and Egypt, were ordered to report themselves at Venice before the 1st September (1171), the day fixed by the Doge for the departure. The whole City contributed to the formation and cost of the naval armament. One hundred galleys were completed or adapted in as many days.³ Twenty transports were set apart for ammunition and supplies. Ten long vessels were contributed⁴ by Zara alone. The joy of the people was exuberant. The nobility vied with each other in munificence and enthusiasm; and it is said that all the

¹ Mutinelli, *Annali*, p. 42; *ibid.*, *Del costume Veneziano*, p. 49.

² Cronaca di Marco . . . , *Archivio storico Italiano*, viii. 260; Martino da Canale, sect. 27.

³ Da Canale, sect. 27; *Cronaca Altinate*, 165.

⁴ *Cronaca Altinate*, 165.

Giustiniani, rivalling the noble zeal of the Fabii, offered their services and their lives to the Republic. This generous fervour was diffused among all classes of the community. During the whole summer of 1171,¹ the Arsenal and Dock-yard presented a busy scene of preparation. Every morning at daybreak, the great bell of the Campanile summoned the shipwrights and other operatives to their labour; they felt that the eye of their country was upon them; and on the appointed day the fleet was announced to be ready to sail. Michieli himself assumed the command; and, since the term of his absence was necessarily uncertain, and a rupture with Stephen or with Barbarossa might render the absence of the Crown inexpedient, his eldest son Leonardo, Count of Ossero, was installed as Vice-Doge.

According to a previous arrangement, a detachment of thirty galleys was sent to recover Trau, which had again gone over to the King of Hungary; the rest proceeded to Ragusa for a similar purpose;² and, those two places having been reduced to submission and partly dismantled, a fresh junction was effected, and the whole fleet stood for Negropont. The Greek Governor of that island had undertaken to oppose the Venetians, and to protect the empire. But, on hearing their force and proximity, he was induced to abandon this resolution, at the same time that he hastened to embrace the ready alternative. Embarking on his state-galley, the Governor advanced to meet the approaching squadron, and begged an interview with the commander. He expressed his unfeigned surprise at the hostile attitude which the Republic had assumed; he confidently traced to some misrepresentation of facts so strange an interruption of the friendly relations which had almost invariably subsisted between the Byzantine Court and the Government of his Serenity; and he assured Michieli, that Emmanuel would gladly repair any losses which might have accrued through his instrumentality to Venetian commerce. He stated that while his Imperial Master lamented the prospect of a war, so diametrically opposed to the true interests of both the belligerents, he had not ceased to cherish the hope of a peaceful and bloodless reconciliation with the Republic; and, as an important step toward that object, the Governor of Negropont suggested that, before such a course became

¹ *Cronaca Altinate*, v. 164.

² *Ibid.*, *ubi supra*.

impracticable, it should be ascertained, whether the existing breach between the two Powers could not be closed without an appeal to arms. The words of the speaker produced on the mind of the Doge a dubious impression; he justly accepted with reserve any statement or proposal emanating from a perjured Court; and he could hardly suppress a smile at the new light and aspect in which the Governor set the point under discussion. It was not difficult indeed to believe that the views and policy of Emmanuel were pacific in their tendency, and that he was really reluctant to engage in hostilities, until hostilities were forced upon him. For it was notorious that the Navy of Constantinople was disorganised, that the finances of the State were at a low ebb, that the national temper was indolent and unwarlike, and that the Emperor himself, now advanced in years, was no longer capable of taking the field. At the same time, although a war with Greece was at variance with the commercial interests of the Republic, Michieli was aware that the extension of Venetian trade had rendered the more sordid consideration of secondary importance. On the other hand, it was already October; the campaign of 1171 could hardly fail to be very brief in its duration and very indecisive in its results; the arrival of the winter season would suspend operations, before they had thoroughly commenced; and by negotiation, though nothing might be won, little was to be lost. The Doge therefore, without formally consenting to an armistice, expressed himself not indisposed, on the whole, to listen to terms; and Manasses Badoer and Pasquale, Bishop of Equilo, the latter of whom was recommended by his conversance with the Greek idiom,¹ were instructed to proceed to Constantinople; while Michieli, on his part, removed into winter quarters at Scio.²

Badoer and his companion were not admitted to an audience of Comnenos. They were told that the Emperor would see them very shortly, and with that answer they were repeatedly met. At last their suspicions were strongly awakened: nor was it long before their eyes were opened to the truth. A Jew, named Aaron, who served the Byzantine Court in a confidential capacity, had in consequence of some slight or injury conceived of late a violent pique against

¹ *Cronaca Altinate*, v. 166.

² *Ibid.*, *ubi supra*; *Cronaca di Marco* . . . , *Arch. stor. Ital.* viii. 261.

Emmanuel: and the present conjuncture seemed to afford him an excellent opportunity of gratifying his resentment. Not very long subsequently to their arrival, Aaron sought a private interview with Badoer and his colleague, to whom he unfolded the object of his visit. He intimated to the Embassy, that it formed no part of the Emperor's design to come to a settlement with them. He assured them that, in his pacific advances to the Republic, his sole motive was to gain time. In corroboration of his assertions, their informant pointed to the busy preparations for the ensuing campaign, and more especially to a powerful fleet which was in the course of construction.¹ This forewarning was not lost on the deputies, who took their departure without farther ceremony; and the Jew perceived with considerable glee, that the diplomatic farce had been broken off by his immediate agency.

But, on the return of the two envoys to Scio, they were shocked to find that a great calamity had befallen the Republic. During their absence, and while they were frittering away precious time at Constantinople, the plague had made its appearance in the Ionian Isles, through the water, as it was alleged, having been poisoned by the Greeks.² The Venetian troops fell easy victims to the epidemic; the mortality increased from day to day; it had soon baffled calculation; and as the vessels of the fleet were gradually rendered inefficient by the loss of their complements, and in many cases of the whole crew, the painful necessity arose of committing them to the flames, in order that they might not fall into the hands of the enemy. In this manner the superb armament of a hundred and thirty sail, which had left Venice in the preceding autumn in the full confidence of victory, was reduced to the moiety of its original strength. So soon, however, as he had learned from the deputies the result of their late mission, Michieli, partly actuated by an idea that he might escape beyond the range of its fatal influence, and, in part, by his anxiety to avoid a collision with the Greek commander, who was said to be approaching the Ionian Isles with a fleet of 150 sail, shifted his moorings in succession from

¹ Lebeau, xvi. p. 262.

² *Chronicle of San Salvador*, quoted by Sanudo, folio 496; *Chronicle of Bartolomeus Veronensis*, Abbot of San Nicolo del Lido, 1197, quoted by the same, folio 504.

Scio to Lesbos, from Lesbos to Lemnos, and from Lemnos to Scyros, where a perceptible decrease of mortality encouraged him to celebrate the feast of the Passover (April 14–18, 1172). In the course of the few days, during which he remained at Scyros, his Serenity, yielding to the force of existing circumstances, wholly relinquished the design of carrying on the war by recommencing hostilities in the spring. But at the same time the Doge had resolved, if it was possible, to maintain his present ground until the fear of contagion was altogether removed. The peevish and refractory spirit, however, which was manifesting itself among the troops, naturally querulous and homesick, the undoubted proximity of the enemy, and the crippled condition of his own forces, militated against this precaution, and compelled him to assent, against his better judgment, to an immediate return. The necessary instructions for the departure of the fleet were accordingly issued; the dead were interred; the dying were carried to the place of embarkation; several ships, which had been disabled since the late melancholy sacrifice, were consumed; and the residue, consisting of seventeen galleys and five transports, shaped their course for the Adriatic. That course gradually assumed the character of a retreat; the retreat became a flight. For the Greek admiral, Contostephanos, who had narrowly watched the movements of the Doge, followed closely in their wake: nor did he desist from the pursuit, until the fugitives had doubled the Cape of Saint Angelo.¹ Contostephanos then leisurely retraced his steps, while the Venetians, having in the first instance touched at Ragusa and Sebenigo, which had again seceded from their allegiance, made sail for the Lagoon. The Republic was already aware of the calamitous issue of the expedition, which she had sent to the Levant in the preceding year. But the troops, who communicated to their countrymen at home the dismal tidings, also communicated the fatal infection. The people wrang their hands in an agony of terror and despair; the rapidity with which the epidemic extended its ravages in a place where no sanitary laws of a fixed or systematic nature were yet established, and where a fetid atmosphere greatly increased its virulence, was truly appalling. It had soon penetrated into every quarter,

¹ Nicetas, *De Manuele Commeno*, lib. v. p. 225.

and had found a victim under every roof. The entire community seemed to be smitten by a mortal sickness. Every sphere and class of society were affected by it in a greater or less degree; every family bewailed the loss of some of its ornaments and pillars; and among those whom the fever had laid low were counted numerous members of the loyal and valiant house of Giustiniani.¹

With three exceptions indeed that ancient and illustrious race is said to have become extinct. The survivors were Petro, Marco, and Nicolo, the last of whom, a youth in his seventeenth year, was now cloistered in a monastery of Benedictines. His Serenity was deeply moved by the noble and enormous sacrifice which their fallen kinsmen had spontaneously made in the service of their country; such generous and unselfish patriotism was unmatched; and he resolved, as a mark of his own sympathy, as well as a high tribute of public gratitude, to offer his only daughter Anna in marriage to Nicolo Giustiniani.² The young Benedictine embraced with alacrity the flattering proposal; a papal indulgence absolved him from his oath of celibacy; and his union with the Doge's child was blessed by an issue of nine sons and three daughters. Of the latter one died a virgin and an abbess. Bartolotta espoused the Lord of Ferrara. Marta became the wife of a La Scala. Both the two remaining Giustiniani obtained subsequent eminence.

There was a considerable section of the community, probably bereaved and disconsolate families, which openly and loudly accused the Doge of being the author of their misfortunes. They deduced them with clearness and confidence from his want of foresight and his credulity. The animadversions of this party were bold, violent, and bitter. They soon wore a really formidable aspect. Their clamours and maledictions gradually arrested the public attention. The subject which formed their ground of complaint became the leading theme of conversation. It was canvassed on the Rialto. It was agitated in the Parliament, where it gave rise to frequent and angry controversies, in which the speakers freely vituperated each other. The sitting of the 27th May

¹ *Chronicon Fratrum Sancti Salvatoris*, quoted by Sanudo, folio 496, says, an hundred; which is, perhaps, a mere *façon de parler*, like the 300 Fabii.

² Mutinelli, *Annali*, p. 47.

was stormy and tumultuous beyond precedent. The debate turned on the affairs of the Republic and on the causes and consequences of the recent catastrophe; all sides spoke with great warmth and emotion: and high words were exchanged. The Doge was present at the discussion, in which he took the part of vindicating his own conduct, and of refuting the charges preferred against him. One by one the friends of order, foreseeing the storm that was gathering, escaped from the scene, and the Doge, finding himself confronted with a furious throng, brandishing knives and uttering terrible threats, also retired from the palace across the Ponte della Paglia, and proceeded toward San Zaccaria, where he purposed to attend vespers. It was already dusk. He was followed at a short distance by a few of the malcontents; Michieli, according to his custom on all ordinary occasions, was unguarded and alone; and he had not gone very far, when one of the party behind him, stepping suddenly in advance of his companions, plunged a dagger by a rapid movement into his bosom. The stab was not instantaneously fatal; but the assassin contrived at the moment to effect his escape; and his unfortunate victim, summoning by one desperate effort his remaining strength, staggered toward the Convent, where he hastily received the viaticum, and expired almost immediately afterward in the arms of the priest, who had been standing at the gate to receive him.¹

The whole city thrilled with horror; and the melancholy end of Michieli, producing a reaction not uncommon in such cases and at such junctures, reconciled to his memory even the most violent and implacable of that party which his alleged mismanagement of the war had at the close of his career arrayed against him. The murderer was easily traced and secured. His name was ascertained to be Marco Casiolo.² His identity and the proof of his guilt were established without much difficulty. From the sentence upon him, which was decapitation, it is to be augured that he was a person of some social position; and the scaffold on which he was executed was erected in front of his own dwelling in the

¹ *Cronaca Altinate*, lib. v. p. 167; Dandolo, lib. ix. p. 296; Sicardi *Episcopi Chronicon*, fol. 600.

² *Cronaca Altinate juxta codicem Dresdensen*, p. 61.

Calle delle Rasse between the Riva degli Schiavoni and the street of SS. Filippo e Giacomo.¹

During his government of more than seventeen years, Michieli III. had shown himself not unworthy of his illustrious predecessors of the same name. That his administration breathed a spirit of ultra-commercialism, and was distinguished by that proneness to negotiation, when negotiation was unavailing, ought not to create surprise; the vice was one by no means singular in him; it was a vice inherent in the community of which he was a member. Nor should the fact be overlooked that, at the time when he ascended the throne, a dark and heavy cloud hung over Italy and the Republic. The ambitious projects of Frederic Barbarossa were just then beginning to excite suspicion in the Peninsula. Those who already meditated opposition were in an anxious and unsettled mood. The Guelphs had reason to feel that their position was one of grave uncertainty. On the one hand, it was difficult to judge how far the Emperor was prepared to respect their municipal privileges; on the other, they were very doubtful how far it would be in their power, in the event of such a course becoming necessary, to offer an efficient and prolonged resistance to so mighty an antagonist. For that voice, which awoke some years later in tones of thunder, was still feeble and timid. The Popular Party, though inspired by a resolute spirit, was still insignificant both in number and strength. No one yet dreamed of the formation of the Lombard League. The Ghibellines, on the contrary, composed a powerful and numerous faction. A large majority of the Italian cities were in the service of the Emperor. The Holy See was loyal and servile in the extreme. The Republics of Genoa and Pisa shewed every disposition to afford Frederic their support. The iron crown awaited his Majesty at Pavia. The golden diadem awaited him at Rome. Such was the gloomy and menacing aspect of the political horizon, when the late Doge succeeded to the throne in 1156. The Venetians fully comprehended the difficulties with which they might be forced to grapple. They foresaw that, to reconcile the conflicting interests of their country as an independent Power and a community of traders, it would be necessary to proceed

¹ The execution of murderers before their own houses is still customary in Turkey (1909), and perhaps in other parts of Eastern Europe.

with wary steps. But Venetian sympathies and predilections were invariably on the side of the League; and it was the most ardent and sincere wish of the Islanders, that the exertions of the Guelphs in the cause of liberty might be rewarded with speedy and complete success.

Michieli lived to see this wish in a large measure realised. He lived to be a witness of the formation of the Lombard League and of the defeat of the tyrannical projects of Frederic. He was among those who beheld with heartfelt satisfaction a whole nation rising in revolt against its oppressor. But that great and glorious resurrection of Italian freedom was the slow and cumulative work of many years; and the intermediate space was long remembered by the Venetians as a season of painful suspense and solicitude. During the greater portion of that period, the Ghibelline Cities, opposed to the political creed of the Republic, more envious of her commercial prosperity, maintained toward her a threatening attitude. She counted among her secret or avowed enemies Padua, Adria, Aquileia, Ferrara, Ravenna, Ancona, Vicenza, Verona, and Treviso. The Bishop of Adria, a bellicose and powerful prelate, who was thought to have more relish for freebooting than for masses or genuflexions, had long been desirous of annexing the Venetian town of Cavarzero to his see. It was well known that the Patriarch Ulric of Aquileia, not less warlike and unscrupulous, and who nourished toward the metropolitan an inveterate and hereditary animosity, was ready to seize the first opportunity of making a descent on Grado, and of despoiling of her vast treasures the ancient and venerable church of Santa Eufemia. It was equally notorious that the Emperor himself regarded the Republic with an unfriendly eye. A prince, less thirsty for power and dominion, might indeed not unreasonably view with dissatisfaction the finest, most capacious, and most convenient harbour on the coast of Italy in the hands of a trading community, which owned no allegiance to his crown. Venice was the key of the Adriatic. To be the sovereign of the Adriatic, which might well be a point of ambition with him, it was necessary that Frederic should become the sovereign of Venice. If Venice continued to be a distinct Commonwealth, it would not only be difficult, but it would be impossible, to command that sea. That the Emperor was a

stranger to such and similar speculations was hardly to be believed; and there was strong reason to apprehend that, so soon as the Guelphic faction had been reduced to submission, an ulterior project would develop itself for embodying the Republic with the kingdom of Lombardy. Then the Venetians might have once more found it incumbent on them to unsheathe the sword in defence of their hearths and homesteads, of their national rights and free institutions; and men shuddered at the thought that Albiola might, in the twelfth century, witness the same spectacle as that which it had twice beheld in other days. Apart from such considerations, there were others similar in their tendency. It can be scarcely necessary to recur to the rupture, which took place in 1170 between the Republic and the Byzantine Court, to the calamitous campaign of 1171, to the outlay and sacrifices incidental to a two years' war after a seven years' peace, to the decimation of the troops by the plague, and to the loss of the greater part of a fleet of 130 sail. These circumstances rendered the period during which Michieli III. was at the head of affairs one of unusual difficulty and peril.

His death may be considered as bringing to a termination the First Epoch of the History of Venice; and he was not only the last of his name, but the last representative of the old reigning families and of the old monarchical system. His fall by the hand of an assassin, near the spot where the Doge Tradenigo had met a similar fate more than 300 years before, introduced an order of things which marks a new era in these Annals.

CHAPTER X

A.D. 1173—1201

Considerations on the Government of Venice—The Acts of the Commission of Reform—The Great Council—The Privy Council—The Senate—Election of Sebastiano Ziani (1173)—Forced Loan—The Negotiations with the Byzantine Court—Siege of Ancona (1174)—Reconciliation with Comnenos—Alexander III. at Venice (1176-7)—Battle of Salboro—Congress of Venice—Ziani is succeeded by Orto Malipiero (1178)—Defection of Zara—Third Crusade—Malipiero is succeeded by Arrigo Dandolo of San Luca (1192)—Difference between Venice and Verona (1191)—Defeat of the Pisans (1192-3)—The Fifth Crusade—Treaty between the Republic and the Barons (1201).

THE Revolution of 1033, which had owed its results to the popular alarm at the overgrown influence of the House of Orseolo, had the effect of weakening the Ducal authority in two essential respects. The conductors of this remarkable movement contrived, not without much intrigue and chicanery, to procure in one sitting of the Legislature the abrogation of the two engrafted systems of association and hereditary succession; and, although the government of Venice still remained by a prescriptive right in the hands of a limited number of families, the law of Flabenigo had never been transgressed: nor could any instance be adduced in which, from that time forward, a son had been called to sit by the side of his father, or to replace him. So far, then, the Revolution had established two great and salutary maxims of civil polity: and it was to those maxims that Venice was largely indebted for her subsequent immunity from domestic troubles. But nearly a century and a half had now elapsed since the days of the first Venetian reformer; two generations of men had passed away; and in the meantime the social and political state of the Republic had undergone an important and perceptible change. That change, though affecting to some extent the whole community, was relative, rather than positive, in its character and operation. There were certainly many circumstances, which clearly denoted the general progress of civilisation. The

Venetians toward the close of the twelfth century were a more experienced and enlightened, perhaps a wiser, people than the contemporaries of Flabenigo; and the expansion of its commerce, the development of its naval resources, the conspicuous part which it had borne in the Crusades, the alliances which it had formed, the treaties which it had concluded, had in a comparatively brief period raised the Republic to a far higher place in the scale of nations than the men of 1033, in any attempt to forecast the future, could have at all anticipated. But, as in 1033, there was one class only, which could be said to have derived any considerable advantage from the progress; and that class was the aristocracy.

The foundation of the aristocracy, considered as a distinct section of the community, dates no farther back than the middle of the eleventh century. The small, yet influential cabal of turbulent and dissatisfied members of the upper class, which owed its parentage to a private quarrel in 1026 between the Gradenigi and Orseoli, and which under the conduct of Domenigo Flabenigo ultimately achieved a result of a magnitude and importance far beyond its design, was the prefiguration of the Oligarchy which afterward exerted so despotic a sway over the Republic. While the commonalty was daily growing more servile and acquiescent in its temper, the influence of the Nobles had, since the era of the Revolution, been steadily in the ascendant. The latter now composed the leading ingredient in the body politic; and they already constituted a privileged class. All the offices of the government, civil and ecclesiastical, naval as well as military,¹ were vested in their hands. All charges of trust and emolument were confided to them. The episcopal and judicial benches were filled by men of noble blood² and ancient lineage. The Dalmatian colonies were exclusively administered by patricians. Patricians alone competed for the Berretta and the Pallium; and, after the lapse of nearly five hundred years, there were not more than nineteen families which could boast that they had given Doges to the Republic.³

¹ Dandolo, lib. ix. pp. 230, 263-7, 272-3-8, 282, 290-3, etc.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 254, 259.

³ The Badoeri, Anafesti, Galbani, Sanudi, Orsi, Tagliani, Morosini, Tradenigi, Flabenigi, Orseoli, Centranigi, Contarini, Catani, Polani, Michieli, Falieri, Selvi, Memi, and Tribuni. But of these families five absorbed nearly the entire space of as many centuries.

Still, with all these advantages, and they were certainly great, the nobility felt that, as a body, they had just reason to be dissatisfied with the position which they occupied; and there were two great constitutional abuses which combined to produce such a sentiment. The first was the principle of Universal Suffrage. Although an entire change had been wrought in the internal organisation of the Republic: although she had experienced a wonderful advance in wealth and dominion, and her population which, in the seventh and even eighth century, probably counted hardly as many hundreds, now reached 65,000; although, with her increasing prosperity, her wants had multiplied, and her interests had acquired complication: still the representative system was suffered to remain unaltered. At irregular periods, the three Estates of the Commune, the *Maggiori*, the *Medioeri*, and the *Minori*, were gathered from Grado to Cavarzero in the church of Saint Mark in the capital, or in that of San Pietro di Castello, if not in the open air, and proceeded to deliberate on the public concerns; in the presence of that large concourse of persons, the bulk of whom had necessarily little or no aptitude for forming an opinion on the topic of debate, all questions of general bearing and import were treated and decided; and unless it had passed the Arrengo, no measure was recognisable as valid. This condition of affairs was undoubtedly pregnant with evil; and it was such evil for which the advocates of reform were now anxious to provide an early and efficacious remedy.

A second point, which bred bitter complaint among the upper class, was the extensive power which was lodged by the Ducal prerogative in the hands of their chief magistrate, and which, though certainly abridged to a considerable extent by the law of 1033, was still too ample to find favour in the eyes of an aristocracy.

It was hardly to be expected, that the patricians should harbour any feeling akin to satisfaction or confidence toward a form of government, of which the two constituent ingredients were of a character totally inimical to the interests of their own Body. In the first place, there was a Legislature, which embraced every adult male inhabitant of the Islands without discrimination of rank, merit, or capacity. In such a promiscuous assemblage there was too large an admixture of

factions and turbulent spirits, and of men, who were apt to overrule wise counsels by giving the rein to angry passions; and it was tolerably plain, that it was useless to look to the Arrengo for the exercise of that dispatch, which was sometimes essentially material to the proper management of public affairs. In the second place, they had an Executive, consisting of a Prince, who had been chosen from time immemorial, and was still chosen, out of a circle of nineteen families, and of a Privy Council of two members, who were eligible by himself, and might be his passive instruments. The upper class was thus placed between two evils. On the one hand, though their voice in the deliberative Assembly was always weighty, it was far from being paramount, and frequent instances had occurred, in which the voice of the mass prevailed. On the other, the Ducal office, though elective, was for life, and the highest dignity to which a Venetian could aspire, was necessarily foreclosed against a large majority of their own class. It was therefore perfectly natural, where the eligible candidates were so numerous, and the chance of reaching the goal of ambition was so slight, that there should be a general wish to substitute for the existing system one, under which a fair proportion of members of the aristocracy might be admitted to a participation in the honours and privileges of the sovereignty. In fact, the First Estate was bent on shaping the constitution of their country to its real wants and interests; and they conceived that the desired object was to be approached only by consolidating the Arrengo, and by inserting certain alterations in the Coronation Oath.

It was at this conjuncture that the Doge fell by the hand of the assassin Casiolo. The crime of course raised an outcry of indignation and abhorrence among all classes and among all parties; and nowhere, perhaps, was that outcry louder than in the ranks of his own order. For the latter, to whatever extent it shared the common sympathy and sorrow, was irresistibly tempted to regard the late catastrophe from another point of view. The death of Michieli was naturally suggested to the patricians as an admirable opportunity for gaining a step at least in their favourite project of reform. Such an opportunity might not soon recur: more than one instance was known, in which there had been no vacancy of the Crown during eight-and-twenty years; and, in short, the aristocracy

procured leave, before a new Doge was appointed, to take such measures as might on mature consideration be deemed expedient for revising the Ducal Promission.

It appears highly probable, that the advocates of constitutional change had the tact to prepare the public mind for what was coming by representing in vivid colours the abuses of the present system, and by insinuating, in soft and guarded language, that while the modifications which they designed to effect were without prejudice to popular rights and liberties, they were greatly calculated to promote the general welfare. These were exoteric doctrines which doubtless it was found necessary or expedient to propagate.

The task of investigating the important subject with which the Maggiori were now busying themselves, and of submitting to the Council of the Nation the model of a new government, seems to have been intrusted to the same Tribunal, which had already sent to the scaffold the murderer Casiolo. This tribunal, the Ducal Court, which had long existed in the Republic, and was part of the original administrative system, consisted of three persons who customarily held their sittings within the ample verge of the Palace. They formed the ancient Venetian Bench, comprising in the earlier centuries civil and criminal jurisdiction; and they survived, till the want of a more elaborate machinery called into existence other courts, and put an end to the old Palace life and its feudal characteristics. But it seems to follow, as a matter of necessity, that the judges were allowed, in this particular instance, the faculty of enrolling a *Giunto* or *Zonta*.

The labours of the commission extended over a space of six months: and no steps were taken to appoint Michieli's successor till toward the first week in January, 1173.¹ During the interregnal period, and while the inquiry was pending, the safety and business of the State were confided to the Councillors of the late Doge, who thus remained in office, until his successor was appointed. It seems that this measure was designed rather to preclude the evils of anarchy and to insure the preservation of the public peace during the vacancy of the Dogate, than with any view of imparting to the Crown that attribute of perpetuity, which it has been held to

¹ Marin, iii. p. 139; Sandi, ii. p. 401.

possess under other constitutions. Elsewhere, by a politic and familiar fiction, the chief magistrate was held to be immortal; but at Venice it was the government which never died.

The labours of the Committee were finished in November or December, 1172; they resulted, as might have been foreseen perhaps in some quarters, in an entire reconstruction of the Legislature, and in the introduction of several important changes into the Executive. In the first place, the pernicious system of Universal Suffrage was abolished for ever. The Arrengo which, with the solitary exception of the consular triumvirate, might claim a higher antiquity than any other institution of the Venetians, was virtually, not formally, extinguished, at a distance of upward of 700 years from the time when it was first called into existence; and it was replaced by an Assembly, similar indeed in its objects and attributes, but materially differing in its character and principles. The whole City was now divided into six *Sestieri* or Wards: San Marco, San Polo, Santa Croce, Castello, Canal Reggio, and Dorsoduro.¹ Every Ward was required to furnish to the State two Commissioners or Deputies, recommended by their reputation and experience. Each of these persons was, in his turn, charged with the duty of sending to the capital, as the representatives of the Ward to which he belonged, forty citizens, possessing the like qualifications, four of whom might be members of his own family; and the Council of Four Hundred and Eighty, which was thus to be organised by the direct agency of twelve individuals, was to be denominated the GREAT COUNCIL, and to be recognised as the General Legislative Assembly. It has already been said that the ancient Arrengo held its periodical meetings *sub dio* for the simple reason that there was no building, secular or sacred, capable of accommodating even such as might choose to exercise their right of attendance; and there can be little or no doubt that, long after the period to which we have come, the new national parliament assembled on the Square before Saint Mark's where not only the space was more commodious, but the security might be naturally felt to be greater, so long as the members of the convention came armed, and the chief of a party or the head of a clan was not willing to have his clients and

¹ Compare Molmenti, *La vie privée à Venise*, 1882, pp. 157, 158.

serfs beyond easy reach. The transition from the sky-roofed parliament, not at Venice alone, but everywhere, to the modern palatial parliament-house was languid and slow; and long after the entrance of the world on the first mediæval epoch the customs of deliberative gatherings continued to preserve distinct traces of a civilisation as rudimentary as that of the South Saxons or of any other primitive society.

The aristocracy was aware that there was a limit to popular forbearance. It also seemed to know where that limit lay; and in a wise spirit of moderation it determined to proceed in its work no farther. Accordingly, the doors of the Legislature, which many might have wished to see shut against plebeians, were thrown open (for the present at least) to every class and section of the community; no distinctions of rank or caste ostensibly existed in favour of the nobility; merit was avowedly the sole title to admission, that the candidate was of suitable age the sole condition; and the judicious system of annual elections, by which all members lost their seats, unless and until they should be re-elected on the 29th of September in each year,¹ appeared to shew no cause why the smallest and most inconsiderable burgher should not, in his turn, be invited to form part of the Great Council. Nor indeed, although the Old Convention, in its original character as an ordinary Parliament, was now superseded, did the patricians yet venture to suggest that the people had renounced their right to be consulted on all occasions of a solemn or special nature. So often as a vacancy of the Crown might occur, or the necessity might arise of declaring war or of concluding peace, the Government was still bound to summon the three Estates of the Commune, as heretofore, from Grado to Cavarzero, to the Piazza of Saint Mark or elsewhere, in order that the sense of the nation might be collected on the point at issue. This reservation, however, as well as the nominal extension of the suffrage to the commonalty, was almost supererogatory. For, so far as the suffrage was concerned, it was practically of little moment whether any limitation in regard to eligibility was made or otherwise. In a State constituted like

¹ Sabellico, *De Venetæ urbis situ*, Venetiis, 1488; Sandi, iii. p. 401. The age subsequently fixed as a minimum for members of Council as well as for governors of provinces was five-and-twenty.

Venice, there was every probability that without pressure or compulsion the Wards would return to the Great Council a very large proportion of members of the upper class; while, on the other hand, had it been openly proposed to enact a law of civil disability against the plebeians, the latter might have taken alarm, and the consequences might have been fatal to the cause of reform.

Almost immediately after its original institution the Great Council adopted a practice, in which it was followed by all the more intricate or secret tribunals, of deliberating with closed doors.

Thus, then, was accomplished without bloodshed, almost without opposition, the first part of the constitutional revolution of 1172; and thus the people abandoned without a struggle a position which they afterward struggled in vain to recover. It would be an exaggeration to say, that from the hour on which the Great Council commenced its sittings, the commonalty ceased to exercise an influence over the Republic: yet it may be confidently affirmed that from that hour the aristocracy constituted the predominant element in the body politic.

The Commissioners next took into consideration the question of the Prerogative. The men of 697, when they instituted the Ducal Office, had designed it mainly as a curb on the lawless tyranny of the Tribunes; and during some time the Doge was regarded simply as the First Citizen and Chief Magistrate of the Commonwealth. But his powers were very loosely defined. No line was drawn beyond which he could not legally or constitutionally tread. Much was left to his own sense of honour and justice, much to the direction of chance or to the guidance of circumstances. The Republic was not exempt from that tendency which is incidental to every newly-formed society, to amalgamate the legislative and judicial functions with those of the Executive. The same authority which belonged to the Government of Rome before the institution of the Prætorship, belonged to the Government of Venice before the institution of the Privy Council (1172). Indeed, it may be questioned whether in the latter case even a greater latitude was not given or assumed; and we have seen an instance in which the Primate united the Ducal authority with his own, and

another where a Doge was installed in power at six-and-twenty.

The result might have been foreseen. This slender bound was soon overstepped. The people offered little opposition. Slight encroachments on their liberties were easily overlooked; and to acts which were beyond doubt arbitrary and unwarrantable stretches of the Ducal prerogative, they frequently extended a measure of forbearance, which could only be ascribed to phlegm or to fear. Even their occasional resistance to tyranny, marked by deeds of dark and horrid cruelty, left no deep or enduring traces behind it. It established no principle. It taught no lesson. It was perfectly true that an oath was administered to the Doge on his accession, by which he swore to rule wisely and moderately, to dispense justice with an impartial hand, and to consult, in every instance, the honour and advantage of the State. But the fact seems to have been that, what the precise nature and extent of the authority of the Doge were, few knew, or even pretended to determine. Only the origin of the office was long and gratefully identified in men's minds with a great and momentous crisis in the history of their country, when a nation, maddened by oppression, had taken refuge as a last resource at the foot of a throne: nor could they forget that in the worst event the new institution was a happy and beneficial change.

The case was at present widely different. In the process of time the Dogate had attained a degree of splendour and dignity which wholly eclipsed the original simplicity of its character, and placed the holder of that high office on a par with emperors and kings; and by slow and almost imperceptible degrees the chief magistracy had acquired, under the three successive dynasties of the Badoeri, the Sanudi, and the Orseoli, a power not less unshackled, though it might be less secure, than that which was wielded in Germany by the house of Hapsburg and in France by the house of Capet. That the Government should have a representative capable of upholding the majesty of the Republic, might be generally wished and intended; such an ingredient in the administration was not flattering to the national pride merely: it was justly considered also to be material to the integrity of the constitution and to the preservation of the balance of power. But it was clear that it

nearly concerned the public interest and welfare to delay no longer in circumscribing within narrower and more intelligible limits the vast and almost untrammelled authority which was at present vested in the Crown. The first aim was to extinguish the Tribunitial Duumviri, who had been hitherto associated with the Doge, and of whom experience abundantly proved the feebleness and futility: and in their room was instituted an Intimate or Privy Council, composed of six citizens, one of whom was to be nominated by each of the wards.¹ It was understood to be the peculiar province of these new ministers to assist and advise his Serenity in all matters pertaining to the discharge of his high and multifarious functions; without their sanction the acts of the prince were in future to be treated as void; and it was decided that the Privy Councillors should be elected on the accession of the next and of all succeeding Doges; with the reservation, however, assumed, if not prescribed, that, on the demise of the Crown the Council should sit and govern either corporately or in the person of the senior member, till a new appointment was completed.

The Republic was now provided with an Executive and a Legislature, both constructed on principles which indicated no ordinary measure of wisdom and foresight on the part of the Reformers. Still it was perfectly obvious that, from opposite causes, both were equally incapable of exercising a due and wholesome control over the affairs of the nation. As the former was too exclusive and narrow for such a purpose, so the latter was too numerous and incompact. Many questions might arise which, though not of sufficient gravity to warrant the convocation of the Great Council, were at the same time too weighty in their character and too general in their bearing to be settled by the Doge and his advisers. To meet this difficulty, it was proposed to make an annual selection from the legislative body of sixty members who, under the designation of THE SENATE, and forming, as it were, a channel of communication between the Privy and the Great Councils, might take cognisance of all such matters as it was thought unnecessary to refer to the latter tribunal. The ranks of the Senate were subsequently swollen by the accession of the *Pre-*

¹ *Repubblicæ constitutio*, p. 29 (Harl. MSS. 4743); *Historia del governo politico della Rep. di Venezia* (Egerton MSS. 18, 174).

gadi (60), *Sotto-Pregadi* (60), and other bodies of functionaries including the Doge and the Privy Councillors, until the number of Senators reached three hundred and upward. This amalgamation of councils at seasons of emergency or on extraordinary occasions, to secure a command of all available experience, was a revival of the Roman practice on an enlarged scale. It was a system of general or grand committees of which the Senate was a nucleus, to examine, hear evidence, and report (much in the same way as the corresponding body in the United States), and it seems doubtful whether its real influence was not impaired by its numerical preponderance. A Senate, even of 300 members, however, was less unwieldy than the Great Council and more responsible than the ordinary Executive. Down to the fourteenth century or later, both the number and composition of the body were therefore subject to constant variation; and the personal authority of the Doge frequently exerted itself during that time, not only in the determination of the number of the Senate, but even in the selection of the Senators.¹

The Commissioners having concluded these arrangements, which so considerably altered the composition and relations of the government, the Great Council—the work of their own hands—at once proceeded to elect a new Doge. The process by which they attained this end, though simply tentative, was sufficiently novel and curious; it seemed to exhibit greater intricacy and elaboration than might have been expected in an age when the science of government was still in its infancy. Yet the scheme was not purely Venetian or Italian, and in fact a somewhat similar one was adopted in the Oxford Parliament of 1258 for the choice of the proposed new Council of State. In the first instance, the Legislature elected by ballot thirty-four candidates, recommended by their high qualifications. The objects of its selection were next reduced by a similar process to eleven.² The latter were constituted an Electoral Conclave; an oath was administered to them, binding them to observe in the exercise of their choice the strictest impartiality; and the person in whom the suffrages of nine of their number might happen to unite, was to be considered as the successor of Michieli III. The eleven, who

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 507; Navagiero, *Storia Veneziana*, p. 967.

² *Cronaca Altinate*, p. 170.

thus owed themselves to an evolution resembling that which in *Sindibad* produced the Seven Sages, met to deliberate in the Cathedral of Saint Mark, the doors of which were thrown purposely open, in order that all suspicion might be removed from the public mind; and, in presence of a vast concourse of spectators, they declared Orio Malipiero, one of their own number and a citizen of high standing, the object of their free choice. But the Doge-designate, expressing a diffidence of his own ability to take the direction of affairs at a moment of such difficulty, declined the proffered dignity,¹ and proposed in his stead his friend and old colleague Sebastiano Ziani, a person of venerable deportment, whose eminent talents and ample fortune² better qualified him for that high and responsible station. The other members of the conclave objected not to the substitution suggested by Malipiero; his nominee was proclaimed Doge at the great altar of Saint Mark's by the Procurator; to the new and judicious formula, "*Questo e vostro doge, se vi piacera,*" the people responded with shouts and acclamations; and Ziani, having been carried by the workmen of the Arsenal (somewhat after the Frankish manner), on a wooden chair (*pergamo di legno*), round the Piazzetta, where he distributed a largesse among the bystanders, of money stamped with his own name, which had been coined for the express purpose, was, on his return to the cathedral, solemnly inaugurated (7th January 1173). At a somewhat later date the chair, it seems, known as the *pozzetto* or little well, from being deep in the seat; it was probably soon made of handsomer material.

Sebastiano Ziani was the son of Marino Ziani, of Santa Giustina, in the ward of Castello. He was born in 1102.³ In his twenty-second year (1124) he was appointed Podesta of Sebenigo. He subsequently filled the high office of Judge of the Commune, in which capacity his signature appears to various documents executed between 1151 and 1163. He was one of the principal subscribers to the loan of 1160. In 1170 he was joined with his friend Orio Malipiero on a special mission to the Byzantine Court, at the juncture when the relations between his own country and that Power were of the most precarious nature; and it is already known how narrowly both escaped the horrors of a Greek dungeon. From this time till his eleva-

¹ Diedo, lib. iv. p. 68.

² *Cronaca Altinate*, lib. v. p. 145.

³ Mutinelli, *Annali*, p. 49.

tion to the throne in 1173, the name of Ziani rarely occurs. The new Doge was equally distinguished by his wealth and his liberality. There was a curious tradition in the family, that it owed the foundation of its fortunes to the casual discovery by one of its remote ancestry, among the ruins of Altinum, of a cow of massive gold, supposed to have been dedicated to Juno, who had a temple in the city. Whatever degree of truth there was in this story, it is certain that the descendants of the legendary owner of the *Golden Cow* early acquired the reputation of being the richest family in the Republic, and at length, when it was wished to convey the idea of enormous possessions, the saying was, "Such an one has *l' haver de Ziani*."

Such was the Revolution of 1172-3, and such were the great and salutary reforms which it had the effect of introducing into the government. The people, little in the habit of thinking for themselves or of forming an independent opinion, silently acquiesced in the change.

Yet one object which, by general acknowledgment, was of vital and momentous importance to the community at large, still remained unachieved. While the organs of the aristocracy were occupied with retrenching the Ducal prerogative, and imposing limitations on the freedom of the people, the financial prospect had gradually assumed the most discouraging character. One of the leading evils attendant on the late war was the heavy call which it made on the public purse; had not private subsidies supplied the deficiencies of the fisc, it is no exaggeration to say that the war could never have been undertaken; and even under the actual circumstances it had reduced the State to the brink of insolvency. A tiresome and fruitless negotiation with the Greeks, having as its object a new commercial treaty, had commenced before the present reign. It was at length broken off in despair, and the Doge resolved, as a last resource, to knit his country more closely with Egypt and Sicily. Accordingly, in the early part of 1174, his representatives concluded with William III. of Sicily an offensive and defensive treaty for twenty years; while a third envoy, simultaneously dispatched to Egypt, prevailed upon the Caliph to grant a charter of trading privileges to the Venetian merchants.¹ The Republic could not but feel that

¹ *Cronaca Altinate*, v. 169; Marco Foscarini, *Dei viaggiatori Veneziani*; *Arch. stor. Ital.* iv.

she had somewhat compromised her dignity by her repeated endeavours to come to terms with the Byzantine Court, and she was not indisposed to avail herself of any opportunity which might occur of marking her resentment. Nor was such an opportunity long wanting.

From the outset of the war in Italy, Ancona, while it remained unshaken in its fidelity to the Court of Constantinople, had maintained, so far as regarded the affairs of the Peninsula, an attitude of strict neutrality. The sole instance in which the Anconese were led to deviate from this policy, occurred in 1163, when their town was besieged by the imperial troops under Frederic Barbarossa in person; and on that occasion they had the proud satisfaction of offering a successful resistance. From 1163 to the present time, the attention of Frederic was fully occupied by the Lombard League and the affairs of Germany; and during the whole of that period Ancona was left in the enjoyment of freedom and repose. But now a new danger threatened it. It learned, in the course of the winter of 1173, that the Archbishop of Mayence, lieutenant of Frederic, had formed a determination to spare no cost or exertion in winning for his master a position which commanded a fine harbour and a natural fortress; and it was soon understood that he counted on the co-operation of the Republic. The Venetians, in truth, were enchanted at the prospect of an enterprise which might at once afford them the means of impressing the Greek Emperor with a sense of his error,¹ and of striking a heavy blow at a place which they perhaps justly denounced as a nest of pirates, yet which, at the same time, it was notorious that they regarded with animosity rather as the seat of a flourishing and competitive trade in salt and grain. The Doge consequently entered with willingness into the suggested coalition; and on the 1st April 1174, a powerful fleet of thirty-four galleys of war, jointly commanded by his son Pietro and by Marco Giustiniani, entered the harbour of Ancona, while the forces of the Archbishop took up a strong position under the walls.² Among the vessels of the Venetian squadron was one which, from its prodigious bulk, was christened *The Whole World*. This ship served to screen its companions from the projectiles of the Anconese,

¹ Dandolo, lib. x. p. 301.

² Filiasi, *Ricerche*, p. 233.

who were struck with amazement at its huge proportions and vast strength of build.¹

The operations of the Allies were, however, indecisive; and several months passed without bringing any considerable advantage to either side. The Venetian commissariat afforded a copious supply of necessaries to the troops of the Republic, as well as to those of her confederate. The besieged soon began to sink under the pressure of want; but nothing could move their fortitude. No hardships or privations seemed to daunt their courage. In the pages of a contemporary² many proofs are preserved of the cool intrepidity and noble self-denial which the gallant citizens exhibited under conditions so trying. One young female of rank, seeing a soldier lying prostrate from exhaustion, and faint with thirst, offered him her breast, that he might not want strength to serve the good cause; but the man, seeming to feel the offer of the young matron as a reproof, started to his feet with renewed vigour, and returned to the post of duty. Neither had tasted, during some time, any other nourishment than vermin and soaked leather.³ A second, snatching a lighted brand, mounted the fortifications, and set fire to a Venetian galley which lay under the wall; and, while the garrison performed prodigies of valour on the ramparts, divers, watching their opportunity, contrived in many instances to sever the cables of the vessels, and to send them adrift. In this manner the Republic lost no fewer than seven sail. Still the Anconese were conscious that, with all their bravery and resolution, their powers of endurance could not extend beyond a certain limit; and indeed the painful conviction was slowly forcing itself upon them, that they must soon either perish or capitulate: when one night in October, they beheld from the tower of the cathedral the heights which commanded their city crowned with blazing torches. These torches heralded the approach and disguised the weakness of a small force, which was at last on its way to their relief.

Among those who admired the constancy of Ancona, and who shared its attachment to the Court of Constantinople,

¹ *Cronaca Altinate*, p. 172; *Cronaca di Marco* *Arch. stor. Ital.* viii. 260.

² Buoncompagno, *Obsidio Anconae, anno 1174*, Murat, 21; Saraceni, *Notizie della Città d' Ancona*, part ii. lib. vi. p. 125.

³ "Anconitani tantis fuerunt miseriis famis et angustiis involuti quod oportuit eos comedere musipulas murilegos solasque calcimentorum suorum."—*Cron. di Marco*, *Arch. stor. Ital.* viii. 264.

were Aldrude Frangipani, Countess of Bertinoro,¹ and Adelard de Marchesella, a wealthy gentleman of Ferrara. No sooner were these apprised of the predicament in which the besieged were, than they at once determined to render them every assistance in their power. In such a cause no sacrifice appeared to be too great. The merchant mortgaged his patrimony; the Countess pawned her jewels. Adelard raised a force of 2400 horse as well as a large body of infantry; Aldrude contributed all her vassals and dependants.² This army marched from Ferrara through Ravenna, evaded the enemy, who had taken up a strong position across the highroad, by striking into a circuitous path; and, in the course of the fourth day's march, gained the heights of Falcognara, whence at a distance of a few miles, they beheld Ancona and its magnificent harbour lying at their feet. The Ferrarese troops halted on the heights till dusk; and so soon as the shadows of night began to fall, Adelard, having extended his line over so wide a space as possible, and having directed each soldier to attach to his lance two or three torches, descended the hill at a steady pace. The signal was joyfully recognised by the watch set in the tower of the cathedral; and every other sentiment yielded, in the breasts of the besieged, to a deep and solemn emotion of gratitude toward their gallant and generous deliverers. The signal, which had wrought so powerful and profound a sensation in the city, was also observed, though misunderstood, by the Archbishop; and the latter, conjecturing from the long range and lurid glare of the beacons, that an overwhelming force was coming to the rescue, gave the order for a general retreat, and retired, without risking an engagement, into the adjoining duchy of Spoleto. At the same time, the Venetians raised the blockade of the port; and the Republic withdrew not unwillingly from a contest in which she had already spent seven months and had lost eight galleys (November 1174).

The participation of Venice in the siege of Ancona, which indicated no change in her policy and feelings, but which may be said to have proceeded partly from jealousy of a commercial rival, partly from malevolence toward the Greek Emperor, was attended, however, at least by one important and beneficial

¹ Romoaldi Salernitani contemp. *Chronicon*, Mur. vii. 214.

² Muratori, vii. pp. 11-12; Sismondi, ii. p. 205.

effect, inasmuch as it rendered Emmanuel more pliable. In April his Majesty had evinced a decided backwardness to accept the terms which were offered to him; in November he shewed himself more tractable. A treaty was concluded at his request in the early spring of 1175, by which the relations between the two Powers returned to their former footing, and by which the equivalent to be accorded to the Venetians for the losses accruing to the mercantile community from the embargo of 1171 was fixed at a million and a half of marks, payable by instalments extending over a series of years.¹

A few years before the accession of Ziani, a treaty of peace had been concluded (1170) on terms of mutual advantage between Venice and Pisa. This treaty had now either already expired, or was on the point of expiration; and some months subsequently to the temporary reconciliation between Venice and the Byzantine Court, the Pisans, finding that, their war with Genoa and other Powers absorbing their whole marine, their merchant service was left without protection, determined to have recourse once more to the Republic. After some preliminary negotiation,² a convention was ratified at Pisa on the 8th September 1175,³ by the consuls of that Power on the one hand and the Venetian ambassador on the other, by which it was stipulated, that the Pisans should purchase security for their trade and indemnity in the event of loss, with an annual tribute to the Ducal Fisc of twenty-five per cent. on the value of their commerce in the Levant. The reception of the ambassador by the magistrates and gentry of Pisa was most flattering; everywhere he was treated with the most marked attention and respect; and when he prepared to return to Venice at the end of September, he was loaded with presents.

Meanwhile, Alexander III. still wandered from court to court, and from kingdom to kingdom, a suppliant and a refugee. Some States pleaded the oath of allegiance, which bound them to Frederic, as a valid ground for refusing to afford shelter to his arch-enemy. Others, while they hesitated not to avow that their sympathies and inclinations entirely lay with him, plainly depicted the risk which they would incur, by openly and actively espousing his cause,

¹ Nicetas, *De Manuele Comneno*, lib. v. pp. 225-6.

² *Croniche di Pisa ad annos 1170-5.*

³ Tronci, *Memorie di Pisa*, p. 140; Roncioni, *Hist. Pisane*, lib. viii. p. 256; Dandolo, lib. x. p. 311.

of drawing on their heads the vengeance of the Ghibellines. Sicily indeed had shown every wish to serve his Holiness, and to promote his interests; and her King was attached to Alexander by the ties of personal friendship. But Sicily, although she could at all times offer the illustrious proscrip-
 an asylum, was precluded by her scanty resources as well as by her geographical situation from becoming the champion of the Church. In this dilemma the eyes of the Guelphs turned not unnaturally elsewhere. They began to feel that the Republic was in a better position than any other Power in Christendom to shield the Holy Father from unjust persecution, and to open the way to a reconciliation between the successor of Charlemagne and the successor of Saint Peter. She was an important member of the great Italian Commonwealth. She was equally independent of both Empires. Her site, which had once pointed her out as a city of refuge, was commanding and secure; and statecraft and priestcraft were amassing there a treasure too precious to lose. Her navy was the terror and admiration of Europe.¹ She was neither a party to the Lombard League nor an ally of the Ghibellines. Unlike Genoa and Pisa which, at an early stage of the war, had made common cause with Barbarossa, Venice continued with characteristic wariness to watch the course of events; and although she had, from the beginning, displayed a strong bias in favour of the liberal faction, she had not yet committed herself to any formal pledges. Consequently the Lagoon was still to be treated as neutral ground. To Venice therefore Alexander determined to make a last and personal appeal; and having for this purpose taken leave of the Court of Sicily late in the autumn of 1176, he arrived at Anagni, near Monte Cassino, toward the close of October. From Anagni he advanced to Benevento, which he reached on the 6th of December, and where a multiplicity of causes combined to detain him till the Epiphany, 1177. He sailed for Venice from the harbour of Goro on the Adriatic on Ash Wednesday, the 9th of March. The Papal squadron was composed of eleven galleys, which had been placed at the disposal of Alexander by the Sicilian prince; and in addition to the Count of Andria and the Archbishop of Salerno, who accompanied him as the

¹ *Cronaca Altinate*, v. 161; *Cronaca di Marco* . . . , *Arch. stor. Ital.* viii. 261.

ambassadors of William, his Holiness was attended by a retinue of five cardinals. At the time of their departure, the breeze had been exceedingly propitious; but an unfavourable change supervened, and the voyagers were driven by stress of weather so far out of their track, that they were glad to put in on Sunday, the 12th of the month, at Zara. They stayed here four days. On Thursday the 16th, the sails were once more set for the Lagoon; and on Wednesday evening, the 23rd of March,¹ the vessel which bore the Pontiff and his suite entered the port of Lido. Alexander was lodged that night in the Abbey of San Nicolo; on the following morning, a procession of the Doge, the nobles, and the clergy came to welcome his Holiness to Venice;² and so soon as he had heard divine service in Saint Mark's, and pronounced his benediction on the assembled people, the Holy Father was escorted by Ziani himself to the palace of the Patriarch of Grado at San Silvestro, which was assigned to him as a residence, so long as he might remain the guest of the Republic.

While fortune was so wayward and capricious toward Alexander, she was even less kind to his rival Barbarossa. Since the formation of the Lombard League in 1167, all the designs of that prince had been frustrated, all his hopes had been falsified. His troops had been beaten at Cassano, and repulsed at Ancona; and they were totally crushed in a battle, which took place at Legnano between Frederic and the forces of the Guelphic confederacy on the 29th of May 1176. Nothing now seemed to remain to the Emperor, save an appeal to a man whom he hated, and to a State which he affected to despise. Alexander, however, was not indisposed to treat; the Venetians, on their part, were prepared to mediate; and as an initiative the Doge dispatched Jacopo Barbolano and Filippo Orio to Naples, where his Majesty was staying, to ascertain his views, and to arrange the preliminaries. But the attempt of the embassy to establish the basis of an amicable settlement was altogether futile. The simple proposition, that he should acknowledge Alexander as the only true successor of Saint Peter, was sufficient; and

¹ *Vitæ Pontificum Romanorum*, p. 470; ap. Murat. iii.

² Gio. Villani, *Cronica*, lib. v. ch. 2, ed. 1823; Romcaldus Salernitanus contemp. *Chronicon*, ap. Mur. vii. 518.

the King gave vent to his passion in a message breathing the severest reprisal against the Pontiff and his allies. The Venetians perceived that they were now in a position from which it was impossible to draw back with honour; and they felt pledged to protect the great and unfortunate man who had taken refuge among them, and to vindicate his pretensions to their utmost power. By an extraordinary caprice of fortune, the State which of all others had shown itself most independent and intolerant of papal control, now stood forward as the great and sole guardian of the Papal cause; and the willingness of the Republic to assume this part was, of course, not entirely heroic.

Thirty-four large galleys of war were at once armed, manned, and equipped. As many patricians, who belonged to the noblest Venetian families, and among whom the Doge's son Pietro was honoured by a place,¹ were selected as their captains. Ziani himself assumed the chief command. On the other hand, Otho, son of the Emperor, had raised in his father's name at Genoa and Ancona no fewer than seventy-five sail; it was reported, that the German prince was already moving in the direction of the Lagoon; and several months must elapse before the vessels which were engaged in the merchant service, and which were lying for the most part at remote points, could be recalled.

On Thursday, the 26th of May, the Doge, having bidden farewell to the Pope at the stairs of the Piazzetta, and having been girded by Alexander himself with a sword, richly chased and mounted in gold, embarked on his barge, and ordered the signal to be given for the departure. The imperial squadron was discovered off Salboro, at a distance of seven miles from Pirano. It presented a broad and imposing front; and its vast superiority of numbers was evident to the most unpractised eye. But the Venetians were little in the habit of counting their foes; and as the wind blew from a favourable quarter, they bore down on the advancing force with their wonted impetuosity. Like all contests in which national antipathies are strengthened by party spirit and commercial rivalry, the engagement was furiously obstinate and desperately bloody; and the issue was trembling for a long time in the balance. Both sides were naturally anxious to sustain

¹ Dandolo, lib. x. pp. 301-2.

their reputation for prowess and skill. On the side of the Venetians, more particularly, there was every consideration which could nerve the arm and stimulate the courage. They felt that they were fighting in a great and holy cause, and that the most important results depended on their exertions. The destiny of Italy was in their hands for good or for evil. Under the circumstances, a reverse might be very prejudicial, a¹ victory would be unusually glorious. They were led, too, by men of high and patriotic spirit, who had a large stake in the safety and welfare of their country; and they were conscious that the eye of the Republic was upon them.

The seamen of Genoa and Ancona were animated by scarcely inferior energy and enthusiasm; and the latter were perhaps not reluctant to embrace so fair an opportunity of seeking retribution for the siege of 1174. But after a hardly-contested battle of six hours¹ the Venetians remained victorious. The rout of the German prince was complete, and his loss extremely heavy; for although two ships only foundered during the action, no fewer than forty fell into the hands of the conquerors. Otho himself was among the prisoners.² It was thought, however, inexpedient to detain him; and shortly after his arrival he was honourably dismissed, having previously afforded an assurance that he would use his offices with his father toward an accommodation. Alexander had hastened to meet his benefactor at the Piazzetta. They at once proceeded, accompanied by their retinue, to the cathedral, where they joined in thanking the Almighty for a triumph to which they had scarcely dared to aspire; and the Pontiff, turning to Ziani, offered him a ring, with these words: "Take this, my son, as a token of the true and perpetual dominion of the ocean, which thou and thy successors shall wed every year on this day of the Ascension, in order that posterity may know that the sea belongs to Venice by the right of conquest, and that she is subject to her, as a bride is to her husband." The Doge

¹ Fra Jacopo Della Citta, lieutenant of his Holiness, then in Avignon; letter to the Doge Giovanni Dolfino, 17th June 1359; Dandolo, lib. x. p. 304; and Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 312. At Salboro there is a very ancient inscription on a stone, affixed to the wall of the local church, commemorative of the visit of Alexander and of the "celestial gifts" with which he enriched the place.

² Cagnola, *Stor. di Milano, Arch. storico Italiano*, iii. 8.

accepted the symbol; and it involved political results scarcely anticipated either by the Holy See or by the Republic.

In the meantime, the influence of Prince Otho had been successfully exerted; and his father, whose spirit was completely prostrated by the result of the battle of Salboro,¹ acceded, after some hesitation, to the suggestion of a Congress. The choice of place formed the subject of a long and angry controversy. The Guelphs named Bologna, Piacenza, Ferrara, or Padua; the Ghibellines and the Emperor himself at first insisted on Pavia or Ravenna. But Alexander was tempted by the security of the Lagoon; the free Communes rejected Pavia and Ravenna, on the ground that they had too strong a bias to Barbarossa; and even the Imperialists were sufficiently candid to acknowledge that the recent excesses of the lieutenant of Frederic at Bologna rendered it impolitic to select that city. It was then that Venice was suggested. It was true that the Republic had borne not long since an active and conspicuous part in the siege of Ancona, and had so far seemed to exhibit a leaning toward the Ghibellines. But it was well known that, in coalescing with the Emperor on that occasion, the Venetians were principally actuated by commercial motives. It was ultimately settled that the Conference should meet there; and, the ambassador of Frederic having signified to the Doge the willingness and desire of his sovereign to ratify the terms of the peace in person, the Pope consented, as a peculiar mark of clemency, to re-admit his fallen rival within the pale of the Church. This important obstacle having been removed, and Frederic having accepted a guarantee of good faith on the part of the Republic, twelve citizens, including the Doge's son,² were dispatched so far as Pomposa to meet his Majesty; and the Emperor, embarking with the deputation at that port, arrived on Saturday evening, the 23rd July, at Chioggia, where a commission of three bishops was in attendance to receive his renunciation of the schism, and to absolve him formally from the papal anathema. He thence proceeded to Lido; apartments were prepared for him at the Abbey, where he passed the night;³ and on the morning of the 24th a procession, not unsimilar to that which,

¹ Gio. Villani, *Cronica*, lib. v. cap. iii., ed. 1823. ² *Cronaca Altinate*, p. 175.

³ *Epistolae Alexandri Tertii*, No. 392; *Recueil des historiens de la France*, vol. v. p. 956 *et seq.*

on a former occasion, waited on Alexander, came to escort his Majesty to Saint Mark's, in the portico of which the Pope sat in state, arrayed in his pontifical robes, and surrounded by the delegates of Sicily, France, England, and the Free Cities, and a throng of peers and cardinals, bishops and archbishops. On his right hand was placed the Doge, on his left the Patriarch of Grado.¹ It was certainly a grand and imposing spectacle, and one which was apt to raise in the breasts of the spectators many strange and conflicting emotions; and while the greater part of those present looked on such a consummation perhaps as the triumph of a great man, Alexander solemnly declared that to God alone was the glory. Casting aside his cloak, Frederic approached the papal chair, and, kneeling, kissed Alexander's foot; but the Pontiff at once assisted him to rise, and they exchanged the kiss of peace, when, according to the account given in one of his letters, Alexander offered the Emperor his right hand, and they entered the church, and advanced to the altar, together. On the following day, in compliance with the wish of his Majesty, Alexander celebrated mass in Saint Mark's, and before the commencement Frederic entered, and placed himself on the right of the Pope. He accompanied Alexander to the entrance at the conclusion, and held the stirrup of his mule, and paid, writes his Holiness, "all the honours which his predecessors had been accustomed to do to ours." A *Te Deum* closed this remarkable scene and ceremony; and Frederic and his suite were entertained and lodged for that night at the Ducal Palace.

Barbarossa proceeded through Tuscany to Genoa, while Alexander, invited by the Roman Senate, set out for the Capitol (October, 1177).² The Pontiff carried with him many rich presents, which he had received not only from his Serenity and the Republic, but from several private citizens, among whom were a few ladies.³ Evelyn, when he was at Rome in 1645-6, saw the large picture in the Vatican, painted in commemoration of this signal event, with an explanatory inscription. The work was of course long posterior to the actual time. During a temporary rupture with the Holy See

¹ *Cronaca Altinate*, v. 173.

² Four of Alexander's published letters are dated from Venice, viz., Nos. 391, 392, 393, 394.

³ *Cronaca Altinate*, v. 176.

Urban VIII caused the inscription to be erased; but it was restored by his successor.¹

As a direct consequence of the meeting, which had temporarily restored tranquillity to Northern Italy, a peace of fifteen years was concluded between Sicily and the Empire, and between the Empire and the League a six years' truce, which again, by virtue of a second convention ratified by Frederic at Constance on the 23rd of June 1183, resolved itself, on the expiration of that period, into a definitive treaty. Nor did Ziani, on his part, omit to procure at the same time the formal renewal of the mercantile charter of 1154, which had lain in a certain measure dormant, since the Republic openly announced her determination to espouse the cause of the Guelphs, and to support the pontifical pretensions.

The Doge had now attained his seventy-fifth year. Forewarned of his approaching end, he abdicated on the 12th April 1178, and withdrew into the abbey of San Giorgio Maggiore.² To the Armenian Company of Merchants at Venice he left by will one of the houses which he owned in the street of San Giuliano;³ and in conformity with the purest precepts of humanity, he placed in the hands of Reniero Zane, Procurator of Saint Mark, a considerable sum, the interest of which was to be distributed annually in alms to the poor, and in special allowances to prisoners of war.

Moreover, in the course of his memorable reign, the late Doge, emulating the example of his predecessors, had bestowed a considerable share of attention on the improvement of the architecture of the metropolis; the Piazza, in particular, was rendered more spacious and picturesque by the demolition of many buildings which were falling to decay or which were inconveniently situated; and bridges of more elegant and elaborate construction were thrown by him across the Canals. There is a legend that the Doge, having undertaken, at his private cost, to embellish and enlarge Saint Mark's and the Rialto, expressed a wish to remove for that purpose the old church of San Geminiano. Before he carried out his project, however, his Serenity thought fit to consult the Court of the Vatican, and the Pope returned answer that, although the

¹ *Diary*, ed. 1862, i. 144.

² *Cronaca Altinate*, p. 170; Dandolo, lib. x. p. 308.

³ Filiasi, *Ricerche storiche*, p. 137. The rest were bequeathed to his second son Jacopo.

Apostolic See could not give its sanction to the commission of a sacrilegious act, it might extend its indulgence to that act when it had been committed. This ambiguous rescript was accounted sufficient warrant. The Church of Saint Geminian, founded in the sixth century by the lieutenant of Justinian, upon an open space known in those times as the *Brolio* or *Bruollo*, and forming a portion of the abbey grounds of San Zaccaria, was immediately razed with the soil; and, the site, as well as the surrounding land, having been already purchased by Ziani of the Sisters of San Zaccaria, the old Canal of Batario, which then divided the Brolio into two parts, was drained and levelled at the expense of the new proprietor. The removal of the church gave rise to a remarkable custom. On a certain day in each succeeding year, the Doge performed a whimsical penance for the transgression of which Ziani had been guilty, by repairing with a numerous and brilliant retinue to the Square of Saint Mark, where he was met by the *piovano*. "Sir," said the latter, "I wish to know when your Serenity will be pleased to restore my church on its former site?" The Doge, thus challenged, gave a piece of money to buy lime and sand for the purpose, or, according to another account, replied, "Next year." The will of Ziani reflected the munificence and piety of the merchant-prince of his day. Its provisions were full of thought for the poor of his own land and the prisoner; and one of the clauses gave certain hereditaments to the monastery of San Giorgio to maintain a lighted lamp in honour of St. Stephen over the premises with a collateral view to the public convenience and safety. But an immense sum, according to certain authorities, was made applicable to the completion of the Basilica, and, if so, the estate of the testator was presumably charged with the gradual payment.

On his return from Greece in 1172, the Doge Michieli III. brought with him, among other prizes, three lofty monoliths of red granite, which it is generally believed he had taken from Scio during his cruise in the Mediterranean. One of these relics fell overboard during the process of disembarkation, and has not hitherto been recovered. The other two remained untouched till Nicolo, a Lombard engineer, who had the superintendence of the late works of improvement, signified his ability to raise them on the Piazzetta. His offer was

accepted; and the Government of that day, anxious to shew their full and grateful recognition of his services, is alleged to have asked him to name his reward. Nicolo, premising that games of chance had been heretofore severely interdicted at Venice, insinuated that the grant of a monopoly in his favour to keep the space between the two granite pillars for the purpose of playing at tables would be considered by him an ample requital for any services which he might have rendered. The Government, however, by way of compromise, ordered that all malefactors and assassins who had been condemned to capital punishment, should be executed thenceforth between the Red Columns.¹ The privilege did not necessarily survive the original grantee; but the columns continued to the end to fulfil their office. The whole story, so far as the gaming-tables are concerned, has an apocryphal air, for backgammon (if that is what is intended) was always tolerated at Venice even in mediæval times, and was scarcely likely to form the basis of a monopoly or the source of a scandal; yet the surname Barattiero bestowed on the person concerned has an eponymous complexion in ulterior association with some such incident.

The reign of Sebastiano Ziani presented, in an unusually small compass, a far wider range of subjects for historical painting than any which had gone before it; and among the decorations of the Sala dello Scrutinio the romantic events, which immediately preceded and followed the coming of Alexander III. to Venice in 1177, were admitted by the Government of a later day to a deservedly conspicuous place; and the Venetians, after a long lapse of years, beheld their favourite old legends about Salboro and the Pontiff Priest of San Nicolo embodied in living colour by the hand of a Tintoretto or a Bellini. Time has transmitted even portions of the personal accoutrements of the Doge, including his breastplate and his sword with its sheath.²

It had been observed that the plan by which the nomination of the Doge had been vested in the hands of eleven citizens was simply designed as an experiment; and, after a single trial, it appeared to be viewed with general dissatisfaction as being at once too exclusive and too open to corruption. It was therefore determined that the system should be again

¹ Pietro Giustiniani, lib. ii. p. 32.

² Molmenti, i. 330.

altered; and it must be owned that the new scheme was infinitely more judicious. Four commissioners, "honest and God-fearing laymen,"¹ were now chosen, in the first instance out of the whole legislative body; each of these commissioners made, at his own discretion, a nomination of ten persons, whom he might consider competent to discharge the duties of electors; and this conclave of forty members,² who might be presumed to be perfectly capable of forming a sound and impartial judgment on the point to be submitted to them, were empowered to elect the individual who might obtain the suffrages of twenty-one or more of their number the successor of Ziani. The forty occupied a period of three days in arriving at a decision; that decision was found to be in favour of Orio Malipiero, the same who had, in 1173, declined the berretta on the plea of unworthiness.

Lampridius, first Archbishop of Zara, having died in 1179, Eugubinus was chosen in his room; and by a papal Bull published some years before, his see having been made archiepiscopal only on the understanding that it should become suffragan to the metropolitane of Grado, the new prelate was required, on his election, to take the prescribed oath. Nor was Eugubinus personally indisposed to comply. But his wishes were overruled by the people, who hated a foreign domination, and who had strongly opposed the conditional investiture of Lampridius with the pallium. The Zaratines peremptorily refused to place their Church under the spiritual jurisdiction of Venice. At the same time they hastened to shield themselves from the certain vengeance of the Republic by accepting the powerful protection of the King of Hungary. Bela III., who had succeeded his brother Stephen in 1173, lent a willing ear to their pressing solicitations; Zara was victualled and garrisoned at his expense; and a large Hungarian force was dispatched to Dalmatia to keep in check any troops which the Venetians might employ in an attempt to recover the place.³ The Zaratines and their ally, however, were led for some time to imagine that they had formed too high an estimate of the public spirit of Venice. The latter, again hampered by financial embarrassments, long continued to

¹ *Cronaca Altinate*, v. 183. "Quatuor honesti laici, et Deum timentes."

² *Cronaca Altinate*, v. 183; Dandolo, lib. x. p. 308.

³ Dandolo, lib. x. p. 311; Bonifinius, *Res Ungaricæ*, dec. ii. lib. vii. p. 278.

retain a passive attitude; and it was only in 1187 that the necessity for doing something decisive was allowed. It seems likely that in this case certain shipowners had come* to the Executive with an offer of vessels; ¹ for on the 7th June 1187 a contract was ratified by which these persons were guaranteed adequate indemnity in the event of damage or loss. But as no mention of hire or remuneration is made in the bond, the conclusion is obvious that the service was one which the old fiscal system exacted from shipowners as a contribution in kind to the revenue in lieu of ship-money. A scheme was, at the same time, approved for raising a fresh loan for the payment of the crews and troops and other expenses; and the subscribers were informed that they would receive, as a security, a mortgage for a term of twelve years on the profits of the Salt-Office and on the annual tribute of 400 *lire de piccoli*, with which the House of Morosini in 1185 purchased in fief the islands of Ossero and Cherso.² The amount realised was 16,360 *lire*. The Ziani contributed toward the loan no less than 1116 *lire*; the Caravelli, 900; the Falieri, 620; the Michieli, 350; the Venieri, 200; the Dandoli, 150; the Memi, 250; the Donati, 250; the Contarini, 200—a total by nine families of 3946 *lire*.

With this seasonable aid, the Executive at once prepared to launch into war; and a fleet, under the personal orders of Malipiero, left Venice for Dalmatia toward the close of November. The siege of Zara, however, which had been so long deferred, and for which it had been thought worth while to add to the public debt, proved in the event a total failure. But it was a failure, which could hardly be said to reflect discredit on the Doge. Even before the united efforts of her inhabitants and the Hungarian engineers rendered her almost impregnable, Zara had been accounted the strongest fortress in the Venetian territories. Her garrison, which was largely composed of royal troops, was numerous, well armed, and well disciplined; the stupendous altitude of her towers and the massive thickness of her ramparts seemed to defy every engine which could be brought against them; and the occupation of her suburbs and environs by the forces of Bela, while it pre-

¹ Romanin, ii. 421, where the contract between the proprietors and the Government is printed textually.

² Saudo, *Vite*, p. 524.

cluded his Serenity from creating a diversion, or from extending his line of operations, afforded the besieged the means of procuring a copious supply of stores and provisions. At the same time, the repeated attempts of the besiegers to gain an entrance into the place were not unattended by much bloodshed and severe loss of life; and, late in the autumn of 1188, Malipiero decided on withdrawing from a contest so inglorious and so unprofitable. The ostensible motive was an anxiety to participate in a new expedition which was contemplated to the Holy Land.

The successes of the Emir Saladin had now long been deemed a scandal to Christendom; the whole of Palestine was overrun by the misbelievers; and the Apostolic See, never weary of preaching a cause of which it was the great spiritual exponent, began, in the closing years of the twelfth century, to exhort the princes of Europe to join in a fresh crusade. The exertions of his Holiness were not without their fruits. France, England, Austria, Saxony, and Hungary promised to form armies; Venice, Genoa, Pisa, Ancona, and other maritime States, agreed to furnish transports, provisions, and naval armaments. But the re-establishment of peace was material to success. England was at war with France; Venice was at war with Hungary; and the first care of Clement III. was therefore to propose a reconciliation between Richard Lion-Heart and Philip Augustus, and a truce, at least, between Bela and the Republic. In both instances his intercession was effectual. In the autumn of 1188, Malipiero raised the siege of Zara; the remainder of that year was consumed by preparations for the new campaign in the East, and a precaution which had been thought superfluous during the Hungarian war, was taken preparatory to a more distant enterprise, in the recall of all the mercantile caravans and of all vessels stationed abroad.¹ The execution of this measure, which was probably designed with a view to the formation of a naval reserve, involved considerable delay; and it was not till the summer of 1189 that the fleet commanded by the Doge in person, left its moorings. Near the mouth of the Gulf of Adria, Malipiero effected a junction with a Pisan armament, bound for the same destination.

The siege of Saint Jean d'Acre, to which the confederates

¹ Dandolo, lib. x. p. 313; Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 527.

had directed their efforts, was formed on the 28th of August 1189, the day of Saint Augustin; the troops of Guy de Lusignan, King of Jerusalem, invested the place by land, while the allied forces of the Pisans and Venetians afforded maritime succour. Yet, although the besiegers far surpassed the besieged in resources and numerical strength, Acre was resolutely held against them till August 1191; and, had not Saladin been precluded by unforeseen causes from rendering it the promised relief, it is probable that the Christians would never have set foot in the town. Their tardy and inglorious success was dearly bought; in the course of the operations, which had extended over a period of two years, nearly 60,000 pilgrims perished by hunger, pestilence, and the sword;¹ and, while the commercial world at Venice were delighted to recover their Quarter and their trading privileges, the Republic had reason to lament the loss of many of her children, who had fallen before those walls.

About the year 1188 a momentary breach occurred between Venice and Ferrara respecting the right of dominion over the Loredan. The point of difference was, by mutual consent, submitted to arbitration, and the award was in favour of the Republic.²

The Doge Malipiero abdicated in 1191, and on the 1st January 1191-2 Enrico or Arrigo Dandolo came into office as his successor. Dandolo had been one of the arbitrators in the Ferrarese business, and he had been sent, several years before (1170), on a diplomatic mission to Constantinople touching the affairs of the Republic in the Lower Empire. He was already very far advanced in years, and under ordinary circumstances it might have seemed that his great age barely afforded a probability of the due discharge of the arduous functions which belonged to the ducal office. Yet his eminent talents, and the high character which he bore for prudence and sagacity, raised him far above all other competitors, and appeared almost to keep every other consideration out of view. The countenance of Dandolo was slightly disfigured by an injury which the visual nerve had sustained from a casualty in earlier life; but in other respects the hardy veteran preserved, in an unusual degree, the fire and vigour of mature manhood.

¹ Michaud, ii. lib. viii.

² P. Giustiniani, *Chronica di Venetia*, p. 58 (King's MSS. 148).

Shortly after the accession of Dandolo a serious difference with Verona on the subject of certain piracies and depredations to which Venetian traders had been lately exposed, led, in consequence of the high ground taken by the Republic, to the conclusion of an advantageous treaty, by which the offenders agreed to pay a heavy indemnity, and to refrain in future from molesting the commerce of the Republic on the Adige. Moreover, the Veronese engaged to draw their entire supply of salt from the Venetian market, and to reduce the import duty on Venetian goods.

The close of the truce with Bela, which had merely embraced a term of two years (1188-90), was followed by a second ineffectual essay to reduce Zara to submission. The Zaratines and their ally had the satisfaction of seeing the Republic once more retire, baffled, through imperfect arrangements or appliances, in her effort to regain possession of that unique stronghold. But the design was postponed only to a better opportunity.

A still graver difficulty had arisen in another quarter to assist in diverting the thoughts of Venice, for the moment, from the Dalmatian question. The peace which had been concluded, in September 1175, between Venice and Pisa, did not expire till September 1185; in the following year the Third Crusade was published; and that disastrous undertaking unavoidably prolonged the alliance till August 1191. In the early part of 1192, however, and shortly after the return of the Pilgrims to Europe, a Pisan squadron sailed up the Gulf, and entered into occupation of Pola. The Government hastened to concert strong measures for the recovery of the fief; but the enemy eluded an engagement, and peaceably evacuating the port, abandoned the enterprise; and the Venetian commanders, having wrung a fresh oath of fidelity from Pola, and razed a portion of the battlements, pursued their course along the Mediterranean, until they reached Modon¹ in the Morea, off which they captured three² richly-laden Pisan argosies. This seizure was well calculated to foment and embitter the international animosity; and a war was again imminent, when the Holy See interposed its authority, and

¹ At Abydos the Venetian commanders were forced to contract a loan, which was subscribed by all the captains of galleys, by the two commanders, and by others. Romanin, ii. *Documenti*.

² Da Canale, sect. 55.

prevailed on the two Governments to consent to a cessation of hostilities. The wound, however, was ill closed; it broke out afresh a few years later, the proximate point of difference being the free navigation of the Adriatic, which Venice refused to admit; and on this occasion the Pisans leagued themselves with the opulent and powerful city of Brindisi. But the Allies were totally defeated in an engagement near the mouth of the Gulf in 1201; and the Venetian commanders directed their course after the action toward Brindisi,¹ which was forced to expiate severely the part which it had borne without any adequate provocation against the Republic.

On the decease of Celestin III. in 1197 the Electoral College named as his successor Innocent III. The energetic and ambitious character of Innocent, who was only in his thirty-seventh year, naturally led men to augur a speedy arrival of that grand struggle which had resulted, twenty years before, in the triumph of the Church over the State. They even foretold that the future of Innocent would be more prosperous than that of the illustrious Alexander. In fact, during the opening years of his reign the new Vicar bent to his will the princes who wore the crowns of England, France, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Arragon, and Castile; and the Lombard cities, while they asserted and maintained the municipal rights for which they had fought so well, were content to acknowledge the spiritual supremacy of the Apostolic See.² The only two Powers which seemed disposed to demur were the Republics of Venice and Pisa, the former of which was at present guided by a man whose strong sense, high moral courage, and inflexible firmness of purpose promised to render him a formidable opponent of the Court of the Vatican.

Toward the close of the twelfth century the situation of the Christians in the Holy Land was perilous and deplorable in an extreme degree. Nearly the whole of Palestine had been gradually recovered by the Saracens who, by their martial prowess, their equestrian skill, and their numerical superiority, easily overpowered the resistance of the Crusaders. The latter, whose ranks had been thinned by slaughter, want, and disease, were in the last stage of distress. In spite of the

¹ Dandolo, lib. x. p. 317; Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 427; Paolo Morosini, lib. v. p. 132,

² Sismondi, *Rep. Ital.* ch. iii. p. 85.

urgent and reiterated appeals of the Kings of Jerusalem and Armenia, the Patriarchs of Antioch and the Holy City, and the Bishops of Syria, no reinforcements arrived from Europe. It was probable that they would now arrive too late: for the holy places were already within the grasp of the misbelievers. The unphilosophical ardour of Christendom was not unnaturally chilled by the terrible reverses which the pilgrims had suffered on the plains of Ascalon, before the walls of Acre, and in the valley of the Jordan. All these enterprises had proved abortive. The Second Crusade owed its organisation to the energetic support at a Church Council in 1146 of the Abbot of Clairvaux, the Mellifluous Doctor, whom we know as St. Bernard, yet it was not only barren of fruit, but involved the loss of Jerusalem. The Third was remembered as one of the most calamitous and ill-concerted undertakings on record; the Fourth was a total failure; and the present state of Europe was, in many respects, unfavourable to the organisation of a new expedition. England was at war with France. France was at variance with Denmark. Hungary was divided against itself. Henry VI. of Germany was dead, and his son Frederic was yet a child.

But the Pontiff and his agents were not to be deterred by any obstacles. Their zeal and energy surmounted every difficulty. Innocent himself wrote an encyclical letter to the rulers of the Christian commonwealth, painting in strong colours the extremity in which their brethren were placed, and demanding, in language which admitted no refusal, their prompt co-operation in affording the sufferers aid and relief. Foulques, Curé of Neuilly-sur-Marne, instilled, by his simple but glowing eloquence, worthy of the Abbot of Clairvaux, a spirit of fervid and fierce enthusiasm into the warriors of France, Flanders, Burgundy, Navarre, Blois, Chartres, and Champagne. Martin Litz, a Cistercian, preached the Crusade in the diocese of Bâle and on the banks of the Rhine. Heloin, a monk of Saint-Denis, traversed the savage provinces of Brittany and Poitou; and Eustace, Abbot of Flay, crossing the Channel, appealed to the courage and piety of England. Peter of Capua, Cardinal-legate, endeavoured to effect a reconciliation between Richard Lion-Heart and Philip Augustus; and all Frenchmen who should undertake the pilgrimage were emancipated from the interdict under which

their king and country had lain since the divorce of the former from his wife, the daughter of the King of Denmark. At the same time every pretext for refusal, every obstacle to compliance, was removed. All Christian governments were enjoined to abstain from imposing restrictions, such as the payment of tithes or the performance of feudal service, on any persons who might shew a disposition to take the Cross. A papal indulgence was published, tempting recruits with the hope of absolution. The Church contributed to the cost of the enterprise a fortieth part of its revenues. Innocent melted his vases and dishes of gold and silver, and contented himself with a plain dinner-service of wood and hardware.

The oratory of Foulques of Neuilly was everywhere triumphant. Thousands flocked to his standard. The streets of Paris, the banks of the Marne, and the plains of Champagne were deserted. Doctors left their patients. Lovers forsook their mistresses. The usurer crept from his hoard. The thief emerged from his hiding-place. All joined the holy phalanx. The joust and the tournay, the love of ladies, the guerdon of valour, were alike forgotten in the general excitement and in the bellicose vehemence of a senseless desire to arrest the current of Mohammedan invasion. In the extremity of their holy fervour, the Crusaders were proposing to themselves the task of protecting or recovering from men who happened to be of a different creed certain monuments of the Christian heresy in Judæa, and they thus unconsciously ignored the very titles by which nine-tenths of them held their own lands at home—the right of conquest and the law of possession. Some of them even parted with their title-deeds to obtain the means of transit and equipment, and thus unconsciously dealt the first blow to the ancient system of land-tenure in Western Europe. Nor do accounts reach us of any of these adventurers being overtaken by conscientious misgivings as to the righteousness of the cause, unless the traditional story of the good Lancashire knight, Sir Hugh le Biron, is to be interpreted in such a sense.

In a short time the flower of French chivalry, from Boulogne to the Pyrenees, assembled under the banners of Theobald,¹ Count of Champagne, and his cousin Louis, Count

¹ Marino Sanudo Torsello, lib. iii. part xi. c. 1.

of Blois and Chartres. The example of those noble youths¹ was readily followed by Baldwin, Count of Flanders and Hainault, and his brother Henry, both of whom took the Cross at Bruges; by Hugh, Count of Saint Pol; Geoffroi de Villehardouin, Marshal, and Geoffroi de Joinville, Seneschal, of Champagne; Matthieu de Montmorenci, Everard de Montaigne, Simon de Montfort, John and Walter de Brienne, Conon de Béthune, Renaud de Montmirail, the Bishops of Soissons, Troyes, and Langres, and an innumerable throng of barons and knights.²

In Germany the exertions of Litz, though attended by a less brilliant result, were far from unsuccessful; and among those whom that zealous missionary proselytised were counted the Dukes of Saxony, Bavaria, and Brabant, the Landgraf of Thuringen, the Margraves of Brandenburg and Moravia, the Count Palatine of the Rhine, the Counts of Pappenheim and Hapsburg, and the Bishops of Bremen, Würzburg, Ratisbon, and Halberstadt.³ The country in which the emissaries of the Holy See met with the coldest reception was England; two Englishmen of note only participated in the expedition. On the whole, this great religious movement owed its chief initiative and maintenance to the Latin race, and the last notes of mediæval ardour for such Quixotic enterprises died away on French soil.

The outline of the new enterprise, the distribution of the troops and their destination, were arranged in two General Councils, the former of which was held at Soissons, in the valley of the Aisne, and the latter at Compiègne, on the banks of the Oise; and in consequence of the disasters of the earlier Crusaders, who traversed on foot the solitary and dangerous provinces of Dalmatia, Germany, and Hungary, it was decided that a negotiation for an adequate supply of ships and stores should be at once opened with the Republic. The Council of Compiègne named accordingly six delegates, of whom Geoffroi de Villehardouin and Miles de Brabant were appointed to act in the name of the Count of Champagne, Conon de Béthune and Alard Maqueraux in that of the Count of Flanders, and Jean de Friaise and Gauthier de Gondonville in that of

¹ Theobald was twenty-two, his cousin twenty-seven, years of age; both were connected by marriage with the royal families of France and England.

² Villehardouin, *Conquête de Constantinople*, p. 2 *et seq.*—*Société de l'Histoire de France*, 1838; *Vitæ Pontificum*, Murat. iii. 526.

³ Michaud, v. p. 15.

the Count of Blois and Chartres, the three principal members of the Crusade; and the embassy, having been furnished with full powers to treat, set out forthwith for Venice, which they reached in the middle of February 1201.

The Doge, having first expressed his satisfaction at such an illustrious visit, desired to be acquainted with the object of their journey. Villehardouin explained the weighty business which had brought them to Venice. "Sir," concluded the Marshal, "we pray you to convene your Council, before which we will lay the message of our lords—to-morrow, should you be willing." Dandolo, however, begged a space of three days, in order that he might revolve the question in his own mind, and take the opinion of his Privy Council upon it; and the plenipotentiaries readily acquiesced in this brief delay, and lodged at the Ducal Palace.

On the 19th February the Great Council was convoked; and after mass, the Marshal of Champagne rose from his seat, and, addressing the Doge, said: "Sir, we have come hither on behalf of the Barons of France, who have taken the sign of the Cross to avenge the dishonour of Jesus Christ and to conquer Jerusalem, if it be the will of the Lord; and inasmuch as they know full well that no nation is so potent on the seas as is yours, they do implore you to consider how they may have ships wherewith to accomplish their pilgrimage." So soon as Villehardouin had finished his address, his Serenity informed him that the Republic would entertain their message, and that in eight days he would make known to them the conditions on which she would be prepared to meet their wishes.

In due course the Doge submitted the draft of a contract. On the one hand, the Venetians engaged to furnish, and maintain afloat, for a period of twelve months, dating from the day of departure, vessels adequate to the transport of 4500 knights, 9000 esquires, 20,000 *sergents* or foot-soldiers, and 4500 horses; to provide both men and beasts with all the means of subsistence for nine months, similarly reckoned; and to equip at their own cost fifty armed galleys, for the service of God and the pilgrims. On the other hand, the Barons were required to pay to the Ducal Fisc, within two months or prior to their departure, the stipulated sum; to divide in equal proportions with the Venetians any conquests

either by land or by sea which they might make conjointly hereafter; and to enter into no contracts for supplies with Cremona, Imola, Faenza, or Bologna, without the full consent of the Republic. The terms were accepted; and the contract, as well as the proposition generally, was submitted for final approval to the National Convention. The strangers were invited to be present; and the zealous Marshal, deeply interested in the result of the mission, was again spokesman: "My Lords," said he, addressing the people, "the most high and puissant Barons of France have deputed us unto you, to beseech you to have compassion on the City of Jerusalem, which has fallen into the hands of the infidels, and to accompany us to avenge the shame of Jesus Christ. And they have more especially chosen you in this matter, since they know that you are the mightiest nation on the sea that is, and us have they bidden to throw ourselves at your feet, and not to rise until you shall have granted our request." Thereupon, Villehardouin and his companions knelt, weeping profusely; and the people, strongly affected by their tears, lifted up their hands with one accord, and shouted, "We agree, we agree."

The contract was subsequently approved; the Doge, when the Count of Flanders on his part pledged the goods of all his subjects as a guarantee for his quota, sank on his knees, and swore on the Gospel to abide by the terms of the agreement; and the representatives of Theobald, having borrowed on acceptable security of a Venetian banker 2000 gold pieces,¹ which they placed as a surety or instalment in the hands of the Doge, returned by Mont Cenis to Champagne, to acquaint the Count with their success. At the same time, while the instrument was sent to Rome to receive the sanction of Innocent, Conon de Béthune and Alard Maqueraux repaired to Genoa, and the two remaining deputies to Pisa, to solicit those Powers to aid the holy undertaking.² The Republic on her part hastened to make her preparations. They were upon such an unusually large scale that supernumerary operatives were hired by the Masters of the Arsenal; and it is said that, the small coins current in the Dogado being

¹ Not of Venetian money, for the Republic had not yet any gold currency. But, no doubt, foreign gold was to be found among the houses of business and exchange. It could hardly have been anything but Byzantine specie at that time.

² Villehardouin, lib. i. p. 10. Both missions were unsuccessful.

found inadequate, a new piece of fine silver was issued by the Mint for the pay of the workmen. This was the *grosso*, the equivalent of the French *gros* and the English groat, but anterior to both.¹

Meanwhile, the envoys who had gone in quest of the Count of Champagne, found Theobald at Troyes, stretched upon a bed of sickness. The feverish impatience of youth deceived the patient, and aggravated the malady; his recovery soon became hopeless; and those who surrounded his death-bed had too speedily cause to deplore his early fate. The valour and enthusiasm of Theobald were inherited by the warlike peasantry of Champagne; but the command of the French and Flemish troops, with which it had been decided that he should be entrusted, was now vacant; and the deputies, who appear to have been clothed with a general power to act in the name of the whole Confederacy, proceeded at once to elect a new chief. With this object, overtures were successively made to the Duke of Burgundy and the Count of Bar; but neither of these noblemen was prepared to take on himself so grave a responsibility, both alleging their unworthiness and incompetence. At the same time, they united in suggesting an appeal to the Marquis Boniface of Monteferrato, a man recommended by his high connections, his gallant and soldier-like bearing, his gentle and amiable character, and his popularity among the troops. The suggestion was readily embraced; and a messenger was dispatched to acquaint Boniface with the wishes of the pilgrims, and to solicit his attendance at Soissons, where he was informed that the leading members of the Crusade had already assembled in council. The Marquis accepted the invitation and the trust; Foulques of Neuilly and the local bishop administered to him the customary oath, while they adjusted to his shoulder the emblematic cross; and the new generalissimo, having engaged to join the army at Venice on or before the 22nd June 1202, returned to Italy, to take leave of his family, and to arrange his private concerns.

From the opening of 1202, the Crusaders began to converge from every point of the Peninsula and Continent towards Venice; the stream flowed steadily onward during the spring; and in the early part of the summer a large number

¹ Da Canale, sect. 36; Dandolo, lib. x. p. 315.

of men had congregated at Lido, which was set apart by the Government for the purposes of a temporary camp. Barracks were erected for the troops, stables for the horses, store-houses for the fodder and other necessaries. Provisions of every kind were in abundance; the pilgrims were supplied at a moderate rate; and the Islanders left nothing undone which might render the gigantic contract complete. In the number of those who had arrived, and who impatiently awaited the hour of departure, were the Count of Flanders, the Count of Blois, the Count of Perche, and the Count of Saint Pol, with their followers: Martin Litz and the Bishop of Halberstadt, with the pilgrims from the banks of the Rhine, the Meuse, and the Elbe. But the Marquis Boniface, General-in-chief, and his Italian volunteers were still absent; while several thousands who had taken the Cross were reported to have violated their oath, and to have embarked from the ports of France, Lombardy, and Belgium. Among others, Renaud de Dampierre, to whom Theobald of Champagne had bequeathed a large portion of his property, with the command of his troops, broke his vow, and started for the Holy Land from Bari; it was said that a considerable body of Flemings had recently sailed from Bruges; and many, after swearing on the Evangelists to repair to Venice within the stipulated period, employed the transports of Genoa and Marseilles. These defections involved the most serious consequences. The 30th of April, the day fixed for the final ratification of the treaty, had long passed; the 22nd of June, that appointed for the departure of the fleet, was close at hand. Of the amount payable to the Ducal Fisc, 53,000 marks only were forthcoming; those who had duly arrived and were anxious to depart at the stated time, though able to contribute their own shares, were not for the most part in a position to supply the deficiency; and, in strictness, even the sum already advanced which Monteferrato and the other leaders of the Crusade had partly raised on the security of their own jewels and plate, was liable to confiscation in default of the balance.

The situation of the pilgrims grew every day more deplorable; and every day it seemed to grow more unlikely that they would be able to save from forfeiture the money which was in the hands of the Government by satisfying the

terms of the bond. For the troops, enervated by idleness, gradually indulged in every species of licence; gaming and drinking prevailed among them to an inordinate extent; and the French and Germans, more especially, finding it hard to withstand the allurements which were thrown in their way by the Venetian shopkeepers, squandered their slender means in costly trifles. The consequence was that the camp of Lido often became the scene of nocturnal brawls and drunken affrays; and these, again, repeatedly terminated in an open rupture and an extensive desertion. Nor were this laxity of discipline and this refractory spirit confined to a particular section or division of the army; they pervaded every rank; they were common, in a greater or less degree, to every class; and even the more reasonable, when they perceived that the delay occasioned by the perfidy of their confederates was obliging them to apply their surplus to the liquidation of their current expenses, soon began to afford unequivocal symptoms of impatience.

The Barons, placed in such an unforeseen dilemma, found relief in a quarter where they perhaps thought that they were little entitled to expect it. The solicitude which Monteferrato and his compeers had shown to fulfil their engagements, the personal sacrifices which they had made to that object, did not escape the eye of Dandolo; the latter was touched by so strong an evidence of devotion on their part; and he determined, if it was practicable, to devise some solution of the difficulty. Naturally of a kind and generous disposition, ardent, high-spirited, patriotic, nor wholly a stranger himself to the pious enthusiasm which he admired and appreciated in others, the Doge bore in mind, nevertheless, that it was incumbent on him, as the sovereign of a commercial people, to act with circumspection and reserve. It might have been the private inclination of Dandolo to reward the noble disinterestedness of the chiefs of the Crusade by consulting their wishes unconditionally; but he felt that, in his public capacity, he could do no more than reconcile, so far as possible, conflicting interests. On the one hand, it was not to be denied that the payment of the residue ought to be secured beyond risk; but, on the other, it was to be considered that every preparation was complete for the departure; the pilgrims were anxious to start; and the temper of the troops

rendered it expedient to raise the camp at the earliest moment.

Under these circumstances the Doge submitted to the Great Council that a compromise should be accepted. The fleet, he said, was ready to sail. There was no ground of complaint against his country; for the latter had more than acquitted itself of its engagements. But it was clear that the Barons were not in a position to discharge their obligations. He granted that it might be the interest of a trading community to enforce the strict observance of the treaty; but he was of opinion, that it became a great country to entertain more liberal counsels. It was true that they might confiscate a very large sum of money; but he conjured them to remember that the eye of Europe and Christendom was upon them; the national honour was at stake; and surely, instead of casting a reproach on the Venetian name, it would be better to impose some task on the Pilgrims which, while it in no way affected the eventful liquidation of the debt, would, he thought, be highly advantageous to the Republic. The Doge concluded by suggesting, that the concurrence of the Barons in the recovery of Zara, which was held by the King of Hungary, should be announced to them as the sole condition on which the Republic could consent to suspend the confiscation of the money advanced, and to defer the payment of the rest. "For," said his Serenity, "unless these people help us in the matter, I fear much that we shall lose the place altogether." This fair and sensible proposition met with general approval; the opposition of the larger contractors and more cautious traders was overruled; and when the Cardinal-legate, Peter of Capua, who was then at Venice in the quality of Nuncio, ventured to inveigh against the new project as a wicked and nefarious attack on the King of Hungary, a Christian and a Crusader, Dandolo contented himself with remarking, that the Pontiff his master had no right, nor could he harbour any wish, to shield a rebellious subject; moreover, that if his Eminence contemplated joining the present expedition as a preacher of the Cross, it was well: but otherwise, that they were in no want of leaders or advisers, and that he could not be received in his capacity as Papal Legate. Peter, not a little startled at this intimation, took his leave somewhat abruptly; and the Chiefs of the Crusade, on

their part, readily embraced an offer which afforded them the hope of discharging their incumbrances from the spoils of the opulent city of Zara.

While the command-in-chief of the Army of the Coalition had been intrusted, at an early stage, to the Marquis Boniface, the naval forces of the Republic still remained without a leader. There were in Venice many men of noble birth and of eminent abilities qualified for that high position, who had fought under Ziani at Salboro and under his successor at Saint Jean d'Acre; there might be some, who had gained experience and had attained distinction under the illustrious Michieli, and who had known his son-in-law, the Doge Polani; and there were perhaps a few who could recall the day, when a handful of stragglers brought the dreadful news, that the Doge Faliero was slain, and his army annihilated by the Hungarians. But the command of the fleet seemed to involve, in fact, the command of the whole expedition; and it was the policy, it might be the wish, of the Venetians, to nominate some person, whose rank and reputation entitled him to take precedence of the Allied Generals. Dandolo himself relieved the doubts of his countrymen, and perhaps anticipated their choice. One Sunday, the people were invited to assemble in Saint Mark's Church to discuss that identical question; and when mass had been celebrated, the Doge, vacating the seat which he occupied, was seen to mount the Tribune. The action excited general curiosity: his words commanded universal attention. "I am aged and infirm," said the old man, "and much need have I of quiet and repose: yet there is perhaps no one more capable of leading you in this expedition, than I am; therefore, if you will allow my son to remain here in my place to govern you, I will at once take the Cross, and go with the pilgrims, to live or die with them, as God shall think fit." A rapturous shout of applause assured him that his proposal was accepted; and Dandolo, descending from the rostrum, approached the nave of the Cathedral, and, falling on his knees before the great altar of Saint Mark's,¹ took the oath, while the Cross was adjusted to the front of his ducal bonnet, "where it might be plainly visible to all men." The example of their prince was emulated by many Venetians, who had hitherto stood aloof,

¹ Da Canale, sect. 36.

and who now joined with him in swearing to devote their lives to the deliverance of the Holy Places; it is no wonder that all were lost in admiration of the marvellous old man, whom Villehardouin justly terms a personage "de bien gran cœur." A few days later, Reniero Dandolo, his eldest son, was proclaimed during his father's absence Vice-Doge of the Republic with full powers;¹ and, every obstacle having been at last surmounted, the Pilgrims embarked at Lido, after so many months of suspense and delay, on the 8th of October 1202. It was the Octaves of Saint Rhemigius.² An eyewitness (Villehardouin) tells us that everything was in perfect order. The Doge and his brother and acting Admiral Vitale Dandolo were on the *galea capitana*, which was distinguished by special colours, and which carried four trumpeters, who blew silver trumpets. Priests on board the ships intoned the *Veni Creator*, and the air resounded with triumphal and joyous cries.

Although the treaty had been so long concluded, the final settlement with the Count of Flanders was apparently deferred till the very moment of departure. The payment due from Baldwin is shown by the contemporary document, dated from the Isle of San Erasmo, October 1202, to have been 121 ounces in marks sterling (*marcas sterlinorum*) at the rate of 13 solidi and 4 denarii the mark. It is remarkable that the bond, drawn up by a notary, was executed in the presence of the Doge, the Count of Blois, the Marshal of Champagne, and others, but signed by Reniero Dandolo, Vice-Doge of Venice; and the money was deliverable at the next fair at Ligny in Belgium to four Venetian delegates named,³ or to their assigns.

The weather was exceedingly fine; and in the course of a day or two, the fleet, consisting of 280 sail,⁴ cast anchor off Trieste, which the Venetians had long been secretly anxious to reduce to their sway. Trieste, overawed by the sight of so large and powerful an armament, capitulated on the first summons, and acquiesced in the impost of a yearly tribute to the Ducal Fisc of 200 gallons of wine. The moiety

¹ Da Canale, sect. 37; *Statuti di Venetia*, c. 27, 31, edit. 1477.

² Ducange, *Constantinople sous les empereurs français*, lib. i. pp. 1-3.

³ Calendar of State Papers (Venice), i.

⁴ The 50 galleys furnished by the Republic, 60 transports, 60 long vessels, and 110 *Dromoni* or *Grossi legni* and *Uscieri* or *Porto-Cavalli*. See Formaleoni, *Nautica antica dei Veneziani*, p. 16.

of that tribute, and an oath of allegiance to Venice, were in like manner exacted from Omago. After these two achievements, which were little in harmony either with the object or the character of the expedition, the order was given to put out to sea; and, at the end of a rapid and prosperous voyage of 150 miles, the pilgrims reached Zara on the 10th of November. It was the eve of Saint Martin.¹

¹ Michaud, lib. x. p. 232.

CHAPTER XI

A.D. 1202–1205

Siege of Zara (11th November 1202)—Its Fall (18th Nov.)—Difference between the Pope and the Pilgrims—Arrival of an Embassy from the King of the Romans (December 1202)—Change in the Destination of the Expedition—Departure of the Latins for Constantinople (April 1203)—Stay at Corfu—Departure from Corfu—Description of Constantinople.

THE fortress of Zara, situated at a distance of fifteen miles from the ruins of the old Roman Colony of Jadera, was accounted, at the period of the Fifth Crusade, the strongest place in the Venetian dominions. A girdle of massive and enormous ramparts, divided at regular distances by towers of colossal height, secured the citadel from surprise or assault; and a lofty wall, recently reared by Hungarian engineers on the side of the harbour, effectually sheltered it from the invasion of a maritime enemy. It was seventeen years since the last Venetian Podesta was expelled from their town; during that space, the Zaratines had enjoyed, to a certain extent, a state of independence, having alienated themselves from the Republic, yet not formally acknowledging the sovereignty of King Bela; and they had therefore been in an excellent position to make all necessary preparations for the impending struggle. The magazines were full; the store of arms and ammunition was calculated for a long siege; and the garrison, which was composed, partly of the inhabitants, partly of Hungarians, was in the highest state of discipline and efficiency.

These circumstances justified, in some measure, the hope of the Zaratines, that the Republic would be foiled in the attempt to recover her dependency; but, at the same time, they did not shake the determination of the Crusaders; and on the day of their arrival before the place, a Venetian galley having forced the bar, which was planted across the mouth of the harbour, the Latins entered, and established a blockade.

The evening of the 10th November passed without any movement being made on either side. On the morning of the morrow the besiegers prepared for action. Their lines were formed; their artillery was drawn up in position; and the general attack began. The Zaratines had vainly endeavoured to oppose the entrance of the fleet and the landing of the troops; and the overwhelming numbers of the French and Venetians, whose alliance in such a cause they had little anticipated, speedily convinced the rebels that resistance was fruitless. Still they maintained the unequal struggle during several hours; and it was not till the morning of the 12th, that a deputation of the principal merchants and magistrates of the city waited on the Doge in his pavilion, and offered to him, in the name of the municipality, the immediate cession of the place, provided that the lives of the inhabitants were spared, and that their personal freedom was unfringed.

This was the fifth¹ revolt of Zara during the lapse of a century and a half. Each had been marked by generosity on the part of the Republic and by treacherous ingratitude on the part of the fief. The latter attempted to extenuate such frequent defections by alleging the impossibility of resisting the aggressions of Bela and his predecessors; but the Venetian Government had reason to think, that a place which had defied its authority from 1185 to the present time, was capable of withstanding the forces of the King of Hungary, at least until the Republic could pour in adequate supplies and reinforcements; indeed so strong were its defences, that Dandolo himself, who might almost remember the year 1117, when the perfidy of Zara cost his country an army and a Doge, had not hesitated to express an opinion that, should the pilgrims not be inclined to co-operate with them in the recovery of the city,² it was highly probable that they would "lose it altogether." The Doge, however, briefly informed the Deputies that he was personally favourable to their request, and that he was willing to consult his allies on the subject; but that, without the consent of the barons he did not feel justified in giving them a definite reply. The old man then, having desired them to wait his return, repaired

¹ The first was in 1050; the second and third in 1115-17; the fourth in 1172.

² Villehardouin, lib i. p. 20.

to the quarters of the other chiefs, to learn their sentiments, and solicit their adhesion.

Very shortly after the departure of the Doge, the Abbot Guy of Vaux-Sernay, who now represented the Court of the Vatican in the camp of the Crusaders, and a few others who, growing dissatisfied at the slow progress of the expedition, were beginning to tax the Venetians with their worldly ambition, sauntered into the Ducal pavilion, and engaged in conversation with the delegates of Zara. They interrogated the latter touching the object of their visit and the nature of their mission; and the answer, which he received, appeared to afford Vaux-Sernay perfect amazement. "Why do you surrender your city?" inquired he; "your lives will not be spared! As to us, our obligations to his Holiness preclude altogether our interference; and surely you can resist now those Venetians, whom you may remember that you have so often resisted!" This forcible appeal was not without its effect on the delegates, who were completely entrapped; they confessed that they viewed the matter in an entirely new light; they admitted that it was foolish to capitulate under such circumstances; and when Dandolo, having obtained the assent of his colleagues to the proposal, returned to his quarters, he found in the place of his late visitors, who had vanished, the agent of the Holy See and a few companions. The Doge at once suspected some mischief; and his suspicions were speedily substantiated. For scarcely had he entered the pavilion when Guy, who held in his hand an open letter from the Pope, advanced toward his Serenity and in a dictatorial tone exclaimed: "Sir, I prohibit you, in the name of the Apostle, from attacking this city: for it belongs to Christians, and you are a Pilgrim!" Dandolo was indignant at the affront which, as he conceived, had been offered in his person to the country which he represented; but at the same time, he could not fail to appreciate the force of the stricture as to his personal responsibility, and the reports, which the emissaries of the Vatican seemed to be disseminating through the ranks of the army, and which were daily gaining strength, filled him with anxiety, he felt that these seditious cabals seriously imperilled the success of the undertaking, in which his confederates and himself were engaged; and, without pausing to take notice

of the apostolic prohibition, which was merely an echo of Peter of Capua, the Doge determined to communicate the strange scene of which he had been an eyewitness, to the other leaders of the Crusade. The barons, who had not unnaturally expected that the capitulation was arranged, fully reciprocated the displeasure and astonishment of Dandolo at the proceeding of Vaux-Sernay, whose conduct could be excused only on the ground that he was simply the instrument of the Holy See; and they also united with him in lamenting that a spirit of disaffection should have arisen among the troops. But they earnestly disclaimed any collusion on their part, or any intention of abandoning their ally; and in proof of their sincerity they cheerfully declared, that they were ready at all times to act in concert with the Republic. In conformity with these assurances, they announced their willingness (should his Serenity advocate the adoption of such a step) to break off the armistice at once, and resume the offensive without farther delay; and, the Doge having assented, the siege of Zara, after an interruption of twenty-four or thirty hours, was reopened on the morning of the 13th November.

The operations lasted only five days. On the 18th, the Zaratines were compelled to implore the clemency of the Latins. The treatment which the vanquished experienced was unusually gentle. Their lives were spared. Their persons were protected from outrage. But their town was given up to pillage; and the booty, having been collected and valued, was divided between the French and Venetians. The movements of the victors seemed to indicate an intention of occupying the place for a considerable period. Stabling was provided for the horses; barracks were selected for the troops; and with a view to the preservation of order and discipline, the naval forces were quartered in the neighbourhood of the harbour, while their confederates were located principally in the town itself. Even this judicious precaution proved itself insufficient as a barrier between the irascible pride of the French and the intolerant jealousy of the Venetians; and on the evening of the 21st November,¹ three days after the fall of Zara, a slight difference between some soldiers and marines, both of whom insisted on installing themselves in one par-

¹ Villehardouin, lib. i. p. 27.

ticular barrack, led to an angry altercation and a bloody affray. Night darkened the scene without parting the combatants, who had speedily procured arms and assistance; and great numbers had fallen on both sides, before the chiefs could subdue the violence of the tumult. Dandolo had reason to blush at the issue of the quarrel: for his countrymen, although far more numerous than their opponents, were thoroughly worsted in the conflict; and it was fully eight days before they regained their composure. A fortnight after this scandalous conflict the Marquis of Monteferrato, who had down to the present time remained at Venice on the plea of ill health, joined the army, of which he assumed the chief command. The generalissimo was accompanied by Matthieu, Baron de Montmorenci, and some others who had lingered behind on a similar ground. There were not a few who whispered a belief that Boniface himself, at all events, had been deterred from sanctioning by his presence the participation of the French in the siege of Zara from a dread of apostolic censure; but subsequent events did not confirm such a view.

While Monteferrato was still at Venice, Innocent discovered that a letter, which he had addressed long since to the Pilgrims, was intercepted by their commander. Boniface, in frankly confessing the omission of which he had been guilty, attempted to palliate it by shewing that his sole motive had been a solicitude for the welfare and success of the enterprise. His feeling was that it was utterly impossible to prevail on Venice to forego her scheme for the recovery of Zara; he reminded the Pontiff, that the Pilgrims considered their honour pledged to a co-operation in that undertaking; and he concluded by expressing an opinion that, had he communicated to the troops the apostolic charge, as his Holiness enjoined, it would under the existing circumstances have exercised a most injurious effect. But Innocent was far from being satisfied with this explanation; he signified in no measured terms his displeasure at the course which Monteferrato had presumed to pursue,¹ and he commanded the Marquis to make known forthwith his sentiments to the Crusaders.

In this correspondence with Monteferrato, Innocent had

¹ "Literae Innocentii III.," *Rerum Gallicurum scriptores*, vol. xix. p. 367 *et seq.*

dwelled at some length on the cruel sufferings of the earlier Crusaders. He depicted in glowing colours the urgent distress of the small band, who were still maintaining in Palestine a desperate struggle with the infidels. He lamented the delay which had occurred in the departure and progress of the expedition; and he ascribed the blame, in principal measure, to Dandolo and the Venetians, whom he placed accordingly out of the Christian communion. He intimated to the Barons that he had addressed a letter to the Greek Emperor, praying him to welcome their arrival at Constantinople with a copious supply of stores and provisions for the troops; and his Holiness went so far as to suggest that, should that prince neglect or refuse to comply with his request, the Crusaders might seek the means of subsistence in the name and for the sake of the Redeemer, wherever there was abundance. He directed them to make restitution of their portion of the pillage of Zara, which belonged to the King of Hungary, like themselves a Christian and a Crusader; and in concluding his epistle, from which he withheld the usual benediction, Innocent charged Monteferrato and the other chiefs to proceed at once to Palestine, turning neither to the right nor to the left, and to hold no converse with the Venetians, except it were of mere necessity, and then in bitterness of heart. By these expressions some of the Barons were startled, and some were abashed. Others were simply annoyed at the reproachful tone in which the pontifical letter was couched. At the same time, all acknowledged that it was their duty, or felt that it was their interest, to conciliate his Holiness; and accordingly a message was sent to Rome from the camp at Zara, detailing on the one hand the solemn nature of the obligations of the Pilgrims to the Republic, and declaring, on the other, their perfect and unanimous desire to defer in all points to the judgment of the Pope. Innocent was not untouched by this sign of contrition and respect; the envoy of Monteferrato brought back the blessing and forgiveness of the Holy Father; and the Barons, when they learned the happy result of their mission, felt as if a heavy weight had been removed from their hearts. The Venetians, on the contrary, were alike deaf to threats and solicitations; their share of the spoils of Zara was rigidly appropriated; the Hungarian rampart, contiguous to the harbour, was levelled with the ground

by the order of his Serenity; and Dandolo declared to the Nuncio in language courteous but firm that in the affairs of the Republic the Holy See had surely no concern.¹

The Doge went a step farther. He represented to his allies the lateness of the season, and the length of the voyage which they were about to undertake. He pointed out the risk which necessarily attended a passage to the Holy Land over a precarious element in inclement weather.² He reminded them, that they were going into a distant and hostile country. Finally, he shewed them how infinitely more judicious it would be to winter at Zara, where there was spacious stabling for the horses and convenient barracks for the troops, and to resume their pilgrimage in the early part of 1203.

That novel proposition was at first vehemently combated. Some of the chiefs declined altogether to listen to it. Several were not unreasonably afraid that, by such a wide and manifest deviation from his injunctions, they would draw down on their heads the severest displeasure of Innocent. Yet on a calm survey of their position and prospects there appeared to be in reality no alternative; without the means of transport, it was obvious that their movements were paralysed; the danger of starting for their destination during the present year was clearly demonstrated by the Doge: and they felt assured, that the latter would not be easily shaken in the resolution which he seemed to have formed, to extend the period of their stay at Zara till the spring. The result was, that after an angry altercation with the papal Cabal, which urged a literal adherence to the commands of the Holy See, Dandolo succeeded in bringing the majority into his views; and instead of embarking for the East, the Army was ordered into winter quarters. The Doge himself occupied a palace which had belonged to one of the principal merchants of the place; the Marquis Boniface, Count Baldwin, the Count of Blois, and the other leaders of the Crusade, were likewise lodged in a manner suitable to their rank; and their followers, distributed through the city and its environs, has already begun to indulge in speculations on the probable course of events in the spring, when an incident occurred which gave an entirely new turn to affairs (December 1202).

¹ Marin, iv. p. 40, *et seq.*: Diedo, *Storia di Venezia*, lib. iv. p. 72 *et seq.*

² Da Canale, sect. 40.

At the opening of the thirteenth century, the crowns of the Eastern and Western Empires were alike worn by usurpers. In Germany, Philip, Duke of Suabia, swayed the sceptre which belonged by right of descent to Frederic, son of Henry VI. At Constantinople, Isaac Angelos Comnenos sat upon the throne, which he had polluted with the blood of his kinsman Andronicos. A matrimonial alliance knit together those two royal Houses: Irene, daughter of Isaac, shared the fortunes of the Duke of Suabia. In 1195, Alexios (the elder), uncle of the Byzantine princess, and whom his brother Isaac had redeemed from captivity, imitated the barbarity of his benefactor; the latter was, in his turn, divested of the purple, blinded, and condemned to languish in a dungeon, where he was for some time inaccessible even to his nearest kindred. After some time, he was permitted to receive the visits of his wife Margaret and of her little son Alexios (the younger); the child, whose innocence disarmed suspicion, served as a messenger and a spy; and through him Philip and Irene conveyed to the aged prisoner an assurance of sympathy and a promise of succour. It was on one of his visits to the Court of Verona, where his brother-in-law resided, that Prince Alexios heard how a large army of Crusaders had congregated at Venice, with the object of delivering Jerusalem and the Holy Places from the Mohammedans; and the royal youth, animated by a faint hope of forming, in concert with the Chiefs of this expedition, some project for the restoration of his father, determined to make overtures to Dandolo and the Barons. The impression which the Prince made on the minds of those to whom he addressed himself, was not, however, extremely encouraging. The Cabal quoted once more the pontifical letter, which distinctly prohibited the slightest aberration from the path of assigned duty. They were followed, and to some extent supported, by others who cherished a persuasion that the Holy See, looking upon the brother as no less legitimate than the son of a usurper, and finding that both were equally ready to restore the papal supremacy, would prefer the claim of the elder Alexios; and even those who had now begun to incline to the opinion, that it was unsafe to march on Jerusalem without first possessing the keys of Constantinople, naturally regarded with distrust the extravagant promises of a boy and an exile.

Fortunately, however, for Alexios, it happened that the Doge and the Marquis of Monteferrato were led by different motives to view the matter in a light more favourable to him. Boniface, connected by marriage with Isaac Angelos,¹ was personally well disposed to espouse the cause of his royal kinsman, toward whom he entertained a feeling of affectionate sympathy; and Dandolo, who foresaw the great commercial advantage which his country might derive from the friendship of the Greek prince, joined the Marquis in supporting the appeal of Alexios, and in urging the expediency of ascertaining from Philip whether, if the Pilgrims consented to uphold the pretensions of the Angeli to the imperial throne, he was willing to treat with them on behalf of his youthful relative. The views of Monteferrato and the Doge ultimately prevailed; a few weeks antecedent to the embarkation of the Latins at Lido, an embassy was sent on this important mission to Verona; and it was the return of that embassy, accompanied by one from the King of the Romans, which now arrested the attention of the conquerors of Zara.

The representatives of Philip were at once admitted to an interview with the Chiefs at the residence of Dandolo; and they hastened to deliver their instructions. If the French and Venetians succeeded in reinstating the legitimate prince on the throne of Constantinople, the King of the Romans stipulated in the name of his brother-in-law that, on his accession to power, Alexios should restore the ancient unity of the Church, and acknowledge the spiritual supremacy of the Holy See; that he should pay to the Republic of Venice a sum of 200,000 marks of silver, which had been owing to her by the Byzantine Court since the year 1174;² that he should either accompany the Pilgrims to Palestine in person, or defray the cost of maintaining for one year an auxiliary corps of 10,000 men; and that he should keep on foot, during his life, a guard of 500 knights for the protection of the Sepulchre. The envoys of Philip, having specified these as the conditions which their master was prepared to subscribe on behalf of Prince Alexios, withdrew; and a fierce and angry controversy at once began between the emissaries of the

¹ Gibbon, vi, p. 545; Michaud, v. p. 48.

² Nicetas, *De Alexio Comneno*, lib. iii. p. 713; *ibid.*, *De Manuele Comneno*, lib. v. p. 226.

Vatican and the supporters of Dandolo. On the one hand, the Cabal, inculcating implicit submission to the Pope, vehemently decried the new proposal as diametrically opposed to the wishes of Innocent; and Vaux-Sernay expressed himself firm in the belief that the curse of Heaven would be upon them if they hearkened to it. On the other hand, the Abbot de Loçes, who was Venetian in his mode of thinking, contended that the deliverance of the Holy Places must be achieved in Greece and in Egypt; and that, so long as the Mohammedan influence predominated in the latter country, and a prince who sought to disguise his weakness by lavishing subsidies on the infidels, reigned at Constantinople, it was futile to think of saving Palestine, or of recovering Jerusalem. By these two opinions the Council of Zara was divided. That of Vaux-Sernay was seconded by the Count of Montfort, Martin Litz, and a few other eminent Papists; that of the Abbot de Loçes was shared by the Doge, by the Marquis of Monteferrato, and by several of the Barons. The former represented a party, bold and skilful in argument, eloquent and ready in speech, but narrow-minded, prejudiced, superstitious; the latter was the organ of one at least, who hated the reigning dynasty at Constantinople as the enemies of his country, and of many who suspected and reprobated its collusion with the Mohammedans. Thus, with the exception of the Cabal, the members of which announced their intention—should the proposal of Alexios be adopted—of returning to their homes or of embarking at other ports, the Latins agreed in regarding the new scheme from a favourable point of view; and it was consequently soon decided that the terms which had been offered by Philip should be accepted, and that the expedition to the Holy Land should be postponed, until the Pilgrims whose route led them in that direction, and who had been led by the Pope to look for supplies on their arrival at Constantinople, had prepared the way for the conquest of Jerusalem by reinstating the two Angeli on the imperial throne.

It has now become proper to consider, by what motive the Republic was led to entertain so favourably the project of Prince Alexios for deposing the reigning branch of the House of Comnenos, and for restoring the exiled line: by which she was led to engage with such zeal and alacrity in an under-

taking, of which the ultimate effect might be to revolutionise Romania, and to establish a new power at Constantinople. It has been already seen how, during the ninth and tenth centuries, the Ducae and Theophiloï vied with each other in lavishing honours and favours of every kind on the colonists of the Adriatic lagoon, who shewed themselves polite courtiers, and might prove useful allies; and it has been seen how, before the rise and aggrandizement of Genoa and Pisa, relations of the closest intimacy subsisted between the Venetians and the Lower Empire. The case was now very different. In requital for the services which they performed under the imperial flag, the Pisans and Genoese had been gradually admitted to a participation in the advantages of Oriental commerce, which the Islanders once enjoyed almost as a monopoly; the newcomers failed not to ingratiate themselves with the Greek Government; nearly 3000 of them occupied at present separate quarters in the Capital, where they pursued their callings in freedom and security, and where, like the Venetians, their own laws were dispensed by their own magistrates; and although the merchants of the Republic still claimed to a certain extent the special patronage and protection of the Byzantine Court, they found that their rivals largely trespassed on the precious privileges, which they had formerly shared only with the merchants of Amalfi. They were perhaps apt to consider that the decline of their influence was a just source of complaint, a reproach to the jealousy or pride of the successors of Valens. Yet the cause of this decline was sufficiently obvious.

The truth was, that the position of the Venetian Factory at Constantinople had long been in one leading respect a false one. So long as the Lower Empire preserved, in a degree however slight, its ancient splendour and glory, and the Republic on the other hand remained an obscure and second-class State, the tone of the Venetian residents had continued to be obsequious, and their bearing to be modest and respectful. But when, in the growth of time, the Empire sank into decay, and the Republic acquired importance, the conduct of those opulent traders underwent a material change. Their demeanour became haughty and overbearing; and their behaviour was in frequent instances such as the Greeks even now found it difficult to tolerate. It was not to be accounted

strange that the latter, peculiarly sensitive in their weakness, should revolt at the authoritative interference of the Venetians in their internal affairs ; it was quite natural that they should harbour animosity toward those who were attempting, as it seemed, to establish a foreign protectorate ; and while the commercial privileges of Venice still remained in full force, the relations between the two Powers grew every day more strained. There was one circumstance that particularly tended to loosen the ties of a friendship, which had at one time appeared to be indissoluble.

When the Emperor Emmanuel Comnenos renewed in 1174 the trading charter of the Republic, he promised that a sum of 1,500,000 marks of silver should be paid in periodical instalments to the Ducal Fisc, as an equivalent for the losses which he had inflicted during a series of years on Venetian commerce. Of this large amount Emmanuel himself discharged only 1,300,000, leaving on his demise in 1180 a residue of 200,000 marks payable by his son and successor Alexios. But that unhappy prince, who had not yet attained the age of puberty, speedily fell into the power of a crafty and ambitious relative ; and during a protectorate of three and a reign of two years Andronicos Comnenos, a cousin of the late Emperor, continued to evade the just claims of the Venetians. In 1185 the usurper was in his turn poignarded by a kinsman, Isaac Angelos ; and the Government of the Republic, acting on a hope that the new Emperor would be more amenable to reason than his predecessor, solicited at once the recognition of the chrysobole and the payment of the debt. But Isaac, without demurring to the terms of the charter, declined to acknowledge the obligation. The Republic, through her representatives, persisted in urging the justice of the demand and its immediate fulfilment. They exerted all their diplomatic skill. They laboured to present the question in the most forcible light. They argued. They expostulated. They threatened. At last Isaac affected to accede to their wishes (February 1188). This feint tried the forbearance of the Republic till 1195 ; and during that period she continued to bring her claims from time to time under notice. In 1195, however, Isaac himself was dethroned, and was cast into prison by his brother Alexios Angelos ; and the Venetian executive did not delay in trying to ascertain, how

far the political change affected the prospect. Alexios stated that he did not object to renew the chrysobole; but, at the same time, he exhibited a strong reluctance to adopt the liability, which he was taught to consider that he had inherited with his crown. His Majesty was disposed, however, to suggest certain modifications, which he purposed to submit to the Ducal Government. His terms met with little favour; a second attempt on the part of the Republic to effect an amicable adjustment of the point at issue was equally unsuccessful; and at length, the Doge, growing weary of these evasions, sent back a plain intimation that, should the Imperial Government persist in its refusal to comply with the fair demand of the Venetians, the latter had determined to support the not unfounded pretensions of the son of Isaac to the throne of the Lower Empire.¹

This ultimatum at first seemed to produce the desired effect. Alexios promised to liquidate the debt, as well as to investigate any other claims, either of a private or public character, which the Republic might think proper to advance. Moreover, he offered of his own accord to introduce several additional clauses into the charter of 1188; and by a new chrysobole, bearing date November 1198, a free trade was established between the Lagoon and all Greek ports from Candia to Durazzo, and from Durazzo to the Golden Horn. This important concession was unaccompanied, however, by any removal of the existing ground of complaint; 1199 and 1200 passed without producing a fraction of the 200,000 marks; the difficulty did not even approach a solution; and so imminent was a rupture between the Empire and the Republic at the period of the publication of the Fifth Crusade (had not other causes supervened to accelerate the crisis) that, almost concurrently with the arrival of the Marshal of Champagne and his companions, the Ducal Government, desirous of obtaining some equivalent for the contingent loss of the Greek connexion, negotiated in December 1201 a commercial treaty for the first time with Leo, King of Armenia.²

The Government was also extremely anxious to maintain peace with Syria. At present the Emir Malek-Adel was its ally; in all the ports of Palestine which lay within his dominions, the Republic already enjoyed many valuable privileges and

¹ Marin, iii. *Documenti*.

² *Arch. stor. Ital.* app. 29.

immunities ; and by closing those ports against the Venetian flag Malek was in a position to strike a terrible blow at her Oriental trade. On the other hand, the relations of Venice with the empire of Constantinople had long been ambiguous and uncertain ; the vacillations of the Byzantine Court had been gradually estranging the two Powers from each other more and more ; and it may be believed that, while Venice aimed at maintaining her amicable relations with Malek-Adel, she embraced with eagerness an opportunity of regaining her former position in the imperial capital, and of obtaining at the point of the sword that redress, which had been denied to her repeated solicitations. Nearly 700 years since, the Republic saw in such a policy her best course as a State so largely reliant on the Eastern trade.

The Latins left Zara, after a stay of almost five months, on the 7th April 1203. The weather was clear and fine, and the fluttering sails were soon wooed by a mild and propitious wind.¹ The palanders, the carracks, and the transports, led the way ; and the galleys, bearing the soldiers and their chiefs, were on the point of following in the wake, when a loud and general shout, accompanied by the blasts of trumpets, announced the unexpected arrival of Alexios himself. The Prince, who had travelled from Verona through Venice, was received by Monteferrato and the Doge with affectionate courtesy ; and that unhappy youth, whose wrongs were serving as a ground and a pretext for the armed intervention of foreign powers, embraced with the passionate fervour of reviving hope the knees of a kinsman and a benefactor. Boniface at once presented his ward to the troops, who welcomed him with acclamations ; and Dandolo, having given him a suitable escort, signified the intention of the Pilgrims to await his arrival at Corfu, where the whole armament would assemble in the course of a fortnight. The departure of Alexios, whose reason for separating so soon from his allies was his wish to visit Durazzo, was closely followed by that of the French and Venetians ; and, as the last galley cleared the mouth of the harbour, the eye distinguished the upright form of the venerable Doge, who stood erect in the prow, and grasped the banner of Saint Mark.

The Zaratines watched the movements of the Crusaders

¹ Da Canale, sect. 43.

with anxious impatience; and the fleet was hardly out of view, when they enlisted in their service a few armed galleys belonging to Gaeta, expelled the Venetian authorities, and proclaimed the King of Hungary. Steps were promptly taken, however, by the home authorities to suppress the revolt; and the rebels who, in their precipitation, had not allowed sufficient time even for the repair of their ramparts, were forced to yield without a struggle to the Vice-Doge. The mere recovery of a place which had seceded from her allegiance six times in the course of a century and a half, and which in a few months might become an impregnable fortress, was considered scarcely a sufficient security for the future; it was felt to be of high consequence that the relations between the Republic and her dependency should now be established on a better footing; and a treaty was dictated to the Zaratines, by which the latter engaged to take a fresh oath of allegiance; to pay in perpetuity to the Ducal Fise an annual tribute of 150 *perperi*: to elect, in all cases, as their Count or Podesta, a Venetian citizen subject to the final approval of his Serenity; to acknowledge the obedience, which was due on the part of their archbishop to the Metropolitan of Grado; to furnish, in the event of war, an armed contingent of 30 galleys, or, should the scene of action extend beyond the city of Ragusa, as large a number as they might be in a position to equip; to select, as a material guarantee, thirty noble hostages, the cost of whose maintenance at Venice during pleasure was to be defrayed by their own townsmen; and lastly, to refrain from rebuilding their fortifications, until the Republic signified her assent to such a measure.

Meanwhile, Alexios, having received the allegiance of the Governor of Durazzo, had joined the French and Venetians at Corfu toward the close of April. The inhabitants of that Island, exasperated at the weak tyranny of the Court of Constantinople, welcomed the Pilgrims as their liberators, the Prince as their sovereign; and this augury of future success tempted the Latins to pass a few days in a fertile spot, where forage and provisions were plentiful, and where they might have farther leisure to consider their undertaking in its various bearings. The delay nearly marred the whole scheme. Some days after their arrival, a report reached Corfu, that sixty knights under Walter de Brienne had, in the course of a few

months, overrun the whole of Southern Italy; and the fame of this achievement, which ought on the most superficial observation to have dwindled into the partial and proportionately rapid success of a small band of adventurers, rekindled the ardour of the soldiers, and refreshed the hopes of the Cabal. The powerful contrast between their own dilatory conduct and the brilliant exploit of the Count of Brienne, gave colour to a complaint that, while Walter had subdued to his sway a rich province, and was now preparing to fulfil his engagement in the Holy Land, they had done nothing, and were besides on the point of engaging in an undertaking, of which the cost was enormous, the perils evident, the result uncertain; and it soon appeared, that these sentiments, if not openly avowed, were secretly shared by a moiety of the army.

The emergency was pressing. The spirit of disaffection was rapidly spreading through the ranks. Nor was the impending danger obviated without a promise on the part of the chiefs that, whatever might be the destination of the remainder, the malcontents should be placed in a position to embark for the East, under any circumstances, on Michaelmas-day ensuing. This difficulty having been removed, the Latins sailed from Corfu, where this untoward incident had detained them nearly three weeks, on the 14th of May. The weather was favourable; the sky was cloudless, and the sails of three hundred vessels were speedily filled with a south-easterly wind.¹ From the poops and masts floated an infinite variety of flags and streamers; the sides of the galleys were covered with the broad and emblazoned shields of the knights, displaying their escutcheons and armorial devices; and the dazzling brightness of the helmets and cuirasses was reflected by the warm rays of a Grecian sun. The Fleet passed the islands of Cephalaria and Zante, doubled Cape Matapan and Cape Saint Angelo, and arrived toward the close of May at Negropont, where a few days were spent in procuring fresh water, and in an expedition to the neighbouring Isle of Andros, which yielded to the power of the Latins. Leaving Negropont and Lemnos on their left hand, the Crusaders entered the Hellespont, and cast anchor off Abydos, which surrendered to Alexios. The harvest was then ripe for the sickle; the soldiers spent eight days in gathering it, and in surveying the town. Pursuing their voyage,

¹ Villehardouin, lib. i. p. 37.

the Latins passed Lampsacos and Gallipoli; and, entering the Propontis or Sea of Marmora, they arrived on the 24th June at the Abbey of Saint Stephen, situated on a promontory at a distance of seven miles and a half, in a westerly direction, from Constantinople. Here the chiefs held a council of war, for the purpose of considering what course it was now most expedient to pursue. Many were of opinion that the troops should disembark at or near the point which they had already reached, and where they would command a peculiarly fertile district. But the Doge, who claimed a more intimate knowledge of the country, shewed his companions that it was unwise to choose a spot where the fleet, exposed to the squalls prevailing at that season of the year on the Sea of Marmora, would be precluded from acting in concert with the army. "Besides," said Dandolo, "this region is very densely populated; if we land here, the inhabitants will be constantly harassing and cutting off our foraging parties; and so far from being lavish of our men in such a difficult enterprise, we should bear in mind, that we have already too few for our purpose. It will be more prudent to collect provisions, and form magazines, in the Isles which you see yonder. There we can deliberate, and when we have fully organized our plans, and completed our stores, we can return to the City. Adopting this course, we shall be in a position to advance with confidence, or to retreat without danger." The advice of the old man was accepted by the Barons; and on the morrow, at sunrise, the Latins directed their course toward the cluster situated at the mouth of the Bosphorus known as the Isles of the Princes. But the wind, which was now blowing strongly from the south, drove the vessels far eastward, despite the efforts of the Venetian pilots; and a few, which came in too close contact with the walls of Constantinople, were slightly scorched by the Greek fire. The rest, instead of casting anchor off the Isles, as it had been proposed, veered toward the coast of Asia, and entered the port of Chalcedon, where the Barons were at liberty to enjoy the luxury and ease of an imperial palace. The baggage and horses were landed in safety; the soldiers disembarked; and, while the mariners took charge of the vessels, the army slept securely in the tents which they pitched along the shore of the Propontis. On the following day the Latins proceeded—the Venetians in their ships, the French by

forced marches—so far as Scutari, where they spent nine days in procuring necessaries; and from that point many surveyed for the first time the lofty spires and gilded domes of innumerable palaces and churches, painted by the rays of the sun on the surface of the waters. During this halt, a foraging party of fourscore French put to flight 500 Greeks under the orders of the grand-admiral, a brother-in-law of Alexios the Elder; and this exploit, which formed their earliest opportunity of testing the courage and temper of the inhabitants of the country, was regarded by the Latins as a farther presage of success.

It now seems natural to inquire, how it happened that the sovereign of a City, which was said to contain four millions of souls, forbore so long to check the progress of a force, which hardly exceeded 19,000 men.¹ Five years had elapsed since the second visit of the Venetian ambassadors to the Byzantine Court. Alexios the Elder still sat on the throne. His brother Isaac still languished in a dungeon. Blinded by his long continuance of prosperity, the usurper wildly plunged into every species of debauchery, delegating the irksome task of government to unscrupulous ministers or unworthy favourites. The subjects of Alexios were on a par with their rulers. Inert, unwarlike, licentious, corrupt, the Greeks were living in the shadow of their former greatness. They possessed a considerable share of industrial wealth; but trade was a monopoly, speculation a system. The grand-admiral had amassed a princely fortune by the sale of the helms, masts, rigging, and cordage of the Imperial marine; abuses of every kind crippled the strength of the State, and exhausted its finances. The eunuchs were the guardians of the Prince and the oppressors of his subjects; and the Varangians, who inherited the power of the Prætorian Guard, often controlled the election of their ruler, while they dispatched him frequently at their pleasure.

Yet while his senses were steeped in sensuality, the Emperor had long been aware of the approach of the Latins, of whose purpose he could scarcely be ignorant, and whose power he had such just cause to dread. But the fears of the royal voluptuary were ridiculed by his parasites; and every night at the banquet Alexios was greeted by the pleasing

¹ Ducange, lib. i. p. 23.

assurance that a handful of barbarians would never dare to insult the majesty of the Roman purple. The ears of the Emperor, drugged by flattery, were deaf to the relation of the fall of Zara, of the defection of Corfu, of the surrender of Negropont. But when he was informed that the enemy had reached Scutari, he at last proceeded to concert measures for the defence of the capital. All the extramural buildings were at once demolished. An enormous boom, supported on piles, was planted across the mouth of the Horn. Along the inner side of this chain were ranged twenty galleys, the wreck of the Greek navy, to oppose the entrance of the Venetian fleet. The garrison, of which the Varangian Guard and an auxiliary force of 2000 Pisans formed the strength, was ordered to make every necessary preparation for the approaching siege; and the Emperor, having placed Constantinople itself out of danger, hastened with an army of 70,000 men to take up a position on the left shore of the Bosphorus, where he was prepared to repulse any attempt on the part of the Latins to effect a landing. At the same time Alexios did not neglect to open negotiations for peace. On the 6th of July, Nicolo Rossi, a native of Parma, and an old servant of the Byzantine Court,¹ was sent to Scutari, where the Allies had established their headquarters, to inquire the motive which could have led a Christian army to assume so hostile an attitude toward a Christian people; to assure the Pilgrims that his imperial master was perfectly ready to supply their wants and to relieve their poverty; and that, although it was in his power to do so, had they been twenty times as numerous, he was loth to inflict any injury on them, so long as they did not refuse to evacuate his dominions. The grounds which Rossi took was somewhat high; the Latin chiefs listened to him in silent astonishment; and when he had terminated his harangue, he was briefly informed that the sole hope of the uncle lay in the clemency of the nephew, who was now seated among them; that, if the elder Alexios chose to resign the crown in favour of the rightful heir, they would recommend the Prince to grant him a free pardon and a liberal pension; and lastly that, unless he himself happened to be the bearer of a more reasonable message, he would act wisely in not repeating his visit. The ambassador was then dismissed, charged to convey

¹ Villehardouin, lib. i. pp. 43, 44; Ducange, lib. i. pp. 8-9.

to his sovereign the sentiments of Dandolo and the Barons. The latter, observing no prospect of a peaceful settlement of the question at issue, proceeded, without loss of time, to make dispositions for the passage of the Bosphorus.

Constantinople is built on seven hills, in the form of an unequal triangle; and the gentle promontory on which it rests terminates the continent of Europe. The capital of the East marked the site of a small colony, which a Megarian adventurer had planted long before the beginning of the Christian era on the borders of Thessaly and the sea; but the splendour of an imperial court effaced the humble limits of ancient Byzantium. Two lines of ramparts, running the whole length of the trigon, inclosed a deep moat, five-and-twenty feet in width, and formed a circumference of eleven or twelve miles.¹ The southern side of the sea-wall, extending from the Castle of the Seven Towers to the Acropolis,² met the waves of the Bosphorus; the northern lay toward the land; the western side was bathed by the waters of the Propontis or Sea of Marmora; and the east side, extending from the Acropolis to the Palace of Blachernae, adjoined the harbour of Constantinople, on which the commercial prosperity of the Greeks had bestowed the name of Chrysoceras or the *Golden Horn*. Two hundred and fifty towers, each of which afforded shelter to a large number of archers, slingers, and arbalisters, were placed, at regular intervals and alternate distances, along the double line of bulwarks; and above the inner wall, which rose twenty feet from the summit of the outer one, the eye of the stranger was attracted by the spires of a hundred churches and the swelling dome of Saint Sophia. Beyond the Horn, in an easterly direction, lay the suburbs of Pera and Galata, where the Emperor Alexios had drawn up his 70,000 Greeks; and on the other shore of the Propontis, which the Bosphorus connected with the Euxine, that of Scutari, where the Latins were already concerting their plan of attack.

After the departure of Rossi, the Chiefs had held a second council of war, to determine how and where they should open the assault. The Doge himself expressed an opinion that the siege should be purely a maritime one; and that,

¹ The walls, as they existed in 1204, had been erected by Theodosius the younger.

² Now called the Seraglio Point.

considering the fewness of their number and the gigantic nature of their undertaking, the army ought to act in strict unison with the Fleet, which would shelter the French from the dense masses of the Greek cavalry. The views of Dandolo were just and sensible; but the Barons, who suspected their partiality, urged on their side the unusual fatigue of a long voyage on a strange element, and demanded a fair trial of their knighthood either on foot or on horseback. The result of this difference was a somewhat injudicious compromise; it was decided, that the Doge should besiege the City by sea, while his confederates invested it by land. The whole army was accordingly divided into six battalions: the first and vanguard, which comprised the flower of the French and Flemish chivalry, was intrusted to Count Baldwin: the second, third, and fourth were allotted to his brother Henry, the Count of Blois, and the Count of Saint Pol, respectively; the fifth, to which the Marshal and Nobles of Champagne voluntarily attached themselves, was placed under the orders of the Baron de Montmorenci; and the command of the sixth division, forming the rearguard and reserve, devolved on the Marquis of Monteferrato, General-in-Chief. The knights, cased in shining armour, embarked on the palanders with their chargers, bridled and caparisoned; the other transports were assigned to the serjeants and esquires; and each vessel was towed by a galley across the swift current of the Bosphorus. The Venetian oarsmen were nimble and adroit; but their pace appeared slow to the impetuous French, many of whom leaped into the sea, where the water rose to their waists, and rushed forward, sword in hand, to attack the Greeks, who lined the opposite shore of the strait, and covered the Tower of Galata. His commanding position and superior numbers might have prompted Alexios to crush a few hundred stragglers, as they landed in disorderly precipitation, and in such a manner to cut off without difficulty or danger a considerable portion, perhaps the *élite*, of the French vanguard. But the heart of that Prince misgave him at this momentous juncture; and, in spite of the earnest solicitations of his son-in-law, Theodore Lascaris, who was serving under him as his lieutenant-general, the Emperor set spurs to his horse, and fled in consternation, followed by the whole army, which turned a deaf ear to the rallying

words of Lascaris. The disgraceful flight of the Greeks afforded the Crusaders ample time to form their ranks, and to join their leaders; and the French, having occupied the outskirts of Galata, soon became masters of the Tower itself.

At the eastern extremity of the harbour of Constantinople, and at the confluence of two small rivulets, the Barbyssos and the Cydaris,¹ the Crusaders had hoped to find a stone bridge, which connected the Capital with its suburbs, and faced the Gate and Palace of Blachernae. But Alexios, at once perceiving the danger, had caused this channel of communication to be destroyed: the Latin engineers were obliged to spend a day and a night in re-establishing it, there being no ford; and so soon as the work was completed, the troops crossed the Sweet Waters, and took up a position in front of Blachernae.

Meanwhile, Dandolo, having landed the troops of his allies in safety, undertook the formidable task of forcing the bar stretched across the mouth of the Chrysoceras; for this purpose each galley was provided with a huge pair of shears, with which it was designed that the mariners should essay to sever the links of the chain; and that feat was accomplished, after some difficulty, by the crew of the *Eagle*. The fleet, which thus gained access to the Horn, was disposed in a single line along the eastern wall; the machines, which formed the artillery of those early times, were immediately prepared for action; and a brisk discharge of missiles soon commenced from 250 catapults and other engines. The exertions of the Islanders were strenuous and unceasing, and their courage was stimulated by the presence and example of their venerable leader; where the greatest danger was, the eye distinguished the gaunt and erect form of the Doge. Before him was borne the great standard of the Republic; and the old man, always in the heart of the fight, instilled his own spirit into those who were within reach of his voice or his eye. His energy overcame every obstacle. An unseen hand² planted the Lion of Saint Mark on the wall of Constantinople. Five-and-twenty towers fell almost simultaneously into the hands of the Venetians; and by sharp and

¹ These streams are known to the modern traveller as the Kyal-Hanah and the Ali-Bey.

² As Gibbon observes, the soldier was instantaneously slain, in all probability.

continued volleys of arrows, stones, and combustible matter,¹ the garrisons were dislodged. But in their malice or despair the Greeks had recourse to a terrible expedient. The whole Quarter adjoining the harbour, and lying between Blachernae and the abbey of Evergetes, was soon observed to be wrapped in flames; and moreover, while he played his own part with such brilliant success, the generous heart of Dandolo was chilled by the news that the French had been assailed, and would be overwhelmed shortly by the superior numbers of the enemy, unless they were at once reinforced.

Alexios, indeed, taunted and emboldened by the fewness of his opponents, had at last summoned resolution to resume the offensive; and under his orders, sixty battalions, each of which was far more powerful than a French division, fell unexpectedly on the thin and unwary van of the Count of Flanders. The distress of Baldwin, however, was instantly perceived. His efforts were nobly seconded by his brother Henry and the other Chiefs; and the Emperor was already wavering between advance and retreat, when he beheld the Doge and a considerable body of men hastening toward the scene of action. Apprised of the perilous situation of his allies, Dandolo had chivalrously resolved to abandon his own conquest, and to proceed to their relief. His approach scared a legion of cowards. The Greeks fled in panic confusion, heedless, as before, of the rallying cry of Lascaris; and their precipitate flight afforded the Barons reason to marvel at their own preservation, as well as a farther opportunity of admiring the noble heroism of the Doge, who said "that he would die with them rather than earn at their cost undivided glory."

That very evening, Alexios, concluding that the fall of the City was inevitable, disclosed to a few of his nearer kindred his intention to consult his personal safety; and having collected a large sum of money, and appropriated the crown jewels, the usurper embarked at nightfall with his daughter Irene for Zagora, on the Black Sea, where he purposed to watch the course of events. The intelligence of his flight was speedily conveyed to the eunuch Constantine, prefect of the Treasury; and this minister, averse on interested grounds from a violent change in the government,

¹ Da Canale, sect. 45.

prevailed on the Varangian Guard and the Pisan volunteers to connive at the reinstatement of the late Emperor. With their aid, Isaac, after a captivity of eight years, was led from a dungeon to a throne; his wife, Margaret of Hungary, was placed at his side; and a messenger was sent to inform the boy Alexios that his father awaited him at the Palace of Blachernae.

Alexios was enchanted at the intelligence. He at once proposed to obey the call. But the Barons suffered themselves to be swayed by the circumspect counsels of the Doge; and preparatorily to the release of the younger Angelos, four deputies, Matthieu de Montmorenci, Geoffroi de Villehardouin,¹ and two noble Venetians, were instructed to repair to the Byzantine Court, to demand the fulfilment of the engagements to which it might be fairly asserted, that the son owed a father, that father a sceptre and an heir. In the presence of the Emperor, of the Empress, and of the principal Ministers of the Crown, the embassy recounted the several terms of the compact existing between the Pilgrims and the Prince his son. Isaac listened with a rueful countenance to the enumeration of the hard conditions to which Alexios had pledged his honour and his country. Still, there being no alternative, he signified his approval of the Treaty; and before they took their leave, he even went so far as to assure the Deputies that "in his opinion, the whole Empire was a scanty recompense for the services of the Latins." The Chiefs of the Crusade then escorted Alexios to the Palace, where they were received by the Court with every mark of honour. The Emperor affected toward those bold and unwelcome intruders the most affectionate gratitude; and the coronation of the two Angeli, which was solemnized on the 1st of August (1203) with unusual splendour and rejoicing beneath the spacious dome of Saint Sophia, appeared to complete the triumph of Dandolo and the Barons.

But the poverty and prejudices of the Greeks were alike opposed to the settlement of the claims, which were now brought forward by the Latins, namely, the payment of the 200,000 marks, the return of the papal supremacy and recantation of the tenets of Photius, and the levy of the armed contingent of 10,000 men for the service of the

¹ Villehardouin, lib. i. pp. 58-99.

Holy Land. The Doge and his allies soon found that the execution of the treaty was impeded by an inability to liquidate the debt and a repugnance to the spiritual domination of a foreign priest; and a small instalment of the money, which Isaac had designed as a convincing proof of his sincerity and goodwill, mainly tended to diminish his power and popularity. Even this dole was raised by the most desperate and scandalous methods. The holy vessels and the images of the Saints were committed to the crucible. The jewels and effects of the late imperial family, which Alexios had not been able to remove, were declared forfeited to the State. In numberless instances, the property of individuals was summarily sequestrated and sold.

The Greek Government appeared to be acting under the influence of some strange infatuation. The system of rapine and extortion, which it pursued, was gradually spreading disaffection through every class of society. The people already began to sigh for a prince who *had eyes to see*, and power to avert, their impending ruin, without so grossly breaking every precept of right and religion. Although a few months only had elapsed since the pompous coronation of Alexios and his father, the Latins perceived that Constantinople was growing ripe for a fresh revolution; and it was, perhaps, their true interest to allow events to take their natural course, to wait until a ground arose for interposing their authority as mediators between the Angeli and their subjects.

Before the departure from Corfu, the Chiefs had become parties to a treaty by which they bound themselves unconditionally to afford a certain number of their followers, who were more particularly desirous of reaching the Holy Land, with the means of transport on (if not before) the 29th of September 1203. The day named for the release of these persons from their engagement was now at hand. But the redemption of the pledge threatened more than to decimate the little army which at present supported the two Angeli in their precarious position; and Alexios, who was conscious that this defection would be fatal to the stability of his throne, and that the disbandment of the Crusaders would be closely followed by another domestic convulsion, resolved to spare no inducement to prolong the stay of the Confederates at Galata. With this object the Prince often visited the Chiefs in their

pavilions; and, in order to popularise himself among the troops, he often deigned, as he passed the bivouacs, to join in a conversation or to take part in a carouse. On these occasions the bounds of discipline and etiquette were overstepped sometimes by the boisterous gaiety of the Frenchmen and by the unconstrained licence of the camp; in a merry fit or in an unguarded moment, Alexios laid aside the majesty of the purple; and in the freedom of discourse and action the soldiers were too apt to forget that their guest was an Emperor. In one instance, a pilgrim snatched the headgear from the imperial brows, and adjusted it sportively on his own, proffering in exchange the woollen cap of a trooper. This pleasantry provoked the sensitive petulance of the boy-Prince; and the soldier was sternly reprimanded. As he turned from the scene, did it occur to Alexios that in his House the crown had more than once as unceremoniously passed in earnest from usurper to usurper?

At the same time his negotiation¹ with the Chiefs was progressing rather favourably. The terms which he offered to their acceptance were sufficiently reasonable. He reminded the Doge and the Barons, that the day fixed for their departure was approaching. He begged them to remember, that himself, as well as his father Isaac, had sacrificed to their friendship and alliance the national confidence and goodwill; he assured them that they were now eyed askance by all classes; and it was his belief, that the people were deterred only by the presence of the Pilgrims from rising in open rebellion. An empty treasury and a scanty revenue hardly admitted the liquidation of the large sum due to them within so short a space; and as to the submission of the Eastern Church to the Apostolic See, he said that that was a work of time. In the spring, however, he trusted that his power would be more consolidated, his finances more buoyant; should they accede to his proposition, he promised scrupulously to satisfy their claims within that term; and they would then be at liberty to achieve their holy undertaking without difficulty or risk. On the other hand he pointed out to them that, according to their present design, they purposed to perform a long voyage on a treacherous element at a bleak season of the year, and to brave the hardships of a winter campaign in a remote and

¹ Lebeau, xvii. pp. 114-15.

hostile country. In conclusion, the Prince disclosed his intention of organizing, without loss of time, the contingent of 10,000 soldiers, as well as the guard of 500 knights for the service of Heaven; and he announced his readiness to furnish the Pilgrims with necessaries at his own cost till the Passover. The Barons were mollified by the verbal generosity of Alexios; and the doubts or scruples of the Doge were removed by a promise on the part of the Prince to defray the entire expense of the armament, and to keep it afloat till April, 1204. The Latins accordingly consented to extend the period of their stay to the first week in that month. The objections of the Cabal, which once more protested against the base attempt of the Venetians to frustrate the designs of his Holiness, and to detain the Crusaders at Constantinople, were overruled; and the qualms of the devout were in some measure relieved by the formal abjuration of the heresy of Photius by the patriarch and clergy of the Greek Church. During this interval of leisure and inaction, the Count of Saint Pol and the Marquis of Monteferrato were tempted by a gift of 1600 gold pieces to place a portion of the army at the disposal of Alexios, who was desirous of testing the loyalty of the imperial cities on the shores or in the neighbourhood of the Bosphorus. Until the return of the expedition, the Count of Flanders was left at Galata with a body of picked troops to guard the camp, while the Doge remained in the harbour with his fleet to protect the Capital.

The march of the army through Thrace at first assumed the form of a triumphal procession. The neighbouring cities yielded without a murmur to the power of Alexios and the Latins. But its advance was speedily checked by the news, that the Bulgarians, under the command of John their king, had lately debouched in great force from the Balkans into the plains,¹ and were now rapidly approaching Adrianople for the purpose of opposing the progress of the Crusaders. The Bulgarian monarch, who affected to hold his crown of the Pope, had long refused to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Byzantine Court; and a war of twenty years, which he waged with Emmanuel Comnenos, far from being favourable to the arms of the Greek Emperor, firmly established the position of John as an independent prince. The alienation of a large

¹ Lebeau, xvii. p. 117.

province, and the rise of a new Power, on the confines of Thrace, constituted a serious and formidable evil: the Bulgarian dominions were thickly populated and extensive; and that dangerous neighbour failed not to seize every opportunity of engaging in hostilities against a declining empire. On learning the proximity of the Bulgarians, the Latins, feeling their inability to cope with so large a force, resolved to proceed no farther than Ipsala. Retracing their steps, they regained Constantinople on the 11th of November (1203).

About a week after the departure of Alexios and the Barons, who accompanied him on the Thracian expedition, a party of Flemings and Venetians were to be seen carousing in one of the tents of the Camp of Galata. It was the evening of August 19, 1203. The wine was of Greek vintage, and it flowed freely. The spirits of the revellers rose high. Suddenly the idea of a drunken frolic suggested itself. There was a quarter in the same suburb, which was assigned by the imperial government to the Jewish and Arab factories in Constantinople. It was known as *Mitatus*. Those who inhabited it were for the most part mild and inoffensive men, whose chief study lay in the accumulation of wealth. The revellers resolved to make a nocturnal inroad into *Mitatus*. The defenceless character of their intended victims presented a temptation. Their religious nonconformity afforded an excuse. The shades of night were already falling; the Latins rose from their cups, and fetched their weapons; and, having communicated the design to a few companions, all hurried in the same direction. The work of pillage and destruction soon commenced. A synagogue was burst open. Every house and building of a private or public character, where they expected to find treasure or booty, was ransacked. A dim twilight assisted the operations of the marauders. The Jews, scared at the sudden noise and tumult, fled in utter dismay from pursuers, of whose power and purpose they were alike ignorant; and that lawless crew succeeded without loss of life or effusion of blood in gaining possession of a rich spoil. But suspecting at last, that their assailants were really few in number, the Jews went in search of aid. In a short time, they returned with a body of Greeks, whom they had probably bribed by the promise of a liberal recompense to espouse their cause. The encounter between the Latins and

their opponents was fierce and sanguinary. The former, although unprepared for resistance, and numerically weak, were in the highest spirits. The merchants, naturally sedentary and peaceful in their habits, were roused to active exertion by the instinctive desire of self-preservation. The desperate efforts of the Jews, combined with the powerful aid of the Greeks, soon turned the scale of victory in their favour. After several hours' hard fighting and considerable sacrifice of life, the Latins found themselves under the necessity of giving way: and some Flemings, alarmed at so unexpected a display of bravery, tried to cover their retreat by setting light to some of the adjoining houses. The flames spread with rapidity. In a few hours they reduced a large portion of the quarter to a heap of smouldering ashes. In a spirit of orthodoxy the incendiaries beheld with exulting delight the demolition of a mosque and a synagogue. Darkness lent new horror to the scene. A lurid glare, extending almost from Mitatus to the Sea of Marmora, burst across the gloom. The collapse of burning houses was preceded by the fall of flaming beams; and amid the clash and din of arms the distracted ear distinguished the shouts of frantic soldiers, the shrieks of women, and the screams of children. This shocking spectacle lasted till an early hour in the morning (August 20th). The flames were less easily subdued; and when their fury abated, at length, on the eighth day, several ships which had ridden at anchor in the Port were burned to the water's edge; and a third of Constantinople was a ruin.

During the progress of this conflagration, the Crusaders had suffered neither the rules of discipline, nor the fear of treachery, nor the consideration of international enmity, to outweigh the dictates of humanity; several thousand Greeks of both sexes were rescued from a cruel death by their generosity and self-possession; and, after the extinction of the flames, Dandolo and Count Baldwin, the two Latin Chiefs who remained at the camp, sent a joint message to Isaac, in which they expressed their excessive sorrow at the recent occurrence, and their anxiety to detect and punish the offenders. But if the popular hatred had been less blind and indiscriminate, the Greeks were reluctant to forsake the pleasing conviction, that the incendiaries acted under the sanction of the Doge and his allies; and a wanton act of aggression, on the

part of a few besotted and fanatical troopers, furnished a stronger handle than any antecedent event to national and religious antipathy. The entire community had reason to deplore the late catastrophe. Imprecations against the Barbarians of the West resounded in every quarter. The unexampled atrocity of the outrage was in every mouth. In the streets of Constantinople rose a mingled cry of vengeance and despair; and so imminent was the prospect of a general insurrection, that no fewer than 5000 Latin merchants, taking alarm, deserted their dwellings, and sought shelter in the French camp at Galata.

The flames were at last quenched on the 27th August. It has been already mentioned that the Prince and his companions did not return to the capital till the 11th of November; and in an interval of ten weeks, the passions of the multitude were in a large measure calmed, while their sufferings had been greatly alleviated. Alexios, who was shocked at the desolate aspect which the City presented, especially in those quarters where the conflagration had made most havoc, was received by the Doge and the Count of Flanders with the most considerate kindness. They extolled his courage, applauded his achievements, complimented him on the success which had attended his arms; and that inexperienced youth, not unnaturally viewing these extravagant praises as the homage justly due to his rank and merit, was thus led to imagine that his genius alone was capable of restoring the ancient splendour of the purple. The tone of Alexios, after his return, was observed to be more grave, his manner more guarded; his bearing toward the troops became less familiar, and toward their chiefs it became less friendly; and his later interviews with Dandolo and the Barons were embarrassed by an air of reserve. The Latins had every disposition to pardon the caprices of a weak and wayward boy. But it was clear that his estrangement proceeded, at least to some extent, from an anxiety to evade the fulfilment of his promises.¹ It was true that the Greek heresy had been formally abjured by the Patriarch of Constantinople and his clergy, and that so far the pledge to restore the papal supremacy had been in some sense redeemed; but, on the other hand, no farther instalment of the 200,000 marks had been received; and the demands of the Latins were treated

¹ *Cronaca Altinate*, lib. vi.

with contemptuous indifference. The Marquis Boniface, who felt that he might use the freedom of a guardian and a friend, had repeatedly urged his youthful relative to lose no time in satisfying their claims; the other chiefs were equally earnest and importunate; and Dandolo himself, although he began to incline secretly to the opinion that a rupture with the Angeli might not be unattended by advantage to the Republic, insisted nevertheless on the prompt execution of the treaty of March 1202. Alexios, however, either from an inability or an unwillingness to make a favourable response, turned a deaf ear to these appeals; the Crusaders at last quite lost patience; and in the early part of January 1204, an embassy, consisting of Geoffroi de Villehardouin, Conon de Béthune, Miles de Brabant, and three noble Venetians, was dispatched from the Camp of Galata to Constantinople with instructions to recall to the memory of Isaac and his son the services of the Confederates; to remind them that the execution of the treaty was still pending; and to intimate that, unless they were disposed to comply at once with the terms of that compact, the Doge of Venice and the Barons of France had resolved to obtain redress by force of arms. Béthune and his companions undertook a mission full of hazard. Quitting the camp on horseback, accompanied by a few attendants, they rode across the bridge of the Sweet Waters, and alighting at the Gate of Blachernae, they repaired on foot to the palace. The path was hedged by a double line of Varangians; it was a reception day; and the Barons, having threaded this glittering file, introduced themselves into the august presence of the Angeli. They found Isaac reclining on a throne, supported by his son Alexios and his spouse Margaret of Hungary; a brilliant throng of ministers and domestics filled the hall; and a single glance assured the Deputies that they were in the midst of the Byzantine Court. Béthune therefore immediately delivered the peremptory message, of which he and his companions were the common bearers; he announced in a commanding voice the high resolution on which the Doge and the Barons were prepared to act, should their legitimate claims fail to meet with prompt satisfaction; and, their adventurous errand being thus at an end, the ambassadors retired without pausing to observe the effect which they had produced. They fortunately succeeded in reaching without

molestation the gate where they had left their horses and attendants; and, springing to their saddles, they returned at full gallop to the camp.

The sudden appearance of the Deputies in the capital and their equally sudden departure, had not failed to give rise to a general feeling of surprise and curiosity. Rumours were soon rife, surmises and conjectures were soon abundant, touching the object of the late visit. Every one presaged some new danger, or suspected some fresh affront. Few were aware of the real cause of the tumult: yet the whole city was thrown, in a short time, into a state of delirium. But the rage of the Greeks was ungovernable when they ascertained the nature of the message, and discovered that the ambassadors had actually succeeded in escaping from their hands. In their phrenzy they turned instinctively from those who had offered so outrageous an insult, to those who had not resented it. The popular indignation against the Crusaders sought an outlet in a general cry, that Alexios had sold his country to the Western barbarians, that the Angeli were unfit to reign, and that it was full time to elect in their room a prince, who was capable of giving them freedom.

The greatest alarm now prevailed at the palace. Isaac, apprised that the mob had actually demolished the colossal statue of Minerva in the Square of Constantine, ordered the Caledonian Boar, a bronze which stood in the Hippodrome, and which was vulgarly supposed to contain some charm against sedition, to be removed to the precincts of Blachernae. Every corner of Constantinople continued to reverberate with confused sounds. By the intrusion of a few strangers into the city and palace of the Cæsars the strongest feelings of human nature were awakened. The Greeks, while they lay spell-bound under the baleful influence of a profligate court and a bad government, could not help regarding the affront which the Latin embassy had inflicted on the throne as a national dishonour; and it was in a frantic outburst of loyalty and enthusiasm that they conceived the design of wreaking their revenge, if not of achieving their deliverance, by destroying that fleet, on which it might be said that the hopes of the Latins mainly rested.

One night in midwinter, a sentinel, planted at one of the outposts of the French camp, suddenly perceived in the distance

a broad, but broken sheet of flame, which seemed to be approaching with rapidity that part of the harbour where the Venetian fleet was moored. The soldier instantly gave the alarm. The ships' crews were quickly on the alert. The practised eye of the mariners readily discovered the nature and proximity of the danger. The light, of which the French vidette had given such timely warning, was found to proceed from a line of fire-ships which had been ignited apparently by the Greeks at the southern extremity of the harbour, and had drifted down the Horn. The sailors threw themselves nimbly into their galleys, rowed at full speed toward the blazing vessels, seized them with long hooked poles, towed them to the mouth of the port, and there loosening their hold, suffered the ships to be swept by the current into the main. The intended victims of the plot thus escaped without sustaining any injury or damage. The incendiaries themselves lost a Pisan merchantman, which was burned to ashes.¹

The Crusaders, relieved from the immediate peril by the hardihood and tact of the Venetians, now began to suspect that the late movement was merely a cover to a more extensive line of operations, and that it was the intention of the Greeks to sally from the Northern Gate in force, and to attack the Latins both in flank and rear, while the latter were thought to be busily engaged in avoiding or extinguishing the flames. Anxious to provide for such an alarming contingency, the Barons ordered their followers to get at once under arms, and the camp consequently soon presented a scene of bustle and preparation. The surmise, however, proved false and the precaution superfluous.

Scarcely had they separated, when a messenger arrived from Constantinople, and solicited an audience of Dandolo and his confederates; his name was Alexios Ducas; but owing to the shagginess of his eyebrows, he was commonly nicknamed by his countrymen *Murtzuphles*. This man had been instructed by the younger Angelos to express his deep regret at the recent occurrence, which he imputed to the folly of the populace; to declare that, so far as the Prince was personally concerned, he wished and intended to fulfil his engagements with them; and to announce, that he was prepared to place the Palace of Blachernae in the hands of the Latins as a token

¹ *Cronaca Altinate*, lib. vi.

of his good faith and as a bond for the execution of the treaty. The recent plot, however, although perhaps justified by the liberal maxims of war, taught the Latins to be extremely guarded in their transactions with the Court of Constantinople; and the present proposal was from its nature and origin peculiarly liable to suspicion. Yet by his tact or importunacy Ducas contrived to overrule objections; and an arrangement was concluded on the spot, by which Blachernae was to be given up to the Chiefs of the Crusade in the course of a few days. But, in the interval, a second messenger came to announce that an unforeseen circumstance had led the Angeli to change their views; amid the general fermentation and excitement which prevailed at present in the capital, they felt that the entry of the Latins into Constantinople might provoke an insurrection; and it was, in their opinion, unsafe for Dandolo and the Barons to accept the recent invitation of Alexios. Hereupon, the negotiation, which had been opened without any precise object, was suffered to drop altogether, the besiegers determining, as they declared, to delay no longer in executing their threat by submitting the question to the arbitrement of the sword, while the besieged indicated an equally firm resolution to part at the dearest rate with their liberties and their lives. To the chivalric ardour of the French and the tried bravery of the Venetians the Greeks opposed superior numbers, a more commanding position, and more copious resources; they opposed the talents of Theodore Lascaris and of Alexios Murtzuphles, the steady discipline of the Varangian Guard, and the active jealousy of the Pisan auxiliaries: and, moreover, they had on their side every motive to exertion and every plea against inactivity. On the other hand, there were few among that large population who possessed the least singleness or energy of purpose: corruption, venality, decay, was everywhere. Its wealth was absorbed by speculation and monopoly; and the masses, except when they were momentarily goaded to madness by some wanton act of aggression or despotism, lay in an ignoble stupor.

CHAPTER XII

A.D. 1203-1205

Siege of Constantinople (1203-4)—Fall of the City (April, 1204)—Partition of the Empire—Bulgarian War (1204-5)—Siege of Adrianople (1205)—Reverses of the Latins—Death of Dandolo (June, 1205)—Marino Zeno, First Venetian Podesta of Constantinople.

ISAAC ANGELOS COMNENOS, at once weak and irresolute, capricious and arbitrary, timid and cruel, shewed himself destitute of those high qualities which should unite to form the sovereign of an independent country. The days of his reign and his empire were alike numbered, and each hour was pregnant with symptoms of approaching collapse: yet Isaac was persuaded to nourish a fancy, that a great and auspicious change was at hand; and the sycophants, who surrounded the throne, succeeded in deluding him with the notion, that his health and sight were about to be speedily restored, and that, at the head of his victorious legions, he would soon again compel the nations to acknowledge the majesty of Rome. The child was hardly less vicious and less despicable than the parent. Though not born in the purple, the former passed his infancy and boyhood in a Court, which had long ceased to be censorious: and at that period of life, when education should be most strict, Prince Alexios was an exile and a wanderer. The vicissitudes of his youthful career made an enduring impression on a fiery temper and a feeble intellect; and, when he ascended the imperial throne in the autumn of 1203, his mind was already a prey to misfortune and neglect. Alexios was less apathetic, less fatuous, perhaps less corrupt, than his father; but it was clear, that he was equally incapable of meeting a public emergency of such unprecedented magnitude.

It is impossible not to treat the continuance in power of two such Princes as a striking exemplification of the morbid torpor of a nation, which tolerated a Government at once

tyrannical and impotent. Even the eventual fall of the Angeli was due not to a general rising of the population, or to an open rebellion against their authority, but to the successful intrigues of a minister, who abused their confidence.

Murtzuphles, now their principal adviser, was a man of conspicuous talent, of indefatigable energy, of unscrupulous ambition. In his high capacity of grand-chamberlain, frequent opportunities were afforded him of popularising himself. By the exercise of great circumspection and tact, the crafty official contrived to win the favour of his countrymen without forfeiting the confidence of his august employers; and he promoted the disunion, which already existed to some extent, between the Greeks and their rulers by every artifice, tending to lower the Angeli in the estimation of their subjects, to exalt them in their own. In their presence he flattered their vanity; while behind their backs he exposed their vices. He extolled their conduct in their hearing, while he was secretly traducing its motives. So ably concerted were all his plans, that those Princes became conscious of the decline of their influence and popularity only when it was too late to save themselves from destruction. So consummate indeed was his duplicity, or so strong had grown the hallucination in their minds that, when the people assembled, toward the close of January 1204, in the church of Saint Sophia for the purpose of deliberating on the question of introducing some change into the government, both Isaac and his son still refused to believe that any such design was in contemplation. Murtzuphles, however, had been whispering in the popular ear that Alexios was on the point of delivering up the City to the Pilgrims; and the Greeks had at last gone so far as to declare that the Angeli were unworthy of their confidence.

All who were capable of filling that exalted station studiously shunned, however, a dignity which offered no security for gentle natures, no scope for ambition; and the Greeks, exasperated beyond measure at the unforeseen difficulty which they experienced in finding a master, went so far, in the prurency of their rage, as to menace with immediate death those whom they considered competent, and who were found unwilling, to discharge the proffered trust. Yet, with a single exception, the risk of life was accounted preferable to an empty and odious distinction; and it was only under the

utmost stress of intimidation, that Nicholas Canabes, a young man of noble birth and amiable disposition, yet wholly incapable of filling such a position at such an extraordinary crisis, could be persuaded to accept the diadem.

What the nation really wanted, was the genius to form plans, and the courage to execute them; and these qualities were found united in Murtzuphles alone. During the period, which immediately preceded the election of Canabes, the Chamberlain had not ceased to observe the course of events with an anxious and vigilant eye; he took everything into calculation and account; and, under the mask of friendship or patriotism, he at last succeeded in removing all the obstacles to his own advancement. By his address he gained the ear of the Treasurer. The collusion of the Treasurer enabled him to tamper with the Varangians. He judged that the rest might be safely left to his own exertions. On the evening of the 8th of February 1204, the Chamberlain entered the Palace after dusk, accompanied by a few satellites. The latter had their instructions; at a given sign they seized Canabes, and hurried him away to a distant dungeon where his presence would be unsuspected, his cries unheard. On the same night, the younger Angelos was roused from his slumber by the sudden and startling announcement, that a revolution was taking place in the capital; and that unfortunate youth, distracted by the noise, deceived by the obscurity of the hour, suffered himself to be led by Murtzuphles, for the alleged sake of greater security, into an adjoining chamber, where he was strangled in the presence of his pretended deliverer. In attempting to conceal his guilt, Murtzuphles aggravated it. The yet palpitating body of his victim was covered with bruises and scars, in order that, while the corpse lay in state, it might appear that the Emperor had died from the effect of a fall; and a few days afterward the natural craving of the multitude for pageantry was gratified by a pompous interment in the church of Apostoli.¹

The intelligence of the death of his son was a fatal shock to the feeble health of Isaac, who had been gradually sinking into helpless decrepitude; and that Prince was saved perhaps from a similar doom by a timely decease.²

¹ *Cronaca Altinate*, lib. vi. p. 192; Lebeau, xvii. p. 133.

² See Antonio Conti, "Proteo Idillio," 22 (*Componimenti poetici in lode di Venezia di varii autori*, Ven. 1792).

The melancholy end of the Angeli created in their favour a general, though momentary, feeling of sympathy; and the cord of the assassin seemed to reconcile the nation for a while to the memory of the father and the son. It required no very extraordinary power of insight into human nature to foresee this transient reaction; Ducas was far too wary to keep aloof at such a critical moment; and few were louder than himself in their expressions of surprise and sorrow. As the Chamberlain had anticipated, the popular emotion quickly subsided, and although it was still gravely suspected in many quarters, that the blood of the Angeli was on the head of their late minister, Murtzuphles was permitted to take undisputed possession of the vacant throne. Thus was accomplished the third domestic revolution, which Constantinople had witnessed in the course of a few months. (February 1204.)

On his accession, Alexios Ducas Murtzuphles hastened to send word to the Latin Chiefs through a confidential agent, that *Alexios* desired them to sup and confer with him, on a certain night, at the palace of Blachernae. Such a proposal, emanating from such a source, deserved to be treated with peculiar caution: its very authenticity could not altogether be free from doubt. Yet, in the air and tone of the individual who was the bearer of the message, there was something which threw the Barons off their guard, and which prompted them to accept the invitation: nor did the Doge himself—Dandolo, *the Prudent of the Prudent*—appear to entertain any misgivings. Dandolo indeed had forborne to express his opinion in the hearing of the Greeks; but the old man failed not, so soon as the envoy had gone, to convince his companions that he was very far from viewing the matter in a favourable light. "It was," he said, "the greatest folly imaginable to place reliance on the perjured honour of the Angeli; there was no reason to doubt, that this was some new snare for inveigling them into ruin; and he recommended them, if they set any value on their lives, to abstain from complying with the invitation of Alexios. Had they forgotten (he asked) the perfidious and ungrateful conduct of that Prince toward them? Restored by their valour, loaded with their favours, so soon as he found himself in a position to dispense with their services, he had become their enemy, he had turned against them the very arms, which they placed in his hands. In spite of solemn

engagements, he opened hostilities. He attempted to destroy the fleet. Already he had repeatedly deceived them with empty and insidious overtures. If they suffered themselves to be cajoled again by the same paltry and shallow artifices, it was their own blame. On the contrary, he urged them to be patient, and attempt to discover how matters stood in Constantinople, before they took any hazardous step." This wise counsel prevailed; and on ascertaining the real posture of affairs, the Barons had perhaps the candour and generosity to own, that they were solely indebted for their preservation to the good sense and prudence of the Doge.¹

The signal miscarriage of his first scheme vexed without disheartening Murtzuphles; and that daring adventurer held himself in readiness to seize the next opportunity, which might present itself, of gaining an advantage over the Latins. This opportunity was soon forthcoming. Shortly after the frustration of his late plot, he learned that a body of chosen troops, about 1000 strong, under the Count of Flanders had gone on a predatory excursion to Phinea on the Bosphorus, for the purpose of obtaining a fresh supply of forage and provisions, of which the army and the fleet were beginning to feel a scarcity. The Emperor conceived that he might without much difficulty take the foragers by surprise as they returned home, encumbered with booty and elated by success, and in this manner might weaken materially the forces of the French, who were reported to have been already reduced by various causes to between 5000 and 6000. The plan was simple; its execution seemed very feasible; and Murtzuphles set out for Phinea at the head of a powerful detachment of troops, with confident expectations of a favourable result.

Meanwhile, the French, having taken the town by storm, spent three days in sack and pillage; and fortunately for the Allies, Baldwin, instead of consigning the spoil, in the ordinary manner, to the care of his followers, caused it to be placed on board some Venetian vessels, which happened to be lying in the harbour, and to be transported by sea to headquarters. The foragers therefore, though greatly inferior in point of number, were in a position to sustain with firmness the onset of the ambuscade, which Murtzuphles had planted in a wood near Phinea. The attack, however, was such a complete surprise

¹ Lebeau, xvii. p. 132.

that the struggle was at first exceedingly fierce. For some time the French failed to make any marked impression on the dense masses of the enemy. But the affair was at last decided by the dastardly behaviour of the Greeks, who fled, after a few hours' fighting, in panic disorder, leaving behind them a miraculous image of the Virgin and Murtzuphles himself, who was saved from capture only by the fleetness of his horse.

This second defeat was highly mortifying to the Emperor. It shewed him without any disguise the hollowness of the ground on which he stood, and the worthlessness of those with whom he was endeavouring to act. Already sensible of the difficulties with which he had to cope, he now learned to the full extent the inadequacy of the means which he possessed of coping with them. At the same time, he could not help feeling that his life depended on the continuance of his power, and that it was necessary, under every circumstance of discouragement, to try some new experiment. To make any farther concealment of the death of the Angeli was clearly useless. It seemed equally nugatory to disclaim a knowledge of the murder of Alexios. He resolved to assume the character of their legitimate successor; and in that capacity he proceeded to invite the Chiefs of the Crusade to a friendly conference, where some plan might be concerted for the execution of the remaining articles of the treaty. But the Barons, who had now grown exceedingly circumspect, refused to fall into such an open snare; and some even harboured doubts, whether they were justified, as Christians and Crusaders, in holding any intercourse with a usurper and an assassin.¹ The Doge, in this instance, was of a different opinion. He thought that it was their duty to sacrifice private objections and scruples (however just they might be) to the public advantage, and that they were bound to reject no opportunity which might present itself of arriving at terms, provided that such terms compromised not, firstly, the honour of God, and, secondly, the honour of the Pilgrims. At the same time, if they were unwilling to accept the proposal, the old man offered to go alone, and to ascertain, in a personal interview, how far the death of the Angeli affected their prospect. The suggestion of Dandolo, though at variance with the views of the rest, was

¹ Lebeau, xvii. p. 132.

at once adopted; and his Serenity, embarking on his galley, met Murtzuphles, according to arrangement, near the Sweet Waters.¹ The Doge stood erect in the prow of his barge. The Emperor remained on horseback. The conversation was opened by the former. Dandolo spoke with the sternest reprobation of the horrible crime of which Murtzuphles had been guilty. He pictured to him the difficulty of persuading the Latins to repose trust in a man who, in defiance of all laws, human and divine, and under circumstances of such atrocious perfidy, had taken the life of his sovereign. The Greek attempted to palliate, even to justify, his conduct. Dandolo, turning a deaf ear to his apology, proceeded to recapitulate the several terms of the treaty concluded in the spring of 1203, between his predecessors on the one part and the French Barons and his own Government on the other. The Emperor acquiesced in every article, save one. He protested that, sooner than submit to the restoration of the papal supremacy, he would bury himself and his countrymen under the ruins of the Empire. It was in vain that the Doge expostulated, or that he pointed out that the Greek clergy had already formally renounced the heresy of Photius. The resolution of the other was inflexible, and thereupon the two princes parted, the only result of the conference being, that Dandolo might now affirm with some truth that he had used his utmost exertions in the interest of peace.²

After a second attempt to destroy the fleet with fire-ships, which was not more successful than the first, Murtzuphles saw that it was impossible any longer to defer hostilities. His resources were fearfully inadequate, and the task which he had undertaken demanded all his firmness and energy. The Exchequer was empty. The conduct of Alexios and his father had rendered the Crown unpopular. The people were enervated by corruption and ease. But all these evils were promptly remedied. The Treasury was replenished with the confiscated property of such as were accused of having amassed fortunes by malversation and other illegal modes during the reign of the Angeli. A new spirit was instilled into the nation by the example and encouragement of Murtzuphles. By his fascinating manners, imperturbable serenity, and conciliatory tone, the Emperor won the affection and confidence of the

¹ Gibbon, ch. lx. p. 562.

² Lebeau, xvii. p. 134.

Greeks. All the available and latent resources of the State were applied to the great work; all who were capable of bearing arms were required to participate in the defence of the country from the Barbarians of the West; and, under the immediate eye of Alexios Ducas, who stimulated all by his presence, the Greeks recovered something of their ancient spirit and powers of endurance. In less than two months, their combined exertions wrought the most prodigious results. It was conjectured that the eastern wall of Constantinople, which adjoined the Chrysoceras, and which had most severely suffered during the late siege, would be the point of attack: it was thither that Ducas therefore directed his almost exclusive attention. The wall itself was not only strengthened and repaired, but it was wholly rebuilt in many places, and raised to such a height as to cover the movements of the besieged; and, at regular distances of fifty feet it was flanked by lofty and capacious towers of stone. Between these stone towers were others constructed in wood, of which several were six stories in height, and none were less than three. Each of these stories became the seat of a numerous garrison, amply furnished with every implement of warfare; to the basement was attached a drawbridge, which connected it at pleasure with the parapet of the rampart; and midway between each of the wooden towers was planted a mangonel of unusually large calibre, for the purpose of projecting stones and darts against any convenient point of the enemy's line.¹

The Latins had been equally busy in preparing for action, and in making the necessary dispositions for the renewal of the siege which was now, in conformity with the original plan of the Doge, to be purely a maritime one. The decks of the vessels were already covered with stores of missiles, and of machines of every size and description for hurling stones or for vomiting combustible matter. It remained only to determine when and where the assault should be opened.

This display of activity and zeal did not prevent the French from continuing to cherish certain misgivings touching the issue of the impending struggle; and at a Council of War, which met to settle all minor details, several of the Barons expressed an opinion that it was both foolish and vain to attempt the reduction of so strong a city with so small a force.

¹ Lebeau, xvii. pp. 134-5.

It was proper to remember that they had now to deal with a prince who far surpassed the Angeli in talent, in experience, and in energy;¹ and they pleaded that, by ravaging the fields, by occupying the environs, by intercepting supplies, they might save a great risk, and secure an easy victory. This argument, however, although by no means without its force, savoured much too strongly of caution to satisfy or please the bold hearts and intrepid spirits, in whose estimation want of judgment was preferable in a high degree to want of courage, and things nobly lost to things basely won. Besides, even granting that the course proposed was just and honourable, how could a handful of soldiers hope to reduce by famine a city which commanded three seas? It was urged, too, by the Doge and his supporters, that their passed reverses had made too vivid and durable an impression on the minds of the Greeks to be removed by a recent change of circumstances. The apathy by which the latter were affected was neither transient nor partial. It was a taint which had been slowly ingrained by time in the national character, and which it was not in one man or in one generation to correct, much less to destroy. Moreover, the death of the Angeli changed the state of parties and the nature of the question. From the moment of the accession of Murtzuphles to a bloodstained throne, the war might be justly considered as having assumed a different complexion. They had come to restore and uphold an exiled dynasty. They were now called to avenge a murder, perhaps to award a crown.

The opinions of Dandolo and his partizans ultimately triumphed; and the malcontents, who had been mainly influenced in their judgment by the remaining members of the Cabal, were obliged to give way. By general consent, the assault was fixed for the 9th of April.

But the Latins, assuming that the city was in their power, the empire at their disposal, were justly apprehensive lest the undue pretensions of some, the ill-judged precipitation of others, should disturb the harmony which at present subsisted between the several leaders of the expedition; and preparatorily to resuming the offensive, it was thought desirable to form a general plan for adjusting all claims which might subsequently arise. They resolved accordingly to frame at once

¹ Lebean. xvii. lib. 94. p. 138.

a series of conditions, which might regulate the conduct, and restrain the ambition, of all parties.

These conditions were to the following purport¹:—1. The entire booty found in the city was to be collected in one spot, to be determined thereafter; and no one was, of his own accord or by his own authority, to abstract, secrete, or appropriate any portion of such booty. 2. It was to be divided eventually in two equal portions between the French and Venetians; but the former were to pay at once out of their share the residue of the debt due to the Republic. 3. The Venetians were entitled to claim, throughout the empire, the same honours and privileges as they formerly enjoyed in the imperial dominions, both temporal and spiritual; and they were to be governed by their own laws, both customary and statutory. 4. The choice of a new Emperor was to be entrusted to twelve electors, six French and six Venetian, who should be bound by a solemn oath to nominate from the Army or the Fleet the person, whom they conscientiously judged most capable of restoring in his dominions the purity of the Church and the dignity of the State, and of maintaining their piety toward God and obedience to the Apostolic See. 5. The nation, which did not give an Emperor, had a consequent right to nominate a Patriarch of Constantinople. 6. Twelve Commissioners, six French and six Venetian, were to be appointed for the purpose of placing their respective owners in possession of the various provinces and principalities, which would necessarily accrue from the remodelling of the Feudal Tenure after the conquest. 7. In consideration of his high rank and extraordinary merit, the Doge of Venice was to be wholly exempt from the payment of homage for any lands or territories which he might hold in fief of the Byzantine Court. 8. Finally, should it be deemed expedient at a future period to enlarge or modify the foregoing conditions, the Marquis Boniface was to be furnished with authority to form a committee, to consist of himself, the twelve Commissioners for the redistribution of fiefs, and six additional members eligible by him. Such were the principal articles of the Treaty concluded between Dandolo and the Barons at the Camp of Galata in March 1204.² The final arrangements were completed during the first week in April;

¹ Marin, iv. p. 52.

² Lebeau, xvii. p. 139; Marin, iv. p. 52.

the French embarked on Thursday, the 8th of the month ; and on the same day, the fleet, having been divided into six squadrons, was ranged at a safe but convenient distance in order of battle along the eastern wall of the Greek capital.

It was no unusual revolution during the middle ages, by which a large city was taken by a handful of adventurers, or by which a robber-chieftain subverted an ancient monarchy, and became the founder of a line of kings. But in the siege of an almost impregnable fortress, which was said to contain no fewer than 400,000 fighting men, by a force, which now hardly exceeded 18,000, there was something almost unprecedented ; and if the besiegers paused to compare the magnitude of their project with the slenderness of their means, they surely had slight reason to feel surprised or disheartened at the failure of their first onset. On the other hand, it appears strange, that the Latins should have neglected to avail themselves of the anarchy prevalent under the Angeli, and should have suffered Murtzuphles to organise resistance to the invading forces. But the latter laboured under the difficulty of divided councils and of an imperfect acquaintance with the numerical and military resources of the enemy, and it is to be suspected that the operations would have been less prolonged, had the Republic had a free hand.

The assault had begun early on the morning of the 9th. The Latins reposed confidence in their prowess and good fortune. The Greeks principally counted on their local and numerical advantages. The courage of both was sustained by the persuasion, that the justice of their cause and the favour of Heaven were sureties for their success. The former, however, had restricted their operations, in the first instance, to a brisk exchange of volleys with the Batteries. But of this languid and unknighthly mode of warfare they quickly grew tired ; the depth of water admitted, and their impatience urged, a nearer approach ; and the vessels were soon brought by the Venetian pilots in juxtaposition to the foot of the rampart. A few of the foremost now endeavoured to maintain against fearful odds a footing on the parapet overhanging the Gulf ; the greater part remained aboard, eager to seize the earliest opportunity of signalling themselves by some deed of heroism. In the moment of danger, in the tumult of battle, the heart of the warrior was opened and

the voice of sectaries was hushed; and the generous ardour, with which each man bent his bow, or grasped his halberd, indicated his anxiety to preserve an old, or to earn a new, reputation.¹ The collision between the besiegers and the besieged was appalling. Every contrivance, which human art had formed for the extermination of human life, was employed on this occasion with portentous effect. The air rang with the shouts of soldiers, with the blasts of trumpets, with the clash of arms; and the sky, unless where for a few moments it was illuminated by a living stream of Greek fire, was darkened by the clouds of arrows and the showers of stones, which poured unceasingly over and against the walls. The embattled towers of Constantinople, bristling with steel, and teeming with life, extending along the Golden Horn: on the other hand, the Venetian fleet with its lofty and garrisoned castles and its busy crews covering, in a long and parallel line, the surface of that broad and capacious basin, afforded a spectacle which made many a heart throb with admiration, not unmingled with terror. But after several hours' hard fighting and (considering the fewness of their numbers) great sacrifice of life, the Allies found that they were losing rather than gaining ground. Even the powerful fleet of Venice seemed to dwindle into insignificance before the huge ramparts and colossal walls of Constantinople. The followers of Dandolo, who had been bred to toil and inured to danger, were prompted to own that they had never engaged in so difficult or dubious an enterprise; and many a gallant soldier, who had conquered against the severest odds, or who had fought at Jaffa and Tyre, hardly suppressed an uneasy sensation, as he eyed those stupendous fortifications, which appeared to defy alike the ladder and the ram. Still, for the most part, such sensations were transient and momentary; and save those few, who still continued to decry the siege of Constantinople as solely undertaken to gratify Venetian ambition and cupidity, and who consequently regarded the slightest reverse, sustained by the Latins, with inward satisfaction and affected despondency, all in that little army were prepared to accept the alternative of victory or death. The Chiefs were at heart equally disposed to run all hazards; and the old Doge had much difficulty in check-

¹ Villehardouin.

ing their intemperate zeal. Dandolo advised his companions to act with caution and coolness; and it was ultimately resolved to direct a temporary suspension of hostilities, in order that they might repair certain oversights in their plan of operations, and collect their strength for a fresh attack. The Latin trumpets sounded a general retreat; and Murtzuphles, who had watched the progress of events from a scarlet pavilion, pitched on an eminence inside the city, beheld with delight the retirement of the enemy to their ships.

In the views of the Latins a wide discrepancy existed. The Papal Cabal was as averse from the renewal of the siege as it had been from its commencement. Some were inclined, on the other hand, to believe that it was in its discontinuance that their error lay. Others, again, were of opinion, that they ought to reopen the assault, not on the eastern, but on the southern side, of the capital, where the fortifications were known to be out of repair. In the last course there was certainly some reason and truth. But its adoption was quickly found to be impracticable. On reference to the pilots it appeared that the winds and currents, which were then prevailing on the Sea of Marmora, would render it out of their power to hold a fleet at anchor in that Strait; and it was asserted that, if the Chiefs persevered in such a design, the vessels would be infallibly swept by the tide into the Bosphorus.¹ Hereupon the proposed scheme was at once abandoned by the Latins, who finally agreed to alter their tactics without shifting their ground; and as the changes, which they contemplated in the former respect, were not calculated to occupy above two days, they decided on resuming the offensive on the 12th of April.

The confederates had gained from experience two useful lessons. They now perceived how necessary it was to strengthen their position and to economise their strength; and the fewness of their numbers left them no other means of accomplishing this twofold object but by contracting their line of battle, and by conducting their future operations on a narrower scale. Other changes of some importance were introduced. The vessels of the Fleet, instead of acting singly as on the former occasion, were now linked together in pairs. To each pair was assigned the duty of investing a tower;²

¹ Michaud, lib. xi. p. 288.

² Sismondi, ii. p. 152.

and prior to the resumption of hostilities, the zeal of the troops was refreshed by a well-timed proclamation, that the first Frenchman and the first Venetian, who should scale the ramparts of Constantinople, would receive, as the meed of valour, a bounty of 100 marks of silver apiece.¹

The morning of the 12th of April was rudely heralded by the shrill braying of the trumpets, which announced to the Latins that the day had broken, and that it was time to prepare for action. Several thousand warriors, many of whom might not live to see another sunset, responded cheerfully to the summons: they armed themselves in silence and haste; everything else was in readiness; and shortly after dawn, the Allies moved forward, at a steady pace, to the foot of the walls of Constantinople. They were greeted by a murderous tempest of missiles, which fell with fatal accuracy on the heads of those who sought to distinguish themselves by their valour and zeal. At such a momentous crisis, the Greeks displayed extraordinary courage and energy. A sense of common danger healed natural infirmities; a sense of common interests levelled the social distinctions of rank and quality. Peasants and senators were seen fighting side by side. Men forgot their constitutional timidity; women lost their habitual reserve; and tender and delicate females, mounting the ramparts, and finding courage in despair, hurled stones and aimed javelins at assailants, from whom they expected no compassion. The Latins behaved with their usual intrepidity and self-possession. By dint of combined hardihood and heroism, they succeeded in repulsing the onsets of the enemy with vigour. A love of fame or a prospect of reward diffused among them an active spirit of emulation; they fought with admirable valour and discipline; and their exertions were stimulated by the assurance that the treasures of conquered Byzantium would amply repay their toil, and would fully relieve their necessities. Nor, if the survivors reaped a speedier and more substantial recompense, was the welfare of those who perished in that arduous struggle overlooked. In their latest moments these found every consolation which our imperfect nature can receive or bestow; and the priest, who administered to the dying soldier the comforts of religion, exhorted him to embrace the hope of immortality.

¹ Michaud, lib. xi. p. 289.

It was now on the verge of noon. The contest had lasted fully six hours; and the Latins had hitherto lost much, and had gained nothing. The deadly and destructive fire of the Byzantine batteries did not abate for a moment; the besieged continued to ply the catapults and mangonels with unwearied energy and precision; and the Barons could not help perceiving that, while the resources of Ducas appeared to be inexhaustible, their own numbers visibly diminished, and their own vigour steadily declined. Men of a sanguine temperament still indulged a hope that, by an auspicious turn of affairs, they might yet retrieve their fortune. But the more common belief was that, unless their prospect speedily improved, recourse must be soon had to that distasteful expedient, which had once already wounded their pride, and that they must seek safety in a second and a final retreat.

When the Latins were almost reduced to this humiliating extremity, a favourable change occurred. The wind veered round unexpectedly to the north; and a strong gust brought the *Pilgrim* and the *Paradise*, the flagships of the Bishops of Soissons and Troyes, which formed one of the pairs, in close and sudden contact with one of the principal towers of the city. Such an opportunity was not thrown away. Without waiting to receive the word of command, André d'Urboise, a Frenchman, and Pietro Alberti, a Venetian, leaped ashore, scaled the wall, and cleared a path for their comrades, who promptly and ably seconded the gallant attempt. The sudden apparition of D'Urboise and Alberti on the rampart scared the Greeks, who were charged with the defence of that part of the fortifications; they fled in utter dismay; and their base desertion of the post of duty left five towers in the hands of their adversaries. The flight of the imperial troops afforded the assailants a safe and secure footing on the parapet; and three gates, forced by the repeated strokes of the battering ram, admitted a confused throng into Constantinople.

The precincts of the ramparts were found to be abandoned by their recent defenders. The Greeks, turning a deaf ear to the rallying cry of Murtzuphles, had fled in disorder; and after several attempts to reassure them, the latter was obliged to take refuge in the palace of Bucoleon, where he succeeded in intrenching himself, and in collecting a garrison. The defection of his followers marred the expectations of the

Emperor. Yet he was barely justified in hoping for better things from a nation, which knew no medium between the most fanatical enthusiasm and the most abject cowardice, and in whose eyes an ordinary French knight was magnified to a giant, and his scanty retinue was multiplied to a host.¹

The success of the Latins was glorious and exhilarating. But the Venetians heard with concern, that the valiant Alberti had fallen in the struggle, not by the hand of a foe, but by that of his partner in danger, André d'Urboise, who mistook him, it was said, in the hurry of the moment, for a Greek. Their attention was soon drawn to a matter of more vital and momentous importance. It was true that they had effected an entrance into the City. But the narrow streets with their spacious buildings, the large population, and the lateness of the hour, made the Chiefs apprehensive that the approach of darkness might suggest to their enemies the idea of a general massacre. Under this impression, they resolved to pass the night under arms. But their fears were wholly chimerical; and the morning of the 13th of April came to lay at their feet the wealth of the palaces and churches of Byzantium.²

The Doge and the Barons perceived that they had taken the richest City and the strongest fortress in the world, that they had vanquished a people, reduced by eight centuries of bad government to the lowest degeneracy, and that they had overturned with comparative facility the throne of the princes who wasted their hours and the public money in the pleasures of the harem and the chase, and who, in the figurative language of an old historian, "cheated time, and offended nature, by rearing flowers in winter, and culling in spring the fruits of the autumn." They also perceived, that out of this triumph had sprung another duty and another danger: the necessity of protecting the conquered, the risk of losing the conquest. They knew that the moment was at hand, when Constantinople, and all that it contained of beauty, of riches, and of sanctity, would be placed by the rules of war at the mercy of their followers; and they were conscious that it

¹ Gibbon, ch. ix.

² That part of the story of the Fifth Crusade of which the scene was laid at Constantinople, has twice appeared in a dramatic form:—

1. *Isaccio*, Tragedia di Francesco Contarini, Ven. 1615.

2. *Alessio Comneno ossia i Venèziani a Constantinopoli*, Tragedia di Lucio Antonio Balbi, Ven. 1791.

would require all their energy to curb the brutal violence of a profligate and covetous soldiery. The Chiefs, however, exerted every means in their power of averting, or at least of alleviating, the terrors of a long siege and a hard-won victory. A proclamation was issued, in their name, calling upon the army to spare the helpless and the innocent;¹ and the gates of the City were thrown open by their direction, in order that every chance might be afforded the inhabitants of seeking safety in flight. Several high and wealthy Greek families availed themselves of the opportunity; and during the first night of occupation, while the Latins were wholly bent on consulting their own security, a large amount of property escaped in this manner through their hands. Among others, the historian Nicetas, trembling for the honour of a pregnant wife and the chastity of an only daughter, owed their common preservation to the dexterous management of a Venetian merchant, his intimate friend, who, assuming the garb and air of a French trooper, escorted them through the City and the suburbs, until he thought that they were placed beyond the reach of danger. They were indeed often challenged on the way, and sometimes were roughly handled by prowling bands of pillagers, who were attracted by the beauty of the women. But the ready wit of their guide and protector, who pushed the assailants aside with gay petulance, claiming the party as his prisoners of war, overcame every obstacle; and even the soldier, who had turned a deaf ear to every other appeal, failed not to respect the portion of a comrade. The merchant who, in the friend of his youth, had forgotten the enemy of his country, having executed this stratagem, returned to Constantinople. The fugitives proceeded to Selibria, in Thrace, where they fixed their future residence, and where Nicetas employed his leisure in describing, under the influence of impressions by no means favourable to the authors of the recent revolution, the last days of the Roman empire.

The Latins, while they received the usual licence for rapine, were enjoined under pain of death to deposit the fruits of their pillage in one of three churches, which were specially set apart for the purpose. This order, though probably not

¹ A knight, who was convicted of disobedience of this order, and of offering violence to a Greek woman, was hanged by the direction of the Count of Saint-Pol. His fate, no doubt, afforded an instructive example.

without its effect, was very far from being rigidly observed. In not a few cases the thirst for spoil overruled the fear of punishment. The most precious articles of plunder were also the least bulky. Gems, vases of inestimable value, relics of odorous sanctity, were pilfered from the altars, the reliquaries, or from private dwellings, by rapacious soldiers who sold them at a paltry price; and, although these matchless rarities were recovered, partly by process of exchange and through the ignorance of art, no inconsiderable portion was irretrievably lost. Some, however, found a worthy destination. The proud monuments of human genius, sculptures, paintings, frescoes, mosaics, and minerals, which the industry and taste of ten generations had gradually amassed in that City of Cities, were scattered by this great Revolution among the palaces and churches, the castles and abbeys of Western Europe. Many of the Venetian public buildings were decorated with the trophies which fell to the lot of the Republic herself; and Venice prized none so highly as the unique quadriga, cast in pure Greek copper, which is usually known as the *Horses of Saint Mark*.¹

In a letter, which he addressed to the Pope in the same year, the Count of Flanders averred that "there was more wealth in the Greek capital than in all the rest of Europe together"; and the Marshal of Champagne has not hesitated to record a conviction that "since the beginning of the world, never was so much riches seen collected in a single city." It seems that the property divided between the two nations was computed at 900,000 marks of silver. Gibbon states that "the secret far exceeded the acknowledged plunder."

The zeal and pertinacity of the Crusaders may help to explain the accumulation of so vast a treasure. Every dwelling was explored by them. Every house was ransacked. Every corner was visited. Even the clergy mixed in the crowd, apprehensive lest the sacred vessels, the vases of gold and silver, and the cups of porphyry, should fall into profane hands; and little that was costly in Byzantium eluded the eye of cupidity. The Greeks beheld the excesses of their conquerors with mute indignation and sullen despondency; but the women, trembling at once for their own honour and

¹ Cicognara, *I Quattro Cavalli di San Marco*, 1815; Galibert, *Histoire de Venise*, 1847, p. 551, note.

for the safety of their offspring, threw aside their natural timidity, and embracing the knees of the Latins, implored their compassion. The name of Monteferrato, who was allied by marriage with the House of Comnenos, was most familiar to their ears; they even thought, as they hoped, that he was already their Emperor Elect; and whenever they came in contact with straggling parties of soldiers, the fair suppliants pressed their crucifixes to their bosoms, and ejaculated, "Holy marquis-king, have pity on us!"

Murtzuphles had already perceived the futility and peril of a longer stay in the capital, and that Prince, accompanied by his wife Eudocia, had left Constantinople by the Golden Gate. The garrison, which he had planted at the Palace of Bucoleon, surrendered to the first summons, and the edifice was assigned as a temporary residence to the Doge. The other public buildings were occupied in like manner by the Flemish and French chiefs and their followers, who thus took military possession of the city; and from this moment the Latins became the nominal masters of the Empire, the arbiters of its destiny.

Still there were not wanting in Constantinople men who fondly believed that the star of Rome had not yet set; and, on the very day of the flight of Murtzuphles, Theodore Lascaris, who had so greatly distinguished himself during the siege by his courage and resolution, was formally declared his successor. Lascaris declined with becoming diffidence the proud title borne by his predecessors, announcing his intention to assume the humbler designation of *Despot*, until he had rescued his new dominions from a foreign yoke. The faintest hope of deliverance from their present situation was apt to force an incredulous smile from the lips of a timid and effeminate auditory. In a few weeks after the occupation of the throne by Lascaris, the Latin Chiefs met in the Palace of Bucoleon, to choose the worthiest among themselves to fill the vacant dignity.

The threefold task of completing the conquest, of sacking the city, and of dividing the spoil, had engaged the confederates during the greater part of the month; and the election of a new Emperor (the seventh since the death of Emmanuel Comnenos in 1180) did not take place till the second week in May. The duty of pronouncing a decision

between so many noble and distinguished candidates devolved on twelve electors, six of whom were Venetians, six Frenchmen or Lombards. The former were Pantaleone Barbo, Vitali Dandolo (the Doge's brother), Ottone Quirini, Bertucci Contarini, Nicolo Navagiero, and Giovanni Michieli; the latter, whose sacred character would, it was considered, secure an impartial judgment, were the Bishops of Soissons and Troyes, of Bethlehem and Halberstadt, the Archbishop of Aere, and the Abbot of Lozes.¹ This Conclave withdrew into the Bucoleon Chapel to deliberate. It was natural that so grave a question should give rise to many guesses and conjectures as to the probable result of the conference, and it was to be expected, that each group, which collected on the morning of the 9th of May round the Bucoleon, should adjudge the sceptre by anticipation to the individual, whom it held, from whatever motive, in the highest esteem. Some indeed extolled the virtues, and asserted the superior pretensions of a chief or a kinsman; but with very few exceptions the suffrages of the army and of the fleet were divided between the Count of Flanders, the Marquis of Monteferrato, and the Doge, whose rank and reputation seemed to lift them above all other competitors. Of that illustrious triad, the French exhibited a bias to Baldwin, the Lombards, a predilection for Boniface: while the Venetians expressed, on their part, an honest conviction, that their leader was most worthy to assume the imperial purple. "That old man," they exclaimed with pardonable vanity, "has gained the wisdom and experience of age without losing the vigour and fire of youth; his sight may be dim; but his intellect is clear and strong,—it is he who took Constantinople."

The electors appeared to be of the same opinion. The Bishops of Soissons and Troyes, and five of his countrymen, declared for the Doge; four only were inclined to vote for Baldwin or for Boniface; and since the supporters of Dandolo formed a majority, they were proposing to make known their decision in his favour, when Pantaleone Barbo, the dissentient Venetian, breaking silence, spoke (it is reported) to the following effect: "Sage Electors, I observe a strong inclination on your part to confer on our Doge the imperial crown, and I am disposed to join with you in thinking that, even

¹ Ducange, lib. i. p. 25.

among so many heroes, there is none more worthy of the high dignity, to which you would thus raise him. Yet, at the same time,—which may appear strange to you,—I feel that there are several, whose claim is preferable.” This somewhat contradictory speech excited, in fact, a general murmur of surprise. “Listen,” said Barbo in continuation, “and I would that the Doge himself were present to hear what I say, so much confidence do I repose in his magnanimity and good sense, that I heartily believe he would echo my sentiments. That empire, which you purpose to restore, is at present encompassed by so many enemies, that it will be impossible to save it from dismemberment and ruin without the aid of a large and powerful marine. It is no exaggeration to say, that the Venetians alone are in a position to furnish that aid. Our Republic took Constantinople: she can protect it. It will be far easier for her to send fleets from her dockyards than for the Count of Flanders or the Marquis of Monteferrato to draw armies from their estates. But, in taking possession of the empire in her own name, our Republic would commit an almost suicidal act. For, leaving out of the question the cabals and dissensions, to which the ambition of reigning would infallibly lead us in the end, how should we provide for the danger and risk, which would arise from the elevation of a fellow-citizen to the throne of Constantinople? Master of the whole of Greece and of a large portion of the East, clothed with the power and swollen with the pride of sovereignty, will he remain subject to the laws of Venice? Will he not forget his country? Dandolo, from the loftiness of his spirit and from the nobleness of his heart, would, as I am well assured, be above such sentiments; but who shall answer for his successors? Who shall persuade us, that Venice will not be crushed beneath the weight of the empire, that the seat of the Republic will not be transferred to Constantinople, and that our freedom will not be sacrificed? It is amid its native lagoons, that that Power has gradually risen, which now commands the respect of Europe; detached from the soil which gave it birth, transplanted to the shores of the Bosphorus, it will decline indubitably, it will cease to be what it is. Venice, Queen of the Seas, would be thenceforth little more than a subject town, a dependency of the Greek empire. You may perhaps tell me, that Dandolo and his

heirs will no longer, in fact, be Venetians, and that Venice will have the honour of having given masters to Greece. But that, I say, is a condition which Dandolo himself would not accept. More proud of being the first magistrate of a victorious Republic than the sovereign of a vanquished State, he would, if I mistake not, reject such an exchange. Consider again: this election will probably preclude you from achieving the leading object of the undertaking, in which you are engaged. You can hardly fail to recollect the peril to which the jealousy of the Count of Saint Giles exposed Palestine, at the time when Godfrey de Bouillon was crowned King of Jerusalem. Raymond, piqued at the preference which had been given to Godfrey, and not satisfied with depriving the latter of his own support, succeeded in drawing the greater part of the other Chiefs in his train; and it is certain that, but for the mercy of God, Jerusalem had been lost. To-day it seems to me that we incur a similar danger; and, if you remain faithful to the oath, which was administered to you on assuming the Cross, you must at once relinquish the idea of nominating our Doge to the vacant throne, and allow your decision to rest between the Count of Flanders and the Marquis Boniface. Those two princes are equally capable, by their prudence and valour, of preserving the conquest of which we share the glory. Only let it be understood, in order that we may prevent the certain and deplorable effects of disunion, that whichever of the two is honoured by your suffrages, shall yield to the other the island and dependencies of Candia, as well as all the territory, which still belongs to the empire beyond the Bosphorus. By these means you will attach them to each other by the ties of friendship and interest; otherwise, it is to be apprehended that both will be lost, and with them the hope of recovering the Holy Land."

The reported words of Barbo are said to have strongly impressed the minds of his colleagues; and, leaving Dandolo out of the question, the electors resumed their deliberations. It remained for them to decide only between Baldwin and Monteferrato. But so equally balanced were the claims and qualifications of those two princes, that the choice at first appeared extremely perplexing. Venetian influence, however, ultimately turned the scale. Barbo and his countrymen

failed not to perceive on reflection, that the Italian possessions of Boniface would render him, as Emperor, a troublesome neighbour and a dangerous enemy, and that, although he professed himself at present the friend of the Republic, other interests might lead him at a subsequent period to form other connections. On the other hand, the estates of Baldwin were more remote, his ambition less formidable; and the Venetians determined to throw their six votes into the scale in his favour. The Count of Flanders was declared the object of their choice. The decision was notified at midnight to the expectant throng without by Nevelon, Bishop of Soissons; and the stillness of the air was suddenly broken by an universal cry of "Long live the Emperor Baldwin!" Dandolo and Boniface hastened to congratulate their noble companion on his good fortune, and to bear a part in the ceremony of raising him on the buckler; his solemn installation took place on the 23rd of May; and after that imposing spectacle four-and-twenty commissioners, twelve of whom were Venetians, twelve Frenchmen, Lombards, or Flemings, were clothed by the Doge and the Barons with authority to assign to the members of the holy Confederacy the lands, which they and their heirs should hold in fief of Baldwin and his successors. This allotment necessarily proved itself in many instances an idle formality. The Byzantine Court still exercised a nominal sovereignty over the whole of Eastern Europe and over a considerable portion of Asia; and the Latins were often put in possession of provinces, of which they had yet to achieve the conquest, and to learn the names. By virtue of the recent treaty, the Marquis of Monteferrato was invested with the sovereignty of Candia, and of all the territory lying beyond the Bosphorus; the Count of Blois became Duke of Nicaea; Regnier de Trit, Count of Philipopolis; the Count of Perche, Duke of Philadelphia. The Republic received the Morea, the Ionian Isles, a large portion of Thessaly, the Sporades, the Cyclades, the cities of Adrianople, Trajanople, Didymotichos, and Durazzo, the province of Servia, and the coasts of the Hellespont.¹

Still the Venetians were not quite satisfied with these large acquisitions. The truth was, that they had, from the outset, cast a longing eye on Candia, whose position and

¹ Da Canale (sect. 56-7).

resources, while they offered such tempting and important advantages to the members of a trading community, appeared to be thrown away on a prince, who possessed neither ships nor commerce. Nor was Boniface, on his part, disinclined to enter into negotiations for the transfer of his new possession; and by a treaty concluded on the 12th of August 1204, the Island was sold to the Venetians for thirty pounds of gold.¹

The Byzantine Court was remodelled. The offices of the new imperial household were bestowed on the friends or followers of Baldwin; and the nobles of France and Flanders consented to tarnish their bright escutcheons with the empty and fantastic titles, which the pompous effeminacy of the Greeks had brought into fashion. Thierry of Loçes was created Grand Seneschal; Conon of Béthune, Protovestiarary; Macaire of Saint-Menehou, Grand Cupbearer; Manasses of Lille, Grand Cook; and Villehardouin, in addition to his marshaldom of Champagne, accepted the designation of Marshal of Romania.² Nor could the Doge himself refrain from seeking a share in these honours. To the respectable title of Doge of Venice, Dalmatia, and Croatia Dandolo added the epithet of *Despot and Lord of One-Fourth and One-Half of the Romanian Empire*; ³ and moreover, as an indication that he was second to Baldwin only in rank, the old man claimed the privilege of tinging his buskins with the imperial purple.

An event of far more genuine importance was the arrival at the Golden Horn of Tommaso Morosini ⁴ who, in pursuance of the Treaty of March, had been chosen by the Venetian Synod Patriarch of Constantinople. Morosini belonged to one of the oldest and the most illustrious families in Venice; he traced his descent in an unbroken line from her thirty-seventh Doge Domenigo; and his talents and virtues procured for him universal esteem among his own countrymen. Yet in holy orders his present rank was that only of sub-deacon; and before he could assume the pallium, it was absolutely necessary that he should undergo a triple consecration as deacon, priest, and bishop.

But it unfortunately happened that the Court of the Vatican, with whom it rested to grant such a rare indulgence,

¹ These thirty pounds of gold may be estimated at about £10,800 of our money, adopting at least the comparative valuation of Leber, *Essai*, etc., p. 103.

² Ducange, lib. i. p. 28.

³ Gio. Villani, *Cronica*, v. 28, ed. 1823.

⁴ Flavius Blondus, *De gestis Venetorum*, ed. 1481.

had been offended at the injudicious omission on the part of his electors to solicit its previous sanction: nor did it appear probable that the difficulty would be easily overcome. For, on hearing of the matter, Innocent expressed, through the mouth of Peter of Capua, his unqualified disapprobation of the course pursued by the Latins, whose conduct he stigmatised as irreverent and uncanonical. He declared that without his concurrence the Venetian clergy were not warranted in making the appointment; and he announced that the election of Morosini was consequently null. Yet out of a particular regard for the object of their choice, to whose merits he bore willing testimony, and likewise from a strong reluctance to disturb the peace of the Church, the Pontiff consented of his own free will to invest Morosini with the pallium; and he enjoined Baldwin and his subjects to treat him with all the love and reverence due to his high and sacred attributes. This material obstacle having been removed, the new dignitary proceeded to Venice to take final leave of his family; and during his stay in the capital, he received from the Government certain imperative instructions for his guidance in the choice of a successor, as well as in appointments or promotions in the Eastern Church. His successors were to be without exception Venetian citizens; and individuals of Venetian extraction, or such as had naturalised themselves by a residence of ten years¹ at least in Venice, were to be alone eligible for preferment. Morosini promised to obey. At the same time he so far reserved to himself a discretionary power as to decline to adopt any course which might be justly construed into disrespect of the legitimate authority of the Holy See.

The triumph of the Republic was still barely complete; the second installation of Baldwin was required to perfect what the first had necessarily left undone; and this Prince who, in the absence of a Patriarch, had received the diadem from the Papal Legate, was once more conducted in state to the Cathedral of Saint Sophia, where he was anointed and crowned by Morosini. If it were true, that the Doge owed his physical blemish to an injury inflicted upon his eyesight by the Greeks, in violation of the sacred rights of an ambassador, his retribution, if tardy, was severe enough, when he

¹ *Vitæ Pontificum Romanorum*, fol. 543-4; Ap. Murat. iii.

came back, with the chivalry of Europe at his back, and all the might of Venice, to change the imperial dynasty, and revolutionise the Levant.

But it was not to be expected that the French clergy would regard with complacency the growth in the East of a theocracy so exclusively Venetian; and the exaltation of Morosini, together with the severe restrictions which the Republic imposed on his authority, had raised in their minds the strongest feeling of jealousy. They loudly contended that the election of the Patriarch was wholly irregular; they said that the Venetian synod had no independent right to make the nomination; and they appealed from its decision to his Holiness.

After the fall of Constantinople, the Crusaders had hastened to make pacific overtures to the Court of Rome from which, by repeated acts of contumacy, they had estranged themselves more and more since the autumn of 1202. In language courteous and respectful they explained the various causes which had led them to change their original plan of operations, and to deviate so far from the line of conduct which they had not promised merely but proposed to pursue. In justification of the enterprise against Zara, they argued the right of the Republic to subjugate its own dependency; as an excuse for engaging in the siege of Constantinople, they hesitated not to plead the nature of the object which they sought to attain, and the character of the enemy whom they found it necessary to oppose. It was unfair to take exception to the exercise of legitimate authority in suppressing the revolt of an insolent and too powerful fief; and surely much was to be forgiven to those who had at once punished the assassin Murtzuphles, and had rooted out the Photian heresy.

Toward the French, whom he regarded as the dupes, rather than as the accomplices of the Republic, the Pope was inclined to be lenient. In their disobedience he had found the former more tractable; in their contrition he chose to think them more sincere; and so far as they were concerned, he was content to receive the foregoing explanation as an apology for the past and as a pledge of future submission. But the Republic was less easily pardoned. The Court of the Vatican had always regarded the Venetians with a feeling of suspicion and dislike; of late they had rendered themselves

peculiarly obnoxious; and Innocent, to whom the unruly arrogance of his countrymen and the unbending nature of Dandolo were galling in the last degree, would have gladly imposed on them some penalty which, even though it might not be commensurate with the heinousness of their offence, would at least help to console his wounded pride. But, at the same time, Innocent was not unmindful of the temper of the people with whom he was dealing: he was aware that they had already set at nought the authority of his predecessors; he had reason to apprehend that they might without much additional provocation defy his own; and his Holiness decided that it was better to receive the penitent culprits back within the sacred pale than to force them to extremities.

Indeed, on the whole, recent events had disposed the Apostolic See to view the policy of Venice in a somewhat more favourable light than before; the restorers of the papal supremacy reconciled Innocent in some measure to the conquerors of Zara and Constantinople; and his Holiness took no notice of the protest of the French ecclesiastics against the elevation of a Venetian sub-deacon to the patriarchal chair beyond the despatch of the Cardinal of Saint Susanna with instructions to pacify the malcontents, to conjure them in his name not to endanger, by any ill-timed and unseemly dissensions, the peace of the Church, and to intimate to them that on mature reflection his Holiness saw no ground for interference.

The Confederates, having completed their various dispositions in the course of the summer, spent the autumn of 1204 in excursions either of a foraging or exploratory character to the Provinces. But the winter necessarily suspended all operations; and during the cold season the Latins indulged in the luxurious repose of the Eastern capital, while they awaited the supplies, which the Emperor was led to expect from Armenia. These reinforcements promised to place Baldwin in a position to achieve without risk the conquests, which he had in contemplation. But the impulsive nature of the Flemish Prince chafed at so long a delay; and having received a small contingent from Nicomedia in the middle of March 1205, he set out from the capital on the 26th of the month, reaching Adrianople on the 29th. Three

days afterward (April 1), he was joined by Dandolo and all the Venetian troops, whose arrival doubled his numbers. Their combined attempt to take Adrianople, which adhered to the party of Theodore Lascaris, proved, however, unavailing; the lofty ramparts and large garrison of that once imperial city defied their utmost prowess and skill; and a report soon reached them that the King of Bulgaria had already advanced with a powerful army within two leagues of the place to raise the siege and cut off the besiegers. The flying squadrons of light cavalry, which now began to sweep the plain in front of Adrianople, verified this startling news; and the scouts brought word to the Latins that these troops formed part of an auxiliary force of Turkoman skirmishers, whom the Bulgarian Prince had sent forward to reconnoitre the camp of the Crusaders, to intercept stragglers, and to endeavour by petty acts of annoyance to entice Baldwin from his intrenched position. The Turkomans, whose force was estimated at about 14,000, were mounted on fleet steeds, and were armed with bows and lances, which they used on horseback, like the Parthians of antiquity, with admirable ease and dexterity. In attack they were far inferior to the Greek phalanx or the French battalion: their excellence lay in retreat, when the unerring sureness of their aim and the marvellous rapidity of their evolutions enabled them to inflict injury without receiving any, and to achieve a victory without risking an engagement.

The approach of the Turkomans within bowshot of their lines, the proximity of the main army, and the obstinate resistance of the Adrianopolitans, excited in the breasts of the Latins a painful and conflicting sensation; their impatience made them pant for action, their weakness made them pause at the first step, and during several days they watched the movements of their new foes with involuntary forbearance. But the taunts and gesticulations of those savage horsemen failed not to produce, in due time, the effect which the latter expected and desired; every one soon grew eager to chastise the insolence of the barbarians; even the Doge appeared to be in favour of the proposition, as well as in ignorance of the risk which it involved; and on the 14th April it was decided that, while Dandolo, the Marshal of Champagne and Manasses de l'Isle remained with a reserve

of troops in charge of the camp and siege-works, the rest should proceed to repulse the enemy.

The advance of the Latins seemed to form the signal for a general retreat; and Baldwin, deceived by the artful feint, was tempted to engage in a reckless pursuit. The Turkomans fled, and the Crusaders followed closely in their track, fully two leagues; and neither drew rein until they came within a short distance of the spot where John had disposed his forces in order of battle. The Turkomans then wheeled round with the rapidity of lightning, and turned on their pursuers, who found to their extreme dismay, that they had been lured into a snare.

Meanwhile Dandolo, with Villehardouin and De l'Isle, were anxiously expecting the return of their comrades; and the old man was in his tent, speculating on the fate of the adventurers, when the Marshal, who was the first to learn from the foremost stragglers the unwelcome tidings, brought word to his Serenity that the army was totally routed, that the Emperor was taken prisoner, and that the Count of Blois had fallen in the struggle. It was clear that the danger was still imminent. Those who had managed to escape from the hands of the Bulgarians, and to regain the camp, concurred in a report that the King was advancing by forced marches on Adrianople; and the other chiefs joined with Dandolo in thinking that as all hope of reducing that place to submission, or of checking the Bulgarians, was now at an end, the only course which lay open to them was to remain under arms till dusk, and then to retrace their steps with all practicable celerity and secrecy to Constantinople.

In the face of a hundred obstacles and dangers this plan was executed; and after a rapid and toilsome journey of four days, the Doge and his companions reached their destination, prostrated by fatigue. The arrival of the Bulgarians was to be hourly expected; and, so far from being in a position to hinder their progress, there seemed to be no possibility even of barring their entry into Constantinople. No news came of Baldwin. The Count of Blois was dead. The flower of French and Flemish chivalry had been mowed down in that terrible retreat. With a very few exceptions, the neighbouring cities were occupied by the supporters of Lascaris. The whole surrounding country was infested by

the Turkomans ; and the Latins learned that, in one of their excursions, those intrepid and indefatigable horsemen had intercepted, and destroyed to a man, the Armenian contingent, on whose succour they so much counted. Their numbers were scanty, yet provisions were scarce ; and, while their expectations were not unpromising, it was to be anticipated that several months would elapse, before their appeals to the Courts of France and the Vatican for aid against the Bulgarians could be answered.

Yet, in fact, the cruellest blow was in store ; and in the hour of their extreme need his colleagues were doomed to lose one who had been chiefly instrumental in conducting the enterprise so far to a successful termination, and whom, in spite of his feeble sight and of his growing infirmities, they still deemed most able to extricate them from their present dilemma. On the 14th of June, after a short illness, the Doge breathed his last at the Palace of Bucoleon. His complaint, which was dysentery, had been aggravated by the pressure of mental anxiety, and by the thought so mortifying to him, that an undertaking which had cost himself and the Republic so much labour and outlay, and from which they had augured the most favourable results, was destined, in all appearance at least, to end so ingloriously.¹ The remains of the hero were interred with imperial pomp in the crypts of Saint Sophia. His ashes, together with his armour, which was laid in the same vault, were suffered to remain untouched and unviolated till the middle of the fifteenth century : the sanctity of their repose was disturbed only by the conversion of Saint Sophia into a mosque during the reign of Mohammed II.² But Gentili Bellini, the Venetian painter, who was held at that time in high estimation at the Porte, was so fortunate as to obtain from his august patron the helmet, the cuirass, and the sword which the Doge had worn at the taking of Constantinople in 1204 ; and the favourite of the Sultan felt a proud satisfaction in pre-

¹ *Cronaca Altinate*, lib. vi. p. 193.

² On a slab encased in a moulding on the floor of the central compartment of the south gallery of Saint Sophia, near the south-east corner, is inscribed in large Gothic characters, *Henricus Dandolo*, and near this spot formerly stood the sarcophagus, apparently enclosed by a railing, and supported by pillars. I have been indebted for this information to Mr. A. Ryan, a member of the British Embassy at Constantinople, who forwarded me the two accompanying tracings : 1. the inscribed slab on a reduced scale ; 2. part of the inscription of the original size.

senting to the Dandoli of San Luca these precious memorials of their great ancestor.¹

Dandolo is said to have been of lofty stature and of a ruddy complexion; his features, cast in a large and fine mould, were handsome and regular; his eyes are described as blue; and it seems probable that in early life his look had been keen, his expression of countenance singularly prepossessing. Even in his declining years, when his sight was dim, and his brow bore the impress of age, he still preserved a more than ordinary share of his youthful comeliness, and there still remained in the conqueror of Constantinople some faint traces of what Dandolo had once been.

It was his fortune to die at a juncture when the position of the Latins was most critical. The Bulgarians were at the very gates of Constantinople, and seemed to be merely awaiting the signal for opening the assault; the Crusaders were destitute of resources, crippled in strength, and on the brink of despair. Such was their despondency that they already dreaded the vengeance of the conqueror. But the King was happily ignorant of their weakness. On the approach of a warmer season, the Turkomans had left the royal camp and retired northward, unable to withstand the heat of a Grecian summer; and the monarch, having thus lost this valuable contingent, determined to abandon the siege, and to turn his arms against the new King of Thessalonica.

The Republic acquired by the recent change glory and renown, population and territory; it yielded scope to her commerce, and expanded her feudal dominion; and the fall of Constantinople planted the standard of Saint Mark on almost every maritime city and seaport town from Lido to Durazzo and from Durazzo to the Golden Horn. A fourth of the imperial capital was set apart as a quarter where the Venetians might reside under the government of their own laws and the protection of their own magistrates; the coins, weights, and measures of Venice were recognised throughout the Greek realm; and her merchants were invited to resume the privileges and immunities which had been secured to

¹ The subjoined *operette* have been published on the exploits of the hero:—

1. *I tre primi canti del Dandolo.* Ven. 1594.
2. *Enrico, ovvero Bisantio acquistato.* Ven. 1635.
3. *Enrico Dandolo: Tre canti di G. Piermartini.* Ven. 1844.

them by the treaty of November 1198. The Doge was, in future, to be represented at Constantinople by a *Bailo* or *Podesta*, who might act as a general Intendant of the legal and commercial interests of his country in the East; and on the demise of the late Doge the members of the Venetian Factory took upon themselves to choose in this capacity the patrician Marino Zeno, a personal friend of Dandolo. The act awakened considerable displeasure at home; but it was ratified on the understanding that the election was in future to rest with the Great Council. Zeno was provided with a Council of Three, a treasurer, an advocate, a Court of Common Pleas, another of Probate, and lastly a Constable or Com-mandant of the troops, to assist or control him in the exercise of his functions.

The chronic and costly instability of their relations down to this time with the Byzantine Court afforded the Venetians excellent ground for congratulating themselves on the vast metamorphosis, by which their influence over Greece and the Levant was consolidated and strengthened to such a marvellous extent. On the one hand, the security for their consular and commercial establishments in Eastern Europe had become immeasurably more complete, and the weight and emphasis added to their political voice in the affairs of Constantinople under the new dynasty was almost beyond immediate calculation. How far responsibilities counter-balancing such advantages might evolve by degrees from the altered condition of relationships, was a question also within arguable distance, and the Republic had yet to learn whether the prodigious aggrandisement and stimulus, which, no doubt, her dominion had just received, would not tend to decentralise and enfeeble her actual power. She found herself at one step, as it were, transformed from a city—the most important in the world,—into a State—into an Empire. The Venetians had, possibly to their own surprise, become at least the titular proprietors of a distant, exposed, and hybrid dominion in days of slow communication and rapid change.

Unless we credit the Republic with an almost miraculous amount of foresight, we cannot suppose that it perceived the full magnitude of the difficulty apt to mature in the course of centuries from the revolution at Constantinople and the

scarcely credible alteration in the posture of foreign affairs resulting from that notable event. The fall of the Greek dynasty naturally disturbed the balance of power in Eastern Europe, and possibly prepared the way for the establishment of the Osmanlis on the Bosphorus. But that episode occurred two hundred and fifty years after the fifth Crusade, and the intervening time might have developed a wholly different issue. The Venetians saw the political situation in 1204 through the contemporary medium of splendid commercial advantages added to rich spoils and a dazzling augmentation of territorial weight. They could not penetrate into the distant future, as we can look back to the distant past. They were prosperous, sanguine, and self-reliant.

CHAPTER XIII

A.D. 1205-1229

Pietro Ziani, Doge (1205-29)—Consequences of the Fall of Constantinople—Treatment of their new Conquests by the Venetians—The Revolts of Candia—The Affairs of Constantinople—War with Padua (1214)—The Famous Debate in the Great Council respecting the Transfer of the Seat of the Republic to Constantinople (1222)—Abdication of Ziani (1229)—His Character—The Correctors of the Ducal Promission.

THE intelligence of the death of Dandolo, which reached Venice on the 22nd of July 1205, diffused through the city a profound sensation of sorrow. The Republic was not insensible of the claim which that great man had acquired to her gratitude and love. The Venetians felt that the exploits of those brave and illustrious soldiers who had conducted so great and arduous an enterprise to a successful and happy termination, ought to leave some deep and enduring traces behind them, and that the story of the Fifth Crusade, which so much enhanced the glory of their country, ought to be handed down from generation to generation; and naturally they grew anxious to confide the fame of Dandolo, which they wisely identified with the national fame, to safer keeping than the imperfect and fading traditions of human memory. The revival of art and literature in the close of the thirteenth century afforded the Republic an opportunity of carrying her wishes into effect. By slow degrees, the deeds of a less polished and of a less enlightened age were committed to writing and transferred to canvas; and on the walls of the Great Council Chamber the gifted pencils of the Great Masters recorded in imperishable characters the heroic things which had been done in former days.

By the decease of his father, the vicarious functions of Reniero Dandolo were brought to a term, and it became necessary to consider the question of electing a new Doge. It is natural to imagine that many were secretly inclined to

vote for Reniero himself, who had now held the reins of Government nearly three years. But the constitution distinctly prohibited the direct succession of the son to his father's place; and the Vice-Doge was obliged to give way to a candidate whose claim, though of slighter foundation perhaps, was of older date. The suffrages of the forty electors, of whom Reniero was one, fell on Pietro Ziani, Count of Arbo, eldest son of the former Doge Sebastiano, and at this period the wealthiest nobleman in Venice (August 5, 1205).¹

The early youth of Ziani had been chiefly passed in Armenia, which was during some time the principal residence of his father;² but on the elevation of the latter in 1173 to the Venetian throne, the son fixed his abode at Castello. In 1174, he divided with Marco Giustiniani the command of the Venetian troops before the walls of Ancona. Three years later (1177) he appeared³ as one of the four-and-thirty captains, who served under his father's banner at Salboro; and, not long afterward, he acted as chief of the deputation which was chosen to invite Frederic Barbarossa to the Congress of Venice. Between the years 1177 and 1201 Ziani exercised, first at Padua and subsequently at Arbo, the high office of Podesta; and on the appointment of Reniero Dandolo he was nominated one of the Privy Council, in which capacity he continued to act till his election as Count of Arbo. The private character of Dandolo's successor was unimpeachable; his public life afforded a gratifying retrospect of upward of thirty years spent in the political and diplomatic service of the State. As a naval commander, as an ambassador, as a magistrate, Ziani had always acquitted himself efficiently and honourably: he was now summoned from Arbo by the voice of the nation⁴ to assume the supreme direction of affairs at a period when his country found itself placed by events of recent occurrence in a situation peculiarly anomalous and perplexing. The squadron, which was sent to Arbo to fetch Ziani, was composed of thirty galleys, of which the sides were covered with silk taffeta drapery.⁵

The subjugation of Constantinople had marked a new era in the Annals. The Republic was no longer the same Venice,

¹ *Cronaca Altinate*, lib. vi. 198; Dolfino, *Annali*, p. 33 (King's MSS. 149).

² Filiasi, *Ricerche storiche*, p. 137.

³ Dandolo, lib. x. p. 301.

⁴ *Cronaca Altinate*, lib. vi. p. 191.

⁵ Da Canale, sect. 63.

which Cassiodorus knew, or which in the ninth century had withstood with such wonderful spirit and success the pretensions of Pepin le Bref. In the memorable days of Sebastiano Ziani, the Island-City had certainly attained a high degree of prosperity; her population then exceeded 65,000; her commerce had then received a stimulus and development, which the most sanguine and far-sighted contemporaries of the great Orseolo would have scarcely treated as possible; her marine was even at that period the most powerful in Europe;¹ and her nobility was perhaps, as a class, not only the most opulent, but likewise the most cultivated and accomplished in the civilised world. Yet the first Ziani would hardly have hazarded a prediction that, in six-and-twenty years after the visit of the Pontiff Alexander, his countrymen would possess by the undisputed right of conquest the fairest portion of the Lower empire, and exercise at least a nominal sovereignty over some millions of souls. Still, surprising as the rapidity of the progress might appear, such was the reality; and the question whether by the utmost prudence and valour the Republic would be able to preserve for any length of time her new acquisitions, was one which engaged at present a very inconsiderable share of public attention. The leading topic of discourse on the Rialto, and the leading theme of debate in the Legislature, were the occupation of the newly acquired territory; and the main impediment to the attainment of such an object was the financial embarrassment arising from the heavy expenses of the last war. But this difficulty was removed by contracting a fresh loan (May 7th, 1207), on the security of the Customs, and (if they were not sufficient) the State Jewels;² the subscriptions were completed with a promptitude and facility, which indicated no want of capital in certain quarters; and the necessary funds having been thus raised on the public credit,³ the Government despatched to the Mediterranean, in the course of 1207, a squadron of one-and-thirty galleys under the joint orders of the late Vice-Doge and Ruggiero Premarino.⁴ On their passage to the Ionian Isles, to which the commanders decided on directing their course,

¹ Formaleoni, *Nautica antica de' Veneziani*, 1783; Filliasi, *Antica marina de' Veneziani*, 1803.

² Romanin, ii. 428.

³ *Ibid.*, ii. p. 195.

⁴ *Cronaca Altinate*, lib. vi. p. 188; Da Canale, *Cronaca Veneta*, 64.

they fell in with nine privateers commanded by Leone Vetrano, a Genoese corsair, who had long infested those waters, where he rendered himself terrible by his depredations and cruelties.¹ The Genoese were constrained, after a sharp struggle, to strike their colours; and having achieved this exploit, Dandolo and his colleague pursued their course without interruption, ultimately reaching Corfu, where they planted a garrison and hanged Vetrano.² The nearly contemporary historian Da Canale depicts his countrymen taking their enemies as falcons take their quarry. Thence the Venetian fleet proceeded successively to Coron and Modon in the Morea, where they hoisted the national flag; and from Modon they pointed their prows toward Candia. The government of Corfu was vested in the hands of a *Bailo*, assisted by a board of ten Commissioners. Each Commissioner received as an inducement to settle in the island a free and liberal assignment of land from the home government, on the simple understanding that he was liable, as a vassal of the Republic, to do service in the field at the shortest notice with twenty knights and forty esquires, and to pay an annual tribute of trifling amount to the Ducal Fisc.³

The policy observed by Venice toward Corfu differed in some degree from that which she pursued in regard to the rest of her dependencies. In the latter cases, free leave was given to all Venetian subjects to conquer and colonise. Wisely conscious of her inability to constitute her recent acquisitions into an integral portion of her dominions, or into more than a feudal appanage, the mother-country reserved to herself at present merely the duty of protection and the right of suzerainty. Many wealthy or adventurous members of the nobility availed themselves, without loss of time, of the permission thus accorded.⁴ Marco Sanudo, a nephew of the great Dandolo,⁵ and himself a scion of one of the most ancient families in the Republic, acquired in this manner Paros, Antiparos, Naxos, Melos, and Nysos; and under similar circumstances Andros, Tinos, Mycone, Scyros, Ceos, Gallipoli, Lemnos, Lampsacos, and other places were allotted to others. All

¹ Da Canale, *Cronaca Veneta*, sect. 65, 66.

² *Ibid.*, sect. 67.

³ Dandolo, lib. x. p. 335; Marin, iv. 84.

⁴ Dolfino, *Annali*, 33 (King's MSS. 149); Ducange, lib. ii. p. 98.

⁵ Sanudo, *l'ite*, p. 547. Marco's father had married the Doge's sister.

these feudal possessions were erected into duchies, with the single exception of Lemnos, assigned to Philocolo Navagiero with the imposing title of grand-duke, in consideration of certain services of an important character, which that nobleman had rendered to the Byzantine Court.¹ At the same time, several of the great vassals within the old frontiers of the empire of Constantinople concurred in tendering their allegiance to the Republic; and the Prince of Achaia, the Count Palatine of Zante, the Despot of Argos and Corinth, and the Grand Feudatory of Negropont (the ancient Eubœa and Hellenic Egripo), afforded a substantial token of their fidelity in an agreement to remit an annual tribute to the Venetian treasury.²

These various dispositions had been completed with comparative facility: for both the Ionian group and those islands, which were scattered along the shores of the Morea, were too feeble to offer a protracted resistance to their new masters. But the reduction of Candia, placed, shortly after its transfer to the Republic, under the nominal government of Marco Sanudo, Prince of Naxos and Duke of the Archipelago, was a work which presented infinitely greater labour and complication. In Candia, the whole of the upper class, and indeed the whole of the landed interest, were naturally disaffected to the Venetian dominion which, they foresaw, would not only operate to the prejudice of their dignity and importance, but would materially injure their feudal and agricultural prospects. They were filled with a just apprehension, that the Venetians would at once usurp all seigniorial rights, and would gradually supplant them in all their positions of honour and trust. They gloomily prophesied that they would be constrained to lay at the feet of foreign masters the fruits of a soil, unequalled throughout the world for its richness and fertility; and they asked whether, for a people once accustomed to the enjoyment of a large share of liberty and independence, such a prospect was not painful to contemplate—whether such a yoke would not be hard to bear? The most distinguished of these malcontents were Agios Stefanitos, a member of a family of high consideration in Candia, and Enrico Pescatore,

¹ Ducange, *ubi suprâ*.

² The tribute of the Feudatory of Negropont was fixed at 2000 *perperi* a year and a robe of cloth of gold to the Doge. See Marin, iv. p. 83.

titular Count of Malta, the latter of whom, holding at present by seigniorial right no fewer than fourteen castles and strongholds in the island,¹ was peculiarly vehement in his opposition to the new Government. Pescatore could hardly entertain a hope, that when the Republic had obtained a firm footing in Candia, he would be suffered to retain his extensive possessions; such an obviously impolitic step was hardly characteristic of her Government; and, on the other hand, he was perfectly conscious that, in resisting the Venetian arms, he would throw himself into collision with a mighty antagonist. Ultimately convinced that it would be simple madness to plunge into a single-handed contest with the Republic, he decided on seeking external support; and the Count of Malta knew that he would be nowhere so welcome as at Genoa. The Genoese indeed lent a favourable ear to his solicitations; with their aid, he succeeded in exciting a powerful insurrection among his adherents and tenantry against the Venetian governor; and Marco Sanudo, having at present no regular troops at his disposal, was under the necessity of summoning to his assistance the Mediterranean squadron under the command of Dandolo and Premarino. By the powerful interposition of the latter the revolt of the Candiots was speedily suppressed; and Pescatore, completely baffled in his object, was obliged to provide for his personal safety by a precipitate flight from the Island. But the prospect of tranquillity, which his defeat had naturally afforded, was deceptive. In a short time Stefanitos, who now became the leader of the Cretan Opposition, collected a numerous body of troops, and attacked Sanudo. The inconsiderable force, which the Republic was maintaining in the Island, was unable to offer an effectual resistance to the insurgents; the castles of Temado and Mirabello were successively taken by assault; and the Governor was ultimately compelled to have recourse once more to the fleet. The presence of the admirals had, as before, the speedy effect of coercing the rebels. But this desirable result was not attained without a severe sacrifice: inasmuch as it cost the life of Dandolo himself who, as he was leading his troops to the attack in person, received an arrow in his breast, and fell mortally wounded. He was the second member of his great

¹ *Cronaca Altinate*, lib. vi. p. 194; Dandolo, lib. x. p. 336; Dolfino, *Annali*, 37 (King's MSS. 149).

House who, within the short period of four years, had left his ashes among strangers.¹

Shortly before the death of Dandolo, however, the marked and violent repugnance which the Candiots exhibited to bow to the Venetian yoke, had rendered it a question whether it would not be expedient to disarm their resistance and minimise the probability of future insurrections by dismantling the forts which had belonged to Pescatore, as well as all the other strongholds in the island. It was conceived in some quarters that by this expedient a few regular troops might easily overawe the native population, and thus supersede the necessity for the constant presence of a naval force on the Cretan station. The plan proposed, while it was advocated by a certain party, was opposed by many, and by none more warmly or stoutly than by Reniero Dandolo, who had communicated to the Executive at home his views on the subject with a manly boldness and freedom not unworthy of his father. The admiral expressed his decided and unqualified disapprobation of the course which his country was about to pursue. He represented that the military stations in Candia, of which some wished to witness the demolition, would be of far greater utility to the regular forces of the Republic than to the undisciplined troops of the insurgents; and he concluded by an intimation that, should his country be disinclined to bear the cost of maintaining those stations, he was prepared to defray it out of his own private resources. So sensible and generous a proposition, coming from such a source, had considerable weight with those to whom it was addressed. The offer of Reniero was rejected; but his advice was suffered to prevail.²

Yet, while the Government consented to abandon their half-formed design of levelling the fortifications of Candia, they grew stronger in their determination to adopt some effectual means of quelling the mutinous disposition of the Candiots. This important question was brought before the Legislative Body, for the first time, at the sitting of the 15th September 1211; but no arrangements of a final character were made till the 20th of February in the following year. It was then decided to resort to a general system of colonisa-

¹ Flaminio Cornaro, *Creta Sacra*, ii. 225; Dandolo, lib. x. p. 336; Muratori, vii. p. 133; Diedo, lib. v. p. 82; Romanin, ii. 195.

² Dandolo, lib. x. p. 335; Lebeau, lib. xcvi. p. 274.

tion as the sole practicable remedy for the evil, and thus to impart to the Venetian element in Candia both social and political preponderance. With the exception of a small portion adjacent to the coast, which the Republic reserved to herself as Government property, and of another, which was allotted to the native proprietors, the whole island was now divided into 547¹ fiefs, of which 132 were designated *Cavallerie* (or knights' fees), the remaining 405, *Fanterie*.² The former were assigned exclusively to emigrants of the equestrian order and their families; the latter to burghers or, as they were termed in Venice, *Cittadini*.³ Each tenant in fee of a Cavalleria was bound to hold himself in constant readiness with horses and esquires to do service in the field. The *Pedoni*, or proprietors of the Fanteries, were also liable to perform military duty; but their obligations in this respect differed both in their nature and extent from those which were imposed on the greater feudatories.

Thus the Republic hastened to lay the foundation in COLONIA VENETORUM of a feudal system, with its prominent and characteristic feature of tenure by knight-service. The system was one which was by no means unknown to the Islanders themselves, although indeed, in the case of the Parent City, it wore a shape and was presented under an aspect better suited to the peculiar site and constitution of Venice.

As a fair equivalent for the cost of emigration, which had, in many instances, been exceedingly heavy, the settlers were permitted by the Government to hold their lands on a free tenure for four years, within which space it was reasonable to conclude that they would recover their outlay, and bring the soil under general culture. In the fifth and all succeeding years in perpetuity, the colony was to be required to pay a tribute to the Ducal Fisc of 2000 *perperi*; and it was distinctly provided that all mineral rights, so far as the precious metals were concerned, were vested in the Signory. In regard to the descent of property, a law was enacted which prescribed that, where there was a legitimate heir, he should succeed on the demise of the actual tenant in the usual course, and that where there was no such heir, or where he was still a minor,

¹ Filiasi, *Ricerche*, 71-2.

² Cornaro, *Creta Sacra*, part iv. p. 251; Marin, iv. p. 80.

³ "Herein they followed the Roman usage of dividing the colonial territory between knights and plebeians."—Filiasi (*Ric. stor.*, *ubi supra*).

it was competent for the legislative body either to nominate a new feudatory, or to appoint a tenant during the period of minority. But under no circumstances was a bequest or conveyance of property to be sanctioned which had the effect of alienating any portion of Colonia Venetorum from the Republic. Moreover, the emigrants were enjoined to make no truce or treaty with any Power, foreign or domestic, without the full concurrence of the Doge; to afford succour and protection to all Venetian traders and travellers who might henceforward touch at the Island or pass through it, and to hold them, so far as they might be able, harmless; to facilitate the commercial intercourse of their country with her Colony; and to consult at all times the interest and welfare of the Republic. They were exhorted to bear in mind that her allies were their allies, and that her enemies were their enemies.¹

Independently of its feudal divisions, Colonia Venetorum formed in itself, like the Parent City, six Wards or *sestieri*; for each Ward was elected a *Captain*; and these six captains composed the Privy Council of the Venetian Governor or Duke of Candia.²

Such was the act of the Great Council, by which the dominion of the ancient island of Crete was transferred to Venice, and which certainly seemed to realise the worst apprehensions of the native proprietors. Yet surely the Candioti were in some measure to blame. Surely they could not fail to perceive that the restless and turbulent character of Pescatore and Stefanitos had powerfully contributed in bringing the country to this extremity: nor had the Republic taken the decisive step without grave and mature consideration. The plan originally adopted for the government of Candia had been altogether different in its character; it was only after seven years of severe provocation that Venice had resorted to the colonising system, and that her Government had enacted the sweeping measure by which a large proportion of the Cretan feudatories were dispossessed of their lands.

The Government of Candia was of a mixed character; yet the Venetian element greatly preponderated. The doors of the Colonial Legislature were thrown open indeed to the native proprietors in common with the members of the settle-

¹ Navagiero, fol. 988.

² Cornaro, *Crete Sacra*, lib. x. p. 186.

ment. But all the higher and more responsible offices connected with the administration were filled by the latter; the Candioti were merely employed in subordinate capacities; and there were some functionaries, such as the Treasurer and the Public Prosecutors, whose appointment the Doge retained in his own hands;¹ the Duke himself was practically no more than the lieutenant of the Doge.² A Keeper of the Seal was the counterpart of an official of the same character and title at home; and he similarly made way for a Grand Chancellor.

Shortly after the foundation of Colonia Venetorum, Marco Sanudo was replaced by Giacomo Tiepolo who, a few years before, had been sent to relieve Marino Zeno in the onerous functions of Podesta of Constantinople. Tiepolo was recommended to the appointment by his tried abilities and by his high legal attainments. In his hands it was hoped that the affairs of Candia would prosper.

On his expulsion from Candia, the Count of Malta had sought an asylum at Genoa. That State, thwarted in its recent attempt to acquire possession of the Island under the pretext of affording succour to Pescatore, harboured a feeling of the deadliest animosity against the Venetians; to the jealous enmity, which had always subsisted between the two Powers, was now added the sharp sting of wounded pride and foiled ambition; and Pescatore consequently experienced slight difficulty in prevailing on those to whom he addressed himself, to lend him their aid in recovering his possessions. In conformity with its resolution to afford him such support, the Government of Genoa organised a squadron of thirty galleys, of which the destination was Candia. The expedition was accompanied by the Count of Malta.

These hostile movements did not long remain concealed from the Venetian Executive. It was soon known, that a fleet had left Genoa for the Mediterranean ostensibly with the simple object of reinstating Pescatore in his feudal rights, but with an ulterior intention of appropriating the Island. They felt therefore, that no time was to be lost in warding off the danger, which threatened Colonia Venetorum; but the diffi-

¹ Marin, iv. p. 83.

² Sanuto, *Diarii*, ii. 869, terms Bernardo Giustinian or Zustignan in 1499 *Vicc-Ducha*.

culty, in which they found themselves, rendered such a task one of no ordinary magnitude. Owing partly to the necessity which had lately arisen of maintaining small fleets in several distant quarters for the protection of commerce, and partly to the practice of amalgamating the navy with the merchant service, the resources of the Arsenal were seldom equal to any sudden exigency. At the present moment the vessels, available for immediate use, were nine only in number. To wait, however, till others could be recalled, was clearly out of the question; and it was too late to communicate either with the commander on the Mediterranean Station, or with the armed cruisers, which were lying off the Syrian and Egyptian coasts. Under these circumstances, the Government decided on completing the equipment of nine carracks, which happened to be in an advanced stage of preparation, and of placing them under the charge of a naval officer of courage and ability, Giovanni Trevisano, who received instructions to press all sail for the Mediterranean, and at every risk to intercept the enemy, before they reached their destination.

The Republic could hardly have confided her honour to safer keeping. It was near the heights of Trapani, on the Sicilian coast, that the Venetian Commander descried the object of his search. The disparity between his own numbers and those of the Genoese was great indeed. The risk was tremendous. Yet the signal for attack was given without hesitation and obeyed without fear. The enemy sustained, in this trying moment, their reputation for bravery and skill, and during some time they maintained the contest, in which they had engaged under such favourable auspices, firmly and equally. But the extraordinary pertinacity of the Islanders, who seemed to be gifted with superhuman energy, soon proved irresistible. The efforts of their antagonists were gradually relaxed in a perceptible degree. Their apparent inability to hold their ground much longer inspired the Venetians with fresh ardour. The latter redoubled their exertions; and the intrepid Trevisano, recovering at last one of his carracks, which he had lost almost at the outset, directed a general attack against the Genoese line, broke it, drove the enemy before him, pursued them to the coast of Africa, gave them battle twice more on two succeeding days, and finally secured four-and-twenty prizes. The vanquished returned

home with six ships only;¹ their arrival, and the intelligence of which they were the bearers, produced at Genoa the greatest terror. To effect a reconciliation with the victors appeared to be the sole chance of safety which that Power possessed; and one of her subjects, Fra Girolamo of Viterbo, was charged with the task of opening the necessary negotiations. The Venetians, on their part, were too fully occupied by their recent acquisitions in the East to spurn these overtures; and a treaty was signed, of which the leading stipulation was, that Genoa should make good the losses, which the piracies of one of her great feudatories, Alemanno, Count of Syracuse, had inflicted on Venetian commerce.² The amount of this indemnification was fixed at 6000 *perperi*.

The Battle of Trapani, which had been won under such great disadvantages, probably saved Colonia Venetorum from falling into the hands of the Genoese. But, at the same time, it kindled a fire in the bosom of the vanquished, which might sometimes smoulder and sometimes burn low, yet which was never extinguished, while Genoa remained a nation.

After the exchange of the ratifications, the usual intimation was made of the fact by the Government to the Podesta of Constantinople, the Duke of Candia, the Bailo of Syria, and all the Venetian consuls or vice-consuls in the Levant, who were strictly charged to hold the provisions of the treaty in respect; and, at the same time, the other contracting party issued a similar circular to all the authorities throughout the Genoese dominions.³

But the success of the Republic was hardly yet complete: for the Count of Malta, whose influence made him a formidable antagonist, still remained at large. It was true that his old confederates, the Genoese, had been disabled from extending to him their protection, or from furnishing him any assistance in regaining his property. But, independently of them, Pescatore was quite in a position to render himself exceedingly troublesome by fomenting fresh dissensions among the Candiots. Under such circumstances, Ziani and

¹ Johannes Trithemius (*Cronicon Genuense*) attributes the defeat of the Genoese, in this and other instances, to their faulty method of naval discipline. He insinuates that his countrymen employed land-lubbers, instead of seamen, like the Venetians.

² Da Canale, sect. 71.

³ Marin, iv. p. 196.

his advisers acted with admirable judgment and tact. Flattering overtures were addressed to the Count. He was invited to come to Venice. He was invested with the rights of citizenship; and the daughter of Giacomo Baseio, Podesta of Chioggia, was given in marriage to his nephew, with a dowry of 15,000 *perperi*.¹ By such blandishments Venice disarmed an enemy, with whom violent measures were calculated to be less successful.

Subsequently to its formal partition by the Latins in 1204, the condition and aspect of the Byzantine empire had undergone several material changes. Two men, whose brows were once circled by an imperial crown, had found an ignominious fate. One, the elder Alexios, was now a close prisoner in a monastery in Asia; and the second, the wretched Murtzuphles, betrayed by those in whom he reposed his confidence, and dragged from his place of concealment, had been precipitated by the victors, as the just penalty of his crimes, from the summit of a lofty pillar in the Forum of Taurus.² Others were or seemed more fortunate. Theodore Lascaris had succeeded with the help of the Sultan of Iconium (Konieh) in uniting under his rule the territory lying between the banks of the Meander and the suburbs of the capital.³ With the title of Duke of Trebizond, a son of Emmanuel Comnenos, a grandson of the tyrant Andronicos, reigned from Sinope to the Phasis. Michael, an illegitimate scion of the same House, established himself in Epirus, Ætolia, and Thessaly. In Thessalonica (Saloniki) an Italian marquis held sway with a royal title; and, on his death in 1207, Boniface of Monteferrato was succeeded by his son Demetrius.⁴ Greece appeared in truth to be to the first comer, and the fairest jewels had already been plucked from her brow. The Morea was in the hands of strangers. Leo Sgueros, a Peloponnesan nobleman, was paramount in Argos and Corinth. Attica and Bœotia were occupied by Otho de la Roche, a Burgundian. Achaia had fallen to the lot of the family of Villehardouin of Champagne. A Genoese pirate was Governor of Syracuse. A wealthy gentle-

¹ *Cronaca Altinate*, vi. p. 193.

² One of the squares of Constantinople; Ducange, *Constantinople sous les empereurs français*, lib. ii.; "Fragments di testi Arabi sulla storia di Sicilia Musulmana," trad. d. Amari, p. 31, *Arch. stor. Italiano*, iv.

³ Sanudo, *Vite de' Duchi*, p. 544.

⁴ B. de S. Giorgio, *Historia Montisferrati*, ad an. 1207.

man of Verona was grand feudatory of Negropont.¹ The Ionian Isles were parcelled out into fiefs among a crowd of foreign adventurers. Corfu was in the hands of a Venetian garrison. Zante and Cephalonia belonged to the Count-Palatine of Zante, a vassal of the Republic; and two Venetian patricians held joint possession of Gallipoli, twelve miles distant from the Capital. On the other hand, the Greek Imperial House, dislodged from its former centre at Constantinople, had established new seats of government at Nicæa in Bithynia, in Epirus, and elsewhere, and was to yield ere long a source of anxiety and trouble to Venice.

In the Annals of the Latin dynasty of Constantinople the reign of Baldwin I. of Flanders occupies a very brief space. In the year immediately succeeding his election (1206) that virtuous and unfortunate prince fell into the hands of John, King of Bulgaria, who cast him into a dungeon. The royal captive enjoyed an opportunity indeed of regaining his liberty. The Queen importuned him with amorous solicitations, smitten by the manly beauty of his person. She pressed him to fly with her, and to abandon *that miserable empire of Constantinople* to the vain ambition of her barbaric spouse. Baldwin rejected the overtures of his fair tempter with firmness and scorn. The refusal of the Emperor awakened the fiercest passions in the bosom of the Queen. The object of her resentment was immediately denounced to the King as the author of a base attempt on her virtue; and the imaginary wrong was expiated by a cruel and lingering death.² Thus, at the age of thirty-six, perished a prince who, as Count of Flanders and Hainault, had raised by his rare virtues the highest expectations: who had gone far to realise such expectations by the conspicuous and brilliant share which he bore in the late war; and who had sunk to an early and obscure grave a year only after his attainment of an object to which, even in his wildest reveries of ambition, he had probably never ventured to aspire. Baldwin I. was succeeded by his brother, Henry of Flanders who, by the justice and liberality which he exhibited in his civil administration, as well as by

¹ 1209—March. Concessione in feudo, con varie condizioni dell' Isola di Negroponte nella persona di Messer Ravano delle Carceri Veronese, fatta da Pietro Ziani, Doge di Venezia.—*Arch. stor. Ital.* App. 378.

² See as to his ultimate fate Delepiere, *Chroniques, de. des Flandres*, 1834, p. 68 *et seqq.*

his soldierlike qualities, secured to himself an honourable reign of ten years (1206-16).

The public life of Henry afforded a constant scene of external warfare and domestic contention. Like the mythic warriors of Cadmus, the enemies of his crown appeared to rise up against him on every side; the indefatigable Emperor was always at the head of his troops, repulsing an incursion of the Turks or Bulgarians, or chastising some refractory and contumacious feudatory.

Yet when the struggle which it cost Henry during the greater part of his reign to preserve his throne, is compared with the polemical disputes and theological controversies which scandalized the metropolis of the East in the same period,¹ the former sinks into insignificance. Since the abjuration of the Photian heresy, the Court of Rome had never ceased to urge the adoption of the Latin ritual by the clergy of Constantinople. But the latter who, as a body, viewed in reality with extreme dissatisfaction the reconciliation with the Apostolic See, declared themselves strongly opposed to such a measure. The matter soon reached a climax. The papal legate, Pelagius, Bishop of Alba, attempted to enforce the obnoxious ritual on the people. The Greeks rose in revolt; and Henry thought it prudent to avoid a crisis by closing every place of Christian worship throughout the capital and its suburbs. This violent and unpopular remedy threatened to produce effects infinitely worse than the evil itself: it became manifest that a domestic revolution would ensue, unless the Emperor rescinded his edict; and Henry was reluctantly obliged to bow before the storm.

Another cause of disagreement between State and Church lay in the payment of tithes. Very few members of the Eastern communion were exactly acquainted with the nature of their obligations in this respect. The Venetians, on their part, solved the difficulty by ignoring the claim altogether; and Innocent felt that it was out of his power to enforce it. The Republic was even inclined to the opinion that she ought to insist on a rigid adherence to the rule, that Venetian subjects only should be eligible for preferment to other benefices in the Eastern Church. But the Patriarch Morosini was disposed to consult in this particular the general wishes and

¹ Ducange, *Hist. de Const.* lib. ii.

feelings¹ of the Latin clergy, and the Venetian Government found it necessary, in many cases, to forego the invidious privilege. In fact, on the demise of Morosini himself in 1211, although the names of no fewer than three Venetian churchmen² were submitted to his Holiness by the Synod of Constantinople, the Pope set them all aside on the plea of unfitness, while he conferred the vacant pallium on a Tuscan. These and other points of difference agitated Constantinople during the reign of the Emperor Henry; and they were only imperfectly adjusted by a Concordat (1209), in which the rights of the Church were acknowledged and restored, in which the abbeys and monasteries attached to the Greek communion were emancipated from temporal jurisdiction, and by which the payment to the clergy of fifteenths was established on a tolerably regular footing.

Henry died in 1216 without issue, and in the direct course of descent the crown belonged to his sister Yolande, a woman endowed with masculine energy. The provisions of the Salic Law precluding Yolande from the succession in her own person, she was forced to content herself with ascending the throne in the right of her husband, Peter Courtenay, Count of Namur, whom the Barons of Roumania consented to invest with the imperial title. In the course of his journey through Epirus to take possession of his new honours, the Emperor, however, fell into the hands of Theodoros Comnenos, Despot of that province, who cast him into prison; and this unfortunate prince was released from his captivity only by a timely death. His gifted wife, who had reached Constantinople by another route, undertook the regency in his absence; she lamented his fate without resigning her vicarious functions; and, on her decease in 1219, she left the crown to her eldest son, Philip of Namur.³ But the latter judiciously declined to exchange his broad acres on the banks of the Meuse for the skeleton of a distant empire. His younger brother was less wise; and the throne of Constantinople was occupied by Robert Courtenay from 1219 to 1228, in which year that weak and pusillanimous prince died in the Morea on

¹ Ducange, *ubi supra*.

² The Dean of Saint Sophia, the Piovano of San Polo (of Venice), and the Archbishop of Heraclea.

³ Despatch of Giacomo Tiepolo, Bailo of Constantinople, to the Doge, 10th December, 1219; Romanin, vol. ii. *Documenti*.

his return from Rome, where he had vainly supplicated the Pontiff Honorius to afford him assistance and protection against his enemies.

The fact was that the power of the Baldwins and the Courtenays was, to a large extent, purely ostensible. The real master of Constantinople, during the first quarter of the thirteenth century, was the Venetian Podesta or Bailo, whose election was made by the Great Council itself, and who was entitled the Governor of One-Fourth and One-Half the Empire of Romania. This high functionary enjoyed¹ the privilege of wearing the crimson buskins in common with the Emperor himself, and was assisted, like the Doge, by a Privy Council, in whose name he acted. The staff under his charge consisted of a Council of State, a Court of *Giudici della Pace*, a Court of *Proprio*, a Public Prosecutor (*Avogador*), a Treasurer, a *Proveditor of the Sea* (whose commission was to assume the command of any naval forces which the Republic might find it necessary to maintain on that station), and a military officer, who bore the title of Constable, and who was placed in command of the Venetian troops throughout the empire. The emoluments of the Governor were probably considerable. From the Jews of Mitatus alone he received a tribute of 52 *perperi* a year in money and kind; and the colony at Mitatus also presented a purse of 10 *perperi* to every new Governor on his entry into office.²

It was the province of the Podesta to exercise a general supervision over the Venetian Factory, of whose welfare and interests he was considered as the especial protector. All the Baili, consuls, and vice-consuls in Syria, Egypt, Persia, and the Levant, were amenable to his jurisdiction.³ With him they communicated on all details connected with the discharge of their functions. To him they referred in cases of difficulty or emergency. Any vexed point of equity which might arise, any questions of a civil or criminal nature, on which the judicial bench was unable to pronounce a verdict, and finally any suits or litigations, which presented features of intricacy or peculiarity of circumstance, were submitted for his decision; and from him the sole appeal was to the Legislature of the mother-country. Moreover, in any matters of a weighty character or of general bearing, the Latin Emperor seldom

¹ Filiasi, *Ricerche*, 64.² *Ibid.*³ Marin, iv. ch. 9.

omitted to consult the Podesta, and rarely failed to adopt his advice; and as the power of the Courtenays declined, the Podesta acquired the habit of concluding with foreign princes treaties affecting the commercial and political interests of the Republic in the name of the Doge. No ordinary judgment and care were requisite in selecting an officer, in whose hands was concentrated such vast authority. It seemed to be necessary that he should enjoy the entire confidence of those who were entrusted to his charge, or who acted under him; it was unquestionably necessary, that he should possess talents of the first order, and all that large range of knowledge and experience which usually marked the Venetian official.

The year 1214 was long remembered in Italy as a year of jubilee in celebration of the general peace,¹ which happily prevailed at that epoch; and in all the principal cities of the Peninsula the auspicious occasion was commemorated by fêtes and galas of every kind. The grandest spectacle was presented at Treviso, where tournaments, games, manly sports, sham-fights, and mimic representations were held; and it was to Treviso therefore that the nobles and gentry of Venice and Padua came for the most part with their mistresses and serving-men to make trial of their knighthood, and to win favour in the eyes of those they loved best. The whole scene was overflowing with life, gaiety, and pleasure. By general assent the leading attraction in these festivities was the mock-siege, which was formed on the Square of Spineda.² On this spot was erected a huge castle with its portcullis, its battlements, and its turrets; the castle was called the *Castle of Love*; and it was garrisoned with the most beautiful ladies that could be found in all Treviso. The besiegers formed three companies. There was the Venetian Company, the Paduan Company, and the Trevisan Company. The ladies of the Castle of Love were the umpires of the exciting contest; and in such eyes each of the Companies naturally strove to

¹ Da Canale, sect. 72.

² *Cronaca Altinate*, lib. vi. p. 196. The three following works relate to this jubilee:—

1. Il Castello d' Amore, Festa Trivigiana; Stanze di Don Giuseppe Gobbato, Arciprete di Postioma: Treviso, 1830, 12mo.

2. Il Castello d' Amore, Novella del Secolo XIII. di C. F. Balbi, Nobile Veneziano: Padova, 1841, 8vo.

3. El Castel d'Amor, festa Trevisana fata el secondo di del Pentecoste l' anno 1214, poemeto vernacolo, da Silvestro Zara: Treviso, 1846, 8vo.

perform the greatest feats of prowess. After a long trial of skill and strength the Venetians obtained the mastery; the guerdon of valour was awarded to them; and the Lion of Saint Mark was hoisted, as a sign of victory, on the highest tower of the Spineda. The Venetians were transported at their good fortune; and they did not care to conceal their intense gratification. Their exuberant spirits only increased the chagrin of their rivals, who maliciously attributed their triumph to unfair influences. "The Venetians," they said, "had gained the day by the presents, which they were known to have distributed with so lavish a hand among the ladies in the Castle"; and some of the Paduans, in a fit of childish and fretful passion, forced their way into the Spineda, and, snatching the Venetian banner from the hands of the ensign, tore it to ribands.¹ The victors were generous enough to leave this gross affront unchastised. But the authors of the outrage were not yet satisfied. In concert with the Trevisans, who readily extended to them their sympathy and support, the Paduans attempted to surprise the Venetian fortress of Bebe on the Brenta, which they selected as the nearest and most exposed point of attack.

The Doge, having received early intelligence of these movements at Treviso, and having learned the intentions of the disappointed competitors at the Siege of the Castle of Love, took prompt steps to strengthen the threatened position; and a considerable reinforcement of troops was dispatched to Bebe under the orders of Marco Zorzano.² Zorzano, however, was not able during any length of time to maintain his ground against the greatly superior numbers of the Allies; and it was becoming more and more probable that he would be compelled, after all, to abandon the place, when his apprehensions were unexpectedly removed by the arrival (22nd October 1215³) of a strong body of Chioggians under the orders of their own Podesta, Giacomo Baseio. The latter was not acting under any instructions from the Government; but, understanding the distressed situation of the Commander at Bebe, he had called out the Militia on his own responsibility, and had marched to his relief. With the assistance of Baseio, the enemy was speedily routed and put to flight, with a loss

¹ Da Canale, *Cronaca Veneta*, sect. 72-5; Dandolo, lib. x. p. 338.

² *Ibid.*, sect. 73.

³ Dandolo, lib. x. p. 339.

of 400 in prisoners of rank alone.¹ When the messenger came from the field of battle with the joyful tidings, he was immediately ushered into the presence of the Doge. Ziani was perfectly wild with delight. He took off the rich mantle which covered his own shoulders, and threw it upon those of the courier; and, putting his hands into his pockets, he gave the lucky fellow more silver pieces than he could have earned in half a year.² After some difficulty and delay, a truce of five years was separately concluded through the good offices of the Patriarch of Aquileia between the Republic and the municipal authorities of Padua and of Treviso. The captives were subsequently liberated without ransom.

“When the Paduans,” writes a coeval Chronicler,³ “who were routed in front of the Tower of Bebe, returned to Padua, they assembled in council, and one of them said: ‘Signors, we have committed an outrage, inasmuch as on account of this Tower we have made war against the Venetians; and you know that the Venetians are men of so much prowess and ingenuity, that their tower would not have been taken or demolished by all those of Lombardy; and I will tell you why. In the first place, came against us the Chioggians, who dug a foss and filled it with water, and then followed the mariners of Venice, who brought the ropes and cordage of their ships, and enveloped the tower in such manner that no stone from an engine could do otherwise than recoil back on the Tower. And afterward Monsignor the Doge came, and reconnoitred, and then returned, and left his Captain in charge. And when all was ready, they began the assault, and the end was, that we were discomfited; and very glad indeed were those whom the Venetians deigned to take prisoners, because otherwise they would have been drowned in the moat. As for ourselves, we were saved only by the fleetness of our horses.’”

The patriotic zeal of the Chioggians was not left unrequited. The Doge accorded to them the privilege of electing thenceforward their own Podesta, and they were relieved from the annual poll-tax of three hens,⁴ which they had been accustomed, from a period immemorial, to remit to the Ducal Fisc. One of the earliest Podestas under the new conditions

¹ Da Canale, sect. 75.

² *Ibid.*, sect. 76.

³ *Ibid.*, sect. 77.

⁴ Da Canale, sect. 74; Dandolo, lib. x. p. 339.

was that Pantaleone Barbo, to whose powerful declamation it is said to have been owing, that the Doge Dandolo was not raised in 1204 to the imperial throne.¹

It was not till a century later that Caorlo, Malamocco, Poveja, Pelestrina, and other Venetian towns, acquired to the full extent the municipal franchise, which was granted in 1214 to the Chioggians.

The Tribuneship, which was, with the exception of the consular dignity, the oldest of Venetian institutions, had now become almost effete. It was to a small portion only of the attributes of the ancient Gastaldi that the Podesta or Mayor succeeded. The jurisdiction of the latter, though sufficiently ample, was local and temporary; and its limits were defined with a precision to which the legislators of an older epoch were strangers. His prerogatives were circumscribed by a class of check which was hardly known before the era of the Lombard League. He was merely a municipal magistrate. The Gastaldo of the sixth and seventh centuries had been clothed with powers not much inferior to those of the Doge himself. To have conferred upon the former a moiety of the authority which belonged, by sufferance rather than by right, to the hereditary Tribunes of Malamocco and Equilo, would have rendered the Promission a dead letter, and have destroyed the balance of the Constitution, and we are to find, as time proceeded, the term *Gastaldo* and *Sopra-Gastaldo* applied to functionaries of an absolutely subordinate grade.

The Doge Ziani lived to witness a fresh outburst of popular feeling in Candia which, partly from the commercial and political monopoly which the Republic sought to establish in the Island, had become under her domination a nursery of turbulent agitators. The new movement was also instigated by Agios Stefanitos; and it was believed that, although the Emperor of Nicæa refrained on obvious grounds from lending its author any active support or open encouragement, it was secretly countenanced by John Vataces. The spirit of disaffection spread with rapidity; the ranks of Stefanitos filled fast; and Giacomo Tiepolo, who still retained the government of Candia, feeling himself unequal to the task of opposing the Rebels single-handed, applied for succour to his predecessor Marco Sanudo, Duke of the Archipelago, who was at present

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 538.

residing on his newly acquired estates at Naxos. Sanudo responded with alacrity to the call; and the insurgents were already beginning to waver, when the Duke, taking umbrage from the supercilious air of Tiepolo, suddenly withdrew his support, and joined the ranks of the enemy. The result of Sanudo's defection was to be foreseen. The hopes of the Candiots revived under their new leader; they speedily recovered their lost ground; and the Governor was at last compelled to take refuge in his palace, whence he effected his escape shortly afterward in woman's clothes to the neighbouring castle of Temado.¹

But Tiepolo's dispatch, apprising the Government of the posture of affairs in Candia, had, in the meantime, reached its destination; and a large body of troops was at once sent to reduce the insurgents to submission, and to extricate the governor from his perilous and unpleasant situation. The arrival of these reinforcements² restored tranquillity for a short space; Sanudo and the Naxiots were forced to re-embark in precipitate haste, and Tiepolo was reinstated in his authority. But the courage of the Rebels was far from being quelled. Stefanitos still maintained an attitude of defiance; and the troops of the Republic suffered severely before peace was thoroughly re-established. The late insurrectionary movement had proceeded from a general scarcity,³ which prevailed in Candia at that juncture, as well as from the restless discontent with which the Candiots naturally viewed the plantation of a colony of foreigners in the heart of their country.

It is scarcely surprising that the principles of Venetian colonization should have breathed a mercantile rather than a political spirit. The Republic regarded her colonies not so much as independent offshoots from the parent stock, as branch trading establishments. At an epoch when communication between distant points was neither speedy nor frequent, such establishments became of material utility. They were the schools in which the sons of the Nobles, after deriving the first rudiments of their education from domestic or academical tuition, learned practical lessons of commercial and political economy. There was no transfusing or assimilating element. The line of demarcation, which the Venetian settlement originally received,

¹ Dolfino, *Annali*, 39, King's MSS. 149.

² Romanin, ii. p. 197.

³ Navagiero, *Storia Veneziana*, p. 999.

was preserved uneffaced. Intermarriages between the emigrants and the families of the country were always discountenanced and sometimes prohibited. There was no naturalization. If the Republic formed a colony at Limoges, at Canea, or at Acre, the simple consequences were, that Limoges acquired its *Rue Venicienne*, Canea its *Colonia Venetorum*, and Acre its *Venetian Quarter*. But at a mile or two from Limoges, or at an equal distance from Canea and Acre, the Frenchman, the Candiot, and the Syrian, looked upon the Venetian cosmopolite as a person of a different race, of a different language, perhaps of a different religion.

Such a system presented more than one grave drawback. The settlers unavoidably laboured under many civil disabilities; but they fully participated in all civil obligations with the parishioners of Rialto or with the burghers of Chioggia. Geographically, and for all political purposes, they were removed perhaps a thousand miles from the Lagoon; but in the contemplation of the fiscal laws they formed with the population of Venice one people. They had no constitution and few municipal privileges. Their revenue was paid into the Ducal Treasury. Their treasurer was appointed by the Doge. Their Bailo or Podesta was sent from Venice, took his orders from the Home Government, and was recalled at its pleasure every second or third year. All their other public functionaries, their Bench, their Advocate, their Court of Proprio, were similarly nominated, and were liable to be similarly displaced. In the declaration of a war they had no voice; but from contributing their quota to its expenses they were by no means exempt.

The severest shock of earthquake of which the Venetian annals speak, was one which was felt in 1221. The subterraneous convulsion shook from its foundations a large portion of the metropolis; the monastery of San Giorgio Maggiore was in great measure destroyed; and the two islets of Amiano and Costanziaco, which had formed with others the earliest settlements of the Altinese in the fifth century, were swallowed up. The Republic had had repeated warnings of the insecurity of the site on which the city was built. In the eighth century (742-755) a series of shocks had submerged a considerable portion of the territory; and the earthquake of 1106, accompanied by a fire, completely ruined Old Malamocco.

Volcanic disturbances were little understood in the Middle Ages, and their results, no less than the natural phenomena accompanying them, have been, no doubt, exaggerated. The craters of Southern Italy and Sicily are yet active; but the Republic, whose liability to more or less violent and destructive oscillations of the soil might have otherwise appeared to arise from some obscure sympathetic action, enjoyed a remarkable freedom after 1221 from this source of mischief and alarm; and the early vibrations which are recorded had possibly no deeper seat than the original instability of the foundations of the capital and their arbitrary subsidence. Yet it was quite natural that such a series of misfortunes, recurring at long, but uncertain and indefinite, intervals, should have awakened the worst apprehensions in the breasts of the Venetians, and that men should have begun to ask themselves, what prospect they could have of founding on a site so entirely at the mercy of the elements a great and enduring empire.

It seems to have been shortly after the second revolt of Agios Stefanitos, and during the deplorable reign of Robert Courtenay (1221), that the Doge Ziani, having, while the profound impression created by the late catastrophe was uppermost in their thoughts, invited the principal men in Venice to the palace, and solicited them to give their earnest attention to a question on which he wished to seek their advice, and which he had been for some time revolving in his own mind. It appeared that it was nothing less than the transfer of the seat of the Republic from Venice to Constantinople;¹ for, from trustworthy information communicated to the Government just before,² it appeared that a Venetian occupation of that City and Empire was rendered by existing circumstances exceptionally easy. The Assembly was naturally taken by surprise.

Ziani represented, in support of his views, the great disproportion which existed between the mother-country and her new colonies; he cited the frequent revolts of Candia, the spirit of disaffection to the Venetians which reigned in

¹ Marin, iv. lib. i.; Salverte, *Civilisation, Venise*, pp. 64-66, with the authorities quoted by him. Temanza (*Antica pianta di Venezia*, Appendice) prints the passage from the MS. Chronicle of Daniel Barbaro, termed by Foscarini (p. 189) "l' esattissimo Barbaro."

² Dispaccio del Bailo Jacopo Tiepolo al Doge Pietro Ziani, 1219, Romanin, ii. 408.

the island, and the precarious tenure by which they held Colonia Venetorum at the present hour. He ventured to foretell that the reverses which they had experienced in Candia would befall them, sooner or later, in their other dependencies. He drew their attention to the feebleness of the Latin dynasty, in which the seeds of decay had already begun to manifest themselves, to the character of Robert Courtenay, and to the unprotected situation of their mercantile emporia in the Levant. On the other hand, he enumerated the various and manifold advantages which would accrue from the proposed translation; and when the Doge had thus prepared the more thinking portion of his future auditory for the important measure which he was contemplating, and had taken their sense thereon, he convened the Great Council, where he opened a discussion on the subject.¹

The Doge commenced by pointing out the value of the establishments which the Republic possessed at present in the Levant, the strength and fertility of Corfu, the extent and advantageous situation of Candia. He pictured all the coast of Greece, the principal islands of the Archipelago, subject to the Venetian domination: those which remained, too glad to range themselves, should an opportunity be afforded, beneath the standard of Saint Mark. At the extremity of that Archipelago, he spoke of a proud and populous City, built on two seas. There existed not in the world a choicer or more attractive site. It was there that, with all the wants of life in plenty, they could live in perfect security; it was there that, by an easy communication with the Colonies, they would be in a position to afford them assistance, or, if it became necessary, to seek it at their hands. These Colonies, besides, which were now ever rising in revolt against a country situated at the bottom of the Gulf of Adria, would, he felt assured, obey without a murmur the same country when she had become by the occupation of Constantinople the mistress of the commerce of Europe and Asia.

It is perfectly characteristic of what must to a certain extent be called prehistoric history, that the very words used by the speakers in the Venetian Assembly on this important occasion are registered by some of the early Chronicles of the Republic with evident good faith. From

¹ Cigogna, *Iscr.* iv. p. 552.

what source their information proceeded, is highly uncertain, but we find in a work, almost the earliest example of critical composition of the historical class—Machiavelli's *History of Florence*—similar addresses incorporated with the text, and, going farther back, it is the same in the pages of the Greek and Roman historians and biographers.

“It is my wish,” the Doge is represented to have said, “that you may be enabled to repulse your neighbours, to keep your subjects under proper control; it is my wish that by commerce you may aggrandize and enrich yourselves. But how can you enjoy the fruit of your prosperity in these morasses, where you are destitute of all the necessaries of life; where, at the ebb of the tide, the air is impregnated with poisonous vapours; where those same waters threaten you, in their rising, with floods? It is but a little while since that they submerged the two islands of Amiano and Costanziaco. It is well known that they have already destroyed Malamocco, and that you were compelled to abandon it. Your dykes overthrown every year by the tempest, your islands laid under water, your harbours blocked up with sand, all these are symptoms that, sooner or later, these lagoons will fall a prey to the sea; and even if you are disposed to think that this danger is less imminent than I imagine, is there not another of which you have had such reiterated forewarnings? It is in vain that you endeavour to settle on a shifting sand; the earthquakes, which visit you periodically, overturn your habitations. You have established yourselves on a soil against which all the elements seem to conspire: surely such a soil can never form the seat of a powerful empire. It is now in your power to exchange these arid shores, this tempestuous sea, these pestiferous swamps, for the finest and most enchanting site in the universe, where you can easily keep at a distance the Pisans and the Genoese, where you may hold sway over the islands of the Archipelago, over the whole of Greece, and over the coasts of Asia, and where you may command, against all rivals, the commerce of the world.”

With these words the Doge descended from the tribune amid a deep and impressive silence. But soon a general murmur, pervading the Hall, seemed to indicate that there was some diversity of opinion on the subject under debate.

Yet the rank and character of Ziani entitled his views to respect and attention; arguments, however specious and unsound, coming from such a high quarter, naturally carried weight with them; and a certain proportion of the Great Council seemed to be inclining to an entertainment of the plan which he had proposed and advocated, when a venerable personage, Angelo Faliero, ex-procurator of Saint Mark, rose, and addressed the Legislative Body to the following effect:—

“Whatever repugnance I may naturally feel,” said Faliero, “to contradict the views of the Prince to whom I owe obedience and respect, I do so, on the present occasion, with less diffidence, inasmuch as I feel that I am about to plead before you the cause of my country. I should account myself, indeed, guilty of ingratitude toward her, toward that native land where my progenitors have always been held in honour, and where I myself have been bred, educated, and raised to high trusts, if I now consented to abandon her, and to go in quest of other advantages which are reported to be awaiting us in a distant and foreign country. And what is the value of those advantages, in reality? A purer air, a more pleasing site, a more fertile soil, a more extensive commerce, it is said, an ampler dominion. Ah! when the inhabitants of Padua first sought an asylum in the Lagoons, they were only too thankful that these shores were barren, uncultivated, deserted, that they were in the midst of the waters. If they had been rich, fertile, and populous, our forefathers would not have found there a secure shelter; our Republic, our country, would not now exist. We should be, on the contrary, the subjects of one of the petty princes of Italy: nor should we be now considering whether it is expedient to forsake our Common Mother, that we may seek a new empire in the East. Did our ancestors think of quitting their lagoons when they found that they no longer needed their protection. No. In grateful recollection of the benefits which they had received from them, they naturalized themselves on these shores; and during 800 years have they not laboured incessantly to fortify themselves against their enemies and against the elements? They have built up here sumptuous edifices; they have collected all the necessaries of life in this spot; they have erected temples, and those temples they have decorated with the

trophies of their victories. We reproach our native land with its insalubrity: yet—blind that we are—we forget that the most terrible diseases and epidemics come from the East, whither they would have us go. We complain of the sterility of our soil, as if anything was wanting to our necessities, to our caprices! As if the waters, by which we are surrounded, did not afford us abundance of nourishment and an unfailing source of industry and wealth! They speak of earthquakes. What country, I wish to know, is more exposed to them than Constantinople?¹ They speak to us of safety and of riches. Is it not here that you have found your safety; is it not here that you have acquired those riches which now make you ambitious? They speak also of Colonies. And from whom, I inquire, have you taken the greater part of those which you now possess? Did you not take them from that Power to which they were said inalienably to belong? Our Greek Colonies are important, undoubtedly; but are they the only dependencies of the Republic which she has to preserve? Have Istria and Dalmatia lost all value in our eyes?

“One of two things,” continued Faliero: “either you must go to the East in the character of conquerors, and then your political projects will be subordinate to the course of events; or you must go there simply with the intention of settling peaceably in one of the quarters of Constantinople. But how can we conceive it possible, that two independent governments should exist within the precincts of a single City? What security will there be in such a plan? How will our fellow-citizens be situated on this foreign soil? What will become of our kindred and parents, who are aged and infirm—of all, in short, that we should be constrained to leave behind us? Forsaken and abandoned, it is then that they will perceive, for the first time, that their native shores are barren and lonely. Commerce, wealth, and power will rapidly decay; an ambitious neighbour will annex these Islands; and we shall learn from afar, that what was our country has ceased to be the abode of a free people. Some Venetian traveller, perhaps, touching a few years hence at these parts, will find the canals choked with sand, the

¹ And in fact the whole of the Levant. They proved more or less destructive in Candia in 1303, 1311, 1416, 1490, 1508, and 1595.

dykes levelled, the lagoons infected with malaria. He will find, that our dwellings have been demolished, that their precious remains have been transported elsewhere, and that the monuments of our triumphs have been dispersed among strangers. He will observe a few Pilgrims wandering over the ruins of monasteries known to have been in former days wealthy and magnificent. He will behold a scanty population without labour, without food; and the magistrate of some remote town will be in the very Palace, where we are now deliberating, dictating laws to what would still be called Venice. And history will tell, how the Venetians, hearkening to the promptings of a restless ambition, renounced the signal blessings of Heaven, and, emigrating from their native soil to a remote land, destroyed one of the noblest and greatest fabrics of human industry!"

They proceeded at once to the ballot; and so equally divided was public opinion now on the point under discussion, that it is said to have been a casting vote merely which decided the fate of Venice. That vote was not inaptly termed the *Vote of Providence*.

It is by no means improbable that a proposal for removing the seat of government from Venice to Constantinople was more than once seriously agitated both in and out of the Deliberative Body. The idea was plausible and attractive. It was a scheme which was susceptible of being embellished with much picturesque illustration, and after the fall of Constantinople and the debate on the question of reorganizing the Government under new auspices in 1204, the advantages and drawbacks of such a revolutionary movement were fully weighed. Next to the City in the Lagoons, the City on the Bosphorus was perhaps one of the most romantic and fascinating sites in the world. But otherwise no fallacy from a political point of view could be more complete. To have replaced the Greek administrative system by a Venetian administrative system might have been practicable enough; for it was already on the road to accomplishment. The Venetian Consul at Constantinople was in fact Viceroy, not merely in Greece, but in all the Doge's eastern dominions which acknowledged or owed allegiance to the Byzantine Court. To go farther than the Republic had already gone was impossible. To have attempted to amalga-

mate the two populations and the two Churches, or to set them in friendly juxtaposition, would have been chimerical. To have deserted their old home and *patria*, which it had cost the labour, thought, and study of eight hundred years to make what men now saw it, must have involved sacrifices of the utmost magnitude. The change, instead of increasing, would have diminished the real power of Venice in the East. It would have brought with it the loss of Lombardy and Dalmatia. It would have thrown into the hands of Genoa and other trading communities a good deal of the Western trade. It might have retarded, it would not have stayed, the tide of Osmanli conquest. The seat of a flourishing and independent State it would have degraded into a Paduan watering-place.

The unsuccessful motion of the Doge for seeking a new country on the shores of the Bosphorus is supposed to have been made in the course of 1222.¹ The health of Ziani had been long on the decline; he took little or no active part in public affairs; and functions belonging to the Crown necessarily devolved on the Privy Council. The inconvenience of this course led his Serenity at length to decide upon placing his resignation in the hands of the Legislature. On the 26th February 1229,² Ziani went with some difficulty through all the constitutional forms. Four-and-twenty years ago, he had been summoned from his private residence at Santa Giustina to assume the government of a great Republic: it was to Santa Giustina that he now returned to die.³

The Electoral College was equally divided between two candidates.⁴ During six days, the scrutineers continued to examine the ballot-box in the hope of obtaining a casting vote, but without success; each of the competitors continued to have twenty suffrages; and, at last, as there appeared to be no other method of solving the difficulty, the Senate sanctioned, as a special measure, a resort to the law of chance. This novel method gave as Doge to Venice Giacomo Tiepolo, late Duke of Candia (6th March 1229).⁵

¹ Compare Salverte, p. 656, with Leopold Curti, *Mémoires historiques et politiques sur Venise*, pp. 105-6. The Venetian project of the thirteenth century forestalled, if it did not suggest, Macaulay's New Zealander, or was his original Mrs. Barbauld's *Eighteen Hundred and Eleven*?

² Dandolo, lib. x. p. 345.

³ *Cronaca Altinate*, lib. vi. p. 189.

⁴ Dandolo, lib. x. p. 346; Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 548; Dolfino, *Annali*, 38, King's MSS. 149.

⁵ Dandolo, lib. x. p. 345; Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 548.

The first act of Tiepolo, on his accession, was to pay a visit of ceremony to Santa Giustina; but Ziani was in bed, and declined to see him. He severely animadverted to those about him on the discreditable anomaly which raised Tiepolo to the throne. He is said to have been jealous of the superior antiquity of the family of his successor; but the expedient by which he was elected was certainly neither dignified nor constitutional.¹

By his will the Doge Ziani left 20,000 lire to be distributed in alms to the poor and in bequests to charitable institutions; and it was with peculiar satisfaction, that he had executed a clause in the testament of his predecessor Dandolo, which directed that a chapel should be erected to Saint Nicholas in Saint Mark's Cathedral, in eternal commemoration of the conquest of Constantinople by the Venetians.

In person Ziani was handsome and prepossessing. He had fine features, with an open and ingenuous expression. He was a man of exemplary piety and of a kind heart; but his temper was violent; and he occasionally indulged in extreme ebullitions of passion. The mode in which he conducted the receptions at Saint Mark's was often highly eccentric. Trusting to a prodigiously retentive memory, he was in the frequent habit of admitting several ambassadors on different missions at one audience, and of bidding them speak in succession what they had to say. Meanwhile, his Serenity leaned back in his seat, shut his eyes, and appeared to be dozing. When the strangers had finished their perorations, Ziani, seeming to recollect himself, took his visitors in the order in which they delivered their addresses, and gave each his reply. On one occasion, two-and-twenty envoys from various parts of Lombardy were received in this manner.²

His singular irascibility and the autocratic complexion of the ducal power are illustrated by an incident belonging to the early part of his reign³ (1211-12). His son Giorgio, while bathing in the then lonely neighbourhood of the Abbey of San Giorgio Maggiore, was assailed by some savage dogs, probably mastiffs, belonging to the Brethren, and mangled beyond the hope of recovery. The victim was the only child,

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 553. Ziani died on the 21st of March following.

² *Cronaca Altinate*, vi. 197; Da Canale, 380.

³ Sansovino, *Ven. descr.* lib. v. p. 218, and lib. xii. p. 505; Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 548; Salverte, *Civilisation de Venise*, p. 86.

which he had by his deceased wife Maria Baseio. In a paroxysm of rage, he ordered the monks, the monastery, and the dogs, to be at once committed to the flames, and so far, at least, as the building and the animals were concerned, this command was executed. No sooner, however, had Ziani regained his composure, than he was touched with remorse at the act of sacrilegious and undutiful violence which he had perpetrated. That ground, he felt, was peculiarly dear to Heaven; in those vaults reposed a parent's ashes. The Doge hastened to make reparation for the double wrong by undertaking, in the first place, to restore San Giorgio at his own expense, and secondly, by instituting an annual *Andata* in commemoration of the circumstance.

The period, during which this Doge held the direction of affairs, was also marked by the conclusion of treaties, highly favourable to the progressive pace of Venetian commerce, with Germany (1209–1220) and Hungary, Aquileia, Constantinople, Haleb or Aleppo, Beyrout, Biblos, Egypt and Tartary.¹ The Government displayed its customary dexterity in turning every political occurrence to account in the case of the Hungarians. In 1216, Andrew of Hungary, filled with pious compassion for the deplorable situation of the Christians of Palestine at that juncture, negotiated with the Venetians the supply of vessels adequate to the transport of himself and a select body of troops to the Holy Land;² and the Doge had stipulated that, independently of the contract, the King should cede to the Republic all rights, which he had unjustly acquired over her Dalmatian colonies, while she was engaged in establishing herself in her Oriental conquests.

The death of Ziani marked an important era in the Constitutional History of his country. Before the election of his successor, two Commissions were established: one of five persons, who were designated the *Correttori della Promissione Ducale*, and who were appointed by the Senate to investigate the nature and extent of the Ducal prerogative, and to suggest any changes or modifications, which it might appear to them expedient to introduce into the constitution of the Republic:³ the other consisting of three members, entitled the *Inquisitori*

¹ Marin, iv. lib. ii. and iii.

² *Mémoires sur l'histoire de France*, iii. p. 79; Extraits d'un Manuscrit Turc, intitulé *Annales de l'Égypte*, composées par Salib, fils de Gelaleddin.

³ *Chronica di Venetia*, p. 10, Harl. MSS. No. 3549.

sul Doge Defunto, whose province was to examine the acts of his late Serenity in connexion with the line of conduct laid down for his guidance in the Promission, to receive and consider complaints from persons, who might look on themselves as aggrieved by any arbitrary or illegal proceeding on the part of the Doge; to lay all such complaints or accusations as might be just or well founded before the Great Council through the Public Prosecutors;¹ and lastly, to carry the decision of the Legislature into effect, by publishing a censure on the defunct, or by levying a fine on his estate.² Whether in this particular instance the Board of Correction and the *Inquisitio post mortem* passed any strictures on the conduct of the Doge during his term of office, or whether the report, which they rendered to the Senate, bore any allusion to the singular misadventure at San Giorgio, and its still more singular consequences, there are no means of knowing. But, subsequently to 1229, these two Boards held their inquest on each demise of the Crown. Of such a class of impeachment examples are to be found even in modern history.

¹ The Coronation oath of Tiepolo is given by Romanin in the documents to his second volume.

² Sandi, ii. p. 621; Romanin, ii. p. 244.

CHAPTER XIV

A.D. 1229-1249

Giacomo Tiepolo, Doge (1229-49)—Fresh Disturbances in Candia (1241-66)—The Affairs of Constantinople resumed—Victories of the Venetians over the Greeks and Bulgarians—Deplorable State of the Lower Empire—Pawn of the Crown of Thorns (1237)—Its Redemption by Saint Louis—Affairs of Italy—Frederic II. at Venice—The Campaigns of 1236 and 1237—Execution of Pietro Tiepolo, the Doge's Son, by order of the Emperor—The Vengeance of the Republic—Siege and Fall of Ferrara (1240)—Hostile Attitude of Frederic toward the Venetians—Revolts at Pola and Zara at his Instigation—Their suppression—Abdication and Death of Tiepolo (1249).

THE reign of Tiepolo was stormy and unpropitious at its outset. Shortly before his accession, fresh disturbances arose in Candia, in which Constantinos Sevastos and Theodoros Melisinos were the active movers. They proceeded from a simple case of horse-stealing.¹ Some horses belonging to Johannes Scordillo, a man of considerable influence in the island, were carried off in the night by the servants of a neighbouring proprietor; and Scordillo instituted a legal process against the offender. Justice was not denied to him, but it was delayed; and the consequence was, that a revolt was immediately framed against the Government, in which the whole family of Scordillo and its adherents, the Melisini and Sevasti, took part. The threatened danger was warded off, however, by the conciliatory policy of the Venetian Duke without much difficulty and without any bloodshed.

The year 1231 witnessed an outbreak of a graver character. The Scordilli and Melisini again rose against the Venetian power. They set the authority of the Duke at open defiance; and they invited the Emperor Vataces to emancipate them and their country from the galling yoke of despotism, and to annex Candia to the Nicean crown. It could not be well doubted that Vataces would readily avail himself of the disposition which had thus been evinced by the Candiots in his

¹ F. Cornaro, *Creta Sacra*, ii. pp. 249-50.

favour. Meanwhile, the Scordilli and their adherents raised the standard of revolt in all the places where their influence happened to predominate; and their agents spread themselves through the villages and over the country, summoning the people everywhere to arms, and calling upon them to espouse the cause of independence. The whole island was soon in a state of commotion; thousands flocked to the banners of the rebels, who gradually swelled into a powerful army; and the Duke, seriously alarmed at the rapid progress of the sedition, and feeling that the troops at his disposal were insufficient to cope with the enemy even in the present stage of operations, dispatched an express to Venice to demand speedy reinforcements. Meanwhile, the Governor acted as Tiepolo himself had acted when he was placed in a similar situation, by calling to his assistance the Venetian Duke of the Archipelago. Sanudo did not carry his resentment against Tiepolo so far as to decline compliance with the present request; and his arrival with a strong body of troops afforded his countrymen considerable relief, while it tended to breed discouragement in the ranks of the enemy, who fell back reluctantly before the combined forces of the Venetians and Naxiots. The Allies followed up their advantage by strengthening their position, and creating several new works of defence.

But the brightening prospects of the Venetians were soon again overclouded. It was not long before a powerful squadron of thirty galleys, commanded by one of the generals of Vataces, and dispatched by that enterprising prince to lend the required support to the revolutionary party, arrived off the Cretan coast; the landing of the Greek troops, which appears to have been unopposed, restored the confidence of the insurgents; and the latter returned to the contest with renewed vigour and determination. The Allies were now outnumbered in their turn; and, no longer able to keep the field, they retired behind the line of towers which the Government of the Republic had in 1208 wished to see dismantled. They were hotly pursued and fiercely assailed by their indefatigable foes; and the commanders of several of the towers were compelled, after a severe struggle, to surrender at discretion. It seemed highly probable that, unless the expected succour from home arrived very promptly, *Colonia Venetorum* would fall

into the hands of the enemy. At this critical conjuncture it was, that a Venetian fleet reached Candia, accompanied by a new Governor; its presence at once restored the authority of the Republic; and the troops of Vataces re-embarked in precipitation, leaving the rebels at Venetian mercy. The agitation was, for the time, calmed; and while the leaders of the late insurrection were gained¹ by a liberal grant of land on easy conditions, a fresh stream of immigration, sanctioned by an act of the Legislative Body (3rd March 1233),² swelled the population and increased the preponderance, of *Colonia Venetorum*.

The courage of the Candiots was cowed, but not quelled. In 1241, two brothers, Georgius and Theodorus Cortazzi, imitated the example of the Scordilli and their partisans; the Venetian Governor perished in the attempt to vindicate his authority; and the insurgents were not disarmed, until reinforcements had been sent from Venice.³ On the whole, perhaps, the revolt of the Cortazzi was far less serious in its character and result than many which preceded, and some which followed, it; and it was appeased without any considerable spilling of blood.

One of the principal landed proprietors in Candia at this period was a man of noble and ancient lineage, and distinguished no less by his talents than by his extraction; his name was Alexis Calergi; and the shining, yet solid qualities of his understanding, his singleness and tenacity of purpose, his commanding influence, his winning address, his strong love of independence, and his fierce detestation of the foreign domination, combined to render him the most formidable enemy with whom the Republic had yet had to cope (1248). The Senate was by no means ignorant of the great Candiots' movements and designs; a secret and well-concerted attempt had been recently made to remove him furtively from the island; it was frustrated only by the vigilance of his spies. Calergi effected his escape in a small vessel under cover of the darkness; and his flight became the recognised signal for the outbreak of a terrible insurrection. The storm, which discerning men might have plainly seen gathering in the horizon, had now burst; and a fire was glowing in its embers which it occupied the mother-country a period of eighteen years to

¹ Sanudo, *ubi supra*, where he quotes the *Chronica Contarina*.

² Navagiero, *Storia*, p. 991.

³ Da Canale, sect. 322.

quench. The Republic exerted all her energy and resolution ; her Government was constantly sending out troops to the Colony ; and the Colony was as constantly nourishing a hope that victory was within her grasp. But so soon as the Venetian troops appeared in the field, the rebels fled to the mountains. When the Venetians retired within their lines, the rebels returned to the field. The former always sought an engagement, the latter always eluded it. The species of guerilla warfare was to the last degree fatiguing and unprofitable ; and the belligerents were sometimes induced to conclude an armistice, which not unfrequently ended in an attempt to negotiate for peace. But here the Colonial Government invariably gained a superiority, and Calergi, unwilling to accept any but the most honourable terms, invariably broke off the conference in disgust.

At last the Republic fixed on a different plan. The same course which she had pursued with such admirable success in the case of Pescatore, was now adopted toward Alexis Calergi. The most enticing overtures were made by the Doge to the great agitator. He was admitted, like the Count of Malta, to the rights of citizenship ; a large and free assignment of land was promised to him ; and the promise was accompanied by a solemn assurance that no thoughts were harboured of ulterior resentment. Alexis, probably worn out by a contest which seemed interminable, met these pacific advances in a corresponding spirit ; and the offer, perhaps too tempting to be easily rejected, was gladly, if not gratefully, embraced. But the Government, having thus removed the leading cause of its anxiety, did not care to act with similar lenity towards Calergi's minor confederates, of whom all were now evicted, and several were sent to the scaffold. In 1266-7, a fresh colony was sent out to take possession of the forfeited estates, and to extend the frontier of the original settlement ; and it was to the anxiety which the Republic felt to render her communication with the interior more easy, and to afford more spacious accommodation for shipping, that the foundation was owing of the modern town of Canea, which was built by the Venetians, in the later half of the thirteenth century, on the ruins of the ancient Cydon.

But while the affairs of *Colonia Venetorum* had demanded such strained attention on the part of the home Government,

those of Constantinople were also affording a prolific source of care and anxiety.

On the decease of the Emperor Robert without issue in 1228, his only surviving brother Baldwin was acknowledged to be the legitimate heir to the throne. But the elevation of a child of ten years of age was wholly impracticable at a juncture when the helm of State peculiarly required the direction of an experienced hand. The electors of Romania were anxious to consult the interests of the empire: yet they were reluctant to adopt any measure which might operate to the prejudice of Baldwin's contingent rights. They ultimately took a middle course. They determined that Jean, Baron de Brienne, and titular King of Jerusalem, should hold the crown during his life, and that, on his demise, it should descend to the heir of Robert to whom, it was expressly provided, that Brienne should at once affiance his daughter Mary.¹ The new Emperor was already octogenarian. Yet, like the illustrious Dandolo, his friend and companion in arms, Brienne still preserved in an unusual measure the vigour of greener age; and his manly character and high reputation as a soldier naturally endeared him to a people who, during nine years, had submitted with a pang to the feeble and odious rule of Courtenay.

Brienne soon learned (1230) that a league had been formed against his crown between the Greek Emperor and the King of the Bulgarians. The forces, which the Coalition would bring into the field, were reported to be barely calculable. The preparations, which were being made for the approaching campaign, were said to be immense. What was now the situation of the Latins? The bulk of their troops had either returned home, or deserted to the enemy, during the peace; the remainder had been recently disbanded, with very few exceptions, on the ground of economy; and to oppose a host, which was loosely estimated at 100,000 men, they had 160 knights and 400 foot. Brienne, firm and undaunted, had already concerted with the Venetian Podesta a plan of defensive and offensive operations, when he received intelligence that the Greeks of Nicæa, having disembarked at Lampacos, and having effected a junction with the Bulgarians in the vicinity of that place, were now within a short distance of

¹ Ducange, lib. iii. p. 236; Lebeau, lib. xcvi. p. 350.

Constantinople, while his admiral, Leo Gavalla, Lord of Rhodes, closed the Dardanelles with a fleet of 100 sail.¹ But, as the levies of the Allies had, in all probability, been rapid and large, a considerable proportion of recruits were raw in their discipline, and deficient in capable leaders; and Brienne succeeded by skilful tactics, on emerging from the Golden Gate with his comparative handful of troops, in achieving the discomfiture of the enemy.

In the meantime, letters having been received at Venice portraying the magnitude and imminence of the new danger, a fleet of five-and-twenty galleys had been sent to the relief of Constantinople. It was at the moment, when the troops of the Coalition were just beginning to waver in the presence of a handful of Latins, that Gavalla descried the Venetian fleet pressing all sail for the Dardanelles. He had scarcely time to prepare for action when the enemy bore down upon him with that vehemence, which had gained their country the victory in a hundred battles. The shock was irresistible; the enemy's line was completely pierced; and the passage of the Dardanelles was forced. The loss of Gavalla, whose squadron, largely composed of the transports which had conveyed the Greek troops from Gallipoli, was more formidable in point of number than in point of strength, was very severe; a large proportion of his vessels was sunk or dispersed; four-and-twenty were taken; an equal number, which floated at anchor in the Chrysoceras, was destroyed; and the Venetian commanders, having achieved this signal success, made a triumphal entry into Constantinople, where they were warmly greeted by the Podesta and Emperor. On their return to Venice, where the result of the contest had been anxiously expected, the victorious admirals were met at the place of disembarkation by the Doge himself, who complimented them on their exploit in the most flattering terms, and thanked them in the name of the Republic.²

The double victory of the Latins, so splendid, so timely, so largely partaking of the marvellous, thoroughly foiled the design of the Greek government of Nicæa. The inhabitants of the towns and villages, through which the discomfited and shattered battalions of the Allies were obliged to pass, harassed

¹ Da Canale, *Cronaca Veneta*, sect. 82.

² *Ibid.*, sect. 83.

their retreat, and cut off all the straggling detachments which fell in their way; and it was with extreme difficulty and hazard that the squadron of Gavalla, which had been almost annihilated during the recent action, regained the harbour of Lampsacos. The Greek prince had counted on an easy triumph; and there was every circumstance connected with his defeat, which could render that defeat wounding to his pride.

Two years later, the sword was again drawn (1232), and the Nicæan ruler, Ducas Vataces, resumed the offensive in concert with his steady ally the King of Bulgaria with undiminished zeal and activity. Since the termination of the last war, the latter had found leisure to equip a fleet of five-and-twenty galleys; and the launch of these vessels from one of the ports of the Euxine offered the first instance in which the Bulgarian flag was seen to wave on that sea. The present campaign, which was almost exclusively maritime, was, however, scarcely less inauspicious for the Coalition than its predecessor. Brienne still cultivated with assiduity the Venetian connexion which, on the one hand, appeared to have become essential to the integrity of his crown, and on which the Republic could not but feel, on the other, that the importance and security of the Factory at Constantinople, and of her Levantine establishments generally, depended to a material extent. The Emperor found a second ally in Geoffroi de Villehardouin, Prince of Achaia, nephew of the celebrated Marshal of Champagne, and a man who with his soldier-like qualities seems to have combined no slight experience of naval affairs. On being apprised of the recommencement of hostilities, Villehardouin at once committed the government of Achaia to his brother William, and hastened to the succour of the Latins. The vessels at his disposal did not exceed six men-of-war, mounting a force of 900 picked troops. The enemy's ships, on the contrary, though reaching, it was said, a hundred and sixty sail, were reported to be both ill manned and ill commanded.

The event fully answered to his anticipations. Villehardouin found the united fleets of the enemy lying near the entrance of the Dardanelles; they seemed to observe little order or discipline; and Geoffrey instantly perceived, with the searching eye of a soldier, that the allied commanders had

perpetrated the egregious error of extending their line over too wide a space. Seizing this important advantage, the Prince pierced their centre, captured fifteen of their vessels, and, with these trophies in tow triumphantly entered the Golden Horn. There he effected a junction with the Podesta,¹ who, with fifteen Venetian galleys and a few Pisan and Genoese, was on the point of debouching from the Chrysoceras; and the arrival of Villehardouin proved a timely reinforcement. In the engagement which followed, the Greeks and their Ally were defeated with a farther loss of ten ships;² and Vataces was obliged to fall back on Lampsacos, eyeing with a look of bitter vexation, as he retired, those tantalizing ramparts which he had constantly in view, yet of which it seemed that he was destined never to become the master.

The success of the Latins, however, was productive of few lasting fruits. Although their position was momentarily improved, and although Constantinople was placed for the present out of danger, the constant exertions which it cost her defenders to maintain their ground against so many enemies, were rapidly sapping the resources of the empire. It was very true that the Venetians, if they brought their whole power to bear on a single point, might have easily sheltered the Latin dynasty from any perils which could arise to threaten its stability. But it was to be remembered that the attention of the Venetians was perpetually diverted from the East by other interests of an equally weighty character. The affairs of Italy, of Dalmatia, of Candia, presented a constant source of solicitude and expense; and it was obvious that, unless a fleet was permanently stationed by the Republic in the Bosphorus, Constantinople might be lost before she could afford it relief. These considerations induced Brienne³ to reiterate his appeal to the other Crowned Heads of Europe³ for succour and support; his son-in-law, Prince Baldwin, was dispatched for this purpose to the French Court; and at the same time the Doge sent an ambassador thither to assist in concerting some effectual measures for preserving the integrity of the Byzantine dominion.⁴ The Pope lent his aid to the movement. A new Crusade was published against the enemies of

¹ Da Canale, sect. 84.

² Ibid.

³ Tillemont, *Vie de Saint Louis*, p. 387; Matthew Paris, vi. p. 338.

⁴ M. Paris, ii. p. 310.

the Latin monarchy; the same indulgences were proclaimed in favour of those who took the vow as had been accorded to the warriors who volunteered to defend the Holy Places; and thousands soon ranged themselves round the standards, which were erected by the Duke of Burgundy, the Count of Brittany, and other great feudatories in various parts of France. Matters were thus favourably progressing, when Brienne expired at Constantinople on the 23rd of March 1237,¹ and Baldwin was invited to take possession of the throne. But the prospects of the young Prince were not at present sufficiently encouraging to tempt him to embrace even the offer of a crown. The levies, which he was raising under the name and authority of the King, were far from being complete; and the Court of France afforded at least a safe and hospitable shelter.

The reign of Baldwin II., last and weakest of the imperial House of Courtenay, belongs to the History of the Lower Empire. Extending nominally from March 1237 to July 1261, it was replete with disgrace and misfortune; and from that date opens a new scene with the return of the Greek dynasty to Constantinople.

At the period of the accession of John de Brienne (1228) to the imperial throne, the financial prospects of the State were very far from being prosperous. During the eight years this Prince remained in power, they had become only more and more gloomy; the expenses of the war with Bulgaria and other Powers considerably more than absorbed a scanty revenue; and on the decease of Brienne in 1237 the resources of the Government were so straitened, that the Regency found it necessary to open subscriptions for a loan. The principal participators were Venetian and Genoese merchants; the sum subscribed amounted to 13,134 *perperi*; and, as a guarantee for this repayment, which was promised within a short and definite term, the Crown of Thorns was taken from its resting-place in the chapel of the Bucoleon, and hypothecated to the Bailo Alberto Morosini, a member of one of the greatest mercantile firms in the Republic. On the expiration of the specified term, however, the money was not forthcoming; and the security was in strictness forfeited. The Regency was advised to avoid so grave a scandal by concluding an arrangement with some third party, by which

¹ Ducange, lib. iii. p. 232.

the crown might be transferred to their custody, on the condition that they should advance the necessary amount, and grant the indulgence of a month for the repayment. Such a contract was accordingly made, in October or November 1237, with a rich Venetian banker; the original bond was cancelled; and, with the lender's concurrence the precious security was placed, for the sake of greater safety, in the church of Pantocrator. It had been provided that, should the Regency fail in the performance of its agreement, the banker was at liberty to remove the relic, and to lodge it for a farther term of four months at Venice; and finally it was understood that, if the money was not paid within the stipulated period, or at the latest, on the 19th of June 1238, the crown became the property of the mortgagee.¹

A report of this singular transaction reached in due course the pious monarch who then presided over the destinies of France; Louis IX. was severely shocked at the sordid profanity exhibited by those who had consented to negotiate a loan on such terms; and he instantly dispatched two Dominicans to Constantinople to redeem the relic from pawn, and, if it was practicable, to secure it for their own country. But, the debt having remained unliquidated, a ship was hired by the proprietor, in the early part of August, to convey the crown to its new destination; and this vessel had long since sailed, when the Dominicans arrived at the Golden Horn. They tracked it, however, with all possible expedition to Venice, where they obtained an audience of the Doge; they explained to Tiepolo the object of their mission; and his Serenity conducted them to the Reliquary of Saint Mark's, where he pointed to a golden casket, carefully sealed with his own arms, as the repository of the treasure which they sought. The Envoys of the King, as they had been charged, tendered to the banker without delay the redemption money,² and claimed with the same breath the restitution of the guarantee. The claim had fairly lapsed; but the Government did not feel itself entitled to interfere. A procession through the streets of Paris, headed by the King himself, barefoot and in his shirt, amply attested the genuineness of his devotion; and it was to contain this and other curiosities of a similar character, that the royal saint

¹ Ducange, *Dulaure, ubi infra.*

² Leber, *Essai*, p. 103.

erected the Sainte-Chapelle at a cost of 20,000 marks on the site of the ancient chapel of Saint Nicole.¹

Thirty-seven years had passed since the termination of the great War of Independence in the Peninsula by the treaty concluded between Frederick Barbarossa and the Lombard League at Constance, in June 1183, when the imperial throne was ascended in November 1220, by another Frederic who, in his exalted conception of the prerogative, in his intolerant jealousy of municipal or local privileges, in his impetuous disposition, and in his overbearing character, closely resembled his grandfather Barbarossa. In both were found united, with talents and virtues² of a high order, a pride, which rarely stooped to propitiate or persuade, and a fitful and fiery temper.

During the earlier part of his reign, the time of the Emperor was spent for the most part either in Germany or in Southern Italy.³ But, in 1232, having occasion to visit the North of Italy, he suddenly expressed a desire to see the Venetian capital. The reception which he met at the hands of Tiepolo was, in the highest degree, splendid and honourable;⁴ and his bearing toward the great people, among whom he had come, to make a short stay, indicated even an anxiety to maintain his amicable relations with the Republic. The affairs of the Peninsula were at that time occupying his Majesty's closest and most constant attention; he had more than one conversation with the Doge on the subject; and the latter could hardly fail to be forcibly struck by the justness of Frederic's remarks. It was much to be regretted (observed the latter on one occasion) that the Italian municipalities did not comprehend their true interests. With what advantage they might take Venice as their model! What a proud, yet what a melancholy contrast her condition, peaceful and flourishing, offered to that of her neighbours and contemporaries, perpetually torn by intestine divisions and disorders! Tiepolo was possibly of opinion that, had the Emperor carried his inquiry only a little farther, he might have discerned one cause, at least, of the evil which he so much deplored. He might have perceived that it lay in his

¹ Dulaure, *Histoire de Paris*, ii. pp. 227-8; Ducange, *Hist. de Const.*, lib. iv. pp. 263-4; Tillemont, *Vie de Saint-Louis*, ii. p. 336 *et seq.*

² Gio. Villani, lib. c. 1.

³ Sismondi, ii. p. 188.

⁴ Dandolo, lib. x. p. 347; Romanin, ii. p. 223.

own overweening and restless ambition, and in his endeavour to check the development of the spirit of the age.

History taught Frederic, that the Venetians were dangerous and formidable enemies. On the other hand, by a prince who, as an Italian by birth and sentiment, set a much higher value on his possessions in the Peninsula than either his father or his grandfather, their alliance was, above all others, to be cultivated. For the lofty influence, which the Republic had acquired on the terra-firma since the commencement of the last war, was still rapidly in the ascendant; her voice had weight in every cabinet; her flag was respected on every sea; and such was the high reputation which her patricians enjoyed for administrative talent, that the free towns of Lombardy, which had for some time been forced by the violence of party-spirit and by the jealous rivalry existing among their own governing class, to seek their Podesta in the person of some alien of note, most frequently chose that magistrate among the members of the Great Council of Venice. These magistrates presided over the municipal affairs of the city or town, both civil and criminal, but did not intervene in political relations with other States. Thus Pietro Tiepolo, the Doge's eldest son, was successively Podesta of Treviso and Milan, the latter the first of the Guelphic cities;¹ Reniero Zeno held the same office at Bologna (1232-1240),² Michele Morosini, at Faenza,³ Marino Dandolo, at Treviso,⁴ Nicolo Quirini, at Reggio, Marino Badoer, at Padua,⁵ Stefano Badoer, at Ferrara,⁶ Giovanni Dandolo at Conegliano. A Marino Foscarini is mentioned, whose services were so constantly employed in this capacity by the Lombard republics, that he was commonly known by the name of Foscarini the Podesta; and it was obvious that, wherever these appointments were made, they would carry with them, to a certain extent, the voice and influence of the Venetians. The Republic, at the same time, acted as banker for some members of the League, and thus protected their pecuniary resources, if she did not even assist them by loans on security.

Frederic was hardly a stranger to such considerations :

¹ Sanudo, *Vite de' Duchi*, p. 552; Sismondi, ii. p. 220.

² Da Canale, sect. 87.

³ *Ibid.* sect. 97.

⁴ Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 553.

⁵ Sismondi, ii. p. 214.

⁶ Sanudo, *ubi supra*; Caffaro, *Annales Genuenses ad an. 1213*.

nor can it be supposed that he was ignorant where his true interests lay. But the truth was, that he was too passionate and headstrong by nature to follow them at all times, or to cherish an alliance, which might have greatly helped to promote the success of the cause so near his heart.

Eccelino the Monk, second Lord of Romano, left, at his death, two sons: the elder was christened, after his father, Eccelino: the name of the other was Alberigo. To the former the old Lord left all his castles between Padua and Verona; the latter received, as his share of the patrimony, those in the vicinity of Treviso. Both the Romani were men of excellent understanding and superior acquirements. In both great parts were associated with great vices. Eccelino himself was peculiarly one of those persons, so common in unsettled times, who join to a vast capacity and high mental endowments a seared conscience and a cold, depraved heart. It was not long before the Emperor, distracted by the civil wars of Germany, began to feel the want of such an instrument in the Peninsula. The Italian was easily gained by flattery and privileges; and what Reinhold of Cologne and Christian of Mayence had been, in the preceding century, to Frederic I., such now to Frederic II. became Eccelino da Romano. The foreign imperial houses, as the range of their dominion spread, and the facilities for intercourse between remote points remained so limited, had found it indispensable to delegate their authority to some viceroy, whose abilities were at once a source of advantage and danger; and such families as Visconti and La Scala owed their rise to the overgrown proportions and decentralized condition of the Carolingian fabric, of which the Middle-Age Cæsar was ere long to become little more than a titular over-lord.

The campaigns of 1236 and the succeeding year were mostly favourable to the imperial arms. The Guelphs obtained indeed a few unimportant advantages before Padua and Treviso, where the Venetians lent some support to the cause of liberty. At the former place, more particularly, the Venetian Podesta signalized himself by his brave resistance to the enemy. But he was at last compelled to retire before superior numbers; and both those cities fell into the hands of Eccelino. From Cremona, Pavia, and other Ghibelline cities the Emperor received congratulatory addresses and

reinforcements. Mantua and the Count of San Bonifacio did him homage. Vicenza, Brescia, and Faenza, were overpowered. Milan, however, the strongest fortress in Lombardy, where the Doge's son held command as Podesta, still remained untaken.

On learning the rapid and triumphant progress of the Imperialists, the Milanese, in concert with their allies of Vercelli, Novara and Alexandria, advanced under the command of Pietro Tiepolo to oppose their redoubtable antagonist within a short distance of Manerbio on the Oglio, where they took up a strong position, and prepared to dispute the passage of the river. They chose their ground so well, that the Emperor did not venture to attack them; and having received this unexpected check, Frederic was apparently desirous of closing the campaign of 1237: for it was already the 27th November; and a winter, which promised to be severe, was fast setting in. In the mind of the Guelphs such a supposition was strengthened, when they observed Frederic to draw off his forces from Manerbio, and, crossing the Oglio at Ponteviso, to march in the direction of Cremona.¹ Tiepolo and his officers consequently conjecturing, that operations would not recommence till the spring of the ensuing year, abandoned their position, and prepared to return to headquarters through the Cremasque territory. But excessive was their astonishment, when they reached Cortenova, to find that the Imperialists were there before them. It was then for the first time, that Tiepolo perceived how thoroughly he had been outmanœuvred. This premeditated stroke on the part of Frederic, who had found it necessary to make a false movement in order to draw the Milanese and their confederates from Manerbio, was a stratagem which did much honour to his military talents. So soon as the Emperor gained a short distance from the Oglio, he had turned aside from the road to Cremona, and, marching with great rapidity across the country, had posted himself on the high road to Milan at a point, where his forces were concealed from observation by a wood. The troops of the League now suffered a total defeat; their loss was tremendous both in killed and in prisoners; and among the latter was the gallant, but incautious Tiepolo. The success of Frederic in humiliating the pride of the most formidable member of the League, elated his Majesty beyond

¹ Sismondi, ii. ch. vi.

measure; and he soon proceeded to resent the aid which the Republic had lent to the Guelphs at Padua and Treviso. A descent was made by his lieutenant Eccelino on Mestra and Murano; the whole district was swept by the invaders; the rich Abbeys of San Cipriano and San Ilario were pillaged, and the disciples of Saint Benedict were forced to seek refuge at Torcello. But the progress of the Imperialists was soon opposed by Giovanni Tiepolo, the Doge's second son, who had hastened with a considerable body of troops to repel the inroad; the Venetians successively recovered Mestra and Murano, driving back the aggressors at every point; and the Lord of Romano was compelled to retire. The victory of Cortenova was the most important in the campaign of 1237. But it was sullied by one black and ill-judged act. It had been known for some time at Venice that Pietro Tiepolo was a captive,¹ when the afflicting news arrived, that Frederic had ordered him to be beheaded.² The most violent indignation was manifested at the atrocious outrage.³ The Republic had reason to believe, that it had been at the instigation of the Lord of Romano that Frederick directed the execution of her citizen: and it was on Eccelino that the first weight of her vengeance fell. An armament was sent against Padua under the same Giovanni Tiepolo, who had already displayed his courage and abilities in the recovery of Mestra. The troops of Tiepolo obtained several advantages over those of Eccelino. They pursued those advantages with unrelenting perseverance. The territory of the Tyrant of Padua was reduced at many points to utter desolation.

The next blow was levelled at the Emperor himself. On the 5th of September 1239, Stefano Badoer and Romeo Quirini, the Ambassadors of the Doge, signed a Concordat with the Pontiff Gregory IX., by which the Republic was bound—(1) To equip, for the projected conquest of Sicily, a squadron of five-and-twenty galleys with full complements; (2) to defray half the cost of such armament, the other half to be defrayed by his Holiness;⁴ (3) to entertain no propositions for peace,

¹ Sismondi, ii. ch. vi. p. 220.

² Pugliola, *Cronica di Bologna*, ad an. 1240; *Chron. Estense*, ap. Murat. xv. 308; Matthew Paris, *Historia Major*, ii. 556: edit. 1640.

³ Marin, iv. pp. 222-3.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 223, states that the cost of each galley per month was 275 Genoese *lire*, and that this sum was payable six months in advance.

which might proceed from the Emperor, without the knowledge and concurrence of the court of the Vatican; and fourthly, to forfeit a sum of 6000 marks of silver, in the event of her neglecting to perform her contract. On the part of the Pope it was stipulated—(1) That he should place his new ally in the enjoyment of certain important franchises in the cities of Bari and Salpi, in Apulia, so soon as those places were reduced to submission; (2) that he should accord to the Republic right of free trade throughout Sicily, subject to a similar contingency; and (3) that he should assign to them in fief whatever acquisitions might be made by Venetian subjects in that island or elsewhere. The hopes and apprehensions, however, which the treaty of 1239 had reasonably excited, remained alike unrealised: the naval campaign in the Mediterranean against Frederic, which in that treaty had seemed to be contemplated, dwindled into an expedition,¹ which committed great havoc on the coasts of the two Sicilies; and it might be well suspected that this expedition was undertaken less with a view to the common interests of the League, than to make the Venetian name respected and feared.

Since the era of the Lombard League, the Roman Pontiffs had made it their policy to support the liberal party in Italy against the Crown; and the Holy See was consequently regarded at the present time as the Head of the Guelphic Federation. It was not surprising that the See should be thus zealous in espousing the cause of freedom. For it was unquestionably her true interest, that that cause should thrive, and that the patriots should be always looking at least toward a successful termination of the struggle. Assuredly then, although the provisions of the treaty of September 1239 were not carried out to their full extent, it was of high consequence to procure the adhesion of the first maritime State in Europe to the League, and to prevail on a proverbially cautious Power to display so unequivocally her popular predilections. There was a second quarter where Frederic had long rendered himself obnoxious by his arbitrary proceedings; and through papal instrumentality a treaty offensive and defensive was ratified at Rome, for a term of nine years, between Venice and Genoa (1240). The conditions of the new compact were of an analogous character to those of 1239. The

¹ Da Canale, *Cronaca Veneta*, sects. 98-9, 100-1.

contracting parties engaged to afford each other aid by land and by sea, more especially in the two Sicilies, and to make no peace with the Emperor without the approbation of the Holy See; and those who well remembered the Battle of Trapani, and the effect which it wrought at the time on the mind of Genoa, were astonished to find the bitterest of foes meeting on common ground, and joining their arms against a common enemy. The Emperor could not help now perceiving that he had gone a little too far.

But it soon became evident that the alliance of Venice was of far more practical utility to the League than that of her old rival. Among the cities which at present embraced the political tenets of the Ghibellines, Ferrara was justly considered one of the most important. Ferrara was formerly held of the Holy See by Azzo I., of the house of Este, with the title of Podesta; but that nobleman had been recently dispossessed by the hostile faction; and it was occupied by the Imperialists under Salinguerra Torelli in the name of a son of Azzo.¹ It was shortly after the accession of the Republic to the Lombard Confederacy, that a design was formed for expelling the Ghibellines, and for reinstating the feudatory of the Holy See. Independently of any political considerations which she might entertain in common with her allies, Venice had other grounds for wishing to re-establish the Guelphs at Ferrara. The valuable immunities, which her traders had enjoyed in that City since the time of the Countess Matilda, were ignored by Frederic, so soon as their country openly sided with the popular party; and the Government of the Doge insisted that the renewal of those immunities should form one of the express conditions on which the Guelphs now undertook to restore the Marquis Azzo. Torelli, however, was too familiar with danger to feel embarrassment or uneasiness at his difficult position; he viewed the hostile preparations of Venice and her Allies with imperturbable calmness; and the old soldier announced his readiness to defend the trust which Frederic had reposed in him to the last drop of his blood.

The siege of Ferrara was formed on the 2nd of February 1240.² The army of the Coalition was composed of six

¹ G. Diedo, i. p. 88.

² Da Canale, sects. 90-96; Pugliola, *Cronica di Bologna, ad an. 1240*; *Chronicon Estense*, folio 309; Bartolomæus Saccus vulgò Platina, *Historia Mantuana*, lib. iii., ap. Murat. xx. 713-16.

divisions; namely, the Venetians and Mantuans, under the Visdomino Stefano Badoer, the Bolognese, under their Podesta, Reniero Zeno, and the remaining four under Azzo D'Este, the Bishop of Ferrara, Gregorio di Montelongo, papal legate, and Eccelino's brother, Alberigo da Romano, who was at present a member of the League. The Allies had taken up a position on some meadow-land on the right bank of the Po; and their encampment extended from the precincts of Ferrara to the village of San Luca.

But, apart from the resolution which Salinguerra and the garrison under his charge exhibited in the face of the enemy, there were other sinister influences with which the latter had to grapple. The Governor, foreseeing the probable course of events, had wisely taken the precaution to lay the surrounding country under water by opening sluices from the Po; by this manœuvre he necessarily cramped and impeded the movements of the besieging force; and the difficulty of the position of the Allies was enhanced by a violent tempest, which arose shortly after the commencement of operations, and which involved numerous desertions. These causes combined with others to militate against the Confederates; their exertions remained during several months without fruit; and at length the patience of the Apostolic Legate was thoroughly exhausted. In the course of July 1240, his Eminence wrote to the Doge, reporting the slender success which had waited on their efforts, and demanding some naval reinforcement, which might act in conjunction with the army, and might enable them to accelerate the attainment of their object.

In laying the dispatch of the Legate before the Senate, his Serenity urged the expediency of bringing the siege of Ferrara to a speedy termination; he proceeded to recall to memory the excellent and worthy example of the princes his predecessors, who had ever deemed it their duty on similar occasions to do their utmost to uphold and exalt the dignity of the Venetian name; and he concluded by observing that, under the hope that fortune would be more propitious to him than she had been to the other generals, it was his desire at once to assume the personal command of the troops before Ferrara. The proposition of his Serenity was warmly applauded; his son Giovanni was appointed vice-Doge during

his absence,¹ and, a squadron of sixteen sail having been manned with all possible expedition, Tiepolo arrived on the third day after his departure from Venice at the port of Ferrara. The presence of the Doge inspired the Allies with renewed confidence; and the double fire, which was now opened from the siege batteries, was to the last degree galling and murderous. It was now the seventh month of operations; but still Salinguerra continued to maintain his ground, and the Ferrarese to defend their ramparts with a courage and intrepidity worthy of such a leader. As provisions grew scarce, however, within the City, and as the ravages and depredations of the Allies gradually took a wider and more destructive range, the General was urged more and more strongly to propose terms to the enemy. One Ugo Ramberti, the proprietor of broad estates thereabout, advocated peace with marked earnestness. But, notwithstanding this pressure, the Governor remained immovable; it was only when he was reduced to the last extremity, that he consented to a capitulation, which was signed in the course of August; and the old soldier, repairing to the ducal barge, placed it and his own person in the hands of Tiepolo. Salinguerra was treated with every mark of respect; and after a brief stay at Ferrara, where the Doge reinstated Azzo II., and established the commercial affairs of the Republic on their former basis, his Serenity conducted his illustrious captive to Venice. There the Ghibelline Chief experienced the same kindness and courtesy; he was honourably lodged on parole in a house belonging to the Bosio family at San Tommaso; and at his death in 1244 a place was assigned to his ashes in the vaults of San Nicolo del Lido, where the inscription on his monument shews that Salinguerra of Ferrara expired on the 25th of July of that year.²

The recovery of so important a place as Ferrara was hailed with delight by the Republic and the Guelphic faction generally; it was natural, that Tiepolo himself should seek in that event some solace for the lacerated affections of a parent; and the Venetian commercial world were, on their part, overjoyed at a turn of affairs, which had the effect of restoring to them their local privileges. Nor was it less to be expected,

¹ Da Canale, sect. 95.

² *Archivio stor. Italiano*, viii. p. 723, note 118.

that the result of the siege would afford an ample source of disappointment to the haughty and sensitive Frederic. The Emperor took more particular umbrage at the share which Venice had borne in the late undertaking, because he felt that she was a Power to whose gratitude he had earned the strongest claims by mercantile indulgences. It was scarcely consonant with his temper and character to submit tamely to what he conceived to be an insult to his person and to his throne; and he endeavoured to make some reprisal by assailing the Republic in a point where he knew her to be more susceptible than in any other. A surreptitious blow was struck at her in Dalmatia, where the Venetian rule had never been consolidated, and where its stability was constantly impaired by Hungarian intrigue. Insidious overtures were made to Pola and Zara; both these places were urged to revolt against their masters: and a secret treaty was concluded between the Emperor and the King of Hungary, by which it was proposed to wrest the whole Province from the Republic.¹ But, like so many others which had been framed from time to time with a similar object, this scheme signally miscarried; the prompt and vigorous measures adopted by Venice stifled the spirit of disaffection in its birth; and the insurrections which had already broken out at Pola and Zara, were suppressed under circumstances humiliating to the insurgents. The walls of Pola were razed.

Shortly after this event Frederic took an occasion to convey to the Republic, in a more direct manner and in plainer language, his views touching her policy in the affair of Ferrara. It having come to his knowledge that a Venetian embassy, on its return from the Court of Savoy, was expected to pass through his dominions, the Emperor gave an order that it should be arrested and conducted to the place where he was staying. So soon as the deputies had been ushered into his presence, Frederic began to upbraid them with the ingratitude of their country, which, after receiving at his hands the greatest favours and benefits, had ranged itself among his enemies; he affirmed that it had always been, that it was still, his sincere wish to maintain amicable relations with the Republic; and he concluded by inquiring what motive led her government to assume so hostile an attitude

¹ Da Canale contemp., sects. 92-95.

toward his empire. The ambassadors, thus challenged, could surely have been at no loss for a reply; but it is probable that they were uncertain what course to take; and all that they did was to falter out a few lame excuses. Frederic was not disposed to press them too closely; he felt that his leading object was already attained, since he had barely room to doubt that his involuntary visitors would faithfully report to the Doge all which had passed between him and themselves; and after a short detention the prisoners received a gracious dismissal. The foregoing incident seemed to afford an illustration of two points. It shewed that the Emperor was fully sensible of the value and importance of the Venetian connection, more particularly under the circumstances in which he was then placed; and it indicated how well that prince could feign ignorance of the considerations which had induced Venice to embrace the cause of the Popular Party in Italy.

The chastisement of Pola and Zara was followed by the conclusion in May 1244, of a fresh convention with Hungary, by which that power renounced, for the third or fourth time, all its pretensions to the sovereignty of Dalmatia and the Illyric Islands in favour of the Republic; and the perfidy of Zara was severely punished. The Zaratines were forced to exchange their old constitution for a new one, differing from its predecessor in the introduction of some additional articles of uncommon stringency: (1) It was required that, in future, the military, as well as the civil, governor of Zara should be a Venetian. (2) Five of those persons chiefly implicated in the insurrectionary movement were to be surrendered as hostages for five years. (3) One hundred of the principal citizens were to be at once deputed to ask pardon of the Doge. (4) As often as the Doge might be pleased so to command, a select deputation of ninety members was to be sent to renew the oath of allegiance.¹ (5) Compensation was to be awarded by the Municipal Council for the losses sustained by Michele Morosini, the late Count, and the other Venetian residents during the sedition. (6) The Zaratines were prohibited from forming any alliances, matrimonial or otherwise, with the Slavonian families of Dalmatia without the consent of the Senate.

¹ Marin, iv. pp. 236-38.

In the early summer of 1249, the Doge, weary of that power which he had enjoyed during one-and-twenty years, imitated the example of his immediate predecessor Ziani, and placing his resignation in the hands of the Legislative Body (May 20), retired to his own house at San Agostino in the Ward of San Polo. In addition to Pietro, whose tragical death flung a veil of mourning over his father's declining years, Tiepolo had several sons; he had also a brother Fra Alberigo upon whom, by a solemn deed under seal, he settled, in June, 1234, a small estate in the parish of Santa Maria Formosa, that Alberigo might build on the site a church in honour of Saint John and Saint Paul. In this church it was the express wish of Tiepolo, that his remains should repose; and they were consequently transferred thither, so soon as the new work was sufficiently in progress.¹ A few years passed away, and the crypts of Saint John and Saint Paul were opened to receive the ashes of a second Tiepolo; and shortly after his sepulture, an inscription was placed on the family monument, in which was briefly traced the Story of Two Lives.²

Chronica di Venetia, Anon., Harl. MSS. 4820.

² Sansovino, lib. i. p. 57; Litta, *Celebri famiglie Italiane*, vii.

CHAPTER XV

A.D. 1249—1268

Marino Morosini, Doge (1249—52)—Reniero Zeno, Doge (1252—68)—Fresh War with Genoa—Victory of the Venetians near St. Jean d'Acre—Campaign of 1258—Second Battle of St. Jean d'Acre—Total Defeat of the Genoese—Destruction of their Factory at Acre by the Venetians—Fruitless Attempt of the Holy See to effect a Reconciliation between the Belligerents—Overthrow of the Courtenay Dynasty at Constantinople, and Recovery of the Empire by the Greeks (1261)—Treaties of the Venetian and Genoese Factories with Palæologos, the new Emperor—Successive Removals of the Genoese to Heraclea and Galata—Recommencement of the Genoese War—Victory of the Venetians at Sette Pozzi (1263)—Battle of Trapani (1264)—Great Joy of Venice at the Announcement of the Second Defeat of the Genoese—Overtures of Palæologos—Truce between the Republic and the Empire—Affairs of Italy—Succession of Conrad (1250)—State of Parties in the Peninsula—Siege and Fall of Padua—Death of the two Romani—Civil Disturbances at Venice—Treaty of Venice with Saint Louis—Death of Zeno (July, 1268)—His Character and Legal Reforms

IMMEDIATELY after the performance of the obsequies of Giacomo Tiepolo, the Commissions of the five Correttori and the three Inquisitori met, for the second time since their institution in 1229, for the purpose of examining the acts of the late Administration, and of qualifying themselves for the task of suggesting any revisions in the Promission, which they might judge to be necessary or expedient. The labours of these singular Boards of Inquiry were somewhat more important in their result than in 1229, when their proceedings were of a purely formal character; and the report which they rendered clearly indicated the progress of the tendency to shorten the prerogatives of the Crown. A feeling was now growing up, that the Doge was rather too prompt to seize any opportunity which might arise of promoting the interests of his own family to the exclusion and prejudice of others. This was an extremely natural policy; and it was one which was incidental to every form of government. Nevertheless, in a State, where the Chief Magistrate was invariably selected from a particular section of the community, and where the

members of the privileged class, to which he belonged, were exceedingly apt to forget that the object of the national choice ceased, on ascending the throne, to be one of themselves, it was always to be expected that an attempt, on the part of the Ducal family, to establish a political preponderance would be viewed with jealousy and distaste. In the plots and conspiracies by which the annals of the ninth and tenth centuries are so strongly marked, and in the Revolutions of 1033 and 1172, there is every proof that such was the case. This feeling which had been constantly gathering strength, was at present so generally received among the upper class, that a resolution was formed, at the recommendation of the Correctors, to embody with the Promission a clause, by which the successor of Giacomo Tiepolo should be pledged to refrain from seeking, on behalf of his children or kindred, any appointment within or without the Dogado, and to govern, for the future, in strict accordance with the laws and the Constitution.

The Oath having passed the Board of Correction with this addition, which was possibly of more ostensible than real value, steps were taken to supply the vacancy occasioned by the abdication of Tiepolo. At the last election, in consequence of the suffrages being equally balanced between Tiepolo himself and another candidate for the berretta, it had been found necessary to solve the difficulty by casting lots. To obviate a recurrence to this impolitic expedient, and to obtain the certainty of a casting vote, the number of electors was raised from forty to forty-one.¹ On the 13th of June, 1249, the Forty-One made known to the people that, after due deliberation, their choice had fallen on Marino Morosini. Morosini, who² had already reached his sixty-eighth year, was a person of venerable presence, of amiable disposition, and of irreproachable character; and he carried with him to the Throne a long familiarity with public affairs and a well-deserved popularity. It was chiefly as a diplomatist that the successor of Tiepolo had distinguished himself in the political arena. In 1245,³ he was sent, in conjunction with Reniero Zeno, late Podesta of Bologna, and Giovanni da Canale,⁴ to represent the Republic at the Council of Lyons. In 1241,⁵ he had been

¹ Sabellico, *De Venetis magistratibus*, sign. b. 3: edit. 1488.

² Sanudo, *Vite de' Duchi*, p. 554.

³ Dandolo, lib. x. p. 356.

⁴ Da Canale, sect. 115.

⁵ F. Cornaro, *Creta Sacra*, ii. p. 250.

selected to replace Marino Zeno in the government of Candia, at a time when that Island was still fiercely struggling for freedom. The House, to which the new Doge belonged, was one of the highest consideration and antiquity in the Republic. It was the wise aim of the governing body to possess in the person of the Doge one who brought to his exalted position and functions a diversified and mature experience of official life. The head of the State was usually qualified by his antecedents to control all the Departments at home and abroad, and if required, to assume the command of the fleet or even of the army.

The brief reign of Morosini enjoyed a profound tranquillity, for which, according to Da Canale,¹ the Venetians were indebted principally to the bold and nervous rulè of the illustrious Tiepolo. "During his administration the Venetians enjoyed peace and abundance," writes the same contemporary,² "and their hearts were light and jubilant." The death of this excellent Prince occurred on the 1st January, 1252. His remains were borne to the church of Saint Mark, where they were interred on the northern side of the porch with a pomp never known before, and where his shield of arms was hung after the exequies. Morosini was buried in his ducal habit, with the sword buckled round his waist, and the spurs indicative of his equestrian rank; it was the first instance in which such a distinction had been allowed.

The forty-one electors who were appointed after the exequies of the Doge for the purpose of naming his successor, made unanimous choice of Reniero, one of the two sons of Pietro Zeno, and Podesta of Fermo (January 25, 1252).

During the vacancy of the Crown, a somewhat remarkable feature was introduced for the first time into the already complex form of the Ducal Election.³ Before the result of its present deliberations was divulged, the College deputed one of its members, Pietro Foscarini, to bind over to its confidence a person as sponsor for the Republic; and this individual, having been initiated by Foscarini, and having formally demanded the consent and permission of those present, proceeded to swear according to the prescribed manner, in the name of the Venetian People, to accept and acknowledge as their ruler whomever the Forty-One should

¹ Sect. 127.

² Da Canale, *ubi supra*.

³ Dandolo, lib. x. p. 360.

declare to have elected to be such, agreeably to the Constitution and to usage.

The day of the coronation was kept as a general holiday. The streets were festooned with garlands; banners, bearing the family arms richly emblazoned, floated from the windows of the houses; from every balcony were suspended silken draperies; and a galaxy of beauty assembled at the casements and verandahs to see the cavalcade pass. In the afternoon, when the ceremony was concluded, a tournament was held on the Piazza of Saint Mark, in which many members of the equestrian order, as well as several strangers of distinction, bore a part; the tilters were principally, however, Venetian and Trevisan noblemen; and among the former were to be distinguished Marco Ziani and Lorenzo Tiepolo, who drew much admiration by their gallant bearing and knightly address.¹

Zeno, who had filled several high appointments at Bologna and elsewhere, and who has been seen commanding the Bolognese at the celebrated siege² of Ferrara in 1240, aspired to something beyond the narrow sphere of every-day politics. In earlier life, he had devoted considerable attention to the legal institutions of his country; and he determined to apply himself to the continuation of Tiepolo's great, though unfinished, task of reform.

But affairs of a very different complexion soon absorbed the attention of the Government. At the period³ of the Crusades, it was usual in those cities or towns where the Christians held sway, to assign to each of the mercantile communities which had borne a part in the conquest or recovery of the particular district, a separate quarter where they might have their own mill, their own oven, their own bath, their own weights and measures, their own church, and where they might be governed by their own laws, and protected by their own magistrates; and this salutary rule was observed, with very few exceptions, in all the treaties between the Italian Republics and the early Kings of Jerusalem. At Ptolemais or Saint Jean d'Acre, however, the church of Saint Sabbas was frequented by the Venetians and the Genoese in

¹ Da Canale, sect. 129.

² Pugliola, *Cronica di Bologna, ad annos 1232-40.*

³ *Chronicon Estense*, Murat. xv. 324.

common;¹ and it happened that, in course of time, both nations sought to found a right to the exclusive property of the building. The controversy at last grew so serious, that Marco Giustiniani, Venetian Bailo of Acre, and Consul-General of Syria, wrote, in the course of 1256, to Alexander IV., explaining the circumstances in which such a difference had originated, stating the point which it had reached, and earnestly soliciting his interposition. At the same time, the Genoese consul, Simone Vento, addressed a letter to the Prior of the Hospitallers, from whom his Republic pretended to have derived the disputed privilege, in which that officer denied the truth of the Venetian representations, placed the whole case in his own light, and concluded by begging at the hands of the Prior a formal confirmation of the right of his fellow-citizens to the disposal of Saint Sabbas. Giustiniani was so far warranted in considering the claim of his countrymen of superior validity, that in the treaties, into which the latter had entered at various times with the early Christian Kings of Jerusalem, it had been distinctly provided, that a third part of Acre, including the street in which the church in question was located, should be assigned to their factory as a free and separate quarter. At all events, Alexander at once decided in favour of Giustiniani, who was soon in a position to place in the hands of Vento a Brief, containing the award of his Holiness. The Genoese, however, still persisted in urging the priority of their claim; and the feeling of animosity, which the dispute had engendered between the two factories, became gradually so violent and bitter, that it seemed to be almost impossible, that an open breach could be long postponed. One day, a private quarrel arose on some indifferent subject between a young Venetian and a Genoese of more advanced years; high words were exchanged; and at last, in a fit of passion, the young man struck his companion a blow.² This act fired the blood of the Genoese bystanders, who clamoured for vengeance; and the quarrel had already assumed an alarming aspect, when a certain Genoese captain, Bassoccio Malloni, arrived at Acre with his vessel, having another, which proved itself to be a Venetian, in tow. This

¹ Da Canale, sect. 152 *et seq.*; Dandolo, lib. x. p. 365; Caffaro, *Ann. Gen.* lib. vi.; Gio. Villani, lib. vi. cap. 60.

² Caffaro, *Ann. Gen.* lib. vi.; Sauli, *Colonia dei Genovesi in Galata*, i. p. 52.

second vessel was said to have been taken from a corsair. The Venetians however, who had flocked to the spot, at once cast discredit on the man's statement; and, violently accusing him of buccaneering practices, they deprived him of his prize. The double insult thus offered to their country carried the indignation of the Genoese to an ungovernable height; they rose in a body, seized their arms, and, profiting by numerical superiority, broke into the Venetian quarter whence, in spite¹ of the remonstrances of their consul, they drove the whole of the hostile factory, and committed the church of San Sabbas and other buildings to the flames.²

Intelligence of these excesses soon reached Venice. The Doge hastened to demand satisfaction. The deepest regret was at once expressed by the Genoese Government at the outrage which had been committed; ample indemnification was promised; and a conference was opened on the neutral ground of Bologna for the peaceable adjustment of the difference.³ To this conference both Powers sent their representatives; and at first the negotiation proceeded smoothly enough. But, in course of time, so many unforeseen difficulties arose, and the diplomatists of the two Powers found themselves so much at variance on several of the points to be discussed, that Venice, losing all patience, abruptly withdrew from the negotiation, and expressed an intention to seek another solution. The rulers of Genoa, however, were most anxious to avoid a rupture; and, after the close of the Congress of Bologna, a formal embassy was accredited to Venice, to convey the sorrow of the Genoese Government at the events, which had lately taken place at Acre, and to express a willingness to make any reasonable concessions.

But it was too late. The Government had already marked out a different line of policy, from which it declined to swerve; and the Genoese were dismissed, after a brief audience of Zeno, with an intimation to quit the Venetian dominions within three days. Having taken this decisive step, the Government, toward the close of the same year (1256), dispatched Lorenzo Tiepolo to Acre with a squadron of thirteen galleys. Tiepolo forced the bar, destroyed all the

¹ Romanin, ii. p. 262.

² Da Canale, sect. 151-60; Caffaro, lib. vi.; Sauli, lib. i. pp. 5-51.

³ Sauli, lib. i. p. 53.

enemy's shipping in the port as well as in the roadstead, and, landing his troops, reduced a considerable portion of their Factory to ashes. The Admiral then proceeded to invest the castle of Azoph,¹ which was in possession of a Genoese garrison. The place fell after a somewhat lengthened siege quite at the end of 1256; and its fall compelled the enemy to demand an armistice for two months, which Tiepolo was persuaded to concede.¹

During the suspension of hostilities, both the belligerents were busily engaged in procuring reinforcements; the Venetians were joined by a small squadron from Candia, while ten galleys arrived to the relief of the Genoese from Cyprus. Having thus completed their preparations, they impatiently awaited the moment for resuming the offensive; and, on the expiration of the truce, they hastened to measure their strength in a regular engagement between Acre and Tyre.² After a hard and sanguinary contest, the Venetians triumphed; and five vessels, including the flag-ship which had the Genoese admiral on board, fell into the hands of the victors.

While Lorenzo Tiepolo was dealing so severe a blow at the naval power of Genoa on the shores of the Holy Land, a second squadron of ten galleys, under Giovanni Doro, swept the waters of the Propontis, and spread the terror of the Venetian name to the very walls of Constantinople. The expedition of Doro, which the Republic had most probably fitted out as an afterthought subsequently to the departure of Tiepolo, extended its ravages along the whole Grecian seaboard, and inflicted dreadful havoc on the large mercantile establishments which had been formed by the enemy in the Levant. These disasters threw the Government and people of Genoa into the utmost dismay; the greatest perturbation prevailed in the capital; and the heart of that proud Republic momentarily quailed, as she beheld every effort attended by a reverse, and every point threatened by a victorious foe. But the maddening reflection, that it was at the hands of a Power which of all Powers she most hated, that she had suffered this disgrace, soon inspired Genoa with courage to persevere; and, as soon as the elections of 1257 were complete, and the Council of Ancients, which was specially designed to assist the new Captain, Guglielmo

¹ Da Canale, *Cronaca Veneta*, sect. 153.

² *Ibid.*

Boccanegra,¹ in the discharge of his onerous functions at this crisis, had been appointed, she plunged into the contest with fresh vigour.

Having received intelligence in the early part of the year, that the preparations of the enemy for the renewal of hostilities were approaching completion, the Venetian Government resolved to lose no time in reinforcing Tiepolo; and for this purpose twenty galleys, under the orders of Andrea Zeno, son of Marco Zeno, the Doge's brother,² and ten *Turide*, under Paolo Faliero, were despatched to Acre to join the Commander-in-Chief.

Tiepolo, whose squadron was raised by the arrival of Zeno and Faliero to upward of seventy vessels of all sail, now felt himself in a position to move with confidence against any force which might be opposed to him; and in the latter part of June, 1258, having left the Bailo Giustiniani with some troops in charge of Acre, he put out to sea in quest of the enemy, who was reported to have left the ports of Genoa early in the year under the command of Roberto dalla Turca.³ The Venetians had not proceeded far, when they came in full view of Dalla Turca's squadron; the two fleets encountered each other on the 24th of June, almost on the very spot which had formed the scene of Tiepolo's victory in 1256. Dalla Turca himself, who had become aware of the numerical superiority of the Venetians only when it was too late to retire, was desirous of avoiding a collision, until the reinforcements, for which he had applied to his Government, and which he had reason to expect shortly, had joined him. The whole of the 24th of June and the succeeding night passed without bringing any important change. Occasionally indeed the Genoese commander, who appeared to be painfully conscious of the predicament in which he had been unexpectedly placed, essayed to weaken the large force opposed to him by segregating a few isolated Venetian vessels. Occasionally he made an attempt to pierce the enemy's line by suddenly bearing with his whole squadron on one point. But these manœuvres were invariably unsuccessful; and, as the darkness increased, they were necessarily discontinued.

¹ Caffaro, *Ann. Genuenses*, lib. vi. p. 523.

² Da Canale, sect. 159; Caterino Zeno, *Commentarii del viaggio in Persia*, 1558. At p. 44, appears a pedigree of the Zeno family.

³ Da Canale, sect. 162.

At the same time, everything foreboded the approach of a general and perhaps conclusive engagement; and early on the morning of the 25th Tiepolo began to get in readiness for action. One of his first cares was to address his men, to prepare them for the probable event, and to animate their courage to the utmost extent. He told his companions in danger and in glory, that it was against those very foes, whom they had beaten only the year before, that he was about now to lead them; he impressed on them the importance of the undertaking, in which they were engaged, exhorting them to bear in mind that on the result depended the honour of Venice and the security of the seas; and he pointed out to them, that it was because their antagonists were sensible of their weakness that they evinced a reluctance to fight. The words of Tiepolo were not lost upon his hearers, who responded with "Long live Saint Mark, patron of the Venetian dominion!" From the determined resistance offered by the Genoese, the fortune of war was terribly fluctuating for some time; but the arms of the Republic were finally victorious. 2600 of the enemy were made prisoners;¹ 25 of their galleys became prizes of war; the rest were dispersed and put to flight. After the battle, Tiepolo finding it necessary to refit the vessels which had more severely suffered, returned to Acre where his troops, not content with their splendid triumph, sullied their laurels by breaking into the Genoese quarter, demolishing all the public buildings and private dwelling-houses, ransacking the stores, and pilfering the valuable effects of the owners, or, in the excess of their wantonness and malice, scattering them among the bystanders.

Meanwhile, the war was arresting general attention. A feud so deadly and protracted, arising on such trivial grounds between two Powers which had formerly signalised their courage and valour as the champions of the Cross, fighting side by side in the same righteous cause, was naturally deplored by all Christian Powers; and the Apostolic See, peculiarly solicitous for the restoration of peace, at length succeeded, by an alternation of threats and entreaties, in prevailing on the belligerents to desist from their work of blood. After the second battle of Acre, in which the arms of Genoa had

¹ G. Diedo, i. p. 93.

experienced such a terrible blow, there was an evident disposition on the part of that State to come to terms; and the Republic herself, whose attention was absorbed by the affairs of Italy, was equally disposed to listen to any honourable overtures which might be made to her. At the same time, it was probably useless to expect that either would condescend to take the initiative. The Papal influence was exerted with effect. Both Powers consented to send plenipotentiaries to a second conference which, in conformity with Alexander's wish, was held at Rome,¹ and where the Pisans, who had, in common with the Levantine factories of Provence and Marseilles, occasionally sided with Venice, were also represented.² The result was, that a truce with exchange of prisoners was concluded between Venice and Genoa; that the latter acquiesced, however reluctantly, in the demolition of her principal strongholds at Acre; and that the Tyrians, the allies of Genoa, were prohibited from hoisting the banner of Saint George on entering the port of Acre, or from having a factory in that place. It is curious enough that, about two years after the ratification of the truce, a demand was preferred by the Papal Legate for the surrender to him, at the hands of the Pisan and Genoese authorities, of all the fortified places within the precincts of Acre. The Consuls joined in a refusal to comply; and in that refusal they received the entire approbation of their respective Governments.³ As the positions could hardly be of value to the Holy See itself, a suspicion becomes natural, that Venetian intrigue and inspiration were behind this unsuccessful movement.

Amid all the changes in the political aspect of Europe since 1237, Baldwin II. still continued to occupy the throne of Constantinople. Baldwin was one of those feeble, undecided characters, so common in history, whose misfortune it has been to be born to a throne. Since his accession, the Latin monarchy had been declining at a pace of increased rapidity, and the seeds of decay, sown in other days by vice and licentiousness, had at last come to ripeness. The situation in which the Emperor was placed was indeed truly deplorable, and the difficulties with which he had to cope were such as might well have appalled a man of far greater firmness and of

¹ Da Canale contemp., *Cron. Ven.* sect. 172.

² Caffaro, *Annales Genuenses*, lib. vi. p. 526.

³ Romanin, ii. p. 266.

far stronger nerve. The spirit of the Latin conquerors was effete, and their numbers were thinned by death or desertion. Few of those who joined the Fifth Crusade had formed permanent settlements in Roumania. The exchequer was empty. The sources of revenue were intercepted or dried up. Private corruption and public misery were at their climax. Enemies, who were too conscious of his weakness, environed Baldwin on every side.

It was about this period that Saint Louis, anxious to alleviate the distress of the Emperor, had ordered subscriptions to be opened at Constantinople in Baldwin's favour for a loan of 1000 *livres tournois*; ¹ and at the same time some members of the Cappello family at Venice commissioned the Bailo of the Republic to borrow in their name, and transfer to the imperial treasury, a sum of 3000 ² *perperi*: for the repayment of the money, Philip, ² Valet of Constantinople, remaining at Venice as a bond. But the relief afforded by these small advances was slight, as well as of a purely transient character: nor were the other expedients to which Baldwin had recourse more permanently effectual. Everything announced the approach of a crisis; and the crisis soon came. In 1261, the Latin-Byzantine Empire, after a duration of fifty-seven years, was overthrown in a single day, and the Greek dynasty was restored in the person of Michael Palæologos, Prince of Nicæa.

About two years anterior to this revolution, the political situation had become so serious, that the Republic, perhaps with the concurrence of Baldwin, perhaps merely under the pretext of watching the interests of her own subjects, established a species of protectorate over Constantinople, by stationing a squadron in the Bosphorus amounting to thirty galleys-of-war. By a singular want of judgment and foresight the present commander ³ was engaged, in conjunction with Marco Gradenigo, Bailo of Constantinople, in an expedition, having as its object the reduction of Daphnusia on the coast of Thrace, at a considerable distance from the Capital; the commander and his colleague were not apprised of the design of Palæologos, till it was already too late to avert the catastrophe; and they returned only in time to receive on board the Emperor

¹ Romanin, ii. p. 268.

² Ducange, i. p. 339.

³ Dandolo, lib. x. p. 367; and Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 560.

himself and the Venetian Patriarch. Baldwin had been deprived of Venetian aid, when it would have been invaluable; and the Republic was thus baffled in the hope which, looking at her special and costly arrangements, she had fairly entertained of retaining Constantinople virtually in her own hands. At Venice the announcement of the change raised a feeling of the most bitter vexation,¹ and the foolish and fatal proceeding of Gradenigo, who had been the instigator of the expedition to Daphnusia,² procured his recall and dismissal.³

Meanwhile, Palæologos made his solemn entry into Constantinople on the 26th of July 1261;⁴ his presence had the effect of restoring order and discipline among the troops; and one of the points, which engaged the earliest attention of the Emperor, was the re-establishment of the relations with the mercantile factories of Venice, Pisa, and Genoa, on a footing nearly similar to that on which they had stood before the Revolution of 1204. The two former were at once confirmed in the enjoyment of their ancient immunities, and the local jurisdiction of their Baili and Consuls respectively was allowed. But the Genoese, to whom Palæologos was under peculiar obligations, and to whose zealous co-operation the success of his undertaking was in some measure owing, received a more ample share of his favour. As a recompense for these and other services, the island of Scio, which had formerly belonged to Venice, was now made a port, where the Genoese alone might be exempt from the payment of all dues or tolls; and the monastery, contiguous to the church of Pantocrator, which had, down to the present time, been the usual residence of the Venetian Bailo, was assigned to the Genoese Podesta. Some remonstrance on the part of Venice against this piece of favouritism was probably the cause why they were shortly afterward transferred by Palæologos to Heraclea on the Euxine. Nor was it long before the headquarters of the Genoese factory were again shifted. For, either at their own request or by a spontaneous act on the part of their patron, they were recalled in the course of a few months, and placed in exclusive possession of the spacious suburb of Galata, while their rivals of Pisa and Venice, who were less numerous, and

¹ Sandi, ii. p. 660 *et seq.*

³ Da Canale contemp., *Cronaca*, sect. 175.

² Ducange, i. p. 345.

⁴ Ducange, *ubi supra*.

in consequence less formidable, were suffered to remain in their original quarters.

In the transformation of Scio into a Genoese trading station the Republic was clearly a loser by the recent change. But the loss of Scio was not the sole respect in which the fall of the Courtenays had operated to the detriment of Venetian interests. Negropont, for which, since the period of the Fifth Crusade, the family of De Carcere had done the Republic homage and had paid her tribute, and which was commercially valuable, was also seized, shortly after the accession of Michael, by his favourites the Genoese, who expelled the Venetian local authorities. On these two grounds the Government of the Doge had strong reason to be dissatisfied with the Revolution and its authors: nor was it long before it lifted its voice in complaint and expostulation. In the autumn of 1261, Marco Giustiniani, ex-Bailo of Acre, was again called into active employment by his selection as ambassador extraordinary to the Courts of France, Rome, and Spain. His instructions were to detail all the circumstances connected with the usurpation of Palæologos, to communicate the unfair treatment which his country had experienced at the hands of that Prince, to represent the danger which might arise to Catholic Europe from the re-establishment of an heterodox Power at the Golden Horn, and to urge the adoption by the Western nations of some measures in concert with Venice for the restoration of the exiled dynasty and for the deposition of the schismatical Emperor.¹

The reception of the Venetian representative was sufficiently encouraging to presage a successful result. His representations were appreciated. His plans received every attention. But, whatever might be the inclination of Saint Louis and Urban IV. to enter into these views, or whatever might be their anxiety to reinstate the line of the Courtenays, neither was in a position to embark in an enterprise so vast and so dubious; and the Western Powers contented themselves with professions of a general and vague tenor. Part of the truth was that military pilgrimages were neither so fashionable nor so popular as they had been;¹ *Crusade* was becoming a byword; and the spirit of enthusiasm, which

¹ Dandolo, lib. x. p. 370.

animated the De Bouillons and the De Montforts, was now leading mankind in a direction more obviously suggestive of progressive civilization.

The Republic was not, however, to be thwarted in her object by the failure of her diplomatic efforts; and, as it appeared impossible to prevail on other Powers to second her in the vindication of her wrongs, she determined to take up the quarrel single-handed. Preparations for a Græco-Genoese war were accordingly begun in the winter of 1261 with characteristic activity; and, in the course of a few months, two naval armaments were fitted out in readiness for the approaching campaign. The one, consisting of eighteen galleys under Marco Michieli, had orders to proceed to the Mediterranean for the protection of the Venetian flag in the Levant, which the ascendancy of Genoa had exposed to danger and insult. The other, composed of thirty sail under Jacopo Dolfino, pointed its course toward the Black Sea with a similar object. It was to the operations of the more powerful squadron that the Ducal Government attached chief importance; and in pursuance of a decree, which passed the Legislative Body in 1262, all the officers serving under Dolfino were selected from the Great Council.¹ For it was felt that with those, who had the largest stake in its welfare, the honour of the land was in safest keeping. The operations of the Mediterranean fleet were indeed few and unimportant; and at the death of Marco Michieli, which occurred a short time after his arrival in the Morea,² a junction was effected between the two squadrons, the undivided command of which was allowed to devolve on Dolfino. The latter, whose force was thus raised to forty-eight sail, having received intelligence that the Genoese fleet had been seen in the direction of Thessalonica, made for that place, and invited the enemy to an action. But the Genoese commander, perceiving that the movements of his adversary had intercepted his expected reinforcement from home and his communication with the Greeks, and distrustful of his ability to engage with his present strength so large a force, declined to abandon the unassailable position which he had adopted in the port of Thessalonica;³ and

¹ Navagiero, *Storia Veneziana*, p. 999.

² Marin, iv. p. 315.

³ Da Canale, sect. 175.

Dolfino, at last losing patience, hoisted sail for Negropont. That island was speedily recovered from the hands of the Genoese; and the authority of the local representative of the Republic was re-established with as little difficulty as it had been lately overthrown. This important result having been accomplished, Dolfino prepared to return to Venice. About the same period an expedition was fitted out by the Grand Feudatory of Negropont,¹ at the suggestion of the Venetians, against Palæologos; it consisted of a few ships of war which were equipped, in all probability, either partly or entirely at the cost of the Republic; and so little vigilance was exhibited by the Byzantine Court, that it was suffered to extend its ravages without interruption within sight of the walls of Constantinople. But on their return to Negropont, the vessels were intercepted by some Greek cruisers; and such of the crews as escaped immediate butchery were afterward executed.²

The next campaign was somewhat more fertile in incident. The Venetian fleet of two-and-thirty sail, under the command of Gilberto Dandolo, confronted the Genoese of thirty-nine strong, off Sette Pozzi in the Morea, into which Dandolo had put to make inquiries. A pinnace, which was taken to be a friend, was discovered to be a Genoese scout, and the Venetian commander caused it to be burned, when the whole flotilla of the enemy was descried, much superior to the Venetian force, near the island of Porcaria. This, however, writes Da Canale, made no difference to Messer Gilberto, the noble captain of Venice, who, like a lion, proud and confident, at once ordered his decks to be cleared for action. The contest was fierce and terrible; the weather was exceedingly rough; the advantage of numbers was on the side of the Genoese; and, although the Venetians might counterbalance to some extent their want of strength by the valour and determination with which they kept their ground, the victory soon inclined to the foe. So precarious indeed did the result appear, that Dandolo began to grow uneasy, and even to contemplate a retreat, when five-and-twenty of the enemy's vessels were suddenly observed to bear off under the apparent influence of an impression that the Venetians were too much discomfited to renew the combat. The effect

¹ Dandolo, lib. x. p. 370.

² Romanin, lib. vi.

of this proceeding upon the mind of Dandolo was electrical; the rallying word was instantaneously given and obeyed; and the self-possession of the Admiral, seconded by the heroism of those under him, retrieved the fortune of the day. Thinned in numbers, and taken completely by surprise, their late conquerors were unable to offer a protracted resistance to the forces of the Republic; and, after an obstinate struggle, they were compelled to retreat with the loss of four vessels out of fourteen, and of one of the Admirals, who fell in the heat of the action.¹ The galleys which escaped took shelter in the port of Malvasia.

In the battle of Sette-Pozzi the Genoese lost about 1000 men, of whom 600 had fallen. The victors themselves were sufferers to the extent of 20 killed and 400 wounded, exclusive of prisoners. It happened, however, that several hundred Genoese, who had been taken during the war, were already interned, wherever accommodation could be found for a time; the late victory considerably swelled the number; and at the intercession of the heads of several religious houses in Venice and elsewhere a complete exchange of prisoners was almost immediately effected.

But the triumph at Sette-Pozzi was not one on which Venice was able, even had she been willing, to repose. The Genoese chafed too severely at their defeat to think of peace; and the mutual animosity was soon strengthened and embittered by the seizure of four Venetian storeships off Malvasia.

In the same year, the Mediterranean squadron was raised from thirty-two to forty-five sail; and Gilberto Dandolo having been sent, in the interval, to supersede Lorenzo Tiepolo as Bailo of Negropont, the post of commander-in-chief of the naval forces was assigned by the Doge to Andrea Barozzi, assisted by two civilians, Giovanni Tiepolo and Raffaello Bettano.²

On leaving Venice, Barozzi made in the first instance for the coast of Sicily, where he had been led to suppose that he should find a Genoese fleet under Simone Grillo. But on arriving in the Sicilian waters, the Venetian commander fell in with a small craft, from the crew of which he learned that

¹ Da Canale, sect. 180 *et seq.*; Sauli, lib. ii. p. 71.

² Da Canale, sect. 194 *et seq.*

the objects of his search had been seen in that neighbourhood, but that they had departed three days since, and, as it was generally believed, had sailed for the Holy Land. Barozzi, not suspecting any deception, acted at once on the information received, and followed in the pursuit.

In the meantime, Grillo, having succeeded in eluding observation, again put out to sea, and directed his course toward Durazzo, where he was not without some expectation of falling in with a force with which he might find it less difficult to cope. It happened indeed at this juncture, that one of those caravans which set out annually from Venice for the Oriental trade, was making its way for Saint Jean d'Acre under the conduct of the *Boccacorte* man-of-war, commanded by Michele Doro. The convoy consisted of twelve merchantmen, well armed and equipped: the *Boccacorte* was accounted the most powerful vessel in the service; and even if Barozzi had not already defeated the Genoese Admiral, whose force was understood¹ to be in a very poor state of efficiency, the Government conceived that it had no ground of anxiety for Doro and his charge.

The Genoese commander, however, having ascertained from a Trevisan informer, who occupied an official post connected with the Great Council, that his more formidable antagonist was beyond reach, shifted his course, and bore down swiftly on his intended prey, of whose movements he had taken care to keep himself exactly informed. Doro, on his part, receiving information of the danger which threatened him in sufficient time to adopt proper measures of defence, at once prepared for action. But as the enemy approached, the captain of the *Boccacorte*, from ignorance of the actual inferiority of the Genoese, considering that he scarcely possessed adequate means of resistance, expeditiously transferred the crews and the more valuable portion of the cargoes of the convoy to his own flagship, and, abandoning the traders themselves off the island of Saso, near Durazzo, set all sail for Ragusa, which he had the good fortune to reach in safety (July-August, 1264).

Thence Doro at once addressed a dispatch to the Government, explaining the incident which had taken place, and

¹ Letter of the Doge to Michele Doro, Captain of the *Boccacorte* (8th September, 1264). The length of the keel of the *Boccacorte* was 110 feet. See Filiasi, *Ricerche storiche*, p. 236.

attempting to vindicate his conduct. He farther desired to be instructed whether he should remain in his present position, or should resume his voyage to Acre. The letter of the Doge in reply¹ was couched, on the contrary, in a tone of severe censure and bitter reproach. "This affair," wrote Zeno, "is viewed here with a mingled feeling of sorrow and indignation. It is universally regarded as a disgrace to the Venetian name; and there is no part of the world where it will not be speedily known that thirteen Venetian ships, including the largest which we possess, have retreated before sixteen ill-manned and inefficient Genoese. The step which you have taken admits no justification; it is one calculated to throw the greatest discredit on your country, and to afford our enemies room for infinite ridicule and exultation. Assuredly the examples of Lorenzo Tiepolo, of Andrea Zeno, of Gilberto Dandolo, ought to have inspired you and those about you with a better courage." "Although," continued his Serenity, "the Great Council has devoted several sittings to a consideration of the subject, that body is still unable to arrive at any decision, and much difference of opinion still exists as to the course which it may be most proper to pursue in the emergency. As you are there, however (*i.e.* at Acre), and must necessarily be better acquainted with the circumstances in which you are situated than any one not on the spot, we have concurred with our Privy Council in the expediency of allowing you to act, as regards your ulterior movements, according to your own discretion."

From the reports brought to him, Grillo was naturally led to expect a large and valuable booty; and it may be imagined that he was not slightly disappointed to find in his new prizes little beyond so many hulks. But the Genoese commander was soon roused from his reflections by the intelligence that Barozzi was again on his track; and as he was not disposed to hazard dependence on the stratagem which had just so unexpectedly succeeded, and was far from anxious to risk an engagement, Grillo stood at once for the Riviera. Barozzi swept the whole line of coast, and met with no sign of an enemy, and it was not till he reached the Sicilian waters, that he was apprised of the seizure of the convoy and of the escape of Doro, or that he saw to the full

¹ Zeno's letter, as above

extent the error which he had committed, as well as the manner in which he had been duped by his antagonist. If any opportunity had existed, however, of palliating his fault, it now existed no longer; Grillo had vanished; the winter was setting in fast; and, as no object could be gained by remaining in his present position, Barozzi pursued his voyage direct to Venice, where it may be conjectured from the tone of the letter which the Doge had already addressed to Doro, that his conduct also met its share of reprehension.

But the decisive blow was soon about to be struck. Early in 1265, the Governors of Zara, Candia, and Negropont were commanded to take immediate steps toward furnishing contingents for the approaching war; and the Republic prepared to resume the offensive. Barozzi, whose late conduct had excited general dissatisfaction, was replaced by Jacopo Dandolo, a naval officer of considerable experience, who was recommended to notice by his intimate knowledge of the coasts of the Mediterranean.

Dandolo sailed from Venice with not more than four galleys in company; he was reinforced near Zara by three others, which had been sent by that fief as her contingent; an equal number joined him from Candia;¹ and, before the fleet reached Ragusa, it had received a farther accession of strength from the arrival of Marco Zeno, the Doge's nephew, with four galleys contributed by the Bailo of Negropont. At Negropont Marco Gradenigo, ex-Governor of the Venetian factory at Constantinople, was awaiting the arrival of the Admiral with ten men-of-war; and the whole squadron, thus raised to six-and-twenty sail, then pointed its course for Sicily. It was between Trapani and Val di Mazara,² ground already rendered historical by the great victory of Giovanni Trevisano in 1214, that Dandolo confronted the Genoese armament of twenty-eight galleys under Lanfranco Barborino.³ The combat, to which old recollections lent a certain degree of inspiration, was fierce, but short; it terminated in a signal triumph on the part of the Venetians; and the enemy sustained a loss of 1134 men, 600 of whom were prisoners. This victory shed peculiar lustre on Dandolo and on those who had served under him. For not only were the Genoese superior in

¹ Dandolo, lib. x. p. 372.

² Marin, ix. p. 320.

³ Trithemius, *Chronicon Genuense*, ap. Murat. ix. 50

numerical force, but the wind, which was behind them, blew so strongly in the faces of the Islanders, that the latter had been compelled to furl their sails, and to confine themselves to the use of their oars.¹ At the same time Barborino was no match for his antagonist. "This Lanfranco," writes a contemporary and a countryman, "was a chicken-hearted fellow, and inexperienced in naval affairs; and a sad piece of providence it was to make such an admiral."² Tiepolo, having remained at Trapani eight days to give his troops rest and to refit, returned to receive the congratulations of the Republic. The success afforded indeed the highest gratification to all classes of Venetian society; the reception of the fleet and its gallant commander was correspondingly warm; and a solemn mass and thanksgiving were offered as a grateful testimony of the singular grace which Heaven had vouchsafed to the chosen people of Saint Mark.

The battle of Trapani produced the most important results. Palæologos, who had counted on a different issue, received the intelligence with profound astonishment; and it at once awakened him to a sense of the necessity of changing his tone and policy. From his accession to the throne down to the present time, the Emperor had continued to exhibit a marked predilection for the Genoese, with whom he established friendly relations even before his usurpation of the imperial crown, and who had largely contributed to the success of that daring project. If his Majesty had courted the Venetians, it was because he feared their power; if he had cultivated the Pisans, it was because he had reason to apprehend the formation of a hostile league between Venice and Pisa. But the star of Genoa seemed now to be on the wane. One disaster, great and signal indeed, yet assuredly neither greater nor more signal than many which she had experienced in years passed, shook the faith of Palæologos in an old and steady ally; and it began to be forcibly apparent to him that Venice was the Power whose enmity he had chief cause to dread. Under such circumstances, the Emperor was not long in coming to a determination to abandon his former favourites, and to make pacific overtures to the Republic. In selecting an instrument to carry his newly formed purpose into effect, Palæologos fixed on Arrigo Trevisano, a Venetian of rank

¹ Da Canale, *Cronaca Veneta*.

² Trithemius, *ubi supra*.

who had been kept in confinement for some time at Constantinople,¹ and by whose unsolicited enlargement he hoped to create a favourable impression in a quarter, where at present it was so much to be desired.

The mission with which Trevisano was charged was understood to be strictly confidential. He was requested to use his best offices in reconciling the Government of the Doge to the Empire of Constantinople, to convey a solemn and earnest assurance of the friendly feeling of Palæologos toward his country, and to solicit Zeno to send some person with full power to negotiate a peace.

But the propositions, of which Trevisano was the bearer, were hardly so favourably entertained as the Emperor, viewing the matter, perhaps, exclusively in its commercial aspect, had persuaded himself to anticipate.² The fact was, that these propositions had immediate relevance to a question on which the public mind of Venice was still much divided. What course it was best, on the whole, to follow in regard to the Byzantine empire, was a point which still sorely puzzled politicians. Some had an undisguised bias to the old Courtenay dynasty, and were impatient to witness its restoration. Others declared themselves favourable to the new one. A third party began to canvass afresh the half-forgotten scheme of 1222 for the transfer of the seat of the Republic to Constantinople. A majority in the Great Council, however, argued fairly enough, from the practical failure of diplomacy in 1261, as well as from other unmistakable evidences, that, on the part of the Western Powers generally, there was either slight inclination or slight ability to co-operate in the restoration of the Courtenay line; they maintained that whatever might, from motives of interest or glory, be the readiness of the Republic individually to embark in such an enterprise, it was useless to think of stemming the current single-handed; and they were tempted to inquire whether, should the deposed House be reinstated on the throne, it would prove itself more capable than before of defending its own possessions, and whether it would not constantly require Venetian support.

On the other hand, there was still a class of statesmen who, in the face of all contrary experience, fondly clung to the chimerical notion that, by the rescue of Constantinople

¹ Da Canale, *ubi supra*.

² Romanin, lib. vi.

from the hands of the schismatists, their country would greatly benefit itself both in a political and commercial respect; and they indulged a romantic belief, that it was the high destiny of the Venetians, treading in the footsteps of patrician Rome, to become the founders of an Empire, which should extend from the Euxine to the Adriatic. If men of more cautious temperament proceeded to represent the vast difficulties of any such undertaking, arising from the apathy of the rest of Catholic Europe, objecting the impregnable situation of Constantinople, the reviving energy of the Greeks, the new-birth of the national spirit under the auspices of a better government, the personal talents of Palæologos, the disordered and precarious state of Italy, and lastly, the humiliating consequences of defeat, these bolder politicians ceased not to urge that the distinction and advantage, which must surely attend success, would amply repay the risk and outlay; that it had ever been the practice of the Venetians to hazard much where much was to be won, and that to play an inactive part in such a cause was both unworthy of the national character and injurious to the national interests.

The more prudent counsels, however, ultimately triumphed; the necessary steps were at once taken for approaching Palæologos; and a treaty was signed on the 18th of June, 1265. The ratifications, however, were not exchangeable until the sanction of the Doge had been obtained; and it created some surprise at Constantinople, when it was announced that the Government disapproved of the proceedings of its representatives, who had, as it insisted, exceeded their instructions, and ignored the transaction. It was now made to appear that the Venetian Executive had never entertained a notion of concluding a peace, such as that to which the ambassadors were led to give their adhesion, and that it had simply intended to grant a truce for a limited term of years; and, the Republic remaining firm in her resolution, Palæologos was forced to yield. The question, however, was not finally dismissed, nor were all minor differences adjusted, without extraordinary difficulty and delay. Palæologos and his ministers, not particularly flattered perhaps by the tone which Venice had adopted throughout the matter, indulged their resentment by creating impediments on their side. At all events, the truce to which the Venetian Government pointed,

as the utmost concession that it was at present disposed to make, was not concluded till June, 1268, precisely three years after the signature of the original treaty. The truce was restricted in its duration to a period of five years. By one of the articles Venetian subjects were declared to be at liberty to export corn from the Lower Empire in every case, where the price fell below half a *perpero* a bushel; while by another the Genoese were admitted to a full share in all the advantages accruing from the armistice.¹

The Genoese, although they might, by a special arrangement, have been admitted to a participation in the new arrangements without otherwise committing themselves to its provisions, were far from disposed at present to restore the sword to the scabbard. The humiliating reverse at Trapani was still too vivid in their recollection to allow them to think of peace; and they were still writhing under a keen sense of the national disgrace. To wipe out the dark stain by prosecuting hostilities with increased vigour appeared therefore to be the only course which the Podesta of Genoa and his advisers could now follow, at all compatibly with the honour and true interests of the commonwealth; and they felt that such a policy might be pursued with the certainty of obtaining the hearty concurrence and support of the great body of the people. For there were few circumstances, indeed, under which a war with the Venetians was otherwise than popular at Genoa; and such a war not unfrequently presented an additional feature of recommendation in the eyes of the government, as being among the most effectual methods of soothing internal agitation. In the present instance, there was scarcely room to doubt that the announcement of an intention to carry the struggle to a satisfactory termination would meet with a cordial welcome; and the Genoese authorities decided on resuming the offensive at the earliest period, and on endeavouring to repair their shipwrecked fortunes.

The operations of the new campaign, however, chiefly consisted of a series of unimportant expeditions and petty acts of hostility. Sometimes the Venetians obtained a trifling advantage over the enemy with the capture of a few galleys.² The Genoese, in their turn, occasionally contrived to intercept an unprotected Venetian merchantman; and, in one instance,

¹ Romanin, lib. vi.

² Dandolo, lib. x. ch. 7.

a Genoese squadron made a descent on the island of Candia, committed the metropolis to pillage, and carried off 350 prisoners.¹ But these desultory and piratical exploits mainly tended to embitter the international animosity, while they illustrated the excesses to which the two communities were driven by the force of jealousy and pride.

Yet it was impossible that the other Western Powers should fail to be struck by the wonderful vitality of Genoa and by the alike surprising resources of her great opponent. The apparent facility with which two small States, almost equally inconsiderable in point of territory and population, had during the war fitted out fleet after fleet, and one expedition after another, was calculated to astonish Palæologos and his ministers hardly less than, in an earlier age, it had astonished the rude peasantry of Champagne and the courtiers of Philip Augustus.

The unrelaxed vigour and enthusiasm, which marked the conduct of the foreign wars of Venice, was due in great measure to the thoroughly national character of a navy, manned by seamen and commanded by officers who had the honour and interest of their country at heart, and who by the system of amalgamating the navy and the merchant service in one body of mercantile marine, were at once enabled to familiarise themselves with every species of hardship, and to carry their professional knowledge to the highest perfection.

Frederic II. had breathed his last at Ferentino in the Capitanate on the 13th December 1250, through a surfeit of a dish of sugared pears and not without a suspicion of poison. With all his vices and faults Frederic was assuredly a great prince. He was not only one of the most illustrious statesmen, but one of the most highly cultivated scholars, of the age.² His countrymen, whose veneration for his character and name largely partook of idolatry, received the first rumour of his death with an incredulous smile; the authentication of the sad intelligence drew a pang from the bosom of Germany, which found an echo in every loyal heart. When the hand, which had once wielded so much power, was cold, the tyranny of the man, his arbitrary acts, his cruelties, his exactions, his arrogant and overbearing disposition, seemed to be forgotten.

¹ Sandi, ii. p. 671; Vincens, *Histoire de Gènes*, i. p. 342.

² Gio. Villani, *ad annum*, ed. 1823

Nothing appeared to survive, save the memory of his genius, his courage, and his misfortunes. If any solace remained to the generation of Germans which had lost him, it was to be sought in the belief, which soon gained currency among the large body of the people, that their Emperor had gone for a while only to the resting-place of the mighty dead—to the Kyffhäuser in Thuringia, and that he would return hereafter and unite under his equable and beneficent sway all the nations of the earth—a second Arthur, *Rex quondam rexque futurus*.

Frederic II. left four sons, of whom two, Conrad and Henry, were legitimate, and the remaining two, Henzius, titular King of Sardinia, and Manfred, Prince of Tarentum, were bastard. Manfred, in a greater measure than any of the other children of Frederic, inherited his character and genius. But Conrad, the elder, was declared his successor; and, in the event of a failure of issue, the heir-presumptive was his brother Henry. But, from the rapid development which the municipal system had received in the Peninsula, it might be safely predicted that the new emperor would not be allowed to maintain his footing there without a struggle.

A partition was shortly arranged; and the government of Naples was soon suffered to devolve upon Manfred, while Henry took possession of Sicily. That it was not long before the power of Manfred in the south of Italy was consolidated, may be judged from the fact that, shortly after his accession, the Venetian Government solicited and obtained a recognition and renewal of the mercantile treaties into which the Republic had entered with his father.¹ But while the Venetians sought on commercial grounds to cultivate the friendship of Manfred, the high considerations which led them at the outset to incline to the popular side, had gained rather than lost weight. The position, however, in which the Republic stood toward the Guelphs was somewhat abnormal. Her alliance with them was more in the nature of a spontaneous adhesion than in that of a binding engagement; and, while she remained favourably disposed toward the League, she reserved to herself the faculty of free action. On the part of so great a State, such a line of proceeding was both natural and necessary. The Venetians felt that to have involved themselves by a closer connection

¹ Dandolo, lib. x. p. 365.

in every petty difference which might happen to arise between the Guelphs and their opponents, or between one member of the Guelphic faction and another, would have been eminently undignified. At the same time, therefore, that the Government seldom neglected an opportunity of promoting the success of the liberal cause, and of lending its help to the erection of a large number of petty municipal boroughs on the ruins of the ancient kingdom of Alboin, it was careful to adopt in general that cautious and far-sighted policy, by which it preserved a good understanding with both political sections, yet compromised itself with neither.

The successes of the Imperialists in the Two Sicilies under Manfred had the necessary effect of imparting fresh vigour to the Ghibellines in the North; and the same cause, combined with the death of Frederic, tended to increase the personal influence of Eccelino. That distinguished man who, in the course of a few years, had raised himself to eminence by the basest expedients, stood at present almost on the loftiest pinnacle of his power; the terror of his name extended far and wide; and no disposition was evinced by him to renounce his projects of aggrandizement, until the whole Trevisan March, perhaps all Lombardy, was within his grasp. He already reigned paramount over Padua, Vicenza, and Verona. His brother Alberigo, with whom he was at present on friendly terms, was master of Treviso. The tyrant also counted, in case of emergency, on the support of several feudatories in the March, with whom he had prudently contracted alliances, and who possessed considerable influence at Cremona, Piacenza, and Parma; and it was far from unlikely that the political contest, which was pending at Brescia between the two rival factions, would soon wear an aspect sufficiently favourable to the Ghibelline interest to enable Eccelino to offer his mediation. Such were the prospects of the Imperialists.

The strength of the democratic party, on the other hand, lay principally in Mantua, Milan, Ferrara, and Bologna.¹ The first-mentioned place was retained in a sort of feudal dependence by various rulers, who were devoted to the Holy See, and bitterly hostile to the House of Romano. Milan, the finest fortress in the kingdom, had at all times been distinguished by the zeal with which she fought, and by the fortitude with

¹ Sismondi, ii. ch. ix.

which she suffered, in the popular cause. Bologna was a powerful republic with a well-organized Militia; and Ferrara, where Azzo Novello wielded an almost absolute authority, was inveterate against Romano and his family, by whom Novello had been denuded of the bulk of his hereditary possessions. The unhappy men, who had sought shelter at Venice and in the neighbourhood from the tyranny of the Imperialists, formed, besides, no inconsiderable accession to the ranks of the Guelphs; and an additional source of strength, as well as an additional incentive to exertion, was to be found in a rational hope that the Holy See, whose welfare was so clearly identified with their success, would soon address herself seriously, in concert with other Powers, to the task of bridling the lawless ambition of the two Romani. Much, too, depended, should a war break out in the Trevisan March, on the line which Venetian politicians might think proper to adopt; that the Republic would remain neuter under such circumstances was barely probable; and her adhesion to either side was quite sufficient to turn the scale.

It was in March 1256, that Filippo Fontana, Archbishop of Ravenna,¹ the legate of his Holiness Alexander IV., arrived at Venice, charged with a mission of considerable moment. Fontana had been desired to call the attention of the Government to the deplorable state of the peninsula generally, and more particularly of the Trevisan March; to bring under serious notice the cruel sufferings of the Lombards under the rule of the Romani; and to invite Venice to become a member of a projected Coalition against the tyrant of Padua and his brother.² The representations of the Nuncio met with a favourable reception. He received permission from the Doge to preach the Cross against the common enemy before the assembled multitude on the Square of Saint Mark. In his sermon, the legate bore the most flattering testimony to the zeal with which, from time immemorial, the Republic had upheld the cause of religion and humanity; and, at the conclusion, a large number of persons of every class, yielding to the impulse of the moment, and impatient to enlist in the holy phalanx, took the new vow of devotion.³ The place, selected as a point to which the various corps of the new

¹ Da Canale, sect. 133; Verci, *Storia degli Ezzelini*, ii. 303.

² Sismondi, ii. p. 331.

³ Da Canale, sect. 134-6.

Coalition might converge, and where they might effect a junction, was Bebe, the Venetian fortress on the Brenta. There the troops were to be organized, and the plan of operations was to be discussed.¹

The forces of the Guelphs were composed of contingents from the several members of the Confederation, among which were some English mercenaries;² the leading contributors were Milan, Mantua, Bologna, Ferrara, and Rovigo; and, each of her Allies having furnished its respective quota, the Republic herself engaged to provide, in addition to a certain proportion of troops, the means of transport from Bebe to Padua. In the distribution of commands, by far the larger share was allowed to fall to the Venetians, whom the Lombards were most anxious to propitiate. With the sanction of his own Government, Marco Badoer,³ a Venetian nobleman, was named by the Archbishop-legate Marshal of the Army; the charge of the two principal divisions was confided to Tommasino Giustiniani and Marco Quirini.⁴ At the same time, as a mark of consideration for the services and misfortunes of the House of Este, which had been so wronged by the Romani, the high and honourable post of standard-bearer (Gonfalonier) was assigned to Tito Novello, a kinsman of Azzo, who still possessed unbounded influence at Ferrara. This office conferred on the possessor supreme jurisdiction over the execution of justice subject to the authority of the Government. It was during a protracted period a dignity enjoyed by the leading families in Florence, notably by members of the house of Medici, before they attained the sovereign power.

The operations of the Crusaders opened with the siege of Padua, the great stronghold of the Ghibellines, and the headquarters of Eccelino; and so sanguine and confident were the Republic and her new Allies of bringing their undertaking to a successful issue, that the Venetian general Quirini had been prospectively elected Podesta of Padua for the current year.

A short time prior to the arrival of the Venetian squadron in the Po and the disembarkation of the enemy in the vicinity of his capital, Eccelino himself, under the hope of reducing Mantua to his sway, had marched with a large body of troops

¹ Sismondi, *ubi supra*.

² Da Canale, sect. 138.

³ Da Canale, sect. 137; Verci, *Storia della Marco Trivigiana*, ii. 330.

⁴ Da Canale, *ubi supra*.

in that direction,¹ leaving the defence of Padua to his nephew Ansedisius da Giudotto, a man of far inferior capacity. It was probable that the exploit which the tyrant contemplated would cost him considerable difficulty; and it was by no means unreasonable to anticipate that, before he could retrace his steps and could afford relief to the garrison, Padua might be reduced. It therefore became of the utmost consequence to act with promptitude; and, so soon as the Crusaders had made themselves masters of the suburbs of Conca d'Albero, Conselvo, and Piove di Sacco, a general attack was opened. The principal efforts were directed against the Porta Altinate; and there also it was that the greatest hardihood and resolution were exhibited in the conduct of the defence. Suddenly, a huge vinea or gatto,² which had been planted by order of Quirini against the Altinate to assist the movements of his division, was observed to take fire; it had been ignited, as was supposed, by some of those on the ramparts. The flames gathered strength and volume; in a short time, the whole machine was consumed; and the manœuvre of the besieged seemed to be completely successful. But the wooden gate to which the vinea was placed in juxtaposition was not proof against the intense heat of the fire; and both were involved in a common destruction. The fall of the Altinate admitted a strong division of the besieging force within the walls; the garrison was panic-stricken; Ansedisius provided for his personal safety by taking horse, and galloping at full speed across the country; and Padua was in the hands of the Allies (20th June, 1256). The blood curdles at the recital of the spectacle which followed; it was a hideous and appalling scene of slaughter, which presented itself to the eye; all the rules of civilized warfare were contemned in the blind rage of lust and avarice; military licence here wore its worst shape; in every direction extended rapine and sacrilege; and the Crusaders³ were guilty of the most abominable excesses.

In one respect the undertaking of the Venetians and their Allies was productive of beneficial fruits. The dungeons of Eccelino, over which had hitherto hung such a terrible veil of mystery, were now thrown open and demolished,⁴ and hundreds of human beings, who had wasted their existence

¹ Da Canale, sect. 141; Verci, ii. 326.

³ Sismondi, ii. ch. viii. p. 9.

² Verci, ii. 335.

⁴ Verci, ii. 338.

year after year in a cruel and, as it seemed, interminable captivity, were unexpectedly emancipated. Padua was at last effectually wrested from the hands of her Ghibelline oppressors; the blood-stained annals of the reign of Eccelino were closed for ever; and the standard of freedom, dripping as it was with gore and sullied with crime, once more floated over the walls of his former capital. The Guelphs, impatient to afford a substantial recognition of the large share which the Republic had borne in so important an enterprise, elected, on the expiration of Marco Quirini's term of office, Giovanni, son of Stefano Badoer, chief magistrate for the succeeding year.

After the sack of Padua, the commander-in-chief having received strong reinforcements from his own and the other confederated governments, proceeded without loss of time to concert measures for opposing Eccelino who, on being apprised of the turn which affairs had taken in the North, at once retraced his steps from Milan, on which he had advanced from Mantua, in the hope that he might, by a rapid countermarch, be able to raise the siege of Padua, and to bring the enemy to action. In this scheme, however, he was forestalled by the fall of the place on the 20th June; and, in the immediate neighbourhood of Cassano, his progress was arrested by the victorious Guelphs, who had hastened to meet him, before he crossed the Adda. A Venetian flotilla had also ascended that river, had broken successively six strong booms placed as a guard to the bridge, and had finally destroyed the latter.¹ In the severe struggle which ensued for the passage of the Adda at that point, the Ghibellines sustained a total defeat; and the tyrant himself was so dangerously wounded with an arrow in the foot,² that it was necessary to remove him from the field. He was carried to Soncino; and whatever hopes had been entertained of his recovery, he destroyed them by wrenching open his wound with his own hands. He almost immediately expired.³ When Eccelino first felt that he was wounded, he had inquired of an attendant what was the name of the place where they were. The man replied: "Signore, this place is called

¹ Sanudo Torsello, *Secreta Fidelium Crucis*, part iii. ch. iv.

² Sanudo Torsello, *loco citato*.

³ Cagnola, *Stor. di Milano*, x.; *Arch. stor. Ital.* iii.

Cassano." Eccelino, appearing to be in a soliloquy, said: "*Bassano, Cassano: Cassano, Bassano,*" and repeated the words several times in a musing tone. It subsequently transpired that an astrologer had foretold that he should die at Bassano, and he therefore imagined that the prediction was now fulfilled, "there being little difference," as he himself said, "between Bassano and Cassano."¹ On the receipt of the intelligence, a thanksgiving and jubilee were celebrated at Venice; all the church-bells were rung; and at night the city was illuminated.

The rumour having spread with rapidity that Eccelino of Padua had breathed his last, the Lombards, no longer overawed by the terror of a great name, and prompted by a general impulse, rose in revolt against the Romani; and Alberigo who had, down to the present time, held sway at Treviso under the shadow of his brother's reputation and power, was obliged to consult his personal safety by taking shelter in the Castle of San Zenone,³ where he did not despair of being able to maintain his ground against any comers. The Leaguers, however, emboldened by their victory at Cassano, as well as by the insurrectionary movement in Lombardy, followed closely in his footsteps; San Zenone, which was accounted by far the strongest fortress in the Marches, and might have been rendered capable of sustaining a systematic siege, yielded to the pressure of a strict blockade; and on the cession of the place, Alberigo and all his relations, who had accompanied him in his flight from Treviso, were put to death in a manner only too consonant with the usages of a barbarous age.⁴ Nor can there be any surprise at the malignant pertinacity, with which the triumphant democrats pursued the surviving branches of the Romano family. The maddening sense of accumulated sufferings gave the victors but one heart of bitterness and one hand of retribution; and, until the cup of vengeance was full, there was no listening to voice or plea of mercy (August, 1259).

The preponderance which the Ghibellines had been gradu-

¹ Da Canale, sect. 147. This seems a curious parallel with the generally received account of the death of Cambyses I., King of Persia. Smith's *Ancient History*, 1873, i. 289. ² *Ibid.*, sect. 149.

³ *Hist. Cortusiorum*, lib. i. ch. 7; ap. Murat. xii. 974.

⁴ Da Canale, sect. 150; Ricobaldi Ferrariensis, *Historia Imperatorum*, ap. Murat. ix. 134; Cagnola, *Storia di Milano*, ap. *Arch. stor. Ital.* iii. p. 11.

ally acquiring in the Peninsula since the assumption of power by Frederic II. terminated to a large extent with the downfall of the two Romani, both of whom, from obvious motives of self-interest, had always been staunch upholders of the prerogative of the crown. After a lengthened season of fierce and feverish excitement, Lombardy began to feel a momentary calm; and many of the municipal boroughs, shaking off by a bold and convulsive effort the shackles of military despotism, resumed the exercise of their privileges by changing their executive governments. Marco Badoer, late generalissimo of the Allied Army, was chosen Podesta of Treviso. The Paduans had already conferred a similar distinction on Giovanni Badoer, a member of the same family; and it was then that Mastino de la Scala,¹ a wealthy gentleman of Verona, acquired in his native city by the popular suffrages, and under a popular appellation, a power scarcely inferior to that which Eccelino himself had enjoyed at Padua and his younger brother at Treviso. These dignities were nominally vicarious. The holder was merely the lieutenant of the Emperor. He professed to wield an authority delegated to him by the king of the Romans. In their public acts and on their coins they styled themselves *Viccomites*, and at Milan what was in its origin an official designation became a patronymic.

At Brescia, the Ghibellines succeeded in preserving their political influence; and in returning, as Podesta of the borough for 1259, Oberto Pallavicini, one of their leading men, they felt that they had gained an important advantage over the adverse faction.²

The historiette of Eccelino of Padua furnished the plot for the earliest dramatic composition in Italian literature—the tragedy written in Latin at the commencement of the succeeding century by Albertino Mussato of Padua. But a later theatrical *coup* was arranged by the ingenious gentleman, who rehabilitated the dungeons of the tyrant, and shewed them at a tariff within living memory to the credulous tourist.³

In the overthrow of the Romani the object with which

¹ The family of De Scales or Scalariis is found in England at the period of the Norman Conquest. See Courthope's *Historic Peerage*, 1857, in v.

² Verci, *Storia degli Ezzelini*, ii. 22.

³ Howells, *Italian Journeys*, ed. 1883, i. 255-64.

the Crusade in the Peninsula was originally undertaken, had been accomplished, and consequently no ground existed for prolonging hostilities. Assuredly no member of the League was more sincerely glad to be rid of the obligations which the alliance naturally imposed on her than the Republic. For, even before the Government was at liberty to sheathe the sword in that cause, a necessity had arisen for drawing it in another.

The decisive character of the naval battle of Trapani in 1264, in which the forces of the Republic won a splendid triumph, bred a hope, that the vanquished Genoese would no longer hesitate to accede to the propositions of peace which the Government of Zeno, at the repeated intercession of the Courts of Rome and France, had as repeatedly offered to their acceptance without success. It was just now, as had too often happened, a grave development of a trivial quarrel in relation to a local question at St. Jean d'Acre. But the Senate of Genoa declined to treat. To open negotiations for peace with shame written on their brows, and with the sound of the Venetian victory still ringing in their ears, was pronounced unworthy of a great and free People; and Genoa turned with fretful and angry impatience from suggestions for an accommodation on any terms.

The Republic, on her part, was not without excellent reasons for desiring to put an end to hostilities. The operations of the war had been glorious to her arms. But, at the same time, the pecuniary embarrassment, which two successive campaigns involved, had been quite beyond anticipation; all the ordinary channels of revenue, the salt-tax, the port-dues, and other sources of income, had been gradually exhausted, as hostilities continued; and it was useless to expect that the Ducal Fisc would be able to satisfy the demands upon its funds, unless some steps were taken to relieve the increasing pressure. It was some time before the Government of the Doge could fix on the course which it might be most desirable to pursue; it ultimately determined to meet the financial difficulty by an augmentation of the duty on corn.¹ The expedient was more novel than happy. Irritated by war taxes, and wrought to a high pitch of excitement by the stirring nature of passing events, the nation

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 564.

was hardly in a fit temper to suffer without a murmur any addition whatever to burdens which were already too heavy to bear; and a protest was at once made from every corner of the Dogado against a measure which so injuriously operated on the price of a vital commodity. The cry of discontent became every day louder, and the symptoms became more alarming. Venice was the scene of a bread-riot. Seditious meetings took place on the Piazza, where wild projects were discussed by popular leaders and popular agitators. The Palace itself was more than once threatened by a mob. It was in vain that the Doge made a personal attempt to pacify the tumult and to assuage the general indignation by liberal promises; he was treated with a ridicule, which plainly denoted the fury of the multitude at the new Corn Law.

The advances of the Doge having been thus spurned and his authority braved, the Government hastened to quell the disorder by forcible means. The metropolis itself had no military establishment. But troops were immediately summoned from the nearest garrisons, from Bebe, Castello, Brondolo, and Chioggia; and, the insurrection having been repressed by the power of the sword without much difficulty, the ringleaders in the late movement were, under the Law of Sedition (976), sentenced to lose their heads between the Red Columns.¹ It is stated that the number of persons who suffered was very great.² The Doge was probably led to the adoption of harsh measures by the contemptuous manner in which his overtures had been rejected by the insurgents. At the same time, the people were ultimately permitted to have their own way; their rulers, having restored tranquillity to the capital, and having vindicated the ends of justice, thought it wise, perhaps, to concede the point under dispute; and the obnoxious measure was tacitly withdrawn.³

During the recent disturbances, the Government acted upon the necessity of preserving, in the face of danger, a firm attitude and a placid demeanour. But the circumstances had been such as were calculated to awaken the worst apprehensions for the public repose. For while the mob assembled on the Piazza was madly clamouring for redress, cursing wars, war taxes, and war prices, and gathering from time to time in large groups round the palace with frightful cries and gestures

¹ Dandolo, lib. x. p. 374.

² Sanudo, *Vite de' Duchi*, p. 564.

³ *Ibid.*

of unmistakable portent, a private quarrel, which threatened to involve the most serious consequences, had arisen between the two ducal Houses of Dandolo and Tiepolo. This domestic feud originally sprang from the recent change introduced into the Corn Laws. The Dandoli had long signalled themselves by the liberal bent of their opinions, and by the strong bias which they exhibited to the popular side; it was a line of politics to which the family was attached, in a certain degree, by its own convictions, but which we may suspect that it also embraced from other motives. The House of Dandolo was represented in the Great Council at this period¹ by Gilberto Dandolo of San Moisè, the celebrated naval commander in the Genoese war, who was subsequently Venetian Resident at Negropont, and his two sons, Leonardo and Giovanni; these illustrious men seemed to be following only a traditional policy, when they espoused with zealous warmth the cause of their indigent fellow-countrymen, and denounced from their seats in the Legislature the ill-advised augmentation of the corn-duty. The course taken by Giovanni Dandolo and his brother naturally threw them into hostile collision with the Government Party, at the head of which stood Lorenzo Tiepolo, son of the Doge Giacomo, and a man whose superior parts fitted him to shine in the highest stations. Already, in his father's lifetime, Lorenzo had been created Count of Veglia. At a later period, he had filled several diplomatic and other trusts. The last post to which he had been appointed was the consulate at Negropont, which he held during some years, until he was replaced by Gilberto Dandolo, a politician of a widely different stamp from his predecessor. The son of a prince deservedly popular, and himself a person whose valuable services constituted a high claim to the gratitude and respect of his fellow-citizens, Lorenzo Tiepolo was generally thought to have an excellent prospect of succeeding to the next vacancy of the Crown; and it was against such a man and his numerous following, that the two Dandoli formed a resolution to fight the people's battle, and to second their clamour against increased burdens. The quarrel soon became a personal one; and every fresh circumstance had a tendency to aggravate the mutual feeling of acrimony.

At last the matter reached a climax. One day, the two

¹ Sansovino, *Cronico Veneto*, p. 31.

Dandoli met or overtook Tiepolo in one of the streets of Venice, and a scuffle ensued, in which the latter received a dangerous wound, and was left on the ground in a state of insensibility.¹ The particulars of this outrage speedily reached the ears of the Government; the authors of the assault on Tiepolo were laid under a heavy pecuniary fine;² their escutcheons were removed from the fronts of their residences, with a prohibition against the renewal or continuance of a display calculated to foment family dissensions; and their rank and popularity probably furnished the only reason why the offence of the Dandoli was not visited with much greater severity.

These intestine disorders, and the dangerous symptoms which continued to manifest themselves in the popular mind, combined to render the Government exceedingly anxious to terminate the war. Genoa, however, still offered obstacles to the settlement of the difference; the sittings of the Congress which, in deference to the joint wishes of Louis and his Holiness, had been opened at Viterbo³ for the purpose, were of the most unproductive kind; and there seemed to be every probability that the attempt to establish a treaty on conditions acceptable to both the contracting parties would be a work of time.

The Doge Zeno, at least, was not spared to witness the return of peace. Shortly after the suppression of the Bread-Riot, that prince breathed his last at Saint Mark's, after a brief illness, on Saturday, the 7th of July 1268. On the following day, his Serenity was interred with unusual precipitation, as if from some special motive, in the vaults of SS. Giovanni e Paolo;⁴ the corpse was enveloped in a robe of cloth of gold, buckled and spurred. The sepulture was singularly imposing and magnificent. The whole body of the clergy, the members of the Government, the judges, the magistrates, the patriarch, the bishops, and large numbers of the poorer classes, joined in the procession. Not a few ladies of quality were present at the ceremonial.⁵ All orders were manifestly anxious to unite in paying the last tribute of

¹ *Archivio storico Italiano*, viii. p. 746; Dandolo, lib. x. p. 374; Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 564.

² Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 564.

³ Dandolo, lib. x. p. 376.

⁴ Sansovino, *Ven. descritta*, lib. xi. p. 489; Dandolo, lib. x. p. 376.

⁵ Da Canale, *Cron. Ven.*, sect. 256.

respect to the illustrious deceased; and the circumstances attending the funeral of Zeno afforded an indication that he had quite outlived the acerbity and ill-will which the corn-tax question had created at the time in the popular mind.¹ It is on the important law reforms, of which he was the author, that his title to posthumous fame must principally rest. Notwithstanding the enormous labour which had been already bestowed on the digestion and codification of the *Statute* by other eminent jurists, and the close attention which had been given from time to time to every branch of the subject, there still remained much to revise and consolidate. The whole body of the common, civil, and canon law presented a field far too vast to be traversed and explored by one individual or one age; the task, which had been so ably commenced by Giacomo Tiepolo, was one which could be thoroughly accomplished only by a succession of labourers, all equally earnest and equally competent, and it was not too much to predict, that before it was brought to perfection, several generations of men would have passed away.

The period, during which the Republic was governed by Zeno was almost parallel with the disastrous episode in the history of France, known as the Ninth Crusade. In that unlucky expedition the Venetians took no active part. But in 1268, the King having treated with the Republic, through the Count of Bar and the Sire de Beaujeu, for a supply of convoys and necessaries, the Government of the Doge engaged to furnish, at a stipulated price, three large ships and twelve smaller, capable of carrying in the aggregate 4000 horses and 10,000 men with their arms, accoutrements, and victuals. Of the large vessels,² the *Boccacorte*, which has been already mentioned, and the *Santa Maria*, were to be 108 feet in length over all, having 70 feet of keel, and about 38 of beam. Their bows and sterns were similar, and contained several cabins; the two principal, one of which was at each end of the ship, were called the "paradise." Besides the orlop, they had a second deck, six feet and a half high, above which were the *corridor* and the *pavisade*, the former being five and the latter

¹ Eight original letters of Zeno are found in Murat. xii. 504-11.

² Nicolas, *Hist. of the R. Navy*, i. 243-4. The author observes: "Though the ships built for the King of France in 1268 were intended to have crews of from fifty to one hundred men, those of English vessels rarely exceeded half that number, and thirty seems to have been the usual average."

only three and a half feet high. A short fighting-deck, called the *bellatorium*, or fore and stern castle, surmounted the extremities of the ship. The crew of each vessel consisted of 110 mariners; and the ships were estimated at 1400 marks (of pure and fine silver of Paris) each. The third, the *San Nicolo*, was only 100 feet long over all, having 75 feet keel and 25 feet beam; she cost 1000 marks, and had only 86 men. The twelve other ships were much smaller, cost only 700 marks each, and carried 50 men in their crews.¹ The total charge has been computed at £24,600. The Government of the Doge found firewood for cooking; and the graduated commissariat and passage were strictly defined. For a knight, his two servants, his groom and his horse, $8\frac{1}{2}$ marks; for a knight alone, a place abaft the mainmast, $2\frac{1}{2}$ marks; for a squire, a place on deck, 7 ounces of silver; for a groom and horse, $4\frac{1}{4}$ marks; for a pilgrim on foot, $\frac{3}{4}$ of a mark, food inclusive. The contractors evidently calculated the whole matter very carefully. But Louis did not take their tender.

¹ Zanetti, *Dell' origine di alcune arti*, p. 38; Filiasi, *Ricerche*, p. 237; Sanudo, *Secreta*, lib. iii. part 12, cap. 8.

CHAPTER XVI

A.D. 1268-1280

Changes in the Ducal Elections—Lorenzo Tiepolo, Doge (1268-75)—Alterations in the Constitution—Corrado Ducato, First Grand Chancellor of Venice—Festivities of Tiepolo's Coronation—Conclusion of a Truce between Venice and Genoa for Five Years (1270-5)—Famine at Venice—Venice declares herself Sovereign of the Adriatic (1270)—Imposition of the Gulf Dues—Considerations on the Claims of the Venetians to the Dominion of the Gulf—War between Venice and Bologna—Retreat of the Venetian Troops on Volano—Defeat of the Bolognese—Conclusion of Peace—Giacomo Contarini, Doge (1275-80)—War with Ancona—Revolt of Capo D'Istria—Chastisement of the Patriarch of Aquileia—Reduction of Almissa—Mission of Marino Pasqualigo to the Court of Rodolph of Hapsburg (1277)—Abdication of Contarini (1280).

ON Sunday afternoon,¹ the 8th of July, 1268, the tolling of the great bell at the Campanile announced to all Venice, that the mortal remains of Reniero Zeno had found their final resting-place at SS. Giovanni e Paolo, where a fragment of the ducal monument still survives.

The election of a new Doge amounted to the investiture of a simple member of the commonwealth with an authority, not untrammelled, yet loosely defined, and in spite of many encroachments still very considerable, an authority which he might wield, for good or for evil, during a very prolonged term. It therefore presented a case in which a false step could not be taken without the severest prejudice to the national interests; and under such circumstances it was no matter of wonder, that there should be an anxiety to secure the exercise of a mature and impartial judgment, and to minimize the liability of the process to corrupt practices. It was on this account, and ostensibly on this account only, that in 1033 it was proposed to rescind the prescriptive right of the Doge to associate his children and to nominate his successor. It was with the same object that, a century and a half later, universal suffrage had been abolished, and that an

¹ Da Canale contemp., sect. 256.

Electoral College had been called into existence. It was to this cause that the Great Council had owed, in some measure, its simultaneous institution.

Yet, notwithstanding many sound and beneficial changes which had been introduced, at successive periods since 1033, into the electoral system, that system was still pronounced too open to abuse; there still appeared to be several material points, in which it was susceptible of amendment; and an opportunity had now arisen which might not soon recur, of removing some of the objections to the existing process. Hence sprang a fear, that there might be a longer delay than usual in supplying the place of Zeno; and, it is not unlikely, that this formed the leading motive for departing from the ordinary practice of placing the Dogeship in commission during an interregnal period, and for creating the senior councillor Nicolo Michieli, Vice-Doge of Venice, till the succession was determined.

In due course, the Board of Correction made known, through the proper channel, its recommendation that clauses should be introduced into the Coronation Oath, binding the Doge, on his election (1) to relinquish any commercial avocations,¹ in which he might previously have been engaged, and to abstain from carrying on any trade on his own behalf, either directly or indirectly; (2) to restrict himself to the exercise of the authority vested in him by the laws and the constitution; and (3) to communicate, without unnecessary delay, to the Privy Council any information, which might reach him through private sources, or which he might personally receive, touching treaties with foreign Powers, secret machinations against the State, and other matters affecting the public welfare and interest. Secondly, the Board proposed the creation of a new dignity in the appointment of a Grand Chancellor of the Republic. This office,² which was for life, and which was intended to supersede the old one of *Cancellarius Ducalis* or Keeper of the Privy Seal, was to be made exclusively from the *Cittadinanza*. The choice fell, in the first instance, on Corrado Ducato, who had formerly filled the position of Keeper of the Seal, and whose appointment appears to have been ratified on or before the 15th of July,

¹ We in England in 1914 have still to decree this. Our *Imperator et Rex* is still a sort of tradesman.

² Sandi, ii. lib. iv. ch. 5.

1268, on which day the first mention of his name occurs in the Archives.¹

The next point, to which the Correttori directed attention, was the manner of the ducal elections. The Capitulary, embodying the reforms made by the Board subject to parliamentary sanction, was read to the Arrengo by the Chancellor, and approved by the national voice, which applauded "the things which those wise men had done."² The process was both solemn and ingenious. The youngest of the Privy Councillors having in the first instance proceeded to Saint Mark's, and having offered up a fervent prayer to the Almighty, invoking His Divine Blessing on the approaching ceremony, the Great Council was convened in accordance with the prescribed forms; and, the House having been counted, all who were ascertained not to have reached their thirtieth year were required to withdraw. The rest resolved themselves into a Committee of Election. Thirty pellets of wax having then been deposited in an urn, a boy of tender years, who had been previously taken at random for the purpose among the youthful loungers of the Rialto, drew them out severally, and delivered one to each member in his proper turn. A strip of parchment, on which was written the word *elector*, was attached to thirty of the balls. The Thirty thus indicated retired into a private apartment, and reduced themselves by ballot to nine. By a majority of at least six votes the Nine chose in their turn forty; the Forty were reduced to twelve. The Twelve next nominated by a majority of nine suffrages twenty-five, who were again reduced to nine. By a majority of seven suffrages the Nine elected forty-five, who were reduced to eleven. Finally, the Eleven nominated the Forty-one, who formed the Electoral College. It was necessary, that the Doge elect should obtain at least five-and-twenty votes. It became his duty to select the first youth whom he met on leaving Saint Mark's after offering up his prayers to God for his election, as the *Ballotino* or person to remove the slips or balls from the urn in elections by ballot. His years were supposed to bespeak and symbolize innocence and purity.

The electoral conclave, which emerged from this complex machinery, ultimately fixed their choice on Lorenzo Tiepolo,

¹ Da Canale, *ubi supra*, note 321; Sandi, *ubi supra*.

² Da Canale, *ubi supra*.

who had already gained a great name by his victory over the Genoese at Acre in 1256, and by other exploits. The election of Tiepolo was notified to the people on Monday, the 23rd of July, 1268,¹ a fortnight after the funeral of his predecessor. The announcement seems to have given general satisfaction: yet it is not quite easy to understand how the elevation of a man who, like the successor of Zeno, was the acknowledged chief of the aristocratic party, could appear to the members of the Popular Opposition in any other light than in that of a defeat.

So soon as the choice of the College had been ratified by the people, a solemn deputation waited upon Tiepolo at his private residence at San Agostino, in the ward of San Polo, and escorted him to Saint Mark's. His Serenity was met at the doors by the Vice-Doge, attended by the ministers of the Ducal Chapel, and was conducted to the principal altar, where he swore to the promission, and received at the hands of the Procurator the standard of the Republic. He was then led to the throne; and in the presence of a vast concourse of persons, who had assembled to witness the ceremony of the investiture, the youngest of the senators encircled his brow with the ducal berretta. This ceremony having been consummated, the chaplains of Saint Mark were dispatched to San Agostino in quest of the Dogaressa Marchesina, daughter of Bohemond, Ban of Rascia; and her Serenity, having been conducted to the palace amid great pomp and rejoicing, was placed on the throne by the side of her consort. In the evening the Forty-One were entertained at dinner.²

The new reign was inaugurated by festivities³ of an unusually magnificent kind, not impossibly with some idea in the background of diverting the current of public thought from recent political modifications. We enjoy the advantage of a coeval pen—that of the quaint and picturesque chronicler, Martino da Canale, who in the Venetian patois has described these scenes of a remote age, and brought them vividly before us in a manner worthy of Froissart or Commines.

Among other amusements and attractions was a Water-Fête, in which the galleys of a squadron, then about to proceed to the Mediterranean for the protection of Venetian

¹ Da Canale contemp., sect. 257.

² Ibid., sect. 257-8.

³ Ibid.

commerce, bore a principal share. The vessels, among which might be distinguished several belonging to private citizens of Burano and Torcello, were gaily and fancifully dressed with pennants; and, as they passed along the Canal in front of the Ducal palace, the choristers on board chanted verses composed for the occasion in honour of the Doge and his Dogaressa.

A Procession of the Trades, which traversed the principal thoroughfares of the metropolis, was opened by the Smiths who, crowned with chaplets and flowers, marched with flags in their hands to the sound of musical instruments. Next came the Furriers arrayed in ermine and miniver,¹ and the Skinners in robes of taffeta, displaying the choicest specimens of their own manufactures. These were followed in successive order by the Tanners, the Iron-Masters, the Barbers,² the Hosiers, the Drapers, the Cotton-Spinners, the Gold-cloth Workers, the Weavers, and the Tailors, the last of whom were sumptuously dressed in white, their mantles edged with fur. The Gold-cloth Workers were apparelled in their own precious commodity. Nor was the costume of the Mercers, the Glass-blowers, the Fishmongers, the Butchers, and the Victuallers less costly. Some were clad in suits of red, some in scarlet, others in yellow. The members of the Corporations mostly bore some token or badge of the calling to which they belonged; the Drapers merely carried olive-branches in their hands. On the whole, the pageant was singularly brilliant and imposing; but where the diversity of dress was so infinite, and where the variety of fashion and hue offered such violent contrasts, it was to be expected that it would wear a somewhat motley and incongruous aspect. To such a result the whimsical attire of the Barbers contributed in no slight degree. The deputies of this Gild, four in number, appeared disguised as knights-errant, of whom two were armed from head to foot and mounted on richly-dressed chargers, while the other two walked at their side. They were accompanied by four damsels on foot, no less fantastically habited, whom they pretended to have rescued from some great and imminent peril. As they passed before the platform, from which the Doge and his Court were observing the show, one of the cavaliers dis-

¹ Da Canale contemp., sect. 267.

² At Venice the barbers were a privileged body.

mounted, and, bowing profoundly, addressed Tiepolo in the following manner:—"Messer, we are knights-errant, who have travelled far to seek our fortune, and have at last succeeded in making a conquest of these four maidens. We have now come to your Court; and if any here be disposed to gainsay our right, we are prepared to defend the prizes we have won with our utmost prowess." The Barbers having finished their speech, the Prince replied in suitable terms, that they were welcome, assuring them, that they and their fair charges should be treated with all honour, and that no one would presume to dispute with them so enviable a possession. The Barber-Knights then shouted: *Long live our Prince Lorenzo Tiepolo, the noble Doge of Venice!*¹—and so moved forward.

The festivities of the coronation presented many other novelties. When the procession of the Trades was concluded, ten of the Master Tailors, changing their habiliments, attired themselves in white suits sprinkled with vermilion stars, and paced the leading thoroughfares, singing scraps of favourite airs and popular ditties of the day; each of the jaunty and jocund crew carried in his hand a goblet of malmsey; and occasionally they suspended their vocal labours to recover breath and to moisten their lips with a draught of the fluid. The picture was very Venetian in its colouring; and it is pleasant to find that the votaries of the needle, who supplied pantaloons to Doge Tiepolo and doublets of Alexandrian velvet to the fashionable loungers of the Rialto, were persons of such genial humour, and possessed so keen a relish for sack,² A people so passionately fond of music and melody assuredly possessed already certain standard tunes, to which such ballads as those recited in the streets by the Merchant Tailors, or such stanzas as the choristers chanted on the Canals, might be set. There were games, besides, in which buffoons were introduced, who by their antic gestures created huge merriment among the mob. There were men carrying cages full of singing and other birds, who, as soon as they came near the spot where the Court happened to be, liberated the little prisoners, and let them fly amid the crowd. This proceeding drew a deafening shout of approbation. Nor was there any deficiency of sharpers who, observing the attention of the

¹ Da Canale contemp., sect. 268.

² Ibid., sect. 271.

bystanders fixed on other objects, nimbly profited by the general hilarity and distraction to fill their own pockets.

The public entertainments closed with an Industrial Exhibition in the apartments of the Palace in honour of the Dogaressa who, as she passed in state through each room, was received by the Masters of the several Companies, and presented with comfits, which her Serenity accepted with kind expressions.

The opening of Tiepolo's ministry was pacific. In 1270, by the concurrent intercession of the Courts of France, Rome, and Sicily, a truce for five years was concluded at Cremona by the delegates of Venice and Genoa;¹ and even the proposition for an exchange of prisoners, which seems to have been violently combated on one side, and to have been abandoned in consequence, was finally embraced by the contracting parties at the earnest and repeated entreaty of the Supreme Pontiff. Much as the temporary nature of the Peace of Cremona might be regretted by many, the armistice deserved to be hailed, under any circumstances, as an event of happy omen. So far as Genoa was concerned, the reconciliation with her mighty antagonist was undoubtedly most opportune. For the war in which she had been for some time engaged with her other rival in commerce and prosperity, the republic of Pisa, was itself quite sufficient to occupy her attention and resources. Nor was it long before Venice herself found abundant reason to treat it as a fortunate circumstance, that all ground of apprehension was removed for the present in that quarter.

The late festivities had had the effect of attracting to Venice a large number of foreigners, and of increasing the consumption of all the necessaries of life to such an extent that the demand at last threatened to exceed altogether the means of supply.

This was an evil which, under ordinary conditions, would have never arisen. For in a country without territory or agricultural resources it had been early recognised as a cardinal point of policy to preserve a ready and constant communication with all the corn-producing countries accessible to her transports; the importance of such a communication became only the more manifest, as the floating no less than the

¹ Da Canale contemp., sect. 328; Dandolo, lib. x. p. 380.

permanent population of the Dogado was gradually swollen by the institution of periodical fairs and by the development of the national marine; and the government had therefore been careful to secure from time to time, by treaty or otherwise, the privilege of exporting grain at the cheapest rate from those districts where it grew in the largest quantities. Hence it was that in the compacts formed at successive periods, though more particularly in those of more recent date, with the Byzantine empire, Sicily, the Mohammedan Powers of Barbary, the Patriarch of Aquileia, and the Count of Goritz, the representatives of the Doge almost invariably stipulated for the liberty to export corn, where the price exceeded not a certain amount the bushel. In Aquileia and Goritz the Venetians appear to have possessed the faculty of taking as much wheat out of the country as might suit their immediate purpose, either without the payment of any duty whatever, or at most with the levy of one of nominal amount; and even in other instances they succeeded in imposing their own conditions. So much, indeed, was this the case in the Two Sicilies that the native merchants had reason to complain, that the Venetians, who engaged in the export trade, were placed by the Government of Charles of Anjou on a more advantageous footing than themselves.

When, however, the Ducal government was thus apparently forearmed, it seems strange that any difficulty should have been experienced in procuring supplies of corn and other grain to any given extent. The fact was that, at the present juncture, several circumstances concurred to defeat the precautions, which had been adopted against the possibility of a sudden pressure from unforeseen causes. The year, in which Lorenzo Tiepolo was called to the throne (1268), and in which the population of the capital was increased by the arrival of thousands, who flocked thither to be present at the Fêtes, was remarkable for an unusually short wheat harvest throughout Europe. In Sicily, Naples, Greece, Candia, and the Morea, the crop was almost equally poor. In Sicily and the South of Italy it was so bad, that the Government found it necessary to restrain, as a temporary measure, the export of all grain from the Neapolitan dominions. Lastly, Africa, generally an inexhaustible fountain of supply, still formed the theatre of the Ninth Crusade.

The consequence of this unfortunate coincidence was that the year was one of extreme scarcity. The dearness of prices, which soon became unprecedented, affected all classes of society. It was too much to be dreaded that, unless the transports, which had been dispatched some time in search of grain, arrived speedily in the Venetian waters with stores, famine would lay its gaunt and desolating hand on the Dogado, and by a sweeping process of extermination do more in a few weeks than all the enemies of the Republic had been able to achieve in 800 years. So critical was the dilemma in which the Venetians found themselves situated by an event altogether beyond the range of human foresight.

On the first symptom of danger indeed vessels were sent to Dalmatia, to Greece, and even to Asia,¹ with instructions to buy all the corn which could be found; and at the same time a circular message was addressed to such of the members of the Lombard Federation, as might not be involved in a similar strait, applying for a contribution of corn and other necessaries. Among those to whom such an appeal was directed, were the Paduans and the Trevisans. The former, more especially, were reminded how at a juncture, when they were chafing beneath the yoke of the Imperialists, Venice, responding to their call, had come forward, and had delivered them from the hands of a tyrant.² The memory of the Ferrarese³ and Trevisans was refreshed by a rehearsal of the services which the Republic had lent to the cause of liberty in the course of the last Peninsular War, and which were acknowledged at the time to be of the utmost importance. In these reminiscences the fall of Padua, and the restoration of Treviso to the Popular Party by the overthrow of the two Romani, received quite their due share of prominence.

The efforts of the Doge and his advisers, however, were uniformly unsuccessful; and those to whom the appeal was addressed might perhaps plead a participation in the same inconvenience and distress. But part, at least, of the truth was that Venice was experiencing in the hour of adversity the common fate of all those Powers which become great at the expense of their neighbours; she had raised against her a host of secret enemies, who merely waited an opportunity

¹ Da Canale, sect. 300.

² Ibid., sect. 303.

³ Ibid., sect. 301.

of declaring themselves; and of these assuredly the most bitter in her jealousy and hatred was Padua. That ancient Borough was too much inflated by her ancestral and heraldic pride to forget that the Republic owed its existence to a decree of her Senate, and that she was accounted the richest and most powerful of Italian Cities at a time when the fisherman was still spreading his nets on the morasses, where the palaces of the Zeni and Tiepoli now stood. Padua even boasted that, long after the invasion of the Huns, she had continued to give laws to the Venetians. In fact the two Powers stood in such a relative posture toward each other, that the services rendered by the Republic during the late War to the Guelphs of Padua were apt to awaken a sense of injury rather than a sense of gratitude.

Nor could it be disguised that there were two sides to the picture. If Venice adduced, on the present occasion, as a claim to grateful remembrance, the liberation of Padua from the hands of Eccelino, the Paduans were at liberty to recall the atrocities committed by the allies after the fall of the place; and we may be assured that they did not fail to ascribe them in principal measure to their insular neighbours. This malevolence was shared by the other people of the Marches, who had joined in declining to comply with the requisition of the Doge. It was with no favourable eye that the independent Communes of Northern Italy viewed the ascendancy of Venice; and there were not wanting some who foretold that its interference in the affairs of the Peninsula would become in the course of time more and more frequent, until it resolved itself finally into the permanent extension of the Dogado to the mainland.

The failure of the Italian missions, coupled with the continued absence of intelligence of the desired kind from other quarters, reduced the Ducal government to a state of the gravest uneasiness. The public distress increased from day to day; the means of alleviating it appeared to be quite as remote as ever. At last, when the pressure had reached a point at which it was all but intolerable, a few transports entered the Venetian waters from Southern Italy and Dalmatia; they were the bearers of a most welcome, though limited, consignment of corn and provisions purchased by Giovanni Dandolo Cane, Consul-General in Apulia, with the

permission of Charles of Anjou,¹ from the merchants of that country, and by other agents of the Doge in the Illyric Provinces. These stores were immediately distributed with rigid impartiality by officers specially appointed for the purpose; and the arrival in speedy succession of other vessels from various parts of Asia with more ample supplies dismissed all immediate cause of apprehension. The crisis, at least, had passed; and although the late pressure unavoidably left certain dark traces behind it, the Republic might be pronounced out of danger.

Misfortune was not without its use and instruction. The terrible ordeal which the Venetians had just suffered conveyed a severe lesson. To guard by every available means against a recurrence of such an evil was the fixed determination of the Government. With this object a new Office was instituted, whose province it became to exercise a general superintendence and control over the Corn Trade, to take cognisance of all matters pertaining to the export and import of the article, and to apprise the Executive at the earliest moment of any circumstance which might render a scarcity of grain a probable contingency. The new Board of Trade, whose jurisdiction promised, as time went on, to become more and more extensive and elastic, consisted of three members, who were designated the *Magistrati delle Biade*.

Having thus extricated the country from this serious predicament, the Venetians felt themselves in a position to proceed to strong measures; and they now resolved to chastise the Lombards for their base and ungrateful conduct during the late famine. With the approbation of the Great Council, a decree was published that henceforth all vessels, navigating the Gulf of Adria between Ravenna and Fiume, should be subject to a gabella or *ad valorem* duty² on their cargoes, payable to the Ducal Fisc; every description of craft, and all Flags, were pronounced equally liable to the payment of dues; and as it was most probable that the new regulation would meet with a warm opposition, proper means were taken to enforce its observance. For this purpose was established a Board of Customs, armed with exclusive powers, and of which the members, entitled *Governadori* or comptrollers,

¹ Marin, v. 35.

² Sandi, ii. lib. iv. art. 8; Romanin, ii. lib. vii. ch. 1.

were charged with carrying the act of the Legislative Body into full and immediate effect ; and to facilitate its operations, a certain number of men-of-war were placed at its disposal under the command of a Captain of the Gulf. The instructions of the latter were to allow no foreign ship to unload or even touch at any of the ports of Lombardy between Ravenna and Fiume, unless it was certified that its goods had been examined and cleared at a Venetian custom-house.

The imposition of the gabella under these circumstances was tantamount to a declaration of a Right of Sovereignty over the Adriatic ; and the Republic meant it to be nothing less. Turning back to the annals of the tenth century, when the Western Empire under Berengar II., about 948, made concessions to Venice on the express understanding that the waters of the Gulf were to be under the protection of the flag of St. Mark, the step may not strike us to-day either as very precipitate or very unreasonable. Yet it was perhaps hardly strange that, when the blow fell, it created a general feeling of astonishment in the Peninsula ; and in the commercial towns that feeling positively amounted to consternation. The Lombards were completely taken by surprise. No one was prepared for such a contingency ; and, although it might be imagined by some that the project had been hastily adopted in a spirit of resentment, and might be allowed to drop on riper reflection, it was quite plain to those who attentively considered the subject, that there was no disposition on the Venetians' side to abandon the newly occupied ground, which in fact had not only been established and recognized in 948, but had been confirmed about two centuries later, when the Pontiff Alexander III. presented the ring to the Doge Ziani. This was the origin of the *Andata alli Due Castelli*, and seems to have superseded the older *Blessing of the Sea* after the conquest of Dalmatia in 998. It was in fact a process of evolution extending over more than 250 years.

As a question of abstract right, the pretension of Venice was altogether indefensible ; but the peculiar situation of the city and capital, and the political interest which the Adriatic possessions of the Republic on the opposite side of the Gulf involved, more especially, where more than one strong Power lay so close to the Dalmatian seaboard and frontier, and periodically attempted to wrest from the Venetian grasp dearly

won territory, among whose population a spirit of disaffection and revolt was almost continuously fomented, lent to this unique claim a more than specious colour and countenance.

It is probable that no nice discrimination existed in that age between Coast and High Sea; but it was nevertheless obvious that a State, whose entire territory was comprehended in a cluster of islands and in a narrow strip of the adjoining *terra firma*, could have no title to constitute itself the mistress of a sea, of which it held so small a portion, or to impose restrictions on the navigation of such rivers as the Adige, the Piave, the Brenta, and the Po. The claim of the Republic might have been more admissible at a time when the waters of the Gulf were infested by the Normans, the Narentines, and the Saracens, and when she was the only Power in Europe capable of resisting the encroachments of the Sea-Robbers. But privateering and piracy, though still pursued to some considerable extent, were no longer exercised upon the same gigantic scale and with the same professional regularity as formerly; and it followed, that the necessity for protecting the subjects of the Republic in the pursuit of their commercial avocations from loss and outrage, was a plea which had lost a good deal of its validity. The fact was that the question was purely one of conventional legality, and that the title, if it existed at all, was of a derivative quality; it may be described as an asserted authority, which was never formally recognised on paper, and which depended on the power of enforcement. It was from the unaided repression of the inroads of the pirates that the right of protection had silently accrued; and this protective right resolved itself in the course of ages into the right of sovereignty. But it was only by employing the argument of the strong against the weak that Venice could hope to preserve her naval ascendancy in the Gulf. Her title could not be founded on first occupation or on first discovery for the most obvious reasons. It was not founded on prescription: for the prescription had been repeatedly broken. Nevertheless the plea of self-defence not only remained valid, but as naval power developed outside the Republic, and the use of artillery became more general, it acquired from the exposed position of the islands increased *ex parte* justification, side by side with diminished means of enforcement.

It was not to be expected, however, under any circumstances, that the other free communities of Lombardy would tamely submit to what might appear the result of a mere act of volition on the part of the Venetian Government. The arbitrary proceeding was, on the contrary, everywhere characterised as a monstrous and intolerable usurpation; and an example of active resistance was soon set by Bologna, which adopted the quarrel with considerable spirit and resolution. It was in the latter part of 1269 that the Executive Council of the Borough addressed a remonstrance to the Doge, in which they strongly represented the unjust and pernicious operation of the *gabella*, and demanded the removal, so far as their commune was concerned, of all restrictions on commerce, more particularly on the trade which it pursued with the ports of Roumania in grain and salt.¹ Bologna was not so immediately the object of Venetian resentment as those Powers which had invoked the aid of the Republic in their distress, and had deserted their Ally in the hour of her necessity. The Bolognese, besides, were a Power whom it might be dangerous to offend, and whom it was certainly unwise to offend without sufficient cause. Their military resources were considerable; their influence in the political scale of Italy was great: and the government of Tiepolo thought it politic to make, with some reservations, the concessions required. In the same year (1269) a treaty was accordingly signed, by which mutual protection and security were guaranteed, and by which the *gabella* was relaxed, in certain instances, in favour of the Bolognese.

Shortly afterward an arrangement, analogous to that which had been effected with them, followed between the Republic and Forli, which had joined in the protest against the right of search and the Gulf dues. The town of Forli is situated on a fertile plain, near the confluence of the Rabbi and the Montone, fifteen miles from Ravenna, and forty from Bologna itself.

The prospect of a rupture between Venice and Bologna, which had at one time appeared not improbable, seemed to be entirely removed by the Treaty of 1269. The Bolognese, however, notwithstanding their acceptance of the terms offered to their representatives by the Doge, still preserved their full

¹ Da Canale, sect. 328 *et seq.*

share of indignation at the new fiscal system introduced by the Republic; and they chafed even less perhaps at the measure itself, than at the spirit in which it was conceived. The special modification of the tariff in their favour, which they had affected to regard as a liberal and graceful concession, appeared, on a more deliberate survey of the question, rather in the light of a compromise, with which the Senate had been only too glad to buy their silence and collusion; and, moreover, the alacrity in complying with their representations and with those of Forli, furnished a fair deduction that, if so much had been conceded on their simple protest, there would not be any considerable difficulty in winning back by another and a stronger effort all the commercial liberties which they had lost. At the same time, the Bolognese were not unconscious of the expediency of masking their design, until the preparations for carrying it out were somewhat more mature. About a twelvemonth after the ratification of the treaty of 1269, a second embassy from Bologna waited on the Doge, to inquire whether any objection existed, on the part of the Republic, to the contemplated establishment of a fort at Primaro, on the Po,¹ directly facing the old Venetian Castle of San Alberto,² for the better protection of Bolognese trade and navigation. The embassy had instructions to return with a specific reply.

But it happened that the Doge and his advisers were already in possession of certain intelligence, which at once enabled them to penetrate the artifice, and to meet the enemy on their own ground. They knew that the work, of which the deputies spoke as merely in contemplation, was actually in progress, and that the Podesta and municipal council of the borough had during some time been actively engaged in recruiting the militia, as well as in forming alliances in several quarters inimical to Venice; it was even reported, that the troops levied, or to be levied, by the new League, would not fall far short of 40,000 men of all arms.³ From these movements it was barely possible to form more than one conclusion; and indeed it was quite manifest that the present negotiation had been opened simply as an expedient for misleading the Government.

The Deputies were therefore dismissed with a message

¹ Da Canale contemp., sect. 287.

³ Ibid., sect. 288.

² Ibid.

that, "as the proposition, of which they were the bearers, was found to involve certain points, which demanded careful consideration, the Doge must beg to take time to decide what answer should be given, and that such decision should be communicated at the earliest moment through the ordinary channel." ¹

The Republic now plainly perceived that it was time to choose between two courses. On the one hand, she was at liberty to abandon the right of search and the Gulf dues, and thus to renounce the sovereignty of the Adriatic, which she had so recently assumed. On the other, it became absolutely necessary to prepare for war. Between these two courses the instinctive sense of honour and pride hardly left an option: yet the temper of a mercantile community is cautious and dispassionate; and it was only at the close of a lengthened debate, that the Great Council chose the latter alternative.

So soon as possible, then, a small squadron of galleys and lighter vessels was placed under the command of Marco Badoer, who had instructions to proceed to San Alberto, to strengthen that position by placing the neglected fortifications in repair, so far as his time and means would admit, and to look upon it as a point from which he might keep the enemy in check, or might direct active operations. The troops, which accompanied the expedition, consisted chiefly, if not entirely, of militia raised in the two wards of Santa Croce and Dorsoduro, and in the separate jurisdiction of Chioggia; ² and although somewhat limited in number, they were amply provided with every implement of warfare and with a powerful artillery.

At the same time, in discharge of the promise which he had made to his late visitors, the Doge dispatched two emissaries to Bologna, to signify that the Republic was not disposed to depart from her original resolution in respect to the tariff, and that she felt that she could not, compatibly with a due regard to her own interests, assent to the proposition of the Bolognese for planting the desired fort at Primaro. Farthermore they were authorised to recommend the Podestà and his advisers to desist from any project which might have the effect of producing a breach between the two States. It

¹ Da Canale *contemp.*, sect. 318 *et seq.*

² *Ibid.*, sect. 288.

is exceedingly doubtful, however, whether the Republic seriously anticipated any important result from this negotiation, and whether her rulers really expected that their advice would have much weight with the Bolognese.

Indeed, if a peaceful settlement of the Tariff Question had ever been feasible, it was soon rendered hopeless by the turn of affairs on the Po, which too clearly portended the approach of a severe struggle between the Republic and her neighbours. On his arrival at San Alberto with the squadron and troops under his charge, Badoer found that the enemy were already occupying a position on the opposite bank of the river where, notwithstanding the late Ducal message, the new fort was in an advanced stage of progress. It was not less clear that the Bolognese had exerted to the fullest extent the vast influence, which they possessed in the peninsula: the militia of Forli, Ravenna, and other towns, which they held in dependence, or which were fellow-sufferers from the gabella, were marshalled under the banners of their Podesta, who had taken the field in person; and making every allowance for exaggerations or misstatements, it seems probable that their forces far exceeded those which the Republic had placed at the disposal of her general. The Podesta, however, was not emboldened by his numerical superiority to cross the river which separated him from his opponents, and to bring the latter to an engagement; and during a period of two entire months both armies lay inactive, with the exception of one slight operation in which Badoer attacked the enemy's position, and in which he met with a repulse. On the expiration of the second month, Badoer was relieved by Raffaello Bettano and Pancrazio Barbo, who brought considerable reinforcements from Venice. But still matters remained without any visible alteration, the belligerents exhibiting a mutual backwardness to measure their strength; and, in the Venetian camp at San Alberto, the only feature which tended at all to diversify the monotony of the scene, was the arrival, at regular intervals of two months, of fresh troops from some of the other wards, accompanied by a new generalissimo. These somewhat frequent changes probably imply that the Government was dissatisfied with the slow progress of the War.

The circumstances in which Gherardino Longo found himself placed, on his arrival at headquarters, were not a

little trying. It was in the summer of 1272 that Longo entered upon the command; the weather, as was to be expected at that season, was hot and unhealthy; and, shortly after, the plague broke out in the ranks. The sufferings of the soldiers were terrible; the epidemic proved fatal to large numbers, and those who escaped its ravages were enervated by sickness and disheartened by the loss of their comrades. The Bolognese Podesta conceived that an admirable opportunity was presented for making a descent in boats on San Alberto, amid the general confusion and distress which were understood to prevail in the Venetian camp, and for attacking the enemy's position, before discipline was restored, or new reinforcements had been received. The project was at once carried out. Its success could hardly have been more signal. The Venetians, absorbed by their own troubles, were seized by a panic; and the Bolognese commander had the satisfaction of seeing his foes retreat in precipitation on Volano, leaving behind them their baggage, arms, banners, and accoutrements.¹ Having achieved this exploit, the Bolognese and their Podesta, without pursuing this victory, returned to Primaro with their trophies and plunder.

There is every probability that the preparations and expenses of the Bolognese were on a much larger scale than those of the Republic: yet, although they had commenced hostilities under the most favourable auspices, and had had an ample opportunity of maturing their plans, the sole advantage which they had hitherto gained, consisted in the use they had made of the helpless condition of Longo by driving him from his position; and that advantage was both ephemeral and unimportant. So far as the Venetians were concerned their loss was chiefly material; while the reverse stimulated the Republic to more strenuous exertions.

It was to be expected, at the same time, that the news of the retreat on Volano would shake Venetian equanimity. The retreat was an unexpected blow to the hopes, more or less sanguine, more or less just, which had been formed of the ultimate success of their arms on the Po. It was quite natural that the Republic should be anxious to ascertain at the earliest moment the true cause of the disaster, and to be in possession of all the circumstances which had produced

¹ Da Canale, sect. 292.

such a discreditable catastrophe; and whatever explanations might have been afforded by Longo in his dispatches, it seems perfectly clear that they failed altogether to satisfy the Government, or to remove a suspicion of something even worse than negligence and incapacity on the part of the general and his officers. In fact, on the first intelligence of the disaster, a special Commission was charged to proceed to headquarters to institute an exhaustive inquiry into the facts, and to adopt measures for restoring confidence to the army.

The report of the Commissioners confirmed the impression already formed regarding the origin and cause of the misfortune. It went to shew that, if a little more circumspection had been exercised before the danger came, or if a little more courage had been displayed in meeting it, the mischief would not have arisen; and the Commissioners went so far as to reprimand the troops and their commander in a public manner for that cowardice and faintheartedness, by which so much dishonour had been brought on the Republic. That this extreme course would have been taken without extraordinary provocation, and in the absence of the strongest ground, is improbable.

Preparations were at once set on foot for the campaign of 1273; fresh levies were made in the Wards; and in the room of Longo the Doge sent, to take command of the army on the Po, Jacopo Dandolo and Marco Gradenigo,¹ two officers of tried abilities and established reputation.

The resolution of the Venetians was soon apparent to employ every disposable means of concluding the contest, which had now had a duration of two years, in a speedy and satisfactory manner. The only forces of which the Republic had just now the disposal, were the national militia, and these troops were necessarily limited in point of number. Yet a strong hope was cherished of a successful issue. In the spirit of the soldiers themselves under better leaders it was thought that confidence might safely be reposed.

The result of the new campaign was indeed brilliant even beyond anticipation; the arms of the Republic were triumphant at every point; and the Venetian militia, anxious to efface the remembrance of the recent disgrace, vied with

¹ Da Canale, sect. 296.

each other in patriotic devotion. Dandolo himself was more like a hero of chivalry than the responsible leader of regular troops; his desperate impetuosity carried all before it; danger and risk were contemned by him; and in conjunction with his colleague Gradenigo this distinguished officer sought to win for his country an honourable peace. Under their new generals the militia of Venice and Chioggia recovered their confidence and energy; and, although greatly outnumbered by their foes, they maintained their ground with firmness, and performed prodigies of valour. It sounds rather like an episode in a tale of fiction than an incident founded on historical truth, when it is related how Dandolo at the head of a hundred of his followers, an elect band, resolute and undaunted like himself, boldly attacked the enemy in front, and how, after a sharp struggle, driving them from their position at San Alberto, he forced them to retreat in confusion to their ships.

The check given to the Bolognese, however, was a splendid rather than an useful advantage. The victors were growing scarcely less tired than the vanquished of a contest which had lasted during the greater part of three years, without bearing any adequate fruits, and which still presented a very faint prospect of conclusion. Yet both the belligerents hesitated to take the initiative in negotiation; and had not the Holy See, the general pacificator in those unsettled times, seized the auspicious moment, the probability is, that the war would have continued, till one of the Powers sank from an utter exhaustion of its strength and resources. After some difficulty, Gregory X. succeeded in obtaining the adhesion of both parties to a definitive treaty of peace, which was signed at Venice on the 13th August 1273,¹ by the syndics of Venice and Bologna. By this convention it was provided that the Bolognese should at once demolish the fort of Primaro, while the old Venetian fortress at San Alberto remained intact; that they should afford protection and security to all citizens of the Republic, travelling or resident in their territory; and that the Venetians should continue to enjoy without interruption or abatement the commercial privileges which they had acquired in the Ravennate in the days of the Countess Matilda, and should have a free passage through every part of the Bolognese jurisdiction.

¹ Da Canale, sect. 309.

On the other hand, the Republic engaged to afford her late enemy advantages of safety and protection throughout the Dogado and its dependencies analogous to those which she claimed for herself in the Bolognese; and (if it was viewed in the light of a concession) her Government did not object, in the case of Bologna, to relax recent decrees so far as to sanction the importation annually from Cervia and from Roumania, without payment of duty, of a certain quantity of salt and grain. This exemption was granted, however, only on the understanding, that the salt and grain so imported were for local consumption; and in order to give full effect to this condition, it was stipulated that all Bolognese vessels, before they ascended the Po with their freights, should undergo an examination at Primaro Custom-house.

The treaty of August enabled the Republic to concentrate her attention and resources on other threatening points, and the Anconese, who had partly formed a design of imitating the example of Bologna, contented themselves with memorialising the court of Rome on the extravagant pretensions of the Republic. His Holiness, who very probably began to dread a revival of the contest which he had just been instrumental in terminating, responded with no ordinary haste to this call. In an epistle to the Doge, Gregory X. strongly deprecated the obnoxious and unfair measures, which the Republic had thought fit to enact with regard to the navigation of the Adriatic Gulf; the pontiff dwelled on the injurious operation of such measures, as exemplified by the three years' war with Bologna and by the present breach with the Anconese, which, unless speedily adjusted, threatened to develop equally deplorable results; and he concluded by inculcating on his Serenity the propriety of submitting to the modification, if not to the removal, of the hampering and vexatious restrictions, which his country had imposed on the commerce of foreigners between Lombardy and the Levant.

But the Government positively refused to assent to any farther revision of the navigation laws at present in force on the Gulf, or to renounce in any manner the protectorate which it had pleased the Republic to assume over these waters; and Ancona was therefore constrained to tolerate an abuse, of which it was apparently futile to complain, and which it might be more than futile to resist. Foiled, however, in their attempt

to shake off the burden of the gabella, the Anconese traders still endeavoured to elude the vigilance of the customs, and thus to avoid the dues without obtaining their repeal. The Government of the Republic was not slow to mark its sense of the new practice by dispatching a squadron to Ancona, which battered down a portion of the fortifications; and the Municipal Council, seeing the danger of the city, gave under stress every pledge which was required.

On his abdication in 1261, Baldwin II. had made a cession of his imperial rights to Charles of Anjou, King of Sicily; and this step was naturally viewed by the founder of the new Greek dynasty with extreme uneasiness. For it seemed to be hardly probable that Charles would neglect such an important bequest; and Palæologos had every reason to fear that his rival, dressing his ambition in a religious garb, might organize, in concert with his neighbours and allies, a fresh Crusade against the heretics of Constantinople. In order to obviate this danger, the Greek emperor wrote in the course of 1274 to the Pontiff Gregory, lamenting all those dissensions between Christian princes, which so much retarded the propagation of the Faith, shewing how such feuds discredited the Christian name, and promoted the success of the misbelievers, and volunteering an assurance that, so far as he was concerned, he was merely waiting, till his power was more thoroughly consolidated, that he might turn his arms against the enemies of the true religion, and re-establish in his own dominions the orthodox ritual.

It required a very slight amount of penetration to perceive that the object in making these propitiatory overtures to the Holy See was to enlist the Papal influence at the Court of Sicily, by feigning a desire of reconciliation with the Papacy. But the hope, always so fondly embraced, and always abandoned, of the reunion of the two churches began to revive in the Curia; and the Emperor was permitted to indulge an expectation that, by working on the weakness and credulity of the pontiff and his advisers, he might oppose an impassable barrier to the ambition of Charles of Anjou and of the other Western Powers. To improve the advantage which he seemed to have acquired, Palæologos sent representatives to the General Council convoked at Lyons (1274), who, in his name,

signed a solemn act of abjuration, and took an oath of obedience to Rome.

By this step, however, the Emperor lost instead of gaining ground. On the one hand, the Greeks were disgusted and incensed at a proceeding, on which they looked as an apostasy, while to the Latins it appeared in the light of a time-serving measure, dictated by policy and fear. At length, the See itself awoke to a sense of the hollowness and scandalous insincerity of the whole transaction: for seven years later, Martin IV., a succeeding pontiff, annulled the instrument subscribed at Lyons, and excommunicated Palæologos as a promoter of schism. At the same time, the apprehensions of the Emperor regarding Charles of Anjou proved to be chimerical. The latter, in fact, was surrounded by enemies, who left him little time to entertain plans of foreign conquest, or to support by arms his claim to the crown of the last of the Courtenays.

The career of the Doge Tiepolo came to a close on the 15th of August 1275; and we are told by his contemporary, Martino Da Canale, that "there was none in all that nation, who did not lament with reason the loss of so excellent a prince." The Ducal remains were deposited in the same vault at SS. Giovanni e Paolo, in which already reposed the ashes of his father, the Doge Giacomo, and of his brother Giovanni Tiepolo, Count of Cherso; and an epitaph was placed on the tomb, indicative of the honourable and satisfactory conclusion, to which the Doge had brought the Bolognese war.

The progress of territorial aggrandisement had of late years been proceeding at a steady pace. On the 5th July 1267,¹ Parenzo tendered to the Republic its submission. On the 30th December 1269,² Omago, which had been a fief of the Republic since 998, also engaged to take an oath of allegiance, and to accept a Podesta appointed by the Doge, with a salary of 250 *lire*, a free residence, and all official perquisites. On the 9th May 1270,³ a nearly similar offer was received and accepted from Citta Nuova or Emonia. On the 10th November 1271,⁴ the example was followed by San Lorenzo; and the few succeeding years witnessed the feudal annexation of Cervia in the Loredano and other places.

By his first wife, Agnese Ghisi, the late Doge left two sons,

¹ Sanudo, fol. 770.

³ *Ibid.*, *ubi supra*: and Dandolo, fol. 380.

² *Ibid.*

⁴ Sanudo, *loco citato*.

both of whom had been united, during the lifetime of their father, to princesses of Slavonian blood. There can be no doubt, that these marriages, for which history afforded many precedents, were fascinating to the pride of the people, and were attended by other advantages. But that they did not produce a favourable impression in higher quarters, some judgment may be formed from the fact that, after the decease of Tiepolo II., and before the vacancy in the Crown was supplied, care was taken, through the medium of the Board of Correction, to insert in the Coronation Oath a provision, by which the inter-marriage of the family of the Doge with royal and noble Houses abroad, without the full and express sanction of the Legislative Body, was interdicted for the future. By a second article, the children of his Serenity were henceforth incapacitated from holding any office or appointment under the Government, excepting foreign embassies and commands in the navy. A third prescribed, that the Doge elect should in no case delay the liquidation of any private debts which he might have incurred, beyond the eighth day after his accession. The fourth and most important clause, however, which was now added to the Promission, imposed an obligation on all the successors of that prince to keep themselves constantly informed, through their notaries public, of the number of prisoners in the cells of the ducal palace, and to cause steps to be taken for bringing to their trial all persons so confined, at least before the expiration of a month from the day on which they had been committed to prison.

The short reign of Giacomo Contarini (1275-80) was almost wholly occupied by the continuation of the war between Venice and Ancona. The latter, notwithstanding the wholesome example set by Bologna, Forli, Mantua, and other places, remained firm in her refusal to conform to any system of tolls or any principle of maritime law enunciated by the Republic. Whatever their neighbours might do, it was not the intention of the Anconese to place themselves under Venetian tutelage; and after a long and tedious negotiation, it became apparent that the sole solution of the difficulty lay in an appeal to the sword.

A squadron of thirty-two sail was accordingly dispatched to the new seat of war. But, the fleet having been overtaken by a tempest near the roads of Ancona, the greater part of the

vessels were thrown away on the coasts of Italy and Dalmatia. The absence of any means of communication necessarily kept the home government in ignorance of this disaster; and the Special Committee of twenty Sages (*Savii*), appointed for the management of the war, continued at intervals to send reinforcements which, entering the enemy's harbour without suspicion of danger, were at once made prizes. The question which the contest involved was one of considerable importance; and it was a question which no treaties, however binding, or no war however decisive, could ever bring to a definitive settlement. There was no moment at which it might not revive, encompassed by new difficulties, and clothed in a new form.

The numerous towns on the Istrian and Dalmatian littoral, which the Republic acquired by cession or conquest at the close of the tenth century, had always distinguished themselves, since the period of their feudal annexation to the Dogado, by the eagerness with which they had embraced every prospect of recovering their independence, or, to speak more truly, of exchanging a Venetian for an Hungarian yoke. The maintenance and preservation of these unprofitable acquisitions cost the Republic infinitely more than the trifling amount of tribute and military or naval service, which she drew from them in token of fealty; and it would have been well if she could have contented herself with concluding advantageous treaties of commerce with the Dalmatians, instead of aspiring to number them among her subjects. But that safe and moderate course did not satisfy a Power which joined to the lust of riches the more dangerous lust of dominion. Besides, the Venetians were anxious to remove any stigma of ultra-commercialism; they were solicitous to shew the world that they were more than a mere trading community or a nation of fishermen, as they had often been called in derision; and it is to be feared that the romantic and dreamy notion of establishing a Fifth Universal Monarchy, which should have its central government on the shores of the Adriatic or of the Bosphorus, was not quite forsaken by some of the occupants of seats in the Great Council. The Romans might have been able to rear on the ruins of other nationalities that vast fabric of military despotism which outlived so many generations of men. Other peoples of antiquity, the Medes, the Persians, the

Macedonians, might have accomplished the same result. But surely it was not by a similar process, that the rising Venetian Empire was to become great and lasting.

In the present instance, Capo d'Istria, taking a bold advantage of the slight distraction of the Anconese war, openly renounced its allegiance, expelled the Venetian authorities, and, to shelter itself in some degree from the infallible consequences of so daring a step, contracted an alliance, offensive and defensive, with Raymond della Torre, Patriarch of Aquileia, and with the Count of Goritz. The former, who nourished an hereditary antipathy to Venice, responded with joy to the call of the Justinopolitans; joined to those of the insurgents, the troops of the Patriarch Raymond formed a somewhat formidable array of hostility, and the Republic found herself unexpectedly threatened by a danger which, though of secondary magnitude perhaps, was still sufficiently serious to demand prompt attention.

The Government of the Doge was far indeed from achieving with facility the twofold task of quelling the revolt and of shattering the Coalition. The small squadron which it had sent to Capo d'Istria to recover the place, was unable to effect that object, until it had received considerable reinforcements; and the inhabitants were reduced to the verge of famine, before they capitulated. Among the prisoners was the Patriarch. Before he was suffered to leave Venice, Raymond was placed on a mule with his face toward the tail, and so paraded, in the midst of an unusually large concourse of people, through the principal streets of the capital, having this inscription written on his back: *Ecce sacerdos pravus, qui in diebus suis displicuit Deo, et inventus est malus.*

The behaviour of the Republic toward her rebellious fief was marked by lenity and forbearance. The walls and fortifications of Capo d'Istria were partly dismantled; the town was required to repeat its oath of allegiance; and its government was intrusted jointly to two patricians, a civil Podesta and a Provveditor or military commandant (1277).

It was during the reign of Contarini that the Republic at last succeeded, after many ineffectual attempts, in reducing the stronghold of Almissa in Dalmatia, one of the principal haunts of the Corsairs. The difficulty of taking the place proceeded in great measure from the fact, that a wall was

thrown across the river which led to the town, and that it consequently became an impossibility to gain access to the latter without a thorough acquaintance with the secret approaches.

The relations between Venice and Germany had always been on a tolerably secure and advantageous footing. But it was with more than ordinary satisfaction that the commercial world hailed the report of Marino Pasqualigo, upon his return in 1277 from an embassy to the Court of Rodolph of Habsburg. Pasqualigo was the bearer, among other dispatches, of a complimentary letter from Rodolph to the Doge, dated Vienna, 18th of March 1277. It expressed the pleasure with which his Majesty had received the representative of Contarini. It testified his warm admiration of Venetian institutions in general, of the patriotic zeal of the people, of their industry and their resources. His Majesty did not harbour the slightest doubt that in their assurances of friendship and esteem the Venetians were most sincere; and the knowledge that they felt such a high interest in his successes was to him, he confessed, a source of great gratification.¹ The Emperor concluded his epistle, the whole of which was couched in a similar strain, by declaring his readiness not only to accord the desired privileges, but to extend to the citizens of the Republic throughout his dominions every protection and security in the exercise of their peaceful callings.

The return of the Doge Contarini in 1280 into private life was a step for which several of his predecessors had prepared the mind of the people. It may be said to have been in one sense remarkable, inasmuch as we here get the first discoverable allusion to the settlement of a pension upon a retiring Doge. An annuity of 1500 *lire di piccoli*² was granted to Contarini by a decree of the Great Council. The rarity of such a provision naturally arose from the majority of Doges being men of ample fortune, who were usually ready to give more than they received.

¹ Romanin, ii. p. 311.

² Dandolo, lib. x. p. 198.

CHAPTER XVII

A.D. 1280-1289

Giovanni Dandolo, Doge (1280-9)—Treaty of Peace with Ancona (1281)—Earthquake at Venice (1283)—Coalition between Aquileia, Goritz, and Trieste against Venice—Preparations of the latter for War—Siege of Trieste—Successes of the Venetian Arms—Sudden Reverse of Fortune—Sack of Caorlo and Malamocco by the Triestines—Establishment of Peace between the Republic and the League (1284)—Preparations for a New Crusade—Triple Alliance between the Republic, the Holy See, and Charles of Anjou (1285)—Revolutionary movements in Sicily—The Conspiracy of Giovanni Procida—His Secret Negotiations with the Courts of Arragon and Rome—The Sicilian Vespers—Dissolution of the Triple Alliance—Excommunication of the Republic—Reconciliation with the Holy See and Negotiations for the Establishment of the Inquisition at Venice—Restrictions on the authority of the Holy Office—Concordat of 1289—Death of Dandolo (November 1289)—His Character—First Introduction of the Gold Ducat (1284).

THE successor of Contarini was elected in his absence. At the time that the College of the Forty-One recorded their suffrages in his favour (March 24, 1280),¹ Giovanni Dandolo was resident at Arbo, one of the Dalmatian fiefs, in the quality of Podesta. The new Doge made his entry into Venice in the first week in April 1280. His election was hailed as a great political triumph by the Democratic party, and was an undoubted tribute to his own exceptional qualifications.

Into whatever degree of odium the old political quarrel between the Dandoli and the Tiepoli had thrown the present Doge, it is clear that it did not form a sufficient ground for excluding him from public employment. In 1266, Dandolo accepted the office of Podesta, which had been offered to him by the Bolognese, and in the succeeding year he obtained re-election. The latter portion of the period, during which his Serenity occupied this important post, was more than usually turbulent. In 1267, the seat of his Government fell a prey to a terrible feud between some of the leading families of Bologna, and the Podesta found himself placed in a situation

¹ Dandolo, lib. x. p. 399.

of great embarrassment. On another occasion, Dandolo, having imprisoned a shoemaker who had killed his wife's lover, the whole Guild of Cordwainers rose, rescued their brother, set fire to the Prætorian palace, and obliged the chief magistrate to betake himself to flight. He was recalled, however, after an absence of three weeks. But at the close of June or the commencement of July Dandolo finally tendered his resignation, and returned home. In 1268 he was officiating as Consul General in Apulia. In 1271, he was sent to Tunis to arrange a new mercantile treaty with that Power, and he subsequently sat on the commission appointed to inquire into the causes which had led to the retreat on Volano.

The first act of the Government, subsequently to its reconstruction under the auspices of Dandolo, was the conclusion of a definite peace with Ancona which, it may be recollected, had withstood with pertinacity and not without success, during the late administration, the fiscal claims of the Republic on the Adriatic waters. The terms of this treaty, which was signed at Ravenna on the 3rd of March 1281, after a negotiation of three or four weeks, were quite of a commonplace character,¹ and, strangely enough, did not touch the main question, which was perhaps intentionally evaded.²

Fresh troubles and difficulties soon arose. On the evening of the 17th of January 1283,³ after an apparent repose from such calamities of more than sixty years, the islands were visited by a severe shock of earthquake, which threw down a large number of houses, occasioning an amount of damage which was not repaired without very considerable outlay to the Government and to individuals, and which probably involved no slight sacrifice of human life. This domestic calamity, belonging to a class of evils with which the Republic had become in course of time only too familiar, was the forerunner of events of a different and a still graver complexion.

Shortly after the pacification of Ancona, the Patriarch Raymond of Aquileia, still brooding over the recollection of the treatment which he had experienced at the hands of the

¹ The text is preserved by Romanin in his *Documentary History*.

² Romanin, lib. vii. ch. ii.

³ Sanudo, *Vite*, 574.

Venetians, formed in concert with his former ally, the Count of Goritz, a scheme for the complete severance of Dalmatia from the domination of Venice. The levies of the Confederates, embracing all persons capable of bearing arms between the ages of eighteen and sixty, did not fall far short of 36,000 men;¹ and the hands of the new Coalition were soon strengthened by the accession of the powerful city of Trieste which, though a fief and tributary of the Republic, had contrived down to the present time to preserve a large share of autonomy. Her strongly fortified and commanding position, and the convenient proximity of her harbour to the probable theatre of operations, rendered her alliance of no slight value; by harassing the movements of the Venetians, by cutting off their supplies, and by making a well-timed descent on the islands of the Dogado, the Triestine Corsairs, so celebrated in those days for their extensive depredations, promised to be highly serviceable auxiliaries.

The Republic viewed with well-founded apprehensions these concerted movements, which almost seemed to form part of a settled plan among the neighbouring Powers for keeping Venice in a perpetual strain of activity. On the present occasion, it was determined to raise an adequate force by a conscription of thirty-three per cent on the whole able-bodied population. The person selected for the post of commander-in-chief of the Army of Dalmatia was Marino Morosini,² who had distinguished himself during the war against the Aquileians in the preceding reign.

The Government rightly judged, that it was of momentous consequence to gain possession of Trieste, before the Allies had an opportunity of effecting a junction under its walls, and of affording it relief; and Morosini was therefore instructed to lose no time in rendering himself master of the situation. The Venetian general having landed his troops in safety on the shores of Istria, in the immediate neighbourhood of Trieste, at once proceeded to make the necessary dispositions for the projected siege. Earthworks were raised, forts were erected, trenches were dug, an encampment was laid out. The result of the first assault was not favourable; the besiegers were repulsed. While the commander-in-chief was preparing to renew the attempt, a report reached head-

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 575.

² Dandolo, *ubi supra*.

quarters that the arrival of the Allies might be hourly expected; and this intelligence was substantiated by the actual approach of the enemy. The Venetian trenches became the scene of several severe skirmishes between the van of the Aquileians and a portion of the troops of Morosini; in these the latter generally had the advantage; and in one of them the nephew of Raymond of Aquileia fell with four of his knights. In order to pay¹ the last rites to his departed kinsman, the Patriarch obtained an armistice for twenty-four hours.

It was during this very day, that the existence of a deep-laid and well-concerted plot was divulged to Morosini for betraying the cause of the Republic. The secret correspondence of an archer serving in the Venetian ranks, named Ghirardaccio di Lancialunga,¹ with the Confederates, ingeniously conducted through the medium of slips of paper fastened to his arrows, was happily intercepted: it went to shew, that a plan was in course of formation, by which Lancialunga agreed, for a certain consideration, to arrange the means of taking the camp by surprise, and of overpowering by a sudden attack the entire army. Lancialunga was arrested and interrogated. Under torture he made a full confession of his guilt; and, being forthwith discharged alive from a mangonel into the hostile camp by order of Morosini, the mangled and quivering remains of the traitor came, almost in the midst of the burial ceremonies, to announce to the Allies the fate of their accomplice and the frustration of their scheme. It was under these circumstances, that hostilities recommenced on the morning succeeding the expiration of the truce.

Down to the present point, the arms of Venice had been uniformly triumphant, and in the petty, yet sharp actions which had taken place in the trenches or in their neighbourhood, the Venetians contrived not only to hold their ground against superior numbers, but in one instance at least they drove the enemy back with considerable loss. But it unfortunately happened that, instead of concentrating his whole force on Trieste, and applying his utmost endeavours to the reduction of that stronghold, as he had been instructed, Morosini had chosen to weaken his position by extending

¹ Dandolo, *ubi supra*.

his line of operations, and detaching portions of his army on collateral expeditions to Pirano and other places along the coast. The Allies, on the contrary, had not ceased to recruit their ranks from Friuli and other quarters; in Maynard, Duke of Carinthia, they found a new and valuable ally; and, so soon as the armistice expired, they returned to the contest with unflagging resolution.

Under these circumstances, the result was to be anticipated. The campaign was marked by the acquisition of Pirano and Isola; but Morosini, despairing of regaining the position which he had lost, and warned by the approach of winter, abandoned the hope of taking Trieste, which had once been almost within his grasp, re-embarked his troops at one of the Istrian ports, and returned ingloriously to Venice. His conduct was viewed with the strongest feelings of disapprobation, and a criminal process was at once instituted against him by the Advocates of the Commune for gross and culpable neglect of duty.¹ The general was sentenced to undergo a protracted term of imprisonment; but he did not long survive his disgrace.²

Meanwhile the Triestines, emboldened by a line of conduct which appeared to spring from the pusillanimity of the Venetian troops and their commander, and freed from all immediate apprehension of the threatened siege, had been preparing to promote the interests of the Alliance by hazarding an incursion into the Dogado. They advanced unopposed, and indeed unobserved, so far as Caorlo. That island became an easy prey to the daring invaders; the inhabitants, unaccustomed of late days to a class of danger formerly so familiar, were completely taken by surprise. The Triestines committed dreadful devastations, and were guilty of the worst excesses. The house of the Podesta of Caorlo,³ with a large number of other buildings, was burned to the ground. The Podesta and his daughter fell into the hands of the enemy.⁴ From Caorlo they penetrated without molestation to Malamocco, which underwent a similar fate; and thence they succeeded in effecting a retreat to their own shores.

The national indignation at these occurrences was intense.

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 576.

² *Ibid.* p. 576.

³ Pietro Giustiniani, *Chronica di Venetia*, p. 82, King's MSS. 148.

⁴ Marin, v. p. 77.

The indifference to the best interests of the people under the circumstances now made known seemed to be barely credible; and the ferment in the public mind greatly increased, when it was reported that the Government, so far from hastening to demand redress, was debating the expediency of maintaining a passive attitude. Such a humiliation was not to be borne. The foul stain, which had been cast on Venetian honour, was only to be washed out in blood. So strong and so generally diffused, in short, was the feeling in favour of an appeal to arms, that the Doge thought it prudent to abandon the scheme, which he had formed or sanctioned for the peaceful solution of the difficulty, and to pledge himself and his advisers to the adoption of vigorous measures against the Triestines.

The escape which Venice had just had from the horrors of a civil insurrection, was a very narrow one; seldom had the mind of the nation been wrought to a higher pitch of excitement;¹ and it was only by the concession of the Doge himself, seconded by the patriotic exertions of those who had weight in the Legislative Body, that the impending storm was averted.

On the 2nd March 1283,² the Great Council passed a decree, clothing the Executive with unlimited powers, "until the war in Istria should have been brought to a conclusion"; and on the 20th April a *Bando* made its appearance, by which all persons, coming within the operation of the ballot, were ordered to hold themselves in readiness for immediate service.

Armed with this extensive and irresponsible authority, the Government addressed itself to its task with vigour and promptitude. In the course of the summer, a fresh expedition was dispatched to Istria; the siege of Trieste was reopened; and, after a resistance which was somewhat protracted, the defenders of that place were forced to accede to the terms of capitulation offered to their acceptance. The moral effect produced by the fall of Trieste was strikingly powerful. All the other possessions which had joined the insurrectionary movement, yielded, on the receipt of the intelligence, without a struggle. Pirano had already (26th January) tendered its submission. These rapid successes, however,

¹ Marin, v. p. 79.

² Romanin, ii. p. 314.

did not appear to create in the breast of the Allies any leaning toward a reconciliation with the Venetians; and the war still continued to rage fiercely, when circumstances arose equally independent of the Republic and of her adversaries, which had the unexpected effect of terminating hostilities.

It was long since the empire of Christendom in the East had begun to exhibit unmistakable symptoms of decline. In the course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, a series of Mohammedan successes had gradually shaken to its base the weak and ill-organised fabric, which was founded in Palestine by the first Crusaders. The disastrous issue of the pilgrimage of Saint Louis had naturally led the European Powers to imbibe a strong distaste for undertakings, of which the advantages were so doubtful, and of which the evils were so manifest. It might be said that with that unfortunate prince had expired the last spark of genuine enthusiasm for the protection or recovery of the Holy Places; and the hour was not far distant, when the flame, which was burning so low,¹ must finally expire, and when the Christian possessions in the Holy Land must be irrecoverably lost.

Still the Court of Rome was unwilling to believe, that a cause in which it had always, on the most obvious ground, taken a considerable share of interest, was altogether hopeless. The Apostolic See cherished a confidence, that something might yet be done to ameliorate the position of affairs; and, in taking this optimistic view of the political prospects of Christian Europe in the East, the Pontiff was of course influenced by the expectation, that other Powers would be found prepared to contribute to the attainment of the object, which the Church itself had so much at heart. The Courts of France and Sicily were profuse indeed in their expressions of zeal and devotion; and Venice, while she studiously refrained from offending the reigning dynasty of Constantinople, offered to assist the organisation of a new Crusade against the Mohammedan Power. The Republic undertook to arm and equip, at the cost of his Holiness, twenty galleys of war, and to furnish at her own risk and charge five others, forming in the aggregate a fleet of five-and-twenty sail, to act in concert with any forces which should be now or hereafter

¹ Letter of Nicole de Lorgue, Grand Master of the Hospitallers, to Edward I., King of England.—*Lettres des Rois, Reines, etc. de France*, No. 253.

raised by the Pilgrims. These terms, which were as liberal as could be anticipated, were accepted by the Pope; the Treaty was signed on the 4th of December 1284; and the Bishop of Tripoli was appointed papal legate.

But, prior to the commencement of the new undertaking, the Holy See was naturally most anxious to close the bitter and unseemly feud, which had so long existed between Venice and Aquileia. The ducal government stated that it entertained no objection to a pacification on certain specified conditions; and the Patriarch Raymond, deserted by his allies, fatigued by the long continuance of hostilities, and discouraged by the fall of Trieste and the other successes recently obtained by the Venetians in Istria, was also not disinclined to enter into negotiations. Accordingly, on the 8th of March 1285, a Triple Convention was signed by the representatives of the Republic on the one part and by the representatives of Aquileia, Goritz, and Trieste on the other, by which the contracting parties pledged themselves toward the members of the Privy Council of the Doge to restore all the possessions of the Republic, of which they had entered into occupation, and to make restitution of all property belonging to Venetian subjects, under whatever form taken; and to throw open their ports to Venetian commerce. Della Torre engaged to confirm the mercantile charter concluded between the patriarchs his predecessors and the two former Doges. The Triestines separately bound themselves through their Syndics and Procurators to discharge all arrears of tribute: to send to Venice a deputation, not exceeding four-and-twenty persons to be named by the Doge, who might take the oath of allegiance to the Republic, and be detained during pleasure; to demolish the fortifications, which they had constructed at the opening of the war; to surrender the artillery which they had employed during the siege of their town, that it might be burned on the Square of Saint Mark; to offer suitable indemnities for the losses sustained by the Venetians in the course of operations; and, lastly, to liberate any Venetian prisoners who might be in their hands.

The treaty was remarkably advantageous to the Republic beyond question, and seemed to intimate something like a feeling of inability on the side of Trieste to resist so one-sided

¹ Marin, v. pp. 82-86.

an arrangement. There were a few other points of some importance, which still remained to be adjusted, but which it had been thought desirable to refer to a Mixed Committee of Arbitration to be chosen by Venice and Aquileia.¹

But while the Aquileian difficulty was making such fair progress toward an amicable settlement, other causes had arisen to delay the departure of the expedition from Venice, and to interrupt the fulfilment of the Treaty of December 1284.² By her union with Peter of Arragon, Constance of Suabia, last heiress of the Hohenstaufen, transferred all the claims she possessed to the sovereignty of the Two Sicilies to the Spanish crown.³ The pretensions of Constance were by no means unchallenged. In the brother of Philip le Hardi, who, on his part, embraced with intelligible eagerness the prospect of extending the French dominions beyond the Alps, Peter and his consort found a formidable competitor; and the Holy See, naturally anxious to seize so admirable an opportunity of crushing a family which, in the persons of the first and second Frederic, had rendered itself so peculiarly obnoxious to the Church, espoused with interested warmth the pretensions of Charles. Under such auspices, the latter readily succeeded in obtaining a firm footing in Sicily; and that Island did not long remain a stranger to the horrors of a government, of which the two constituent elements were a licentious foreign soldiery and a remorseless foreign tyrant. The ambition of Charles was of the most selfish cast; his own aggrandizement was the sole object of his conduct and policy; and his exactions and cruelties soon weaned from him the affections of a people, whom a wise and moderate rule might have reconciled, in course of time, to their new master.

Among those, who were least disposed to tolerate the excesses of the French domination, and who were most acutely sensible of the grave reflection which it cast on the national honour, apart from the practical evils with which it was fraught, was Giovanni, Baron de Procida, a Salernitan of ancient family, of popular manners, and of considerable influence in the island. After the establishment of the French

¹ Romanin, ii. pp. 315-16.

² Sanudo Torsello, *Secreta*, lib. ii. part 4, ch. 18.

³ Sismondi, iii. ch. xxii. edit. 1809.

power at Naples, Charles had proceeded to sequestrate the estates of a large proportion of the native aristocracy as a means of recompensing the services of the more meritorious of his followers, and of rendering the landed interest more pliable by the introduction of a certain number of French colonists. The property of Procida shared the common lot; and that nobleman, stripped of his possessions, withdrew, breathing vengeance against the House of Anjou, to the Court of Arragon, where the King and Queen received him with every mark of condolence and friendship. To Constance¹ and her royal consort the illustrious exile gave a long and ornate recital of the troubles in Sicily; and he powerfully and solemnly reminded the Queen, that she was the sole legitimate heiress of the House of Suabia and of the kingdom of Sicily.

Procida, however, did not allow his exertions to be confined to Spain. In 1279, he passed over to Sicily, to ascertain the state of the island and the temper of the people; and, having satisfied his mind on these points, he proceeded in the course of the same year to Constantinople, with the object of interesting the Greek Emperor, Michael Palæologos, in a cause, which was also the cause of his country. In this endeavour he was far from unsuccessful; and, on a second visit which he paid to the Eastern capital in 1281, he even prevailed on the Byzantine Court to promise to him, under certain conditions, the sum of 25,000 ounces of gold. A portion of this money, on his return to Arragon, Procida lodged in the hands of the King, urging the latter to delay no longer in prosecuting the claims of his consort to the Sicilian crown. It was not difficult to divine the motive of Palæologos in lending such substantial support to Procida and his Spanish patrons. Since the publication of the Crusade against the Greeks and the heterodox dynasty of the Palæologi, in which Charles of Anjou appeared as a leading party, the ill-feeling engendered between the two Courts had been constantly on the increase; and the Byzantine Emperor thenceforth regarded Charles as his worst enemy. Should Charles succeed in planting himself at Naples, and in reconciling the Neapolitans to his sway, Palæologos felt that there was scarcely any moment, at which the soaring

¹ Sismondi, *ubi supra*.

ambition of the French prince might not take a new flight, and at which the Western Powers might not be invited to bear their share in a second Holy War against the Greek schismatists. Such a contingency was not to be viewed without alarm; and the Emperor was easily induced to become instrumental in aiding the secret preparations which were being made at the Court of Arragon, as well as in some parts of the Neapolitan territories, for aiming a blow at the newly-created power of the French in Sicily.

It still remained to procure the adhesion of the Holy See, for which Palæologos, from an anxious desire to be on the best terms with the Head of the Church, had distinctly stipulated as the condition of the loan; and this consequently important object was effected in a personal and confidential interview, arranged between Procida and Nicholas III. at the Castle of Suriano. It afforded some indication of the impatience which the Sicilian patriot felt to overcome this last point of difficulty, that he made a journey to Rome for the express purpose of waiting on the Pontiff, and of explaining his wishes. For the sake of greater security, he adopted the character and garb of a Franciscan; it was a disguise, which he had often assumed while he was engaged in the hazardous task of interesting the Powers of Europe on behalf of his oppressed countrymen.

Procida, however, was only on his return from Rome to the Court of Barcelona, when Nicholas III., with whom he had recently had so satisfactory a conference, was suddenly removed by death, the tiara descending to Martin IV., a firm ally of the House of Anjou. Moreover, he now became conscious that reasons of a cogent nature might not improbably debar Palæologos from rendering that important help to the cause of Sicilian liberty, on which he had so largely counted, and on which the issue of the present undertaking might be said so much to rest. For reports reached Barcelona in the course of July 1281, that, after repeated solicitations, the Republic had been persuaded to enter into a treaty of peace and alliance with the Holy See and the King of Naples, by which she bound herself:—1. To provide a naval contingent of forty or more galleys-of-war, under the command of the Doge himself, to the large force which Charles had, for some time past, been fitting out in the ports of his dominions for

the recovery of Constantinople from the Greeks; 2. To divide equally with her allies any conquests, either by land or by sea, which they might effect conjointly thereafter; 3. To make no separate peace with the Greek Emperor; and, 4. Not to consider, in the event of either, or any, of the contracting parties dying before the terms of the agreement were fulfilled, those terms as in any degree invalidated. The expedition, to which this treaty had reference, was appointed to sail in April 1283; and Brindisi was named as the port of embarkation. Should such an event really take place, and should the French and Venetians actually join in a second Crusade against Constantinople, it was quite manifest that Palæologos would find ample employment for the resources at his command; it was equally certain that, until the expected subsidies from the Byzantine Court were received in full, the needy Arragonese would be in no position to carry out his views concerning Sicily.¹

Still Procida did not suffer these discouragements to deter him from the prosecution of his project. He was unceasingly employed in maturing his plans, and in organizing his resources. It was not without some difficulty that he succeeded in reassuring the King of Arragon, to whom the unexpected death of Nicholas III., and the consequent loss of a patron and ally in the Head of the Church, had been a severe blow; the supplies from Constantinople, the delay of which might seriously retard the preparations of Peter, or at any rate might furnish a subterfuge to a prince who was already flagging in his resolution, had not yet arrived. It was not till the early part of 1282, that Procida found leisure to pass once more into Sicily, for the purpose of preparing the mind of that island for the grand stroke, which he had in contemplation. Nothing could be farther from his intentions than to give undue publicity to his visit; he therefore travelled, as he had done on the former occasion, under a close disguise; and every precaution was taken by himself and by those whom he had chosen to admit into his confidence, in order that the government of Charles should be kept in ignorance of his arrival in the island. Bent upon rousing the national

¹ *Notizia di alcuni Documenti dell' Archivio Barcelonese spettanti a Giovanni da Procida e alla guerra del Vespro Siciliano (Archivio storico Italiano, Appendice v. 233-58)*. From these papers it appears that Procida received several small advances from the king.

feeling by secret intrigues, and by winning over to his interest the more influential of his countrymen, Procida, now appointed by his royal master Chancellor of the Kingdom of Sicily,¹ had the wisdom to refrain from embarking in any wild enterprise, or from lending his name to any ill-planned movement, which could have the effect only of compromising his own position, and of ruining, perhaps irreparably, a cause which was dear to so many. From those vices, which commonly mark and disfigure the revolutionary character, the Sicilian patriot appears indeed to have been unusually exempt. He was calm, collected, patient, and circumspect, neither too precipitate nor too sanguine; and he was wont to counsel in others, who were his fellow-labourers and his fellow-sufferers, the exercise of that prudence and moderation, of which he gave them the example.

Procida had set foot on his native shores in strict secrecy. To obviate, so far as possible, the probability of detection, as he passed from hamlet to hamlet, in furtherance of his favourite object, he changed his dress often, and had recourse to an endless series of expedients and artifices. No one could comprehend better than himself the nature of the mission in which he was engaged. It was in the ears of a nation, embittered and alienated by a lengthened course of oppression, that he came to whisper words of hope and counsels of vengeance. He painted to the Sicilians in vivid and startling colours the horrors of their present situation. He brought home to them the wrongs which they had suffered, the miseries to which they had been subjected, the degradations which they were daily enduring. He appealed to every noble sentiment and to every generous impulse of their nature. Those whose term of military service was found to have expired, and who had retired from the capital to their rural farms or country estates, were secretly urged to return, as if of their own accord, to Palermo, where they might hold themselves in readiness to seize any opportunity which might be offered to them of retaliating on their tyrants, and of shaking off, by one powerful and united effort, a yoke which he told them, that they had borne too meekly and too long. Procida judged rightly, that to a nation whose temper had been so severely tried the cause of pro-

¹ Documenti, *ubi supra*.

vocation could hardly be wanting; and the crisis indeed soon arrived.

It was Easter Eve (30th March), 1282; and there was a holiday in all Palermo. It was an occasion on which the citizens were accustomed to repair, with their wives and families, to the church of the Holy Ghost at Mon-reale, three miles from the town, to pay their devotions, and to attend the evening service. The matrons and their daughters were attired in their gayest costume; and the latter, as they leisurely strolled toward the common destination, plucked flowers from the hedgerows by the wayside, while they gave utterance to their joy in songs to the incoming spring. The whole scene breathed pleasure, innocence, and contentment. The burgesses of Palermo had banished all care and sorrow, and had buried for awhile the remembrance of their wrongs. The French residents hesitated not to mingle in the throng, and to join in the procession. The members of the Government, and even the Vicar-Royal himself, who had impaired his popularity by prohibiting the Sicilians from wearing their arms at the approaching festival, were present.

The various arrangements of the evening were proceeding without any breach of order or decorum, and no circumstance had arisen which could serve to explain or justify the extraordinary precaution taken by the Vicar against the consequences of a tumult at Mon-reale or in Palermo itself, when an incident occurred which darkened the prospect. A young maiden of singular beauty, who was on her way to the church at Mon-reale, accompanied by the youth to whom she had plighted her faith and by several of her relatives, happened to be observed by a Frenchman, named Drouet, who roughly accosted her, and, advancing in an insolent manner toward her, dared, under the frivolous pretence of ascertaining whether she carried weapons under her clothes, to place his hands on her bosom. This affront proved too much for the feelings of the delicate and sensitive girl, who swooned in the arms of her lover. A loud burst of indignation followed this tragical catastrophe. A cry of *Death to the French! Death to the French!* echoed in every quarter. Another instant elapsed, and the ruffian lay weltering in his blood, pierced with his own sword. The fall of Drouet became the signal for a general onslaught on his compatriots; to arm themselves was

for the Sicilians the work of a few moments; 200 of the enemy were butchered on the spot; and before the expiration of that memorable Easter Eve, 4000 Frenchmen were numbered among the dead.

The example of active resistance which had thus been unexpectedly set by the Palermitans, was more or less promptly followed by other places in the island; among the rest, the important city of Messina gave its adhesion to the revolutionary movement; in almost every instance, the French were put to death without distinction of age or sex; and this organization in Sicily of a league hostile to the reigning dynasty led the way, as a natural consequence, to a protracted struggle between the supporters of Charles of Anjou and the supporters of Procida. The latter, having by a violent and sudden effort succeeded in partially shaking off the hateful domination of the House of Anjou, lost no time in sending a solemn invitation to Peter of Arragon to establish his pretensions to a throne which he claimed by right of Constance of Suabia.

The Sicilian Revolution not only wrought an entire change in the position and prospects of Charles, but it relieved the Greeks from the apprehensions which they had, during some time past, been led to entertain of a foreign invasion, by compelling that prince to renounce for the present all his projects of conquest, and left the Republic at liberty to adopt a course to which she had long secretly leaned, by resuming her former relations with the Byzantine Court. The Government went a step farther. It prohibited the Patriarch of Grado, the Bishop of Castello, and the clergy of the various dioceses, from preaching the Cross against the Spanish claimants to the Sicilian crown.

The surprise and wrath of the Holy See at the new change in the Venetian policy, which it might be disposed to treat as an act of tergiversation, were excessive. Under pontifical responsibility an anathema was forthwith launched against the offenders by the Cardinal of Bologna. The Republic was laid under an interdict. The performance of holy worship and of the other offices of religion was strictly forbidden. The functions of the priests were declared to be in abeyance. But against this coercive proceeding the Venetians did no more than address to the Court of the Vatican a

dignified and respectful remonstrance; and under the new pressure, which was perhaps to some extent alleviated by evasion, they behaved with admirable firmness and resignation. Not the slightest disposition was manifested by Venice to swerve from her purpose; and the relations between the two Powers were still unchanged, when the sudden death of Martin IV. (1286) opened the way to an accommodation.

The severe shock of earthquake, which was felt in the beginning of 1283, was closely succeeded by a most destructive inundation. On the evening of the 20th of December 1284, observers became conscious of an unusual rising in the tide of the Adriatic. The waters continued to swell, until a considerable portion of the city had been flooded, and until even the Capital itself was incurring some danger of a similar fate. Nor did they eventually subside without leaving the deepest traces behind them in desolate streets and deserted habitations, in the destruction of property and the ruin of families. The people had at once instinctively betaken themselves to their boats, where they found shelter, at least for themselves, from the fury of the sea. Their consternation at the unexpected catastrophe, which had reduced so many to misery and destitution, exceeded all description, for it was the season when the tides were neap; and in the bleakness of the season and the lateness of the hour there was every feature which could lend additional horror to the scene.

Under these trying circumstances, it had become the duty of the Government to lose no time in rendering the sufferers every assistance and consolation in its power. The Doge and his advisers addressed themselves also to the task of repairing the losses which the monasteries had sustained from the recent floods. For in that primitive age the monks were the principal, if not the only, guardians of the poor. It was to the monastic institutions, that the humbler classes, as well as persons of fallen or decayed fortunes, chiefly looked for the means of shelter and sustenance in their distress; it was seldom that the doors of those holy foundations were closed against the unfortunate; and among the deserving the brethren dispensed their alms with an unsparing hand. The monasteries were therefore regarded as the fountains of charity; and those fountains could not be suffered to remain dry.

To place the monasteries in a position to administer to the

wants of the poor at this terrible conjuncture, a loan was contracted on the 31st of July 1285¹ on the public credit; and the proceeds were applied to the purpose for which the money was so urgently required. Already an order, bearing date the 8th April 1285, had issued from the Doge, directing the delivery of 10,000 bushels of the best corn to the Chiefs of the Streets for distribution among the people at a nominal price; and in truth the Government of Venice left nothing undone, which might inspire a renewed confidence in its paternal solicitude for the general welfare and happiness.

It was on the 31st October 1284,² that the first publication took place of a certain number of gold pieces, named *Ducati* or *Ducats*. The ducat was worth twenty silver *grossi* or nearly 9s. 6d. of English currency.

The purity and fineness of the Venetian gold, and its peculiar freedom from alloy, procured an immense circulation for the money of the Republic throughout the Peninsula, in Europe generally, and indeed in every part of the civilized globe; and it was of essential consequence, that in the case of a piece which, like the ducat, promised to create a revolution in the currency, its admission as a legal tender should be sanctioned by other Governments. At a time when the monetary system was not on that intelligible footing which it subsequently attained, when the mintage of gold was quite exceptional, and when the remarkable facilities of exchange which were afforded to the commercial world at later periods did not yet exist, nothing could be more thoroughly obvious or less open to misconstruction, than the motive in seeking the recognition of their ducat by the reigning Emperor of the West. It was a measure of the highest commercial expediency. The politicians of that day were aware, that Venice was as much entitled to make money as to make laws or to make war. The Emperor might have been surprised if his attention had not been drawn to the new piece which was coming into circulation. But it is probable, that his surprise would have been infinitely greater, if the Doge had sought his opinion on the size, the weight, or the pattern, or had asked his permission, before he stamped his serene image on the disc. On such points it was matter of notoriety that his Majesty had as little right to interfere, as he had to alter the Venetian

¹ Romanin, ii. 319.

² Ibid., ii. 320.

system of testamentary jurisdiction, or to dictate a new law of divorce. It was no more the practice of the Republic to consult the Court of Pavia on questions of coinage, than it was her practice to consult the Court of Rome on questions of naval architecture or prison discipline. The clear and sole object was to make the Venetian money negotiable at full value everywhere, as the loss to trade from even a trifling depreciation or discount in the case of heavy remittances would have been disastrous.

It is generally supposed that it was a condition expressly involved in the reconciliation between the Republic and the Apostolic See in 1286, that the Government should consent to the introduction of the Holy Office into the Dogado. At a considerably anterior epoch, a species of tribunal had been established at Venice for the trial of heretics. But it was merely called into existence from time to time for the investigation of cases of heresy, which had been pronounced too intricate and technical to come within the cognizance of the common ecclesiastical court. The Republic had hitherto deemed it inexpedient to sanction the admission of the Inquisition into her dominions; ten successive pontiffs vainly endeavoured to overcome her repugnance; and so severe were the restrictions which the Government decided upon placing on the authority of the Office, that the triumph of the Court of the Vatican was even now more ostensible than real.

The establishment of a branch of the Holy Inquisition at Venice was the last act, which received the approval of Giovanni Dandolo. The measure in question was sanctioned by the Legislature early in September 1289; the Doge breathed his last, after a reign which had embraced a term of nearly ten years, at the close of the following November.

With rare intellectual gifts, the highest moral worth, incomparable firmness and energy of character, Dandolo united defects which would have dragged down less brilliant parts. The manners of his Serenity were uncourtly. His temper was inclined to moroseness. He shambled in his gait to such a degree, that his oddity of demeanour carried with it sometimes an air of affectation; and some of his habits were disagreeably eccentric. Nevertheless he was a man of unquestionable genius; and his influence, not only over his own party but over his country, was immense. He was to the

very last jealous of any encroachment on his prerogative or on popular freedom ; and the democratic principles, which he had brought with him to the throne, endeared him to the nation at large. Dandolo was an old public servant, and had passed, when he ascended the throne, through every grade of official life.

CHAPTER XVIII

A.D. 1289-1302

Popular Tumult at Venice after the Death of Giovanni Dandolo—Irregular Election of Giacomo Tiepolo—Its Annulment—Accession of Pietro Gradenigo (Nov. 25, 1289)—His Entry into Venice (Dec. 3)—Antecedents of Gradenigo—Last Days of the Crusades—Views of the Republic in respect to the Holy War—Renewal of the Armistice with Genoa (June 1291)—Fresh Rupture with the Lower Empire (1291-2)—Effect of the Disasters in the Holy Land on the Relations between Venice and Genoa—Abrupt Termination of the Armistice of 1291—Preparations at Venice and Genoa for War (1294)—First Encounter between the Belligerents at Aias—Disadvantages of the Venetians and their Defeat—Campaign of 1295—Excesses of the Genoese—Expedition of Ruggiero Morosini to Constantinople—Siege of Constantinople (July 1296)—Destruction of the Genoese Emporium at Caffa (1296)—Proposal of a Peace-Congress by the Pope—Departure of a Fleet under Andrea Dandolo from Venice (August 1298)—Battle of Curzola—Victory of the Genoese (September 8)—Suicide of Dandolo—Tremendous Losses of the Republic in Prisoners—Almost entire Destruction of the Fleet—Marco Polo and 5000 of his Countrymen conducted to Genoa, where Polo dictates his Travels—Firmness of the Venetians under the blow—Organization of a New Fleet—Exploits of Domenico Schiavo—Distracted Condition of Italy—Internal troubles at Genoa—Their pacific Influence—Mediation of Matteo Visconti—Treaty of Milan (May 1299)—Temporising Policy of the Republic toward the Lower Empire—Eventual Rupture—Expedition of Belletto Giustiniani to Constantinople (1302)—His Successes—Concessions of Andronicos II.—Treaty of Constantinople (October 4, 1302).

THE grave had hardly closed over all that remained of Giovanni Dandolo, when the people began to congregate in large numbers on the Piazza of Saint Mark, and to demand with vociferous shouts the election of Giacomo Tiepolo.¹ This nobleman, son of the Doge Lorenzo, and Count of Zara, belonged to a Venetian family of tribunitian rank. His father indeed had been in his day the acknowledged leader of the aristocratic party in the Great Council, and it had been by the influence of that party that he procured his nomination in 1268 as the successor of Reniero Zeno. But the present representative of the House was of a diametrically opposite school of politics. At an early stage of his public career, Giacomo Tiepolo had forsaken the ranks of the Exclusionists

¹ Litta, *Celebri famiglie Italiane*, art. Tiepolo.

and had gone over to the popular side. The resistance of Tiepolo to the tyrannical ambition of the upper classes was temperate and conscientious. He was not a factious demagogue: nor was he a bold speaker. His character was even somewhat open to a charge of timidity and faint-heartedness. Still the sympathy and countenance of such a man could not be without considerable utility to the cause which he had chosen to espouse, and to which he brought all the weight and influence of a great name. The race, from which he sprang, had been honoured in his native city through many generations. He was the son and the grandson of a Doge.

More than two centuries before,¹ an instance was known to have occurred in which an attempt, on the part of the people, to dispense with the forms of election was completely successful. But fundamental changes had since taken place in the Constitution. When the demonstration was made in his favour, Tiepolo happened to be at home, in the very mansion, from which his father and his grandfather had been called to assume the supreme authority. He at once became sensible that the position, in which he was placed, was one of no ordinary delicacy. If on the one hand he should yield to the clamour, there was a certainty that a powerful spirit of jealousy and ill-will would be raised against him in the mind of that body, whom it was most dangerous to offend, and that the same spirit would accompany him to the throne. It was possible that the step might develop even graver consequences. On the other hand, to decline a crown which the nation proffered to his acceptance, was to do sore violence to his family pride and his personal ambition. It was a step calculated to compromise his party, and to injure his connections. In his embarrassment, however, Tiepolo was not allowed much leisure for reflection: for time pressed. From hour to hour the crowd became more dense, and the uproar grew more portentous. Presently a message was brought to him from the Privy Council. He was urged, was entreated, to shew himself to the people, to pacify their excitement by disclaiming any intention of assuming the berretta, and to quit the city, until the elections had been completed in the accustomed form. The democratic chief hesitated no longer. On the whole, he entertained a doubt whether he should be able to

¹ In 1071.

command a majority on any question in the Legislature, or to preserve proper unity among the members of his own political section; the Quirini, among other families which gave him their support, threatened to be particularly troublesome by advancing their own pretensions; their kinsman, Marco Quirini di Ca Maggiore, was thought himself to have an eye to the vacancy, and under all the circumstances the popular favourite determined to escape from the responsibilities of office. Having accordingly hastened to exhort the people to respect the Constitution, and not to violate the tranquillity of the State by an abnormal course of proceeding, Tiepolo lost no time in leaving for Villa Marocco in the Trevisan March, near Mestra,¹ where he purposed to remain in retirement, until the crisis had passed away.

The conduct of Tiepolo completely disconcerted his party. Abandoned by the leader, on whose co-operation they had confidently reckoned, his supporters lost courage; and the people at large, silently receding from the lofty ground which they had taken up, rather perhaps from impulse than any definable motive, relapsed into their accustomed inertness. Whatever might have been the precise cause which influenced Tiepolo, it is to be believed that, by so tractably acquiescing in the wishes of the Provisional Government, he followed the only course consistent with his own and the public happiness. If that nobleman had been only in the slightest degree conscious of the temper of the upper class, it was impossible that he could have been a stranger to the difficulty of organizing, under such a constitution as that which his country now possessed, an Executive which should have no other support than that derived from popular opinion and the influence of a comparatively small faction. He could not but be aware that his hereditary claims which, in the eyes of the mass, might form an additional ground of recommendation and an additional title to favour, rather tended to disqualify him for office in the eyes of the aristocracy, who saw in his election, among other points, a return to an obsolete and obnoxious principle. The government of the late Giovanni Dandolo offered the sole instance, in which such a task had been successfully accomplished. But Dandolo was a man of a very different calibre from the Count of Zara. He was a man of

Pietro Giustiniani, fol. 69 (King's MSS. 148); Caroldo, *Hist.* fol. 90 (Harl. MSS. 5020); Sandi, iv. 9.

much bolder spirit and of far stronger nerve. He was perhaps, of all the members of the party to which he belonged, the one of whom the opposite faction stood in chief awe. It may be allowed to look on Dandolo as an almost unique example of a peculiar type of Venetian statesman. Although the representative of one of the oldest families in the oldest of European aristocracies, he carried with him to the Throne that strong and politic attachment to liberal principles, which had distinguished him through life. He was among those few who learned to identify the preservation of popular freedom with the integrity of the Ducal prerogative. Unlike Domenico Flabeno, the Reformer of 1033, he had no pledge to redeem, no pique to gratify; nor did he choose to initiate or sanction changes, by which he would have been the first to suffer; and during ten years that illustrious personage governed Venice with all but regal power.

Meanwhile the organs of the aristocracy were not idle. Immediately after the decease of his Serenity, the six members of the Privy Council united with the three Chiefs of the XL¹ to form a Provisional Government during the interregnum. That the latter would have no lengthened duration, soon became sufficiently apparent from the anxiety, which was displayed to supply the vacancy of the Crown. The proceedings were accelerated by an apprehension lest the seditious spirit, which had manifested itself among the lower orders, and which was known to be fostered in certain high quarters, should assume a more dangerous form; and while the Piazza still continued to present a scene of tumult and disorder, the customary steps were being taken at Saint Mark's to elect a new Doge. On Saint Catherine's day (November 25), 1289, it was notified to the National Assembly in the usual manner that the suffrages of the College of XLI. were given to Pietro or Perazzo Gradenigo of San Polo, Proveditor of Capo d'Istria.²

The Doge elect, whose mother was a Giustiniani,³ was a nobleman who to every advantage of birth added a highly gifted mind. He combined great natural gentleness of disposition and equability of temper with unrivalled tenacity of purpose and strength of will. The talents and accomplishments of Gradenigo, coupled with his family influence, had

¹ Dandolo, fol. 400.

² *Chronica di Venetia*, fol. 30 (Harl. MSS. 3549); Pietro Giustiniani, *Historia*, fol. 69 (King's MSS. 148).

³ Litta, *Celebri amiglic Italiane*, art. Giustiniani.

opened for him the way to early distinction. In 1277, when he was no more than six and twenty, he was appointed Proveditor of Capo d'Istria, which had then been recently recovered by the Republic; here the future Doge had admirable opportunities of developing his administrative capacity; and, at an age when many of his countrymen had hardly left college, Gradenigo found himself in a position of the gravest responsibility. In 1280, he was appointed, on the abdication of the Doge Contarini, to the Privy Council of his successor; and he is believed to have been the prime mover in three attempts which were made during the lifetime of Dandolo (1286) to promote the views of the aristocracy. Whether it was that the politics of the Privy Councillor rendered him distasteful to the Doge, or from some other motive, Gradenigo was removed from the Council Board in the course of 1286, and was invited to return to his Proveditorship, which he retained down to 1289. The successor of Dandolo was distinguished by the firm and consistent support, which he had lent to what was now generally recognised as the aristocratic party in the Republic; and though absent, he was still regarded as one of the leading members of that party in the Legislative Assembly. The announcement of Gradenigo's election was consequently received by the multitude with a coldness and silence indicative of the strongest disapprobation: Marino Bocconio, one of the popular leaders and a man of large means, and in his particular sphere of influential character, remonstrated in unmeasured terms against the proceeding; other speakers of the same political views followed his example; and there is a probability that, had the anti-patrician faction been at all compact, or had it possessed any definite plan of operation, the attempted intrusion of the unpopular nominee of the College might have been resisted with some success. But the truth seems to have been, that that faction had no longer any organization or any plan. Bajamonte Tiepolo, in whom it had been thought by the Quirini and others, that the utmost confidence might be reposed, was found wanting at the critical moment; to supply the place of that nobleman, no second candidate at present appeared; and it followed that, with every disposition to oppose the election of the aristocrat Gradenigo, a recognition of the votes of the College in his favour was procured by dexterous

management without much difficulty. The person, who was deputed on the part of the XLI. to make known to the National Assembly the result of their deliberations, pronounced the customary formula, "Pietro Gradenigo e vostro Doge, se vi piacera," and, for the first time, immediately withdrew without waiting to receive the declaration of the popular will. No expression of dissent therefore having reached the ears of the Deputy, it was considered, that Gradenigo had been duly elected. His first act was to pray the Great Council, that the day consecrated to the Blessed Virgin Saint Catherine (November 25) should be henceforth observed throughout the Dogado with peculiar veneration. This request was, in other words, to call upon the people to signalize in perpetuity their own defeat at the late election.

The reign of Gradenigo was inaugurated by the accession to the throne of Hungary, through the armed intervention of the Republic, of Andrew the Venetian (1290), son of the former King Stephen, by Tommasina Morosini. That lady was the aunt of Tommasina Morosini, the Doge's consort,¹ and the sister of Albertino Morosini the Elder of San Giuliano; and it was in the course of frequent visits to the house of the latter, during a residence at Venice in his earlier life, that Stephen fell in love with his future wife. Andrew III. remained on the throne, which he principally owed to his connexion by the mother's side with the Ducal family of Venice,² till 1301, when he died childless. The crown then passing to another branch, Tommasina returned with her brother to Venice, where she ended her days in the mansion which Albertino owned at San Giuliano,³ and which long retained the name of *Corte della Regina* or *the Queen's Court*.⁴

This auspicious occurrence, which flattered the pride of the Republic without conferring on her citizens any substantial benefit, was speedily to be forgotten amid the distraction of succeeding events; and the new ministry soon found itself thrown by the force of circumstances into a

¹ P. Dolfino, *Annali Veneti*, p. 56, King's MSS. 149.

² Romanin, iii. 82.

³ It appears from Sanudo, fol. 771, that this gentleman's granddaughter Constance afterward (1293) married Lladislaus, son of the King of Servia. The "Strumento di Matrimonio celebrato tra Madonna Costanza figliuola di Don Michele Morosini di Don Albertino e il Signore Lladislaio, figliuolo del Re Stefano di Servia," will there be found entire. The marriage was solemnized at Venice at the house of Albertino Morosini, on the 14th August 1293, in the presence of seven witnesses.

⁴ Romanin, ii. 324-5.

position, where its energy and judgment were called into the fullest exercise. Even in the eyes of statesmen who were no alarmists, the political horizon was at the present juncture by no means without its threatening symptoms; the relations of Venice with more than one of the Powers, with which she was nominally on friendly terms, were of such a character as inspired slight confidence in their stability; Genoa, in particular, with whom she was under a formal treaty of peace, hardly cared to disguise an impatience of the restraint, which was imposed on her by this diplomatic engagement; and, as if European politics had not presented a sufficient degree of complication, the affairs of Constantinople and the East took about the same time a turn, which necessarily constituted them an additional source of solicitude and embarrassment.

The power of the Christians in the Holy Land was attenuated at the close of the thirteenth century to the shadow of an empire. Of their original possessions, many were already in the hands of the Mussulmen; and in those which they had still contrived to retain, their strength was insufficient to check for any length of time the triumphant arms of the Crescent. This weakness on the part of the Crusaders proceeded less from their poverty of resources than from their want of union; it was due to the pernicious principle of parcelling out towns into separate quarters, and of conferring on each its own peculiar institutions. The fall of Tripoli, which had happened in the spring of 1289, and which was known indeed at Venice some months before the death of Dandolo, led the way to the loss, in the course of the two succeeding years, of Sidon, Beyrout, St. Jean d'Acre, and several other important places; Acre itself, which formed one of the chief Venetian emporia on the coast, was taken, after an obstinate defence and great sacrifice of life on both sides, in May 1291.¹ Thus the Eastern dominions of the Cross were again reduced within the narrowest compass; and once more the Holy See zealously addressed itself to the somewhat discouraging task of memorialising Europe on behalf of the cause, which had ever lain so near its heart. To this new call the Republic responded so far only as her sense of interest prompted her,

¹ Marin, v. 89-90.

and the more immediate pressure from other quarters seemed to warrant; and the Pontifical Government merely obtained from the Doge, on reasonable terms, a force of twenty-five galleys in which 1600 raw Italian recruits were shipped to the seat of war under the charge of Giacomo Tiepolo, whom the Government seems to have taken the earliest opportunity of employing on a distant mission. His popular opinions were less dangerous on the shores of the Mediterranean than on those of the Adriatic.

But this succour was of the most inadequate and ephemeral character: while the Mohammedans were advancing with rapid strides to the total recovery of Palestine; and so feeble in a practical light had the enthusiasm for the Holy War at length become, that even the Court of Rome began to awaken to the conviction long since embraced by the Republic, that the direct rule of the Western Powers in Asia was on the point of being terminated for ever.

The Venetians could not view with any genuine sentiment of regret the reflux tide of Mohammedan conquest. It was true that, in the earlier stages of the Crusades, they had entered with some degree of ardour into the exciting contest; and how, on one occasion too memorable to be forgotten, they had suffered themselves to be chiefly instrumental in changing the dynasty at Constantinople, was already matter of history. But nevertheless the character which they had (perhaps almost insensibly) imparted to their connexion with the Holy War from the beginning, was a commercial rather than a political or religious one. Whatever romantic or chivalrous aspirations might have at first actuated her citizens, or whatever deference the latter might have chosen to pay in a particular instance to the personal wishes of a great man, it is certain that the experience of two centuries was more than was necessary to bring the Republic to the conclusion that her soundest policy lay in leaving the Mussulmen in the undisturbed enjoyment of their possessions in Palestine. In other words, it did not require any special penetration on her part to discover, that less was to be gained by retaining Acre and other places under the system of participation with rival Powers, than by obtaining advantageous charters from the Mussulmen to the exclusion of those Powers. Thus perhaps

the heart of Venice could not be said to have been at any time entirely with the cause, which she had hitherto so effectually contributed to uphold. She was among the first to give her adhesion to the Crusades; and she was the first to adopt measures for establishing her relations with the Holy Places on a more substantial, though perhaps a less glorious, footing.

In June 1291,¹ shortly after the loss of Acre, the armistice subsisting between Venice and Genoa, which was then on the point of expiration, was renewed for the usual quinquennial term. The step, however, which might otherwise have passed unnoticed, was known in political circles at Venice to possess, in the present instance, more than its customary share of meaning. It pointed, in a manner which was unmistakable, to a resolution on the part of Gradenigo and his advisers to enforce the satisfaction of certain large pecuniary claims which had been long outstanding between the Government of the Doge and the Byzantine Court, and a consequent desire to detach the Greeks by an opportune stroke of diplomacy from their most potent ally. In short, it portended nothing less than a fresh rupture with the Lower Empire: nor was it very long before the meditated blow was struck. In the same, or in the early part of the succeeding year (1291-2), a small but efficient naval force was fitted out, and intrusted to the charge of an experienced officer, Pancrazio Malipiero, who was furnished with general instructions to coast along the shores of Romania, and to open hostilities on any point of the enemy's seaboard, which might appear to him favourable for attack. Malipiero, whose mission was undisguisedly of a buccaneering character, was not very fortunate in his operations. He made a descent indeed on the island of Lango; but, in consequence of the sudden outbreak of a spirit of insubordination among his troops, he was compelled to retire. He returned without laurels to Venice. Shortly afterward a second expedition was sent out with a similar object under Count Tiepolo, for whom the Government thus found, within a short period, a second remote commission. The gallant behaviour of the troops under their new leader more than redeemed the discredit, which it was not improperly conceived that their former misconduct had

¹ Dandolo, 403.

attached to their country; the maritime population of the empire felt once more the edge of Venetian steel; Lango, after sustaining a severe loss in killed and prisoners, was reduced to submission; and in a vindictory sense, at least, the result of Tiepolo's exertions was equal to the most sanguine expectations. His reception was accordingly as cordial as that of his predecessor had been frigid and mortifying; and so far, perhaps, the issue did not quite answer the calculations of the Ducal party, who might have nourished an unpatriotic hope, that the too popular chief of the opposite faction would meet with a fate similar to that of Malipiero.¹

The Greeks, who had long since become too feeble and pusillanimous to cope singly with their audacious and unscrupulous foes, endeavoured in their dilemma to enlist in their service the active sympathies of the Genoese. The latter were far from being disinclined to listen to such an invitation. But the five years' armistice here interposed; Genoa did not think it prudent, on the whole, to break faith with her rival; and it was not until the treaty of 1291 should have expired, or until some fresh ground of quarrel should have arisen to recall the two competitors for the dominion of the ocean to their belligerent attitude, that the Byzantine Court could expect to be able to resent the insults which had been heaped upon it.

It was not many years after the close of the Fifth Crusade, that the Republic had been supplanted in her possessions at Pera and Galata by her commercial rivals; and it was that circumstance which constituted the leading cause of the subsequent wars between Venice and Genoa. It was true that the Venetians still retained a quarter in Constantinople itself, and that they were still represented by their own Bailo; but it was to be remembered that those privileges had been materially abridged, and that this magistrate was no longer the Protector of the Empire. It was true, again, that the islanders had hastened to seek an equivalent for the loss of Pera and Galata by the formation of trading establishments at Trebizond, Azoph, and elsewhere; but the Genoese had not omitted to follow their example by planting similar settlements at Caffa on the Euxine and other places. Affairs were in this posture, when the almost complete recovery of Palestine by

¹ Marin, v. 94.

the Mohammedan arms had the natural effect of narrowing the ground over which the two great naval Powers had long been forced to distribute their strength and attention, and of bringing them closer to each other. The approximation was one which could not well fail to give to the heart of both peoples a throbbing pulsation.

Amid all their reverses, one feeble solace still remained to the Christians. In their new career of conquest, the Mussulmen had not yet reached Cyprus. In that island were now centred all the hopes of the Soldiers of the Cross; and the Holy See was professing an intelligent anxiety to save so valuable a possession from the general wreck. In such an undertaking, the Venetians and Genoese, being still bound by the truce of 1291, were persuaded by the Court of Rome to join their arms; and an adequate force was accordingly contributed by the two States for the defence of the island. But a protectorate, formed on such a basis, contained within itself the seeds of its own early dissolution.¹ A collision was soon announced in the waters of Cyprus between four Venetian galleasses and seven armed traders of Genoa. The meeting had at first worn no particularly hostile aspect; but on some unknown ground high words arose; and from words to blows, among those hot-headed Italians, there was only one step. A sharp action ensued, the Venetians being apparently the aggressors; and the advantage remained with the Genoese. The victorious commander, however, thought it his duty, as the armistice was still in force, to restore the prisoners and other trophies after the engagement, and simply to report the circumstance which had occurred to his Government. The latter, instructed that the Venetians had taken the initiative, and feeling itself in no way obliged under the circumstances to view the check suffered by the Republic as a set-off against the first outrage, immediately dispatched two Dominicans to Venice to demand redress. The deputies were received with that respect which was rarely denied to persons of their order; and the Doge at once appointed two other Dominicans to concert with the Genoese Friars some arrangement for the remedy of the late mischance.

Meanwhile, both Powers were beginning to feel that the prospect of war almost amounted to a certainty. The provoca-

¹ Marin, v. 96-7.

tion which the international hatred was daily receiving from various sources, above all from the marked bias exhibited by the Greeks and Venetians toward the Genoese and Pisans respectively, while the fatal Battle of Meloria¹ was still fresh in the memory of all, was too keen to be endured much longer; and no time was lost on either side in preparing for the worst which could happen. The sole object of a Conference, which sat upon a question, capable of being decided in three days, three entire months, was plainly therefore to gain time; and consequently, so soon as it was found inconvenient to retain the mask, or convenient to drop it, the solemn absurdity of a negotiation was brought to a close; the parchment of 1291 was unceremoniously crumpled up; and the gauntlet was once more fairly flung at the feet of Genoa.

Dandolo the historian reports that about this period the Genoese, counting somewhat too much on the disaffected spirit and vacillating temper of the Candiots, made an attempt to wean them from their allegiance by corrupting the fidelity of the celebrated popular chief Calergi. But when the deputation, which was appointed to wait upon the latter with this object, announced the message of which they were the bearers, that great man (says Dandolo) at once returned answer, "that although there had been in times passed certain unhappy differences between the Venetians and himself, and that such differences still subsisted in some measure, not only was there no disposition on his part to listen to the present overtures, but if he had had sufficient power on the sea, he should have been prepared to sharpen his sword against Genoa, and thus to shew that the enemies of the Venetian Republic were not less the enemies of Alexis Calergi."

The scene, which daily passed under the eyes of the Genoese Dominicans in the latter part of their stay in the capital, should have sufficed to shew what a grave illusion their errand was; it was a scene that could hardly inspire confidence in the favourable result of the negotiation. At the Arsenal, and in all the offices where the business of the Government was transacted, the same air of activity was manifest. In every quarter were signs, which denoted a great

¹ Fought in May 1284. The Pisans were commanded by their Venetian Podesta, Alberto Morosini. It is said that they lost 5000 in killed and 11,000 in prisoners.—See Sismondi, iv. 24, edit. 1809.

deal more than mere ordinary precaution against contingencies. But any doubts, which lovers of peace might have persuaded themselves to entertain, were soon entirely dissipated. For the latest advices from Constantinople and elsewhere substantiated in every particular the rumours which had been for some time afloat respecting the menacing attitude and hostile designs of Genoa; it became evident that the latter Power had at length yielded to the intrigues of the Byzantine Court, or had allowed itself to be overruled by its own passions; and the Ducal Government properly judged that a temporising policy was no longer expedient or defensible. Accordingly a conscription was at once ordered to commence. Two registers, one for the City of Venice, the second for the suburbs, were opened for the enrolment of the names of all men between the ages of sixteen and sixty, who were capable of service; and in the course of June 1294, in pursuance of a resolution to proceed in raising the necessary supplies according to precedent, partly by way of private levies, the Chiefs of the Streets were charged to lay before the Government within a fortnight an exact return of every family which was in a position to contribute its quota to the new armament. On the 13th of the ensuing month, a Special Commission of thirty Sages was constituted for the purpose of carrying the return into effect, by fixing the proportion of ships with their crews, munitions, and stores, which each large contributor, or association of smaller contributors, should be required to furnish, and of superintending all minor details. Three weeks passed in this manner, during which the election of Captains of Galleys was made, in conformity with the Rules of the 2nd February (1294)¹ by balloting them severally in the Great Council; and Marco Baseio was nominated to the supreme command. On Sunday morning, the 7th October, the fleet was under sail.²

In the meantime, all Genoese merchantmen, which happened to be stationed or to be trading in the Levant, had received directions from home to join at Pera where, agreeably to the usages of those times, they were speedily transformed, by process of unloading and partial refitting, into an effective force of mercantile marine. The command was assumed by Nicolo Spinola, resident ambassador at the Byzantine Court,

¹ Marin, v. 199.

² Romanin, ii. 332.

but who, in common with the majority of his countrymen, possessed a competent knowledge of naval affairs.

The hostile squadrons came in sight of each other near the seaport of Aias, on the cognominal Bay, on the west side of the Gulf of Alexandretta. It was Saturday, the 22nd May 1294. Spinola, who found himself inferior in numerical strength to his adversary, and who had been on that account loth to hazard an engagement, drew up his little force in the form of a crescent, linking the vessels together, and establishing a communication by a line of bridges which reached from one extremity to the other. He thus imitated the tactics which had been pursued by the Venetians themselves at the Battle of Durazzo in 1081. Baseio, observing this manœuvre on the part of his antagonist, and seeing that the wind was not at all propitious for an attack upon so strong a position, concurred with some of his officers in an opinion that the most judicious course would be to send forward a few fire-ships, in the first instance, to damage and weaken the Genoese line. The greater part of the Staff, however, held a contrary view, and derided this precaution as unworthy of the national honour and reputation; and Baseio ultimately allowed himself to be over-persuaded.¹

The activity of the rowers was now suspended; every canvas was spread; and the vessels, at the word of command, bore down gallantly on the foe. But the breeze, which was still blowing fresh, now began to make its influence felt; many of the galleys soon grew unmanageable; the full-set sails became an incumbrance; to recur to the oars was no longer practicable; the Venetians, unable to bring their ships under steerage, were driven broadside against the impenetrable line of the enemy; and their rout became complete. Of five-and-twenty vessels, sixteen were captured by Doria, who secured a booty richer than he might have expected, as it happened that among the Venetian galleys were some armed traders bound for Aias. The vanquished sustained a considerable loss both in killed and prisoners; and in the number of the former was Baseio himself, who fell in a gallant attempt to retrieve a disaster which he appears to have foreseen.

A short diplomatic interlude succeeded this serious col-

¹ Rime istoriche di un anonimo Genovese, contemp., *Arch. stor. Ital.* App. iv. 11. "*De Victoriâ factâ per Januenses contra Venetos in Laguccio Ermenicâ.*"

lision.¹ The government of Gradenigo, on the first intimation of the disaster, hastened to address to that of Genoa a verbal message, in which it sought to shew that the latter, by taking the initiative at Aïas, and thus setting the example of aggression, had flagrantly infringed existing compacts, and that the Republic did not consequently feel herself in any degree pledged to their farther observance. To this note the Genoese returned a reply conceived in a sarcastic and flippant spirit of recrimination. "The Podesta and his Commune had received with unfeigned surprise," it was stated, "the protest of the Doge and the Signory; they had hitherto believed that the Venetians intended to adhere scrupulously to the treaty of 1291, so long as it remained in operation; they emphatically denied the charge that they had initiated the attack at Aïas: and in conclusion, as they understood that all Venetian vessels on foreign stations had been recalled in order to take part in a projected war against Genoa, they had sent Uberto Doria to the Mediterranean with a force that would effectually demonstrate to such as might be on their way home the extreme impolicy of embarking on so long a voyage." The piece of grim pleasantry, conveyed in the closing paragraph, broke off this singular parley, which had merely helped to foment the reciprocal spirit of hatred and defiance. The disaster at Aïas, although it had involved many classes of persons at Venice in severe loss and embarrassment, exercised no depressing influence on the courage of the nation. On the 26th of April 1295, the Commission of Thirty was again called into existence, and was invested till the return of peace with unlimited and irresponsible control over the conduct of hostilities. The powers of the Board, however, though extraordinary, were quite special: for its members were to be permitted on no pretence to extend their authority to any other branch of the Executive. Dispatches were at the same time forwarded to all Consuls, Baili, and naval commanders in the various distant dependencies, acquainting them with the premature and abrupt termination of the treaty of 1291, instructing them to take every precaution against the not impossible contingency of a sudden attack from Genoese cruisers, and exhorting them to act vigorously on the defensive, should the necessity arise.

¹ Marin, v. 100-1.

The Thirty applied themselves with earnestness to their appointed task. A new registration was opened forthwith of all male persons between the ages of fifteen and forty; and in the present instance, the conscripts were arranged in three classes according to their more or less immediate liability to serve; letters of marque were granted to two privateering captains, Domenigo Schiavo and Jacopo Barozzi, to make prize of the property and goods of Genoese subjects, wherever they found them; and, in the course of the summer, the Commissioners were able to announce the completion of a new fleet of sixty sail.

The fleet under Uberto Doria, to which the Genoese Government had so pointedly referred in its recent message to the Doge, consisted of no fewer than 165 sail, of which 105 were vessels newly launched;¹ and the whole squadron mounted a force of 45,000 men, among whom was counted the flower of the Genoese nobility. To such overwhelming numbers Quirini and his colleague were in no position to offer an effectual resistance; and the Venetian commanders were therefore instructed to confine themselves to a cruise of observation, and on no account to run the risk of an engagement.

When the first report was brought to Venice of the formidable and sumptuous scale on which the naval equipments were being made at Genoa, opinions were conflicting with respect to the line of policy which it might be most expedient to pursue. By some it was urged, that the most dignified course would be to make large additions to the Navy without loss of time, and thus to enable the Republic to meet her enemy, at any moment, on a footing of equality. There was another section of the Great Council, which evinced a decided repugnance to such a grand and costly programme. The latter² now joined in representing that, in the present distracted state of Genoa and the embarrassed condition of her finances, it would be utterly impracticable for that republic to keep such a large flotilla in commission for any length of time, and that the measure was consequently one which must speedily neutralise itself; and they thence argued, that it would be eminently unwise on their part to proceed, for the present at all events, beyond the maintenance of such a force,

¹ Dandolo, p. 405.

² Marin, v. 104-5.

as might be requisite for reconnoitring purposes and for the defence of the Lagoons against any sudden aggression. Of these views the soundness quickly became appreciable. In the early autumn of 1295, Doria was recalled without having encountered in a single instance the relatively insignificant squadron of the Republic, which purposely eluded his search; and before Christmas the Genoese Armada was broken up, and the bulk of the 45,000 troops, which had served in the expedition, was disbanded and paid off.

Doria, however, could not consent to return to the Riviera without having struck a decisive blow in some quarter. It was on the Candiots, toward whom the Genoese Government had borne no slight malice since the refusal on the part of Calergi to entertain its insidious proposals, that the whole weight of the enemy's vengeance fell. A descent was made on Canea, the chief town in the island; and there the Genoese troops committed extensive ravages, and put to the sword a considerable number of the unresisting population. This outrage was not suffered to remain long unresented; and to the voice from Rome, which continued to speak of pacific solutions,¹ the Republic sternly declined to hearken.

The theatre of operations was now shifted, however, to another direction. In the early part of 1296, Marco Bembo, having been appointed Bailo of Constantinople, was escorted to his destination by a squadron of honour.² It happened shortly after Bembo's arrival at the Chrysoceras, that one of those collisions which were at all times more or less frequent between the Venetian and Genoese residents in the imperial capital, arose out of some unexplained circumstance. Angry and bitter words were at first exchanged; blows, of course, succeeded; blood was drawn on both sides; the conflict gradually acquired a general character; the Genoese, by a comparative coolness and presence of mind which imparted to the affair the air of a preconcerted scheme, slowly gained the ascendant; their rivals, who had been taken by surprise, were outnumbered and overpowered in every direction; it was in vain that the Emperor Andronicos, unfeignedly terrified by the prospect of ulterior consequences, attempted to inter-

¹ "Breve del Pontifice Bonifacio VIII. ai Veneziani per ottenere la loro pacificazione coi Genovesi," *Arch. stor. Ital.* App. ix. 389-91.

² Dandolo, 405-6; Marin, v. 106; Romanin, ii. 334.

pose; Bembo himself was pitilessly cast from one of the windows of his own house into the street, and killed on the spot; and the Venetians in Constantinople, without distinction of age or sex, were ruthlessly massacred. "So terrific is the slaughter," says the contemporary historian, "that it has become necessary to dig huge deep trenches everywhere to bury the dead."

When this deplorable and scandalous occurrence reached the ear of the Republic, every voice cried shame and vengeance. All lips muttered, *War to the knife*. The excitement was intense. Those families, whose members were counted among the victims, were naturally most vehement in their language and most uncompromising in their tone. Among the lower classes, the feeling, though scarcely stronger, was, as it usually happened, more demonstrative; and, the news of the affair having gained publicity before the arrival of the deputies, whom the Emperor had instantaneously sent to mollify the wrath of the Republic by exonerating him and his own subjects from any share in the catastrophe, it was with the greatest difficulty that the Government rescued them from the mob on landing. When the Greeks at length were admitted to an audience, Gradenigo sharply interrogated his visitors respecting the complicated atrocity which had been so recently perpetrated. "Is it to be believed," demanded his Serenity, "that this event has taken place in the absence of any collusion on the part of your imperial master? Was not the wholesale butchery of my fellow citizens a sufficiently gross iniquity; and was it necessary to add crime to crime, and tragedy to tragedy, by desecrating, in the person of the hapless Bembo, the inviolable character of an ambassador? Will not Europe view with horror so flagrant an infraction of justice and humanity? Has the Republic afforded a precedent for such a class of proceeding? Is a single instance on record in which she has been known to behave with similar treachery and cruelty toward the strangers who have chosen to seek the hospitality of her shores, or toward the accredited representatives of other Powers? No! The Venetians are more scrupulous of breaking the laws of God and man; and the Venetian Government knows better, it seems, than his Majesty, how to protect the lives of good citizens and to curb the passions of bad men." Gradenigo concluded by an intima-

tion that, unless the most ample satisfaction was given forthwith by the Byzantine Court, the Emperor might rest assured, that a declaration of war would issue without farther warning. The indemnity was fixed at 15,000 gold *perperi*.

The Emperor, whatever his inclinations might be, despaired of being able to raise so large an amount; and he was brought by the help of Genoese counsels to the conviction, that it was a minor evil to bear the consequences of refusal than to satisfy the terms of compliance. The Republic, which had by a foregone conclusion anticipated such a result, did not delay, in the meantime, to prepare for a new Greco-Genoese war.¹

Somewhat late in the spring of 1296, Ruggiero Morosini *detto* Malabranca, left the Venetian shores with a heavy armament of forty sail. At Modon, in the Morea, he was reinforced by Marco Michieli with thirteen of the twenty galleys which had so lately formed the escort of Bembo; and off Scio the remaining seven, which had been accidentally separated from their companions in a recent encounter with a Genoese force, joined Morosini's squadron. The latter, however, finding no immediate occasion for this large addition to his strength, confided to Michieli the defence of Negropont, and at once directed his own course toward Constantinople. Having passed the Dardanelles, and entered the Sea of Marmora, the Venetian commander found twenty of the enemy's ships, to which he gave chase so far as Largiro; and he thence proceeded to lay waste the whole coast down to Pera. On his arrival at that point, Morosini was not slightly vexed and disappointed to discover that the Genoese Quarter had been entirely abandoned, and that its late occupants, forewarned of his approach, had procured leave from the Emperor to take shelter in the Capital. The Venetians vented their spleen by desolating the whole suburb; and then, once more moving forward, the Commander advanced on Constantinople itself, of which he opened the siege in the neighbourhood of the Palace of Blachernæ (July 1297).²

While the gallant Morosini, whose emulation might be aroused by traditions of the martial achievements of the Venetians of a former age on that soil, was spreading dismay

¹ Trithemius, *Chronicon Genuense*; Murat. ix. 15.

² Romanin, ii. 335.

along the whole littoral from Pera to the Chrysoceras, Domenico Schiavo was carrying out another branch of the instructions of the Thirty, by keeping the sea with a few light vessels, intercepting stragglers, and operating on any point of the enemy's territory where he might chance to find the opportunity; and a force of five-and-twenty galleys under Giovanni Soranzo,¹ having about the same time sailed into the Euxine, accomplished the almost total destruction of Caffa. The issue of Soranzo's expedition, which purely aimed at retaliating on the Genoese their proceedings at Canea in 1295, was far less prosperous, however, than its commencement had seemed to augur. It was already somewhat late in the season when the Venetian commander laid siege to Caffa; and before he was prepared to leave those waters, the northern winter had set in with such unwonted severity, that he found himself actually imprisoned in the ice. The intense frost proved fatal to a large number of the seamen and soldiers, whose clothing and appointments had not been calculated for a winter residence in so bleak a latitude; seven of the five-and-twenty ships which Soranzo had brought to Caffa, were, in the end, completely disabled; and the Venetians returned home in the spring of 1297 with the most dejected and forlorn air.

Morosini himself, having inflicted considerable damage on the imperial capital in the precincts of Blachernæ, in spite of the efforts which were made by the Greeks and their Genoese allies to repulse him, had, with better judgment than Soranzo, suspended hostilities before the cold weather set in, and had retraced his steps in safety. The commander was accompanied by a certain number of Genoese prisoners; but he brought little, if any, prospect of peace. The Emperor, relying on the continued support of Genoa, and encouraged by the energy with which the Genoese residents had withstood the recent attack of their rivals, expressed himself unshaken in his resolution to resist the demand for indemnification.

Little was done during 1297. The Thirty confined their exertions to the equipment of two small squadrons,² of which one counting fifteen galleys under Matteo Quirini swept the Sicilian waters, and made a few unimportant captures: while the second, consisting of nine vessels under Eufrosio Morosini,

¹ Dandolo, fol. 406; Cigogna, *Iscrizioni*, iii. 404-5.

² Dandolo, fol. 407.

took the direction of Cyprus, entered the harbour of Famagusta, where the commander burned to the keel a large Genoese man-of-war under the very eyes of the Cypriots, and in spite of a warm attack from the Genoese owners, who attempted to save their property, and then shaping his course for Armenia, took and demolished the enemy's trading station on that coast. Having concluded his cruise, Morosini, who in deeds of daring vied with his kinsman Malabranca, returned to the Adriatic, and rejoined Matteo Quirini with whom, in obedience to the instructions of the Thirty, he remained in charge of the Gulf.

There seemed to be absolutely no means of judging how long this system of filibustering reprisals would last. It was, in the highest degree, costly, destructive, and unsatisfactory; and as it had always happened, neither Venice nor Genoa evinced an inclination to initiate pacific overtures. As, however, the operations during 1297 had been comparatively perfunctory and unimportant, the Pope stepped forward at the close of the year, and tried to negotiate a reconciliation.¹

The question which was to be submitted to the Conference at Rome had already begun, however, to wear a somewhat complicated aspect; both parties had numerous heads of grievance and ample room to recriminate; and no difficulty could be anticipated on either side in answering each accusation, which might be made, at least by a counter-charge. If any balance might be struck, it was certainly on the whole in favour of the Venetians. Their rivals, with an audacity which was too shallow and transparent, urged, as a set-off to their excesses at Canea in 1295, the retribution exacted at Caffa for those very excesses in 1296. With hardly greater felicity they sought to palliate their acknowledged enormities at Constantinople by pleading, that the Government was not responsible for the crimes of private citizens, of which it had neither foreknowledge nor cognisance, and that the countrymen of Bembo had given provocation by striking the first blow. A third ground on which the Genoese diplomatists essayed to build an argument was the affair of Aias; and there they equally failed to establish priority of attack on the part of their opponents and the sequence of their own freedom from blame. The sole field, from which it became possible

¹ Marin, v. 114-16; and the authorities there quoted.

for them to glean anything really apposite to their purpose, was the campaign of 1297 just concluded, in which the Republic, following the dictates of passion, had proceeded to the commission of acts which were not to be justified. The destruction of the Armenian Factory was fairly pronounced to be an indefensible outrage.

At the same time, both parties claimed the credit of a disposition to be tractable. The Venetians were perfectly prepared to treat on the basis of adequate compensation for the losses which had accrued to them at Canea, Constantinople, and elsewhere. The Genoese were not disinclined to come to terms, saving the suggestion for an indemnity which, in the face of the demolition of their Black Sea Factory in 1296, and of their Armenian Factory in 1297, they declined absolutely to entertain. Such was the impediment which now presented itself: yet the Pope did not quite despair of success. Having his own particular object in view in coming forward in this instance as a peacemaker, Boniface VIII. even offered to pay half the amount of the Venetian claims, if Genoa would consent to defray the residue. But to this liberal and equitable arrangement, to which the latter was not disinclined to accede, and which could hardly have been expected to find demurrers, the Venetian Syndics unaccountably declared themselves opposed; they affirmed that they had no power to accept any compromise. Hereupon Boniface, losing patience and heart, desisted from the attempt, exclaiming with an emotion which he was unable to disguise, "that since, although Genoa, in deference to his wishes, had agreed to forget the past, and to terminate even at a sacrifice a war, which she was known to be thoroughly capable of maintaining, by sharing with him the burden of satisfying the terms named by the Republic, the latter, obeying no law but a capricious and perverse pride, now chose to desert her own ground, and to ignore her own propositions, he would wash his hands of the affair, and the consequences must rest on her own head!"

The early part of 1298 was marked by a successful cruise, made by a Venetian fleet under Andrea Dandolo, grandson of Gilberto, along the Mediterranean so far as the Barbary coast.¹ In this expedition, Dandolo who, by a union with the Gulf Squadron, had carried the force at his disposal to 64 sail,

¹ Dandolo, fol. 407; Marin, v. 118.

made a considerable number of important captures; and in the neighbourhood of Tunis a Genoese galleon was secured, of which alone the cargo was estimated at 100,000 ducats. The Venetian commander, having thus satisfactorily executed the plan of operations laid down for his guidance by the Thirty, returned home in triumph with an enormous booty, including between 25 and 30 prizes. His return was possibly accelerated by the reports which had reached him of the movements and designs of the enemy; and on his arrival, he found the Government already in receipt of information which had placed beyond doubt the intention of Genoa to resume the offensive without delay on an extended scale.

The preparations of the War Department soon assumed a corresponding character. The equipment of fifty-five additional galleys, of which ten were contributed by the Chioggians and five by Zara, was completed in the course of the summer, making with the Mediterranean fleet of forty sail a total of ninety-five; and the Government, having reason to be satisfied with the conduct of Dandolo, allowed him to retain the command-in-chief. But on the present occasion he was accompanied by a council of civilians, who were empowered to tender their advice to the commander in any matter of exigency. Under his orders was commissioned a suitable staff of captains or sopra-comiti of tried courage and experience. Moreover, there were several persons of large property, who had come forward in a patriotic spirit, and offered their ships and their services to the Republic. Among others, the case was particularly noticed of a gentleman of fortune, popularly known as Messer Marco Milioni, who had just then returned from his travels in the country of the Grand Khan, China, Japan, Persia, and the Indies,¹ and who, imbued with an irresistible desire to bear a part in the approaching campaign, had solicited leave to act under Dandolo with a man-of-war, fitted out at his own expense. The Thirty readily accorded to Marco Polo the permission which he sought.

Dandolo sailed from Venice in the beginning of August 1298, shaping his course for the Illyric Islands; and in the neighbourhood of Crúzola he fell in with the Gulf Squadron under Matteo Quirini. Directions were then given to heave anchor; and the Captain-General, not thinking it probable

¹ Filiasi, *Ric. stor.* 1274

that the services of Quirini would be required in the forthcoming contest, authorised him to return home. That officer, however, had hardly reached Zara, when the intelligence overtook him, that the Genoese, seventy-eight strong, under Lamba Doria, were reported to have just entered the Adriatic. Transported with delight by the news, and perfectly unable to repress his ardour, Quirini unhesitatingly transferred his present charge to other hands, and with three of his largest vessels hastened to rejoin his chief, whom he found already preparing for battle.

Doria arrived at Curzola during the first week in September ; and he had already advanced sufficiently far to render retreat impracticable, before he observed that the enemy in superior force had taken up a position immediately above the island. Although, however, it was true that the Venetians were more numerous, the galleys of Doria were of much heavier draught and burden, and their complement of men was larger ; and the latter had therefore no just cause to dread the result of an engagement. Notwithstanding this advantage, coupled with the fact that the wind and sun were at his back, the Genoese commander was so strongly possessed by a consciousness of the indomitable spirit which animated the breasts of the Venetians, and he felt the responsibility of hazarding a battle to be so grave, that he resolved on the whole to resort to a parley. In his overstrained caution, Doria went so far as to offer, on condition of being permitted to withdraw from the contest, the delivery into the hands of his adversary of all his magazines and stores. If Dandolo was surprised at Doria's proposal, Doria was, in all probability, far more surprised at Dandolo's reply. Not satisfied with the terms which had been submitted to his acceptance, the latter demanded unconditional surrender. This step, which elicited many an angry and bitter comment on the insufferable arrogance of Venice, restored in a moment the wavering courage of the Genoese, and brought them instantaneously to a sense of their duty and honour ; while it served to inspire their leader with a determination to risk an action, and to brave consequences.

Having therefore in the first instance judiciously detached ten galleys from his squadron, and planted them as a reserve in a position where they were effectually screened from observation

by the island itself, he proceeded to dispose the remaining sixty-eight in line.

The two natural causes,¹ which so materially promised to second the efforts of the Genoese, threatened of course to hinder proportionably those of their opponents; and so striking indeed became this truth at the last moment, that even the intrepid Dandolo, seeing that his troops must necessarily fight, under existing circumstances, with the sun in their eyes and the wind in their teeth, seriously hesitated to commit himself to an engagement, or to do more than act on the defensive, until the wind had shifted, or at least until the intensity of the solar rays had somewhat abated. At any rate, the Captain-General, who was perhaps already beginning to blame himself for his summary dismissal of the Genoese proposition, was not willing to be personally responsible for the consequences of such a step; he most properly judged, that the difference between the circumstances, in which the enemy and himself were placed, rendered what was mere cowardice on their part only common prudence on his own; and he decided upon laying the point before his councillors. The latter thought fit to dissent from the views of Dandolo; the civilians took upon themselves to combat and set aside the opinion of an officer of long experience and high reputation; and the Captain-General was compelled against his judgment and convictions to engage the enemy. He therefore hastened to prepare for the attack; and the rejection of his advice was not suffered to have any relaxing influence on his exertions.

The decisive action took place at length off Curzola, on Sunday, the 8th September.² The result of the first encounter was eminently discouraging to the Genoese; ten of their galleys fell almost instantaneously into the power of the enemy. The Venetians pursued this advantage with considerable success; their foes were reduced to the necessity of giving way at every point; and Doria already began to tremble for the final issue. But fortune soon came to his succour. The followers of Dandolo, distressed by the sunshine, and seriously incommoded by the wind, had hitherto sustained the contest with honour; and the advantage, if there

¹ Marin, v. 121.

² "Historical Rhymes of an anonymous Genoese," *Arch. stor. Ital.* App. iv. 15; Gio. Villani, lib. viii. c. 24.

was any, inclined to their side. But, after several hours' hard fighting, some of the Venetian ships were by a sudden gust driven ashore and completely crippled. This incident changed the whole prospect. It was in vain that the Chioggian and Zaratine contingents now hotly disputed every inch of water with their adversaries, and performed prodigies of valour. It was equally so that the gallant Quirini, that Marco Polo and a few others, with the vessels under their immediate control, behaved with truly patriotic devotion. It was to no purpose that Dandolo himself set an illustrious example. Every attempt to restore order had become futile. The mischance which had befallen the stranded galleys confused and disheartened their companions; twelve of the Venetian captains, smitten by a panic fear, opened by flight the way to the ruin of their cause; and the day, which had seemed almost won, was irretrievably lost. Doria, who at once perceived how matters stood, directed a general advance; the word of command ran with electric rapidity along the Genoese line; and a fearful struggle followed, in which the loss of life on both sides was such as had rarely been surpassed. At length, in an unlucky moment, the Venetian centre was forced by a vigorous and well-sustained movement; and, the Reserve posted behind the main squadron, arriving at that precise juncture to complete the rout, the victory was secure in the hands of Doria.

Of ninety-five fine vessels, which Dandolo had proudly marshalled at Curzola, those twelve only, which bore the flags of the fugitive captains, were saved from the wreck. The remainder, with the exception of five or six which had foundered in the course of the action, were made prizes by the victor, by whom they were for the most part dismantled and committed to the flames. The loss of the Republic in killed was large, but uncertain:¹ the Venetian prisoners exceeded 5000. Among the captives were Dandolo himself and the volunteer Polo, who had paid the forfeit of their impetuous daring and fearless exposure to danger. The latter had fought with unrivalled gallantry in the advanced division of the Fleet, and had already received a slight wound, when he was taken prisoner.

Curzola heard no shouts of victory, no songs of triumph;

¹ *Chronicon Estense*, Murat. xv. 344; Varese, *St. di Genova*, lib. v. 113.

several thousand Genoese had fallen; several thousand Venetians saw before them the horror and ignominy of a Genoese dungeon; and as the sun went down on the conquerors and the conquered, its serene effulgence afforded a striking contrast to the deep lurid hue which had been imparted to the sky for several miles round by the gradual immersion of sixty galleys in a sea of belching fire.

Such was the fatal Battle of Curzola, which Lamba Doria had gained under circumstances so accidentally fortunate. The battle was one, in which the losses of both parties were almost equally balanced, and in which, all points considered, hardly so large a share of credit was due to the Genoese as to their rivals. For, the former more than compensating by the superior character of their vessels for their deficiency in numerical force, the two squadrons were to be fairly regarded as evenly matched; and previously to the untoward disaster which shook their strength, and the desertion of the twelve captains, the advantage had been wholly on the side of the Venetians, notwithstanding the formidable difficulties with which they had to contend: nor could there be much question that if, even after the first stage of the catastrophe, the heroic conduct of the rest had been seconded, the tide of success might have remained in the same channel. The Genoese historians themselves do not pretend to believe that the victory of Curzola was otherwise than fortuitous; and more than one pious writer, in sharing this view, has traced in the defeat of the Republic merely the evidence of Divine wrath for her presumption in declining the intercession of the Holy See in the preceding year, as well as the terms offered by Doria immediately before the engagement.¹

No joy-bells or other manifestations of popular enthusiasm awaited the return of Doria to his country. Too many among the multitude which thronged the quays to witness the landing of the troops, were doomed to retrace their steps to hearths made desolate by war; and in the extremity of their affliction the Genoese were almost tempted to forget their glory, and to check their unbecoming exultation at the abasement of Venetian insolence.

But there was one, who was expected to be in the crowd

¹ Dandolo, fol. 407; Sanudo, fol. 579; Marin, v. 118-24; Sismondi, iv. 250; Romanin, ii. 335-6.

of Venetian prisoners, and whom the Genoese displayed the greatest eagerness to see in chains. He was not there. Unable to support the galling thought, that the son of a Doge of Venice was about to grace a Genoese triumph, to be paraded in fetters before a Genoese mob, and then to rot in a Genoese dungeon, the brave and unfortunate Dandolo took an opportunity of dashing his head against the gunwale of the vessel which was conveying him to his new destination, and thus miserably terminated his existence.

Polo suffered himself to be carried to Genoa, where he shared the lot of his countrymen. His high reputation, however, his winning address, and his extraordinary faculty of relating amusing stories and anecdotes, soon gained him favour, not only in the eyes of his companions in captivity, but in those of his enemies themselves, many of whom procured leave from their government to visit him in his confinement; and through their instrumentality he obtained from time to time not a few indulgences, which alleviated the rigour of his fate, and enabled him to pursue his literary studies and employments.

The news of the Battle of Curzola reached Venice about the 11th of September, 1298; and the twelve recreant captains, who had alone escaped to bring home the tidings of this stunning disaster, were forthwith committed to close custody by the authority of the Avogaria, preparatory to their trial for treasonable and cowardly desertion. By an act of the Great Council, passed on the 10th August 1293, this offence had been made capital;¹ and the Avogadors proceeded to demand the execution of that decree in the present instance. But the Government, not willing on political grounds to aggravate the public distress and excitement, decided, under the very peculiar circumstances, upon treating all the culprits with lenience.

The Venetians submitted to the defeat, on the whole, with that fine fortitude and serenity which so prominently characterized their institutions. After all, some solace still remained. In the first place, the victory was proved to have been purely accidental; secondly, Genoa was even a greater sufferer than themselves;² and, their own losses being chiefly

¹ Marsden, xxvii. ; Formaleoni, *Sulla nautica antica de' Veneziani*, 18.

² Marin, v. 122-3, and the authorities cited by him.

in prisoners, there was slight doubt that, on the conclusion of peace, there would be the usual exchange.

At the same time, the XXX., acutely sensible of the extreme jeopardy in which the country was placed by the recent reverse, directed the immediate organization of a new fleet of one hundred galleys; and, meanwhile, the unconquerable Schiavo, having provided himself with two of the swiftest vessels which were to be procured, proceeded (March 1299) under the sanction of the Government to make reprisal for certain outrages committed with impunity by a Genoese privateering expedition¹ in the neighbourhood of Malamocco. On his outward course, Schiavo met near Majorca with a Genoese trader, of which he secured possession without difficulty. Thence pursuing his voyage direct to Genoa, he unhesitatingly entered the port, burned to the keel all the craft which fell in his destructive path, and refused to relinquish the position, until he had, in a spirit of audacious and scornful defiance, planted the standard of St. Mark, and struck a piece of money impressed with the arms of the Republic, on one of the quays.² Retracing his steps without molestation amid the disorder and depression which still reigned in the City, the buccaneer swept the Sicilian waters; and on the 25th May, 1299,³ he made prizes of no fewer than ten of the enemy's ships, which he conducted exultingly home.

Schiavo was a member of the *cittadinanza* who, without any adventitious advantages, had during five or six years passed, at least as largely contributed by his small privateering expeditions to strike terror into the enemies of his country, as the commanders of well-appointed, heavily-armed, and expensive fleets. Such a man was a host in himself; and it seems unaccountable except on the ground of the most fatuous aristocratic jealousy, that the Commission of War, in making its selection of officers for the squadron which had been so lately annihilated at Curzola, should have entirely overlooked so faithful and important a servant. Had Dandolo had on his right hand one who laughed at defeat, and who was never known to have failed in any of his undertakings, it is not too much to say, that the result would have been very different. The 8th of September 1298 might have been

¹ Dandolo, fol. 408.

² Varese, *St. di Genova*, lib. v. 114.

³ Dandolo, fol. 408.

registered as a white day in the Venetian annals: while the *Travels of Marco Polo* would have been possibly lost to literature and science.

The social and political aspect of Italy remained supremely deplorable. The whole country bled profusely from the wounds of civil war; every place of note was split into Guelphic and Ghibelline divisions. Despotism and anarchy exercised alternate domination; and the transitions from faction to tyranny, and from tyranny to faction, were unusually violent and spasmodic. In some quarters, the Guelphs contrived to gain a short-lived ascendancy, and expelled the Ghibellines. Elsewhere the Ghibellines triumphed and drove out the Guelphs. In Tuscany the latter were divided against themselves under the denominations of the *Neri* and the *Bianchi*. The Pontiff was at strife with the Colonna. At Milan a lengthened struggle for power between the Torriani and the Visconti had terminated not long since in favour of the latter; and Matteo Visconti, the head of the family, was at present Captain-General and Imperial Vicar of Milan. At Genoa, in a similar manner, the Ghibellines had recently succeeded in obtaining a temporary advantage over their political adversaries.

Whatever strictures indeed the battle of Curzola might provoke, and to whatever extent the character of its issue might qualify the credit due to the conquerors, the sacrifices incurred by the Republic in men and money had been terribly severe; and looking at the duration of the struggle, and the concurrent drain on the population and exchequer, it remained a source of wonder that her government had the courage to propose any fresh preparations. The close of 1298, however, witnessed a constitutional phenomenon of no ordinary significance. It beheld Venice rising with buoyancy from a great defeat: and it beheld her rival prostrated by a great victory.

The first step, which the Genoese Ghibellines took on their accession to power, was indeed in the direction of peace. The amazing report of the extensive and costly preparations which were being set on foot by the Thirty, and the rumour that large commissions had been already sent to Spain for the purchase of new artillery, coupled with the crippled state of her own strength and finances, demonstrated to Genoa the

positive impracticability of sustaining the war; and it was with more genuine satisfaction than they cared perhaps to own, that her rulers acceded to the offer of a third Power to negotiate peace with the Republic on honourable terms. This intermediary was the Captain-General of Milan. Visconti, having prevailed on one of the belligerents to accept his offices, hastened to seek the cohesion of the other; and the Venetians, while they were perfectly prepared to resume the offensive, were on more than one account reluctant to oppose a satisfactory adjustment. For there were other quarters, as usual, in which circumstances might arise of sufficient gravity to engage their undivided attention; and there was unfortunately too little ground for the apprehension, that the large outlay to which the Government had already proceeded would be superfluous. The relations of the Republic with the Lower Empire were still, as they had long been, on a most insecure basis; and there were some of her Dalmatian colonies, which were once more evincing a disposition to falter in their allegiance. The disquieting aspect of public affairs moved the Government to publish a manifesto against unnecessary personal and domestic expenditure in the year succeeding Curzola; and it was during centuries a sure harbinger of depressed finances, when these sumptuary edicts came forth, only to be discussed for the moment and thrown aside.

After the nomination of two parties on each side therefore (Padua and Verona for Venice, Asti and Tortona for Genoa), to see the provisions of the treaty carried into execution, and to hold the guarantees, perpetual peace was concluded at Milan on Monday, the 25th May 1299, the very day on which Schiavo secured the ten Genoese galleons in the Mediterranean, between the contracting parties, in the presence of Visconti himself. The treaty embraced eight articles:

1. There shall be perpetual peace between the Venetians and the Genoese, both parties abstaining from all ulterior hostilities, and granting an amnesty of all passed causes of offence.¹

2. In case the Venetians shall have seized, or shall wish to seize, any Greek territory, and the Genoese shall lend their assistance to the Emperor, *this circumstance shall not be treated as a violation of the present Treaty.*

¹ Marin, v. 128-9, quotes this instrument textually. See Giovanni Villani, lib. viii. c. 27.

3. *Should war arise between the Genoese and the Pisans*, the Venetians shall not navigate beyond Genoa, that is, neither to Pisa, nor to Corsica, nor to Sardinia, nor to any other point between Nizza and Civita-Vecchia. In like manner, in the event of a war of whatever kind within the Gulf of Adria, the Genoese shall not sail save to Venice itself.

4. The captain or master of every vessel leaving Venice and Genoa shall take an oath, prior to his departure, not to commit any aggression on the Genoese and Venetians respectively.

5. The two contracting Powers shall with all convenient dispatch mutually complete their sureties and other guarantees.

6. The Communes of Venice, Padua, and Verona, on the one part, and of Genoa, Asti, and Tortona on the other, shall give pledges reciprocally; and the Imperial Vicar (Visconti) shall be competent to enforce the exchange of the same within a definite period.

7. The Communes aforesaid bind themselves to the observance of all the conditions of the present compact, and the same shall be ratified by their respective Governments, failing which, a forfeit of 40,000 marks of silver shall attach to the defaulter or defaulters.

8. The private claims which any Genoese or Venetians may design to prefer for indemnity or other satisfaction of injuries sustained, shall be presented within the space of forty days at Venice and Genoa respectively, all rules and orders to the contrary notwithstanding.

In this document is missed any mention of Polo and his fellow prisoners. The general theory of capture in those days was similar to that which has prevailed at almost every epoch. The freedom of the captive was considered merely as subject to restraint, until an adequate ransom and the cost of his maintenance in the detaining country were paid. Still, whatever the theory might be, the practice was in many cases totally different; and the example of Polo himself, whose family would have cheerfully laid down purchase-money to any amount, furnishes evidence that the faculty of redemption was not accepted as a ruling principle by the mediæval law of maritime warfare. The truth may be, that there was no such principle. Each Power, to a large extent, had its own views,

and there was always the modifying virtue of circumstances. Whatever has been said or thought to the contrary, the general evidence is in favour of the view that in their treatment of prisoners of all descriptions, whether prizes of war or those sentenced by the courts, the Venetians were unusually indulgent. Yet, apart from sentiment in the case of prisoners of war, the difficulty of accommodation and subsistence generally shortened the period of detention.

The first objects which the eye of Polo encountered, on entering his Genoese prison in 1298, were some of the Pisans, who had been taken at the fatal battle of Meloria in 1284, and who, at the distance of fourteen years, were still pining in a hopeless captivity. The spectacle was one, from which the Venetian might have drawn a conclusion sadly unfavourable to his own prospect of release.

The true meaning of the second clause of the late treaty was, that the Republic did not choose any hostile measures which she might think proper to direct hereafter against Constantinople, to become a pretext to Genoa for creating a diversion in the Adriatic or the Mediterranean. This object, however, did not at once become apparent; and Venice was content for the present with the tolerably successful negotiations of May last, being partly actuated by an impression that the Emperor might be induced, without complicating existing difficulties, to concede an adequate indemnity, and in other respects to come to terms. After various delays, it was not till 1302, after the completion of the exchange of prisoners with Genoa, that the Ducal Government determined to resort to a more stringent course, and to send a more effectual diplomatist to the Chrysoceras in the person of Belletto Giustiniani, who went, sword in hand, to enforce compliance with the repeated demands of his country. The fleet under Giustiniani battered down a considerable number of the extramural buildings of the Capital, and subjected to ignominious chastisement, under the very eyes of the Emperor, several Greeks who had fallen into his hands.¹ At this stage Andronicos sent word that he was prepared to yield the contested points; and a parley ensued. The result was successful; the compensation claimed by the Venetians for the losses accruing since the commencement of the war in 1294,

¹ Romanin, ii. 339.

which reached in the aggregate the sum of 69,000 *lire di perperi*, after a deduction of 24,000 *lire*, on account of the galleons made prizes by Schiavo near Chio, was allowed after much demur; and on this basis of concession peace was signed at Constantinople, for a term of two years, on the 4th October 1302.

CHAPTER XIX

A.D. 1286-1309

Fresh Changes in the Constitution—Irregularities in the Election of the Great Council—Statistics of the Great Council—Its Aristocratic Complexion—Defeats of the Aristocratic Party during the late Reign (1286)—Renewed Attempts (1296)—Manœuvres of Gradenigo and his Party—Elections of 1296—Proposed Reformation—Its Character—Its Provisional Adoption—Its Permanent Adoption—Farther Changes between 1297 and 1317—*Serrar Del Gran Consejo*—Conspiracy of Marino Bocconio (1300)—Its Instantaneous Suppression—Considerations on the Revolution of 1297-8—War with Padua (1301)—Its Origin—Conclusion of Peace (1304)—Arrival of the Prince of Portugal at Venice (1304)—Relations of the Republic with Candia and the Byzantine Court—Treaty between Gradenigo and Charles de Valois for a new Crusade against Constantinople (1306)—Affairs of Ferrara (1308)—Espousal of the Ghibelline Cause by the Republic—Consequent Rupture with the Holy See—Siege of Ferrara by the Venetians—Its Progress—Threat of Anathema—Preparation of the Bull (October 1308)—Fortitude of the Venetians—Debate in the Great Council on the Ferrarese Question—Its Stormy Character—Unprecedented Scene of Tumult—Continuance of the Siege—Capitulation of the Ferrarese (December 1308)—Fulmination of the Bull (March 1309)—Unshaken Attitude of the Venetians—Their Critical Situation—Attack of the Venetian Garrison at Ferrara by the Plague—Consequent Abandonment of Ferrara (August 1309)—Public Discontent—Character of the Venetian Opposition—Marco Quirini—Bajamonte Tiepolo—Pietro and Jacopo Quirini—Organization of a Conspiracy against the Government—Influence of Private Causes in this Movement—Meetings of the Conspirators—Sentiments of Jacopo Quirini—His Departure for Constantinople—Plans of the Conspirators—Their Progress toward Maturity.

ANOTHER motive which had influenced the Government in listening favourably to the overtures of Matteo Visconti, but which it was perhaps backward in avowing, was that the object which it had partly in view in protracting the war, no longer existed. While, by the dexterity of Gradenigo and his aristocratic advisers, the attention of the people at large was drawn away from domestic concerns to the progress of foreign affairs, a new revolution was being accomplished without much opposition, the magnitude and importance of which were, as it had happened in former instances, by no means sufficiently appreciated, and to the true principles and work-

ings of which all, save a few political circles, were comparative strangers.

Among the remarkable changes which were introduced into the constitutional system in 1173, the most notable had been the institution of the Great Council. This Body was properly composed of 480 members, who were chosen by twelve nominees from the six Wards or *Sestieri*, two nominees representing each ward. The day of election was the 29th September, and the members, though virtually re-eligible for the second and succeeding years, held their seats only from the Michaelmas current to the Michaelmas ensuing. No property qualification was demanded. No distinction of class was ostensibly recognised. At first, no limitation in point of age was specifically made. The attendance of members remained optional. Those who did not choose to vote against a particular measure, or in favour of a particular amendment, freely absented themselves; and the consequence was, that though the number of the Council was nominally carried nearly to 500, it was considered a full House when 350 or 360 could be counted.

In another and more leading respect, while the theory was strict, the practice was lax and informal. Instead of the original system of renewing the Great Council at Michaelmas, from year to year, through the medium of twelve electors, a usage gradually sprang up,¹ from a desire, perhaps, to diminish the tumult inseparable from such occasions, of distributing the process over two half-yearly periods, and of returning at each a moiety only of the full complement; and it not unfrequently occurred that the number in the Legislative Assembly fell short of 250. In 1296 there were 210 only. In the preceding year, 260 had been counted on the benches: while in 1294 as many as 350 were present.

In 1293, a totally different plan was pursued, and additions were made to the Great Council, from time to time, without the slightest apparent deference to constitutional practice. Thus, 100 members were elected on the 27th September, 60 on the 4th November, 68 on the 22nd December, 41 on the 23rd February: representing an aggregate of 269 new members in rather less than five months. There were some cases in which, by a still bolder departure from the

¹ Romanin, ii. 341, *et seq.*

general routine, the procuratorial division of the city into Di Cà and Di Quà Canale was substituted for the more usual method of distribution into Wards, and four electors were appointed, two for Di Cà, and an equal number for Di Quà.

Amid these outgrowths from first principles, which will at once make it apparent that no uniformity of practice was observed down to the present time in this respect, a constant and unvarying tendency was exhibited to recruit the ranks of the Council from a single section of the community. It was not indeed, that any constitutional or statutory limitation yet existed in favour of the nobility, nor was it that an overt attempt was ever made to contest the eligibility of any *cittadino*, who might choose to offer himself as a candidate. But the simple fact was, that the inherent and pronounced leaning toward the aristocratic form of government was having the effect of closing the election by little and little against the plebeians. The legislative assembly, nominally renewable from year to year, and nominally thrown open to every order of society, was virtually becoming more and more irregular in its electoral forms and more and more exclusive in its composite character. The public ear was insensibly familiarised with the same names. A certain number of seats was insensibly perpetuated in the same families. The Contarini, the Morosini, the Foscari,¹ and a few other great houses, were already almost in a position to command by coalition a majority in the ballot; and the trifling innovations, which had been introduced at intervals in the method of election or nomination, were admirably calculated to prepare the mind of the people at large for ulterior changes of a more sweeping and fundamental description.

So far back as the seventh year of the late reign (October, 1286),² a returning disposition had shewn itself to reform. On the 3rd October 1286, a proposition was laid before the Legislature by the three Chiefs of the Forty (*Capi della Quarantia*) to the following effect—"That all such as are elected to seats, either in the Council of Pregadi (*Rogati*), or in the

¹ In 1293, the Great Council counted	Contarini	18
	Morosini	11
	Foscari	10
						<hr/>

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² Sandi, part 2, vol. i. ch. i.

Great Council itself, shall be balloted by the Forty one by one ; and such as obtain a majority of suffrages shall be confirmed, while such as do not, shall be rejected." On a division, this retrospective motion was lost.

The organs of the aristocracy were not disheartened. Two days later (October 5) a second resolution was submitted by the Forty for adoption, namely: "Whereas it was formerly proposed by the Forty that none should be eligible for any Council, unless his father or paternal ancestor should have sat there before him, but that, in the latter contingency, he should in all respects be so eligible, it is now moved, that no person whosoever be admitted, save with the previous approbation of the greater part of the Privy and the Great Councils." In this instance, the Doge himself, from whose democratic tenets such a course was to be anticipated, proposed as an amendment, that the mode of election should remain without alteration ; and, on a division, the amendment of Giovanni Dandolo was carried by a majority of thirty-four.

On the 17th of the same month, after a pause of somewhat less than a fortnight, the Chiefs of the Forty returned undaunted to the contest. A new motion had in the interval been drafted to the ensuing purport: That three electors be at once nominated from the ranks of the Great Council, who shall remain in office till the 1st April 1287, and shall then present a list of candidates to be balloted severally by the Privy Council and the Forty ; and that on the 2nd April three other electors be named, who shall proceed in a similar manner." This proposition met with no better fate than its predecessors ; on it being negatived, directions were given that the three reformations should be formally cancelled in the minutes of the Great Council ; and it seems that these successive failures sufficed to convince the aristocratic party of the futility of expecting any other result, so long as the will and influence of Dandolo and his political friends interposed between them and the accomplishment of their ambitious designs.

The transfer of the Dogeship to other hands in December 1289 wrought an important change in the position of parties ; and although it might be true that the democratic element survived in considerable strength, the voice from the throne, which had lent to it so much moral and material force, was

now mute; and the commanding influence, which it had enjoyed under the late administration, was buried for ever in the grave. But a variety of causes supervened to retard the progress of legislation in the direction of reform; and it was not till 1296 that the great subject was again seriously broached. On the 6th March in that year,¹ while the Græco-Genoese war was occupying a leading share of the public attention, the Chiefs of the Forty, deeming the moment opportune for reopening the question, laid before the Great Council the outline of a new project. The lesson of caution and patience, inculcated by the three signal repulses sustained in 1286, had not been lost upon the Forty. In the interval of five years and a quarter which had elapsed from the decease of Dandolo to the present time, that tribunal, in concert with the Doge Gradenigo and the Privy Council, had been feeling its way, maturing its plans, and watching its chances; and the hope of a triumphant issue was now generally embraced by the Party, of whose principles the existing Government was the accepted exponent. To their extreme disappointment and surprise, however, the attempt once more miscarried; the democratic side of the Assembly coalesced with admirable firmness and unity against the plan, which was found to be of a cognate nature to its predecessors; and the motion for the amendment of the Constitution was negatived for the fourth time.

Between March and September 1296 all allusion to the subject appeared to be studiously avoided. The Tiepoli, Quirini and other members of the popular party, were content to repose on their victory; while the Doge and his supporters thought it politic to postpone any farther discussion on the question until the time came round for the elections (Michaelmas 1296), when the latter had determined, as a last resource, to test the result of a skilfully-conducted canvass. It was their confident expectation that by weakening the democratic element, which had lost less at the elections of 1295 than they were led to anticipate, and by a powerful infusion of new aristocratic blood, the Great Council would be rendered much more amenable.

The Elections of 1296 were conducted on the procuratorial principle. On Michaelmas day the four electors, two for Di

¹ Romanin, vol. ii. ch. 3.

Cà and two for Di Quà, were nominated in the usual manner; and the list of members presented by them in due course, as returned to serve in the new Assembly, contained only *two hundred and ten* names.¹ The amount of money expended in bribery and corruption on this occasion was immeasurably above the average; and the almost unexampled smallness of numbers, which the benches of the Legislative Body for 1296-7 exhibited, stamped upon it the character of a packed assembly. Even its predecessor, which had just dissolved, and which shewed a decrease of ninety from the returns of 1295, and of fifty-three from those of 1293-4, counted as many as 260 members. It was clear that Venice had a Government not very scrupulous of the means by which it attained the favourite object of its ambition.

It was not till the 29th February 1297 that the Chiefs of the Forty deemed their plans sufficiently ripe to invite a return to the debate on the delicate topic of Self-Reform. The draft of a bill in the ensuing sense was laid on the table of the Great Council on that day;—

“In the year 1296 (1297),² on the last day of February, in the Council of the Forty, and afterward in the Great Council. The motion of the Forty is that—

“1. The election of the Great Council, which is appointed to take place on Michaelmas day, shall be conducted in the following manner:—

“2. All such as, during four years passed, may have formed part of the Great Council, shall be balloted severally in the Forty; and as many, as may obtain twelve suffrages or upward, shall be thereby admitted to the Great Council on Michaelmas day next for one year.

“3. If any person (otherwise qualified) happen to miss his election by absence in foreign countries, he may have the option, on his return home, to require the Chiefs of the Forty to put it to that Council, whether he may be a member of the Great Council or not; and the Chiefs of the Forty shall be bound to originate such a motion, and if the candidate obtain twelve suffrages or upward (by ballot in the Forty), he shall be allowed to sit in the Great Council.

“4. Moreover, three electors shall be chosen, who may have power to nominate, in conformity with directions to be

¹ Romanin, *ubi supra*.

² Marin, v. 149-51.

given to them by the College, others (De Aliis), who may not have formed part of the Great Council within the prescribed period; and their nominees shall in like manner be put by the Forty to the ballot, and such as acquire twelve suffrages shall be also invited to sit in the Great Council.

“5. Such three electors shall form part of the Great Council till Michaelmas day ensuing, when three successors with similar functions shall be appointed, who shall belong to the Assembly for an equal time.

“6. The present resolution shall not be revoked, save with the concurrence of five Privy Councillors, of five-and-twenty members of the Forty, and of two-thirds of the Great Council itself.

“7. At the opening of the year, it shall be put on fifteen consecutive days to the Legislative Body on the part of the Privy Council, whether the present resolution be confirmed or not; and the decision of the Great Council shall be binding. And a clause shall be introduced into the Capitulary of the Privy Councillors, rendering it obligatory on them to put such motion under a penalty of ten *lire* [*di piccoli*] each; and the Advocates of the Commune shall be charged to enforce the said penalty.

“8. It shall be imperative on the Chiefs of the Forty, whenever they may design to elect any one to the Great Council, to notify the circumstance to the Forty three days previously, and the Forty shall not presume to proceed to such election, unless three-fourths of them at least be present. And this clause shall be added to the Capitulary (of the Forty); but the Council (of Forty) or their Capitulary withstanding, it is liable to be revoked.”

The measure embodied in the foregoing resolution was avowedly and strictly experimental. The seventh paragraph vested in the Great Council during a fortnight the power of revocation. This was the most conspicuous among the points in which it differed from its predecessors, and it was the one which alone saved it, perhaps, from sharing their fate. There were many voters who, in the absence of any strong convictions on either side, were possibly induced to give their adhesion by a feeling that it would be perfectly competent for them to reconsider their decision; and the measure was ultimately carried.

In this famous resolution, which had now passed provisionally into law, there appeared, even on a close scrutiny, to be nothing which was otherwise than equitable and ingenuous. In the first place, the Government ostensibly sought only to introduce a certain change into the composition of the Great Council and into the method of admittance to that body, which they conscientiously believed to be beneficial to the constitution. Secondly, they demanded for such change no final legislation at present, but merely a fair trial. It was emphatically declared that, in September 1298, it would remain in the power of any member of the Legislature to propose from his seat a relapse to the old system. How far any foregone conclusions, at which the Doge and his advisers might have arrived touching the perpetuation of this temporary change, might be treated by some political circles as an insidious feature in the measure, was another question.

The allotted term of trial, during which the supplemental seats were filled agreeably to the principles indicated in the fourth and fifth clauses, soon passed away; and at length arrived the day, on which the Privy Council was pledged to take the sense of the Legislative Chamber on the resolution of September last.

It was not on Michaelmas day, however, but on the 11th September,¹ when the whole city had been thrown into the last extremity of distress and perplexity by the reports just received from Curzola of the battle fought off that island on the 8th, and when the public mind was therefore by no means disposed to pay attention to irrelevant matters even of such magnitude, that the Government, with greater adroitness than strict constitutional decorum, took occasion to put the question finally to the Great Council, whether the resolution of February 1297 should become permanent or not. The decision unavoidably involved one of two results: on the one hand, it involved the defeat of the Gradenigo Ministry: on the other, the triumph of aristocratic institutions. There were certain leading members of the popular party who were not without hope of the former issue: while the Doge and his supporters sanguinely looked, under the circumstances, to the latter consummation. Upon a resort to the ballot, the

¹ Marin, v. 155.

resolution was confirmed; and the experimental principle, which it sought to establish, was approved in due form. On Michaelmas day, 1299, the same operation was repeated with similar consequences.

From 1297, the date of the first resolution, till 1317, the tide of legislation flowed strongly in the direction of reform.¹ On the 30th September 1298, the Forty procured the sanction of the Great Council to an act, by which no member was qualified to take his seat in the latter assembly or in the Pregadi, until his election had been finally ratified by seven votes at least in the Forty; on the 22nd March 1300² a decree passed the Legislative Chamber, which laid the College under a disability to propose the admission of any new man (*uomo nuovo*) to the Great Council, until the step had obtained the previous concurrence of the Quarantia; and by laws passed in 1307 and 1317 additional rigour was imparted to the system, and the seats in the deliberative body were rendered still more difficult of access. The successive proceedings, which went far to neutralise the liberal operation of the fourth and fifth paragraphs of the resolutions of 1297, completed the process, which is known as the *SERRAR DEL GRAN CONSEIO*, or *the Closing of the Great Council* against new families.

The operation of the Serrar was by no means numerically restrictive. The authors of the project were far indeed from pretending to impose limitations on the numbers returnable to the Council; they did nothing more than determine from what class of the community candidates were henceforward with unvarying strictness to be selected. That its tendency was to expand, not to compress, is proved by the fact that, while in 1296 the Deliberative Body counted, exclusively of persons who occupied seats *ex officio*, such as the Doge, the Privy Council, the Forty, and a few others, 1210 members only, in 1311 the figures had risen to 1017, in 1340 to 1212, and in 1464 to 1634.³

Thus, then, while the arms of the Republic were experiencing reverses, to which her passed annals hardly furnished a parallel, while thousands of her population were pining in the dungeons of Genoa, a great social and political revolution was being enacted in the heart of her capital

¹ Romanin, ii. 3.

² Marin, vi. 234-5.

³ Romanin, ii. 347.

without riot or tumultuous demonstration, though not without bloodshed and not without crime.

Of members of the middle class (*cittadinanza*) who ventured to approach the subject of reform with any manliness of spirit, or who appreciated indeed to any large extent the importance of the actual crisis, the number was exceedingly small; and the voice of complaint or remonstrance was therefore all but unheard. In revolutions there are rarely wanting, however, daring spirits who, inspired by a vague instinct of opposition, essay to divert the tide of political progress from its deeply marked channel; and the crisis of 1297-98 was not without a few examples of such misdirected heroism. The most conspicuous were Giovanni Baldovino¹ and Marino Bocconio, the latter, a person who had already attracted attention by the violent manner in which he inveighed in 1289 against the election of the present Doge, and who had since that time gained a certain notoriety by his consistent denunciation of oligarchical principles. Bocconio does not appear to have been a man of any brilliancy of parts or of much vigour of understanding. Possibly he was little more than a noisy declaimer. But, nevertheless, he enjoyed that kind of influence among the lower classes, which earnestness of purpose, community of sentiment, and the possession of a tolerable fortune, coupled with a winning address and a voluble tongue, might be expected to confer; and there was room to suspect that in a higher quarter, where Bocconio's disgust at the elevation of Gradenigo met with unqualified sympathy, his intrigues and declamations were more than countenanced.

It appears that, one day in the beginning of 1301, Bocconio and some of his following presented themselves without notice at the doors of the Great Council, and demanded admittance, in order that they might have an opportunity of recording their protest against the series of resolutions which had been lately carried. The Doge, who happened to be present at the debate, affected neither surprise nor displeasure at the request; and his Serenity, after some consultation, desired that they should be invited to enter. Of what subsequently passed in the Council no particulars are known to have transpired. But, on the morrow, the adventurous intruders were secretly condemned to death upon a

¹ Sandi, lib. v. c. 2.

charge of seditious machinations against the Government and the Republic; and, within a few hours from the delivery of the sentence, they were hanged to the number of eleven between the Red Columns near the gates of the Palace.

There is another and more thrilling account, which states that they were introduced, five at a time, to be balloted for places in the Council. Baldovino, Bocconio, and three others made the first quota, and were immediately seized and transmitted to the Torricella prison, where they were put to death, stripped, and thrown into a trabocco or oubliette; and so the malcontents, to the number, it is said, of about 150, were treated in turn, while their friends outside deemed that they had all been successful in gaining seats. Later in the evening the members of Council came forth armed; the Doge issued a proclamation ordering all good citizens to disperse on pain of severe punishment; and the corpses were afterward laid in a heap on the Piazza, causing a great stench, and no one was allowed to approach them or to claim their relations. The corpses of eleven of the ringleaders were subsequently suspended between the Red Columns with their heads downward. But this grim legend is disbelieved by Romanin; and it seems in itself improbable, considering all the circumstances. Yet the Doge and his supporters were very resolute and thoroughgoing, and might have entertained a conviction that resistance and retrogression, if successful, might have recoiled on themselves. At the same time, no fewer than forty-two persons, who were suspected of complicity, were banished for ever from their country; and it is a circumstance which has its significance, that among the exiles were members of the Ducal houses of Polani and Malipiero.

To men who, like the late Baldovino and Bocconio, professed to penetrate the crafty designs of the Ducal faction, the complete triumph, which, mainly in consequence of the peculiar and painful situation of the Republic at that juncture, had crowned the efforts of Gradenigo and his friends, was singularly irritating and mortifying. It was then that the advocates of popular government most severely felt the want of a leader who could bring to their cause the commanding weight of a great name; it was then, and perhaps hardly till then, that they became sensible to the full extent of the loss which they had sustained in the death of Giovanni Dandolo. By

his manly tone of independence, however, Bocconio had engaged the respect of many; by his martyrdom he won the sympathy of more; and it was possible that his example and his fate might, at no distant date, stimulate the remaining friends of liberty to more united and more effectual exertions.

The men, who accepted the leadership of the Doge in carrying out the *coup d'état* of 1298, were scarcely in a position to foresee its far-reaching and manifold consequences, and probably anticipated, when the new parliamentary system had become an accomplished fact, an acquiescence, however reluctant, on the part of such as would not suffer any direct prejudice from the change. But the aristocratic party soon found that it had to reckon with a second class of difficulty in the vehement and resolute attitude of Bocconio and his followers, against whom the altered condition of affairs permanently closed the prospect of political influence and official advancement. The masters of the new situation were scarcely at liberty to choose their course in the face of this revolt on the part of a faction, which the possession of pecuniary resources and the countenance at all events of a certain number of patricians, rendered far from contemptible, and we are not to feel surprise at a prompt resort to fierce and even violent measures of repression.

The Revolution is to be viewed both in relation to the influence which it exercised proximately on the Ducal authority, and with respect to the ulterior operation which it had on that of the Great Council. Yesterday the head of the Republic was the Doge; to-day it was the Council of Forty which really swayed her destinies. From the hour at which an assembly of Patricians incautiously suffered the task of remodelling itself to devolve on a committee of patricians, the authority and weight of the Great Council began to decline; and it was in the Quarantia that for the time being the initiative authority was vested.

Assuredly it was not the personal interest of Gradenigo to co-operate in strengthening the hands of a body, whose influence was prejudicial to his own prerogative. It could not be the spontaneous or unconstrained policy of the Doge to act a prominent part in the creation of a power greater than his own. In fact, it is difficult to account for the active support which his Serenity had lent to the recent changes, without

resorting to the supposition that his conduct was swayed by motives of a special character. A notion was prevalent at that day in more than one quarter, that Gradenigo was solely actuated by a rancorous antipathy to the *cittadinanza*; it was alleged, that he neither forgot nor forgave the affronts which he had experienced at the hands of Bocconio and men of a similar school, both anterior and subsequent to his entry into office in 1289; and the numerous party, which had arrayed itself almost from the commencement in hostility to his administration, was fond of repeating and spreading the scandal, that such recollections formed with him a more powerful impulse in later life than either the sense of public duty or the calls of private ambition. It is well known how in all history, how in Italian history especially, passion and policy are ever found playing against each other the game of government, and how actions, ostensibly inspired by the highest motives, spring in reality from underlying sources. It is readily conceivable that the spiteful attacks upon the somewhat youthful successor of Dandolo by his opponents, apart from any share which they might have had in moulding his political creed, would deeply rankle in his mind, and contribute to foster those vindictive sentiments, with which he was so freely and mercilessly taunted by Bocconio and others; but the truth was, that Gradenigo, by his very acceptance of the throne, had, constructively at least, laid himself under an obligation to adopt the traditions of the faction to which he was indebted for his advancement, and that, even if he had been willing, he was in no position to ignore that pledge. On the whole, the fact may have been that, while the party ties of Gradenigo led him to yield his assent to certain extreme reforms, which the Doge of Venice might, in the absence of such pressure, have not been disinclined to defer, the selfish instincts of the man concurred in reconciling him to a sacrifice of the interests of the Crown to the interests of the Aristocracy.

Fundamental as the constitutional tendency of the Republic to aristocratic, or rather oligarchical, government might be, and unavoidable as the great organic reforms, which had been introduced at three distinct epochs between the middle of the 11th and the close of the 13th century, might be confidently pronounced, it appears to be clear that, in the ordinary course of events, each of these changes would have been more

or less delayed, and that the crisis in each case was accelerated by adventitious causes. The disputed succession to a See, the dagger of an assassin, the loss of a battle, might be truly said to have been instrumental in hastening the three Revolutions of 1033, 1172, and 1298.

The fall of Bocconio and his accomplices was followed by a moment of profound tranquillity, happily contrasting with the distracted state of the adjoining peninsula. With all the great Powers of the Terra-Firma the Republic was now at peace. With the Byzantine Court her relations were cemented by the Treaty of Constantinople, with Genoa by the Treaty of Milan. None of the minor Italian States afforded her any ground for anxiety. Even with Aquileia she had, through the intercession of Padua, made terms in 1291. This calm, supervening at a season, when the last spark of democratic opposition to the Gradenigo party seemed to have been extinguished, and when, besides, external distractions had lost to a large extent that charm which they secretly possessed in the eyes of the aristocratic reformers from 1295 till 1298, was hailed as peculiarly auspicious and opportune. Unhappily it was not of lengthened duration.

The quarter, from which a recommencement of hostilities was to be foreboded, was Padua herself, the peacemaker of 1291. With the alleged object of protecting their salterns, the Paduans prepared to construct a fortress on the skirts of the Lagoon, between Chioggia and Monte-Albano, at Peta-de Bo¹ without the concurrence of the Republic, which should have unquestionably had a voice in the matter; the latter consequently lodged a formal protest against the measure; a conference and an explanation ensued without bringing any satisfactory result; and the Government of the Doge ultimately proceeded to defeat the obvious manœuvre by throwing a fortified dyke across the boundary line in such a manner as to intercept the sea-water on its way to the Padua salterns. To defend the approaches to this work, a body of troops was dispatched under Roberto Morosini and Filippo Belegno; and the violation of the territory of Padua shortly afterward by a larger force under Giovanni Soranzo, the Hero of Caffa, was treated as tantamount to a declaration of war. The movements which followed the decisive step of Soranzo belonged

¹ Sanudo, fol. 581.

to that class of hostilities, which were constantly recurring in a country split up into a large number of powerful and jealous municipalities. The contest was unattended by material loss or gain on either side. The Venetian government, upon whose mind the memory of recent domestic events remained deeply imprinted, displayed on the present occasion more than ordinarily keen distrust of its servants; Soranzo was replaced by Eufrosio Morosini, who had fought at Curzola, and by several other officers at unusually frequent intervals; and this policy, which was manifestly designed to guard against the organisation of a conspiracy between the disaffected spirits in the Capital and the chief of the Army at Padua to overthrow the existing Ministry, chilled the zeal, and paralysed the exertion, of the troops. At the close of a year or eighteen months, however, a reconciliation was effected between the two Powers, through the instrumentality of Mantua and Treviso; and a treaty of peace was concluded on the 5th of October 1304, on the basis of mutual restitution and indemnity, with exchange of prisoners.¹

An unexpected incident soon assisted the Government in effacing the remembrance of an unpopular war. In the summer of 1304, the son of the King of Portugal paid a visit to Venice. The Doge and a suite of five-and-twenty Senators advanced so far as Malghera to meet the Prince; the progress of his Highness to San Giorgio Maggiore was attended by an unusually large concourse of persons of every condition; the public rejoicings extended over two or three days; the visitor inspected the Arsenal, which had then been recently enlarged, and all the other features of interest in the City; and, on his departure, he was accompanied by Gradenigo and his retinue to Malamocco. It is interesting to think that on this occasion the Prince may have seen Marco Polo, and received from his own hands a copy of his *Travels*, the perusal of which formed the earliest stimulus to Portuguese enterprise and greatness.

In the succeeding year, the affairs of Candia, which had long worn a threatening complexion, were brought to a settlement by a treaty concluded with Alexis Calergi (April 1305). The generous instincts, which had prompted Calergi to repel with indignation the advances made to him by the enemies

¹ Romanin, ii. 6-7.

of Venice in the last Genoese war, did not lessen the repugnance to the yoke of the Republic, which he shared with the majority of his countrymen; the Cortazzi and other great Candiot families, who had never ceased to brood over their wrongs and to sigh for their lost liberty, still continued to swell the ranks of the rebels; it was known that a breath only was sufficient to rekindle the smothered flame of insurrection; and there was no lack of political prophets at Venice, who saw in that unfortunate territorial acquisition an everlasting source of embarrassment and outlay. Nevertheless, all immediate ground of apprehension was removed by the Treaty of 1305, by which, among other conciliatory measures, Calergi himself was placed in possession of the temporalities of certain Sees in the island; and there can be little doubt, that these concessions were intimately connected with the difficulties experienced at the outset of the negotiation.

The policy of the Republic toward the Byzantine Court, during the same period, was remarkable for its trimming and vacillating character: nor was it particularly hard to divine the cause. The fact was, that public opinion still remained in the same divided and fluctuating state upon the Eastern question, in which it had been during the negotiations with Michael Palæologos; the disposition to promote the restoration of the Latins, which had manifested themselves in so unequivocal a manner in 1261, so far from having lost strength, existed in 1305 in increased force; and the ambitious hope of achieving the second conquest of Constantinople, which had been suspended by the fall of the House of Courtenay, experienced a revival on the rise of the House of Valois. By the recent union of Charles of Valois, brother of Philip le Bel, with Catherine, sole daughter and heiress of Philip Courtenay, Count of Namur, the last male representative of that imperial stem, these two illustrious families were merged; and pretensions, which it was not likely that he would neglect to prosecute, were acquired by the French prince to the throne of the Palæologi. It consequently occasioned very slight surprise in European political circles, when it became known as a certainty that, notwithstanding the renewal of the truce between the Greeks and Venetians in October 1302 for a decennial term, a treaty, setting its predecessor totally aside, had been concluded in December 1306 between Charles of Valois and the

Doge, of which the leading and undisguised aim was to wrest the sceptre of the Lower Empire from its present incapable hands, and to place upon the throne the husband of Catherine Courtenay. The signatories mutually pledged themselves to pursue the objects, with which the undertaking was to be set on foot, to their full attainment. Charles agreed to furnish men; Venice agreed to furnish ships. It remained at the option of the Doge to command the fleet in person, or to name a lieutenant. The cost was declared to be equally divisible between the contracting parties; and the proposed expedition was appointed to sail from Brindisi in March 1307.

At Constantinople itself and at Genoa the sensation produced by the report of this new coalition was alike profound. It was possible that the ulterior consequences of such a movement, if the Valesian prince could prevail on the French to aid his efforts and recognise his acts, might hardly yet be foreseen in their full extent; but its operation on the Treaty of Milan (1299) was too self-evident to be misunderstood.

But, in the end, the convention of 1306 with Charles of Valois was as barren of result as the convention of 1281 with Charles of Anjou; and the alarm created by the Franco-Venetian League proved itself, as in a former instance, wholly chimerical. Apart from the disordered and embarrassed condition, in which the French nation found itself at the opening of the 14th century, the inability of Charles to meet his engagements really arose from his want of support among his own countrymen, coupled with the sudden death of his wife, through whom alone he could advance any claim¹ to the Lower Empire; the barons of France in truth, the bosoms of whose grandsires had glowed in 1202 with enthusiasm for a similar expedition, were more intent in 1304 on watching their own affairs and defending their own interests; the gentry, who in 1204 had hardly existed as a class, were now sensible that they had privileges to secure and liberties to advance; France under Philip le Bel was no longer what she had been under Philip Augustus; and after repeated messages of an expostulatory character from the Venetian government, which may have too much relied on the influence and representative power of Charles, and a

¹ Sanudo Torsello, *Secreta*, chap. xviii. p. 73.

series of evasive replies, the matter was suffered to drop. Almost immediately afterward, the suspended relations with Andronicos II. were resumed by a mutual effort of dissimulation.

Whether the conduct of Charles of Valois was to be attributed to an unpardonable recklessness in subscribing conditions which he had never been in a position to ratify, or whether it simply proceeded from an insolent perfidy, the Republic had equal right to be indignant at her treatment in a transaction in which, so far as she was concerned, the risk and outlay would have been at least on a par with any accruing advantage. For in the first place her Government had pledged her to share the cost with her French ally; it had bound her to maintain at her own expense a fleet of observation in the Mediterranean; and it had committed her to a contest which, notwithstanding the express provision in the second clause of the Treaty of Milan, would have assuredly made that treaty within a month after the departure from Brindisi as worthless as the parchment on which it was written. It was also to be considered that by the contemplated war Charles proposed to acquire a crown, to which he had the feeblest of titles, and that the Venetians merely aimed at the recovery of legitimate privileges, of which they had been wrongfully dispossessed.

While the twin questions of the breach of the Treaty of 1306 and of the abandonment of the Greek Crusade were still continuing to occupy diplomatists, the affairs of Lombardy remained as distracted as ever. The peninsula was divided against itself; its cities and towns, with very few exceptions, groaned under the oppressive rule of a factious and turbulent nobility; and instead of emulating Venetian progress, the Lombards were suffering their civilization to recede. It signified little that to the Attilas and the Alarics had succeeded in the course of time the Gonzagas, the Eccelini, the Este. The cycle of the Huns and the Goths might have passed away; but the reign of tyranny and persecution was perennial; and in the wrongs of the Italians, who fought at Basentello and at Legnano, there was only too close an affinity to the wrongs of the men whom Dante knew, and of the contemporaries of Petrarch and Boccaccio.

On the last day of January 1308, Azzo III., Lord of

Ferrara, whose family had exercised sovereign power in that part of the peninsula since the close of the twelfth century, died somewhat suddenly at Ferrara. The departed nobleman was the second in descent from that Azzo d'Este, whom the Republic had restored to his possessions in 1240 after the defeat of the Imperialists under Salinguerra Torelli; by his will, his grandchild Fulco, the offspring of his natural son Frisco, was named, in exclusion of his brothers, Francesco and Aldrovandino, his successor; and during the long minority of Fulco, his father, who is said to have been the fruit of an amour with a Venetian lady of high family, was tacitly approved by the Ferrarese as his guardian and their Regent. Francesco d'Este, however, a man of ambitious character, did not appear disposed to allow his nephew to remain undisturbed in the enjoyment of his vicarious office. But, being in his own person hardly capable of preferring a superior claim, and the authority of Frisco being already too firmly established to be overthrown by his unaided exertions, the idea opportunely occurred to the uncle, that his objects might be equally served by resuscitating an obscure and obsolete right of the Apostolic See to the Este property. To Clement V., who had then lately transferred the seat of the Papacy to Avignon, he unfolded his scheme for seizing so matchless an occasion for enforcing the indefeasible pretensions of Rome to the possession of Ferrara; and he declared, on his own part, a perfect willingness to hold the city in fief of his Holiness. The assertion of a dormant title to such a temporality was a proposition, which the Pope embraced with avidity; the suggestions of Francesco were met by Clement V. in a corresponding spirit; and injunctions were forthwith transmitted to Cardinal Arnaldo Pelagrua, Legate of Bologna, to second the Guelphic cause to the full extent of his resources. Pelagrua lost no time in departing for the new seat of war with a considerable body of troops; and the Regent, apprehensive that his strength might be overmatched, and distrustful of the constancy of popular favour, threw himself into the citadel of Tedaldo, which commanded the burgh. His departure was closely followed by the arrival of Francesco and his ally the cardinal legate, who duly entered into military occupation of Ferrara, and were favourably received by the Ferrarese,

who fondly hoped to find the government of Rome milder than that of Venice.¹

Meanwhile, upon the first intimation of the illness of Azzo III., which reached Venice about the first week in January 1308, the Republic, anxious to secure her immunities in that municipality, had accredited to the Marquis an embassy, which was sagaciously furnished with a double set of instructions. If on the one hand, upon its arrival at Ferrara, Azzo still lived, its duties were understood to be confined to a condolence with him on his malady, an inquiry, in the name of the Doge, respecting his actual state of health, and a general offer of friendly service. Should it happen, on the other hand, that when they reached their destination, he was no more, or even was in his last moments, the Deputies were directed to avoid the acknowledgment of any successor, to ascertain the temper of parties, with the extent of the popular bias toward each, and to report the result of their observations from time to time to their Government. It was fortunate that they were prepared to meet either contingency. For when they entered the city, the 31st January had passed, and Azzo had already expired. The mission therefore resolved itself into a reconnoitring tour; and, under the circumstances, its stay was as brief as possible.

A story was current at this time that, on his death-bed, Azzo, too truly anticipating that his brother Francesco, in whose character no one was better read, would dispute the succession to his estates, and bearing in mind the friendship which had subsisted between the Republic and his grandfather, commended Ferrara and his grandson to the Venetians, and that the latter, by a solemn act of Council, accepted the weighty and delicate trust. It was to the Venetians, at all events, his reputed countrymen on his mother's side, that Frisco, baffled in his calculations by the dexterous manœuvres of his relative, and unexpectedly driven from a position in which he had thought himself secure, now applied for sympathy and help. He omitted not to inculcate on the Republic the interest, which she had in the preservation of the Ghibelline power at Ferrara. He depicted the hazard which she would incur of losing her local privileges,

¹ Sanudo Torsello, *Letter to the Archbishop of Ravenna*, March 1326; G. D. per Francos, ii. 305.

or of being constrained to enjoy them, at least, under certain obnoxious restrictions, if the City should fall under the pontifical government. On being reinstated through her instrumentality, he not only guaranteed the integrity of her ancient charters, but he promised many additional franchises. Of general professions of amity and devotion the Regent was lavish; and he concluded by suggesting that the strategical movements of any troops, which the Ducal Government might decide on sending up the Po to his aid, would be facilitated by placing them in possession of Tedaldo, of which he at present remained master.¹ This fortress was of high value to the Republic, inasmuch as it commanded the Po, which flows between it and Ferrara.²

The result of this appeal, to which collateral influences might be expected to bring some additional force, was awaited by Frisco and his rival with almost equal anxiety. To the former it was highly material to know, how far the Venetian policy might have changed with the change in the state of the Peninsula. It was notorious that the object of the Republic, in giving her adhesion to the Lombard League, and on several other occasions in upholding the pretensions of the Guelphs, had been the subversion of the imperial power rather than any predilection for popular institutions; this object for which she had in 1177 made common cause with the Apostolic See, and had afforded to Alexander III. an asylum on a soil untrodden by the foot of a conqueror, was for the present, at any rate, thoroughly accomplished; and it was now to be tested, whether the Government would consider the attempted encroachment of the Papacy on the Po a sufficient ground for embracing the Ghibelline cause, and for plunging into a war, of which it was alike impossible to limit the theatre and duration.

The case appeared to the Great Council to be one of those in which a false step could not be taken without involving the most serious consequences. It was competent for the Republic either to observe a strict neutrality, or to second by armed interference the claim of Frisco d' Este. There were many in the Legislative Body who, when the question was formally submitted for deliberation, argued with vehemence against a course of policy which was not less invidious

¹ *Chronicon Estense*, 365 et seq.

² Sanudo, *Itinerario*, 52.

than costly. They deprecated any participation in a quarrel, where they would have a bastard, and not impossibly a parricide,¹ as a confederate, and as an enemy the Church herself. But the views, which the Doge and his immediate supporters thought proper to entertain, were different. The Ducal party imagined, that none who had the greatness and glory of their country at heart could desire to neglect such an excellent opportunity of gaining a permanent footing in the Peninsula by the consolidation of the Venetian position at Ferrara; vigorous resolution and skilful management alone were requisite to transform that municipality into an integral though outlying portion of the Dogado. They conceived that, apart from any schemes of annexation, the scene of the disputed succession lay too immediately in their neighbourhood to warrant them in suffering the overt aim of Clement at temporal aggrandizement in such a direction to remain unchecked; nor did they allow either that the See had any legitimate claim to Ferrara, or that there was any just cause why they should not prosecute their own right, "inasmuch as the Veronese or the Mantuans would be too happy to have Ferrara for themselves, if they had the chance."² These considerations, in which there was no want of soundness or truth, were suffered to be final; and the Opposition, whose repugnance to the war might be fairly suspected of springing, to some extent, from factious or personal motives, found itself in a defeated minority.

On the 25th June 1308, an extraordinary meeting of the Great Council was convened, at which it was resolved that a special Board of Seven Sages should be appointed, "to examine and inquire into the affair of Ferrara."³ On the 5th of the ensuing month, a decree passed the same assembly for the embodiment of the militia of Venice and Chioggia, and for the completion of all necessary arrangements for the approaching contest within a stated period; and on the 11th, a new Commission of War issued, directed to twenty Sages therein enumerated.

About the first week in July, Giovanni Soranzo, whose talents were now fully appreciated, was sent to Ferrara with the first draught of troops; and the Venetians did not long

¹ This charge, however, was untrue. Sandi, vi. p. 53.

² *Chronicon Parmense*, Murat., ix. 878.

³ Romanin, iii. 13.

delay to open a vigorous and well-sustained assault upon the city itself. The Venetian main position was at Francolino, between the two arms into which the Po here divides itself.

Meanwhile, Pelagrua had been maturing his plans in concert with Francesco, and had received reinforcements from Florence, Lucca, Ancona, Padua, and various other quarters, in which the Papal influence was paramount, or in which a disaffection existed to Venice. But the preparations of the Cardinal were still imperfect, and he continued to be desirous of gaining time. Upon being apprised of the significant proceedings in the Great Council on the 25th June last, his Eminence therefore immediately sent a cajoling message to the Doge, in which he complained of the threatened aggression, exhorted his Serenity to reflect upon the course which his Government was pursuing, and obscurely intimated the possibility of arriving without bloodshed at an adjustment of the Venetian claims on the late Marquis. To this communication, which was referred for decision to the newly created Council of Twenty, that tribunal returned (July 8) the laconic answer "that the Republic was not contemplating any change of policy."² At that point the negotiation halted. But after the lapse of seven or eight weeks, during which the Venetian artillery at Tedaldo continued to harass with an uninterrupted shower of missiles the troops of Pelagrua, dispatches arrived (September 2) from the Court of Avignon, in which the demands of the Cardinal were reproduced in an amplified form.

Upon being opened at the Palace, in the presence of the Grand Chancellor and the Ducal Notary, on the 3rd September, the new papers were found to raise points of such gravity, that it was deemed necessary to refer their decision to an extraordinary Giunta, which was convoked on the 5th.³ His Holiness insisted on the immediate evacuation of Tedaldo, on the recall of all the Venetian troops, and on the award of full redress for injuries sustained. But the Republic was impassable; and the answer with which the Papal envoys were dismissed was that, "Ferrara, released by the arms of the Republic from the tyranny of Salinguerra in 1240, had returned under the domination of the House of Este; that the latter was competent to dispose of the inheritance at will;

¹ Galibert, *Histoire de Venise*, p. 77.

² Romanin, iii. 23.

³ *Ibid.*

and that Frisco having (on behalf of his ward) ceded the city to Venice, no right resided in any one to gainsay the possession." The object, with which the two strangers from Avignon had come, had in the meantime gained publicity; and so violent became the popular manifestation in the thoroughfares which the envoys were obliged to traverse on their departure, that their lives were more than once jeopardised.

It was a circumstance, which partly arose from an imperfect knowledge of administrative economy in those days, and partly from constitutional causes, that the executive authority ordinarily vested in the Doge and the Privy Council was too circumscribed and responsible to allow a proper latitude of action in cases of emergency; and as the belligerent relations with other countries gradually increased in frequency and in complication, it had grown into a political necessity to call into existence a special Board of War. The prospect of a serious rupture with the Guelphs of Ferrara had already become in the summer of 1308 so imminent that, on the 11th July, the latter measure was carried out by the issue of the usual commission from the Great Council; but it was not till a month after the delivery of the ultimatum to the Papal ambassadors that, by a solemn act of the Legislature (October 7), the Doge was enabled by an enlargement of his prerogative to declare war against Ferrara, and to exercise, by the advice and with the concurrence of the Privy Council, the three chiefs of the Forty, and the War Department or Zonta (Giunta), all other acts of sovereignty. The Legislative Body merely reserved to itself the right of concluding peace.

Disconcerted in its attempt to intimidate the Venetians, the Papacy determined to resort to another species of tactics. It was not long subsequently to the dismissal of the propositions of Clement himself, that Pelagrua, on behalf of his Holiness, announced his readiness to cede Ferrara to the Venetians, on the condition that the latter should acknowledge the seigniorial rights of the Apostolic See, and should consent to pay into the Roman treasury, as the tenants of the Church, an annual sum of 20,000 ducats. This sudden and unexpected change of ground appeared to be symptomatic of growing alarm on the part of the Cardinal, of his supporters, and of the Ferrarese generally, at the probable result of the siege; it seemed quite within the limits of possibility, that

a few more days would bring an unconditional surrender; and it was under such an impression that the Government rejoined somewhat evasively¹ that "as the ordinary revenue of the municipality was by no means considerable, and as there was no method, except by recourse to vexatious and unjust imposts, of raising so large an amount, it was not in their power to meet the suggested arrangement."

That rebuff, which conclusively denoted the resolute persistence of the Venetians in their design, exasperated the Papal party beyond measure. A few days only after the receipt of the answer, Pelagrua forwarded (October 16) an excommunicating Bull. By that instrument the City of Venice, the Doge, the Privy Council, the Podesta of Chioggia, and all who, in contempt of repeated admonitions, had aided, advised, or countenanced the defence of Ferrara against the arms of the Church, were laid under civil and religious disabilities. The sequestration was decreed of all property acquired and held by the Venetians in Ferrara; all treaties, leagues and covenants whatsoever between the Republic and other Powers were annulled;² all intercourse with the Dogado, even to the supply of the necessaries of life, was prohibited; and any privileges accorded in times passed by the Holy See to the Church of Venice were cancelled or revoked. A space of ten days, however, during which the operation of the interdict was suspended, was still vouchsafed to give the Venetians leisure to weigh with due care the question before them, to appreciate the extreme gravity of their situation, and to retract their ill-advised ultimatum. But a voice from Avignon sternly declared that if, on the expiration of that term, after all the gracious indulgence extended to the Republic, she exhibited the same callous and unchristian obduracy, the sentence, which had been pronounced, would be infallibly executed.³

This was indeed a widely different step from that, on which the Government had been partly led to count. Well as its members knew the firmness and violence of Clement's nature, they had hardly conceived that his Holiness would allow himself to proceed to such an extremity. The threatened launch of the Bull was calculated, however, to inspire

¹ Romanin, iii. 15.

² Muratori, *Annali*, viii. 41.

³ De Monacis, lib. xiv. (Add. MSS., 8574).

the utmost alarm. It was not so much from their own estimate of this comparatively novel class of weapon, which was unusually qualified, that the Venetians formed their judgment, but from the character of the notions which they knew to be received respecting ecclesiastical censures by less sceptical communities. It was that they were too intimately conversant with the tone of religious feeling in other countries toward the edicts of the Vatican, as well as too familiar with the latent or underlying tendency which existed to make obedience to Rome a subterfuge for more worldly motives, to treat with levity the danger which hung over them; and while the Government, echoing perhaps the personal sentiments of Gradenigo, professed an inclination to persevere in their aggressive policy, the Doge and his advisers concurred on the whole in the expediency of submitting the Ferrarese question in its present phase to the Great Council.

A special sitting of that august Body was held accordingly for the express purpose. The Doge, who opened the discussion, premised by tracing the question from its origin down to the point, which it had now reached. He afforded the Assembly a detailed exposition of the actual posture of affairs. The course, which he had pursued in favouring the pretensions of Frisco d'Este against his uncle and the Apostolic See, his Serenity vindicated on the ground that he had felt it to be his duty not to neglect such an opportunity of aggrandising his country. He sought to impress on his auditory that such opportunities were of very unfrequent occurrence; and it still more rarely happened that governments knew how to use them. He then proceeded to explain the nature of the right which they had acquired over Ferrara by virtue of its spontaneous cession to them by their ally for a valuable consideration.¹ In assuming an hostile attitude toward the Republic, and in directing against her a measure so excessively harsh, Gradenigo declared his persuasion that the Pontiff had been influenced by bad councillors and false information; and the Doge thought they might rest assured that, so soon as his Holiness could be brought to a correct view of the circumstances, he would soften his resentment, and rescind the anathema. He reminded his listeners in conclusion how the

¹ The Doge here must be understood to have referred to the pension which Frisco was to receive, to indemnify him for the loss of his revenue at Ferrara.

Apostolic See, so far from having any pretext for regarding them with animosity, owed a debt of the deepest gratitude to the Venetians for the affectionate zeal which they had exhibited for its welfare in the past. History bore the Republic testimony, that she was a dutiful daughter of the Church, and, when necessity pressed, the unflinching champion of the Christian Faith.

Such were the views of the party of which the Doge was the exponent. So soon as Gradenigo had resumed his seat, Jacopo, one of the sons of Giovanni Quirini della Casa Maggiore, took up the debate. The new speaker was a nobleman of singular probity and courage, who had been insensibly drawn by family ties into the outer circle of the Opposition, but who was far from approving the extreme tenets of his brother Marco and the other members of the same school. The politics of Jacopo Quirini were of an unusually moderate and independent cast. He had declined to pledge himself to either of the parties, by which he beheld his country divided: nor was he an aspirant to the confidence of either. He deprecated all violent remedies as worse than the evils which they professed to cure; and he discountenanced all measures of a revolutionary complexion. Still his rank and his high character could not fail to procure for him a large share of influence and respect. He was the Nestor of the Great Council. There was one point indeed, and one only, on which the connexions and relatives of Quirini enjoyed his unreserved sympathy; and that point was his distrust of the Executive, not unaccompanied, perhaps, by a certain distaste to Gradenigo himself. It was on such an occasion as the present, when he could feel that patriotism called him to be her vindicator, and that he was rising to advocate the cause of truth and justice without pandering to the intrigues of a factious minority, that this noble-hearted and intrepid personage became half unconsciously the best of partisans.

Quirini, chiefly addressing himself to the task of refuting the proposition just advanced by the Doge, earnestly inculcated on the Council the broad and fundamental principle, that the rulers of the State were bound to govern themselves in all their transactions by the fear of God and by reverence for the Church. He laid down with slightly dogmatic emphasis, that human enterprises conducted under such auspices could alone

experience or deserve success. He reminded his hearers that it was their duty, before committing themselves to war, to investigate with care the source of the present disagreement, and to assure themselves of the legitimacy of a quarrel with the Holy See. On his own part, he had no hesitation in averring that, independently of other points, a juncture when the Republic was only beginning to rally from a succession of losses and calamities, appeared to him singularly inopportune for re-entering on a policy, of which it could not be necessary to insist on the costliness and hazard; and he thought that, if the Venetians continued, in defiance of all warning and intreaty, to pursue such a policy, they would provoke against themselves, at no very distant date, an Italian Coalition.

A scene of riot followed, and partly accompanied, the delivery of this speech. In an assembly usually remarkable for its dignified placidity all sounds were soon rendered inaudible by a distracting din of voices. Several speakers ineffectually attempted to gain a simultaneous hearing. The two political sections unsparingly vilified each other. The Government organs stigmatised the Opposition as a Guelphic and traitorous cabal. The Opposition christened the supporters of Gradenigo Ghibellines and Jews. Coarse gibes and foul insinuations were conveyed from one to the other in language principally marked by its scurrility. From moment to moment, the uproar increased, and the mutual exasperation grew more incapable of constraint. At last a few members on both sides, goaded into fury by taunts and sarcasms, did not scruple to bring their fists into play; and a few hard blows were actually exchanged. Ultimately the brawl was appeased by the exercise of considerable tact on the part of the Doge and his friends; and order was restored. The debate on the Ferrarese question is alleged to have furnished the first occasion on which the terms GUELPH and Ghibelline were employed at Venice in the sense of party nicknames; and it was, perhaps, the first instance in which gentlemen were allowed to convert the floor of the Great Council Chamber into an arena for pugilism, and to assail each other with opprobrious invective. It is instructive, at a period so immediately subsequent to the Revolution of 1298, to lift the curtain from such a picture, and to catch a glimpse of characteristics so strangely at

variance with the received notions of a Venetian Legislative Assembly.

Notwithstanding the sympathy which was felt in many quarters with Quirini, the supporters of that nobleman possessed, however, neither the strength nor the unanimity requisite to carry their point; and the Government prevailed on the Legislature to accept their passed policy and to sanction its continuance. The siege operations were concurrently proceeding with unslackened vigour; and the Ferrarese began seriously to despond. At length, on the 2nd of November 1308, the Venetian commander received notice of their readiness to capitulate. They proposed, on the one hand (reserving always the rights of the Church), to receive a Venetian Podesta; to consent to the retention by the Republic of Tedaldo with its approaches and outworks, as a pledge for the fulfilment of treaties; to pay the Venetian garrison of that fortress; and to revoke the outlawry of Frisco and his adherents. On the other hand, the Ferrarese demanded at Venice an equalisation of rights with the subjects of the Republic; the annulment of an outstanding debt; a guarantee for their independence and freedom from farther molestation. The paper, embodying this basis of submission, was laid before the Great Council in due course, and received the assent of that assembly on the 3rd December; and on the ensuing day the appointment of Giovanni Soranzo as the new Podesta of Ferrara was ratified. On the entry of the Allies into the city, Frisco regained his position without regaining his popularity; the first discovery of his clandestine intrigues with the Signory had irretrievably damaged the character of the Regent in the eyes of his townsmen; and so strong became the current of feeling against him, that he was afraid to stir abroad without an armed escort. The Republic, who had made Frisco her tool, and who now made him her pensioner, had no objection to surround a man whom she mistrusted with a bodyguard which, while it protected his person, might act as a spy upon his movements.

During the remainder of the winter and the early spring of the following year (1309), the Government continued to cement and consolidate its power at Ferrara. With this object the War Commission, which already promised to become a new element in the administrative system, was twice

confirmed (December 31, 1308, and March 17, 1309); and for some time, even in the presence of the violent and traditional repugnance of the Ferrarese to her yoke, the Republic preserved the ascendancy which she had acquired, without interference on the part of either of Clement himself or of Pelagrua. But in the latter half of March 1309, this prospect was overclouded by the receipt of advices from Avignon, that his Holiness was in no mood to swerve from his declared resolution, and that the publication of the Bull might be daily expected.

At length, on the 27th of the month, the blow which had been suspended over the Republic since the 16th October last, was struck.¹ On that day, the Bull was published. The Republic, the Doge, his Councillors, and all who had rendered her aid, countenance or advice, were placed out of the pale of the Church. The property, goods, and chattels² of the islanders at Ferrara and elsewhere were declared to be sequestrated. Their treaties were dissolved. They were released from their oath of fealty to the Doge. It was declared unlawful to trade with them, eat with them, or converse with them. Every one was at liberty to take them and sell them into slavery; they became incapable of giving testimony, of making wills, of succeeding to benefices. Their clergy were commanded to leave the Dogado within ten days from the expiration of the month of grace, which was still vouchsafed.

The moral force which the condition of society lent to such a measure was immense. The obsequious blindness, with which Europe followed the dictates of Rome in the 13th and 14th centuries, elevated the Papal interdict into an engine of fearful potency. It paralysed trade; it dried up the sources of industrial wealth; it laid a country under every civil and religious disability; it shed over society an atmosphere of gloom; it affected every relation of life. It blanched the cheek, checked the pulsation of the heart, and caused the lip to quiver—the most courageous quailed before it. At home, it fomented agitation, gave colour and pretext to the worst motives, and evoked all the latent distempers of the public mind. Abroad, it legitimised rebellion, imparted to moribund

¹ Romanin, iii. 20.

² *Vitae Pontificum*; Murat., iii. part 1, 675, and part 2, 446.

antipathies a new vitality, and transformed wavering allies into open enemies. Of such a character was the weapon, which Clement V. had launched against the Republic; and such was the posture in which Venetian affairs stood in May 1309.

The thirty days, which were still extended to the offending State to enable it to arrive at a final and binding decision, passed away, as might have been foreseen, without bringing any change in the relative position of parties. The Signory contented herself with pleading for the second time a misconception of circumstances, and demanding a review of the Ferrarese question on a modified basis; but the embassy, which was sent to Avignon on this errand on the 26th March, one day anterior to the publication of the Bull, was dismissed by the irritated Pontiff without an audience; and on the 7th May the interdict came into full operation. The clergy soon declined to celebrate mass, to administer the sacrament, or to perform Divine worship; and many at once quitted the Dogado. The churches were for the most part closed. All religious observances were suspended. Abroad, as the Government had not failed to anticipate, the licence conferred by the Bull was ignobly abused. Everywhere the same jealousy was betrayed of Venetian prosperity, and the same disposition evinced itself to unite in crushing a State, which was guilty of being too thriving and too powerful. The Kings of England, France, Arragon, and Sicily, had the weakness to connive at the atrocious plot. All the Venetian residents in those countries were despoiled and maltreated. Their property was seized; their counters were pillaged; an embargo was laid on their ships. They were excluded from the Christian communion. They were disqualified from executing any civil contract whatever. In several parts of Italy the Venetians were put to death; and at Genoa a large number of prisoners were shipped as slaves.

It was idle to disparage the gravity of the crisis.¹ The peril to which the Doge and his countrymen were exposed was indisputably of the highest magnitude. In any other European Power, indeed, resistance to the Pontifical will would have been madness. The England of Edward II.,

¹ A short account of these transactions is found in *Hist. Cortus.* lib. i. c. x. (Murat., xii.)

though less exposed by her geographical position to hostile continental movements, would have soon bowed her neck to the storm. The France of Philip le Bel would have yielded, perhaps, a still prompter submission. Even the Emperor, warned by more than one signal example, would have paused, before he entered on a fresh struggle with the Holy See. Yet the Republic, single-handed, unbefriended, encompassed by enemies who envied her greatness, and were plotting her ruin, determined, rather than to abandon her pretensions, to brave the utmost resentment of the Papacy.

Nor did the Signory unadvisedly take this desperate course. She assured herself that her resources were abundant, and that in the courageous loyalty and devotion of her citizens implicit confidence might be reposed. She assured herself that her consistent religious tolerance would enable her to draw from the Mohammedan countries, to a certain extent, those supplies which were to be denied to her by the members of her own communion. If sacrifices were to be made, if great odds were to be eventually opposed, the Government had unlimited faith in the patriotism of the people at large; and when danger pressed, as it had already twice pressed at Albiola, as it had so lately seemed to impend at Curzola, it felt that the Republic had the best of allies in her own unconquerable heart.

Among the manifold evils which the interdict entailed, none was more keenly felt than its disabling operation on the exercise of religion. But, although a certain and not inconsiderable proportion of the more independent Venetian clergy was induced to yield implicit submission to the measure, and although the more elaborate and imposing services of the Church were temporarily discontinued, we should err in thinking that the Papal Bull was universally construed with strictness. For it must be remembered that the somewhat peculiar system of lay patronage, by which the Venetian hierarchy was so widely governed, possessed a powerful tendency of a counteractive kind. Venice was a Power, whose civil and ecclesiastical institutions were blended in a manner which was almost to be regarded as anomalous. There was probably no country where the political and everyday life of the people breathed so thoroughly a spirit of religion, or where religion was at the same time so thoroughly secularised.

There was no country where the Roman Catholic faith was symbolized by more splendid rites, and none where the Roman Catholic priesthood was so complete a cipher. The influence over clerical discipline and preferment, which the right of patronage vested in the laity, more especially in the parochial districts, was enormous. That influence had its drawbacks and its vices. It was very liable to abuse. It was too apt to place the clergy at the arbitrement of personal or party caprice. But there is ample room to believe that it was exerted, in the present instance, to a highly salutary end, and that the Republic was rescued from an impending convulsion mainly by the resistance of lay patrons in the Ghibelline interest to the injunctions of the Holy See. Such contumacy ran small hazard of being treated with intolerance, or of being viewed otherwise than with complacency, by the Government of Gradenigo.

On the day of the receipt of the news from Avignon (April 9, 1309), the Signory transmitted instructions to the Podesta of Ferrara to retire to Tedaldo, and there to remain in the full exercise of his functions; and at the same time a dispatch was addressed to Soranzo, now military commandant at Ferrara, in which he was told: "On this day has been received an intimation that on Holy Thursday the Pope pronounced the threatened sentence against us unjustly and precipitately, without waiting for our ambassadors." "Ascertain therefore," concluded the letter, "the precise extent of your force and efficiency; and if any expedient or plan should occur to you, communicate it: since we have resolved to do all that is in us, manfully and energetically to maintain our rights and our honour. In the meantime, you will not fail to keep a watchful eye on our possessions, and on the naval equipment intrusted to your care."¹

But an object, in which one of the most choleric and resolute of Pontiffs had thus signally failed, was destined to owe its accomplishment to a totally distinct agency. With the return of the warm season in June came malaria, and malaria bred dysentery and pestilence. The sufferings and losses of the Venetians, whose numbers were loosely calculated at this point of time at between 15,000 and 20,000, were considerable. Among the victims of the distemper at Ferrara was the Podesta himself.

¹ Romanin, iii. 21.

He was replaced by Marco Quirini della Casa Maggiore, the brother of that Jacopo who has been already introduced to notice. The selection of Quirini was more intelligible than Quirini's acceptance of the post. He was the leader of the Opposition. His antipathy to the Doge and his party was proverbial. He had voted against the election of Gradenigo in 1289, and he took every occasion to attack his Government. Unlike his brother who, though no friend to those in power, was known to shrink too much from violence and bloodshed to be a dangerous antagonist, Marco was of a caballing and restless disposition; his rank was exalted; his personal character stood high; and by the recent marriage of his daughter with Bajamonte, son of Giacomo Tiepolo of San Agostino, he had not only cemented the old friendship between the two great Guelph families, but had improved his own position in the Great Council. He was at present, perhaps, the most influential member of that assembly. The Government felt that to buy such a man was a hazardous and compromising experiment: its only plan was to remove him from the sphere of his intrigues by conferring upon him an honourable but peculiarly perilous appointment. The advantage of that step was twofold. It was highly probable that the term of his absence would be prolonged: and there was a possibility that he might share the fate of his predecessor.

The order of the 9th April last, in obedience to which the late Podesta had transferred the seat of his jurisdiction from Ferrara to the Citadel, was designed by the Signory, perhaps, as a spontaneous and dignified concession to the Holy See, as well as a propitiatory measure toward the Ferrarese themselves. But the step, which was certainly susceptible of more than one construction, was viewed by Pelagrua and his minion Francesco d' Este quite in an opposite light; and at any rate it resulted in a rupture of the negotiation. Subsequently to the entry of Quirini, however, upon his functions as Podesta, the movements of the besiegers were languid and indecisive; the epidemic, which had not yet abated, continued to thin the numbers of the soldiers, and to warp their energies, and although an attempt on the part of the enemy to cut off the retreat of the small Venetian flotilla on the Po, which was supplying the garrison with provisions, by throwing a strong

boom across that river, was gallantly repulsed by Soranzo, it began to be painfully apparent that the mere operation of natural causes would ultimately render the position untenable. Nevertheless the Venetians continued with undiminished perseverance to hold their ground through June, July, and the following month. It was not till the close of August, when the mortality among the troops had assumed frightful proportions, and when their fortitude was at last shaken by extreme physical suffering, that the enemy ventured to open a general attack upon the fortress; and on the 28th, after some resistance, Tedaldo was stormed, and the garrison, with very few exceptions, was put to the sword. The forces of the Church were guilty of the most barbarous excesses. The carnage of the Venetians was terrible. Their corpses were thrown into the Po. Those whose lives were spared were deprived of their eyes. The fleet was dismantled. It was with the utmost difficulty that the Podesta and Soranzo themselves effected their escape, and regained Venice (August-September 1309).

Thus the Republic was compelled by pressure from an entirely unexpected quarter to relinquish at the close of the ninth month of occupation a conquest, which it had cost her so much trouble to acquire and so many sacrifices to preserve. It was some source of consolation, perhaps, that her enemies were as little gainers by her submission as they had been by the whole war. The Ferrarese themselves were heavy losers in all respects; and, a few months only after the massacre at Tedaldo, the Venetians could not be sorry to learn that the Ghibellines had risen in revolt against Francesco d' Este, had overpowered Pelagrua and the Papal party, which was weakened by internal divisions, and, after the sack of the city, had proclaimed Salinguerra III. (June 1310).

The Papacy, on its part, had derived absolutely no advantage from the contest. The anti-Venetian League, which his Holiness had projected, proved a blundering failure; and it might be fairly predicated of the Bull, whose objects were only imperfectly fulfilled by a totally independent agency, that it was one of the most outrageous measures which had ever emanated even from the Papal government. The sad and terrible crisis was long held in remembrance at Venice, and even in the nineteenth century it was a popular saying, where

any one presented a gloomy aspect, that he looked as if he were the bringer of the excommunication of Ferrara.

The promulgation of the interdict in March 1309, and the abandonment of Ferrara at the close of the following August, were, however, two events which brought the Ministry into considerable odium, and which gave an admirable vantage-ground to the Opposition. It was not that the Republic was unconscious, on the one hand, of the inability of Clement to carry to its remoter consequences his insolent and infamous project for circumventing her resources and for undermining her power. It was not, on the other, that she regretted the termination of a costly and not creditable war. But the truth was, that her people began to entertain conscientious misgivings touching the civil and religious ban under which they were laid. They began to lament with intelligible bitterness their insulated situation, of which the evils, though neutralised to some extent by their fertility in expedients, their maritime power, and their religious indulgence, were still sufficiently serious and patent. It was useless to conceal from themselves, that the interdict was both morally and materially damaging; proudly self-reliant as they might be, the Venetians had too much sagacity to imagine even for an instant that they could afford to contemn the legitimate influence of the Church, or could exalt themselves above opinion; and when the immediate peril of an universal blockade, which had momentarily absorbed their attention, was in a considerable measure removed, the voice of discontent was lifted in many quarters against a Government, which had not only exposed itself to just animadversion by its systematically aggressive policy, but had aggravated the faultiness of its executive principles by its mismanagement and its blunders.

The protracted reign of Gradenigo had been strangely unfortunate. Each year seemed to bring its share of calamity and disgrace. His very elevation in 1289 was commonly ascribed to a dishonourable manœuvre. It was not a twelve-month after his accession that the necessity had been propounded for supporting the claim of Andrew the Venetian, the Doge's kinsman by marriage, to the throne of Hungary (1290). Next followed the imperfect adjustment of the difference with Aquileia in 1291. Then (1293) came the Genoese contest with its distressing and humiliating incidence:

an unblushing resort to the privateering system on a scale unknown to former times: the reverse at Aïas, the disasters in Candia, the massacre at Constantinople, and in 1298 the rout at Curzola. To these occurrences closely succeeded the war with Padua, which had lingered from 1301 to 1304, the ludicrous and abortive Treaty of 1306 with Charles of Valois, and finally the actual Ferrarese difficulty, the consequences of which were brought home to every door. But, in the catalogue of charges against Gradenigo and his advisers, above all towered the constitutional reforms of 1296 and 1297, now known to have been procured by a corrupt election and a packed House. This remarkable chain of events, more particularly the equivocal transactions of 1296 and the following years, and the proceedings of 1308 and 1309, supplied an inexhaustible theme for political jealousy and party invective. After a lengthened forbearance, the opposition began to ask with pointed earnestness whether such a Government was worthy of the Republic, or whether the Republic ought to be tolerant of such a Government?

Foremost in the ranks of the opposition stood Marco Quirini, a member of a family, which we are presently to see in conflict with the Morosini (the Doge's kindred) in the public streets.¹ He was a man of great respectability of character: proud, irascible, and violent; fertile in expedients, devoted to intrigue, and a slave to ambition. He was a shrewd politician, an able dissembler, and a speaker of no common fluency. Although he had long passed the prime of life, age had not impaired the strength of his understanding; and of physical courage he was known to possess a liberal share. It was this nobleman who, in the summer of 1309, when the affairs of his country had been reduced by the recent breach with the Pope to a situation of the utmost peril, was somewhat ambiguously selected to replace the deceased Podesta Michieli; and Quirini was one of a handful of stragglers who, after the storm of Tedaldo in August, contrived by eluding pursuit to escape the general butchery. There was a story, which gained belief at the time in certain quarters, but which was probably nothing more than a fabrica-

¹ Caroldo, *Relazione della Conjiura delli Nobili Quirini della Cù Mazor di San Mattio in Rialto e Bajamonte Tiepolo di Sant' Agostino, unitamente con alcuni Badoeri*, Additional MSS. Brit. Mus. 8595, on vellum; Caroldo is commended by Apostolo Zeno, *Lettere*, v. 416.

tion emanating from his political opponents, that Quirini failed to display in his late office that vigour and perseverance, which his countrymen conceived themselves entitled to expect from a man of experience and repute, and that the loss of Tedaldo was entirely due to his personal negligence and incapacity. Such a charge was barely sustainable; and no stronger proof perhaps was required of Quirini's innocence than the silence of the Venetian quæstors.

United to Quirini's daughter was Bajamonte Tiepolo *detto* Scopulo, of San Agostino, a young man of soaring views, of vehement disposition, of sanguine temperament, of engaging address, and of unsurpassed popularity. He was adored by the people, who fondly christened him their *Great Cavalier*, and who never named him except in terms of endearment and reverence. His errors were judged with tenderness. His virtues were even fulsomely extolled. His countrymen at large honoured him not only for his own sake, but for the sake of his grandfather and of his great-grandfather, both of whom had reflected lustre on the throne. They loved to discern in his character the happy union of the statesmanlike wisdom of the first with the chivalric heroism of the second Tiepolo. Above all, they idolised him as the child and representative of that Count Giacomo who, after receiving the national suffrages, had spontaneously deserted the path of ambition, and whose worst fault was that he carried moderation to a weakness.¹

At the period of the Revolution, Bajamonte Tiepolo was absent in the exercise of his official functions in one of the remoter dependencies of the Republic, the Podestat of Modon and Coron; and he had returned to Venice only in the beginning of 1300, when great changes were already wrought in the constitution of his country. It occasioned considerable surprise, and in many circles no slight pain, when it became known that a prosecution was contemplated against the ex-Podesta before the Forty for malversation of the public money during his term of office. Bajamonte was charged with having withheld in excess of his legitimate salary a certain sum for which he was unable to render any account; the evidence adduced in support of his guilt was of a damning kind; and judgment went against him (July 15, 1300). It appears,

¹ De Monacis, *Chr. lib. xiv.*, Add. MSS. 8574; Litta, *v. Tiepolo*.

however, that no ulterior steps were at present taken to enforce the reimbursement of the defalcation; the Quarantia reserved sentence; and Tiepolo was merely required to find substantial sureties for his appearance.¹

This disagreeable exposure was no bar to the promotion of Bajamonte in 1302 to a vacant seat in the Forty. But the assumedly factious prosecution of 1300, the initiation of which he confidently imputed to the personal malice of the Doge, did not cease to haunt his thoughts; and it was not long before he retired in a sullen mood from the bustle of official life to his villa in the Trevisan March. For some years subsequently to 1304, the Great Cavalier appears to have remained in seclusion, and to have kept aloof from public affairs.

Attached also to Marco Quirini by the ties of blood and interest, were his two brothers, Pietro and Jacopo. Pietro Quirini, *detto* Pezzagallo, was a person who had hitherto attracted a comparatively slight degree of attention, and of whom the little that was known was not to his credit. During a certain time, he had officiated as Bailo of Negropont, one of the twelve principal colonial appointments² in the gift of the Government; and it was during his continuance at this onerous post that he was guilty of nepotism and neglect in suffering his son Nicolo to maltreat with impunity one of the Jewish population of the island. For this misdemeanour the Bailo was, upon his return, cited by the Advocates of the Commune before the proper tribunal, and fined in the sum of 500 ducats.³ To this grievance, as it was naturally interpreted, a second was soon superadded. After the crisis of March 1309, the Government had thought fit to renew, for the sake of the more effectual preservation of the peace, an existing prohibition against the practice of wearing side-arms in the capital; and the Signori di Notte were charged to enforce with increased strictness the observance of this wholesome regulation. One evening, late in the autumn of the year, as Marco Morosini, one of the Signori, was making his circuit, he encountered somebody muffled in a cloak, and

¹ The decision was not given till the 28th May 1311, when, by twenty-six to three, the Forty resolved, that Bajamonte should be required to liquidate the debt in nine instalments, payable at intervals of four months.—Muratori, *Rer. It. scr.* xii. 492.

² Sandi, *lib. v. c. 1.*

³ Caroldo, *Conjiura, ubi supra.*

traversing in solitude one of the thoroughfares; and "the devil," to borrow the expression of an old historian,¹ "put it into the head of Morosini to confront the stranger with the formal challenge, 'Let us search.'" That stranger was no other than Pietro Quirini: and the latter, disgusted at the indignity, instead of complying with the requisition, tripped up the heels of the magistrate, and left him sprawling on the ground. For this misconduct the offender was for the second time prosecuted and fined.²

Jacopo Quirini, Marco's remaining brother, whose name has already occurred, was a nobleman of strict integrity, of immaculate fame, and of great moral rectitude. As a rhetorician, he was hardly ambitious to excel. His eloquence was of that school which sought to convince without aspiring to dazzle; and he was indebted for such political influence as he enjoyed to the soundness of his sense and to a certain conscientious earnestness of style, rather than to any impassioned fervour in his delivery, any aptitude for metaphor, or any fecundity of wit. Quirini was a declared enemy to all revolutionary projects, and from extreme measures of every kind he was insuperably averse. The independence of his views disqualified him from following a party, while their singularity unfitted him to lead one. He therefore found himself placed in a somewhat anomalous and isolated situation. For the politics of his brother Marco, and of Marco's nephew Bajamonte, he avowed little relish; the politics of the Government excited the strongest emotions of hatred of which his nature was capable. The consequence was, that much of the weight, which his sage and patriotic counsels might have otherwise carried with them, was lost. He had unsuccessfully opposed the election of Gradenigo in 1289; he had opposed the constitutional changes of 1297; he had opposed the war of 1308.

A remarkable event, in which Jacopo Quirini was prominently concerned, had lately occurred. Doimo Da Canale,³ Count of Veglia, having returned from Ferrara in the beginning of September 1309, with Marco Quirini, under whom he had served at Tedaldo, was brought forward as the candidate for a recent vacancy at the Privy Council Board. The

¹ Marco Barbaro.

² Caroldo, *Congiura, ubi supra*.

³ Litta, fascicolo 18.

Doge himself assented to the appointment; but it was necessary to procure the concurrence of the Great Council. The introduction of the matter into that assembly unexpectedly became the signal for a debate of unusual animation. The point having been raised, Jacopo Quirini was the first to speak. He remarked that, by their Minute of the 27th January 1267, the Counts of Dalmatia were expressly disqualified from sitting at any board or any tribunal excepting the Great Council itself and the Pregadi; and he demanded to know on what special ground a departure from that rule was to be sanctioned in the present instance? To Quirini replied one of the connexions of Da Canale, and a partisan of the Government, Ugolino Giustiniani; and the argument of Giustiniani was in its turn combated by Quirini's kinsman, Badoer Badoer. Each succeeding orator displayed increased warmth and incoherence; the most alarming symptoms began to be discernible; the composure, which usually reigned in the Hall, was being gradually lost in a confusion of loud and angry voices; and a repetition of the spectacle, which had followed the Ferrarese debate a few months before, was too much to be dreaded. Nor was it long before the storm burst with fury. The scene of anarchy and disorder was terrible. The uproar even exceeded that on the previous occasion; and the salutary prohibition against the use of weapons alone saved the effusion of blood, and precluded the affray from assuming a highly dangerous form. After a short scuffle across the benches, and some displays of a pugilistic kind, the indecorous exhibition was allowed to terminate; and Da Canale was ultimately installed in the office. The recollection of the incident, however, remained for some time vividly impressed on the minds of such members of the Council as had taken a leading share in the brawl; and during the few following days collisions between the two parties, who had divided on the question, continued to be of frequent occurrence.

Exclusively of his son-in-law and his two brothers, Marco Quirini reckoned among his adherents Nicolo Quirini, rector of the church of San Basso, Canon of Castello, and a poet of some celebrity,¹ and several other branches of his own family;

¹ Agostini, *Notizie degli scrittori Viniziani*, Prefaz. Some of his rhymes are said to be preserved in the Barberina Library at Rome. See Allacci, *Antichi poeti*, 1661, p. 55.

two or three more Tiepoli; two or three Badoeri; a Barozzi; Andrea Doro, a Privy Councillor, who had thought proper to change sides; two Florentines, four or five Ferrarese, and about twenty persons of more obscure name, who had been induced to range themselves among the Opposition by various considerations of more or less validity.

The circumstances of a private nature, which have been detailed, operated more powerfully than any ostensible motives in riveting the links, which bound the leading members of the Quirini-Tiepolo Cabal to each other. To that party, which Marco Quirini supported by his influential connexions, by his energy of character, by his firmness and consistency of purpose, and by his distinguished talents as a parliamentary speaker, his brother Jacopo brought his rare moderation, and his son-in-law lent his matchless popularity. The recognised necessity of redressing the abuses of the Government furnished an ample pretext to those, who were now meditating nothing less than its subversion.

It was by a process, of which the successive stages were barely perceptible even to themselves, that the Venetian Opposition lapsed into a Secret Society. During the first week in June 1310, a private meeting took place at the Casa Quirini at San Matteo near the Rialto, for the purpose of debating the general question of reform, and of arranging certain preliminaries. The attendance was not numerous; but among those present were Bajamonte Tiepolo, Badoer Badoer, and Jacopo and Pietro Quirini.¹ Marco Quirini, who presided, opened the discussion.

Quirini represented that, although any one who should seek the gratification of his private resentment by embarking in a movement of a seditious tendency against Gradenigo, would forfeit the name of a good citizen, it was hard to contemplate the manifest symptoms of the ruin of a country, of which they all prayed for the prosperity, without concerning themselves with the question of providing some salutary remedy for the evil. They all knew how many persons of virtue and desert had been excluded by the reform of the Great Council from its deliberations. It was impossible to conceal from themselves how severe a blow that step had inflicted on the patriotic spirit of a large proportion of the

¹ Caroldo, *Conjiura*, Add. MSS. 8595; Romanin, iii. chap. 4.

population, of men whose love of their country had persuaded them on former occasions to sacrifice their fortunes and their lives to her safety and her greatness. What, again, was to be thought of that ill-omened undertaking against Ferrara, which had been prosecuted with so much obstinacy by the present Doge, and which had had such a pitiful termination? How could a second opinion be formed of the terrible interdiction, which Gradenigo had by his stubbornness drawn upon them, and by which so many Venetians had been dispossessed of their patrimony, had been put to death, or had been sold as slaves? Could it be necessary to point attention to the arbitrary acts, which the Doge was daily committing, and in which he was encouraged to persevere by a too passive submission to his authority? Had not the time come for vindicating their rights? Was it not expedient, before the evil rooted itself too deeply in the soil, and spread too widely, to adopt a decisive line of conduct? "Fortunate we may esteem ourselves," concluded the speaker, "if we succeed in our object without bloodshed; but if it becomes a necessity, it is surely better that a few should fall, than that all should be lost."

While Quirini was resuming his seat, his son-in-law rose. The latter rehearsed the various wrongs and indignities which individuals had sustained, and his own family in particular, at the hands of the existing Government. He complained of the false and damaging construction which had been set upon the conduct of his father-in-law in regard to the abandonment of Tedaldo. He dwelled on the certainty of their success, if they employed secrecy and circumspection in forming their plans, and celerity in executing them. He exhorted them to waste no time in vain words, but to proceed at once to practical measures. He pronounced it to be their object *to obtain a good prince, who might preserve the national liberty*, and under whom the Republic might revert to her former greatness and prosperity.

The next, who broke silence, was Jacopo Quirini, who had lately accepted the appointment of ambassador to the Byzantine Court, and who was at present on the eve of his departure for Constantinople. That virtuous and excellent nobleman, perceiving at a glance the perilous direction, in which his relatives were allowing their thoughts to drift, and

trembling for the fate which might befall his own children, and all who were endeared to him by blood, laboured with his accustomed intrepidity, and with more than his accustomed eloquence, to dissuade his brother and Tiepolo from embarking in an undertaking fraught with so much danger and uncertainty. "There is nothing," he admitted, "more just and more holy than the vindication of the rights and liberties of one's country; but we ought not to suffer passion to prevail over reason and judgment. It is far from me to defend the Doge or his policy; but it behoves us to bear in mind that all his acts have been sanctioned by the Councils, and that the bribery, the corruption, the contrivances and manœuvres of every kind, which were formerly employed to obtain seats in the Great Council, loudly called for reform. It is incumbent on us to remember that the Ferrarese war itself formed the subject of a lengthened debate in the Assembly, and that the resolution committing the Republic to that undertaking was carried by a majority of suffrages. To what purpose, then, are you about to raise a tumult? What legitimate pretence exists for exposing to hazard the lives and property of so many? How can you justify yourselves in rekindling civil war? You hope, perhaps, to carry the people with you; but the people, as everybody should know, are fickle and apathetic; and all who repose confidence in them, prepare the way to their own fall and destruction. I recommend you to profit by the example of Marino Bocconio. I counsel the immediate abandonment of the proposed scheme and a perseverance in the path of order and justice, which presents a more appropriate and even more efficacious medium for the fulfilment of your wishes and for the satisfaction of your wants, than violence or agitation."¹

No labour, no arts, were spared by his connexions to reconcile Jacopo Quirini to their views.² But the latter was neither to be coaxed nor to be over-persuaded; and he not only remained unalterably firm in his determination to keep aloof from any rash political adventure, but he protested that, unless he received an assurance that the enterprise which his brother and his nephew appeared to have concerted between them, was from that moment entirely and unreservedly relinquished, he should instantly place the resignation of his

¹ Caroldo, *Congiura*, Add. MSS. B. M. 8595.

² *Ibid.*

embassy¹ in the hands of Gradenigo. For this step even Marco Quirini and his son-in-law were hardly prepared. The proposition astounded even those who knew the speaker best. It was not that they greatly valued the co-operation of Jacopo: for he was a troublesome and almost an impracticable ally. It was not that they suspected his honour: for that was universally believed to be alike above impeachment and beyond corruption. But they were now haunted by an apprehension lest, in the first place, by his continual presence in the Capital he should mar the whole scheme by sowing division in their ranks, and by making converts of known waverers; and secondly, lest, in a moment of weakness and indiscretion, or from an impulse of misjudging zeal, he should betray their confidence, and ruin the cause.

The reasons prompted them to simulate compliance. The required pledge was given with feigned reluctance and sincerity; and the new ambassador was no sooner ascertained to be beyond hearing, than his kinsmen returned to their task with an enthusiasm which was equally deaf to the voice of prudence and to the whispered reproaches of conscience. The two Chiefs of the Opposition were apt indeed to conceive, that they had gone too far to draw back. The die was cast: on the issue they elected to stake their fortunes, their existence.

At the subsequent conferences between the conspirators satisfactory progress was reported to have been made in extending their confidences and in enrolling fresh accomplices; and the scheme gradually assumed a definite form. It was now understood to be the common aim of the association of noblemen, of which Quirini and his kinsman had become the nucleus, to render themselves masters of the Rialto and its environs, to secure the person of the Doge at all hazards, to proclaim the restoration of the Old Constitution, and to place upon the throne the son of the legitimate Doge. There was a time, when Marco Quirini might have dreamed of encircling his own brows with the berretta; but he was now willing to waive his personal wishes in favour of one who was younger and more popular than himself, and whose elevation would make his daughter a Dogaressa.

This stupendous plot, of which the conception and details were due to the daring and fertile genius of Tiepolo and his

¹ Sandi, lib. v. c. 2.

father-in-law, was already advancing toward maturity; even the date of its execution was approximately fixed for the middle of the current month of June; and such excessive caution was exercised by each of the confederates in his allotted sphere that, in the absence of any extraordinary fatality, it was extremely improbable that the Government would become aware of its danger, until the blow was actually struck.

CHAPTER XX

A.D. 1310—1311

Quirini-Tiepolo Conspiracy *continued*—Proposals of Badoer Badoer—Postponement of the Execution from the 14th to the 15th June—Adverse Causes—Heavy Rain—Apostasy of Marco Donato—Counter-Preparations of the Doge—Complete Frustration of the Scheme—Successive Defeat of the Three Leaders of the Insurrection—Treatment of the Insurgents by the Government—Partly Factitious Importance of the Conspiracy—Its results—Establishment of the Council of Ten for Two Months (July 1310)—Extension of its Powers—Confirmation for Five Years—Its Vigorous Proceedings—Institution of the Civic Guard and the Water Police—Death of Gradenigo (August 13, 1311)—His Character—Importance of his Reign—Difficulties of his Position—Contrast of Venice with England.

AMONG recent political occurrences there had been none perhaps which was more susceptible of being turned to good account than the late war with Padua (1301–4). The Paduans¹ had been immemorially noted for their deep-rooted disaffection to the Republic; the recent conduct of the Venetian Executive, in the short negotiation which ushered in the war, had provoked the utmost animosity of the municipality; and it was well known that the soreness of feeling thus occasioned was very slightly allayed by the hollow peace of 1304. It was treated by the conspirators as a felicitous coincidence, that at Padua the influence of the Badoeri was peculiarly commanding and extensive. For a great length of time that family had occupied a prominent place among the residents of the Paduan suburb of Peraga, and several of its members had filled at various periods the highest official posts in the City. It was therefore without a dissentient voice that the partisans of Badoer Badoer acceded to a project suggested by that nobleman for the secret formation at Peraga under his auspices of a company of auxiliaries, which might operate usefully as a reserve.

All points of detail having been settled, everything was

¹ "Erat Padua armis et equis plena, et aliis divitiis infinitis munita, et turribus et aliis ædificiis delicatis."—*Hist. Cortus.* 1310, fol. 778.

left to depend on the tact and rapidity with which the plan was carried into effect. Many circumstances might arise—the slightest was felt to be sufficient—to thwart all their anticipations, and to dispel their ambitious dreams. The moment had actually arrived when the conspirators were in reality so situated, that it was out of their power to recede. A few days ago, a free choice lay between advance and retreat; but such an option existed no longer. Delay and hesitation were at present tantamount to failure, and failure was tantamount to destruction.

On Saturday, the 14th June, Badoer, after a final interview with his confederates, started for Peraga, where all his arrangements were completed, and where his accessories were waiting only the signal to take arms. During the same evening, the conspirators began to assemble as noiselessly as possible at the Casa Quirini at San Matteo; and the gathering continued up to a late hour. The consummation of the revolutionary crisis had been originally fixed for Saturday night; but, on the whole, it was thought expedient to postpone the catastrophe till the following day at dawn.

The morning of Sunday, the 15th of June, the day of San Vito, broke inauspiciously. The sky was overcast, and the clouds were watery and low. It soon began to lighten and thunder portentously; the rain fell in a deluge; and it blew a hurricane. A very early hour had been named for the great stroke of State; and, as the day began to break, the weather failed to improve. This ominous incident had no influence, however, in deterring Quirini and his kinsmen from the prosecution of their desperate adventure. The conspirators, having collected their whole disposable force at San Matteo, divided themselves into two bodies, one of which, under Quirini himself and his two sons, Nicolo and Benedetto, was appointed to proceed by the Lova Bridge, the *Calle dei Fabbri* and the *Ponte del Malpasso*, while the other, under Bajamonte, penetrated by the Merceria. The Piazza of Saint Mark was the common point of convergence.

The revolutionists quitted San Matteo amid shouts of *Libertà* and *Morte al Doge Gradenigo*, but the sound of their voices was drowned in the howling blast. Quirini, who had taken a somewhat less circuitous route than his son-in-law, expected to have been the first to debouch into the Rialto

from the Ponte del Malpasso ; but, somewhat to his surprise, he found himself anticipated, and the Piazza already in military occupation. At a second glance he perceived to his infinite dismay that the troops before him were neither the corps of Tiepolo nor the contingent of Badoer.

Among the earliest supporters of the insurrectionary movement was a certain gentleman of plebeian family, named Marco Donato of Santa Maddalena. Donato was a man of nervous temperament and of impulsive and vacillating character. He had allowed his eyes to be dazzled by an overdrawn picture of existing evils, coupled with a plausible representation of the patriotism and facility of remedying them ; but he had no sooner given in his adhesion than he began to repent the act. A night of calm and sound reflection convinced him of his folly and his peril ; his courage forsook him ; he wavered ; he seceded. Donato went a step farther ; for he followed up his secession by divulging his secret, and by turning evidence against his former accomplices. It was on the afternoon of Saturday, the 14th June only, while Quirini and Tiepolo were looking with unabated confidence to the successful issue of their grand machination, that the traitor solicited a private interview with the Doge. In few words he communicated to Gradenigo the object of his visit and the imminence of the danger which beset the government of his Serenity. The extremity of his listener's astonishment was legible in the involuntary changes of his countenance. He was absolutely thunderstruck at the intelligence. The audacity of the scheme and the impenetrability of its contrivers almost passed belief. For a few instants his composure was shaken ; and the suppression of his rising emotion seemed to require an effort to which even that iron nature and those rigid lineaments were barely equal. But these sensations were transitory ; the Doge soon recovered his self-possession ; and any misgivings which he might have entertained touching the veracity of his first informant were quickly removed by the arrival in speedy succession of three or four others, who substantiated Donato's statement, and apprised his Serenity of an unusual stir at the Casa Quirini at San Matteo and at the Casa Tiepolo at San Agostino. Nearly a quarter of a century had elapsed since the year when Gradenigo, still a comparatively young man, was chosen to replace Giovanni

Dandolo. He was then scarcely thirty-eight; he was now verging on sixty. Yet he prepared with an energy, which would have done honour to the Privy Councillor of 1285, to confront the new danger. The momentous character of the crisis itself exercised a rejuvenescent influence on his vigorous mind. The old man summoned forthwith to his presence all the great Officers of State, the five Privy Councillors,¹ the Chiefs of the Forty, the Advocates of the Commune, the Procurators of Saint Mark, the Signori di Notte, the members of the Senate, and all his personal following. He sent confidential messages, couched in the most pressing terms, to the Podestas of Murano, Torcello, and Chioggia, who were commanded to call out their respective militia, and to hasten to his succour with the utmost privacy and dispatch. He directed all his private friends to arm in silence themselves, their servants, and their dependents; and assurances of prompt and loyal co-operation were returned by the Dandoli, Giustiniani, and others. He named Antonio Dandolo and Baldovino Dolfino his lieutenants.² From time to time he employed emissaries, on whose fidelity he could rely, to reconnoitre in the neighbourhood of the Casa Quirini, and to report to him the result. Within the space of a few hours the preparations of Gradenigo were nearly finished; and in the course of the night all his reinforcements with the exception of the Chioggians, who were not expected till the following afternoon, succeeded in joining him by water without the cognisance of the rebels congregated at San Matteo. It was true that the forces at the disposal of his Serenity were after all not very considerable. But their paucity of numbers was quite balanced by their devotion; and they had all the authority of the Republic at their back.

Shortly before daybreak, the Ducal troops were mustered in front of the Palace along one side of the Piazza; and at that point they proceeded, regardless of the rigour of the weather, to await the course of events. It was this little army, then, which arrested the eye of Quirini, so soon as the latter had emerged from the Ponte del Malpasso.³

A dead pause ensued; but it did not last long. The first

¹ Andrea Doro, it will be remembered, had resigned, and his place was not yet filled up. It was not known till afterward that he had gone over to the insurgents.

² Cigogna, *Iscrizioni*, i. 75.

³ *Ibid.*, iii. 29 *et seq.*

onset was characterised by singular ferocity. Amid a storm of wind and rain, the foremost division of the troops, consisting of the volunteers of Marco Giustiniani of San Moisè, opened an impetuous and desperate attack upon the rebels, to the cry of *Amazza, amazza! A terra, a terra! Dalli, dalli!* The ranks of Quirini, who commanded in person, were broken by the first shock; his followers, lacking any strong faith in the merit of their cause, could not be persuaded to rally; their dispersion was complete; their loss in killed and wounded was not inconsiderable; the survivors fled in precipitate confusion; and Quirini and his son Benedetto fell by the hand of Giustiniani himself.

The scattered remnant of Quirini's corps fled so far as the Campo of San Luca, where they attempted to re-form their ranks. But they were promptly assailed by a troop of volunteers, hastily levied by the Director of the *Scuola Della Carita*, and were, after a sharp and gallant resistance, again thoroughly worsted. This discomfiture was conclusive. They now abandoned all intention of rallying. Such was the rapid and dioramic character of the first act of the revolutionary drama.

While Quirini was sustaining a signal defeat on the Piazza, he had vainly looked for the arrival of Badoer from Peraga, or of Tiepolo from the Merceria. The instructions of each had been explicit. Their continued absence was unaccountable. A suspicion of treachery flashed perhaps across his mind; and it is possible that the dying man was a prey in his latest moments to the agonising conviction, that he had been betrayed by those whom he most trusted and he most loved.

The truth was, however, that with an absolute knowledge of the apostasy of Donato, and with every opportunity of foreseeing his subsequent revelations, Quirini himself had committed two capital errors. The first lay in dividing his forces, and in thus placing it in the power of his opponent to fight the three divisions severally; the second, in confiding to his son-in-law an independent command. Bajamonte wanted neither the natural gallantry of his race, nor the common attributes of a brave soldier; but he wanted judgment, firmness, and continuity of purpose. This fact was abundantly illustrated by the result. The collateral support, on which the late Chief of the Revolution had implicitly relied, failed

him at the critical moment; and the consequence was, that the whole scheme collapsed in the course of a few hours.

Quirini alone had remained true to his engagements. The temporary obstruction which the heavy rain offered to the navigation of the Brenta, and the impossibility of transporting troops down that river, was indeed the reason why Badoer was delaying his departure from Peraga; and that reason was both simple and legitimate. But for Tiepolo no similar excuse could be found. By a waste of time, which was apparently susceptible of no rational explanation, the latter had thrown away his opportunity, and had already all but ruined himself and his partners in the enterprise by his improvidence; and it was not until the cause had experienced a fatal blow that he gained San Giuliano, about the middle of the Merceria. At that point the intelligence was brought to him of the disaster on the Square of Saint Mark, and of the fall of his two relatives; and he accordingly came once more to a halt at San Giuliano, seeking shelter from the raging elements under a large and shady elder-tree. The detachment, which his father-in-law had commanded, being hopelessly disorganised, and the arrival of Badoer being still gravely problematical, Tiepolo, after a short consultation under the elder, decided upon marching against the troops which were remaining under arms on the Piazza, before the Chioggians, who were hourly expected in considerable force, could come up to their relief. With this design he subdivided his men into two corps, one of which, led by himself, might pursue the original route of the Merceria, while the second, by a slight divergence, took the direction of San Basso. The former, in its passage through the Merceria, was pelted with stones by the householders; and one lady, named Giustina Rosso, seizing a mortar which happened to be lying in her window-casement, hurled it with her utmost strength at Bajamonte himself, exclaiming at the same moment, *Morte ai tiranni*.¹ The ponderous missile, however,² slightly overreaching its mark, missed the Chief, and crushed the head of his standard-bearer, who bespattered him with brains and blood.

At the same time, Gradenigo and his lieutenants fully

¹ Mutinelli, *Annali*, p. 151.

² Cigogna, *Storia della casa e bottega in Venezia di ragione della grazia del mortar, e cenni sulla congiura di B. Tiepolo*, 1842.

comprehended the importance of disposing of Tiepolo, before he was joined by the Paduan auxiliaries; and they were therefore not displeased to observe the symptoms of a spontaneous advance on the part of their adversary, which would obviate the necessity on their own of abandoning the finest strategical position in the metropolis.

A second triumph was in store for the Doge and his armed supporters. The attack, directed against the Ducal troops simultaneously from the Merceria and from San Basso, was well concerted and well sustained; it was the ablest manœuvre and the most extended operation which the resources of the leader allowed; but, after a hard struggle and no slight sacrifice of life on either side, the insurgents were driven back, and forced to retreat in some confusion across the wooden bridge of the Rialto. In their retrograde course, they diverted the attention of their pursuers by setting fire to the office of the *Cinque alla Pace* and the *Uffizio del Frumento*, from the latter of which they purloined a large sum of money. So soon as the rebels had passed the Canal, they cut down the bridge; and Tiepolo thus gained time to occupy the buildings at its foot on the opposite side, and to place them in a condition of defence.

It was already somewhat advanced in the afternoon, when, by the oversight of the Doge in leaving the line of retreat open, the aspect of affairs was thus unexpectedly changed, and Bajamonte was enabled, at least, to prolong his resistance by taking up a commanding position beyond the Canal. The prospects of the opponents of Gradenigo were now brighter than ever. The latter, covered by the Canal as by a natural breastwork, and protected by the fortifications which they had hastily constructed in the precincts of its margin, were prepared to maintain their ground, and to check the advance of the Ducal troops for a considerable space of time; and Badoer was known to have at length summoned sufficient resolution to stir from Peraga, and to be approaching the capital. It was still quite possible, according to the calculations of Bajamonte, that a coalition might be accomplished, and that the hopes which he had so fondly cherished might be eventually realised.

But Bajamonte deceived himself. The inscrutable blunder, by which so much time had been frittered away in the

Merceria, was irretrievable. The arrival of Badoer from Peraga, though believed to be imminent, was still to be expected; and meanwhile the Chioggians under their Podesta, Ugolino Giustiniani, had brought a large accession of strength to the ranks of the Doge.

The line of tactics which it became incumbent on Gradenigo, reinforced in so timely a manner by the Podesta of Chioggia, to pursue, was too obvious to be mistaken. The Doge seized the auspicious moment with avidity. Directions were at once given to Giustiniani to march against Badoer, who was reported to be close at hand, and to crush him, if possible, before he had an opportunity of strengthening Tiepolo: while his Serenity undertook to dislodge the latter from his position beyond the Canal. The arms of the Podesta were brilliantly triumphant. The insurgents, dispirited by the original frustration of their scheme and by their failure in coalescing with Bajamonte, and out of humour with themselves and their leader, offered no protracted resistance to their antagonists; they were ultimately repulsed with great loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners; Badoer himself was among the latter; and extraordinary care was taken to secure his person. The defeat of Marco Quirini and Badoer, so closely succeeding each other, went far to put a term to the internecine contention. Two of the three divisions of the enemy were now virtually annihilated. But the Great Cavalier, a host in himself, still remained in the field, and still preserved an attitude of defiance.

With Tiepolo, however, the Doge was disposed to test the effect of negotiation, before he resorted to coercive measures. The fact was that the position, in which the surviving ringleader of the rebellion had established himself, was too difficult of access to be carried without severe damage to property and terrible effusion of blood. Secondly, Gradenigo felt that, even when he should have succeeded in enforcing the submission of his powerful adversary, he would find himself reduced to the embarrassing alternative of sparing a dangerous and forfeited life, or of bringing to the block the most popular man in Venice. In the third place, it was easy to perceive that the long summer evening was gradually losing itself in twilight; and it was impossible to surmise what fresh schemes might be in course of

formation, and what new horrors might be perpetrated before daybreak.

While the sedition had been in its most critical stage, some Milanese merchants¹ endeavoured to prevail upon Tiepolo to accept their mediation with the Doge. But Tiepolo was then ignorant of the fate of Quirini, and sanguinely looking forward to the speedy arrival of Badoer; and the proffered intercession was superciliously rejected. Under very different circumstances, Giovanni Soranzo and Matteo Manolesso were made by his Serenity on Sunday evening (June 15) the bearers of a conciliatory message in which, after a pointed *anima ad-version* upon the ingratitude of Bajamonte toward his country, the solemn promise was conveyed of a general amnesty to himself and his followers, subject to certain specified conditions of a moderate and equitable character. This liberal proposal was spurned with similar haughtiness, though perhaps not on a similar ground. The Great Cavalier was probably influenced in the second instance less by reliance on his own fortune than by distrust of Gradenigo's honour. At this point, a venerable personage, Filippo Belegno, one of the Privy Council, who was persuaded that his age and experience would carry more weight, seasonably volunteered his services. The self-imposed task of Belegno was, however, more arduous than he had calculated. Bajamonte remained long unconvinced and inexorable. It was in vain at first that the Councillor conjured him, for the sake of every object which he held dear, to take counsel with an old man, and to respond in an appropriate spirit to the pacific advances of Gradenigo. It was to no purpose, for some time, that he pictured to him the perilous dilemma in which he would be situated under the singularly probable and not very remote contingency of a successful attack on his last tenable position. But the grey hairs and importunate eloquence of the speaker ultimately prevailed; the better genius of Bajamonte prompted him at last to relent; and the Councillor procured leave to tell the Doge that his terms were accepted.

The condition, on which Gradenigo assented to a compromise, was that Tiepolo himself and such of his accomplices as possessed an actual or contingent qualification to sit in the Great Council should be relegated for a term of four years

¹ Caroldo, *Congiura*, Add. MSS. 8595, Br. Mus.

to such parts of Dalmatia as might be thereafter determined : that an unconditional amnesty should be published in favour of all his accessories who did not belong to the equestrian rank ; and that all the property and treasure which had been abstracted from the Government Stores and from private dwellings should be surrendered or made good.

The decision of the revolutionary leader was formed in the course of Monday the 16th ; and on the following day the Legislative Body was invited to assemble for the special purpose of ratifying the contract. In a House of 377,¹ the resolution to accept the surrender of the rebels on the basis indicated in the recent message of his Serenity was adopted by a majority of 355. An advertisement of the amnesty was immediately affixed to the walls of conspicuous buildings in all parts of the city ; and, before the close of the 17th, the bulk of the plebeians implicated in the late treason had tendered their submission and had received a full pardon.

The Government knew perfectly well, where the real strength of its antagonists lay ; and it thus contrived by a simple yet masterly stroke to win a reputation for forbearance without prejudice to its security. It might be true that Gradenigo was now master of the situation, and that it was in his power to dictate terms to all his enemies. But the Doge and his advisers probably acted under the influence of a feeling that it was more prudent, as well as more dignified, to shew a placable spirit and to disarm resentment by clemency, than to goad insignificant foes into reckless and desperate revolt by unnecessary harshness and persecution.

The expatriation of Bajamonte,² and of such of his more immediate accomplices as were of patrician standing, was achieved, on the contrary, with the slightest possible delay ; the majority were allowed to distribute themselves over various parts of Lombardy and Dalmatia ; the Cavalier himself was banished to the latter country ; and the lives of any, who might be detected in the act of breaking their parol, were pronounced to be irredeemably forfeited. The offices, which the exiles had enjoyed, were conferred upon the saviours of the Republic ; their wives and families were, by a decree of the 2nd July, expelled from the precincts of the Dogado ; and to harbour them, or correspond with them, was declared

¹ Sandi, lib. v. c. 2.

² Sandi, *ubi supra*.

to be treasonable. The dwellings of Bajamonte Tiepolo (July 25) at San Agostino, and of Marco and Pietro Quirini at San Matteo, were demolished.¹ On the site of the former was raised a column, with an inscription² which eternised the infamy of the late proprietor; and the Casa Quirini was converted into a *stalon* or common shambles.³ The armorial bearings of both families were reversed. All the aliens who were taken with arms in their hands, or of whose complicity proof could be established, suffered capitally. On the other hand, to the Scuola Della Carita, in commemoration of the signal service which its guardian had so lately rendered to the country, was accorded among more substantial privileges the right of erecting on the Campo di San Luca, the scene of its brilliant exploit, a flagstaff from which might float the banner of the Art. An unique honour was paid to Marco Donato, whose name was inscribed on the Register of the Great Council without an election. Giustina Rosso, whose mortar had so nearly proved itself fatal to Bajamonte, was invited to choose her recompense; and the moderate wish that she and her heirs in perpetuity might be permitted to hold of the Procuratie, as heretofore, her present residence and place of business in the Merceria at an annual rent of fifteen ducats, accompanied by a desire that the Casa Rosso should enjoy the privilege of unfurling on the anniversary of San Vito, and on other days of public festival, a standard from the memorable *Mortar Casement*, was unhesitatingly gratified. During the temporary absence of a descendant, Nicolo Rosso, in 1468, the Procurators of Saint Mark resumed possession of the premises; but on the appeal of Rosso the Council of Ten ordered an evacuation; and even when the "casa e bottega della grazia del mortar," as the house was called, passed by sale, the new owners paid the same pepper-

¹ "Di Baiamonte fo questo tereno
E fo per suo iniquo tradimento
Posto in comun e per l' altrui spavento.
E per mostrar a tutti sempre seno."

Mutinelli, *Annali Urbani*, p. 150, note 4; Cigogna, *Iscrizioni*, iii. 58. The fate of the column was somewhat curious. In 1785, it was removed—presumptively with the sanction of the Government—by Angelo Maria Quirini to his villa near Padua. It subsequently came into the possession of the antiquary Sanquirico, who sold it to a gentleman residing on the Lake of Como.—Mutinelli, *ubi supra*. An engraving of the relic occurs in Litta *in voce* Tiepolo.

² The iron door of the residence of Bajamonte was reinstated at the Church of San Vito.—Molmenti, i. 106.

³ A representation of the house in its degraded state is in Molmenti, i. 54.

corn rent, for in 1310 fifteen ducats a year had been considered nominal. It is interesting to observe that in the decemviral minute of the 11th March 1468-9, one hundred and fifty-eight years after the event, occur the words: "in signum et memoriai illius supra dictae tantae rei." The patriotic service was still fresh in the recollection of the Government.

On Wednesday, the 18th June, began the trial of Badoer Badoer before the Forty for high treason. The guilt of Badoer was aggravated in the eyes of his prosecutors by two important circumstances. In the first place, unlike Tiepolo and Quirini, he had acted in the absence of any ostensible provocation. The second and more weighty consideration was, that that nobleman, not satisfied with disseminating his inflammatory and infectious opinions among his own compatriots, had obeyed the dictates of a profligate and unprincipled ambition by making common cause with foreign hirelings, and by preparing the way to a new war between the Republic and Padua. The indictment having been read and other preliminaries having been completed, one of the Chiefs of the Forty demanded, addressing his colleagues:—"Does it appear to you, from what you have heard, that Badoer Badoer ought to be put to the question with a view to draw from him farther disclosures, or that we should proceed on the facts before us?" A majority decided that the facts before them were amply sufficient to criminate the accused. Badoer was remanded to his dungeon. On Sunday, the 22nd, the Great Council was convoked; and the following motion was put:—"Does it appear to you, seeing the verbal and written charges which have been preferred against Badoer Badoer, that the said Badoer ought to lose his head?" The suffrages were in the affirmative. On the same evening, by the verdict of his peers, Badoer was decapitated.

His Paduan accomplices were similarly tried before the Forty on the 23rd June; and the greater part shared the fate of their principal. In the latter cases, where no privilege of nobility was pleaded, the course of proceeding was more summary; and the fiat of the Forty was held by the executioner a sufficient death-warrant.

To mark the providential deliverance of the Republic from her extreme peril, a day of general thanksgiving was ordained; the Doge, the members of the Government, the clergy, and

the nobility, went in solemn procession to the Church of San Vito, where a special mass was celebrated, and where homage was rendered to the Almighty for the grace which He had exhibited to His people;¹ and the 15th June, which was consecrated to that saint, was numbered henceforth among the great anniversaries. Within the space of a few months, almost all the consular and diplomatic agents of the Signory abroad were placed in full possession of the facts of the recent plot, and of the merciful dispensation by which the threatened calamity had been averted. Upward of fifty letters to the Powers of the *terra firma* and even to those at a remoter distance were written with this object, in the name of the Doge, between June 1310 and June 1311.²

A safe-conduct for the exiles to the points, to which they were relegated, was solicited at the hands of those Powers through whose territory they had to pass, while to others letters superscribed by the Doge were addressed, enclosing a list of the condemned, and enjoining the refusal of an asylum.

The authorities treated the Great Cavalier with studied tenderness; and on the 16th April 1311, we find him at Padua, presiding over an entertainment, and addressing a meeting of supporters, both Venetians and foreigners, to whom he rather unfairly complained of the harshness of his lot. It was a somewhat mysterious gathering, intended to be strictly private; but a spy was present, who obtained a complete list of the company, and reported to the Government the proceedings. A messenger arrived, and delivered letters to Tiepolo, who thereupon announced the necessity for his immediate departure. There was a considerable fear of his secret return, since many were prepared to rise in his support; and when one of those present was hunting a day or two before near Malghera, he said that there was a rumour, that the exile was approaching, and the guards at San Giuliano and Della Torre were at once reinforced. Nothing came of all this talk and intrigue; and it bespeaks a certain share of unpopularity and divided opinion, that the Doge and his friends should have suffered Tiepolo to remain within so easy a dis-

¹ Pietro Giustiniani, *Historia di Venetia*, King's MSS. 148, fol. 77.

² Muratori, *Rer. Ital. scrip.* xii. 483-90. The Quirini-Tiepolo conspiracy attracted, no doubt, a good deal of attention in Italy. It is mentioned by Gio. Villani, lib. ix. ch. 2; edit. 1823, and by Albertinus Mussatus in his *Historia Augusta*, ap. Mur. x.

tance of the city, when he was at the same time beyond the frontier. But the Serrar was a triumph, which carried with it its cost in anxiety and odium, and which made some degree of forbearance alike possible and judicious. The principal source of danger and solicitude eventually quitted Lombardy, and removed to Dalmatia, where he had wealthy connections, and where he died about 1328—it is suspected, by violence. Latterly he had caused additional trouble by fomenting disaffection among the Dalmatians, always predisposed to waver in their allegiance. His name, his presence, his life, were a daily menace. He was probably assassinated by some agent of the Executive.

Such was a movement,¹ the remembrance of which naturally survived for a certain length of time in the mind of the Republic, and which is to be viewed as a reaction from the revolution of 1297-8. It indeed belonged to a class of impressions which could not be quickly obliterated. The exalted rank of the leading offenders, the respectability of their connexions, the illustrious antecedents of several, coupled with the stupendous iniquity of the design, the hermetical closeness which so large a number of individuals of different station had exhibited, for even during four or five days, in so confined an area as the Venetian metropolis, in abstaining, with a single exception, from divulging the momentous secret confided to their keeping, and the conduct of the undertaking to a point within a hair's-breadth of success, were incidents which it seemed impossible that any one could view without terror and amazement. The rarity in the Dogado of an occurrence, of which the records of other municipalities abounded in examples, gave, besides, to the Quirini-Tiepolo conspiracy an importance which was perhaps partly factitious. For a while men could not traverse the streets without the dread of an ambush, or compose themselves to rest without misgivings for the morrow. It was felt that there was no hour at which some ulterior scheme might not develop itself, and that there was hardly any moment when, out of the disorganized ingredients of the late diabolical machination, some fresh project might not be shaped. It was clear that no ordinary foresight or precaution was sufficient to meet this latter-day revival of

¹ Caroldo, *Historia di Venetia*, Harl. MSS. 5020 *ad annum*; Pietro Giustiniani, King's MSS. 148, fol. 76.

an evil which was thought barely to have outlived the First Revolution (1033). It was generally conceded that the nation required additional guarantees for its security, and that the Constitution was in need of broader pillars for its support.

This distempered condition of the public mind carried with it a tendency which could not be mistaken. That tendency acquired from day to day increased force. The conviction gained ground that the community could not be pronounced out of danger, until a rigid and searching inquiry had been instituted into the origin, bearings, and possible ramifications of the late conspiracy. To such a call the aristocratic organs promptly, though warily, responded. On the 10th July, a Reformation, emanating from the Forty, was laid before the Great Council. It was conceived in the following form:—

“ Be it resolved that, on account of recent events, and of the likelihood that such may recur, the Council of Fifteen (the War Department), united with the Chiefs of the Forty, shall be empowered for certain specific objects to act and order in such a manner as it may think proper, and that all such acts and ordinances shall be accounted good and valid, as if they had proceeded from the Great Council.”

To the foregoing proposition, however, two objections were raised. The Council seemed too incompact and unwieldy; and it was thought preferable to create a new tribunal than to clothe an existing one with new attributes. On these grounds the reformation was negatived.

The following amendment was then brought forward. It was moved, that a new committee of ten persons should be elected with analogous authority, and should be similarly united with the Chiefs of the Forty. It was suggested that the members might be drawn from every branch of the administration, and that they might hold their actual offices irrespective of their seat on the Committee; but stress was laid on the principle that no family whatsoever should be allowed to have more than one representative. The amendment likewise miscarried.

The reformation which succeeded differed from its predecessors in a two-fold manner. It contained two supplementary clauses, by one of which the Procurators of Saint Mark were to be exceptionally disqualified from serving on the Board, and by the other of which the duration of the Board

itself was to be restricted to the period of the next elections (Michaelmas 1310). This course was ultimately adopted; and on the 10th July¹ the committee of inquiry was called into existence on the full understanding, that the trust was created for temporary and specific purposes, and that it would expire at Michaelmas.

On the 29th September, the Doge came down to the Great Council in person. His Serenity reminded those present that the day had arrived on which the dissolution of the Board of Inquiry was appointed by the act of the 10th July last to take place. But under the circumstances of difficulty and inquietude, in which the Republic still found herself, and seeing that the popular ferment and excitement had not yet subsided, Gradenigo proceeded to represent the expediency of prolonging the existence of the Board for a farther term of two months, in order that it might continue to direct its useful labours to the rooting out of treason and sedition. A resolution to the desired effect was framed and carried; and the committee was entitled to retain its authority till the 30th November. On that day, it procured an extension of its powers to the 30th January 1311;² and then, by a general acquiescence in its utility and efficacy, it was confirmed for five years (1311-16). Such was the remarkable progress of that small body of men who, on the 10th July 1310, had been invited to resolve themselves into a committee for a special object, with determinate and purely temporary jurisdiction; such, by a total departure from its original attributes, were the stealthy approaches to the helm of government of a body, of which the existence had been fixed in the first instance at somewhat less than eleven weeks; and of which present symptoms already gave liberty to prophesy the perpetuation. Such was the manner in which the Council of Ten was climbing to power.³ We are able, in fact, to recognise at this time a first clear start in the constitutional movement for centralising force and authority, and

¹ Caroldo, *Congiura*, King's MSS. 150, or Add. MSS. Brit. Mus. 8595.

² Sandi, v. 2.

³ The following doggerel lines will be familiar to many:—

“Dell Mille tresento e dièse,
A mezzo el mese del ceriese.
Baiamonte passo el ponte,
E per esso fo fatto el consegio di diese.”

See Mutinelli, *Annali*, p. 153, note 2.

creating an official organism out of the aristocracy, yet to stand apart from it and above it, which should operate as a barrier equally against the tyranny of individuals and the turbulence of factions. The Decemvirs had in fact superseded the *Quarantia Civile*, which constituted the first practical encroachment on the ducal power outside the Privy Council.

In the meantime, the Committee of Public Safety had inaugurated the commencement of its dictatorship with an edict (July 10), directing the *Capita Sexteriorum* or Chiefs of the Wards to concert such measures as might be necessary for raising without delay a civic Guard of 1500 men, to be held in readiness for the future to act at the shortest notice. Two days later (July 12), the prohibition against the use of side-arms by members of the Great Council, which had been renewed in 1309, was provisionally rescinded in favour of such members as attended the legislative body; and that assembly, with a view perhaps to the more effectual preservation of order and decorum, was advised to deliberate with open doors, the practice since 1172 having been to close the entrance during sittings. On the 19th July, the Ten published several other decrees. They decided: (1) That a body of 200 soldiers, divided into five detachments of forty, should be distributed over the Piazza of Saint Mark from a certain hour in the evening till a certain hour in the morning. (2) That a watch of ten persons, or fewer, according to circumstances, should be set in each street. (3) That sentinels should mount guard every night at the Ducal Palace. (4) That to remove the dangerous facility of transit by which Badoer Badoer had so lately conveyed himself and his accomplices by water from Peraga, an efficient police should be forthwith instituted to exercise a supervision over the traffic of the lagoons and canals; and that no person whosoever should be henceforth permitted to pass from one street to another, after the third bell of the night, without special licence from the Watch. The *Capita Sexteriorum* were commanded by the Ten to charge themselves with the execution of all the foregoing measures.

These wholesome regulations of police reveal the defective state of legislation in regard to such matters so late as the beginning of the fourteenth century; and they lead to a conclusion that the laxity, which was then prevailing, alone

rendered possible such movements as those recently discovered and frustrated.

While the vigorous administration of the Ten was gradually restoring the public confidence and internal repose, a circumstance occurred which occupied no slight share of attention. On the 13th August 1311, the Doge Gradenigo expired. His remains were at once borne to the Baptistery of Saint Mark's; and on the following day they were interred without pomp at San Cipriano. His funeral was purposely simple and unostentatious: for the City still betrayed a strong undercurrent of agitation, and it was apprehended that otherwise his political foes might avail themselves of the tempting occasion for creating fresh disturbances. Such was the closing scene of a career so brilliant, so stormy, and so checkered.

Gradenigo had nearly completed the two-and-twentieth year of his reign: he was only in his sixtieth year. He had survived barely by fourteen months the triumph of his principles and party in the extinction of the popular rebellion and in the establishment of the Decemviral Council; the latter institution was an encroachment on his prerogative, which it is to be surmised that he would not have willingly tolerated at an earlier stage of his public life. It is perhaps nothing more than an indication of the extreme odium into which the Doge had recently fallen in certain quarters, that his death was not uncommonly ascribed to poison. By his consort Tommasina Morosini, niece of the Dowager Queen of Hungary, the deceased left behind him five sons and one daughter, Anna, who was united to Jacopo di Carrara. The other children of Gradenigo inherited his name; but the wife of the Carrara inherited his genius. There was issue of that marriage a daughter Taddea, who wedded in 1321 Mastino de la Scala, Lord of Verona, the most powerful nobleman in Italy.

The Doge had won his great constitutional battle; but the collateral fruits, apart from the main point, tended to darken and embitter the close of his public life. The spirit of opposition was deeply seated and widely spread, and years after the death of Gradenigo, and during the remainder of the career of his political adversary, the feeling of discontent and the tendency to insurrection survived in a more or less overt

form. The organs of the democratic party gave the Government an immense amount of trouble and anxiety, more especially as it was discovered that a strong body of foreigners was enlisted in the cause, and was held in readiness to throw itself into Venice at any moment. Some of the immediate members of the plot of 1310 died or disappeared; but during nearly twenty years the Council of Ten and other bodies were in continual correspondence and negotiation, endeavouring to secure the persons of Bajamonte and his surviving confederates. The Quirini-Tiepolo movement may altogether be treated as the gravest and most trying peril, from the peculiar nature of the original circumstances, to which the City was ever exposed.

The character of this eminent man, as it has been delineated by Daniel Barbaro, exhibits, perhaps, a not unfaithful portraiture of the Great Patrician. Pietro Gradenigo (Barbaro tells us) was a person of infinite astuteness and sagacity. For the vigour of his understanding and the soundness of his judgment he was not more remarkable than for his constancy of purpose and firmness of will. In the prosecution of his formed designs his energy and resolution were indomitable. As an orator, his delivery was fluent, his language was copious, and his manner was persuasive. Toward his friends and partisans no one was more urbane in deportment, more profuse in kindness, more apparently studious to please. Toward those, who had provoked his enmity, no one could be more unforgiving and implacable. In politics, he was a dexterous tactician and an habitual dissembler; and he at all times evinced a backwardness to employ force, until intrigue and artifice were exhausted.

The interval between 1289 and 1311, during which Gradenigo presided over the Government, was one of almost unexampled importance in the annals of the Republic. The aristocratic revolution of 1297-8 constituted the third and most sweeping stage in that grand movement of reform, which had had its rise in the changes of 1033.

The mission with which Gradenigo ascended the throne, and of which he lived to witness the accomplishment, was one which was fraught at the outset with prodigious difficulty, and which demanded the exercise on his part of the utmost tact and of consummate nerve. The ultra-liberal politics of his

predecessor in the Ducal office had been excessively damaging to the aristocracy, and had given to that body a blow from which it by no means easily rallied. The evil did not cease with the death of Giovanni Dandolo. The latter had not only vindicated a principle, but he had established a school. In his latest moments, he commended to his political disciples the part which he had played so well. The tradition was taken up by other men, whose character was less irreproachable, and whose motives might be less disinterested, but whose zeal was not less ardent, and whose party influence was hardly less powerful. The advocacy, if not the protection, of popular rights devolved on the Bocconii, the Tiepoli, and the Quirini.

To stem this tide of democratic reaction, and to remove by degrees the obstructions which were besetting the path of aristocratic ascendancy, became henceforth with Gradenigo a labour of love and the unswerving aim of a life. His genius was triumphant at every point. At every point his enemies were humiliated and scattered. Bocconio died on the scaffold. Quirini perished by the sword. Tiepolo the Cavalier spent his declining years in exile. In 1289, the successor of Dandolo found his party a disunited minority. In 1311, he left it an oligarchy all but paramount. The whole retrospective range of Venetian history offers no period in which so many organic changes were wrought as in the last eleven years of the thirteenth, and the first eleven of the fourteenth century. Neither the *Serrar Del Consejo*, however, nor the creation of the Decemvirs thirteen years later, instantaneously precluded the people from continuing to influence the conduct of public affairs directly and indirectly. It was not till long after the opening years of the fourteenth century, that the upper classes succeeded in establishing their autonomic authority, and in completing the destruction of political freedom.

The reign of Gradenigo at Venice (1289-1311) was nearly parallel with that of Edward I. in England (1272-1307); and it becomes curious to compare the constitutional tendencies of the two countries at that remote epoch. It will be found that precisely similar causes were producing in each diametrically opposite results, and that, while the foreign wars of Venice from 1293 to 1298 were promoting the consolidation of the Aristocracy, the foreign wars of the Plantagenets were favouring almost in an equal degree the rise of the English Commons.

CHAPTER XXI

A.D. 1311-1342

Marino Giorgio, Doge (1311-12)—Relaxation of the Interdict—Zaratine War—Death of Giorgio (July 3, 1312)—His Will—Giovanni Soranzo, Doge (1312-28)—His Antecedents—Termination of the Zaratine War—Removal of the Interdict (1313)—Chastisement of Genoa—Prosperous Administration of Soranzo—Commercial Treaties with France and England (1320-6)—Internal Improvements—Institution of a Hall of Physicians—Erection of Windmills—Cheapness of Provisions—Death of Soranzo (December 31, 1328)—His Funeral—Alterations in the Promission—Elevation of Francesco Dandolo *Cane* (January 8, 1329)—His Popularity—Ceremony of his Investiture—Treaty between the Doge and Charles IV. of France (1334)—And between the Doge, the Emperor of Constantinople, and the Knights of Rhodes (1332)—Expedition of Pietro Zeno—Perpetuation of the Council of Ten (1335)—War against the Scaligers (1336-7-8-9)—Treaty of 1339—Acquisition of Treviso—Alterations in its Constitution—Appointment of Marino Faliero as First Podesta (July 1339)—Death of Dandolo (October 31, 1339)—His Legal and Literary Claims—New Additions to the Coronation Oath—Accession of Bartolomeo Gradenigo (November 7, 1339)—Great Inundation (1340)—Decease of Bartolomeo Gradenigo (December 23, 1342)—Charge of Nepotism against the Doge—Establishment of the Foundling Hospital.

THE Electoral College, which was constituted by the customary process to supply the vacancy of the Crown, made choice of the distinguished senator Stefano Giustiniani, who had already filled with credit several diplomatic posts, and who was a great-grandson of Fra Nicolo Giustiniani who, in 1172, had married Anna Michieli, the Doge's daughter.¹ But the Doge designate, solicitous to shun the responsibilities of office at a juncture when the complexion of affairs threatened to render them more than usually onerous, begged permission to decline the trust; and Giustiniani displayed considerable anxiety to obviate the imputation of an unworthy motive by entering the cloister of San Giorgio Maggiore. It is traditionally reported that while the Forty-one, a little disconcerted by the refusal of their first nominee, were puzzled in the selection of a second candidate, an aged nobleman, Marino Giorgio or Zorzi by name,

¹ Litta, *Celebri famiglie Italiane*, art. *Giustiniani*.

happened on his way to visit some objects of charity, attended by a servant with a large sack of bread, to pass at a slow pace the building where they were deliberating with open doors. The venerable personage, upon whom their eye accidentally fell, was renowned for the austerity of his manners and the sanctity of his life. He was commonly called *Giorgio the Holy*.¹ In 1303, he had been the ambassador of the Republic at the Papal Court; he was personally known to the present Pontiff; and although the weight of fourscore years was upon his shoulders, the College, mainly with a view to the settlement of the unhappy difference with Clement V., determined to register their suffrages in his favour. The veteran Giorgio who, so recently as November 1310, had excused himself from filling an embassy to Henry VII. of Germany on the plea of infirmity, was persuaded with some difficulty to accept a trust, which he could not hope in the course of nature to retain very long (22nd August 1311).² In the choice of such a man as Giorgio to replace such a man as Gradenigo, fortuitous as that choice might have been, while the electors perceived the advantage of a candidate who was on good terms with the Holy See, the oligarchical influence was not impossibly swayed to some extent by a feeling that the decrepitude of the one might promote the consolidation of the power, which the other had founded by his masculine vigour. Recent domestic circumstances had had the effect of diverting general public attention from the Ferrarese question and the critical relations with the Papacy. It is a proof of the stability, which the Executive had attained, that the Republic, amid the acute dangers arising from the almost simultaneous Quirini-Tiepolo plot and the change in the Dogeship, was able to withstand the hostility of the Holy See and all the consequences of the pontifical Bull.

The administration of Giorgio was signalized by the relaxation of the Interdict through his personal intercession; by a Zaratine War; and by a timely correction of the incipient tendency to a rupture with the German Court in consequence of certain novel and extravagant demands on the part of Henry VII., which the Government, during the late Dogate, had contented itself with evading, but of which it now happily

¹ Caroldo, *Hist.*, Harl. MS. 5020, fol. 91.

² Dandolo, fol. 441.

succeeded in procuring the relinquishment.¹ In the siege of Zara,² which had once more rebelled at the instigation of the Ban of Croatia and under the Apostolic licence, the Republic lost some of her best officers. One of the divisions of the army consisted of Dalmasio de Banoli, a native of the Balearic Isles, and his corps of mercenaries. This man, who had demanded that the pay of his troops should be placed in his hands and had been met with a refusal, soon laboured under a strong suspicion of treachery; and affairs went so badly that it at last became a common remark that Dalmasio was betraying his trust. The General himself owned that he was not quite so energetic as he might be; "but," said he, as an excuse, "the Venetians have not sent my soldiers and myself the pay for which we stipulated."³

The struggle was by no means terminated when the Doge breathed his last on the 3rd July 1312, after a reign of unusual brevity. By his will the departed bequeathed considerable sums to various charitable purposes, and set apart funds for the endowment of an institution for the relief and education of destitute children of both sexes, in emulation of the older *Scuola della Carita*. The former institution was the parent of all the other Infant Asylums, which subsequently rose in the Capital.

The elevation of GIOVANNI SORANZO⁴ (July 13, 1312) was hailed as a just tribute to his conspicuous talents, his varied accomplishments, and his long and valuable services. The successor of Giorgio was the son of the Procurator Antonio Soranzo of San Angelo. He was born in 1240.⁵ Between 1293 and 1304, Soranzo had filled with equal distinction the highest posts in the Army and the Navy, as well as in the diplomatic service; in May 1309, he accepted the office of Procurator of Saint Mark *di Sora*, which his father Antonio had formerly (1269) occupied.

The termination of the Zaratine war engrossed the atten-

¹ *Voyage of Henry VII. into Italy*, A.D. 1310-13; *Arch. stor. Ital.*, App. iv. 154.

² Caroldo, *Hist. Harl. MS.* 5020, fol. 91. Four letters from Giorgio to the King of Hungary and other persons, touching the affairs of Zara, are given by Muratori, xii. 493-8. One of the two addressed to the King commences:—"To the Most Serene and Most Puissant Lord Charles, by the Grace of God, King of Hungary, Marino Giorgio, by the same Grace, Doge of Venice."

³ *Historia Cortusiorum*, lib. i. c. 18. See also Albertinus Mussatus, *De gestis Italicorum post Henricum Septimum Cesarem*, lib. ii. Murat. x. 583-6.

⁴ Pietro Dolfino, *Annali Veneti*, p. 59, King's MS, 149.

⁵ Cigogna, *Iserizioni Veneziane*.

tion of the new Doge. But the attainment of that object, of which Giorgio might at first seem to have too hastily despaired, soon proved itself indeed no childish task. General succeeded general. One plan was substituted for another. New levies were raised. Fresh taxes were imposed. Dalmasio and his Venturi, 1000 strong, were still in the Venetian service, although the intrigues of their leader had been denounced by an informer in the ranks; but their efforts were uniformly fruitless; and it was not till the autumn of 1313 that, in consequence of the desertion of the Zaratines by their Croatian and Hungarian allies, the Signory procured the submission of that refractory colony and all but impregnable fortress. Through the tact and adroitness, however, which the Government displayed, the capitulation was framed on a basis hardly less favourable than if the arms of the Republic had experienced the most brilliant success.

Meanwhile, the Ferrarese difficulty, which had now nearly completed the fourth year of its duration, began to wear a highly promising aspect; and the news from Avignon was of a character which exceedingly tended to console the Republic for any disappointments in the adjustment of the Zaratine question. At length, on the 26th March,¹ the welcome announcement was brought that his Holiness had relented, that the proffered indemnity of 20,000 gold florins of Florence² for the losses, alleged to have accrued to the Guelph cause at Ferrara, was definitely accepted, and that the anathema was cancelled. The stubbornness which the Venetians had displayed in withstanding, at all hazards, the Pontifical pretensions in 1308 and 1309, did not prevent them from receiving this intelligence with exuberant satisfaction. Although they had borne with exemplary fortitude the burden and odium of the late interdict, their joy at their restoration to the Christian communion was not less universal. On the 1st April, five days only after the arrival of the Avignon advices, a special embassy was accredited to the Papal Court, for the purpose of following up the release from the Bull to its natural consequences; and, in the course of the summer of 1313, the Signory returned to her position at

¹ Romanin, iii. 94.

² A. Sagredo, *Fraternita dei Fiorentini in Venezia*; *Arch. stor. Ital.* App. ix. 444. Sanudo reckons that the reconciliation cost the Republic not less than 25,000 ducats. *Vite*, p. 596.

Ferrara on an improved footing; and her relations with the other European Powers were satisfactorily re-established.

The piratical depredations,¹ which the Genoese of Pera had within the last twelvemonth committed on Venetian commerce, now reached a culminating point in a somewhat episodic manner. A certain privateer, Ottone Doria, thought proper to attack with a superior force eight Venetian ships which were trading in cotton at some neighbouring port. The prey was secured without much difficulty; and two of the merchants were killed in the fray. Doria, however, gladly permitted his captives to ransom the booty for 8000 ducats. To a suggestion that his conduct was not perfectly consonant with the law of nations, and with the usages of civilized communities in time of peace, the marauder answered with facetious effrontery:² "My plea is absolute necessity, since I have not sufficient money with me to pay for certain goods, which I have been purchasing; and it is lawful enough, as the Scripture declareth to the Jews, to eat in cases of similar urgency the bread of promise, even although it be consecrated"; the whimsical impertinence was not appreciated by the Republic; and the time had arrived for putting a term to such atrocities in the just opinion of an administration, to which the Battle of Curzola had become a mere tradition. A squadron of forty galleys was at once fitted out; and the command was conferred upon Giustiniani Giustiniani, who was popularly said, from the prosperous issue of all his undertakings, "to carry victory in his bosom." The merchant-service of the offending Power was in its turn exposed to capture and spoliation. The 8000 ducats and her other Venetian spoils were wrung from her grasp. Her establishments at Galata were destroyed. As the price of peace, her Government was compelled to defray the cost of her humiliation.

In other respects, the reign of Soranzo was equally favourable to the happiness and to the aggrandizement of his country; and at the same time the consistent aim of the new Council of Ten at self-popularisation is plainly discernible. An age of commercial development and industrial expansion had succeeded to an age of constitutional and administrative reform. A cycle of disaster and privation had passed away,

¹ Villani, lib. x. c. 64, *inter alia*.

² Marin, vi. 5, 6.

and one of prosperity and abundance seemed to be setting in. The intercommunication of the Republic with Italy and the Continent was strengthened and extended by new treaties with Sicily (1314), Hungary (1316), Milan (1317), France and Brabant (1320), Bologna (1321), Bruges (1322), Brescia (1325), England (1326), Como and Recanati (1328); and a cruise of observation was sent to Spain and Portugal to report on the benefit which might probably accrue from the establishment of factories at Seville, Cadiz, and Lisbon. At the same time similar activity was exhibited in cementing the alliances with Persia, Trebizond (1319),¹ Armenia (1321),² Tunis (1320), and the Lower Empire (1328); and in 1320-21 no less a personage than Dante came to Venice on an unsuccessful mission from Ravenna.

In the negotiations with France, the Government conceived itself fortunate in securing, for a substantial consideration, the friendly offices of Charles of Valois; and the letter, bearing date the 8th October 1320, is still extant, in which the Prince acknowledges the receipt at the hands of Benedetto Molini of 2000 florins,³ as a recompense for obtaining from the King a fresh mercantile charter, and the promise of a total removal in favour of Venice of existing fiscal abuses.

It is to be suspected that in England, where the interdict of 1309 had been carried out, in the maltreatment of the Lombards, to an infamous extent, the Republic found at least equal occasion to loosen her purse-strings. The dues, not excessively heavy only, but excessively arbitrary, which were levied by corrupt ministers and more corrupt favourites on foreign imports, are known to have formed one of the leading grounds of complaint, on the part of his own subjects, against Edward II.; and it seems highly probable that the burden of such exactions fell principally on the Flemings and Venetians.

Abroad, the policy of her Ministry was eminently such as tended to inspire the Republic with a lofty self-respect, and to raise her in the estimation of foreigners. At home, the appliance of the mechanical arts on an unprecedentedly wide

¹ 1319, July. Commercial privileges granted by the Emperor of Trebizond to the Venetians at the request of the Doge Giovanni Soranzo and of the Venetian Ambassador Pantaleone Michieli. *Arch. stor. Ital.* App. ix. 374.

² 1321. Privileges granted to the Venetians at the prayer of the Doge Giovanni Soranzo and of the Venetian Ambassador, Michele Giustiniani, by Leo IV., King of Armenia. *Arch. stor. Ital.* App. ix. 371.

³ Marin, v. 309.

scale to domestic improvements: the liberal encouragement afforded to the Lucchese silk manufacture:¹ the institution of a College of Physicians, where medicine and pharmacy were professed, and where gratuitous relief was administered to the poor by competent practitioners: the erection of windmills in various parts of the Dogado by a Lombard engineer: the adoption of more efficient precautions against the recurrence of fires: the amplification of the streets and public squares: the embellishment of the Ducal Palace: the creation of new thoroughfares: the enlargement of the Arsenal: were circumstances which combined to entitle that Ministry to public gratitude and honour.

A prolonged interval of profound calm occasioned a fall in the market value of provisions, which offered to the war prices of former reigns a pleasing contrast. Barbaro and Sanudo relate that for a ducat, which was then equivalent to ninety-six *soldi*, might be purchased a bushel of corn, a quart of wine, a cartload of wood, and a seven days' allowance of meat; and the weekly maintenance of an artisan or other operative did not exceed perhaps at this time on the whole twelve or fourteen shillings.

Under this tranquil and beneficent rule, the progress of the Venetian Ephori was steady and unopposed. In 1316, the Decemvirs, whose authority was then about to expire, obtained a confirmation for ten years; and in 1326 their powers were renewed for a second decennial term.

Soranzo continued to preside over the affairs of his country sixteen years and a half. On Saturday morning, December 31, 1328, the Doge breathed his last in his eighty-ninth year. No prince had ever been more generally beloved. The cheapness of food and the uninterrupted enjoyment of peace had made his administration exceedingly popular.

In the first instance, the Ducal remains were transported from the Palace on the shoulders of twenty of the oldest Senators to the saloon of the Signori di Notte; one of the household marched in front, carrying a sheathed sword with the point upward; and a large number of patricians followed the corpse. The Doge was splendidly attired in the costume

¹ Romanin, iii. 102; *L'Arte della Seta portata in Francia dagli Italiani*; *Arch. stor. Italiano*, Nuova Serie, vi. part ii.; and Filiasi, *Ric. storiche*, 108, who says that thirty-two families, with about 300 workmen, emigrated from Lucca to Venice. They were driven from their native city by the troubles of the Peninsula.

which he wore on State occasions; and the gilded spurs, indicating his equestrian rank, were fastened at his heels. After a brief interval, the procession was again set in motion; and, the Members of the College having taken leave at this point, the rest proceeded to Saint Mark's, where the Dogaressa and her ladies, and a throng of mourning Nobles, had assembled. Here the burial service was performed with the accustomed solemnity; and after its celebration the bearers resumed their burden, and the body was conveyed with every mark of pomp to the family vault of the Soranzi in St. John's Chapel in the Cathedral.¹ The term, during which Soranzo had presided over the affairs of his country, was in a material sense highly prosperous and satisfactory; but it lay in the shadow of the Serrar and its product—the successive insurrections of Bocconio and Tiepolo, with all their surprising incidence, which the long intervening time scarcely sufficed to exhaust or stamp out. The hostility to the aristocratic movement was partly aggravated and intensified by a wide personal dislike to Gradenigo, and partly by the thoroughness and consequent violence of the political revolution. It is singular, that so many persons belonging to the privileged class, which might be supposed to view the new scheme with favour, should have ranged themselves on the side of the Opposition; and perhaps the most remarkable instance was that of the daughter of Soranzo, who seems to have been condemned to exile in 1320, and who was still absent in 1328, when the illness of the Doge, which proved fatal, moved the Ten to permit her to come to Venice by night in a covered barque (*peota*) for eight days, on condition that she returned on the expiration of that term, or if her father died, after her attendance at the obsequies. The lady took up her residence at the Ducal Palace; yet she does not appear to have left Venice, but to have retired into a convent, whence she emerged only on the rarest occasions to be present at some religious ceremony, and then in a close conveyance. This was the stern severity of the decemviral sway in its nonage; but the Executive had an arduous part to play at this juncture with the new constitution on its trial and enemies within and without.

Only in the last year of the reign of the late Serenissimo

¹ Sanudo, fol. 600.

were the traces of the political events of 1310 finally effaced in the execution of a Quirini and two members of the house of Barozzi, all very rich men, Sanudo informs us, and they were hanged on the Piazza, probably after having been strangled in prison.¹

A meeting of the Great Council was fixed for the afternoon of the 31st. The proceedings were opened by the senior Privy Councillor, who expressed his profound regret at the event which had just taken place, and pronounced the eulogium of the deceased, praying that his successor might be worthy of him. All the constitutional forms regarding the temporary devolution of the Ducal authority upon the College, the revision of the Coronation Oath, and the election of a new Prince, were then satisfied; and it became time to resort to a process, which was now little more than a solemn and specious illusion—to obtain for the work of the few the sanction of the many.

The Arrenge was convoked by sound of tocsin to St. Mark's; and, the College coming down, the senior Councillor repeated the oration on Soranzo which he had previously delivered before the Peers. He besought his audience to govern themselves by good counsels, and to pray God for a good Doge. He intimated that his colleagues and himself had, agreeably to the usages of the Land, taken proper steps for the correction of the Promission. Whereupon the Grand Chancellor came forward, and read in distinct tones the amendments which had been introduced into the Oath, and when he had finished, that high functionary raised his voice, and demanded: "May it please you to approve what has been done?" The people exclaimed *Sia, sia!* The usual oath was administered to the Gastaldo by the Notary of the Ducal Court; and the former swore on behalf of all Venice that he would observe the Constitution,² and accept as Doge him who should be duly elected.

The leading emendations which were inserted, at the suggestion of the Board of Correctors and with the popular

¹ *Vite*, p. 599.

² Romanin, iv. *Documenti*, No. 10. The term *Gastaldo* or *Castaldo* seems to have been understood at Venice and elsewhere in more than one sense. Here it has the aspect of signifying a proxy. But we elsewhere encounter the word, where it stands for an usher or a teller of votes at an election, and *gastaldi* and *sopragastaldi* occur. It is the German *gasthalter*.

consent, in the Promission, were those which raised the salary of the Crown from 4000 to 5200 *lire* a month, and which debarred his Serenity from summoning the Arrengo for the future without the concurrence of the College, except in matters of purely ecclesiastical cognizance. After the completion of these preliminaries, Francesco Dandolo *Cane* was proclaimed Doge on Friday the 8th January 1329.¹ Marino Sanudo Torsello, a contemporary, writing to the Archbishop of Capua under date of the 15th February, says: "Your Magnificence is aware that, on the last day of December, my lord Giovanni Soranzo, who was Doge of Venice, migrated to the Lord. In his room, my Lord Francesco Dandolo, surnamed *Can*, and appropriately enough, has been created Doge. He is a man of good reputation, especially in the study and knowledge of the Law."

Francesco Dandolo was the son of Giovanni Dandolo *Can*, himself a personage of some repute as a diplomatist. Francesco had served in 1309 in the embassy, which was accredited in that year to Clement V. at Avignon; and his efforts to assuage the ire of the Pontiff were of the most strenuous and meritorious kind.² The cognomen *Can* or *Cane* may have been borrowed from the *terra firma*, where that and *Mastino* occur as distinctive names of the La Scala family of Verona, and imported, perhaps, steadfast courage. But there was at this period an eminent family of the name, of which the distinguished military commander, Facino Cane, was a member.

The new Doge mounted the throne under the brightest auspices. The popularity which he had gained by his conspicuous share in mollifying the wrath of the Apostolic See was extreme. The enthusiasm at his election was unmingled. So soon as the choice of the College had become generally known, the people flocked to his private residence, and many pressed forward to carry him on their shoulders to the Palace. But Dandolo purposely eluded this boisterous display of affection; and, hurrying to Saint Mark's, he cast himself on his knees before the great altar, and received his solemn investiture

¹ Epistola Marini Sanuti Torselli ad Episcopum Ostiæ, Januarii die 18, 1329, et ejusdem ad Archiepiscopum Capuæ, data Venetiis, Februarii 15, 1329; *Gesta Dei per Francos*, ii. 313-14.

² De Monacis, lib. xv.; Add. MSS. 8574; *Hist. Cortus*. lib. iv. c. 7; Murat. xii.; Sansovino, lib. xiii. 569.

at the hands of the Primicerio, with the oath of allegiance. Quitting the church, followed in procession by the Officers of State and by a promiscuous assemblage of persons, his Serenity, grasping in his hand the great standard of the Republic, passed into the Palace, where he swore before the Senior Privy Councillor to observe the Constitution; Dandolo afterward proceeded to shew himself to the people, to whom he promised the blessings of a mild, honourable, and impartial administration. The next stage of the Ducal progress was to the Great Council Chamber, where Dandolo formally installed himself by sitting down for a few moments on the throne; and when the fatiguing ceremonial was concluded, the Doge finally retired to his own apartments.

Having taken their leave of him at the point prescribed by etiquette, the Privy Councillors, attended by the Grand Chancellor, paid a complimentary visit to the Dogaressa, and each was dismissed with a present of a purse richly worked in silk and gold. Her Serenity afterward proceeded to swear to certain clauses of the Promission, received the oath of allegiance, made the customary¹ oblation on the great altar in the Basilica of 120 ducats, and was ushered in due course into the Hall of the Signori di Notte, where she momentarily occupied a thronal dais specially prepared for her. In the evening, the Privy Council was invited to dine with the Doge at the Palace; and the Dogaressa entertained in a similar manner in her own rooms the Wardens and Masters of all the Trading Gilds.

The earlier years of the Dogate of Francesco Dandolo were unmarked by any events of great consequence. A collision, in the beginning of 1335,² with her old enemy the Patriarch of Aquileia, arising out of the revolt of Pola in Dalmatia and of Valle in Friuli, cost the Republic some troops; but it finally resulted, as in many former instances, in a diplomatic victory and in the acquisition of fresh commercial advantages. In 1331 and 1334 a desultory correspondence was maintained between the French and Venetian Governments, touching a Crusade which the Papal Court of Avignon³ was anxious to organize against the newly-risen power of the Osmanlis; and

¹ The practice was apparently an established one.

² *Hist. Cortus.* lib. v. ch. 9; Murat. xii.

³ *Annali di Lodovico Monaldesco*; Murat. xii. 534.

in March of the latter year a treaty was actually concluded between Venice and Charles IV. of France, which was to have taken effect in 1335, had not the French wars of the Plantagenets¹ rendered it as nugatory as its predecessors of 1281 and 1306. An independent tripartite convention, however, between the Doge, the Emperor Palæologos, and the Knights of Rhodes, had already been ratified in the autumn of 1332 for the protection of Constantinople against the threatened inroads of the Turks; and a squadron under Pietro Zeno, Captain of the Gulf,² was dispatched to the Archipelago. But this expedition developed no important fruits: nor were any serious apprehensions to be entertained at present from the quarter in question. Still, in one of his letters³ to the Bishop of Ostia, Apostolic Legate, Sanudo Torsello writes, under date of the 18th January 1329: "You must know that I have received letters from my lord Marco Gradenigo, Bailo and Captain of Negropont, son of Pietro Gradenigo, the renowned Doge of Venice of happy memory, dated the 18th September last, in which he tells me that unless some remedy be found against the Turks, who have marvellously increased in number, Negropont and all the islands in the Archipelago will be infallibly lost; and that for himself, with his present resources, he has no means of resisting them."

With certain inconsiderable exceptions, the Republic had now enjoyed halcyon days of peace since the return of the Zaratines to their allegiance in 1313. Twenty years of foreign war and domestic convulsion (1293-1313) were thus followed by twenty years of external and internal repose (1313-33). Dalmatia was tranquillised. Genoa was humiliated. The Lower Empire, though not without its alarming symptoms, was quiescent. The pressure of extraordinary taxes was no longer sensible. Prices were low. Provisions were abundant. Commerce had received an enormous impulse and expansion. The condition of trade was highly flourishing. The upper classes were elated by the development of fresh sources of wealth. The lower orders were exhilarated by the removal of their burdens. It was under these auspicious circumstances

¹ Froissart, by Berners, edit. 1812, i. 41.

² "On the 18th February 1330 (O.S.)," says Sanudo, fol. 773, "Pietro Zeno, returned Captain of the Gulf, presented to the Doge a glass vial, in which was contained some of the milk of the Virgin Mary."

³ *Gesta Dei per Francos*, vol. ii. p. 313.

that the time was approaching for the dissolution of the Council of Ten.

The original jurisdiction of this unique tribunal had been of a purely exclusive and strictly transient character. To devise measures for the safety of the State, to obtain by any expedients every new clue to the conspiracy of 1310, to unravel those clues to their source with untiring diligence, to bring to justice all who might have eluded detection—were the objects to which the labours of the Decemvirs were directed, and the points to which their cognisance was confined. But the Council, even if its attributes had not been emphatically inquisitorial, shewed no disposition to be perfunctory. The line of demarcation, if any such line had existed, was soon obliterated or ignored. Every branch of the Executive was submitted in its turn under various pretexts to the novel influence. Nor could it be denied that that influence was exercised, on the whole, to a highly beneficial end. It had been accounted a great revolution when, so recently as 1298, the Great Council succeeded in arrogating to itself the prerogatives which formerly belonged to the people. But the narrow jealousy and distrust, which were gradually growing up in the ranks of the nobility, had long made it palpably evident to the more discerning, that a still higher and still more concentric power must eventually arise to wrest those prerogatives from the hands of the Great Council itself. That power was already found to exist in the Decemvirs. Primarily elected and periodically renewed by the legislative body on the clearest ground of expediency, the Ten had incessantly striven to strengthen their position by propitiating the lower classes on the one hand, and by turning to account, on the other hand, with unequalled dexterity the disunion among the patricians to rule that order with a hand of iron. By some the dictatorship was viewed as an indispensable ingredient in the constitution; by some it was tolerated as an odious necessity; but all accepted the silent innovation in a spirit of acquiescence. The Decemvirs knew their power, and they quickly made that power felt. It was on the 30th January 1336, that their commission was about to expire; on the 20th July 1335, *they caused themselves to be declared a permanent Assembly*. Such a fact was symptomatic not so much of a change in the state of public feeling as of a transition, at no

distant date, from Aristocracy to Oligarchy; but in the tentative or experimental method pursued in arriving at the definitive result there was a remarkable testimony to the leisurely circumspection, which preceded the committal of the country to so vital a step.

So long as the crisis, to which they owed their existence, continued in their own estimation more or less imminent, the Ten had sat every day, and at all hours of the day, in one of the chambers of the Ducal Palace set apart for their deliberations. It was not till the public danger was to some extent removed that they relaxed in the closeness of their application to business, and that they contented themselves with meeting at their official residence for the dispatch of all matters of routine every Wednesday or Thursday afternoon.¹

The admission of the Council of Ten in 1335 into the body-politic as an integer of the constitution was prompted, however, to some extent by other considerations. The prospect of a new Italian difficulty, which was already to be numbered among contingencies, operated in reconciling the Great Council to the adoption of that momentous step.

The shock which the imperial system in Italy had sustained from the Lombard League was one from which that system never thoroughly rallied. The distractions of Germany completed the work which the union of Lombardy had begun. The two cardinal points, at which the Republic had in her Italian policy aimed with tolerable consistency since the Confederacy of 1167, lay in destroying the centralizing influence of the Court of Pavia, and in weakening her enemies in the Peninsula by dividing them; and it was therefore with unqualified satisfaction that she had beheld the stealthy rise of a considerable number of petty municipalities, which possessed few common sympathies, and whose separate hostility she had comparatively slight cause to dread. An object was thus achieved which she had always had secretly at heart, and which she had been constantly promoting by arms and by diplomacy. It was to some extent with complacency that she saw at Verona a La Scala almost outvying the splendour of an imperial court; at Lucca, Castruccio Castracani, who had been a captain in the Venetian service,² reproducing the

¹ *Liber Presbyter*, ad. cartam 82, quoted by Sanudo, *Vite*, 595.

² Sanudo Torsello, *Letter to the Archbishop of Capua*, 1325; *G. D. per Francos*, ii. 292-3.

worst types of imperial tyranny (1327); even Padua elevating herself to an importance which she had not known since the days of Strabo. The dismemberment of the peninsular possessions of the German Caesars opened to the Venetians a new political career, and created for them a new class of interest. How far that career was to be developed, mainly rested with the Venetians themselves. At the same time, the partition of Italy in this manner, while it was so favourable to the Republic in other respects, was accompanied by the disadvantage of involving her in what seemed to be a never-ending series of costly local wars and tiresome negotiations.

It soon became palpable enough, that the principles of government, which sprang out of the Italian revolution of 1167, possessed the same radical defects as those which they had been designed to supersede. It was not long before the Lombards were enabled to detect symptoms of a relapse to the evils, against which their fathers had so nobly struggled. A few great potentates speedily absorbed the acquisitions of their feebler neighbours, and Italy was once more placed at the arbitrement of two or three military leaders. The inherent proclivity to centralization speedily revived in a slightly altered form. Instead of a line of princes, whose weighty German interests had always engaged a large share of their time and attention, there was grave reason to apprehend that at a period, more or less remote, some dynasty might arise, whose sympathies would be purely Italian, and to whom Germany would be no more than England or Denmark. Such a contingency was one which it was alike impossible that the Republic should not foresee, and should not foresee without extreme dismay. Jealous as the Venetians might appear of the presence of any imperial power on the mainland: intolerant, as they might well be of the insolence of Frederic II. or Henry VII., they were far too acute not to perceive how incomparably preferable was a Duke of Luxemburg or a Duke of Bavaria to a Duke of Milan or a Duke of Treviso.

Among those families which had contrived to raise themselves from comparative obscurity during the war of independence against Frederic Barbarossa, none was more distinguished than the Veronese family of La Scala. During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the representatives of that House acquired the highest political influence, and rose to the most

important administrative trusts in their native city; and in 1257 Mastino della Scala availed himself with adroitness of the hostilities between the Venetians and the two Romani to strengthen to a material extent his position and local authority. By a natural and not uncommon transition, an annual or biennial magistracy merged, in the course of time, into an hereditary possession and a ducal title; and by judicious alliances, ably-conducted wars, and scandalous diplomatic artifices, the aggrandizement of the Scaligers steadily proceeded until, toward the middle of the fourteenth century, another Mastino became the master not of Verona only, but of Padua, Lucca, Brescia, Vicenza, Feltre, Belluno, Cadore, Treviso, and Parma. The first had been wrested from the Carrara, the second from the Republic of Florence, Parma from its prince-bishop: while Feltre, Belluno, and Cadore were previously under the protection of the Bohemian Crown. In 1321,¹ the Duke of Verona was united to Taddea, daughter of Jacopo da Carrara by Anna Gradenigo, the Doge's child. The nuptials were solemnized at Venice with great splendour in the Church of San Giorgio Maggiore; and in 1329 (March 12th)² Mastino was created, as a rare honour, a Venetian Citizen. La Scala affected regal magnificence, and aspired to a regal diadem. His court was beyond comparison the most brilliant in Italy. His antechambers were incessantly crowded by princes, grandees, and ambassadors from other Powers, soliciting an audience. He was a man of unquestionable ability as a soldier and as a statesman; but his character had its weak side. His mind was intoxicated by success. His thirst for dominion was not greater than his love of adulation; and in him unbridled ambition was found united with feminine vanity. He was feared by all, caressed by all, and hated by all. His extensive territories, mainly won by usurpation, touched Venice on the one side and Florence on the other. By both his movements were consequently viewed with suspicion, and by both his preponderance was impatiently borne.

Of those neighbours who beheld themselves deprived of their possessions by the Duke of Verona, none had imbibed a more inextinguishable hatred for that nobleman than his distant kinsmen Marsilio and Ubertino, nephews of Jacopo

¹ Gataro, *Istoria Padovana*, fol. 18; Murat. xvii.

² Sanudo, fol. 430.

da Carrara. The wife of the latter had been seduced¹ by Mastino's brother Alberto de la Scala, who governed in the Duke's name at Padua; Ubertino superadded the wrongs of an injured husband to other motives of revenge; and his vindictive feelings were cordially shared by Marsilio.

Not satisfied with committing a political crime by denuding the two Carrara of the sovereignty of Padua, the Duke of Verona proceeded, in direct opposition to the advice of his prime minister, to perpetrate a political folly by curtailing the commercial privileges of the Venetians throughout the municipality, and by laying their intercourse with Padua and the Trevisano under restrictions. The consequence was, that the Government transmitted a protest against such proceedings, suspended the relations between Padua and the Republic, and interdicted the export of salt for that market.

The Venetians would have been glad to see a check imposed on the progress of La Scala, and the double tie of marriage and citizenship was hardly one which the oligarchical government was likely to view as of great weight; but a numerous party in the Great Council shrank on financial grounds from plunging into hostilities of which the cost was as certain as the result was doubtful; the Doge himself leaned strongly to peace, so long as peace was compatible with honour and safety; and it is probable that if the question had lain between the Signory and La Scala himself merely, the rupture would have been closed without any farther complication. But the voice of a tempter was at the Duke's ear. "What has so great a prince," whispered Marsilio da Carrara, "to fear from Venice? Why should you not persevere boldly in your course, and foil the aim of the Republic by planting salterns independent of her jurisdiction in the Paduan lagoons, and by building a new fortress at Peta-de-Bo for their protection? What derogation will it not be on your part to register the edicts of the Doge?" This bait was greedily devoured. The innate conceit and arrogance of La Scala drew him completely into the snare. Steps were taken for establishing the *saline*. The ground was chosen at Peta-de-Bo² for the site of the new fort. A chain was thrown over the Po at Ostiglia, to interrupt the commerce between Venice and Lombardy. An attempt was even made by

¹ A. Gataro, *Ist. Padov.*, fol. 22.

² Dandolo contemp. 413.

Mastino to seize Motta, Porto Buffoletto, and Canino, which the Venetians had taken under their protection.¹ Carrara and his brother perceived with suppressed ecstasy that their fly was already beginning to entangle himself in the meshes of the spider's web!

The course, on which the Duke had entered at the instigation of the wily Paduan, developed the precise result on which Marsilio had counted. The Venetians at once demanded an explanation of the circumstances, under which the rights of the Signory were being so grossly infringed. The tone of the Ducal message spoke of preparations for war; hostilities were intimated as no remote contingency. La Scala took alarm; and Marsilio, whose own alliance with the Gradenigi was fairly supposed to carry with it a certain share of Venetian influence, was charged at his own suggestion with the task of ascertaining the temper of Venice and the real state of her preparations, and of pacifying the Republic by such means as might occur to him. La Scala's envoy, who had wormed himself into the confidence of his present employer by the usual arts of hypocrisy and dissimulation, felt as if a load had been removed from his heart; he hailed with secret joy the so-long-deferred arrival of the hour of retribution; and while he professed with consistent duplicity the utmost devotion to the service of the Duke, he inwardly breathed vengeance against the spoiler of his own patrimony and the dishonourer of his brother's bed. As he entered Venice, the people, to whom he was peculiarly odious, called out, "*Let him die! Let him die!*"² and the Lord of Padua was in fear of becoming the victim of a mob. The throng, however, abstained from any actual violence, and the ambassador reached the palace in safety.

The conduct of Count Marsilio, in his diplomatic visit to the Venetian capital, offered a finished specimen of duplicity and falsehood. To extenuate his treachery, he pleaded to his conscience, perhaps, the still blacker treachery of La Scala; but he played his part with masterly address, "an old fox as he was," says Muratori.³ Saving appearances by busying himself ostensibly with the interests of the Duke, he devoted his better energies to the promotion of the object which he had

¹ Sandi, v. 73.

² *Hist. Cortus.* lib. vi. ch. 2, note 11.

³ *Annali*, viii. 196.

more nearly at heart. There were no persons of political consequence in Venice whose influence was not canvassed, and whose goodwill he failed to secure. While he hoodwinked La Scala's spies and La Scala himself by specious interviews with the members of the Government and audiences of the Doge, this profound schemer applied all his knowledge of the world and all the arts of corruption to the advancement of his own ends; and in this labour of love his perseverance was matched only by his circumspection. Carrara experienced slight difficulty in inculcating on his private hearers the prejudice which was arising to the Signory from the overgrown power of the Duke of Verona. He spoke of Mastino's attitude of defiance. He rehearsed, not without embellishments, the expressions of a vaunting or contumelious import which had dropped from him in the unguarded freedom of confidential intercourse. In short, he omitted no artifice which might help to poison the good opinion of such as had a lingering bias to La Scala; and he employed every sleight of argument serving to prejudice those whose public duty it might become to decide the question of peace or war. A story stole at this time into currency, that on one occasion, when the Carrarese was dining with the Doge, to whom he occupied the next place, he allowed his knife to slip from his hand as if by accident, and that, in the act of stooping to pick it from the floor,¹ he bent toward his Serenity, in whose ear he whispered: "*If any one were to give you Padua, what recompense should be his?*" "*We would confer upon him the government of Padua,*" was the reported rejoinder of Dandolo. Whatever truth there may have been in this anecdote, it is at least certain that a tolerably perfect understanding now existed between Marsilio and the Government; and the humiliation of La Scala appears to have been already seriously meditated.

Upon his return to Verona, the second act of the drama opened. The Paduan was the bearer of a doleful tale. He reported that his reception at Venice had been most unfavourable; that the conduct of the Government had been outrageous; and that, on his exit from the City, he was pelted. He hastened to disabuse the mind of his employer of the impression that the character of the Venetian preparations was at all formidable; he assured La Scala that he had

¹ *Hist. Cortus., ubi supra.*

nothing to fear from that quarter, inasmuch as his own forces were superior to any which could be brought against them; he exhorted him to be quite firm. The Duke was immeasurably incensed at the affronts alleged to have been offered to his representative; but he could not disguise his glee at the contradiction which Marsilio gave to the rumours previously current touching the Venetian armaments; and upon the counsel which his evil genius had the excessive effrontery to tender, he had the equally marvellous fatuity to act. The Venetian legation was still waiting in his antechamber for a reply to their latest communication; they were now dismissed, in spite of the earnest remonstrance of the Duke's minister,¹ with a message that the Duke would make no concessions, and that he would furnish no additional explanation. He even banteringly inquired of one of the deputies: "Why does your master throw away so much lead in sealing his dispatches, seeing that the metal is in such high request for roofing Saint Mark's?" The rescript of the Doge, however, demonstrated to La Scala with admirable clearness that, although he might be in jest, the Republic was not so. "You seek war," wrote his Serenity, "and you shall have war; and your injustice is our guarantee that you will be the sufferer."

This was the consummation indeed, which Venice had anticipated: nor was she a stranger to the magnitude of the enterprise, in which she was purposing to embark. After two-and-twenty years' repose, the Venetians were prepared to resign themselves cheerfully to the losses and sacrifices which would infallibly attend such a struggle. The circumstances were eminently propitious. The provocation was extremely severe. Apart from public motives of resentment, the eviction or maltreatment of several Venetian proprietors in the Trevisano had bred a strong feeling of animosity against La Scala in the Great Council; and it was in vain that the Doge and the Peace Party still affected to look wistfully at the stormy prospect, and continued to intimate their pacific convictions. It was to no purpose that, in the Senate, Dandolo himself, in a somewhat lengthened address to that body,² declaimed against a relapse to the belligerent state, and declared his persuasion that the desired objects could be obtained, as in many former instances they had been obtained,

¹ Sandi, v. 74.

² Marin, vi. 81.

merely by a total suspension of commercial intercourse with a Power, whose multifarious wants they alone were in a position to supply. It was fairly rejoined by another speaker, "that it by no means follows, because a certain policy was in former times found to answer the ends of the Republic, that such a policy continues to be suitable or advantageous, when her commerce has been expanded to an enormous extent, when her resources are immeasurably ampler, and when acquisitions of territory have created interests which were then undeveloped, and necessities which were then unknown."

All the calculations of the Government were made. A census of the able-bodied population had been ordered, which exhibited a return of 40,100¹ male adults between the ages of twenty and sixty inclusive; the persons whose names appeared in this conscription were divided according to their seniority into twelve classes, of which the first alone was at present pronounced liable to serve by themselves or their proxies;² and between 3000 and 4000 men were ready to take the field. As a prelude to the assumption of the offensive, the Doge sent to Testa di Cane,³ one of the conterminous points between Padua and Chioggia, an embassy which delivered on the boundary line a formal and conclusive protestation against the aggression of La Scala, and then, as a symbol of defiance, cast a stone three several times in the direction of the hostile territory⁴ (May 28, 1336).

On the 21st June 1336,⁵ an offensive treaty was concluded on a satisfactory footing between the Venetians and Florentines,⁶ the latter of whom, by the unprincipled annexation of Lucca to the Veronese duchy,⁷ beheld one of their fairest and most legitimate possessions snatched from them. Under this convention, which was ratified by the Great Council on the 22nd, the restoration of Lucca to Florence was guaranteed, and the Florentines consented to share with the Republic the expenses of the war within the Trevisan March.

It quickly became apparent, that any attempt to localise that war would be futile. In a short time, Venice and the

¹ Romanin, iii. 121.

² Navagiero, fol. 1027; Marin, vi. 27.

³ Romanin, iii. 119.

⁴ Romanin *ubi supra*. This custom, which was one of the canons of mediæval warfare, was apparently borrowed from the Roman practice of hurling a javelin under similar circumstances.

⁵ G. Villani, lib. xi. c. 50; Marin, vi. 25.

⁶ *Hist. Cortus.* lib. v. c. 10.

⁷ G. Villani, lib. xi. c. 44.

neighbourhood swarmed with refugees, who were hastening from every corner of the Peninsula to proclaim their wrongs and to volunteer their services. The Allies found their ranks swelling from day to day. The revolutionary element was already somewhat more preponderant than the Republic could have wished; and there was not the slightest room to doubt that, so soon as operations had fairly begun, and a victory was announced, many whose sentiments were wavering, or whose enthusiasm was curbed by fear and uncertainty, would tender their cordial adhesion.

In all their local and other contests, with a single exception, the Venetians had not only employed native soldiers, but where the Doge himself did not act, had selected commanders from the ranks of their own nobility; and the present occasion may be perhaps regarded as almost the earliest systematic resort to a principle, which was thought to be politically safer. The influence acquired by a successful general over his troops, which began by being a source of strength, might end by becoming a source of peril, if the command should be conferred on a Venetian, who was also a popular favourite; and agreeably to this doctrine, which might be considered an aftergrowth from the constitutional movement of 1310, the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Coalition was offered by the Government to Pietro Maria Rossi of Parma, the youngest member of an illustrious family, a nephew of Marsilio da Carrara,¹ and one of the ablest captains of the age.² Rossi, to whom the Ducal letter brought not only an intimation of the desire of the Signory, but the first report of the poisoning of one of his brothers by the secret order of La Scala, accepted the trust with alacrity, vowing vengeance against the murderer of Marsilio; and on the 10th October his solemn investiture by the Doge in person with the great banner of the Republic took place in the Church of Saint Mark, amid the acclamations of the assembled people. Two Venetian civilians were appointed to assist the counsels of Rossi.

The forces of the Republic and her confederates concentrated themselves on Motta,³ in the March of Treviso, from

¹ Sandi, v. 15.

² Gataro, *Ist. Pad.* 22; Platina, *Hist. Mant.* 52; Murat. xviii.

³ Dandolo contemp. fol. 413.

which point the general had decided on directing his strategical manœuvres. Robbed of his own estate and power by the same rapacious hand which had now imbrued itself in the blood of his brother, the Parmese displayed to full advantage his resplendent talents. The progress of the Venetian arms under his conduct was rapid and triumphant. The Florentine contingent having now effected a junction, the invaders carried fire and sword into the domains of the Veronese tyrant: while the Chioggians under their own Podesta proceeded to occupy strong positions at Monte-Albano and Stalimbeco, and Paolo Loredano put into a condition of defence a fort belonging to the Republic on the Paduan border. The standard of geographical knowledge in this age was necessarily not very high even among the cosmopolitan Venetians; and the absence of maps and plans of the districts to be traversed in the course of a campaign was a want which had been supplied to a very slight degree. But the personal acquaintance of Rossi with the new theatre of war was peculiarly accurate and extensive; and this circumstance, which had been the proximate ground for his employment, largely contributed to the success of operations. The whole line of country so far as the Brenta was mercilessly swept; the passage of that river was effected in a masterly manner, before the enemy, who had designed to dispute it, had time to come up; and the Venetians advanced without serious opposition within a short distance of the ramparts of Padua. It had been expected that the gates of this city would be thrown open to the Allies, according to preconcerted arrangement, by Count Marsilio; but Alberto de la Scala, Mastino's brother and lieutenant, who exercised here the same terrorism which the Duke himself was exercising elsewhere, was still sufficiently powerful to render such a step impossible without exposing the author to immediate destruction; and Carrara was reluctantly obliged to postpone for the present the decisive blow. The Commander-in-Chief, who was advised not to enter rashly upon a siege, which might shortly prove superfluous, turned thereupon the heads of his columns from Padua, occupied Piove di Sacco and Bovolenta, invested and took the Castle of Curano, and marching through Cavarzero, reached at length the fort of Peta-de-Bo, the erection of which had been one of the principal causes, if not the primary one, of the war. This infantile stronghold, which

dated its foundation only from the preceding year, was assaulted concurrently by the Venetians and Florentines on the side of the land, and by a small Chioggian fleet from the sea; the position was taken by storm on Saint Cecilia's day, 1336 (November 22), and afterward completely dismantled and razed; and the stones and other material, having been conveyed in boats to Stalimbeco, were at once employed in the construction of a new fortress, which was christened the *Torre d' Argere*. A festival was instituted in remembrance of the day and the exploit to the honour of the Virgin Cecilia.

To preserve through a like medium the memory of remarkable occurrences is a practice which has been common to every age. But, independently of other points, such a practice was of uncommon utility at an epoch when intercommunications were difficult and slow, when periodical literature was unthought of, when dates, depending on oral tradition, were readily forgotten; and when important facts, known perhaps only to eye-witnesses, were extremely apt to perish. The history and chronology of the mediæval period are sufficiently obscure and imperfect; but that they are not far more obscure and far more imperfect, posterity owes in a large measure to the Red-Letter days.

Before the campaign of 1336 was brought to a close, the success of the Coalition had attracted to its ranks several new members, in whose eyes, perhaps, the triumph of the cause was its best justification. The League was now joined by Azzo Visconti, Lord of Milan; Luigi Gonzaga, Lord of Mantua; and Obizzo II. D' Este, Marquis of Ferrara, the last of whom had vainly striven to reconcile the belligerents;¹ and on the 10th of March 1337, the compact of June in the preceding year between the Venetians and Florentines was reconstructed on an enlarged basis.² In the course of the summer,³ Cittadella, Asolo, Ceneda, Conegliano, and other places within the Trevisan and Paduan confines rebelled against Mastino; twenty Lombard regiments in the service and pay of the Duke went over to the enemy; and at the end of July the King of Bohemia, under whose protection had been Feltre, Belluno, and Cadore, was admitted into the Veneto-Florentine League. These accessions changed altogether the relative

¹ Pugliola, fol. 371.

² Marin, vi. 21.

³ Muratori, *Annali*, viii. 197.

strength of parties; and the balance at present preponderated greatly in favour of the Allies, who were once more directing their steps toward Padua.

But while a series of victories was wreathing with laurels the brows of Rossi and the standard of Saint Mark, the perfidy of Count Marsilio had by some unlucky mischance been rather prematurely unmasked. The wrath of his dupe was ungovernable, his indignation unbounded; and he sent immediate instructions to his brother, without explaining his motive, "to destroy instantly the two Carrara." Alberto prepared to obey the mandate; but when the fatal blow was to be struck, the heart of this naturally excellent man failed him; and three messages, each more peremptory than its predecessor, were ineffectually addressed to him with a similar object. When he summoned Marsilio¹ and his brother for the first time on some frivolous pretext to his palace, those familiar accents and that captivating manner arrested the arm, which was to give to the guards the preconcerted signal; and instead of carrying out his revolting commission, he clasped the Count to his bosom, saying, "*My brother does not well to diminish so the number of his friends.*" In the second instance, the two Carrara, having spent the evening with the Governor of Padua, had retired to their own house at San Nicolo in the neighbourhood. It was midnight; and they were preparing for rest, when a messenger arrived in haste from the palace with an announcement that "Messer Alberto desired to speak another word with them." Although they were already in an advanced stage of undress, they at once hurried back; and Marsilio, espying the Governor pacing the verandah, cried out to him with an air of pleasantry and affected petulance: "What the devil do you want?² We parted from you but just now; will you be always disturbing us?" This sally was too much for Alberto. He was touched by the unsuspecting confidence of his late boon-companions. He had given strict orders that, so soon as the brothers entered the palace, they should be pitilessly massacred by soldiers purposely stationed at the foot of the staircase; but he now exclaimed with an impatience which was somewhat suspicious, "Do not come in, do not come in; go home to bed;

¹ De Monacis, lib. xv., Add. MSS. 8574; Gatáro, *Ist. Padov.* p. 25, et seq.; Gio. Villani, lib. xi. c. 54.

² Gatáro, *Ist. Pad.* 26.

I want nothing!" The third occasion presented an equally curious episode. It is on the 2nd August at midnight, when the messenger of Mastino reaches his destination. Alberto happens to be playing at chess with a friend of the Count; Marsilio as well as Ubertino is present; but they are simply looking on, and watching the moves. The Governor raises his eyes for an instant from the game on which he is intent, and seeing that there is a letter from Verona, he carelessly says to Marsilio: "Open and read." The courier declining, in obedience to his instructions, to deliver the packet to a third party, La Scala snatches it from him, and without examining even the superscription, hands it to Carrara. The latter breaks the seal, and runs his eye over the contents with an exquisite air of indifference; his countenance remains unchanged; the muscles of his face preserve their usual rigidity; but it requires all his habitual self-command to prevent his lineaments from betraying the inward working of his mind and the secret heart-struggle. His emotion is strengthened by its suppression. Drawing Ubertino gaily aside, he converses with him for a short space of time in an undertone; Ubertino quits the apartment immediately afterward; and his brother, turning lightly on his heel, rejoins the chess-table. The game is just finished, and the Governor, who has been fortunately too much absorbed in his favourite amusement to note the late byplay, demands, without inquiring for the letter itself: "*What news from Messer Mastino?*" "O!" returns the Count, with unruffled coolness and self-possession, "he wishes merely that you will bear in mind the purchase of those peregrine falcons for him." "A momentous business, truly," retorted the other, with a barely perceptible curl of his lip. On the following day (August 3), by the collusion of the two Carrara, who had, of course, been no strangers from the outset to the true nature of the correspondence between the Duke and his gentler lieutenant, and who now felt that their lives were jeopardised, the Allies became masters of Padua; and on the 4th, Alberto de la Scala, accompanied by Nicoletto his jester,¹ was conducted a prisoner to Venice.²

¹ *Hist. Cortus.* vii. 5; G. Villani, lib. xi. c. 65.

² *Arch. stor. Ital.* xvi. part ii. p. 509; *Vite Principum Carrariensium*: Murat, xvi. 156.

This great event, for which the Venetians had been probably prepared to some extent by occasional advices from Rossi and the Carrara, prostrated the power, and destroyed the prestige, of the Scaligers. It was a victory which had the glory of being all but bloodless, an advantage, of which the value in the eyes of the Republic was immeasurable, and which gave her reason neither to blush nor to weep. The capture of the Governor was calculated to carry with it so much moral weight, that the Doge hastened to make it officially known throughout Lombardy; and the letter of Francesco Dandolo, dated the 4th August 1337, in which he notified the circumstance to the Commune of Perugia, has been preserved.¹ The fall of Padua was followed by the most important consequences. Brescia and Bergamo returned (October-November) to the Visconti. The King of Bohemia recovered his protectorate over Feltre, Belluno, and Cadore. Monselice yielded to the Carrarese. Vicenza and Montagnano were in the hands of the Venetians. Treviso was threatened, and Verona was hemmed in. One sad incident, however, had checkered the triumph of the Federation.² Before the walls of Monselice the heroic Rossi terminated his brilliant and enviable career at the age of thirty-six; his fall, which was owing to a lance-wound received during the siege, was universally lamented, and his memory was honoured by a sumptuous funeral, and by the nomination of his brother Orlando to replace him in the chief command of the forces.³

The spirit of the Duke was entirely broken by these accumulated disasters, and by the rapid disruption of his possessions. In June 1336 he had been the absolute master of the greater portion of the kingdom of Alboin. In June 1337 his authority in Verona itself was not unchallenged. But prudence counselled submission; and he demanded peace. The Republic, personally satisfied by the actual success of the war, although Lucca, which had been guaranteed to Florence, was still to be regained, and considering that there was no utility, and possibly some prejudice, in prolonging its duration, gave her assent to the renewal of the suspended conferences; and Venice, which became the centre of negotiations, soon

¹ *Arch. stor. Ital.*, *ubi supra*, where a copy of the original will be found.

² Muratori, *Ann.* viii. 200-3.

³ Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 604; *Istoria di Parma*, Murat. xii. 741; *Hist. Cortus.* lib. vii. ch. 4.

began to witness the arrival of a flock of diplomatists from Mantua, Florence, Verona, and every other quarter of the Peninsula (January 1337-8).¹ After considerable delay and impediment, consequential upon the natural backwardness of Florence to forego her pretensions to Lucca, peace was signed on the 24th January² 1339, on conditions which were dictated for the most part by the Venetians themselves; and its concurrent proclamation throughout Italy on the 14th of the following month was the signal for general rejoicings and festivities. On the piazza of Saint Mark, a splendid tournament was held in honour of the occasion. Italy carols and is jubilant with delight.³

The treaty of January 1339 was a treaty of partition. Its provisions were almost tantamount to a reconstruction of the map of Lombardy. The Signory reserved to herself Treviso and its dependencies,⁴ and obtained the renewal of her old mercantile charters with Vicenza and Verona. As an equivalent for Lucca, the Florentines⁵ received Pescia, Buggiano, Colle, and Altopascio, in the same locality. Padua was given to Marsilio da Carrara, but not without a somewhat significant intimation on the part of the Government of Francesco Dandolo, that he was bound to bear in mind how entirely his reinstatement was due to the Venetian arms. To Ubertino da Carrara were ceded Bassano and Castelbaldo. Parma reverted to its prince-bishop. The Rossi were restored to their estates; and Orlando and his brother Andreasso were liberally pensioned. In addition to these redistributive clauses, there were two other noticeable articles. By one, the navigation of the Po was thrown open to all flags at all times from its mouth to its source. By the other, the Venetian residents in the dominions of La Scala were not only secured for the future in the free enjoyment of their liberty and in the unmolested pursuit of their callings, but were indemnified for their passed losses and sacrifices.⁶ Of all his vast domains, Verona and its outskirts alone remained to Mastino.

Such was the first acquisition which the Republic, at a

¹ *Hist. Cortus.* lib. vi. ch. 5.

² De Monacis, lib. xv., Add. MSS. 8574.

³ *Hist. Cortus.* lib. vii. ch. 1.

⁴ *Ibid.* lib. vii. ch. 18.

⁵ *Istorie Pistoiesi*, 1300-48, Murat. ii. 475; *Chronicon Regiense*, Murat. xviii. 52.

⁶ *Hist. Cortus.* lib. vii. ch. 18. The amount of the compensation was fixed at 10,000 florins.

distance of 135 years from the conquest of Constantinople, made on the Italian *terra firma*; and such was the first war in which she had ever leagued herself with the opulent and powerful city of Florence. The conquest was one which might probably become a landmark in her eventful history. The war was one on which the Venetians, as a nation, looked back with unmingled satisfaction. It brought them glory and dominion. Nor did the Florentines on their part reflect without pride on the share which they had borne in the three years' campaign. But the peace of January was a severe disappointment and a heavy blow to their expectations. They complained with bitterness that, while their ally was so large a gainer, they had not even reaped the comparatively slender advantages, for the sake of which they were tempted to enter the field, and had merely involved themselves in a debt of 450,000 florins. They complained that the pledge given in 1336, and renewed in 1337, by which Lucca was secured to them, had been perfidiously ignored. They declared that by a precipitate¹ pacification their best interests had been shamefully sacrificed. They protested that the equivalent, which they had been forced to accept, was indeed no equivalent. The Venetians were able to rejoin that, as the burden of the war had chiefly devolved on them,² they conceived themselves entitled to close hostilities so soon as the grand object, with which the sword had been drawn, was achieved; and that, although Lucca was withheld from Florence at present by political considerations, the latter was not left without a fair indemnity.

Under the new Venetian rule, the municipal Government of Treviso underwent certain organic changes, tending to assimilate its constitution to that of the Republic. At the head of the civil administration was placed a Podesta, at the head of the military staff, a Captain; but these two functions were susceptible of amalgamation. The Podesta was assisted by an executive Council of Forty and by a legislative Council of Three Hundred; and his authority was circumscribed by a Capitulary embracing a variety of severe restrictions. During his year of office he was forbidden to see his wife or any female member of his family, or to receive into his house such of his male relatives as had

¹ G. Villani, lib. xi. c. 90.

² De Monacis, lib. xv., Add. MSS. 8574.

passed their twelfth year. Other equally stringent regulations were added to the Capitulary, on which he swore prior to his entry into office, and of which he was nominally bound to rehearse the conditions at monthly intervals before the Council of Three Hundred. The civil jurisdiction was divided between two Courts, of which one took cognizance of all suits above fifty *lire*, the other of all falling below that amount.¹ The Statute or governing code descended to the minutest particulars, such as *octroi*, lighting, health, wells, roads and bridges, fortifications, guilds, and even wet-nurses, which were mainly assimilated to the municipal system pursued at Venice itself, and we are otherwise in some cases without exact information for this period on such points.

The first Podesta and Captain of Treviso subsequent to the constitutional changes, who was appointed in July 1339, was the same who had filled the office of Podesta of Padua in 1337, after the fall of La Scala. His name was Marino Faliero.² Francesco Dandolo did not long outlive the final close of that Peninsular war, of which he had so earnestly opposed the undertaking, and of which he did not stand alone in pronouncing the benefits to be showy rather than substantial. His death took place on the 31st of the following October. The event had been expected from day to day since the beginning of the month.³

Among the correspondence of his contemporary, Marino Sanudo Torsello, author of *The Secrets of the Faithful of the Cross*, and a distinguished traveller, are found two letters, respectively dated January 18 and February 15, 1329,⁴ and addressed to Ingramo, Archbishop of Capua, in which the accomplishments of Dandolo, then newly elected, as a juriconsult and legislator are mentioned with applause. Nor was the encomium of Sanudo unmerited. For the amendments and additions which the books of the Statute received at the hands of this prince were of considerable extent and value; and in a printed edition of 1477 his labours are discriminated from those of earlier and later jurists.⁵ Sanudo the historian

¹ Sandi, lib. v. c. 13.

² Sanudo, p. 594; Verci, *St. della Marca Trivigiana e Veronese*, xii. 32.

³ Dandolo contemp., p. 414.

⁴ Sanudo Torsello, *Epistole; Gesta Dei per Francos*, ii. 312-14.

⁵ *Statuti et Ordini di Venetia*, 1477, folio.

speaks of the successor of Soranzo as a distinguished man of letters¹ and a person of rare culture and erudition; and it is to be regretted that of his literary tastes no memorial has descended to our time.

Before steps were taken to supply the vacancy now existing, a few additions were inserted² in the Ducal Promission. Of these supplementary clauses the most remarkable was that which debarred the Doge henceforth from vacating the throne without the concurrence of the Privy Council and the legislative body. It was a somewhat novel restraint on the Prerogative, which was not proximately referable perhaps to any incident in the late reign, but which was simply designed to operate as a precautionary check on the unconstitutional and mischievous habit, which the Chief Magistrate had contracted and indulged, at an earlier date, of withdrawing at pleasure or on whim from political life into religious seclusion. It may be difficult to imagine any conditions under which a similar practice would not be fraught more or less with inconvenience; but it is certain that it was more than commonly detrimental, where a sudden and unexpected abdication was exceedingly apt to breed popular disorder and foster party distempers. Still, the rule, although it was merely prospective, was unquestionably tyrannical: nor was it more than a specious argument in its favour, that any elect candidate, who accounted the prohibition obnoxious, was at liberty to take the alternative. For the significant conduct of Stefano Giustiniani, so recently as 1311, furnishes tolerably conclusive testimony that refusal on the part of any statesman was, in the absence of peculiar circumstances or the weightiest reasons, practically out of the question, unless the recusant was prepared to follow the example of Guistiniani by sacrificing his worldly prospects.

Summoned to make choice of Dandolo's successor, the Electoral College became divided between two candidates, Bartolomeo Gradenigo, Procurator of Saint Mark *di Citra*, and a veteran of seventy-seven, and Andrea Dandolo, Procurator of Saint Mark *di Sôra*, both of whom happened to be among the Forty-one. The latter, who was the son of Fantino Dandolo of San Luca, and who reckoned in the number of his ancestors

¹ *Statuti et Ordini di Venetia*, 1477, p. 46. "Era uomo letteratissimo."

² Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 606; Romanin, iii. 141.

the conqueror of Constantinople, was a young man of precocious erudition and accomplishments. He was one of the earliest Venetian scholars, who had aspired to academical honours in the University of Padua; and after prosecuting his studies with rare assiduity under Riccardo Malhombra, the first legist of the age, he had graduated as Doctor of Laws.¹ Although the office of Procurator di Sôra, which he had filled since 1331,² placed him already so near the steps of the throne, he was at present only in his thirtieth year.³ The suffrages of the College were equally balanced for some time; and it was Dandolo himself who at length turned the scale in favour of his competitor by refusing the berretta.⁴

A curious little piece of legendary history belongs to the days which we have reached. A tidal wave occurred in the Adriatic, which involved Venice in a serious inundation. On the night of the 15th February 1340, the level of the sea rose much above the ordinary high-water mark, and a portion of the Dogado was submerged. The amount of damage which was sustained on this occasion was in all probability very considerable; and from the hour at which the event occurred it was peculiarly terrifying. But the popular mind long clung to the favourite delusion that the tempest and the accompanying flood were the work of bad spirits, and that it was by the opportune interposition of the saints alone that the dire calamity was warded off.

A solitary weather-beaten mariner (so runs the story), standing on the Piazzetta amid the wind and rain, suddenly becomes conscious of the approach of a venerable figure, who says to him in clear and authoritative accents, "I am Saint Mark the Evangelist; ferry me over to San Giorgio!" The man, though at first rooted to the ground by fear, is ultimately awed into compliance; and, on their arrival at the specified point, there issues from the portal of the Church a second personage of robust aspect, who is in due course announced to be no other than Saint George himself. From San Giorgio the three proceed at the desire of the Evangelist to Lido, where they are presently joined by Saint Nicholas. The ferryman, who has now begun to rally from his fright, and to feel a little confidence in his fares, obeys without demur the

¹ Sanudo, 609, 627.

³ Caresinus, fol. 418.

² Sansovino, *Chronico Veneto*, p. 57.

⁴ Romanin, iii. 146.

injunction of the Patron-Saint to row onward. The boat, gliding over the crested and foaming waves, shoots into the middle of a cohort of demons, the putative conjurers of the storm; and after a preliminary exorcism the spirits are signally put to the rout. Hereupon, Saint Mark, presenting a ring to the proprietor of the gondola, addresses him thus: "Take this ring to my Procurators; and they, recognising the symbol, will recompense thee with five ducats!" The gondolier, stupefied by the bewildering spectacle of which he has been the sole eye-witness, and dazzled by the prospect of so large a reward, collects himself only in time to perceive that his passengers have vanished.¹ Such is a tale which retained a lengthened hold upon the credulity of the multitude, and upon which a sagacious government was so far from willing to cast discredit, that a festival was forthwith instituted, commemorative of the salvation of the Republic by her trusty champions, Saint Mark, Saint Nicholas, and Saint George. No country has been without its peculiar creed, either indigenous or transfused, in preternatural agencies, or without its peculiar system of witchcraft and demonology. Nomad nations have been seen entertaining superstitions of spirits who dried up the fountain of the desert, and who spread the murrain among their cattle; agricultural nations, believing in fiends or imps who blighted their crops, and sent them drought, when they prayed for rain; warrior nations, again, putting faith in such as were imagined to ride the blinding whirlwind and to wither, in the hour of battle, the arm of the soldier; and we may naturally expect to trace in the early legendary lore of Venice belief in a class of malignant influences, harmonising with the genius of a maritime people. These monkish fables and old wives' tales served perhaps, at an epoch when polite learning was confined to a few, and when popular education was unknown, to lend attractions to the domestic hearth, and helped to diversify the monotony of the long winters' evenings.

The period seems too early to allow us to resolve the tradition just noticed into a deception or a hoax. Yet sharpers, if not practical humourists, were already in the field; and the mediæval pickpocket was a familiar character.

With the exception of the renewal of an expiring treaty

¹ Dandolo contemp. fol. 415-16, *et alii*.

with the Byzantine Court,¹ a curious episode in connexion with England in 1340, to be more particularly noticed hereafter, the forcible repression of a fresh revolt of the Calergi in Candia after some bloodshed and many executions,² and the quelling of certain domestic disturbances which had arisen in Poveja and elsewhere,³ no other event of consequence or note happened during the brief continuance of Gradenigo in power; and the throne was once more vacated by the death of that prince on the 28th December 1342.⁴ A scarcity, which was experienced at Venice shortly before his decease, had impaired his popularity, and the Doge had brought himself into some odium among the patricians by the pertinacious nepotism which he displayed in thrusting his sons, to whom an invitation to London had been given in 1340, into posts of emolument.⁵ It is to the period during which Gradenigo remained in office that the institution belongs, however, of the Foundling Hospital, as well as the embellishment of the capital with the beautiful church of the *Servi* and other picturesque buildings, in continuation of the grand scheme of metropolitan improvement which had already found so warm a patron in the Doge Soranzo.

¹ Sanudo, 607; Romanin, iii. 143.

² Dandolo contemp. fol. 415; Sanudo, 607; *Hist. Cortus.* lib. viii. 908; Marin, vi. 46.

³ Dandolo contemp., *ubi supra*.

⁴ Sansovino, xiii. 569.

⁵ Pietro Giustiniani, *Cronica*, p. 96, King's MSS. 148; Sanudo, fol. 607, 609. The consequence was that, on the demise of Gradenigo, a clause, declaratory of the law of 1275 in this respect, was inserted in the Promission.

CHAPTER XXII

A. D. 1343—1354

Andrea Dandolo, Doge (1343)—His Antecedents—Renewal of the Ottoman War—Fall of Smyrna (1344)—Dissolution of the Triple Alliance—Fresh Troubles in Dalmatia (1345)—Defeat of the Hungarians by Marino Faliero at Zara (July 1346)—Submission of the Zaratines—Dissensions between Venice and Genoa in the Crimea (1342–3–4)—The two Republics make common cause against the Native Powers (1345)—Fresh Dissensions—Earthquake and Famine at Venice (1348)—Frightful Visitation of the Plague (*ibid.*)—Suppression of a Revolt at Capo d' Istria (*ibid.*)—Peace with Hungary (1348–56)—New War with Genoa (1350)—Capture of Genoese Prizes off Negropont—Extension of the War—Alliance between Venice, Arragon, and Greece—Desultory Character of the Campaigns of 1351 and 1352—Battle of the Dardanelles (February 13–14, 1353)—Equivocal Triumph of the Genoese—Battle of Lojera (August 29)—Total Defeat of the Genoese—Genoa accepts the Protection of the Duke of Milan (October 1353)—Visconti employs Petrarch as his Envoy to the Doge—Character of Petrarch—His want of Success.

ON Saturday, the 4th January 1343,¹ Andrea Dandolo, who had already once declined the dignity, was elevated in his thirty-third year² to the Venetian throne by the unanimous suffrage of the College of Electors. In the person of the new Doge, flattering homage was paid to literature and learning. Carefully nurtured and educated, Dandolo had been sent in due course to the University of Padua, where he gradually became proficient in every branch of polite and liberal knowledge. With the law he acquired peculiar conversance; he learned to write Latin with elegance, and to speak it with fluency; and he could boast of being able to read a few favourite French authors in the original.³ Nor was he more remarkable for his versatile and multifarious attainments as a scholar than for his administrative ability and his extensive political information. Under the patronising indulgence, perhaps, of his distant kinsman, the then reigning Doge

¹ Caresinus contemp. 417; P. Dolfino, *Annali*, p. 61, King's MSS. 149; Caroldo, *Historia*, King's MSS. 147.

² Caresinus, *ubi supra*; Marin, vi. 47.

³ Foscarini, *Lett. Venez.* 134, n. 1–2.

Francesco Dandolo, he soon rose to the highest offices and was entrusted with the most responsible functions; and in 1331, at a period of life when most of his friends were still at college, he became Procurator of Saint Mark *di Sora*.¹ Sanudo the historian speaks of him, on the authority of his lost work, the *Mare Magnum*, as a member of the Council of Ten. There were, indeed, few fields of inquiry which this admirable person had left untraversed, and few points of mental culture which he had neglected. With the lawyers he could solve problems in jurisprudence. With the philosophers he discussed ethics and perpetual motion. With foreigners of distinction he corresponded on the current literary topics of the day—the rendering of a passage in Homer, the character of Cicero, or the discovery of a manuscript of Quintilian. In the presence of politicians, the prospect of a breach with Genoa or the Visconti, the growth of the Turkish power, or the proceedings of the late committee of metropolitan improvement, were themes on which he could expatiate without constraint or embarrassment. But if there was any subject which he found more congenial than another, it was the institutions and antiquities of his native country. With an assiduity which is easily understood, he pored over the pages of writers of the dry and discursive school of Zeno and Sagorninus; and while the bulk of his time was still engrossed by graver studies and by public avocations, the pupil of Malhombra applied himself in his leisure hours to the compilation of the Venetian Annals, in a narrative fully as dry and discursive as its prototypes, but which in point of precision and accuracy has deservedly placed its author in the first rank of mediæval historians. The urbane manners of Dandolo, his affable disposition, his polished breeding, and his austere morality, were proverbial. He was popularly known by the epithets of *Courtesy* and the *Count of Virtue*.² In person he is said to have been tall and handsome, and of a noble and prepossessing mien.

Such was the man who was nominated by the Conclave of Forty-one, in the first week of January 1343, in the room of Gradenigo.

The operations of the Coalition, which had been organized

¹ Romanin, iii. 146.

² Sanudo, *Vite*, 609; Romanin, iii. 146. The Champagnese fief of Vertus enjoyed by Giangaleazzo Visconti, Duke of Milan, *jure uxoris*, seems to be unconnected with this designation.

so far back as 1332 between the Signory, the Pope, the King of Jerusalem and Cyprus, and the Knights Hospitallers, against the Ottoman Power, had been hitherto excessively languid and intermittent; but they now experienced a fresh stimulus.¹ The command of the naval forces of Venice remained in the nervous hands of Pietro Zeno;² that of the Pontifical levies was (1345) intrusted to Huberto Dolfino of Vienna;³ and an invaluable advantage was shortly reaped in the reduction of Smyrna (October 1344), of which the Turks had too tardily advanced to the relief. The destruction of the shipping and arsenal was successfully accomplished; but the exploit cost the life of the Venetian commander. His abilities were of the first order, and the services which he had rendered were of the most important and meritorious kind.

The League was once more dissolved:⁴ for the attention and resources of its members were already beginning to find more immediate and pressing occupation elsewhere. But, considering the prospective assignment to them of the ecclesiastical tenths falling due to the Pontiff within the next three years, the Venetians independently consented to close the seas during that period against the new enemy, and to resist any attempt on the part of the Turks to restore their shattered navy.

The motive, which had proximately influenced the Signory itself in desisting so abruptly from the active prosecution of the Ottoman war, was the outbreak of a fresh Zaratine revolt.⁴ As a check upon the disaffected spirit which it so repeatedly manifested, Zara had been from time to time shorn of many of its municipal privileges; and at last, instead of a Podesta elected by itself annually, it was forced to accept the nominee of the Republic, whose authority was equally arbitrary in its extent and duration. Armed with these grievances, and reliant on the promised succour and protection of Louis of Hungary, the fief foreswore its allegiance in May 1346, and expelled its Governor and all the Venetian residents. This movement

¹ Caresinus contemp. 417-18-19; *Arch. stor. Ital.* vii. 360; Romanin, iii. 147-8.

² *Historia Cortusiorum*, lib. viii. ch. 16.

³ *Ibid.* and Romanin, *ubi supra*.

⁴ On the books of the Pregadi, under date of November 10, 1346, appears an order for giving Dolfino of Vienna a present of 1000 ducats.—See Sanudo, *Vite*, 778.

⁵ Among the *Monumenti Veneziani di varia letteratura*, 1796, edited by Morelli, is an account of this revolt from the pen of a contemporary. It is entitled: "*Istoria dell' Assedio e della Ricupera di Zara, fatta dai Veneziani nell' anno 1346, scritta da autore contemporaneo.*"

had not been without its premonitory symptoms; and the dispositions of the Signory were completed with corresponding promptitude. In the early part of June, forty galleys under Pietro da Canale, and a land force under Marino Faliero, assisted by two civil Proveditors, were in presence of the rebellious dependency; on the first of the following month, a pitched battle was fought at Luca, eight miles from Zara, between the Venetians commanded by Faliero, and the Hungarians upward of 40,000 strong, in which the former fought, it is related, "not like men, but like lions," and the enemy was defeated, with a loss in killed and wounded of between 7000 and 8000:¹ while Da Canale burst the chain which spanned the entrance to the harbour; and, after repeated attempts to reduce them to submission, which were only rendered abortive by the colossal height and strength of the ramparts, the besieged succumbed to the pressure of want in the month of November.² The threatening posture of the King operated, perhaps, as an inducement to grant milder terms to the Zaratines than they might otherwise have obtained. Their lives were guaranteed; their personal liberties were untouched. But they were compelled to dismantle their walls, to acknowledge that they had belonged from time immemorial to Venice, and that, if they had at any period formed alliances elsewhere, such alliances, being in contravention of their engagements, were unlawful, unconstitutional, and void; to implore the grace of the Doge, to promise to submit wholly and exclusively hereafter to his jurisdiction, and to provide permanent quarters for 400 Venetian foot and 200 cavalry. On this basis peace was signed on the 15th December in the same year; and Marco Giustiniani was sent out as Podesta and Captain.³ It may appear singular that it was not till nearly 300 years after the original sedition of 1050, at the close of a war which is said by Sanudo to have cost 3,000,000 ducats, that the Government resorted to the somewhat obvious expedient of overawing disaffection by planting at Zara an efficient garrison in Venetian pay.

Many years before the defection of Zara in 1346, affairs in the Crimea⁴ had begun to wear an aspect which

¹ *Assedio di Zara*, Morelli, *Monumenti*, 1796.

² Caroldo, *Historia di Venetia*, pp. 347-50, King's MSS. 147.

³ *Assedio di Zara*, contemp. 5.

⁴ Marin, vi. 59-60.

threatened to embroil the Republic alternately with the local authorities and with her Genoese rival. It was impossible that the immense advantages, which the ancient Chersonesus presented as an entrepôt for the commerce of Europe and Asia, should long escape the notice of Venice. So far back as the tenth century, a sort of connexion subsisted between the two countries; at some period anterior to 1287, a consulate was established on that coast; from time to time, the islanders procured from the minor Crimean potentates additional immunities; and at length in 1333 a treaty was concluded on highly advantageous terms with the Khan.

But the monopoly of the Black Sea trade was not long retained in the Venetian grasp; Genoa soon obtained a participation in a commerce, of which the benefits were so covetable.¹ From this source sprang a keen and chafing competition; and the international jealousy wrought itself to such a height that the two Powers found it necessary in 1342 to save themselves from drifting into war by arriving at an understanding, by which the rights of their respective subjects in the Crimea were defined with greater accuracy.

During some time subsequent to this accommodation, the face of affairs underwent slight visible change; and 1343 merely witnessed a new compact with one of the minor princes, by which the Venetians themselves acquired a separate quarter, and were relieved from certain civil disabilities, under which they had previously laboured. But an unexpected complication was forthcoming. In the early part of 1344, the capricious Tartar took umbrage at some proceeding on the part of the two factories; and a massacre, in which numerous Genoese and Venetian lives were sacrificed, was the consequence.² Upon receiving a report of this atrocity, the Genoese Government expressed itself in favour of an immediate appeal to arms. In deference to the views of the Signory, however, pacific efforts were at first made, but without success, and in July 1345 the two Powers concurred in a resolution to coerce the enemy by breaking off for a twelvemonth their commercial relations with the Crimea. As some equivalent for Azoph and the Chersonesan depôt there, the Genoese offered to the Signory in a generous impulse a provisional quarter and consulate at Caffa, where the two nations, knit together by a

¹ Romanin, iii. 151.

² Pugliola, 421.

common grievance, continued during some time to transact their commerce on a footing of equality. But the rupture with the Crimea soon brought forth its natural fruits in the exercise of smuggling and contraband upon a largely extended scale; a course of bickering and recrimination followed; Venice and Genoa mutually inveighed against the infraction of treaties: and the Khan¹ had reason to complain of privateering practices on both sides, while he bewailed the loss of his customs² and the impoverishment of his treasury. The final issue of the affair was that, in June 1347, the Signory having arranged the Zaratine difficulty in the preceding December in a manner which promised to postpone at least a collision with Hungary, and having acquitted herself of her obligations to the treaty of July 1345, ventured to put a term to the scandalous mockery, which lay in the almost systematic evasion of the customs at Sudak, by returning to an amicable understanding with the local authority. At the adoption of such a course the Genoese might have had no valid reason to cavil, if they had been simply consulted; it was easily explained by the rational anxiety of the other contracting party to substitute a legitimate for a stolen intercourse with the Crimea. But the complaint was that the arrangement was surreptitious; and this circumstance, added to pre-existing sources of irritation, prepared the way for a fresh breach at no distant date between the two States.³

But at present the Venetians were too completely absorbed by domestic troubles to pay much attention to foreign affairs. On the night of the 25th January 1348,⁴ the anniversary of the Conversion of Saint Paul, a shock of earthquake was sensibly felt throughout the Dogado. On the following day the vibration returned; and the shocks were repeated at intervals during a fortnight, raising the popular consternation to a high pitch, and occasioning great damage. Several tidal and other phenomena were observed. Wonderful, thrilling tales of hair's-breadth escapes or terrible deaths were soon current. A few, perhaps, were fabricated for the nonce. But all were greedily believed. At one moment all the church

¹ Romanin, iii. 153.

² The import duty charged at Azoph was three per cent.—Marin, vi. 73.

³ M. Villani, lib. i. c. 83.

⁴ Caresinus contemp. 419; De Monacis, lib. xvi., Add. MSS. 8574; P. Dolfino, *Annali Veneti*, p. 62, King's MSS. 149.

bells in Venice rang spontaneously. At another, the principal streets and thoroughfares were laid under water, while the bed of the Grand Canal was left dry. "The Venetians," says Sanudo, "continued all this time in an extreme state of trepidation: for they knew not how the earthquake came; and it was agreed to christen the day on which the trembling commenced, *Il Giorno di San Polo de' Tremuoti*."¹

In the wake of the earthquake of January and its accompanying scarcity,² followed a still more frightful scourge. In the ensuing March, the Asiatic cholera, which the Genoese³ had brought with them from the shores of the Black Sea, and which subsequently desolated entire Europe, smote the islands with a deadly and paralysing hand. The efforts of the Government to prevent contagion, or to mitigate the severity of the evil by the timely establishment (March 30) of a *Committee of Health*,⁴ and by summoning the best medical aid which could be procured from the *terra firma*, were, in the absence of any quarantine, completely abortive. The mortality assumed terrific proportions. All commercial activity was suspended; all the counters were closed; all the popular amusements were abandoned. Everywhere a death-like stillness and a sepulchral gloom presented themselves. Pontoons, hung in black, traversed the canals, to the cry of "*Dead bodies! dead bodies!*" and every house was obliged, under heavy penalties, to bring out its dead. So incalculable was the number of corpses, that several boatloads were interred without the administration of the sacrament, and even without being identified by their kindred;⁵ and large numbers were transported for burial to the more distant islands. The most harrowing and heart-breaking scenes were of common occurrence. Anguish and despair were portrayed on every countenance. Orphans and widows were seen frantically wringing their hands. Parents and children were seen clinging convulsively to each other, refusing to part for an instant, lest it should be for ever. Nor was it unusual to observe mendicants crouching in doorways, or at the corners of streets, alternately begging alms in

¹ Sanudo, fol. 614.

² Sanudo, fol. 778. It appears that this evil had been felt more or less since 1344; for under the date of August 12, a premium of seventeen *grossi* the bushel is offered by the Pregadi for corn.

³ *Istoria di Parma*, Murat. xii. 746.

⁴ Romanin, iii. 155.

⁵ Sanudo, *Vite*, 615; *Hist. Cortus*. lib. ix. ch. 14.

piteous accents, and delivering jeremiads over the dead bodies of supposititious relatives. In the course of the six or seven months during which the epidemic raged, two-fifths of the population of the Dogado perished; the mortality was loosely estimated at 100,000; and no fewer than fifty patrician stems became extinct.¹ The benches of the Great Council were all but deserted; many of the members were dead; others absented themselves from dread of infection. The ranks of the Quarantia were thinned to such an extent that an extraordinary election was found necessary before a quorum of thirty could be constituted. Such a painfully peculiar emergency naturally superseded every ordinary political maxim and constitutional restraint; on the 11th June, all persons confined for debt and other civil offences were unconditionally liberated,² and when the mortality had subsided, the term of residence requisite to confer naturalization was reduced from ten to two years. On the 27th, it was proposed that all candidates for admission to the Great Council, whose names were on the lists, should be permitted, seeing the difficulty of arranging a sitting, to take their places without any farther formality; but the motion was negatived.³

The year of the plague was marked nevertheless by the vigorous suppression of a revolt at Capo d' Istria, which had too rashly counted on the internal prostration of the Republic, and by the accomplishment of an important feat of diplomacy in the conclusion of peace for eight years with Louis of Hungary (1348-56). In this affair the Government itself had taken the initiative in February, and the Ducal Ambassadors were even instructed to offer the King, who was then at Naples, the sum of 100,000 ducats, on condition that he should renounce unreservedly, and for ever, all pretension to Dalmatia in favour of the Signory. But Louis, who still chafed at the severe defeat of his troops at Luca a few years before, superciliously declined to receive the legation; and the consequence was, that shortly afterward (July), when his Italian projects against Joan of Naples had begun to demand his undivided attention, and the necessity became manifest of maintaining a communication with the Adriatic through Dalmatia, he found himself obliged to make overtures, instead of re-

¹ Mutinelli, *Annali*, 160.

² Romanin, iii. 156.

³ Sanudo, fol. 778.

sponding to them, and to accept, under less dignified circumstances, less desirable terms. The convention was signed at Venice on the 5th of August;¹ and the ratifications were exchanged in the course of the following month (September 1348). An uncommonly weighty motive, which had already influenced the Government in accelerating from its vantage-ground the pace of negotiations, induced the Doge and his advisers to welcome with peculiar pleasure the new treaty.

It was impossible, indeed, to conceive anything more opportune. For at a moment when the Genoese troubles, which had so long been foreshadowed, were manifestly hastening to a climax, this arrangement left the Republic at full liberty to fix her attention, and when it became necessary, to concentrate her resources, upon the threatening point.

The mutual irritation was already intense. The Genoese, on the one hand, had not grown tired of inveighing against Venetian duplicity with respect to the treaty of 1345, and they now added a protest against the invasion of their commercial rights in Trebizond by the Republic. The latter complained with at least equal fairness of the injuries sustained by her subjects in Cyprus, of the unjust seizure of certain Venetian vessels at Caffa on a frivolous pretence, and of the detention of others at Pera on the plea of unpaid arrears of customs, to which the Genoese authorities falsely stated themselves to be entitled. Exclusively of these leading circumstances, there were minor grievances without number. With these wounds, which remained unclosed and festering, the two Republics appeared to be desirous of goading each other to phrenzy; and both were soon destined to taste the acrid fruit of their short-sighted folly.

Two years before the plague of 1348, Marino Faliero, who had greatly distinguished himself at the siege of Zara, was charged by the Doge with the delicate task of signifying to the Government of Genoa the nature of the claims which the Republic was prepared to advance for damages inflicted on her subjects in Cyprus and elsewhere. The mission of Faliero,² though not entirely barren of results, was by no means entirely successful, and a moody and somewhat lengthened silence ensued. Among other agencies which contributed to interrupt

¹ Romanin, iii. 158.

² Pietro Dolfino, *Annali*, p. 63, King's MSS. 149

the active prosecution of the question, the heavy and calamitous floods of January 1348, and the subsequent epidemic, were of course foremost; and it was not until the beginning of 1349 that the suspended correspondence between the two Powers was resumed. In the January or February of that year the Doge of Genoa wrote suggesting a joint crusade against the Turks; in this letter no allusion whatever was made to the embassy of 1346; and the proposition was set aside with significant coldness. The identical measure, which had been designed to postpone the crisis, hastened such a result; and the Signory, plainly perceiving that Genoa was trifling with her interests, resolved to hazard the reference of the dispute to a more summary arbitrement.

On the 6th August 1350, accordingly, a new public credit was taken, and a committee of six sages was named to superintend the assessment of householders and the collection of the loan, which was negotiated at two per cent.¹ The preparation of a squadron of nine-and-twenty sail was at the same time rapidly progressing; the command was given to Marco Ruzzini;² and a reserve of six picked galleys, under the orders of Marco Morosini, was furnished with instructions to follow in the wake of the admiral, and to be in readiness to support him at the shortest notice. Ruzzini proceeded so far as Negropont, where he discovered a rich Genoese caravan of fourteen vessels, bound for Caffa,³ on the point of putting out to sea. The proximate object of the present expedition to the Mediterranean was to retaliate upon the enemy for the fiscal exactions at Pera; and an admirable opportunity of chastising the more immediate offenders was now therefore offered to the Venetian commander. The latter at once ranged his forces in a line within a short distance from the roads, and thus cooped up his adversary in a position where he was obliged to give battle under great disadvantage. The combat which ensued was terrific but indecisive; and the Genoese officer, considering that the final chances were against him, determined to stake the fortune of the day on a daring manœuvre. Spreading every canvas, and calling all hands to the oars, he attempted by holding his course between the reefy

¹ Galliccioli, *Memorie*, lib. i. c. 13.

² De Monacis *contemp.*, lib. xii., Add. MSS. 8574.

³ M. Villani, lib. i. c. 84.

shore and the Venetian line to gain the open sea. By this feat of desperate hardihood he partially effected his object; after a sharp struggle, his own and three other ships extricated themselves. But of the remainder, with the exception of a few which were thrown away on the rocks, all were made prizes. The booty was enormous; all discipline and subordination were at an end; and while the enemy was distancing Negropont, Marco Morosini and the other Venetian captains were absorbed in transferring the captured treasures to their own bottoms. Ruzzini, who had made several ineffectual attempts to induce his subalterns to restrain for the present their cupidity, and to engage in the pursuit of the fugitives, soon found it quite a hopeless task to overtake them; and he vented his spleen and chagrin by ordering all the plundered argosies to be set on fire.¹ The season was now too far advanced to admit the possibility of ulterior operations; and the disappointed admiral having handed over his prisoners to the Governor of Negropont, Tommaso Viaro,² set out on his return. But the last vessel of his squadron had no sooner disappeared below the horizon, than the Genoese commander, having meanwhile received some reinforcements, retraced his steps, rescued all the prisoners at Negropont (October 24, 1350), and having bitterly resented the pillage and destruction of his convoy, quitted the island in triumph with an ample spoil and numerous trophies.³ Thus ended the campaign of 1350. On their arrival at Venice, Morosini and the other captains who were accused by their superior officer of having disobeyed orders, were prosecuted and severely punished. The Governor of Negropont, who was suspected of having been guilty of negligence in suffering the Genoese to surprise Negropont, was recalled and similarly impeached; but he obtained his acquittal.⁴

The Republic, bent upon a continuation of hostilities, now proceeded to contract alliances with Peter, King of Arragon,⁵ and Johannes Cantacuzenos, Emperor of Constantinople, by the terms of which both those potentates engaged to furnish contingents; the War Department was reconstituted; the taxes on oil, wine, salt, and other commodities were augmented

¹ Caresinus contemp. 420.

² Ibid., fol. 420-1.

³ M. Villani, lib. i. c. 85.

⁴ Marin, vi. 94-5; Romanin, iii. 160.

⁵ M. Villani, lib. ii. c. 27.

by one-third; and in spite of the remonstrances of the Holy See, which fervently desired a continuation of the crusade against the Turks,¹ the relations with Genoa were definitively broken off. By the former Government letters of marque were issued on an unprecedented scale; and a squadron of fifty-five sail, under Nicolo Pisani,² kept the sea. The enemy on their part were in somewhat superior force under Paganino Doria. But the admirals, strangely enough, never confronted each other; and the campaigns of 1351 and 1352 dwindled into a series of piratical excursions. The only noticeable advantage obtained on either side consisted of a successful attack, made by the Genoese in the autumn of 1351, on Negropont, which they contrived to hold from the middle of August till the middle of October, when they found themselves constrained to relinquish the possession. This desultory and undignified species of operations, which exhibited fully as broad a departure from the canons of legitimate warfare as the reprobated practices of the pirates of Barbary or the sea-robbers of Narenta, was not without its feature of thrilling dramatic episode. There was a conjuncture, while both Republics were maintaining powerful armaments afloat, when both were by a singular fatality left entirely at the mercy of each other. Pisani, on the one hand, having missed Doria, of whom he was then in search, held his course along the Mediterranean, entered the Riviera, and committed terrible devastations on the enemy under their very eyes. But the admiral, apprehensive lest his adversary, of whose position he was ignorant, should surprise him and intercept his retreat, reluctantly refrained from attacking the city itself, and hastened to regain the open sea. Doria, in the meantime, not finding Pisani, ascended the Adriatic, and advanced without the slightest symptom of opposition so far as Parenzo on the Dalmatian coast, which he sacked and burned.³ The reported proximity of the Genoese threw the population of Venice into the utmost trepidation. The city was shorn of its defenders. To the actual movements of the fleet there

¹ Yet in 1349 Montpellier on its cession to the French King obtained from the Pope a formal licence to carry on commerce with the infidels without incurring ecclesiastical censure.

² *Memorie che possono servire alla Vita di V. Pisani. Nobile Veneto*; Venezia, 1767, 8vo. Morelli, *Mon. Ven. di varia letteratura*, xv., 1796, calls the author "a most distinguished senator," but does not name him.

³ M. Villani, lib. ii. c. 25.

was no clue. The stand, which the Signory might be able to make against the invaders under present auspices, was exceedingly feeble. Such a contingency was totally unforeseen. All that the Government could do was to prepare for the worst, and to plant scouts at every commanding point, who might give immediate notice when they descried an enemy's sail in the offing. But these apprehensions proved unfounded: for Doria, under the belief that Pisani was upon his track, and ignorant of the defenceless condition of Venice, thought it prudent to content himself with his meagre achievements at Parenzo, and bore off, to the inexpressible relief of the Venetians, in the direction of the Mediterranean. During the greater part of two years, these distinguished men¹ appeared to hold in the balance the destinies of their respective countries. But greater events were impending.

The ratifications of the triple convention against Genoa, between the Venetians, the Catalans, and the Greeks, had been already exchanged; and the footing on which that alliance stood furnished an excellent guarantee for its durability. The King of Arragon, on his part, was animated by the hope of making the coalition a vehicle for carrying out his project for wresting Corsica and Sardinia from the common enemy, while the Emperor of Constantinople was burning to resent the insults which the Genoese colonists of Pera had heaped upon his crown, and to shake off the incubus of Genoese terrorism.² The contingents, which each member of the League was bound respectively to provide, had been definitely fixed; Venice engaged to supply thirty-seven men-of-war, Arragon thirty, Cantacuzenos, eight or ten; and the spring of 1353 had barely set in, when the belligerents recommenced operations on a wider scale. In the new campaign, the charge of the Venetian fleet remained in the hands of Pisani; the Catalans were under the conduct of Ponzio da Santa Paz. The former having quitted its winter quarters at Canea,³ and having been joined in the Mediterranean by Santa Paz, the united armament made sail for Constantinople. It traversed the Grecian Archipelago, and passed unopposed through the Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmora; close under the Asiatic shore it descried the Genoese squadron of sixty-

¹ Pietro Dolfino, *Annali*, p. 62, King's MSS. 149.

² Lebeau, xx. 300-1.

³ *Ibid.*, xx. 311.

four galleys, commanded by Doria; but the latter, deterred by the force and rapidity with which the current was running through the straits, was unable to offer any resistance, and the Allies triumphantly entered the Chrysoceras,¹ where they joined the Greek contingent, consisting of eight galleys² and a large number of small craft.

It was the afternoon of Monday, the 13th February.³ The daylight was perceptibly ebbing. Within a few hours nightfall was certain. The weather was lowering and squally; the wind, which had momentarily subsided, was again blowing almost a hurricane from the south; and at the present season of the year there were tidal causes which materially added to the difficulties of a naturally intricate navigation. On these grounds it appeared to Pisani, that it was expedient to postpone any engagement till the following day. But Santa Paz was in favour of giving battle; his views were shared and seconded by the imperial admiral, Constantine Tarchaniota, who expressed a conviction that their vast superiority of numbers would ensure an easy victory;⁴ and Pisani ultimately suffered himself to be over-persuaded. The coalesced squadrons therefore debouched from the Golden Horn, and, disposing themselves in order, advanced to attack Doria, before the latter had time to collect his forces and to complete his arrangements.

The action commenced two hours before dusk. The allied commanders sought in the first instance to segregate their adversary from those scattered portions of his armament which he had signalled to join him somewhat too late; and in this attempt they partially succeeded. The combat consequently soon assumed a very irregular character; the Genoese line was never formed; the Venetian and Catalan lines speedily found themselves broken; and the fighting was distributed over several points. Doria himself, who had taken up a secure position in a basin surrounded by shallows and breakers, was seen defending himself with desperate tenacity against three Venetian galleys, of which two were fastened on the prow of his flagship and the remaining one was clinging to her poop. In another direction, ten Genoese men-of-war, losing their steerage, and driven ashore by the current, were

¹ M. Villani, lib. ii. c. 59.

³ Varese, ii. 7.

² Villani, *ubi supra*.

⁴ Sismondi, vi. 122.

abandoned by their crews, and left at the mercy of the enemy, who burned them to shells. In a third quarter, three of their companions shared the same lot.

The last straggling gleams of daylight had now disappeared; a winter's evening was already somewhat advanced; and the shades of night were beginning to mantle the horizon. As darkness gathered over the scene, Tarchaniota and his auxiliary squadron, which had already suffered severely, but which was of little use,¹ mysteriously vanished; the followers of Santa Paz, though brave and resolute under ordinary circumstances, were unequal to the crisis in which they found themselves placed; many of the Catalan captains fell into bewilderment; and the whole brunt of the battle was eventually cast on the Venetians. The spectacle which now presented itself was indescribably awful and impressive. The utmost disorder reigned throughout. Shrieks, groans and yells: curses, shouts and imprecations, were mingled in one deafening and unearthly din. Clouds of arrows were discharged at random. Missiles of every kind were launched without any special aim. Ships foundered; and hundreds of human beings were swallowed up by the waves, which they beheld for an instant only as they sank beneath them. Amid the impenetrable gloom in which the surrounding water was gradually enveloped, the lurid glare of blazing vessels alone enabled the combatants imperfectly to distinguish friends from foes. Genoese boarded Genoese; Venetians assailed their own countrymen with blind fury, mistaking each other for the enemy; and it too frequently happened that the bloodshed and carnage had proceeded far, before the frightful error was rectified. Through the entire night of the 13th, with very few intermissions, the struggle continued to rage. The first streaks of dawn on the succeeding day revealed a scene tragical and ghastly in the highest degree. Numberless corpses, in which animation had been extinct during several hours, were floating on the still boiling and crested waves. Wrecks, arms, wooden artillery, fragments of timber wrenched by drowning sailors from the sides of sinking vessels, studded a crimson sea.

It was now the morning of Tuesday the 14th.² Both the belligerents were fairly worn out. The Catalans, who deserted

¹ Lebeau, xx. 302-3.

² Sismondi, vi. 125; Romanin, iii. 161.

their ground before daybreak, had been the first who retired. The Venetians, a portion only of whom had been actually engaged, soon followed their example; and consequently in strictness Doria remained master of the situation. But, in point of fact, the battle was nearly a drawn one, and the losses on the whole were equally balanced. The Allies missed twenty-six vessels and about 3800¹ men, besides several Venetian and Spanish officers of rank. Pisani himself was slightly wounded; and Santa Paz died not long afterward at Constantinople of a broken heart, it was said, at the rejection of his own strategical plans. The Genoese figures were found to be approximately similar. Thirteen galleys were ascertained to be missing,² several more had been totally disabled, and 700 persons of noble extraction³ were numbered among the slain. Very few Genoese prisoners had been taken.⁴

At the close of the action on the 14th, Pisani retired from the Bosphorus, and having scoured the Mediterranean with those vessels which had involuntarily kept aloof in the recent struggle, and the crews of which were therefore perfectly fresh, repaired to Candia to give his troops rest, and to await reinforcements. The enemy, who were too much crippled to push their meagre advantage, or to engage in the pursuit, returned after a fruitless cruise in the Gulf of Adria to the Riviera, where Doria soon found that his political rivals had not been idle during his absence. The dear price, which had purchased an equivocal triumph,⁵ banished all thoughts of the ovation and thanksgiving which were usually celebrated on such occasions. The mind of the people was engrossed by their misfortunes; and the silence, which reigned in the streets of Genoa, spoke a language more eloquent than words.

The news of the severe check given to the allied squadrons before Pera⁶ was received at Venice with the strongest manifestations of sorrow and anger. There was at first a disposition to suspect that Pisani himself was not wholly exempt from blame. But that blame rested somewhere the Government was convinced. It was barely credible that the coalition had been worsted by those Genoese whom the Venetians had so often vanquished single-handed; and one of the Advocates of

¹ M. Villani, lib. ii. c. 60.

² Marin, vi. 100-4

³ Varese, ii. 263.

⁴ Romanin, ii. 167-8.

⁵ M. Villani, lib. ii. c. 60; Stella, *Ann. Genueses*, fol. 1092, Mur. xvii.

⁶ Pugliola, fol. 427-8; Cantacuzenos, *Historia Byzant.* lib. iv. ed. 1832.

the Commune was at once sent to headquarters to make all necessary investigations, and to bring back the culprits, if there were such, under guard. At the same time, the requisite reinforcements were dispatched to Candia, and instructions were forwarded to the Admiral to resume the offensive without avoidable delay. The sole result of the inquiry was, that two *Sopra-comiti* were impeached and subsequently released.

On the renewal of hostilities, the Arragonese squadron of two-and-twenty sail under Bernardo de Cabrera, successor of Santa Paz, took the initiative by the blockade of Alguero, on the Sardinian coast, of which, in common with many other places on that seaboard, the Genoese had contrived to keep possession. This step had the undesigned effect of creating in the mind of the Genoese Government a fallacious impression that, Pisani not having yet received his reinforcements, the Admiral was still unprepared to weigh anchor, and to leave Candia; and Antonio Grimaldi, to whose faction the disgrace of Doria had lent a temporary ascendancy, was promptly dispatched to the Sardinian waters with a fleet of fifty-nine sail, carrying instructions from his Government to seize the opportunity which thus seemed to have arisen of throwing himself between Pisani and Cabrera, and of crushing the latter before the two armaments effected a junction. The Spanish commander was overtaken by the enemy at an indented point of the northern coast of Sardinia between Lojera and the Cape of Cagliari.¹ Obligated to give battle at a disadvantage, the Catalans performed miracles of valour. But the disparity of numbers was too great; the superiority was overwhelming; and the scale of victory was rapidly inclining to the foe, when a vessel, hoisting the Lion of Saint Mark, was seen to double the Cape. It was the flagship of Pisani. The whole squadron, bearing down with crowded canvas, was soon in view. The fortune of the day was instantaneously changed, and the battle recommenced in earnest. Grimaldi, flurried by the unexpected arrival of the Venetians, who had adroitly screened themselves from observation, no longer retained his composure. His troops, fiercely assaulted by the new-comers, who, coupling their vessels together with grappling chains, presented to the enemy an impassable front, forgot their discipline. They were boarded on all sides. It became a hand-

¹ Sismondi, vi. 134-5; Romanin, iii. 169.

to-hand struggle. The Venetians and Catalans emulated each other in feats of courage and activity, while the sun, which was at their back, favoured their exertions and dazzled the eyes of their adversaries; and after a sharp resistance the Genoese were overpowered. Out of fifty-nine galleys, Grimaldi saved eighteen only; and his loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners was computed at between 4500 and 5000. Such was the battle of Lojera, fought on the 29th August 1353.¹ It was an action as honourable to the arms of Venice as it was fatal to the glory of her rival, and fatal to her power.

The loss of the battle of Lojera,² following at so short an interval the disputed and costly victory of the Dardanelles, fell like a thunderclap upon Genoa. The whole city was profoundly agitated by the intelligence. Every quarter and every street wore the same funereal aspect. Trade was paralysed. Factions became rampant and uncontrollable. All constitutional equilibrium was destroyed in a moment: the Doria and the Grimaldi vituperated each other in language saturated with the venom of party spirit. The existence of any common cause was forgotten in the blindness of furious malice and hysterical grief. The Government, the nobility, the entire people, writhed passionately under an anguish which could find no utterance, of a despondency which refused to be comforted. Messages of condolence from friendly neighbours met with no dignified response. The sympathy and proffered aid of Florence were treated with equal indifference. The heart of a proverbially proud commonwealth seemed to be dissolving itself in effeminate paroxysms of sorrow; and Italy and the world were permitted to see that the Genoese, if they were the rivals of the Venetians in wealth and in power, were not at least their rivals in fortitude. Apt perhaps to be intoxicated by success, and, though no stranger to the vicissitudes of fortune, a stranger hitherto to its more violent caprices, Genoa was now at length smitten on the brow by the iron finger of adversity; and because she had too little courage, too little constancy, too little union, not because she had too little strength, she was seen to sink beneath the shock.³

A great and free people despairing of their country pre-

¹ Pugliola, *Chronica*, 431; M. Villani, lib. iii. c. 79.

² M. Villani, *ubi supra*; Stella, *Annales*, 1092.

³ *Istoria di Parma*, Murat. xii. 748; Vincens, *Histoire de Gènes*, i. *ad annum*.

sented to the eyes of mediæval Europe a somewhat unaccustomed spectacle and study. Such a despair was that which prostrated Genoa the Proud. The Government and the whole community were under the sinister influence of a spasmodic impulse and a morbid fascination; the dread of a Venetian yoke, the most abhorred of yokes, already haunted many minds; and by a resolution, only perhaps the more precipitate and fatuous because it possessed unanimity, the vanquished Republic hastened abjectly to implore the protection of Giovanni Visconti, Lord and Archbishop of Milan.¹ In complying with her prayer, the latter realised the favourite dream of his ambitious reveries and the brightest vision of his fancy. Visconti was already paramount over the fairest portion of the Peninsula; and to become Lord of Genoa, master of the Riviera, and the second, if not the first, maritime Power in Europe, surpassed his most sanguine aspirations. The surrender of Genoa, subject to the enjoyment of her civil rights in their full integrity and the provision of the means for prosecuting the war against the Signory with unrelaxed vigour, was accepted without delay (October 1353). Count Pallavicini was sent by Visconti with a garrison of 700 cavalry and 1500 infantry as governor of the City; the requisite sums were simultaneously drawn from the Milanese treasury to defray the cost of a new campaign, and a gold coinage, on which the sovereignty of Milan over Genoa was proclaimed, was struck. This diorama seemed to shew how much dearer to Genoa was vengeance than honour or even than glory; it shewed how hatred of Venice had grown into an absorbing and enslaving passion, and how to the humiliation of that odious rival she could consent to sacrifice five centuries of political freedom.²

But in the late battle the Genoese had lost the flower of their navy and their troops; and Milanese gold, the wages of shame, was not omnipotent. New resources were to be created; a new fleet was to be organized; new levies were to be made; and the Lord of Milan became sensible that it was of extreme importance to temporise. Such an object Visconti hoped to achieve by deluding the Signory with overtures for peace;³ and as his deputy to the Government he selected a

¹ Stella, *Annales*, 1092.

² *Vita Pont. Roman.*, Murat. iii. pt. 2, 608; Pugliola, 431; M. Villani, lib. iii. c. 86.

³ M. Villani, lib. iii. c. 93.

distinguished individual, whom he had attracted to his brilliant court by a liberal and flattering offer, and who at the present juncture happened to be resident at Milan. It was upon a man of letters, whom succeeding generations have revered as the regenerator of Italian literature, but who by no rare idiosyncrasy was pleased to judge himself almost greater as a diplomatist than as a writer, that his choice fell. It cannot be necessary to name the lover of Laura and the friend of Boccaccio. Notwithstanding his own whimsical foible, Petrarch, whatever he might be as a sonneteer, was hardly of much promise as a negotiator; his mind, in which poetry and invention were such richly developed faculties, was deficient in world-wisdom, tact and common sense; he was selfish, pedantic, and vain; his eloquence, of which he had no contemptible share, was perpetually misspent upon parallelisms between ancient and modern history, in which there was too often the fatal defect of a total absence of congruity; his political philosophy consisted in overlaying the shallowest commonplaces and the tritest maxims of government with sparkling sophisms and specious figures of rhetoric. It was the misfortune of Petrarch, in common with many other great men, to apprehend imperfectly his mission and his gifts; and, turning aside too frequently from the path in which he distanced all competitors, he strove to excel in a sphere, for which he had scarcely more aptitude than the most obscure graduate of Padua University.

Between the Poet Laureate and Andrea Dandolo a certain intimacy had long subsisted. Already on the first outbreak of the war between Genoa and Venice, Petrarch had addressed to the Doge from Padua (March 17, 1351¹) a prolix epistle, abounding in quotations from the pages of Ovid, Cicero, and Livy. "I am sensible, and strongly sensible, illustrious man," wrote the Poet, "of a great warning. If you ask me to call my feeling by its proper name, I dread exceedingly the gathering storms, and the signs of the times which we discern around us on every side.² But to pass in silence the general troubles of the human race, I, an Italian, come to a consideration of Italian quarrels. You, the two most powerful peoples, the most flourishing cities, in short, the two Eyes of

¹ *Opera Petrarckæ*, 1501; *Epist. Senilium*, i. The letter is dated "Patavi, xv. Kal. Aprilis 1351."

² *Epist. ubi supra.*

Italy, are rising in arms. The age is ignorant, and inexperienced in the caprices of fortune, by which great empires were of old destroyed. Men promise themselves everything which they covet, and therein are very often deceived. Than peace what is more pleasant, more happy, more sweet? Without peace what is the Life of Man but a perpetual pilgrimage of danger and fear? Do not, I beseech you, hide the truth from yourselves; you are waging war with a most intrepid and most invincible—what is worse, I say you are waging war with an Italian—nation. Would that Damascus or Susa, would that Memphis or Smyrna rather had been the object of your hostility than Genoa! Would that you could fight again the Persians or the Arabs, against the Thracians or the Illyrians! What is to be the end of the war? Is it to close when you have conquered, or when you have been vanquished? For the die of fortune is ambiguous. It cannot but be that one of the Eyes of Italy will be put out, the other darkened. For, indeed, to hope for a bloodless victory over such an enemy, beware lest it betoken a fatuous and fallacious confidence! In truth, you will see hereafter, magnanimous man and most potent peoples. For what I say to one I wish you to construe¹ as applying equally to both. Thou, who hast deserved to be the first Voice in the Councils and the Head of affairs, remember that, whether glory or infamy be reserved for your country, the largest share of either will fall upon yourself. What labour has it not cost to make your power what it is? By what gradual steps have you ascended to the pinnacle on which you now stand? Your nation, if you know it not, traces back its fame to the most remote antiquity. Many ages ago, I find not only the City founded; but what you will still more greatly marvel at, I find a Venetian Duke mentioned by name. For the sake of charity, I beseech you with tears in my eyes to lay aside your arms, to give your hands to each other, and to exchange the kiss of peace. By the arts of peace you will throw open to you the sea and the mouths of the Euxine. So India, so Britain and Æthiopia, will be made to fear you. Farewell, O most excellent of Doges and of men.—Yours, and of your Republic the devoted, FRANCIS PETRARCH.”—Padua. the 17th of March 1351.

¹ Epist. *ubi supra*.

The reply of Dandolo¹ was tardy, but flattering and encomiastic. "We have willingly received," ran the Ducal epistle, "by the hands of the bearer your long-expected letter, at which we were purposing, indeed, to glance merely at present, and at a season of greater leisure diligently to peruse, had not the sublimity of the style carried us away. You may imagine how eloquent we deemed it, when we tell you that we incontinently read the whole with joy and delight. We admired as well the strength of a master-mind and the profundity of a high intellect as the savoury and soothing eloquence; and when we observe this combination of qualities, we can scarcely persuade ourselves that so manly and so religious a composition can have proceeded from any but a sacred bosom. God is witness, who has from all time and will ever preside over our fortunate destinies, that we cherished toward them (the Genoese) a sincere and brotherly love which has not been reciprocated. To overlook, however, passed occurrences, we will follow the thread of present affairs. The aim of these Genoese is to snatch from us the most precious of all possessions—our liberty; and in meddling with our rights they drive us to arms. *Arma tenenti omnia dat, qui justa negat.* The quarrel is an old one. They have rendered the sea a hostile field for their own republic, and have stirred up the whole world and every nation against them, of whose manners this is an apt and brief sum: *convenire nescit cum aliis qui minime cum seipso.*² Thus we have undertaken war, merely that we may secure for our country, which we hold dearer than life, an honourable peace. Farewell, O most excellent of men, and rest assured that you are most dear to us; still dearer, however, if you would vouchsafe to favour us more frequently with like admonitions.—Venice, the 22nd of May 1351."

Thus the eloquence of Petrarch had met its full share of panegyric. But his arguments and his prayers remained equally unheeded.

The ambassador of Visconti landed opposite the Riva dei Schiavoni near the Casa Molin toward the end of January 1354; he was in buoyant spirits, and sanguine of success. He had several interviews with Dandolo and the other members of the Executive. But all his anticipations were falsified;

¹ *Epistolarum de Rebus Senilibus*, ii.

² A keen satire upon the intestine discords of Genoa.

and all the time-serving propositions, of which he was the bearer, were parried with adroitness, or rejected with unconquerable civility. On topics of literary or general interest he found Dandolo as genial and communicative as ever. But at official audiences no one was more obdurate, more punctilious, and more impassable than his noble correspondent. The Doge and the author of the *Mare Magnum* were not indivisible. The envoy at length abandoned his barren and thankless task in sheer despair; and, after a stay of three or four weeks in the capital, he set out about the close of February on his return to Milan. If there was anything which had mortified Petrarch more cruelly than his recent rebuff, it was the character of the reception which he had experienced. He wished to be treated as Petrarch the plenipotentiary, and still the Venetians affected to know him only as Petrarch the poet-laureate. This proceeding galled him far more than he was willing to confess. Of tributes to his talents and of adulation as the first man of letters in Italy, he conceived just now that he had had a surfeit; he looked in vain for some compliment to his profundity as a political sage or to his dexterity as a practical politician; and beneath the elaborate homage which was paid everywhere to his genius as well as in the lavish encomiums which were pronounced at every point on his last verses to the peerless Laura, he almost thought that he discerned an implied sneer at his first apprenticeship to the portfolio.

Undiminished as the hatred was which the Venetians nourished toward their fallen rivals, there was a marked inclination in many quarters to come to terms and to repose on a victory. The threatening attitude of Hungary,¹ the unquiet state of Dalmatia, the hollowness of the relations with the Byzantine Court, the enormous accession of strength which Genoa derived from her union with Visconti, and lastly, the pecuniary embarrassments which attended such a protracted campaign and such unprecedented disasters, and which raised the rate of interest from 2 to 37 and even 38 per cent.,² con-

¹ M. Villani, lib. iii. c. 67-8.

² Gallicioli, *Memorie*, lib. i. c. 13.

In 1341 the rate was	19 per cent.
1343 "	18 "
1346 "	11 "
1350 "	2 "
1352 "	37 "

tributed to deter the more circumspect from perseverance in the war. But the Doge and his immediate supporters, whose Genoese antipathies were peculiarly strong, were, on the contrary, no advocates of peace, of such a peace at least as that which was offered to them by Petrarch and his employer. They said that it was probably not sincere, and that if it was sincere, it was certainly not honourable. If Genoa had coalesced herself with Milan, was it not open to the Signory to seek allies at Mantua, Ferrara, Verona, and Padua? Was there not every likelihood that the new Emperor, Charles IV., would espouse with alacrity a cause which proposed as its aim the destruction of his most formidable competitor in the Peninsula? The line of argument seconded by the Doge ultimately prevailed. The idea of a pacification was relinquished; and war was declared against Milan in the latter half of July 1354.

CHAPTER XXIII

A.D. 1354-1355

Letter of Petrarch to the Doge (May 28, 1354)—The Reply—Renewal of Hostilities—Ravages of the Genoese in the Gulf—Precautionary Measures at Venice—Andrea Dandolo dies of a Broken Heart (September 7, 1354)—His Literary and Legal Acquirements—His Funeral—Dandolo is succeeded by Marino Faliero, Ambassador at Avignon (September 11, 1353)—Entry of the new Doge into the Capital (October 5)—Continuation of the Genoese War—Battle of Portolongo (November 4)—The Venetian Fleet, taken at a disadvantage, is totally Defeated—Punishment of the Captain-General Pisani and his Lieutenant—Firmness of the Republic—Conclusion of an Armistice (January 8, 1355)—General Aspect of Foreign Affairs—Conspiracy of Marino Faliero (April 4)—Its fortuitous Revelation (April 14)—Execution of the Accomplices of the Doge (April 15)—And of the Doge himself (April 17, 1355).

MEANWHILE Petrarch, since his diplomatic defeat, had continued to observe a moody silence. It was not till the 28th May that the discomfited Laureate addressed to the Doge a letter in which he recapitulated his old arguments against the profession of Mars with sundry new illustrations, but without any new force.¹ He intreated the Republic to pause, before she again snatched from the scabbard her still reeking sword. He dwelled with pathos on the blessings and enjoyments of peace, and dilated by contrast on the horrors and miseries of war; and if his pacific counsels were hearkened to, he expressed himself prepared to hail in Andrea Dandolo a second Trajan. "Persuade not thyself that, if Italy perish, Venice will not fall: for Venice is part of Italy."

The answer of Dandolo,² which was written on the 13th June, was brief and expostulatory. The Doge averred that he was not a little surprised at the accusation which Petrarch threw in his teeth, seeing the temperate and polite answer which he had given to him on a former occasion, and the strenuous exertions which the Republic had made to facilitate

¹ *Opera Petrarcke*, 1501. "*Nil audies novi*," such is the preamble, "*nil insolitus leges; sed ea tantummodo recognosces quibus jam sæpe aures tuas oculosque lassavi.*"

² *Opera Petrarcke*, 1501, *Epist. Senil.*

the intercession of the Holy Father. "At the same time thou knowest," said the Doge, "on the testimony of thy own Cicero, that no death is worse than servitude, and that nothing is more hateful than disgrace, or more foul than the loss of freedom, when we are born to an inheritance of honour and liberty. Our liberty is a prize which it behoves us to keep and defend, and which we care not to outlive. What we were, such we remain—lovers of peace, saving always the reputation of our country, to which we and all our fellow-citizens are ready to sacrifice not only our gold and our silver, but our life. Farewell, O most eloquent man!—Venice, the 13th June 1354."

With that response the correspondence dropped: nor was it ever resumed. It was only a few weeks later that the gauntlet was thrown down at the feet of Visconti. The parley on paper between the prince and the poet was a sort of by-play without prejudice.

Dandolo, however, was not legitimately open to the charge of having, in any spirit of wilfulness and spleen, or from a wanton love of bloodshed, spurned the proffered olive-branch. In point of fact, the insincerity and futility of the late negotiations were already transparent, when the Doge committed himself and his country to a continuation of hostilities. In March 1354, three months before Petrarch put pen to paper, the new fleet of five-and-twenty galleys, built, equipped, and manned with Milanese money,¹ had been launched from the dockyards of the Riviera; and Paganino Doria, restored to popular favour, had again taken the command. In the course of April or May, while the Signory still saw room to cherish the hope of a settlement, Doria ascended the Adriatic, and ravaged Lesina and Curzola. The Venetian Government promptly dispatched a small armament of five vessels to protect the Gulf; and behind followed Pisani himself with a powerful fleet of seventeen galleys. When the latter reached the mouth of the Gulf, however, no enemy was in sight; Doria seemed to have disappeared; and the Venetian commander, having ordered the smaller fleet to join him, and having received other reinforcements from Dalmatia, from Candia, and from Venice itself, which raised his squadron to an aggregate of forty-one sail, proceeded to shape his course

¹ M. Villani, lib. iv. c. 22.

for the Sardinian waters, in the expectation of falling in with the Genoese in the classic vicinage of Lojera, where he had beaten them the year before. But Doria, who had dexterously contrived to slip through his fingers, was still hovering in reality about the Illyric Islands; and he impatiently seized the earliest moment for leaving his retreat and continuing his course up the Gulf. About the middle of August, he reached Parenzo, which he took and burned to the ground. The near approach of the redoubtable Doria struck the population of the Lagoons with dismay: all possible precautions were at once taken by the Government against the contingency of a Genoese invasion; a boom of the largest size was thrown across the canal at Lido; the militia of Venice and Chioggia, 3600 strong,¹ were called out and divided into forty corps; Paolo Loredano was declared Captain-General of the city with plenary authority; and peremptory instructions were sent to Pisani to return forthwith to the rescue of the capital. The aggressors, however, did not venture to proceed beyond the immediate theatre of their devastations; the Genoese commander, unaware of the precise position of his adversary, was apprehensive of being intercepted at a point where no help could reach him, and where Pisani, on the other hand, would enjoy corresponding facilities for obtaining it; and, turning his back accordingly on the ruins of Parenzo, Doria retraced his steps.

These consecutive troubles severely tried the equanimity of the Republic. But there was no one upon whom they created a deeper impression than the Doge himself, who beheld with poignant anguish of mind, and, perhaps, not without some conscientious qualms, the degradation of his beloved country. In his uncompromising hatred of the Genoese Dandolo was accused sometimes of having pursued, during his administration, with blind stubbornness a policy involving sacrifices which neither the safety of the Republic nor her honour seemed to demand. But, nevertheless, he was an honest and ardent patriot. The humiliating catastrophes at Curzola and Lesina in April had preyed upon his mind, and had severely shaken a frame which was never robust. His health was already declining, when the news came in the following August of the destruction of Parenzo.

¹ Romanin, iii. 172.

This blow was too weighty to bear; and it broke a noble heart. A day or two after the receipt of the fatal tidings, his Serenity was seized with an illness from which he was never to rally; and after lingering three weeks, he expired on the 7th of September 1354.¹ He had not yet completed his forty-fifth year.

Thus died in the prime of manhood one of the brightest ornaments of that remarkable era which had produced Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio. The talents and virtues of the late Doge had arrived at a fine though precocious maturity; his genius was appreciated and admired before he had passed the years of adolescence; and from the time when he quitted the university to that at which he was placed upon the throne, the highest and most flattering distinctions continued to be showered on him. He was the recipient of all honours, as he is said to have been the conqueror of all hearts. Procurator of Saint Mark at one-and-twenty;² Ambassador, Decemvir,³ at twenty-five, he was Doge at thirty-three. All the offices of the State were thrown open to a youth who had left college as it were but yesterday; and hoary-headed senators were obliged to uncover before one, whose father they remembered as a boy. As a man of letters, Dandolo was lifted by his rank and affluence above the privations of poverty and above the tyranny of governments. It was not his lot to be persecuted like Dante, or to be pursued by obloquy like the author of the *Decameron*. Everything that unbounded political influence, that domestic felicity, that a literary renown which Petrarch might envy, could give, were his covetable portion. But the gleams of sunshine became fewer and fewer in latter days; and a season of tribulation and bitterness came at length. The meridian and close of his career were painfully checkered by evils from which his earlier life had enjoyed a rare exemption. Pestilence, earthquake, famine, war, were misfortunes which in his time were poured out like vials of wrath upon the Republic; and they were too often accompanied by disgraces far worse than any misfortunes. The plague of 1348 was harrowing to his soul; the loss of the Battle of the Bosphorus acutely wounded his pride; but the events of 1354 struck him prostrate, and

¹ Sanudo, fol. 627.

² Sansovino, *Cronico ad an. 1331*.

³ Sanudo, fol. 628.

severed the feeble link which attached him to life. He felt, then, that the end was not distant, and that death, when it came, would be welcome to him. To those who indulged in reminiscences of the past—who had known the man in happier times, when the brow of Dandolo was unclouded by care, and when, among the Peers of Venice, the graceful and commanding figure of the Count of Vertus stood conspicuous—that deathbed was indeed invested with no common impressiveness.

Literature was indebted to Dandolo in no trifling degree for the concise and veracious, though jejune narrative, which he left behind him as a contribution to the historiography of his country. But the cause of Venetian jurisprudence was laid by him under even weightier obligations. The dry tone of his understanding, which was pronounced by some a blemish in the annalist, ceased at least to be a blemish in the codifier. His mind, if it wanted poetical fervour and pathos, if it was not happily gifted with imagination or eloquence, was luminous, methodical, and exact; and a new and enlarged edition of the Laws, which he had undertaken at the outset of his reign, and with the assistance of several eminent lawyers had brought to completion in five years, was a labour at once congenial to his habits of thought and agreeable to the course of his early reading.

The obsequies of Dandolo were performed in Saint Mark's Cathedral, where his remains were deposited with imposing solemnity in a sepulchre adorned with carving in mosaics; and some verses composed by Petrarch himself, at the express desire of the Grand Chancellor of Venice, were afterward inscribed as an epitaph on his monument.¹ But a production, more worthy of the subject and of the writer, was that noble panegyric which the Laureate subsequently delivered to the memory of his friend. It was no niggard praise, no faltering tribute, which the living here offered to the dead. All bitterness and heartburning were banished, for a moment at least, from the thoughts of the Poet, and Petrarch dwelled only in the proud and happy retrospect of an intimacy of twenty years, when he wept over the early grave of the incorruptible statesman, the sage and zealous politician, the rarely endowed orator, the cultivator of learning for its own sake,

¹ *Opera Petrarce*, 1501.

the patron and ornament of literature, and the true lover of his country.

As a successor to Andrea Dandolo, the College of XLI. made choice (September 11,¹ 1354) of Marino Faliero of SS. Apostoli, Count of Valdemarino, a veteran of seventy-six. Like some of his predecessors, the new Doge had been elected when absent. He was at this time Resident at the Legatine Court of Rome;² and it was necessary to send an extraordinary envoy, Stefanello, Secretary of the Ten, to Avignon with a safe-conduct from the Lord of Milan, to apprise him of the decease of Dandolo and of his own elevation to power. At Verona the Doge was welcomed by a deputation of patricians, which had been sent forward to meet him, and to form his escort of honour. On the 4th October,³ he arrived at Chioggia, where he found the great State-barge prepared to receive him and his suite, and to conduct them to the capital. As the Bucentaur neared its destination, the weather became so hazy that it was judged absolutely unsafe for a vessel of such draught to advance beyond a certain distance of Venice itself; and the Ducal party was consequently obliged to land on the Piazzetta in small boats.

Faliero ranked as one of the oldest members of the public service. So far back as 1312, he had been among the electors of the Doge Soranzo;⁴ and from that time, during a period of two-and-forty years, he had filled a succession of magisterial and diplomatic appointments. There was hardly any court in alliance with the Signory to which he had not presented credentials; and there were scarcely any political functions of which he had not had experience. The ancient family to which he belonged had already given two Doges to Venice,⁵ and it traced its pedigree in an unbroken line from the maritime tribunes of the sixth century. From Charles IV. he had received the honour of knighthood; of the Bishop of Ceneda he held the fief of Valdemarino,⁶ which conferred the title of Count. His skill as a diplomatist was exceeded only by his military talents; and his brilliant victory over the Hungarians at the battle of Luca in 1346 placed the Count of Valdemarino in the first rank of Venetian generals. He had

¹ Caresinus contemp. fol. 423.

² Caresinus, 423; Mutinelli, *Annali*, 161.

³ Sanudo, fol. 629.

⁴ Dandolo, fol. 411.

⁵ *Vide supra*.

⁶ Sanudo, fol. 774.

been twice married: first, to one of the Contarini family, and secondly, in 1335, to Aluica, one of the daughters of the Doge Pietro Gradenigo, and a lady already of mature years. The new Doge was, moreover, a man of taste and culture, of whose collection of objects of art or curiosity the catalogue still exists.

In disposition, however, Faliero was supremely arrogant. His temper was quick and fiery to an excessive degree; and more than one anecdote was current of the complete mastery which this infirmity had over him. While he was Podesta at Treviso in 1339, there was a religious procession, at which the Bishop as well as himself was present; and the former having in some manner, as Faliero chose to conceive, rendered himself unnecessarily officious, or, as another account states, having kept him waiting, the Podesta dealt him a sound box on the ear before a numerous assemblage of persons.¹

The continuation of the Genoese war was a legacy which Dandolo had transmitted to his successor. It was fortunate that the price of money had fallen:² for, as it not unusually happened, the Signory found itself at the last moment deceived in the alliances which it had sought to form with Spain and the Empire. The resources of the King of Arragon were directed into other channels by his ambitious schemes in Sardinia and Corsica. Charles IV., although he might be strongly desirous of curbing a Power which threatened to trench so seriously on his own prerogatives, was precluded by distractions of an analogous character from lending that active succour which he had partly led the Venetians to expect. The few minor Italian princes, who still remained independent of the authority of Visconti, but who eyed nevertheless with increasing alarm his rapid aggrandizement, were, by rendering assistance to the present cause, in great risk of compromising themselves gravely with Milan without the faintest prospect of being able to promote the interests of Venice.

Meanwhile, Pisani, having vainly searched for Doria in the Sardinian waters, determined to act upon intelligence which had just arrived by seeking the enemy in the neighbourhood of the Ionian Isles. This information proved to be correct.

¹ Romanin, iii. 178. Compare Sanudo, *Vite*, 639.

² Gallicioli, lib. i. c. 13.

The Venetian commander fell in with the Genoese fleet off Scio, and at once offered battle, which Doria, not having yet received his reinforcements from home, and being in a sheltered situation, thought proper to decline. Pisani proceeded to vent his disappointment by desolating the adjacent island of Santa Panagia, and afterward advanced so far as Cerigo with the design of intercepting the expected arrivals from the Riviera. The Genoese Government, however, had been forewarned of its danger; the anticipated prizes neglected to shew themselves; and the Admiral soon found it necessary to seek quarters for the winter season. He fixed on Portolongo, opposite the island of Sapienza. It was near the beginning of November 1354.¹

The increasing bleakness of the weather, which had driven Pisani into Portolongo, obliged Doria to adopt a similar precaution; and he was on the point of retracing his steps, when he was apprised that his antagonist was in a position which offered unusual facilities for assailing him at a disadvantage. This report having induced him to change his plans, the Admiral presented himself unexpectedly, on the 4th November,² before the roads of Portolongo. Of the Venetian fleet, it happened that some vessels were being refitted; while others were laid up in dry dock; and a portion only, amounting to twenty galleys under Nicolo Quirini, who was stationed by his superior officer in charge of the roadstead and port, was immediately available for active service. The Captain-General therefore was proof against all the provocations which were offered to draw him into an engagement; and Doria was beginning to despair of success. But a brilliant manœuvre quickly altered the aspect of affairs. By a rapid and masterly movement, Giovanni Doria, Paganino's nephew, suddenly penetrated with a detachment of thirteen galleys between the Venetians and the littoral to the very extremity of the harbour; and, thus throwing himself behind Quirini, burst upon him with fury in the rear, while his uncle concurrently attacked him in front. The double shock, for which Pisani and his lieutenant were alike unprepared, produced a complete collapse; the Venetians were confronted by

¹ Caresinus, fol. 424; M. Villani, lib. iv. c. 32; P. Dolfino, *Annali*, p. 67, King's MSS. 149.

² Pietro Dolfino, *Annali*, p. 67, King's MSS. 149.

vastly superior numbers; there was no action, hardly any struggle; many threw themselves into the water in a fit of terror, and were drowned in the attempt to reach the land. The Venetians sustained not a defeat, so much as a total rout. 450 were killed; an enormous number of prisoners, loosely calculated at 6000,¹ and a highly valuable booty in prizes and stores, were taken; and the Captain-General himself, his son² Vettore, his lieutenant Quirini, a few other officers, and about 1500 seamen, effected a narrow escape to Modon, whence they returned home. Both Pisani and his subordinate were impeached by the advocates of the Commune, and were convicted of high misdemeanours. The former was fined and disqualified from holding hereafter the supreme command of the forces by land or sea. The latter was condemned to pay a similar amount, and to be deprived of all public employments for six years.³ Vettore Pisani was acquitted.

But the bearing of the Venetians after the battle of Portolongo⁴ afforded an impressive and admirable contrast to the conduct of the Genoese after the scarcely more disastrous battle of Lojera. There were few patrician households which did not mourn the loss of some ornament or prop; there were few countenances in which a tale was not legible of bereavement or separation. The dungeon had become the lot of those whom the waters spared. Yet the cry of despair, which had resounded in the Genoese streets, was not here suffered to escape from the lips: nor was there to be witnessed that unmanly and crouching spirit which had tempted the people who constituted the other Eye of Italy to court servitude, and to walk in gilded fetters; and under the blessed auspices of a concrete and stable government Venice surmounted without a riot a crisis greater than that which had elsewhere so lately been the forerunner of a revolution.

Immediate directions were now given that the clergy of all dioceses should chaunt the requiems of those who had fallen at Portolongo; and 5000 ducats were at once sent to Genoa to alleviate the sufferings of the captives. Applications were forthwith addressed to the municipalities of Padua, Ferrara, Mantua, and Verona for paid contributions of troops,

¹ "5860," says Villani, *loco citato*.

² *Memorie di Vettore Pisani*, 3; Cigogna, *Iscrizioni*, i. 180.

³ Sanudo, fol. 774.

⁴ See Varese, ii. 275.

arms, ships, and stores of every description; and a circular was prepared for transmission to all diplomatic and consular authorities abroad, in which they were exhorted to be of good courage, to abstain on every account from compromising the honour of their country, and not to despair of the Republic.¹

Meanwhile, Venice was in no immediate peril; the winter had fairly set in; and all operations on the part of Genoa were understood to be suspended till the spring.

In the beginning of January 1355, the Emperor Charles, who had entered Italy in the preceding October,² was crowned at Milan. That prince proved himself of greater utility as a mediator than he had proved himself as an ally; and through his agency an armistice for four months was effected between the belligerents, professedly as a step toward the conclusion at the earliest moment of a definitive peace (January 8, 1355³).

The complexion of foreign affairs in general was at the present juncture far from being satisfactory. On the Dalmatian, Istrian, and Slavonian frontiers, the Hungarians still preserved a menacing and ominous posture. It had been found necessary to set six additional Proveditors over those provinces. It was true that the convention of 1348 expired not in strictness till 1356; but the restless ambition of the King, coupled with the traditional disaffection of Zara and the other colonial dependencies of the Republic on that coast, reduced war to a contingency which might arise from day to day.

At Constantinople, a Greek revolution, of which a Genoese, Francesco Cataluzzo, was the hero, had recently (January 1355⁴) seated a Palæologos on the throne of Cantacuzenos, the steady, though feeble ally of the Signory; to the new Emperor, whose sister he espoused, Cataluzzo was in a position to dictate his own terms; and at a moment when the continuance of Cantacuzenos in power would have been of incalculable service to the Venetians, this change of government, with its Genoese predilections, was singularly unseasonable.

Lastly, the Spanish connection, from which it had been hoped at one time that mutual advantage would accrue, was now virtually dissolved. The King of Arragon, although he

¹ Romanin, iii. 181.

³ Caresinus, fol. 424; Varese, ii. 278.

² Sismondi, vi. p. 223-4.

⁴ Sismondi, vi. 143.

had shown himself of some value as an occasional auxiliary, was not in command of resources, which enabled him at once to cope with Genoa, and to pursue his visionary projects of territorial conquest in Sardinia: nor was he altogether satisfied, perhaps, by the manner in which the Venetians had fulfilled their share of the contract, as seconders of his claims. If he was taunted with being an insincere and faltering ally, there was more than a possibility that he might have found room to recriminate.

The armistice with Genoa had not been violated by either of the contracting parties, and the negotiations for peace were progressing in a favourable manner, when an event of a totally unexpected nature occurred in the very heart of the Dogado, under the eyes of all Venice. On Carnival-Thursday, the 2nd April 1355,¹ the pompous and mystical immolation of the ox and twelve boar-pigs, which symbolised the Patriarch Lupo of Aquileia and his twelve canons, was celebrated in the usual manner on the Piazza; a brilliant assemblage of persons was present; the Doge and his court viewed the spectacle from one of the windows of the palace; and in the evening a splendid entertainment was to be given by the Dogaressa Gradenigo at Saint Mark's to all the beauty and fashion of the metropolis. In the midst of the ensuing festivities, a knot of libertines of rank who had formed a circle round some of the maids of honour, rendered themselves conspicuous by their noisy and boisterous behaviour; and some of them were observed to indulge in certain indecorous levities toward the ladies of the Dogaressa's suite. This circumstance attracted the notice of the Doge; and the latter, with an ebullition of indignant wrath, which belonged to the individual, rather than to the epoch, singled out one of the culprits, named Michele Steno, who was probably not more in fault than any of the others, and directed his instantaneous exclusion. The order, which was executed by the body-guard in waiting somewhat more roughly perhaps than the occasion warranted, stung the pride of Steno to the quick; and various expedients for vindicating his injured honour, or for gratifying his burning resentment, crowded in succession upon his heated and whirling brain. At length an idea flashed across him, which appeared

¹ Caresinus, 424; Sanudo, 631-2-3-4; Mutinelli, *Annali*, 162; Romanin, iii. 181, *et seq.*

supremely felicitous.¹ Steno, accompanied by some sympathising friends, as they passed through the *Sala Camminorum* (Faliero's private apartment), scrawled on the ducal chair some words reflecting on the honour of the Prince and his nephew.

In Venice, and throughout Italy, we constantly meet with cases, where important issues depended on accidental circumstances and on infirmities of temper or outbreaks of passion. In the present instance we seem to recognise an illustration of the mischief resident in what Dante terms, in direct allusion to the Venetians, *il fango della loro sfrenata lascivia*.

Whatever share the other gallants might have had in the affair, the authorship of the insult was fixed upon Steno. The culprit was arrested and brought before the Forty; and after the usual process of examination, he was sentenced, on account of his youth and the provocation under which he acted, merely to eight weeks' imprisonment, followed by a twelvemonth's exile. The lenity with which the gross affront of which he had been the object was thus visited, exasperated Faliero, if it was possible, more than the affront itself. He demanded in an imperious tone, that the verdict of the Forty should be quashed, that Steno should be cited before the Ten, and that the latter, treating the misdemeanour as high treason, should record a sentence, if not of capital punishment, at least of perpetual banishment. The Decemvirs, however, chose to view the matter in the more venial light; the years of the delinquent, which numbered hardly five-and-twenty, were pleaded in extenuation of the fault; the Doge was not left unreminded, perhaps, that by a leading clause of the Promission it was declared that there was one law only in Venice for his own Serene person and for the poorest fisherman of San Clemente; and Faliero, impotent before a tribunal which was not to be cowed by a box on the ear, vented his ire and disgust in curses on patricians and bureaucrats.

It happened on the next day² that a Noble, named Marco Barbaro, had occasion to pay a visit to the dockyard, and to request some favour of the Masters of that establishment, which the latter, on the plea of inability, excused themselves from granting. Hereupon Barbaro desired an interview with

¹ Lorenzo de Monacis contemp. Hist., Add. MSS. 8574.

² Sanudo, 322.

Stefano Chiazza, *detto* Gisello, Admiral of the Arsenal, to whom he made known his wishes without any better fortune. This second rebuff, which gave additional umbrage to the patrician, bred high words between him and Gisello, a person of considerable influence and popularity, but a commoner by extraction; and at length Barbaro in a burst of passion struck the functionary a blow in the eye with his clenched fist. A ring on one of the fingers of the assailant was driven by the impetus into the lid, and created a gash from which the blood freely flowed.¹ The Admiral, reddening with shame and rage, and wrought to phrenzy by so flagrant an indignity, hurried with the blood unstaunched and still trickling from the lacerated organ to lay his complaint before the Doge himself. Faliero, who was naturally prepossessed in favour of any fellow victim of class influence and arrogance, listened with unwonted condescension and patience to the recital of Gisello, to whom he offered his cordial sympathy. But when the sufferer spoke of redress—"How," cried the old man with passionate vehemence, "can I obtain justice for others, when it is denied to me the Doge? See how tenderly they have treated that ribald Steno!" At this sally the Admiral muttered between his teeth: "*But wild beasts we bind; and if we cannot bind them, we slay them.*"² The words were not lost upon the Doge who, as if in a soliloquy, said in a half whisper: "How might such a thing be done?" Gisello startled his companion by signifying that it was feasible.

A glance was now sufficient to assure the first magistrate of Venice that he and his visitor understood each other. They discovered that they had a common wrong, the overbearing insolence of the aristocracy, and a common cause, its total annihilation. An exchange of confidence and a mutual pledge of secrecy succeeded. The outline of a plan for the subversion of the Constitution was sketched then and there. Various points of a preliminary character were discussed in an undertone; and that very night (April 3-4) the first foundation was laid in one of the private chambers of Saint Mark's of a great conspiracy. The Republic was to be entirely remodelled in its internal organization; once more, after the lapse of centuries, supreme unlimited power was to be vested in the Doge; the sceptre of the Badoeri and Sanudi was to

¹ Sanudo, *ubi supra*.

² Romanin, iii. 184.

be restored to the third Faliero; the days of Venetian autocracy were to return. The scheme was at present sufficiently crude; but Faliero had irrevocably committed himself to an undertaking of which it was impossible to fathom the issue, in concert with a person whom he knew only in his official capacity, and with whom he had probably not exchanged six sentences in the whole course of his life. The brain of the Doge was feverish and giddy with excitement. He had already lost his temper, and he was beginning to lose his head.

But the movement soon took its ramifications. Each of the principals hastened to seek partisans among such as were known to share their disaffection to the Oligarchy. His Serenity sent for his nephew Bertucci, who was an inmate of the palace,¹ and disclosed to him his project, into which the misguided young man plunged with blind enthusiasm. Gisello similarly communicated, not naming his confederate, with his son-in-law Bertucci Israello, a seafaring man; Filippo Calendario of San Severo, a distinguished architect and his son Nicoletto;² Giovanni Del Corso; Beltramo di Bergamo, a furrier; and about twelve others, who cherished on various grounds an animosity toward the Decemviral government.

The plot was hurriedly matured: for success depended on the celerity of its execution; and the fitful impatience of Faliero brooked no delay. It was arranged that the two Calendarii, Beltramo, and other accessories should be distributed over the City; that each should enlist under some specious subterfuge the services of forty followers,³ who were to be kept till the last moment in profound ignorance of the object for which they were hired; and that the stroke of State should on no account be deferred beyond Wednesday, the 15th of the current month; at a fixed hour on that day, the tocsin was to be rung as a signal to converge to the Piazza; a false report of the arrival off Lido of a Genoese fleet was to be industriously spread;⁴ and all members of the obnoxious order, as they thronged without distrust and without weapons to the public square to ascertain the truth, were to be dispatched, amid cries of *Viva Il Principe Faliero!*⁵ by six hundred and fifty poignards.

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, 332.

² Caresinus contemp. 224.

³ Mutinelli, *Annali*, 162.

⁴ Matteo Villani, lib. v. c. 13.

⁵ Romanin, iii. 185, compared with Villani, *ubi supra*.

Till the decisive day, the instinct of self-preservation, if no other motive, enjoined the observance of the utmost caution. At the same time, various artifices were employed to advance the scheme or to disguise its existence: Gisello was summoned to the presence of the Doge, at the desire of Barbaro, who alleged that the Admiral had threatened his life,¹ and received a severe rebuke "for having presumed to insult a patrician." At night, parties of desperados in the pay of Faliero, but who neither knew nor cared to inquire whose tools they were, paraded the streets, and, stopping in front of every respectable house, addressed coarse conversation or obscene proposals to the female inmates; and then, decamping with ringing peals of laughter, bawled at the pitch of their voices: *Bravo, such an one!* or *Well done, such an one!* for the purpose of bringing time-honoured names into infamy and odium. These outrageous disturbances were soon checked by the Ten; and on Monday, the 6th April, several of the roisterers were arrested. But their offence was not thought to amount to anything beyond a nocturnal frolic; and the culprits were allowed to escape with a mild punishment.

The 15th April was now at hand. The crisis approached. The stroke was to be consummated. Nothing had yet transpired which could awaken the suspicion of the intended victims, or could darken the sanguine hopes of the feigned restorers of popular government.

Beltramo the furrier had a noble patron; his name was Nicolo Lioni.² For this gentleman the dealer in peltry had conceived that sort of regard which is apt to spring up between the client and his benefactor.³ Though not a man who had proposed to himself for his guidance any exalted standard of moral rectitude or purity, Beltramo had not hardened his nature against the kindlier instincts of humanity: he was susceptible of gratitude; and it grieved him to reflect that one, to whom he was bound by cliental relations, might probably share the fate of his caste. He determined to try if it was possible to forewarn his patron without prejudicing his cause; and on the evening of the 14th he repaired with this object to the dwelling of his old friend and protector. After some introductory conversation, the skinner darkly insinuated

¹ Romanin, *ubi supra*.

² Sanudo, 332.

³ M. Villani, lib. v. c. 13.

“that it might be well if the Signor refrained from stirring abroad on the morrow.” The patrician started at words so pregnant with meaning and so prefigurative of peril. It was evident from the man’s tone and air that some terrible secret lurked in the bosom of Beltramo. He demanded an explanation of the innuendo. His monitor reiterated his warning merely; he declined to enter into particulars. But the worst surmises of his patron were awakened; he deemed it his duty to persevere; and he apprised his visitor that he must consider himself a prisoner on parol, until he had had time to institute certain inquiries.

Lioni ran to Saint Mark’s, where he obtained a private audience of Faliero. He disclosed to him the mysterious warning which had been addressed to him; he suggested that it seemed to him to point obliquely at some secret movement of a seditious or revolutionary character; and he respectfully desired to be furnished with the opinion and instructions of his Serenity on the subject. To his astonishment, the Doge after a pause treated his fears¹ as visionary; and he prayed him to dismiss from his thoughts the idea by which he was possessed. But whatever vices might be chargeable upon Faliero, hypocrisy was not among them. His confused manner, his stammering accents, and his air of forced gaiety, created painful misgivings in the breast of the nobleman whom he was vainly essaying to reassure; and Lioni, taking leave, returned to his own house, accompanied by Giovanni Gradenigo of San Polo and Marco Cornaro of San Apostoli, at whose residences he had called on his homeward route.

Beltramo was then examined anew. At first, he sturdily adhered to his original resolution, and remained impassable. But under the pressure of an importunacy, in which bribes and menaces were alternated, he at last gave way. The skinner unmasked to his petrified interrogators the whole machinery of the plot. He made a single reservation only; but it was an important one. He abstained from inculcating Faliero.

The weighty and momentous intelligence, which Lioni and his two companions lost no time in carrying to the Ten, was, as it happened, merely corroborative of a slightly antecedent report precisely to the same purport made to the Council by

¹ M. Villani, lib. v. c. 13.

Giovanni and Giacomo Contarini, whose informant was Marco Nigro of Castello. There were circumstantial indices of an obvious nature which at once directed suspicions to a high quarter. The chiefs of the Tribunal summoned its members¹ forthwith to an extraordinary sitting in the Sacristy of the Monastery of San Salvatore,² but Nicolo, son of Marco Faliero, the Doge's brother, *received no invitation to attend.*³ The proceedings were of the most prompt and energetic description. The Forty, the Avogadors, the Signori di Notte, the Capi de' Sestieri, and other civil functionaries, were desired to assemble, and to hold themselves in readiness for any emergency. Calendario and his son, his son-in-law Israello, Giovanni del Corso, and others to the number of twenty or upward, were arrested. The Palace of Saint Mark was surrounded by guards; and it was ordered that *no one* should be suffered under any pretence to quit the building. The Militia was called out; instructions were transmitted to Chioggia for farther reinforcements; and the musters had soon reached between 6000 and 7000 men. All persons of equestrian rank were not authorised only, but advised to wear weapons. Marco Cornaro of San Apostoli was nominated to the command of all the civic troops gradually collected on the Piazza. As the solemnities and fair of the Sensa impended, all strangers wearing side-arms were required to surrender the same, to be delivered up to them on their departure.

The trial of Calendario and his minor accomplices occupied a very brief space. On the same day (April 13) the architect himself, his son-in-law, Del Corso, and seven more, were sentenced to death and hanged at the casements of the Palace. Bertucci Faliero was imprisoned,⁴ and Nicoletto Calendario was banished, for life. A few others, whose complicity was less heinous or capital, were less severely punished. The names of some, whose conduct excited distrust, but against whom no conclusive evidence was forthcoming, were enrolled in a *Register of the Suspected*. Lastly, several, whose innocence was established beyond doubt, were unconditionally set at liberty.

But the demands of justice were not yet satisfied, and the law claimed a larger sacrifice, a nobler victim. The process

¹ Among them was Nicolo Trevisano, author of the *Cronaca Trevisana*.

² Romanin (iii. 186).

³ Sanudo (333); Romanin, *loco citato*.

⁴ P. Dolfino, *Annali Veneti*, p. 68, King's MSS. 149.

against Marino Faliero followed. On the morning of Thursday, the 16th April, the old man was led from his apartments, attired in his robes of State, to the Great Council Chamber, where he was confronted with his accusers and his judges. The Bench was composed of the six Privy Councillors, nine of the Decemvirs, and a Giunta of twenty Sages, which had been specially convoked to meet the extreme gravity of the occasion. The latter had a deliberative voice merely and no vote.

The articles of arraignment were no sooner read than Faliero made a candid and unreserved confession. He avowed all.¹ He stigmatised himself as the worst of criminals, and as one deserving of the highest penalty which it was in the power of the laws to inflict.² Without farther preamble it was then put to the vote, whether the accused should suffer death. Five of the Privy Council and the nine Decemvirs recorded their suffrages in the affirmative. It was a majority of fourteen to one. One voice alone, it seemed, asked mercy for him who had in the eyes of the aristocracy aggravated the crime of treason by fraternising with tradesmen and plebeians. After the delivery of the verdict the condemned was led back to the Palace. It had been ordered that "Marino Faliero, being convicted of conspiring against the Constitution, should be taken to the head of the staircase of Saint Mark's, and there, being stripped of the ducal bonnet and the other emblems of his dignity, should be decapitated."³ The sentence was one which could not fail to strike an icy chill into every heart. But it was received, by the Doge with a placid equanimity worthy of the Hero of Luca.

The execution took place on the following morning⁴ at the hour of tierce.⁵ Giovanni Mocenigo, senior Privy Councillor, followed by his five colleagues, the Decemvirs, the Advocates of the Commune, and the other great officers of State, advanced to meet his Serenity, who had been conducted under guard from his own apartments to the Great Council Saloon. Forming a circle round him, they escorted

¹ M. Villani, lib. v. c. 13. "Il Doge nol seppe negare."

² Romanin, iii. 184, n. 1.

³ Villani, *ubi supra*.

⁴ The guides shew beneath the ducal palace the cell in which Faliero was confined prior to his execution. But there is no certainty on this point. It is immediately contiguous to that in which Count Carmagnola is said, perhaps with equal truth, to have passed his last hours.

⁵ Sanudo, *Vite*, 334.

him to the steps outside the Hall, where the Corno was removed. A concourse of persons of all conditions had congregated to witness the spectacle. A gloomy and awful stillness reigned throughout the Piazza. The Doge, amid a silence in which a whisper or a sigh would have been audible, implored the forgiveness of his fellow-citizens, and extolled the equity of the doom which he was about to undergo. He was then disrobed. A black cap was substituted for the berretta, and a cloak of the same colour was cast across his shoulders. On the landing at the top of the steps leading down to the courtyard of the palace, the executioner awaited him. At an appointed signal he laid his head on the block, and at a single stroke it was severed from his body. Immediately after the removal of the latter, the doors of Saint Mark's were thrown open; and the crowd entered in wild disorder, eager to catch a glimpse of the mutilated corpse, which was there exposed to view preparatory to burial (Friday, April 17).¹

Thus miserably perished, at the ripe age of seventy-seven, one of the greatest soldiers and statesmen whom Venice could boast: that same Faliero who during two-and-forty years of public service had earned as Count of Valdemarino a splendid and enviable reputation. Such was the ignominious fall of a man, whose versatile talents had enabled him to shine in every branch of official life, who was distinguished as an archaeologist and collector, having acquired by gift or purchase many souvenirs of Marco Polo, and whose uncontrollable passions brought him before the close of seven months from a throne to a scaffold. Faliero had survived most of his early friends, if not his domestic happiness; it was ruled that he should survive his honour also. He lived to see the day when a great name had become the byword of scoffers, and when his brother's son had been branded as a felon. The cup of bitterness could hardly have been fuller. From a modern point of view, the attribution of the conduct of Faliero to diabolical inspiration is nothing beyond another way of saying, that he was carried away by his vehement irascibility.

The Ducal remains were interred without any mark of

¹ P. Dolfinò, *Annali Veneti*, p. 68, King's MSS. 149; Caroldo, *Historia di Venetia*, lib. viii. p. 25, King's MSS. 147.

pomp at SS. Giovanni e Paolo, behind the monastery, and in the direction of the Chapel of Santa Maria della Pace. At p. 33 of the fourth volume of the *Misti Consiglio de' Dieci*, where an entry of the deliberation and verdict in the Faliero affair would have occurred, there is a blank space with the words "N Sc'batvr"; but a record of the tragical affair was, as we shall presently see, preserved in another place. As in the case of the Serrar, which left its marks behind it, the Faliero episode preserved a certain share of vitality in common talk and discussion during a lengthened course of time; and the ostensible disposition of the Doge Celsi to follow the precedent led in 1364 to a formal declaration on the part of the Ten, that the attainder of the former Doge could never be annulled or reversed; and in 1366 the Council went farther by removing the effigy of Faliero, and substituting a black curtain with the inscription: *Hic est locus Marini Faletro decapitati pro eriminibus*.¹ The effects of the late Doge, of which an inventory will be found elsewhere, were dispersed by auction; but a claim subsequently made by his relict, in respect of certain assets and other property belonging to her private estate, was allowed by the Council of Ten (Nov. 4, 1355), and ordered to be paid; and, curiously enough, nearly two years after, the Gradenigo family preferred a demand for indemnity on account of certain objects inadvertently sold among the personalty of Faliero.

Three centuries had passed away, when some labourers digging near the spot accidentally exhumed a sarcophagus.² The discovery did not at the moment attract much curiosity; but the sarcophagus was eventually opened, and it was then found to contain a *skeleton with the skull placed between the knees*. This peculiarity indicated that the person, whose spirit was once dwelling in the now uninformed clay, had died by the hand of the executioner; and if any doubt still remained, the half-defaced inscription on the urn served to shew that the bones of the unhappy Faliero were there!

The title of Valdemarino suffered attainder, and his property in Padua and elsewhere, with the exception of a

¹ This, with the entire series of portraits, presumably perished in the Fire of 1479.

² Now in the Museo Civico. A representation of it is in Molmenti, i. 109.

sum of 2000 ducats which was reserved for the family, was sequestered. In consideration of the important, though involuntary, share which he had borne in the detection of the late plot, Beltramo the furrier advanced a preposterous claim to the forfeited estates and the dormant title.¹ But a less exalted estimate of his merit was formed by the Decemvirs, who awarded him simply an annuity of 1000 ducats and the liberty of using side-arms. The indignation of the peltry-merchant at this unhandsome treatment was unmeasured, and his conduct became at length so outrageous, that he was transported to Ragusa.

To Marco Nigro of Castello the Government granted a pension of 100 gold ducats and the same privilege as it had accorded to Beltramo; and a few others, who were thought to have deserved well of their country, were recompensed with similar liberality. It formed no part of the Venetian policy to discountenance informers or to be parsimonious in the distribution of secret-service money.

The Republic sending her Prince to the block on a charge of high treason, after a regular trial, was an anomaly in her annals. There had been examples indeed of Doges, who were butchered on the steps of the throne, or at the foot of the altar, by an infuriated mob. There had been Doges who were condemned by the popular voice to perpetual exile or to cloistral solitude. But the case of the unhappy Faliero stood alone; and for the earliest instance of a Doge of Venice being tried for his life by those, who had constituted themselves his peers, the thrilling tragedy of 1355 alone can be quoted.

The detection and defeat of this notable scheme was, beyond doubt, an immense triumph for the oligarchy and the Decemviral Council; for the natural course of events had shown more clearly and forcibly than any preconcerted demonstration the need for a permanent Committee of Public Safety apart from the Ducal office, and in a certain way above it.

It is singular that one of the ramifications of the Faliero conspiracy should have remained undisclosed till several years later. It came to the knowledge of the Signory only in the beginning of 1361 that Pietro Badoer, who was Duke of Candia while Faliero sat upon the throne, and who was

¹ Sanudo, 638.

now occupying a high military post in the island, had employed at the time certain expressions which implied a treasonable sympathy with the Doge; and injunctions were consequently addressed to Marino Grimani, actual Duke of Candia, and one of his privy councillors, Vettore Trevisano, to investigate the matter. The inquiries of Grimani and Trevisano, which they were desired to prosecute with secrecy and caution, established two points.

It appeared, that in the first year of his government (1355), and posterior to the execution of April, Badoer and several noble Candiots were returning from the Feast of San Lazaro, and that the Duke was ascending the stairs of the Palace, where all that chose were freely drinking and carousing, when he overheard some one mention the name of Marino Faliero. "What are you saying about my lord Marino Faliero?" at once cried the Duke.¹ "He was my intimate friend; and I was at Venice when he became Doge. If I had been there, when *that affair* took place, and he had sent for me and said, 'Pietro, I intend to give you Valdemarino, and to make you a great lord, how could I have said Nay?'" Moreover, Badoer was reported to have added: "Yes, indeed, *if I had been there*, and he had sent for me at the moment, I would have certainly brought 200 men to his cause; and if he had given me a day's notice, I would have brought 1000."

The second point, which was elicited, was that about eight months afterward, Caterino Badoer, brother of Pietro, was frequently in the habit of calling on the latter, and of tempting him in such words as these: "My lord, you might, if you choose, be absolute master here, in the teeth of Venice; and I would bring to your standard 2000 men—4000 men—in fact, as many as you might think proper." But the Duke² always answered, "that he had no mind that way." These papers, transmitted to Venice by Duke Grimani, were thought sufficient, even at that distance of time, to criminate the accused; a prosecution was set on foot; and sentence was recorded. But on the precise nature

¹ Documenti sulla Coniura di Marin Falier, presso Romanin, *Docum.* iii. 397-8.

² Cornaro, in his *Creta Sacra*, 1755, 4to, does not give the name of the Duke of Candia for 1355. But (ii. 315) he states that Badoer was Duke (perhaps for the second time) in 1358.

of the latter the archive, from which the foregoing particulars are derived, is silent.

It was a circumstance of sinister augury, which may only have been recalled after the event, that the gondola, which brought Faliero on his election to the landing-place, instead of making for the Riva, drew up at a point facing the Red Columns.

CHAPTER XXIV

A.D. 1355—1365

Giovanni Gradenigo, Doge (April 21, 1355)—Treaty of Peace with Genoa (June 1)—Exclusion of the Venetian Flag from all the Ports of the Black Sea except Caffa—Altered Character of the Relations with Hungary—New War with that Power (1356)—Siege of Treviso—Loss of Dalmatia—Futile Negotiations with Padua—Death of Gradenigo (August 8, 1356)—Election of Giovanni Dolfino (August 13)—Retreat of Louis from Treviso—Conclusion of a Truce (Nov. 16, 1356—April 9, 1357)—Differences in the Venetian Senate touching the Prosecution of the War—Triumph of the Peace Party—Ratification of a Treaty by which Venice retains the Trevisan and cedes Dalmatia (Feb. 18, 1358)—Peace with Padua (June 7)—The Republic commits herself by demanding Investiture of the Trevisan by Charles IV., who refuses the Request—Death of Dolfino (July 11, 1361)—Enactment of a Sumptuary Law in the preceding year (May 21)—Anomalous Election of Lorenzo Celsi (July 16)—Character of the new Doge—Anecdote of Marco Celsi—Festivities at Venice on the occasion of the Visits of the Duke of Austria and the King of Cyprus (September-December)—Remarks on the Government—Enjoyment of Tranquillity (1361-3)—Rebellion of Candia (1363-6)—Internal State of Candia—Share of Venetian Settlers in the Revolt—Proximate Causes of the Movement—Its eventual Suppression—Luchino del Verme and Petrarch—Demolition of the Fortifications of Candia (1366)—Previous Death of Celsi (July 18, 1365)—Singular Revelation respecting him—Marco Cornaro, Doge (July 21).

ON the day following the decapitation of Marino Faliero, the Great Council, having assembled (April 18, 1355),¹ decreed the registration on its Minutes of the ensuing constitutional formula:—" *The Ducal throne having fallen vacant by the death of Marino Faliero, Doge of Venice, lately beheaded for conspiring the ruin and destruction of the City of Venice and its people, this Council was convened for the purpose of taking the necessary steps for the election of the future Doge.*"² On the 21st April,³ Giovanni Gradenigo, one of the XLI., and a veteran of seventy,⁴ was proclaimed the successful candidate. Gradenigo was the maternal grandson of the Doge Giovanni Dandolo, who had reigned from 1280 to 1289. He was a person of superior

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, 635.

² Romanin, iii. 193.

³ Caresinus, *Danduli Cont.* 425; Pietro Giustiniani, *Cronica*, p. 104, King's MSS. 148.

⁴ Sanudo, *Vite*, 630.

acquirements and of great legal erudition. But he is said to have displayed parsimonious habits and eccentric ways. His nose was so big, that he was familiarly known as *Nasone*, and his slouching gait, and his blunt, awkward manners, strongly reminded people of his grandfather.¹ He was the same nobleman who, in conjunction with Nicolo Lioni and Marco Cornaro, had so importantly contributed to the frustration of the recent plot.

The first business of the new ministry was to lift the drag-chain of the Genoese negotiation, which had been suspended during the last few months. Considerable difficulty and delay were experienced in the mutually satisfactory solution of certain points connected with the award of indemnities and the disposal of prisoners. The Genoese plenipotentiaries at first exhibited an exacting and dictatorial spirit; but the Ducal representatives, Benintendi da Ravegnani and Raffaello Caresino, two illustrious names in contemporary literature—the former Grand Chancellor of Venice, the latter Ducal Notary—carried instructions to be exceedingly firm; and although the four months' truce had expired in April, the signature of the treaty at Milan was not completed till the 1st of June.² Under its provisions: the Mediterranean from Porto-Pisano to Marseilles, and the whole course of the Adriatic, were closed against Venetian and Genoese men-of-war respectively. 2. In the event of the outbreak of hostilities between Genoa and Pisa, or between Venice and any of her Dalmatian settlements, the Venetians were to be permitted to touch at Genoa alone, and the Genoese at Venice alone. 3. A mutual and immediate cessation of offensive operations was secured. 4. The Venetians were prohibited from trading with Azoph for three years. 5. A claim for damage inflicted on either side in contravention of the treaty was admissible. 6. The scale or amount of reciprocal indemnification for losses accruing from seizures and other causes since 1299 was to be submitted to the arbitration of Visconti. 7. An exchange of prisoners without ransom was effected.³ 8. A sum of 100,000 gold florins was contributable by the contracting parties, in equal proportions, for deposit at some neutral point, as a bond for the execution of the compact. There was a supplemental clause, that if the King of Arragon and the Duke of the Archipelago gave their cohesion on or

¹ Sansovino, *V. D.* xiii. 570.

² Sanudo, *Vite*, 639.

³ *Ibid.*

before the 28th September, these potentates should be recognisable as parties to the agreement.¹ On the same day, a separate peace was signed between the Republic and the successors of Giovanni Visconti. It was stipulated that the ratifications should be exchanged within forty days.

The exclusion of the Lion of Saint Mark from Azoph and all the other Euxine ports excepting Caffa, where the Republic was still allowed to have a counter, was a serious blow, though one of transient duration, to the commerce of the Signory with the Black Sea; and it was a circumstance of aggravation, that it was so closely preceded by that unlucky revolution of January 1355, which elevated a Genoese emperor to the Byzantine throne. The June treaty, however, was no sooner ratified, than the Government hastened to create an approximate equivalent for the loss by improving the Venetian relations with Flanders, Egypt, Barbary, and the Grand Khan; and by the grant of fresh charters, or by the amplification of existing immunities, the important and extensive trade with those countries was placed on a footing of increased stability. The month of June 1358, when the inhibition was calculated to expire, was a date which circumstances nevertheless invested with no ordinary interest.

The year 1345 had opened a new era in the relations of Venice with Hungary and in the Dalmatian policy of the Signory. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries indeed the Republic is already found repelling the periodical irruptions of the Solomons and the Lladislai, and even vindicating at heavy sacrifices her prescriptive right to that invaluable Adriatic seaboard, of which she was so intelligibly jealous. The pretensions of the early Hungarian kings ostensibly amounted to nothing beyond the invited assertion of an occasional protectorate over the towns scattered along the Dalmatian littoral: nor was Venice strong or injudicious enough to attempt the subjugation of a territory to which she enjoyed no more than the shadow of a possessory title. A few miles inland lay a region subject to petty chieftains, who substantially acknowledged no suzerain.

But time wrought a great change. The Venetians as well as the Hungarians grew more aspiring. The former began to covet a country of which they had held the sea-margin

¹ M. Villani, lib. v. c. 45.

from an epoch immemorial. The latter in their career of conquest, having gradually rendered themselves masters of the interior, were becoming sensible of the enormous advantages which would attend the incorporation of the coast. Hungary, populous, rich in pastures, advanced in agriculture, abounding in military resources, not deficient in industrial labour, was feeling the three wants of a progressive civilization—ports, shipping, and commerce; and she naturally looked toward Dalmatia. Under such circumstances, it seemed to require only that the crown of Saint Stephen should descend upon the brows of a prince of enterprising spirit and soldier-like qualities, to render that province the theatre of a protracted and bloody struggle between two great Powers; and such a prince had at length appeared in the person of Louis, brother of Andrew of Naples. The new King was only four-and-twenty.

The attack upon Zara in 1345–6 had been a miscalculation and a failure; undertaken at a period when Louis was young and inexperienced,¹ it was as unsuccessful as it was premature. But the design which lay next his heart, and which he seemed to accept as a tradition of his crown, was suspended, not abandoned; and he no sooner found himself released from his Neapolitan engagements than he returned with the impatience of a zealot to his scheme for the extension of the Hungarian frontier toward the Adriatic.

The formal declaration of war against the Signory dated back so far as 1353. But it was not till May 1356,² that the barons and freemen of Hungary met their monarch in council³ on the Slavonic borders, where the dispositions for the forthcoming campaign were concluded. Alliances had been already contracted with the Counts of Goritz, with the Patriarch of Aquileia, and with the Lord of Padua, Francesco da Carrara,⁴ the last of whom pledged himself to remain neutral and to discharge the functions of a commissary-general, and a secret negotiation was opened with Genoa with a view to create a naval diversion in the Adriatic. It was decided that operations should be undertaken on a grand scale, and that while the bulk of the royal army entered the Marches through Friuli,

¹ *Assedio di Zara*, anno 1346; Morelli, *Monumenti*, 1796.

² Sismondi, vi. 280.

³ M. Villani, lib. vi. c. 36.

⁴ Bonfinius, *Res Ungaricæ*, dec. ii. lib. x. 350.

and laid siege to Treviso, the sole possession of Venice on the *terra firma*, the remainder, distributed in detachments over Dalmatia, should attempt the reduction or alienation of that province. In pursuance of the strategical plans which Louis had formed, the advance guard of 4000 cavalry under Conrad de Wolfast, Ban of Croatia, was immediately pushed toward the theatre of war.¹ By forced marches the Ban reached the Italian frontier; and on the 28th June he halted under the walls of Treviso.² Louis himself was not far behind him. The latter easily rendered himself master of Sacile;³ after a three weeks' siege,⁴ he took Conegliano, ten miles from Oderzo, on the 12th July.⁵ At Asolo and Serravalle he overcame the resistance of the Venetian troops.⁶ Before the beginning of August, the Hungarians were completely concentrated in front of Treviso. They were estimated at upward of 40,000.⁷

Meanwhile the Government was not wanting in alertness and activity. Large additions had been made to the garrison of Zara, which was plentifully victualled;⁸ and successful advances were made to the Ban of Serbia for the purchase of Chisa in his dominions.⁹ On the 28th June,¹⁰ a decree of the Great Council authorised the reorganization of the Board of War. A large body of troops was dispatched to Treviso under three proveditors, to the succour of the Podesta.¹¹ All the suburbs of the town which were thought incapable of defence, and which might serve on the other hand as so many advanced posts to a besieging enemy, were destroyed.¹² Six other proveditors were sent to various parts of Dalmatia, Istria, and Slavonia, to examine and strengthen the fortifications at every assailable and defensible point,¹³ and, as a precaution against any breach of faith on the part of Genoa, the Captain of the Gulf was efficiently reinforced.¹⁴ Of the confidential correspondence between Padua and Hungary the Government affected to harbour no suspicions. It was obvious that, so soon as offensive operations had commenced in the Peninsula, the active friendship and assistance of Padua would become of paramount utility and importance; and an energetic

¹ Sismondi, vi. 283.³ Romanin, iii. 198.⁵ *Hist. Cortus.* lib. xi. ch. 8; M. Villani, lib. vi. c. 52; Sanudo, *Itinerario.*⁶ Sanudo, *Vite*, 640.⁸ Wilkinson, *ubi infra.*¹⁰ Romanin, iii. 198, and note 3.¹² Sismondi, vi. 283.² *Ibid.*⁴ Sanudo, *Vite*, 640.⁷ Villani, *ubi supra.*⁹ Wilkinson, *Dalmatia and Montenegro*, ii. 275.¹¹ *Ibid. ubi supra.*¹³ Romanin, *ubi supra.*¹⁴ *Ibid.*

attempt was now in consequence made (July 1), to prevail on Carrara to coalesce with Venice against the common enemy. But the representative of the Doge was, of course, unable to extract from a man who had actually thrown himself into the arms of Louis, and who probably surmised that the Signory had more than an inkling of the truth, any definite or ingenuous avowal of his intentions. He could only be persuaded to deal with generalities of the vaguest kind. An Hungarian invasion was assuredly a prospect to be dreaded. The projects of Louis were beyond doubt to be treated with distrust. He entertained toward the Republic the highest sentiments of friendship and esteem. He was pressed to be a little more explicit. Carrara then (July 4) formally advanced, through his own diplomatic agent, the exorbitant demand that the Signory should raise 3000 troops, should obtain the co-operation or neutrality of Verona and Ferrara, should subsidise him to the amount of 8000 ducats *per mensem*, and should guarantee the integrity of the Padovano. On these terms he was prepared to enter into the proposed alliance. The Doge replied that his country had no objection to exert its best influence in securing the cohesion, or at least the neutrality, of La Scala and D' Este, that it consented, in addition to the troops which had been already shipped to Treviso, to take into pay 1000 *borbutc* (men-at-arms) and 1000 foot, for the protection of the respective States; and that, in the approaching contest, every care should be taken that the Padovano suffered as lightly as possible. As to the subsidy, however, it was intimated that present circumstances, at all events, rendered such a measure absolutely out of the question. The rejoinder of Carrara was lame and evasive; he muttered monosyllables; and the Republic at length plainly perceived that the whole brunt of hostilities was destined to fall upon her own shoulders. After a second and a third ineffectual essay, in fact, Marino Morosini, Podesta of Padua, received his recall; all commercial intercourse with that State was strictly interdicted; a militia force under the Proveditor Marco Giustiniani was ordered to devastate the Padovano; and the exasperated Government left no means untried of exciting against the trimming and vacillating Carrara the formidable power of the Scaligers.

The war between Venice and Hungary was presenting this

phase when, on the 8th August 1356,¹ the Doge Gradenigo breathed his last, having occupied the throne rather less than fifteen months. The critical complexion of foreign affairs demanded in the choice of his successor a union of the highest qualities of statesmanship; five days after the decease of Gradenigo, the College of Electors communicated in the usual manner its solemn decision in favour of Giovanni Dolfino, one of the three Proveditors at Treviso (August 13).²

Treviso, situated at the confluence of the Silis and Piave, enjoyed at this period the reputation of being a massive and all but impregnable stronghold; it was encompassed by a broad and deep moat; and all the resources of the engineering art, so far as it was known in the Middle Ages, were carried to singular perfection in the fortification of its ramparts. Louis, after a short siege, found to his cost that his success by no means corresponded with his expectations. His commissariat, for which he was indebted in a leading measure to the zeal and good-will of Carrara, who had at length unmasked himself, was sufficiently well provided; but his loss both in men and in material of war was excessively severe. The composition of his army, moreover, was purely feudal; and for his levies he entirely relied on the loyalty of the great vassals of the Crown. The latter in their turn were not in a position to bind their dependents to any but a specific and limited period of service; and so much delay unavoidably arose in the march from point to point, that that period had for the most part already expired or was on the eve of expiration. This circumstance tended to spread impatience and discontent through the ranks; and the King was constrained, sorely against his will, to withdraw the bulk of his troops from Treviso in the course of August, with the reservation only of a sufficient force of fresh soldiers to form the siege.

It was not therefore in a particularly happy mood, that the King received the ambassador who waited on him to announce the change of government, and to solicit in the name of the Signory a safe-conduct for the new Doge. When the news of the election of Dolfino first reached the Hungarian camp, Louis was heard to say to those about him that they would now number among their prisoners the chief magistrate

¹ Caresinus contemp. 416.

² Caresinus contemp. 417; Sanudo, *Vite*, 641.

of the Republic ; and his Majesty appears to have harboured some thoughts of withholding the safe-conduct. But the courtesy, with which the demand had been preferred, disarmed the royal resolution, and he graciously assented to the wishes of the Venetians.¹ The Proveditor who, probably without the King's knowledge, had succeeded by a clever nocturnal sortie in escaping from Treviso, safely reached Mestra, where a deputation from Venice was in readiness to receive his Serenity, who on the 25th August made his entry into the capital. Dolfino was a nobleman who had won equal distinction in the profession of arms and in the arena of politics ; but a pad over the socket of one of his eyes, of which he had been deprived by a casualty during his late residence at Treviso, disfigured his features.²

The Venetians, who had viewed with considerable dismay³ the host which Louis led into Italy, and of which a single division was equal to their whole army, were indescribably relieved when they discovered that the feudal military organization, while it had in so striking a measure its element of strength, was not without its element of weakness. For it became an ascertained fact that the King, thwarted in his probable anticipations of taking Treviso by a surprise, would not have it in his power to assemble under the walls more than 5000 men at one time, and with such a force the Republic, animated by the precedent of 1346, did not despair of being able successfully to grapple. At the same time she observed with uneasiness the arrival of contingents in the Hungarian camp from Milan and Verona, which too clearly denoted the existence of a secret understanding between Louis and some of the Italian princes.⁴

During the remainder of the summer and through the autumn of the year 1356, the belligerents continued to maintain the struggle with varied fortune. But the first symptoms of returning winter rendered both parties naturally desirous of suspending hostilities ; the measure, as a prelude to a definitive pacification, was warmly seconded by the Holy See, which treated the dissensions of Christendom as so much vantage-ground given to the Turkish power ;⁵ and an armistice

¹ Galeazzo Gataro *Padre*, 55, and Andrea *Figlio*, 56, Murat. xvii. ; *Ad Hist. Cortus. Addit. Secundum*, Murat. xii. ; Pietro Dolfino, *Annali Veneti*, p. 70, King's MSS. 149 ; Sanudo, fol. 642.

² Sanudo, fol. 652.

³ M. Villani, lib. vi. c. 54.

⁴ *Ibid.* c. 55.

⁵ See Villani, c. 60.

was concluded from the 16th November till the 9th April 1357,¹ by the terms of which the King retained all his acquisitions in the March till the resumption of the offensive. His allies, the Patriarch of Aquileia, the Counts of Goritz, and others, were included in the operation of the truce.

At the close of the Passover, the horrors of war were renewed. Venice, on her part, returned to the field with an impoverished treasury and a temper soured by the unfading recollections of Portolongo and an apparently interminable series of loans and conscriptions. The political prospect had become exceedingly gloomy and discouraging; and the Venetians began to perceive that the struggle into which they had entered was far more arduous than they had calculated. Hostilities were unhappily not confined to one side of the Adriatic.² Louis was wielding a double-bladed sword.³ While, in conformity with the principles of feudal service which were as eminently favourable to the supply of fresh relays of troops as they were inconsistent with the concentration of large masses of men on a single point, the besieging force before Treviso was constantly relieved, Hungarian arms, gold and intrigue were mining their way in another quarter; and Dalmatia was all but lost. In the Trevisano Castelfranco, Oderzo, Noale, and Mestra only remained true to the Signory. The submission of the rest was believed with some reason to be due to a want of firmness and nerve, if not of common courage, on the part of their defenders: for to the authorities of those four towns, which made a successful stand against Hungary, an intimation had been sent that, "if they yielded, their heads would answer for it"; and it was probable that if the menace, which was so seasonably directed to them, had been directed to all, the province might have been saved. The precautions, which the Government had used against contingencies, were most elaborate and complete, and the severity with which it visited the offenders, who forgot their duty or betrayed their trust, was perfectly legitimate and justifiable.⁴

Meanwhile Louis continued to date his dispatches from Zara, which had been betrayed (September 2, 1356⁵) into his

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, 642.

³ Pugliola, *Chron.* 446.

⁵ Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 643.

² *Hist. Cortus.* lib. xi. ch. 8.

⁴ Romanin, iii. 200, 202.

hands by the Abbot of the Monastery of San Grisogono. The conduct of the war was still delegated to his lieutenants; and the progress of his arms was already too triumphant. With the exception of Castelfranco and the three other places which defied the enemy, especially of Noale, where Giovanni Giustiniani heroically held his ground until he was starved out, the entire dominion on the mainland, as well as on the opposite shore of the Gulf, was wrested from the grasp of the Republic: while the condition of Treviso itself was growing week by week more and more hopeless. So imminent and so inevitable at last seemed the fall of the town, that the inhabitants began to embrace every opportunity of making their escape down the Silis to the Lagoon, where they were treated by the Venetian ladies with the utmost humanity and kindness, and in cases of necessity became recipients of charitable donations from the public purse. Among the fugitives was the Bishop of Treviso himself.

The Government now found itself in a veritable dilemma, and it was for some time absolutely puzzled how to proceed. There was, as it usually happened, a War-Party and a Peace-Party. The former, which reckoned among its numbers the Doge himself and a fair proportion of influential politicians, enunciated the opinion that, although it might be granted that the finances were disordered, and that success had not yet crowned their efforts, it was wiser to take high ground and to make no concession whatever. If they persevered, they were allowed to hope that fortune would at last smile upon them. The resources of the Republic, were they not vast; and the present cause was it not a cause in which all Venetians should unite to serve their country? To dream of sacrificing Dalmatia was madness. It was a course which was alien alike from the dignity and interest of Venice. Her Adriatic provinces had ever been dear to her, and their preservation was now as material to her policy as it was indispensable to her commerce. It was idle to prate of the engagement of the King of Hungary, on the cession of those territories, to offer no impediment to trade, and to discountenance piracy. Dalmatia surrendered, they were at his mercy. It would be then too late to talk about promises and undertakings!

On the other side, it was pleaded with equal plausibility that the expenses of the war had already imposed burdens on

the people which it was beyond their power to bear, that the public credit was endangered by the appropriation of the interest on public bonds for current needs, while by the levy of a new income-tax of one per cent. to meet the deficiency a feeling of angry discontent was very widely diffused; and that a fresh campaign, with its inseparable adjuncts of new taxes and new levies, was emphatically out of the question. It was painful to lose Dalmatia: but the plain truth was that Dalmatia *was already lost*; and an honourable compromise, by which the integrity of the possessions on the *terra firma* should be secured, was undeniably preferable to a continuation of hostilities, by which farther disgraces and misfortunes merely were entailed. They were asked to exercise an option between two evils: War and Peace; and Peace was the lesser.

It was possible that the latter view was less chivalrous; but there could be small doubt that it was practically sounder. It was unluckily not against Louis alone and his jackal Carrara, that the Venetians were obliged to guard. The sincerity of the Genoese policy was always gravely to be mistrusted; it was well known that the King had been long endeavouring to tamper with Genoese honour; and the advices which had been lately transmitted from Candia of the internal state of that island, were far from being satisfactory. It was borne in mind, moreover, that the old year 1357 was approaching its close, and that in rather less than six months the Black Sea trade would be again thrown open to Venice; and there was room to cherish an expectation that under brighter auspices the Republic might be enabled to reconquer the line of coast which its geographical situation rendered so precious, and which four centuries of possession rendered so dear. Finally, between the March of Treviso and the Dalmatian littoral, between a territory contiguous to the lagoons and one separated from them by a wide gulf, there could be no choice. It was vital that the former should belong to Venice, or at least should not belong to Hungary. Nevertheless it was a hard struggle between conflicting passions and instincts; it was a trial of prejudice and pride, which wrang and embittered many patriotic hearts; and there was a lengthened and obstinate discussion among the Committee of seventy-five Sages who had been specially appointed

to deliberate upon the momentous question, before it was decided that a pacification on terms, which the King himself had named, should be accepted.

The conditions dictated by Louis were: 1, that the Republic should retain the Trevisano; 2, that she should renounce all titular¹ and possessory title to Dalmatia and to the whole line of coast, with a very few exceptions, from Quarnaro to Durazzo, and should recall her consuls; 3, that she should give up within three weeks the isolated places which remained in her hands in Dalmatia; 4, that the King should on the other part surrender all the conquests which he had achieved in Italy; 5, that he should guarantee to Venice the full and undisturbed enjoyment of her commercial privileges in his new territory; 6, that he should suppress piracy to the utmost extent of his power. The treaty, which purported to be contracted between the King of Hungary, the Patriarch of Aquileia, the Lord of Padua, Albert and Maynard, Counts of Goritz, the Bishop of Ceneda, the Counts of Collalto, the Cities of Feltre and Belluno, and all others, the subjects, liegemen, and followers of Louis, on the one part, and the syndics and plenipotentiaries of the Doge, on the other part,² was signed and sealed on Sunday, the 18th of February 1358.³

Francesco da Carrara superintended the details of the negotiation, so far as he was concerned, in person. He took up his quarters in a palace contiguous to the Church of San Polo,⁴ which the Republic had acquired in 1348 at a cost of 5000 ducats, and had presented to his father. The Signory, recovering by a convulsive and almost choking effort her wonted serenity of aspect and suavity of demeanour, consented to shake hands with her bitterest enemy over rivulets of patrician blood and over the broken sceptre of Dalmatia;

¹ M. Villani, lib. viii. c. 30; P. Dolfino, *Annali Veneti*, p. 70, King's MSS. 149.

² Sanudo, *Vite*, 651, gives the text of the document.

³ " Cette même année," writes Sismondi (vi. 342), " fut signalée par le grand nombre de traités de paix qui furent conclus presque en même temps dans toute l'Europe. L'Angleterre fit la paix avec l'Ecosse, et le roi David Bruce fut relâché de sa prison; le roi Jean de France, prisonnier à Londres, conclut aussi avec Edouard III. d'Angleterre un traité qui ne fut pas ensuite accepté par son royaume; Pierre le Cruel de Castile fit la paix avec Pierre le Cérémonieux d'Arragon; la république de Vénise avec le roi d'Hongrie; les Visconti avec la ligue des seigneurs de la Vénétie; le roi Louis de Naples avec son cousin le Duc de Duras; enfin, les Perousins avec les Siennois."

⁴ *Hist. Cortus*. lib. ix. ch. 16.

and a compact regulating the trade in salt, and disposing of all other points, were solemnly ratified on the 7th of June following. Whether the change of rulers was productive of advantage to the province is more than questionable. At present the general aspect of Dalmatia is, at any rate, changed for the worse. In many places the population has decreased by one half; arts and manufactures, which Venice did so much to foster, have been neglected; commerce has suffered a marked decline; the old national customs, of which the people were so fond and so proud, have fallen into disuse. Of the former opulence and splendour of the larger and more important towns few vestiges now remain. The palaces of Spalato are in ruins; and the grass grows in the streets of Ragusa. Yet the modern traveller along the Adriatic coast traces remains of the old Venetian influence and power and the characteristic tendency of the Signory to assimilate its possessions.

An amusing and illustrative anecdote is related in an almost contemporary historian¹ of this war between Venice and Hungary. While Louis was commanding in person before Treviso in 1356, he was in the habit of spending the summer evenings on the banks of the Silis at some distance from headquarters; and there he was accustomed to read dispatches, and to transact in solitude any business which he might happen to have before him. A Trevisan, named Giuliano Baldichino, noticing this practice, conceived an ingenious plan in his own mind for making the King prisoner, and delivering him into the hands of the Signory; and he told the municipal authorities of the city that he would accomplish the feat for 12,000 ducats and the Podestat of Castelfranco. The Proveditors of Treviso referred him to the central government; and he accordingly presented himself to the College. But, upon being interrogated, he declined to explain the method which he purposed to employ; and he was dismissed as an impostor or a madman. After the conclusion of peace, however, an account of this strange affair having reached the ears of Louis, his Majesty begged the Republic to send Baldichino to him, as he wished very much to have an interview; and the travelling expenses of the mysterious individual were paid to Buda. He gained immediate access

¹ *Ad Hist. Cortus., Addit. Secund.* 649-50.

to the royal person. Presenting his credentials, he awaited the result in silence. The King hastily ran his eye through the document, and said with an arch smile: "Are you the same who wished to deliver us dead or alive to the Venetians, had not your terms been rejected?" Throwing himself on his knees, Baldichino replied: "Most Serene Prince, I am." "Let me know, then, I beg of you," continued Louis, "how you meant to compass this matter?" The Trevisan unfolded his plan. He stated that he had designed to conceal himself among the rushes of the Silis, to watch his opportunity when the King turned his back to the river, to cast a rope round his neck, to drag him through the water to the opposite bank, and if he resisted, to strangle him with the noose. Louis expressed himself much edified by the recital and in equal admiration of the audacity of the projector of such a scheme; and Baldichino was sent back with a present of horses and birds.

Another interesting trait of the King is preserved. When Louis unsuccessfully besieged Treviso in 1357, the Count of Collalto had served under him with great distinction, and it is to the sagacity of that Prince that the Count's subsequent line of politics was thought to be due. "I have an esteem for you, Collalto," said the King to him one day, after his retreat to Buda; "remember the advice which I am going to offer. Never be guilty of quarrelling with neighbours who are more powerful than yourself, under the hope of being assisted by a distant ally. It is quite as dangerous as having your house on fire, while water is out of reach." The Count perceived the wisdom of the aphorism, and from that hour attached himself firmly to Venice.¹

The late reconciliation was of the shallowest and most time-serving kind. Events succeeded which shewed how readily the smothered flame might be rekindled. Carrara, restless, turbulent, wantonly aggressive, shortly commenced the erection of two fortresses: one on the Bacchiglione, which debouches into the Adriatic near Chioggia, the second on the Brenta in the direction of the capital itself. To the former he gave the name of Castelcarro: the latter was christened Castelnovo.² The step, which was fairly interpreted by the

¹ Smedley's *Sketches from Venetian History*, 1831, vol. i. p. 288.

² And. Gataro, Murati xvii. 60-1.

Signory as an implied or constructive menace, gave deep offence. But no explanation was demanded, and no notice was directed to the circumstance, beyond the creation as a counterpoise of a similar work of defence at Lizza-Fusina, in the vicinage of San Ilario. At this natural precaution the Lord of Padua was immoderately incensed. He angrily declared that Lizza-Fusina was within his boundary; and he protested that the Venetians had no right to establish fortified lines at that point. Unable to procure redress, Carrara lost no time in strengthening his position by adding to the defences of Saracinissa, Santa-Croce, and other places; and a tendency on the part of the two States to drift into war became more and more apparent (1360). The embroilment, however, was saved from reaching a critical stage by an almost mutual backwardness to resume the offensive under present auspices. The Republic, harassed by pecuniary difficulties, and too full of the reminiscences of 1358, was not disposed, in the absence of the severest provocation, to draw the sword in such a cause. Carrara, viewing with uneasiness the projects of the Visconti, was dissuaded, on calm reflection, from entangling himself, till a better opportunity offered, in a quarrel which might not impossibly eventuate in an alliance between Venice and Milan and in a partition of the Padovano. The Government of his Serenity gratified its spleen by ordering the Paduan delegates, who had been sent to parley about the point in agitation, to quit the Dogado: while the Carrarese, once more fixing on his visage the mask which he had partly raised, nursed in moody silence his deferred vengeance, and contentedly allowed the debt of hatred to accumulate.

The evacuation of Dalmatia under the treaty of February 1358 naturally enhanced in the eyes of the Republic the value of those dominions which she still retained. At the close in 1339 of the war against the Scaliger, a treaty of partition was concluded; and the Trevisano was allotted to Venice. The validity of that treaty had never yet been disputed. The legitimacy of that cession was still unimpeached. But recent events left the Signory in a nice and sceptical humour. A delicate question arose in her mind, whether there might not be some flaw in the title of La Scala, of whom by a legal figment she pretended to hold. It was thought possible that the original usurpation of the Duke of Verona carried

with it a heritable taint; and it was determined to seek a new investiture at the hands of Charles IV., with whom sufficiently amicable relations had been hitherto maintained. The notions, which were received in that age of the law of possession, were here contemplated in a strained form and through a feverish medium. The spirit of feudalisation had seldom been presented under a more curious phase, and the theory of capital tenure had rarely been illustrated in a more singular manner, than when the envoys waited upon his Majesty to prefer the request. Charles did not choose to wound the sensibility of his visitors by a flat and churlish refusal; but he foiled them by annexing to compliance with their prayer certain exorbitant demands, which amounted to the same result. Thus the Republic compromised her dignity, and committed herself in the eyes of her Trevisan subjects, without serving in the remotest degree her material interests in the desired quarter. The right of conquest was the basis on which she had founded her occupation of the March down to the present date, and it was one which was thoroughly consonant with the spirit of the times. It was this basis and that right, upon which she was now obliged to fall back. The whole affair of the embassy, whether it originated with the Quarantia, the Decemvirs, or the Doge himself, appears to have been an error of sense or judgment. It was only hard to say whether Venice in giving the Emperor the vantage-ground, or the Emperor in neglecting to seize it, was guilty of the greater indiscretion.

The Doge Dolfino, the short annals of whose reign had been uniformly calamitous, did not live to witness any new troubles which the signs of the times might prognosticate (July 11, 1361).¹ Dolfino, a true soldier at heart, was known as one of the most consistent members of the War-Party. He was aware to the full extent how ample and elastic were the resources of his country. He was always averse from any measure dictated by unworthy motives, which tended to sully her honour or to sacrifice her prestige; and it was with almost insuperable reluctance and with the acutest pain, that he had put his seal to the lamentable treaty of 1358.

To the throne vacated by him no fewer than four competitors aspired.² The Conclave was debating the rival claims,

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, 644.

² Caresinus, 438.

when a rumour was circulated in the courtyard of the Palace, that Lorenzo Celsi, recently appointed Captain of the Gulf, had made prize of some Genoese corsairs on the Cretan coast.¹ A popular expedient was thus suggested to the Forty-one of solving the difficulty under which they were labouring; and, setting aside all the names before them, they enthusiastically accorded their votes to the triumphant Celsi (July 16, 1361).² The reported victory over the pirates was in due course discovered to be a hoax.³ It was a piece of intelligence, which some of the Doge's political supporters had probably fabricated for the purpose of tickling the popular ear. But there was more than one account on which the College did not choose to stultify itself; and the somewhat droll incident, which had led to the election, was not suffered to affect its validity.

The successor of Dolfino was fifty-three years of age;⁴ and his father, Marco Celsi, a venerable and respected patrician, was still living. Celsi had been at one time Podesta of Treviso, and he was a distinguished officer of the Navy. But he was principally known as a gallant and dashing captain of cavalry, in which capacity he had won considerable renown during the recent Hungarian war. His latest employment was as a member of the embassy to Charles IV. a year or two before. Raffaello Caresino, who was Celsi's Chancellor, describes him as a magnanimous and patriotic personage;⁵ but he is said to have been of an imperious and haughty temper. A fondness for animals and birds formed one of his characteristic traits. In horse exercise he particularly delighted; and he prided himself on the possession of the finest stud in Venice.⁶ It was on horseback that he made his entry into that capital on the 21st August 1361, and the twelve noblemen who composed his train were also mounted. Almost immediately after the change in the Government, a vacancy occurred in the Procuratorial department; it was supplied by the appointment of Lorenzo's father.⁷

Contrary to the practice which obtained at some other courts of this age, it was the etiquette of that of Venice that all should uncover in the presence of the Throne. To such

¹ Sanudo, fol. 653-4.

³ Sanudo, fol. 654.

⁵ Caresinus contemp., 423; Dolfino, *Annali*, p. 71, King's MSS. 149.

⁶ Sanudo, fol. 660.

⁷ Sansovino, *Cronica Veneto*, edit. 1663, *ad annum*.

² Caresinus contemp. fol. 428.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 660.

an observance the elder Celsi felt, under the peculiar circumstances, an instinctive repugnance.¹ He argued that the primary law of nature made the child inferior to the parent. In the prince he saw only the son, whom he had nurtured and from whom he conceived himself entitled to expect reverence; and he sturdily resisted all invitations to conform to the secondary law of comity. Hereupon Lorenzo devised a felicitous expedient, which at once saved his father's scruples and vindicated his own dignity. In the centre of the berretta he inserted a small carved image of the Passion;² and Marco was persuaded to pay to the wearer of a crucifix the homage which he had denied to the wearer of a crown.³

The early days of Celsi were days of rejoicing in honour of two great personages, who paid visits to the Capital in the course of the same year. The first was the Duke of Austria, who arrived at Michaelmas. On learning his approach overland, and his friendly intentions being ascertained, the Signory dispatched to Treviso a sufficient number of gala-barges to bring him and his numerous cavalcade down the Silis so far as San Giacomo Del Palude, at which point it had been arranged that the Doge, with a suitable train of senators and patricians, should meet his Highness in the Bucentaur. The Duke entered Venice on the 29th September,⁴ accompanied by no fewer than two hundred gentlemen-at-arms and thirty noblemen of his court, and bringing in his suite two of the three members of the Legation to Germany in 1358, Marco Cornaro and Giovanni Gradenigo, who had been detained on their homeward route without his cognisance by the Castellan of Tench, in retaliation for certain injuries inflicted upon him during the Hungarian war, and for whose enlargement their Government had vainly interceded. The new-comers were accommodated in the vacant palaces of Leonardo Dandolo, Duke of Candia, and Andrea Zane, Podesta of Treviso,⁵ both of which were at San Luca on the Grand Canal. Their stay extended to six days.⁶ Celsi conducted his distinguished guest to all the noteworthy objects of his metropolis. His

¹ Dolfino, *Annali*, p. 71, King's MSS. 149.

² This reminds us of the leaden figure of the Virgin, which Louis XI. wore in his cap or *barette*—the Venetian berretta.

³ Sanudo, 654–655. A precedent and parallel case may be found in Aulus Gellius, Beloc's transl. i. 100.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 654.

⁵ Sanudo, 655.

⁶ *Ibid.*

own matchless stud was hardly overlooked; and the noble pair were seldom seen except on horseback. On the fifth of the following December,¹ Pierre de Lusignan, King of Cyprus and Jerusalem, reached the Lagoon by sea. His Majesty was similarly fêted. At his departure, on the 27th of the month,² Lusignan was escorted by the Doge to Malghera. The King was contemplating the organization of a new crusade, and he afterward bent his steps toward Avignon,³ in the hope that he might create in the breasts of the French monarch and his Holiness a more favourable impression than he had been able to create on the Government of his Serenity, which was in no humour for incurring fresh financial responsibilities in any visionary undertaking.

Yet the collective cost of these two celebrations was computed at 10,000 ducats;⁴ and there were members of the War Party who might reasonably ask why, if the Republic was really capable of launching into such expenditure upon comparative frivolities, she was so lately required to accept a peace which weakened her moral and material influence over a hundred leagues of the Illyrian coast, and to sign a treaty, the remembrance of which ate like a canker into the heart of the late Doge Dolfino, and hastened his end? But the same inquiry might have been repeated during the career of the Republic at least a hundred times. Such ceremonial observances formed part of her system, and the outlay was often, to a large extent, borne by private individuals or by one of the sections of the *Compagnia della Calza*. Yet sumptuary laws were published at intervals, enjoining retrenchment in all directions, if not enforcing it.

Venice was no longer mistress of Dalmatia and the Illyric Islands. But she was mistress of vast material resources, and of the finest marine and most solid government in the world. Her constitutional stability and centralisation were to Genoa untranslatable enigmas. Her naval strength was a glorious faculty, which Louis of Hungary coveted in vain. If she was true to herself, she was a match for combined Europe. There was no Power which was exhausted with so much difficulty, or which rallied with such astonishing rapidity and ease. No adversity shook her courage. She succumbed sometimes

¹ Sanudo, 655.

³ Froissart, by Berners, edit. 1872, i. 275.

² Sanudo, *ubi supra*.

⁴ Sanudo, 655.

indeed; but from every fall she rose with renewed vigour. Even to her contemporaries she was a riddle and a paradox; and her political philosophy was a sort of occult science. The craft and subtlety of her statesmen were new in modern history; and, in common with all novelties in human combinations, they were thought by some to carry a certain heretical taint. They thus met a liberal share of detraction and scepticism; but they received a still more ample share of encomium. The ignorant decried them, the speculative admired them, the judicious studied them.

It was a fine spectacle, and one of which Venice herself was the great archetype, in which a purely maritime State, hardly yet recognised as a country, setting aside its national traditions and specialities, was seen to collect its troops, to instil into the militiamen of the Six Wards and Chioggia the same martial enthusiasm, which inspired the souls of the archers of England and the halberdiers of the Rhine, and to meet in the battlefield the first military Power in Christendom and the greatest of the Magyar kings.

The Signory, sensible of a humiliating check, but not enfeebled, far less subdued, now seemed left, however, in the enjoyment of tranquillity. With Genoa and Hungary she was at peace, and the Genoese counter-revolution of November 1356, in producing a breach with the Visconti, broke a dangerous coalition. Her differences with the Scaligers touching the navigation of the Po were adjusted (July 3, 1362). Her quinquennial treaty of commerce with Constantinople was renewed (March 15, 1362). Her rupture with Carrara was amicably closed, and the troublesome litigation regarding the proprietorship of San Ilario had been permitted to terminate in a compromise (July 6, 1363). With Tartary, Egypt, and other European or Asiatic States, whose manifold wants were the sinews of her trade and of their financial welfare, her relations had never been more firmly established. In the Levant, her position was strengthened by a matrimonial alliance (August 19, 1363) between the Doge's daughter and the son of the Hereditary Duke of the Archipelago.

It was so far, therefore, at an auspicious point of time and at a juncture rendered favourable by the absence of other

pressing affairs, that the long foreshadowed troubles in Candia broke out at last.¹

Candia, since the epoch of its imperfect subjugation by the Signory, had been the peculiar seat of political distempers. Of late years, instances of open rebellion had become somewhat more rare. But the radical feeling of discontent and reckless hankering after change were by no means allayed: while the sources of domestic feuds and dissensions, so far from having decreased, had multiplied. To the malevolence which the Candiots had always entertained toward Colonia Venetorum were superadded the fierce hatred and jealousy which had recently arisen between the latter as followers of the Latin ritual and the former as disciples of the Byzantine communion. The Calergi and other Greek families, which had established themselves in the island during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, carried with them all the vices, without many of the virtues, of their countrymen. They shewed themselves for the most part exclusive, insolent, intolerant, and bloodthirsty. They were perpetually plotting or conniving at plots; and they had in an eminent degree the itch of intrigue. They prostituted their influence, which was collectively large, to the fomentation of discord and party-spirit. Many of them were revolutionary propagandists and phrenzied agitators, who organized themselves into secret societies, at the meetings of which the measures of the Ducal government were advisedly misconstrued and its motives malignantly traduced. Unhappily, these Clubs were not exclusively composed of Greeks or Candiots. Among their most active members they counted several Venetian malcontents, who had caught the dangerous infection, and who seem to have had at least this reasonable ground of complaint, that they were refused the voice and share in the local government, which they would as a matter of course have enjoyed at home. Among these accessories were Tito Veniero, an officer of the navy, who had been violently piqued at the preference shown to Donato Dandolo in a recent promotion, his brother Teodoretto, several members of the Gradenigo family, Francesco Mudazzo, Michele Faliero, and many others who, from more or less personal motives, were unceasing in their declamatory efforts

¹ Letter of Petrarch to Fra Bonaventure, *Opera*, 1501: *Epist. Senilium*, ix. lib. 4; Dolfino, *Annali*, p. 72, King's MSS. 149.

to infuse into the rest their own desire of independence. Nevertheless, in the instructions sent so recently as 1353 from headquarters for the government of the Duke and other administrators, liberality of treatment and an avoidance of friction or jealousy are particularly prescribed, and equality of civil rights between Christians and Jews is laid down. A great deal of care and tact was requisite in dealing with a mixed population, where the Christian element was mainly a Greek one.

The proximate cause of the insurrection, which had for some time been ripening and gathering to a head, was a tax, which the Duke Leonardo Dandolo had been advised to levy on the proprietors for the repair of the port and docks at Canea. Against this legitimate impost the Venieri, Gradenigi, Calergi, and others, raised a vehement outcry; and it was to no purpose that they were warned to beware of the consequences of disorderly proceedings. They demanded, in language which could not be mistaken, permission to send a deputation of twenty sages to Venice, who might lay their grievance at the foot of the throne; the sole alternative was open revolt. Upon the delivery of this virtual challenge, one of the Privy Council of the Duke inconsiderately twitted the bearers of the message with a doubt of the existence of so many wise men among their body; no attempt at conciliation or calm reasoning was vouchsafed; and that insulting taunt gave, as it were, unity of form to an agglomeration of volcanic atoms. There was an instantaneous call to arms. The Palace was assailed by a furious rabble, whose efforts were directed by numerous ringleaders. The solid strength of that edifice mocked indeed every attempt to force a passage through the gates; but an entry was effected from the roofs of the contiguous buildings. The confusion and dismay were excessive. Tito Veniero, pitching his voice in the highest key, was heard among the crowd shouting: *Muora Il Traditore!* It was without any success that Dandolo, preserving his collected demeanour, commanded the insurgents to disperse, and threatened recusants with the penalties of the law; the uproar increased; the Palace was soon in the hands of the malcontents and their partisans; and the Duke and two of his Councillors, who were in attendance, had the narrowest escape from being torn piecemeal by a rabid mob. By the strenuous exertions of some of

their friends they were conveyed, however, to places of security.¹

Candia was now a prey to disorder. There was a panic throughout the island. All occupations were suspended. The loyal Venetians, merchants, civil functionaries, mariners, operatives, who thronged on hearing the tumult to rally round the Duke, only came to find themselves the victims of premeditated treason and the inmates of dungeons. They were overpowered, seized, and incarcerated.² Even a worse fate awaited some who had remained in seclusion at their country villas and who had stood altogether aloof. They were dragged from their places of retirement by the Greeks, and massacred in cold blood. The house of Andrea Cornaro at Mopsila, of Gabriello Veniero at Pulea, of Marino and Lorenzo Pasqualigo at Melissa, of Lorenzo Gritti at Pestria, as well as the dwellings of Zanachi Giustiniani, Leonardo Abramo, and numerous others, were entered by the minions of the Calergi, who butchered the proprietors, and pillaged the premises.³ It was a reign of terror.

The revolt spread with electric rapidity. Canea, Rettimo, Sitia, and other fortified points, rose against the constituted authorities.⁴ The capital itself was confided to Tito Veniero; and a new general government, under the auspices of Marco Gradenigo *detto* Bajardo, was proclaimed. The Rebels consummated their flagitious crime by pulling down from all the flagstuffs the Lion of Saint Mark and by substituting the banner of San Tito, the guardian-saint of the Candiots.

Meanwhile, the Executive at home had been placed in possession of all the facts. It was naturally loth to commit the Republic to a new colonial war, until it had convinced itself that milder expedients were of no virtue; and two numerous and influential deputations were accordingly dispatched to remind the Candiots of the uniform kindness which they had experienced at the hands of the Signory, to impress upon them that the tax, of which they complained as an undue hardship, was designed exclusively for their own benefit, and might therefore in fairness be exclusively borne by themselves, and to inculcate upon them the fatuity of resistance. The chief of the second legation, the Procurator Andrea

¹ De Monacis, fol. 88, Add. MSS. 8574.

³ Sanudo, *Vite*, 656.

² *Ibid.*, fol. 88.

⁴ De Monacis, fol. 86.

Contarini, whose commission was dated the 12th of September 1363, carried letters-patent from his Serenity to the principal landowners and feudatories, as well as secret instructions to the Duke and his local representatives. In a dispatch addressed to Vettore Pisani, Governor of Canea, that functionary was emphatically enjoined to use his best co-operation, if it became unavoidable, in the coercion and chastisement of the rioters. This gentle and reiterated appeal of the mother-country in the interest of peace was lost upon hearers deafened to reason by a few deceptive successes. The recollections and admonitions of the Government were alike ridiculed; its clemency was spurned; and Contarini and his associates executed their mission at the imminent hazard of their lives.

The Signory, perceiving that her pacific advances were slighted and abused, proceeded forthwith to alter her tactics and to shift her ground. She saw that harsher measures were indispensable; and such measures were soon in a forward state of preparation.

The necessary troops, 1000 picked cavalry and 2000 picked foot from Lombardy and the Romagna, had been procured. A squadron of thirty-three galleys, independently of transports, was almost complete in its equipments. A circular¹ was sent to several European Powers—among others to Louis of Hungary, Joan of Naples, and the Genoese—praying them to abstain from lending the rebels any countenance or aid; and this demand was met on all sides by an affirmative response. The choice of a generalissimo appears to have constituted a source of some perplexity, till Petrarch, who was now sojourning at Venice, suggested the great Veronese condottiero, Luchino del Verme, whose acquaintance he had formed at the court of Visconti;² and the poet was asked to second the invitation of the Government to his distinguished friend. Petrarch wrote accordingly,³ and Del Verme was appointed (March 1364). Shortly after his arrival, the General reviewed the mercenaries on the Piazza. The expedition started from Lido on the 10th April, accompanied

¹ De Monacis, fol. 87, Add. MSS. Brit. Mus. 8574.

² On the 1st April 1364, we find Petrarch writing to Del Verme from Padua concerning "quæ summo duci sint necessaria," *Epist. Senilium*, lib. iv. epist. 1. It was for this eminent soldier that he wrote the Treatise *De Officio et Virtutibus Imperatoris*; *Opera*, 1501.

³ This letter is not in the folio of 1501; but there is an allusion to it in one written to Fra Bonaventura on the 7th December 1363, from Venice.

by a new Governor, Pietro Morosini; but it was not till the 7th May¹ that Del Verme and his 3000 forestieri, having sailed day and night, reached Fraschia, seven miles from Canea.²

In this interval, several potent agencies had been concurring to breed disunion among the insurgents, and to produce a tendency toward a counter-revolution. Many of the Venetian renegades, weighing the chances of success against the chances of failure, and finding that the latter preponderated, began to stand shyly aloof and to speak of a return to loyalty. Many who were no lovers of bloodshed were disgusted and alienated by the barbarous excesses of the Greeks, who were animated by a rabid Caloyer, named Miletos.³ Others, appreciating the hopelessness of the prospect, counselled a tender of the island and their own liberty to Genoa; and such an offer was actually (May 1, 1364) made to that commonwealth in the name of the Calergi and other political visionaries and fanatics. Comparatively few of the ringleaders, who had implicated themselves, perhaps, too deeply to recede, continued to propagate their inflammatory doctrines; but they succeeded in retaining in their service a considerable number of adherents by persuading the latter that their situation was not less desperate and forlorn than their own. When the fleet arrived at Fraschia, however, in the first week of May, the cause of disaffection had sustained from schisms and secessions both moral and material damage.

The success of the Condottiero answered the most sanguine expectations of Petrarch and his other admirers. After an obstinate but brief resistance, Canea was the first to yield; and the example of the capital was contagious. The other places in the island hastened for the most part to offer their submission; and a few fastnesses only in the more inaccessible districts remained. Tito Veniero and his brother fled to Stromboli, the sequestered retreat of the Calergi; but the bulk of the insurgents took refuge in Scio, where they believed themselves safe from pursuit. Leonardo Gradenigo and Zanacho da Rizo fell into the hands of Del Verme or his officers, and were decapitated on the spot. Giovanni and Pietro Gradenigo were massacred by the country-folk. A

¹ Lorenzo de Monacis, fol. 88 *et seq.*, Add. MSS. Brit. Mus. 8574; Dolfino, *Annali*, p. 72 *et seq.*, King's MSS. 149.

² De Monacis, fol. 89, Add. MSS. Brit. Mus. 8574.

³ Lebeau, xx. 415.

price was set upon the heads of those who were known to be lurking in concealment.

"It was on the 4th June," Petrarch, again at Venice, writes to his friend Pietro Bolognese, rhetorician, under date of the 11th August 1364,¹ "at about the sixth hour of the day, as I was standing at my window enjoying the prospect of the open sea, in company with my old frate, the present Archbishop of Patras, that one of the vessels which they call galleys enters the mouth of the port under full play of oars, and arrests our conversation. We at once augur good news of some sort or other. The masts of the ship are garlanded with flowers, and on the deck we can just discern youths of a gladsome countenance crowned with green branches, who are flourishing flags over their heads, and saluting their country as yet ignorant of the truth. An innocent impulse of curiosity brings the whole City down to the sea-shore.² As we draw nearer to the object, we see hostile standards trailing from the poop in the water, and it becomes impossible to doubt that the galley is a herald of victory. When the ambassador steps out of the vessel, the facts speedily transpire. The enemy has been conquered, slain, captured, put to flight; the citizens of the Republic have been rescued; the cities have returned to obedience, the yoke has been again riveted on Crete; the victorious sword has been sheathed. The Doge Lorenzo, called truly *Celsi*, a man who, unless my partiality for him blinds me, is for his magnanimity, the suavity of his manners, his study of virtue, and, above all, his singular piety and warmth of affection, worthy of all commemoration, has ordered, before all other things, a thanksgiving to God."

Petrarch proceeds to describe the religious ceremonies in the Basilica, "than which," he says, "nothing, as I conceive, could be finer. Not only the native clergy, the Government, the people, but foreign prelates and notabilities who are attracted or detained here, were present." Spiritual duties having been discharged, festivities succeeded. The crowd was stupendous; there was not an inch of ground unoccupied. "Yet," he tells Bolognese, "there was no confusion, no tumult, no ill-humour; all was agreeable, joyous, and smooth. There

¹ *Epistola ad Petrum Bononiensem rhetorem, de Victoriâ Venetorum: Epistolarum Senilium*, lib. iv. ep. 3; *Opera*, 1501.

² "Ad littus e tota urbe accursum erat."—*Epist. ubi supra*.

was a magnificence without any breach of decorum or of sobriety of behaviour. The games were held on the Square of Saint Mark, to which I question whether the world can shew anything at all equal." Of Tommaso Babasio, a Ferrarese, who had come to take part in the tournaments, and who afterward won the second prize,¹ the poet writes:—"Babasio who, to make him known to posterity—if indeed among them my name preserve any lustre, or my word any credit—is to-day in Venice what Roscius was in the olden times at Rome; to me he is as dear as was the other to Cicero."

"All classes, all ages, all professions," continues Petrarch, "were here to be seen. None was wanting. The Doge himself and an enormous assemblage of persons viewed the sports from an elevated platform in front of the church of Saint Mark, near the spot where the four bronze gilt Horses of ancient and excellent workmanship (whoever the author may have been) are placed. I myself, invited as a guest, sat on the right hand of the Doge, and to screen the spectators from the heat and glare of the summer sun, an awning was spread over the stand. After the second day, I grew weary of the sights, and absented myself on the well-understood plea that I was too busy to attend."

The galley had arrived with its welcome tidings after a swift passage of eighteen days. The popular joy was effervescent. To the victorious general, whom, in a letter dated the 11th June 1364,² Petrarch hails as "the Cretan Metellus or the Veronese Scipio," a pension of 1000 ducats was accorded. A triduan jubilee was decreed. "The jousts," says Sanudo,³ "were held on the Piazza; but the festive boards were laid out in the mansion of the late Andrea Dandolo at San Luca on the Grand Canal." The King of Cyprus was at this point of time returning to his dominions from France through Venice. Lusignan was persuaded to participate in the tournament; and he tilted with Luchino's son, Jacopo del Verme.⁴ We hear that certain noblemen from the parts of Britain, kinsmen or comrades of the king, were of the company, having arrived by chance.

¹ Mutinelli, *Annali*, 176.

² "Ad L. del Verme gratulatio velocis incrementæque victoriæ," *Epist. Sen.*, lib. iv. ep. 2; *Opera*, 1501.

³ Sanudo, fol. 659.

⁴ *Ibid.* "The first prize," says Mutinelli, *ubi supra*, "was awarded to Pasqualino Minotto, a Venetian, the second, to the Ferrarese Babasio."

By the athletic exercises and manly sports, in which the citizens of Venice delighted and excelled, Petrarch was particularly edified and charmed. For they denoted a chivalrous spirit, which the laureate had deemed almost foreign to the Venetian character. The passages of arms on the Rialto demonstrated to him that the great people, among whom he had spent so many happy days, were no strangers to the martial predilections of the epoch, or to the generous and widespread influence of the Crusades. They served to convince the poet that there were seasons, at which the Ziani and the Tiepoli could wake from the day-dream of sordid commercialism, and forget the current rates of exchange on the Broglio or the price of Egyptian wheat; and when the members of the oldest aristocracy in Europe, encasing in steel their stalwart forms, could hold the lists against all comers.

But this glorification proved, after all, sadly premature. The breath of disaffection in Candia had been shortened, but it was not stifled. The Venetian ingredient in the rebellion was now comparatively small and insignificant; but the two Venieri and a few others still remained in the field; while the Calergi and the rest of the Greeks felt that they had too weighty interests at stake, or too slender a chance of mercy, to abandon lightly their high though insecure ground. Their policy and desire were to withdraw their island from the spiritual dominion of Rome and from the temporal sway of Venice; and they no sooner rallied from the somewhat staggering blow which the desertion or defeat of their Venetian accomplices had given to their courage, than they prepared, in concert with the brothers Venieri, to erect once more the standard of revolt.

The Republic perceived with inexpressible vexation that her Sisyphean task was about to recommence. But the second act of the terrible drama was conducted on a different plan. Fresh troops were shipped, and fresh provveditors were appointed (March 15, 1365). The most rigorous measures and the most unsparing severity were sanctioned. The voice, which had at first studiously modulated itself to accents of persuasion, awakened in tones of thunder. The rebels were hemmed in and beleaguered by land and sea. Francesco and Antonio Gradenigo, Teodoretto Veniero, and Marco Avonal,

were captured and beheaded. The revival failed at every point. Sitia submitted (August 13, 1365). All the other haunts of treason and sedition were again recovered. Finally, on the 12th April 1366, fell Anopoli, the last refuge and hope of the insurgents; and Georgius and Johannes Calergi and Tito Veniero, who were found crouching and huddled together in a cave, were sent to the block. At the same time, the Executive Government of Candia was placed on an altered footing. Her walls were dismantled. Her strongholds were demolished. Every vestige of fortification was obliterated. Experience had taught the Republic that her best guarantee for the preservation of the colony lay in the defencelessness of the landowners and native nobility, and that the risk of external aggression was trivial in comparison with the danger arising from internal distempers.

The increase of population in the old world and the discovery of new continents have combined in our own time to introduce radical changes into the colonizing theory and system. To the Greeks their colonies had been little more than maritime stations. The Romans regarded theirs in the light of military outposts. From the Venetian point of view, a distant settlement was simply a trading depot with a garrison and a governor, or with a consul and a consular staff. The modern principle and policy lay outside their comprehension and their grasp; nor would it have suited the conditions of Venetian political life. The first men who carried into practice what we know as colonization were the planters whom England sent to Ulster and New Plymouth, and whom the Dutch Republic sent to Surinam, to Guiana, North America, and the Cape. In the case of Venice, territorial absorption, the actual proprietorship of the soil, was an impossibility. A command of the seaboard, access to the interior, and a seigniorial title were the utmost at which such a Power could prudently aim. The man who quitted the lagoons to settle in Candia, in Corfu, or in Zara, differed from the English colonist in Virginia or the Boer in New Amsterdam as much as the youth who now emigrates to Melbourne or to Natal differs from the early backwoodsman of the Swan River or the first Californian gold-digger. So far, however, as the retention of a more or less firm and permanent hold on their distant possessions went, the Venetians

were placed in a far more favourable position than many of those nations or Powers which had preceded or lived side by side with them. For the maintenance of a naval force available for any emergency was in their case a two-fold need, and entered into their commercial system as well as into their political interest.

The extinction of the Great Cretan Rebellion of 1364-5-6 was shortly preceded by the death of Lorenzo Celsi, which had occurred quite suddenly on the evening of Friday, the 18th July 1365.¹ Celsi was in his fifty-seventh year. In person he was tall and athletic and of a robust constitution. He appears to have been not less passionately fond of falconry than of riding. He often, too, whiled away a spare morning at the Mint, where he amused himself by watching the coining process. He was liberal to profusion and princely in his tastes.² His disposition was not less aspiring than generous; and it was with unfeigned disgust and intolerance that he viewed the consistency of aim with which the Oligarchy had stealthily robbed the Ducal prerogative of its primitive amplitude. By nature the son of the Procurator Marco was as open and reckless as he was tempestuously choleric; the conditions of the coronation-oath were repeatedly set at nought; and the Doge cared not to disguise his intention of carrying his reforms beyond the arrangement of his bonnet or the etiquette of his court. The notice of the Ten was unavoidably drawn to the constitutional anomalies and irregularities, of which the Head of the State was constantly guilty; and it seems that a serious inquisition into the matter was already meditated, when the object of suspicion was so abruptly removed by death.³ It was then thought inexpedient to pursue the matter any farther, and the entries in their minutes relative to this singular affair were subsequently ordered by the Decemvirs to be cancelled.⁴ On the 30th July 1365, the Ten decreed that the new Doge shall be bound "to declare publicly at the first meeting of the Council that his predecessor was unjustly accused after his death of offences committed against the honour of the Commune of Venice, which charges upon

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, 660.

² *Ibid.*, *ubi supra*.

³ Nota che, se non moriva Lorenzo Celsi Doge, il quale avea 57 anni, e avea Dogato anni 4, faceva la fine di Marino Faliero Doge, come ho veduto in una Cronica antica scritta.—Sanudo, *Vite*, 661.

⁴ Romanin, iii. 251-2.

examination *had proved to be false!*" The precise character of the charges is not found stated.

Three days after, that Marco Cornaro who had acquired celebrity ten years before by his leading participation in the Faliero business, was proclaimed his successor (Monday, July 21, 1365).

CHAPTER XXV

A.D. 1365-1378

Petrarch—His Bequest to the Republic (1362)—Liking of Petrarch for Venice and the Venetians—His Opinions about the Averroesian School of Philosophy—His Adventure with an Atheist—Short Administration of Cornaro (1365-8)—Incipient Backwardness of Venice to fight against the Turks and its political Cause—Person and Character of Cornaro—His Death (Jan. 13, 1368)—Continued Decline of the Ducal Authority—Constitutional Changes—Andrea Contarini, Doge (Jan. 20, 1368)—Singular Episode connected with his Election—Difference with Trieste (1368)—Alliance between Trieste, Austria, and Aquileia—Defeat of the Austrian Army by the Venetians under Taddeo Giustiniani (Nov. 10, 1369)—Submission of Trieste (Nov. 18)—Treaty between Venice and Trieste (Nov. 28)—Peace between Venice and Austria (Oct. 20, 1370)—Fresh Breach with Francesco da Carrara (1371-2)—Discovery of a Carrarese Conspiracy at Venice (May 1372)—War with Carrara (November)—Coalition between the latter and Louis of Hungary—Treaty of 1373, by which Carrara pays the Expenses of the War—Scarcity of Money at Venice—Interest at 20 per cent.—Death of Petrarch (July 18, 1374)—Venice at Peace (1373-6)—Improvement of her Relations with England and other Countries—Formation of a Secret League between Hungary, Naples, Padua, Genoa, Aquileia, Austria, and Ancona against the Republic—Introductory War with Austria (1376)—The Venetians make Sacrifices to obtain Peace (October 1378)—First Employment of Cannon by the Venetians in this War—Sir John Hawkwood—Quarrels with Genoa (1373-6)—Preparations of Venice for War (1379).

IN the course of the passed few years, Petrarch had paid three or four visits to the metropolis. One of the latest occasions, on which he honoured the city with his presence, was in June 1362, the year of the plague.¹ In its ravages the epidemic had been devious and sporadic; Venice herself enjoyed at present an exemption from the scourge; and thither consequently came the laureate, in search of repose, from Padua, which had been already attacked. He was a lover of literature, and possessed what was then considered a liberal tincture of antiquarian lore. His collection of books, which

¹ The letter of Petrarch to Boccaccio, dated Venice, 8th September (1363), refers to this event. It is entitled, "*Ad Joannem Boccacium de hâc peste ultimè atatis, et astrologorum nugis,*" and occupies nearly ten closely-printed columns of the folio of 1501, *Epistolarum Senilium*, lib. iii. ep. 1. Petrarch returned to Venice on the 24th January 1366.

was acquired more frequently by donation than by purchase, had insensibly accumulated; in the estimation of the bibliomaniacs of that age, his library ranked high; and it afforded him a constant source of comfort and amusement. But, on the other hand, it was an unceasing care. He was in perpetual dread of losing his treasures by some unlucky fire, by damp, or by dry-rot; and as he grew older and feebler in health, he became solicitous of finding some repository, where they might be placed beyond the reach of all such casualties. In a conversation which he had once had with Giovanni Boccaccio, he spoke of bequeathing his acquisitions to some religious fraternity; but that notion had been abandoned, and a new idea suggested itself, upon which he formed a resolution forthwith to act. He determined to bestow some of them—possibly the choicest—upon the Venetians, and to reserve the rest for the present in his own hands. The aggregate was, as we are led to infer, by no means numerous; but the era had not yet arrived for the formation of extensive or systematic collections. Having communicated on the subject with the Government of Lorenzo Celsi, he announced that, if safe and suitable accommodation was provided for his books, and the Signory entered into an engagement to abstain from selling or dispersing them, he was prepared to confide and bequeath them unreservedly to the Republic. The Procurators of Saint Mark, to whom the point was referred for decision, reported favourably; on the 4th September 1362,¹ the Great Council, in concert with the Forty and the College, decreed the acceptance of the gift on the specified conditions, *in honour and memory of himself* (Petrarch), *and for the delectation of the ingenious and of the Nobles of this city*;² and until a separate receptacle could be set apart for the books, they were provisionally lodged in a loft in the roof of the palace, where the procuratorial³ archives used at that time to be preserved.

In the summer of 1363 Boccaccio joined the laureate, and that illustrious pair spent together delightfully the months of June, July, and August. Petrarch was fond of Venice, and in the main he was partial to the Venetians. He was attached to that insulated oasis by the choiceness of the site, by the sense of security, by the comparative salubrity and freedom

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, 660; Morelli, *Operette*, i. 5.

² Romanin, iii. 227.

³ Morelli, i. 6.

from malaria, by the cheerfulness and amenity of the prospect which he enjoyed from his windows on the Riva degli Schiavoni, by the genial character of the people, and by the constant whirl of pleasurable excitement. "From this port,"¹ he writes, "I see vessels departing which are as large as the house I inhabit,² and which have masts taller than its towers. These ships resemble a mountain floating on the sea; they go to all parts of the world amidst a thousand dangers; they carry our wines to the English, our honey to the Scythians, our saffron, our oils, and our linen to the Syrians, Armenians, Persians, and Arabians; and, wonderful to say, they convey our wood to the Greeks and Egyptians. From all these countries they bring back in return articles of merchandise, which they diffuse over all Europe. They go even as far as the Don. The navigation of our seas does not extend farther north; but when they have arrived there, they quit their vessels, and travel on to trade with India and China; and after passing the Caucasus and the Ganges, they proceed as far as the Eastern Ocean." But the civil freedom of the Venetians he neither understood nor appreciated; he decried it as the wellspring of a licentious and demoralising liberty of thought and speech; and their schools of disputation, which were strongly tainted by the Averroesian tenets, he barely tolerated. "These free-thinkers," he says, "have a great contempt for Christ and His Apostles, as well as for all those who do not bow the knee to the Stagyrite. They call the doctrines of Christianity fables, and hell and heaven the tales of asses." In former days, the philosopher of Arezzo had felt peculiar chagrin when he found that the Signory was not prepared to glorify him as the prince of diplomatists as well as the prince of bards; but he could now afford to smile at the pedantic and puerile flippancy, which solemnly adjudicated the Aristarch of letters³ *a good man, but illiterate*.⁴ Petrarch, at this stage of his life, appears to have occasionally indulged in curious freaks, and to have been betrayed by his prying nature into droll weaknesses; and a diary of his residence on the Riva degli Schiavoni, which was now assigned to his use as the benefactor of the Republic, might have presented some

¹ Campbell, *Life of Petrarch*, ii. 249.

² Sanudo, fol. 775.

³ Campbell, ii. 276.

⁴ *Vita Fr. Petrarce per Hier. Squarzacicum composita*, apud Op. 1501.

interesting details. He dwelled, as he tells us himself, "in the *Two Towers*, where Luca Molin, son of the late Andrea, now lives, and every kind of honour was offered to him, which he declined, because 'nothing was more distasteful to him than pomp.'" ¹ It was here that presumably he received Boccaccio. In one of his letters to the author of the *Decameron*, he retails a protracted dialogue which he had had with a celebrated atheist and blasphemer at Venice. He concludes by narrating how he ejected him from his house.

Boccaccio does not seem to have shared the appreciation of Petrarch of Venice and the Venetians. Not only in the *Decameron*, but other works, he speaks of the Republic in a tone disparaging to its government and manners. He contrasts it unfavourably with Tuscany, and challenges its pretensions to Candia and the sovereignty of the Adriatic. The excellent romancist may have written as he thought; but he was in his own lifetime in a distinct minority, and his friend Petrarch was by no means in agreement with him. But then Petrarch was not a Tuscan.

The administration of Marco Cornaro had during its short continuance in power the gratifying task of pacifying Candia: while the metropolitan improvements, so long suspended, were resumed on a scale and with an activity which were highly creditable to the Government. At the same time, the Republic participated to some slight extent in a new Crusade against the Sultan. But since the rapid aggrandisement of the Hungarian kingdom had threatened to develop such mischievous results, the fact was that Venice began to respect Turkey as a valuable counterpoise and, as it were, barrier to Magyar ambition; and on this account her appetite for Moslem blood was growing much less keen.² So from period to period the views of even the most far-sighted politicians were apt to fluctuate.

Cornaro who, when he mounted the throne, was already an octogenarian, survived till the 13th January 1368. The successor of the magnificent and ambitious Celsi is represented also to have been of a commanding presence,³ though from age slightly stooping in his gait, and of polished and courtly

¹ Molmenti, i. 108.

² Lebeau, xx. ch. 115, edit. 1836.

³ Sanudo, *Vite*, 662: "Fu di gran prudenza, e grande di persona. Avea bella faccia e presenza."

breeding. His worldly means were not large, and he had married a commoner; and these two circumstances, taken into connexion with his very advanced years, had operated so strongly on the minds of some of the Electors in 1365, that out of one-and-forty votes he received only twenty-six. Yet, being the first prince who, after a protracted interval, had been enabled to cultivate with any assiduity the arts of peace, and to promote the material interests of his country, his memory was cherished by the Venetians.

In the last nineteen or twenty years, changes had been wrought in the Constitution almost of equal consequence to those which were effected in the half-century prior to 1339. The times were altered for the better, perhaps, since the First Magistrate of Venice was permitted to enjoy all the latitude and licence of unfettered power, to deride every constitutional restraint, to trample on the liberties of his country, to burn monks for keeping mad dogs, to crush the independent action of the clergy, to raise himself to the throne, polluted perchance by the blood of his predecessor, on the bucklers of an armed faction, to hold his dignity at his pleasure or at their caprice, and, after a lengthened reign, to descend from his curule chair, and to resume the pursuits of horticulture, or by penitent abnegation to soothe the qualms and twinges of a wounded conscience. He was no longer a Unit with cipher Councillors and a slavish Convention; but he was the central figure and pivot of a system, in which he was scarcely a free or independent agent. His hereditary instincts were silenced. His aristocratic attributes were fast becoming mere matters of history or oral tradition. The Idol of Monarchy was thrown down from its ancient pedestal, and in its room was set up that Idol of Oligarchy, which had drunk the blood of a Faliero, and was not very far from demanding the blood of a Celsi.

The innovations which were made in this branch of the Constitution by a cumulative process between 1172 and 1339 may be treated as having been more numerous than important; those which found their way into the Promission from 1339 to 1368 were more remarkable, on the contrary, for their importance than for their number. At various epochs, clauses had been inserted in the Oath, which prescribed vaguely enough, that the Doge should not overstep the legitimate

bound and compass of his jurisdiction, which restrained the corrupt dispensation of justice and patronage, and which narrowed in many particulars the basis of the prerogative, and swept away certain abuses which had furtively crept into the practice of the Throne. But it was reserved for other men and for another generation to declare that¹ the Doge was incapable of renouncing his office without the concurrence of his Privy Council and a majority in the Great Council (1339); which denied his competence to give decisive answers to any one on affairs of State, and to receive foreign envoys (1339), or even his own ambassadors returning from missions abroad (1354), in the absence of a certain proportion of the College; which required that, at the invitation of the Great and Privy Councils, he should be prepared to abdicate within three days under penalty of forfeiture of his property (1365); and that he should dispose of all the family estates upon his accession to power (1368). But it was not merely by the reforms which the Promission itself underwent, that the authority of the Crown was diminished. For the development of the administrative system, and the complete revolution which had been silently accomplished in the Executive government, necessarily operated in the same direction. The Communal Bench (*Giudici del Commune*), the Avogadors, the Criminal Quarantia, the Sages of the *terra firma*, the Board of Trade, the Comptrollers of the Fisc, Mint, and Customs, the Senate, the Chancery, the Committee of War, and lastly, the Council of Ten, tended, each in its respective way, to distribute the power, in the exercise of which the Doge had originally had neither rival nor partner.

A most novel and curious restriction, trenching not so much on the political power of the Doge as on the political freedom of the nobility, was now introduced into practice. This disability, which was directed against the constitutional mischief calculated to arise from a refusal, under an endless variety of subterfuges, to accept the proffered berretta, was not embodied in the Promission of 1368; but it was conceived and exercised for the first time in the case of the Procurator Andrea Contarini, who was chosen by the unanimous suffrages of the Forty-one to replace Cornaro. Contarini, on being apprised of his election by Vettore Pisani² and fifteen other

¹ Romanin, *passim*.

² *Mem. di V. Pisani*, 1767, pp. 30-1.

deputies who came to seek him at his farm at Gambarere, on the Brenta (where he was engaged in grafting his espaliers and tying up his vines), declined to undertake the responsibilities of office, alleging that while he was formerly in business as a merchant in Syria a soothsayer had augured "that if he ever became Doge, Venice in his time would experience untold disasters"; and this represented his third refusal, as he had twice previously gained a majority of suffrages. Nor could he be persuaded to submit, until a more peremptory message, coupled with a hint as to the sequestration of his property in the event of contumacy, had been conveyed to him by one of the Avogadors. The new Doge, who had so reluctantly torn himself from his rural retreat, accompanied the deputation to Chioggia; at that port the august party took gondola for San Clemente, where the Bucentaur was in waiting; and Contarini and his retinue entered Venice amid the joyous acclamations of the people on the afternoon of Monday, the 27th January 1368.

The gloomy presage of the Syrian dervish, which had ostensibly formed the main ground of Contarini's backwardness to assume the reins of government, was not slow to receive what might appear to credulous minds a striking fulfilment. The first year of the new administration was a year of new troubles. The revolt of Candia was closely succeeded by that of Trieste, which had been a Venetian fief and tributary since 1202, but which, at the secret instigation of the Dukes of Austria, had been constantly, though more particularly of late years, attempting to shake off its yoke. It happened in the autumn of 1368, that one of the vessels attached to the Gulf squadron captured and towed into the port of Trieste a local smuggler, laden with salt, which had not paid duty. In the night-time, a successful attempt was made to rescue the contrabandist; and in a deadly fray between some of the inhabitants and the crew of the coastguard vessel, the sopra-comiti of the latter and several other Venetians were killed. This catastrophe made the delinquents tremble for the consequences; the vengeance of the Captain of the Gulf or of the Republic herself was reasonably dreaded; and in anticipation of such a result, the Municipal Council sent simultaneously a demand for pardon to Venice and a prayer for help to the Austrians. The Government, which had long desired to consolidate its

position in this quarter, agreed to overlook the offence upon certain conditions, which Contarini enumerated (August 1368). But, in reply to the note addressed to him, the Duke of Austria earnestly dissuaded the Council from submission, and promised it, in case of necessity, his active and prompt assistance against the Signory. A choice thus lay between two courses; the Council adopted the more hazardous; and Trieste threw itself into the arms of Austria. To get rid of the Venetian envoy was no difficult task. A quibbling objection was raised to the terms which that functionary had brought; he was told that the Council preferred to incur all the risks of a war to the degradation "of hoisting on holidays the Lion of St. Mark"; and, after experiencing the most insulting treatment, he made his exit from the town at the peril of his life. The gross affront offered to the Republic through her representative, and the knowledge of the duplicity of Trieste, hurried the affair to a climax; the mediation of the Emperor Charles was declined; and war became the sole alternative (Sept.—Oct. 1368). In addition to Austrian co-operation, Trieste was soon allowed to look upon Aquileia as an ally.

The hostile operations had commenced late in the year; and nothing of consequence was done till the spring of 1369. The blockade of Trieste was then regularly formed. But the fighting between the Venetians and the Austrians was confined throughout the summer and autumn to harmless and indecisive skirmishes; without a collision, however slight, hardly a day passed. Toward the return of winter, the Aquileian contingent not having yet arrived, the Venetian provveditor thought the season too far advanced to delay any longer in bringing the Austrian commander to an action. On the 10th November,¹ a battle was fought, in which the Austrians were totally defeated with the loss, in officers and persons of quality alone, of 650;² and the moral influence of this stroke, together with the increased pressure of famine and the approach of severe weather, drove the Triestines to a capitulation eight days later (November 18³). On the 28th of the same month,⁴ a treaty was concluded, by virtue of which the Republic was restored to her rights over the city and its district, and the former swore renewed and inviolable fidelity to its legitimate

¹ Caresinus contemp. 423.

³ Caresinus, *ubi supra*.

² Sanudo, *Vite*, 671.

⁴ Caresinus.

suzerain. On the 20th October in the following year, peace was signed between Venice and Austria after a tedious negotiation, by which the latter relinquished for ever all her claims upon Istria, in consideration of the payment of 75,000 ducats by three instalments. To obviate the recurrence of a Triestine insurrection, Venice at once laid the foundations on a commanding site of the castle of San Giusto.

A new breach with Carrara was impending; and the pacification with Austria was consequently opportune. In contemptuous disregard of the reiterated appeals of the Signory, this prince, not less audacious than wily and treacherous, had continued to construct new palisades and earthworks of defence at Oriago and Moranzano toward the lagoons.¹ The Venetians complained of this manifestly hostile and aggressive policy; they felt that these great preparations on the skirts of the Marshes could injure no other Power, and therefore could threaten no other; and they repeatedly urged Carrara to weigh the propriety of a disarmament. But the latter offered nothing but compromises; a few towers merely were dismantled; and, the Government having crushed the Candiot and Triestine seditions, and considering that the Treaty of February 1358 was nullified by the acts of the Lord of Padua himself, determined, in spite of the strenuous opposition of a certain party in the Councils, to postpone no longer the blow, which it had for some time meditated (1371). A circumstance is related which indicates the existence of some collateral provocation. A Venetian, having seduced a married woman of that city, eloped with her to San Ilario; they were pursued; the Podesta of Padua, asserting that San Ilario was within his jurisdiction, ordered the Venetian officer of justice to be decapitated, and the Republic obtained no redress, Carrara justifying the Podesta.²

The requisite measures and financial resolutions were immediately adopted. Fresh proveditors were commissioned; 3000 Venturi were taken into pay; and the first draught of troops had already effected its landing on the prospective theatre of hostilities, when a concerted movement was made among the other Italian Powers, seconded by Hungary, to

¹ *Hist. Cortus., Addit. Secundum*, 983.

² *Hist. Cortus., Addit. Primum*, 965-6; Sanudo, *Itinerario*, 22.

prevail upon the belligerents to submit their disputes to arbitration.

The trick was sufficiently shallow. But Venice, though ready at all points, was unwilling to incur the odium of wantonly flinging away the chance of peace. Carrara, whose preparations were still incomplete, and who was in secret correspondence with Louis on the subject of an Hungarian invasion of the Venetian territories, was only too happy to embrace the prospect of a respite; and an armistice for two months was mutually conceded. The arbitrators, of whom five were Venetians and five were Paduans, wasted their time, however, in idle discussion; the latter appeared to have no other mission in reality but to temporise; and the truce was resultless. The Lord of Padua found himself reduced, nevertheless, to a puzzling predicament; for the expected succour from Hungary had not yet arrived; and Francesco began to be diffident of his capacity to grapple singly with the Power which had so lately crippled Austria and prostrated Trieste. But he was seldom at a loss for expedients. In order to create a diversion for a moment from the Padovano, and to give the Hungarians time to join him, the Carrarese conceived or approved an atrocious design.

There was a certain friar at Venice, named Benedetto, of the Order of Hermits.¹ This ecclesiastic, who appears to have been a man of venal and chicaning character, Carrara made his tool. Benedetto was hired to bribe certain members of the Pregadi and other Councils, and to plan the murder of three patricians, who were thought to be most inimical to Padua, Lorenzo Dandolo, one of the Chiefs of the Forty,² Pantaleone Barbo, and Lorenzo Zane; while his employer sent some bravoes under two confidential agents, Nicolo Vignoso and Bartolomeo da Gratario, to carry out his views, as well as at a suitable opportunity to set fire to the residences of other noblemen more or less antagonistic to his interest, and in the confusion to poniard the proprietors. Vignoso and his accomplices came to Venice without suspicion in the beginning of May 1372, and took up their quarters in different localities, where they were in least danger of being observed; ³ the details of the plot were rapidly shaped and matured; and the dia-

¹ Navagiero, fol. 1053.

² Sanudo, fol. 776.

³ Ibid. fol. 672

bolical scheme was on the eve of execution when, at the last moment, it was frustrated by the revelations of two courtesans,¹ who were cohabiting with some of the bravoës at a house of ill-repute kept by an old procuress² called La Gobba. These women from some paltry motive turned evidence against their paramours; and in the course of the first week in May³ the secret was divulged to the Ten. The informers were detained. Vignoso, Grataro, La Gobba and her son Bartolomeo⁴ who, as it appeared, had been the medium by which the cut-throats were familiarised with the persons of their intended victims, were immediately traced to their haunts; and the truth was wrung from the two former by torture.⁵ The miscreants criminated their employer, and mentioned by name those whom the Carrarese had employed them to corrupt. These were Pietro Bernardo, Privy Councillor;⁶ Luigi Molini and his son-in-law⁷ Leonardo Morosini, members of the Pregadi;⁸ and Marino Barbarigo, one of the Chiefs of the Forty.⁹ The accused were forthwith taken into custody and were put to the question. A full avowal of the charge was extracted. The affair was speedily ventilated. Conjecture was at once rife. Sundry thrilling tales stole into circulation. It was studiously reported by some, who could desire no better opportunity of bringing the Carrarese into odium, that every cistern in the capital had been poisoned; and soldiers were actually stationed at the reservoirs and wells to prevent the public from partaking of the infected water. Others, shuddering with fear, asserted that a dark conspiracy had been set on foot for destroying the Signory and reducing Venice to a heap of ashes. The alarm became almost a panic. The civic guards were doubled. Patrols were directed to pace the streets; and the water-police were enjoined to exercise the utmost vigilance. Persons were forbidden to leave their houses with weapons in their hands or at their sides. All ingress into Venice and egress from the city were jealously watched.¹⁰

¹ Romanin, iii. 244.

² Sanudo, *Vite*, 672. These details are found, with some variations, in G. Gataro, fol. 85.

³ Compare Caresinus contemp. 434, with Sanudo, *loco citato*.

⁴ Caroldo, *Historia*, lib. viii. p. 214, King's MSS. 147.

⁵ Sanudo, *ubi supra*.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Romanin, iii. 244.

⁹ Sanudo, *ubi supra*.

¹⁰ Romanin, iii. 244.

The arrest of Vignoso and the other emissary of the Carrarese was followed by that of their subordinate accessories. The treatment which they experienced was summary. Vignoso was decapitated. His colleague was condemned to ten years' imprisonment, preparatory to transportation.¹ The rest suffered according to their supposed degrees of complicity. Some, after being dragged at horses' tails through the streets,² were hanged between the Red Columns, and then quartered (May 10³). Nor in dealing with the implicated patricians was the Decemviral Council less inexorably severe. Bernardo was sentenced to a year's imprisonment and to perpetual exclusion from all the councils. Barbarigo, Molini and his son-in-law, and the Friar, were incarcerated for life.

This attempt at assassination and incendiarism fired the blood of the Venetians; the most furious indignation was manifested against the real author of the crime; hostilities were expedited; and the Venetian troops under Reniero del Guasco, a Siennese soldier of fortune, whom the Republic had taken into pay, having destroyed all the fortifications contiguous to the lagoons, penetrated into the Padovano (November 1372), and spread desolation through the entire district. Del Guasco established his headquarters at Monte-Albano.

But the Signory was not fortunate in her generalissimo. The Siennese proved himself less docile and amenable than the illustrious Del Verme; a difference arose between him and one of the Venetian proveditors, Domenico Michieli, in consequence of his wish to cross the Brentella and besiege Padua itself, in opposition to the views of the proveditor; and Del Guasco, toward the close of 1372, threw up his command. This untoward proceeding, which drew upon Michieli a stern rebuke from the Senate, and procured that officer his recall and a heavy fine, occasioned considerable inconvenience and delay; the vacancy was not supplied till the 3rd of March 1373; and the Paduan general, taking advantage of the weakness and embarrassment of his adversary, attacked Monte-Albano, burned a portion of the encampment, and carried fire and sword to the very ramparts of Treviso.

¹ Romanin, iii. 244-5.

² Sanudo, *Vite de' Duchi*, A. Contarini.

³ Caresinus contemp. 434.

Additional encouragement was afforded to the enemy by the near approach of 5000 Hungarians under the conduct of the King's nephew, Stephen, Waiwode of Transylvania. It was the aim of the Paduans to effect at the earliest moment a junction with the Waiwode, and to seek to crush the Venetians by a combined movement; and to support this strategy the Carrarese himself left his capital on the 6th of May (1373) at the head of about 1500 cavalry.¹ To avert such a peril as that which now appeared imminent, the Venetian proveditor in charge at Monte-Albano, Taddeo Giustiniani, who had already earned his laurels by his victory over the Austrians in 1369, attempted to throw himself between the two armies, with a view to beating them separately. For this purpose he shifted his position with great rapidity, and posted himself at Narvesa, near the banks of the Piave. It was a daring manœuvre; and it did not succeed.² In an engagement which seems to have taken place about the 12th of May between the Hungarian van, 1000 strong, and such of his own forces as in the celerity of his movements he had been able to bring up, the Venetian, after making a gallant stand and rallying twice, experienced a sharp repulse. Many lives were lost; many prisoners were taken; and Giustiniani himself was in the number of the latter. The gallant proveditor was sent to Padua, where he met with no ungentle treatment; and by his eloquent representations of the resources of his country the Carrarese was persuaded to offer terms to the Doge.³

Before it entered on the discussion of a question of such gravity, the Great Council resolved to exclude from its deliberations all persons below the age of thirty; and those who came within that category were desired thereupon to withdraw.⁴ The order was murmuringly obeyed; a strong feeling was excited; and the eliminated patricians remained in the exterior vestibule, where they indulged in loud and indecent clamours. "We all know perfectly well," they bawled outside the door of the saloon, "why you seek to shut us out. It is only because you want to patch up a peace with

¹ Gataro, *Ist. Pad.* 162.

² Gataro, *Compendio della guerra di Chiozza scritta da D. Chinazzo*, Add. MSS. Brit. Mus. 8583, fol. 7.

³ Romanin, iii. 243-4; Bonfinius, *Res Ungaricæ*, dec. ii. lib. x. 354.

⁴ A. Gataro, *Ist. Pad.* 154; G. Gataro, fol. 153

the Carrarese against our will and without our consent, in deference to the King of Hungary! But you shall not do it!" The Council, scandalised at this unbecoming and indiscreet conduct on the part of their younger colleagues, addressed a complaint to the Senate; and some examples having been made of the most culpable among the riotous legislators, the rest returned to good behaviour; and, after a short interval, the temporary decree of exclusion was revoked. Their suspicions touching the object of the extraordinary step, which had so sharply wounded their sensibility, proved after all to be totally unfounded. For the answer conveyed through the Doge was that the Republic would not sheathe her sword, unless the Lord of Padua should agree to bear the expenses of the war, to cede Curano and Oriago, to demolish all the remaining forts and earthworks which menaced the security of the Signory, or trenched on her domain, replacing the same at no future time, and to ask pardon in person or by proxy of the Doge.¹ Francesco, knitted in close alliance with Hungary, and in daily expectation of the arrival of the Austrians, who had pledged themselves to give him their active and zealous support, was not unintelligibly amazed at these conditions; and he at once threw back his half-withdrawn stakes into the lottery of war. Operations recommenced forthwith. At Fossa-Nuova a second defeat was sustained by the arms of the Republic.²

But this double disaster, so far from disheartening the Government, stimulated it to fresh exertions. The army of the Padovano was powerfully reinforced; and a new generalissimo, Pietro dalla Fontana,³ assisted by Leonardo Dandolo as provveditor,⁴ was placed at its head. Fontana inaugurated his assumption of the command by a spirited address to the troops; and having distributed through the ranks spiked clubs and long barbed poles, which were peculiarly calculated to make havoc among the Hungarian cavalry, he led his soldiers against the victors of Narvesa (July 1st, 1373). The result of this novel and ingenious stratagem was surprisingly signal. The Waiwode and his mounted followers were astonished at the apparition of a legion of club-men and

¹ Romanin, iii. 244. See also Galeazzo Gataro, fol. 131.

² Romanin, iii. 244.

³ Gataro contemp. *Ist Padov.* 158.

⁴ Navagiero, fol. 1054.

pole-bearers; before they could reach their antagonists with their swords, or even with their lances, their horses were killed under them; the Hungarians were thrown into a confusion from which they could not rally; and their rout was complete. Stephen himself, the bulk of his officers, and about 1200 men, were captured¹ in the action, and removed under escort to Venice, where they found every kindness and attention. Apartments were assigned to the prince in the palace: his companions in misfortune were lodged at San Biagio;² the best medical and surgical aid was procured for the sick and wounded; and to each of the humbler prisoners a ration of four loaves of bread was daily allotted.³

The gratification of the Signory at the issue of the second battle of Fossa-Nuova was intense; a jubilee and thanksgiving were ordered: and the Venturi received double pay. The event hastened the close of the war in dissolving the Hungaro-Carrarese coalition, and in exposing Padua to the triumphant Fontana. Louis, ceaselessly importuned by his brother to accelerate the exchange of prisoners, which alone could restore the son of the latter to liberty, and inspired by the parent of Stephen with an incipient distrust of the ambition and ulterior views of the Italian prince, now wrote to Carrara signifying his intention of concluding peace with the Venetians. The Paduan found himself forsaken and without a friend. He felt that he had been betrayed by Hungary. Family treason and popular discontent assailed him at home. He had discovered a plot, which his brothers Marsilio and Nicolo were forming against his life, and of which he suspected the Venetian Senate to have some cognisance. It was under such pressure that he embraced in September the terms which he had spurned in March.⁴ A select and mixed commission was appointed to determine the boundary line between Venice and Padua; Carrara engaged to take part with the Signory in any future Austrian war; and a space of fifteen years was allowed him for the payment of the 290,000 ducats, at which the Government assessed its disbursements. The captives were released on

¹ Bonfinius, *Res Ungar.* dec. ii. lib. x. 354.

² Romanin, iii. 244-5.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Andrea Gataro contemp. *Ist. Padov.* 193-6; *Hist. Cortus. Addit. Secundum*, 983; *Chronicon Regiense* contemp. Murat. xviii. 81.

both sides: and the Waiwode of Transylvania was exchanged for the proveditor Giustiniani (November 1373).

In the course of her arduous struggle with Louis, which culminated in the treaty of 1358, the Republic was fortunately enabled to contract her loans at an uniform rate of seven per cent., which was probably considered moderate. But an almost consecutive series of hostilities from 1356 to 1373 produced a certain commercial stagnation: the Venetian market became less elastic; money grew scarcer and dearer; and in the Carrarese war just terminated the price had gradually risen from seven to twenty per cent. This exorbitant scale of interest naturally rendered the pacification of September 1373 as agreeable to the Government as it was popular among the more heavily-taxed portion of the community.

The treaty having been signed on the 22nd September, the ceremony of asking pardon of the Signory, conformably with one of its provisions, was performed by Francesco Carrara Novello as the proxy of his father. The young man, who had started from Padua on Tuesday, the 27th September,² brought with him the now venerable Petrarch, who had, at the earnest desire of Francesco Vecchio, unwillingly agreed to accompany his son on such an equivocal errand.³ On Sunday, the 2nd October,⁴ the prince and the bard were ushered into the Great Council Saloon, where it had been arranged that the formality should take place. Both made a profound obeisance as they approached the throne, on which the Doge sat in state. Presenting himself once more after a long interval in his favourite character as the apostle of peace, the laureate proceeded to deliver a florid and elaborate oration in advocacy of concord among mankind; and at its conclusion his companion, sinking on his knees, demanded forgiveness of the Republic.⁵ His Serenity benignly replied in set phraseology, that the Venetians freely and joyfully condoned the grave offence; and in adding, *Go, and sin no more, neither thou, nor thy father*, he begged the suppliant to rise and be seated. Petrarch, who was now in his 69th year, did not

¹ Galeazzo Gataro *Padre* contemp. folio 197.

² A. Gataro contemp., *Ist. Padov.* 195.

³ Gataro, fol. 195.

⁴ Gataro, *ubi supra*; Sanudo, *Vite*, 677.

⁵ Pancrazio Giustiniani, *De Venetæ Aristocratice Gestis Liber*, 1527, sign. c. 4.

long survive this embassy; and his rhetorical diatribe in the Great Council against war became appreciable as a valedictory address to Venice and to Italy. He expired somewhat suddenly on the 18th July 1374.¹ Not Arezzo, his natal place, but Arquà, where he died, holds his ashes.

The Republic was now permitted to enjoy a transient repose (1373-6); and her rulers again sedulously applied themselves to the advancement of her internal welfare and the consolidation of her foreign relations. Her outstanding treaties with England, Egypt, and Constantinople were renewed; and the position of her subjects in those countries was secured and ameliorated. In 1374, England and Portugal were summoned to give satisfaction for injuries sustained by Venetian merchantmen. About the same time, certain impediments to the commercial intercourse with Verona were removed by diplomacy; the pretensions to the dominion of the ocean were vindicated against the tentative encroachments of Ancona, Fermo, and Ascoli; and to a communication from the Pope, touching the free navigation of the Gulf, an answer was returned, "that Venice, not being an agricultural country, depends entirely upon her external resources; that ships are her caravans and the ocean her highway; and that it is not only essential to her own vital interests that the sea should be under the protection of the Lion of Saint Mark, but that the suppression of piracy and smuggling, in which she spares no expense and labour, is in point of fact a matter in which the whole commercial world is concerned."

It seems to be demonstrable that the supreme and exclusive jurisdiction claimed by Venice over the Adriatic, its littoral, and the circumjacent waters, though possibly recognised by no parchment, was tacitly admitted and allowed from the earliest times on grounds of expediency, and that from the tenth to the seventeenth century such a jurisdiction formed part of the common law of the high seas. The right was envied in many quarters, and continually invaded. But it was never successfully disproved, and seldom successfully withstood.

The struggle between the old mediæval forms and the modern constitutional theories of government, the crudeness

¹ *Ad Hist. Cortus. Addit. Secundum*, 984; *Vita Petrarchæ per H. Squarzacicum composita; Opera*, 1501.

of political science, the imperfect recognition of public and private right, and the conflict and uncertainty of dynastic claims, kept Europe during the fourteenth century in a constant state of disquiet. It was an unhappy phase of an immature civilization, which was throwing the Signory into perpetual collision with those neighbours, whose system was military and aggressive.

Venice was emphatically a maritime Power. But she had not merely maritime interests to consider and protect. The territory, which she had acquired by treaty in 1339, was now hardly less material to her political integrity than Trieste was material to her commerce. Both the province and the port were therefore preserved at every cost. In 1369, the latter was reconquered in defiance of all the forces of Austria and all the arts of Paduan chicanery. Eleven years before, Dalmatia itself had been sacrificed to the retention of the March of Treviso.

But Louis was perfectly aware, that Dalmatia had not been surrendered without an acute pang; and he was conscious that the opportunity, not the desire, was wanting to wrest from his grasp the province which he so greatly prized, and which he had so dearly won. That occasion seemed to be even now at hand. The Republic was at peace with all the world. By the Treaty of 1373, she had closed the Carrarese war on advantageous terms, and had secured for herself three years of profound repose, during which she had been untiringly engaged in developing her resources, and promoting her internal prosperity; and it was to be more than suspected, that at no distant day Venice would overtly essay the reconquest, to which she was known to be already preparing the way by intrigue.

The King was no longer what he had been in 1356. Twenty years had brought with them grey hairs and an impaired constitution. His own life was uncertain. He was unable to answer for his successors. It was on this account that he had been indefatigable in stirring up the old enemies of Venice against her, and in creating new ones. It was on this account that he had supported the unfathomable and inscrutable Carrara, and had favoured the designs of Austria upon Trieste. Louis felt that it was fatuous to await, under the shadow of a false security, a blow which, come when it

might, was certain; and it appeared to him that the sole method by which his object could be compassed, was the pursuit of a policy of extermination. He was convinced that, in the heart of her capital alone, Venice was to be conquered, and that in Lombardy alone Dalmatia was to be preserved. Such sentiments the Hungarian monarch employed in reasoning with himself; and such maxims, conveyed in the most emphatic and unvarnished language,¹ soon found their way into the pages of his confidential correspondence with Austria, Padua, and Genoa. To Leopold who, by the death of Albert, had become sole Duke of Austria, the proposition for fattening his hungry troopers upon the smiling plains of Lombardy could not but be acceptable; and against that temptation the treaty of 1370 and the 75,000 ducats weighed as a straw in the balance. To such a project Genoa was no prudish or unwilling listener; and in the course of 1375 the first outline was sketched of a league between Hungary, Austria, Genoa, and Padua "for the destruction and humiliation of the Commune of Venice and all her allies."²

Venice was too great not to have many enemies. Surrounding nations naturally viewed with malice and heart-burning in so small a city so powerful a commonwealth. It roused a violent and profound jealousy to see the empire of the Venetians, in apparent defiance of adversity, prosper and increase. Above all, it excited their anger to observe that the Republic, not content with building the largest ships, with employing the ablest seamen, and with asserting a naval supremacy which was not less anomalous than offensive, was beginning to obey the dictates of an insatiable ambition by competing for military glory and territorial aggrandizement with the Turk and the Magyar. It was not that Venice was peculiarly perfidious in her statesmanship; for none of her contemporaries was more rigidly observant of diplomatic and other engagements. Nor was it that she was more unscrupulously aggressive in her policy than others: for her possessions were held, for the most part at least, by unusually legitimate

¹ Gataro contemp., *Ist. Padov.* 147, 153, gives the text of two letters written by Louis to Carrara. The first is dated the 7th of February 1374. The second is without date; but it was delivered to the Lord of Padua on the 4th of April in the same year.

² Letter of the King to Carrara, 7th February 1374.—A. Gataro, *loco citato*: Galeazzo Gataro *Padre*, fol. 235.

titles. But the truth was, that she was too powerful, too opulent, and too proud.

Neither Padua nor Genoa, however, threw down at present the gauntlet to the Republic. The former still thought it prudent, in the absence of any certain intelligence respecting the advance of the Hungarians, to save appearances by professing amity and peace. No indications of a marked kind had yet manifested themselves of a breach between Venice and the oldest of her antagonists; and Genoa was a prey to twenty factions. Hungary itself was obliged to keep a vigilant eye on the Sultan and his Tartar allies; and Dalmatia, groaning under a taxation¹ which made the Venetian rule appear the mildest of pastoral institutions, also occupied to a large extent its attention and resources. In the spring of 1376 Austria therefore took the field alone. In a letter to the Doge, May 16, the Marquis of Ferrara, reporting these movements as well as those of the English Company under Sir John Hawkwood, proffered his aid to the Signory. The contemporary correspondence exhibits the whole country a prey to military licence and devastation. In the middle of March,² Duke Leopold penetrated, with 4000 cavalry, exclusive of foot,³ through the important and unguarded Pass of Quer or Guaro into the Trevisano, and, establishing his headquarters in the Bishopric of Feltre,⁴ committed dreadful ravages over the whole country.⁵ This inexcusable perfidy, of which the Signory had also received some previous intimation from the Count of Collalto, did not take her altogether by surprise, and she was consequently on the alert. The Austrian possessions in Venice were seized as a material guarantee, and the persons of their owners were detained in hostage. Troops were transmitted with all possible expedition to Treviso; and the proveditors in charge were empowered to adopt any measures and to incur any outlay, which might be requisite in the defence of that position. Other places in Istria and Friuli were strengthened and reinforced with similar dispatch. Urgent messages were directed to Verona, Ferrara, Milan, and Padua; and Carrara was reminded of the obligations which the treaty of 1373 imposed upon him. The answer of the

¹ Wilkinson's *Dalmatia and Montenegro*.

² *Ad Hist. Cortus.*, *Addit.* ii. 984.

³ Gataro, *Istoria*, 222. Cal. of State Papers (Venetian), 1864, i. 19 *et seq.*

⁴ Gataro, 224.

⁵ *Ibid.* 226.

Carrarese, who was at a loss how to act, was shuffling and self-convicting; while from the Visconti hollow promises only were elicited.

The Venetians, however, in concert with a few auxiliaries under Simone Schiavo whom the Marquis of Ferrara had placed at their disposal, behaved, on the whole, with exemplary bravery and devotion; and the faithful Collalto also rendered some service to the Republic. At Treviso itself the Podesta Pietro Emo and his proveditorial staff maintained their ground with unconquerable pertinacity; and Marino Soranzo, advancing with a detachment of troops as far as Feltre, made himself master of the town and defile of Quer, and thus cut off the Austrian line of retreat (June 1376).¹ But by an unaccountable piece of negligence the Venetian officer subsequently allowed his prize to slip through his fingers; the defile, which was of the highest strategical value, was recaptured by the enemy, who planted at the point two strong redoubts with guns; and the Government, incensed at the carelessness of Soranzo,² punished him by fine and temporary exclusion from employment (July 10, 1376).

The introduction of cannon into warfare is usually referred, so far as Italy is concerned, to its use in the defence of Florence in 1326, whence there is reason to suppose that the explosive appliance was introduced into England, and in 1339 both guns charged with gunpowder and leaden balls of great weight are described as available for the protection of the City of London in a way not suggestive of quite recent adoption. Seven years later we hear of similar artillery at the Battle of Crécy; but the properties of gunpowder were familiar to the Moors, the French, and the Spaniards at least in the previous century.³ Speaking of the bombards brought into service at Quer, when they can scarcely have been a novelty, "It is," says a writer, who was almost a contemporary of the events he describes,⁴

¹ Gataro, *Istoria*, 224.

² Redusio, *Chronicon Tarvisinum*, Murat. xix. 735; *Hist. Cortus.*, xii., note 15.

³ Filiasi, *Ricerche*, 225; Zanetti, *Origine di alcune arti*, 35. Riley, *Memorials of London*, 1868, xlix. 205. If the "engines" mentioned in a note on p. 206 were the cannon used in 1339, their cost was £87, 15s. 8d. But the old crossbow or *Balestra* long remained in general use. See Molmenti, *La Vita Privata*, i. 199 *et seq.* But the value of gunpowder as an ordinary explosive had been already discovered by the Chinese.

⁴ Redusio, *Chronicon Tarvisinum*, fol. 754. "Quibus quidem bombardis tunc lapides eructantibus homines putabant desuper Deum tonare." Petrarch, *Opera*, 1501, speaks of the use of bombards as early as 1343. "De Remediis Utriusque Fortunæ," lib. i.

“a great instrument of iron, with a hollow bore in its whole length, in which a black powder, made of sulphur, saltpetre, and charcoal, is placed, and above that powder a round stone; and then the powder, being ignited through a touchhole, the stone is discharged with enormous force.” Thus lead does not appear in 1376 to have been generally substituted for stone.

Immediately after the vexatious and mortifying loss of Quer, the Signory determined to open operations on a larger scale; and Nicolo Morosini was dispatched with all speed to Faenza to engage Sir John Hawkwood and his *Tard Venis*. This celebrated soldier of fortune was a native of Heddingham, in Essex. His father was a tanner; and it is said that the son had been apprenticed to the Merchant Taylors' Guild. But he soon relinquished that calling, and adopted the lucrative profession of arms, in which he had won spurs and a world-wide fame. The demands of Sir John, who was at this moment profitably occupied in quelling a rebellion in the Ecclesiastical States, were thought, however, too exorbitant; and in his stead Venice procured the services of Jacopo Cavalli, a Veronese condottiero and his company¹ at a monthly stipend of 700 gold ducats.² These costly preparations, which sounded the shrill key-note of war, broke the more than suspicious reticence of the Carrarese; and that accomplished dissembler at once sought to divert the threatened storm from his own territories by volunteering (August 6³) to guard the pass of La Scala with 400 horse and 300 foot.⁴ Otherwise the enlistment of the Cavalli company did not seem to bring any commensurate results. The only mentionable exploit was the bombardment of San Vettore in August. During the rest of the year, hostilities were conducted with fluctuating and nearly balanced success. Cavalli, though sufficiently intrepid and active, appears to have been somewhat of a loiterer, and to have wasted a good deal of time in reconnoitring ground for battles which were never fought, and in surveying sights for redoubts which were never used. The company was dissatisfied with the Government, and the Government was dissatisfied with the company. In September, the former demanded double pay and the full licence of rapine, before they would storm Feltre; but the Senate

¹ Gataro, 226.

² Romanin, iii.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

refused both the one and the other,¹ and got rid of the mercenaries at the earliest moment.

The sole means, by which the Austrians could have hoped to hold the Trevisano through the winter, was by gaining a great victory or by reducing Treviso itself; and no such good fortune was in store for them. Treviso remained impregnable; the Veronese general disputed with them every inch of ground, and turned every strategical mistake to advantage; as the cold weather set in, food and forage fell short; the intense frost in the beginning of the year had already carried off a large number of troops;² and on the whole Leopold thought it the wisest plan to solicit or accept, in the latter half of October, the intercession of Louis with the Republic. The Doge and his advisers, deciphering the signs of the times, and divining the true nature of the war which was being waged against their country, prudently resolved not to let such an opportunity slip of withdrawing from a comparatively insignificant contest, in order that they might hold themselves in readiness for the far greater struggle, which it foreshadowed: and an armistice, by which both belligerents retained their respective conquests, was arranged on the 3rd November till Whitsuntide following, then terminable, or by mutual consent capable of extension till Pentecost, 1378.

Long antecedent, however, to the last-named date, the political horizon had assumed an aspect, and a multiplicity of circumstances had manifested themselves, which rendered the Venetians excessively solicitous to eliminate Austria from the list of their open enemies; and all the arts of diplomacy had been therefore directed to this point. In the autumn of 1378, a second treaty was solemnized between the Signory and Duke Leopold, by which Venice set at liberty her hostages, released the Austrian property from sequestration, and gave up all the acquisitions of Austria in Feltre, as well as the fortress of San Vettore. These were hard terms; but they were the best which she could just now obtain. On Tuesday, the 19th October, peace was proclaimed at all the markets and churches of Venice and Treviso.³

The reconciliation with Austria was most timely. For

¹ Redusio, fol. 755.

² Sanudo, 677.

³ Redusio, fol. 756; Gataro, *Istoria*, fol. 227.

the symptoms, which portended a coming tempest, were daily growing more unmistakable.

The island of Cyprus, so choicely situated as an emporium for the commerce of the Mediterranean, and wealthy in almost every variety of natural production, especially sugar, vines,¹ and salterns, was a spot on which both the Genoese and Venetians had cast for some time a longing eye; and the equipoise established by this reciprocal jealousy had alone perhaps arrested the downfall of the feeble dynasty of Lusignan. The trading entrepôts formed by the rival commonwealths at Nicosia and Famagusta, the two capitals of this tiny monarchy, enjoyed approximately similar privileges; but it was rarely that the reigning king was sufficiently strong or judicious to refrain from patronising one settlement in preference to the other. The predilections of the late prince, Peter I., had been Genoese; and throughout his reign, more especially toward its close, that Factory obtained a marked ascendancy in the Island. At his decease, however, the crown devolved upon a minor, who fell under the tutelage of his uncles; and the latter at once betrayed an equally decided bias to the Venetians. At a banquet which was held at Famagusta after the coronation of the boy-king, a question of etiquette was raised between Doria, the Genoese consul, and Malipiero, the Venetian Bailo, as to which should sit at table on the right hand of Peter II.; this disputed point begat high words; and words led to blows, and blows to bloodshed. The Regency had delivered its award in favour of Malipiero; the Cypriots soon espoused the same cause; and a riotous multitude, pouring into the dining-hall, proceeded, among other acts of violence, to throw Doria and several Genoese, who had been previously engaged in pelting the Venetians with bread and meat,² out of the windows. "Our consul," relates Sanudo, "was attired in a scarlet robe, lined with miniver, which reached to the ground; and so were all the other Venetians."

The resentment of the outraged country was keen and prompt. A Genoese fleet disembarked 15,000 men on the island, entered into occupation of Famagusta, levied enormous contributions, and concluded by laying the crown under an

¹ The wines have always had an unpleasant flavour from an infusion of resin.

² Sanudo, fol. 678.

annual tribute of 40,000 florins.¹ This melodramatic incident was the source of much scandal and recrimination ; but a crisis was happily avoided. For Venice, not unconscious of the critical phase into which events were passing, was unwilling to compromise herself by any ill-advised step : while Genoa, whose share in the secret coalition was already marked out, had the best of reasons for not desiring to enfeeble her resources by a premature and unseconded effort ; and the result was, that conciliatory messages were exchanged (September 1376). The diplomatic branch of these transactions was conducted upon the part of the Republic by Marco Giustiniani of San Polo ; and although the principle had been laid down in 1268 and 1296 by two successive edicts of the Great Council, the relation of his embassy, which this gentleman was invited, when he returned to Venice in the course of 1377² to deliver before the Senate, is said to form the earliest instance of an actual resort to a custom which, happily for the cause of historical literature, was subsequently observed with peculiar strictness.

But a second cause of offence was speedily superadded to the former ; and it constituted a grievance which, occurring at a point of time when the measures of the Triple Alliance were more ripe for execution, Genoa knew how to turn to good account.

Tenedos, lying in the Archipelago at an easy distance from the Chrysoceras, was a commanding situation which the Venetians, more especially since the decline of their political influence at Constantinople, had ardently coveted. During the last Genoese war, and so far back as 1355, the Signory demanded leave to occupy Tenedos provisionally, as a military station, on payment of 2000 ducats ; but the Byzantine Government of that day declined the assumedly insidious proposal. Again, in 1363 or 1364, the negotiation recommenced, but without success ; and from that time the affair remained in abeyance till 1375, when an opportunity was taken to moot once more the cession of Tenedos, for which the Doge offered 3000 ducats and the redemption of the imperial crown-jewels from pawn.³

¹ Vincens, *Hist. de Gènes*, ii. 8.

² Romanin, *Stor. Docum.*, iii. 256.

³ The Emperors of Constantinople appear to have been not unfrequently in the habit of pledging their jewels.—See Sanudo, fol. 773.

The throne of Constantinople was filled at this juncture by Calojohannes V., who, after making the circuit of Europe in the vain quest of allies against the Turks, returned to his capital to punish a conspiracy against his throne and his life in the heart of his family by depriving his heir Andronicos of his eyesight, and throwing him into a dungeon. But, at the end of two years, the Genoese of Pera favoured a revolution, by which the elder Palæologos was deposed, and Andronicos was elevated to power (August 1, 1376).¹ For this service the factory dictated its own requital; and imperial gratitude involuntarily evinced itself in a chrysobole, by which Tenedos was transferred to Genoa. But an unforeseen difficulty supervened. The Greek governor of the island, ignoring the succession of Andronicos, resisted the formal summons to surrender his trust; and the Tenedots, arriving at a sense of the danger of their situation, formed, at the instigation of a Venetian merchant, Donato Trono,² the hazardous and decisive resolution of placing themselves under Venetian protection. A collusive understanding was thence assumed to exist between the Governor of Tenedos and the Venetian commander on the station; and, on the motion of the Genoese, the Emperor made reprisal by incarcerating the Bailo and all other subjects of the Republic at Constantinople.³

The formal acceptance of Tenedos, which appeared to be tantamount to a declaration of war against Genoa, and the reference to arms of the outrage offered to its representative, were points on which the Senate was slow to arrive at a decision; and an endeavour was made in the first instance to feel the temper of the Genoese and of the Byzantine Court. But the offices of diplomacy were of small avail; the question only became more intricate and less susceptible of a bloodless solution; the escape of Calojohannes from prison, through the instrumentality of some Venetians who bribed his guards, imparted fresh bitterness to the irritation of Genoa and Andronicos; the former government, while it professed in courteous phraseology a regret for the share, if any, which its subjects had borne in the outrage upon the Venetians, definitely refused to listen to any proposition for the relinquishment of Tenedos; and the option of peace or war at length existed

¹ Chinazzo, *Guerra di Chioza*, 711.

² *Ibid.* 712.

³ A. Gataro, fol. 229.

no longer.¹ The Republic clenched the matter by sending a garrison to Tenedos, accompanied by a Bailo and an official staff;² and a Græco-Genoese squadron, which attempted to effect a landing, was driven back with great slaughter.³

While Genoa, ulcerated by a score of petty factions, was grimly calculating the chances of the Alliance, and was planting by anticipation the flag of Saint George on the tower of the Campanile, Venice, profoundly sensible of the danger which impended, was beginning to bristle with arms, and to reverberate with martial sounds. A new loan was contracted under the sanction of the legislature. A promise of farther assistance was obtained from the Marquis of Ferrara. An alliance, offensive and defensive, for four years was formed with the Lord of Milan; and the daughter of Barnabo Visconti was affianced under Venetian auspices to the young King of Cyprus. Proveditors were appointed to report upon the affairs of Treviso, Padua, Romania, Genoa, and Istria; and others were charged with drawing up statistical tables of the public income and expenditure.⁴ The fortification of the March of Treviso and of the lagoons was prosecuted with redoubled activity. Venturi were enlisted. All persons liable to serve in the navy were ordered, under penalty of fine and imprisonment, to inscribe their name on the registers opened at the Chamber of Armaments, and to indicate the galley on which they desired to embark. These lists were distributed into classes; and the first, second, and third divisions were at once called out on active duty. On the 20th April 1378, Carlo Zeno, a patrician who had gained a high reputation in various capacities, and who had just been recalled from the Trevisano, where he was conducting some military operations of minor importance, received the responsible appointment of Bailo and Captain-General of Negropont; and two days later, Vettore Pisani was invested in the Basilica with the supreme command of the fleet by the Doge himself. "You," exclaimed Contarini, in delivering to him the great banner of Venice, "are destined by God to defend with your valour this Republic, and to retaliate upon those who have dared to insult her, and to rob her of that

¹ Chinazzo, *Guerra di Chioza*, 713, relates that Carrara, in anticipation of war, bought up sufficient provisions and salt in the Venetian market for five years.

² Andrea Gataro *Figlio*, fol. 230.

³ Chinazzo, fol. 712; Galcazzo Gataro *Padre*, fol. 230.

⁴ Romanin, iii. 262-3.

security which she owes to the virtue of our progenitors. Wherefore we confide to you this victorious and dread standard, which it will be your duty to restore to us unsullied and triumphant.”¹

On the 24th April, Nicolo di Chioggia, notary of the Ducal Court, was sent to Genoa to make the formal declaration of war;² and on the same day Pisani sailed from Lido.³ His object was to intercept Luigi de' Fieschi, who was understood to have quitted the waters of the Riviera with ten galleys,⁴ and whose suspected destination was Tenedos. The commander left Venice with fourteen galleys in company; but he expected that reinforcements would be forwarded to him, if necessary, from Candia and from Negropont.

¹ Romanin, iii. 263.

² Caresinus contemp. 444; Chinazzo contemp. fol. 714; Redusio contemp. fol. 758.

³ Chinazzo, *ubi supra*.

⁴ Redusio, *ubi supra*.

CHAPTER XXVI

A.D. 1378-1383

Antecedents of Pisani—Defeat of the Genoese at Porto-d'Anzo (May 30, 1378)—Simultaneous Operations of Carlo Zeno—Battle of Polo (May, 7, 1379)—Victory of Luciano Doria—Prosecution and Imprisonment of Pisani (July 7)—Resumption of the Negotiations with Louis—Their failure—Advance of the Genoese on Venice—Precautions of the Government—Chorography of the Lagoons—Situation of Chioggia—Blockade of the Lagoons—Siege and Fall of Chioggia (Aug. 11-16)—Firmness of the Government—Diplomatic Efforts—Their Futility—Preparations of the Venetians for Resistance—Compulsory Liberation of Pisani, who is appointed Captain-General (Aug. 20)—Character and Person of Pisani—Devotion of the People—Fortification of the City—Unsuccessful Attempt of the Allies on Venice (Aug. 24)—The Genoese return to Chioggia—Desperate Posture of Affairs at Venice—Dearthness of Food—Expedition to Chioggia under the Doge and Pisani, his Lieutenant (Dec. 21)—Strategical Plans of Pisani—Blockade of Chioggia—Misery of the Venetian Troops—Approach of a Crisis—Biographical Account of Carlo Zeno—His Arrival (Jan. 1, 1380)—Recovery of Brondolo (Feb. 19)—Danger of Zeno—Hopeless Condition of the Genoese—Arrival of a Genoese Fleet to their Relief and its Chase by Pisani (May 14-26)—Various Expedients of the Enemy—Negotiations for Peace (June 1-9)—Surrender of Chioggia (June 24)—Lingering Duration of the War (July 1380-June 1381)—Death of Vettore Pisani (Aug. 13, 1380)—His Funeral—Appointment of Carlo Zeno as Captain-General (Aug. 28)—Treaty of Turin (Aug. 8, 1381)—Admission of Thirty Plebeians to the Great Council, Sept. 4, 1381—Death of the Doge Contarini (June 5, 1382)—Michele Morosini, his Successor (June 10)—Character of Morosini—Anecdote of him—His death (Oct. 15)—Antonio Veniero, Doge (Oct. 21)—Entry of Veniero on his Functions (Jan. 13, 1383).

VETTORE PISANI, whom the Republic had made the keeper of her honour and the arbiter of her fortunes at the outset of a struggle which threatened to be lengthened and arduous beyond all precedent, was the son of that Nicolo Pisani of San Fantino,¹ who had attained such eminence during the last Genoese war. Vettore was born in 1324,² and was now in his fifty-fifth year. His earliest employment had been under the Government of Andrea Dandolo, when he embarked in 1354 as a subaltern on the little fleet of Marco Michieli.³ In the

¹ *Memorie di V. Pisani*, p. 3; Ven. 1767.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.* p. 6.

following year, he obtained command under his father at Portolongo; and he was one of the few who escaped capture after that fatal action. From 1355 to 1361, he continued to serve with distinction in the navy. In the latter year, being at Venice momentarily out of commission, he was sworn of the Electoral College, which made choice of Lorenzo Celsi, Captain of the Gulf, in the room of Giovanni Dolfino,¹ and he was fortunate enough to secure for himself the vacancy, which his vote had helped to create.² In 1364, while the torch of civil war was blazing in Candia, Pisani was dispatched to the capital of that island as Governor in the name of the Republic;³ and it is reported by his biographer,⁴ that he there betrayed the boxing propensities of his younger days by striking Pietro Cornaro, a proveditor of the commune,⁵ from whom he happened to dissent on some matter of routine. In 1368, he was one of a deputation of sixteen persons⁶ sent to desire the presence of Andrea Contarini, with whom he was distantly connected, in the city which had chosen him Doge; and it is said that Vettore in the vehemence of his temper employed even threats in inducing the Doge designate to accept the office.⁷ Subsequently to the accession of Contarini, his relative had been engaged in various capacities as naval officer, military engineer, diplomatist, which opened to him an admirable field for the development and display of his resplendent and versatile talents. In such an illustrious and experienced personage the Government reposed the most ample share of confidence, which it was possible for an Oligarchy to extend to a kinsman of the Doge and a favourite of the people.

Pisani pursued his course along the Ligurian coast so far as Porto-Pisano, and menaced Genoa by sea at the same time that the Marquis of Caretto,⁸ Lord of Finale,⁹ who at the instigation of Visconti had espoused the Venetian cause, threatened it by land. The consternation of the Genoese was undisguised. Noli, Castelfranco, Albenga, had fallen already into the hands of Caretto. The common cry was, that a large Venetian fleet was in the immediate neighbourhood of the Riviera, and that the Stella Company under Milanese colours would soon be at their gates. There was a panic. The Doge was deposed.

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, fol. 653.

³ *Memorie*, p. 25.

⁶ Caresinus contemp. 432.

⁸ Stella, *Annales*, 1108.

² *Ibid.* 654; *Memorie*, p. 17.

⁴ *Ibid.* 25-6.

⁵ *Ibid.* 26.

⁷ *Memorie*, 31-2, 174.

⁹ Romanin, iii. 264.

Another, more popular or more competent, was elevated in his room. It was solemnly resolved, that it behoved all good citizens to sink their party differences, and to coalesce against a common foe.¹

But Pisani, questioning the feasibility of any such design as was ascribed to him, had retraced his steps; and in front of the promontory of Antium, or Porto d'Anzo, he found himself upon the track of Fieschi.² It was the 30th May.³ The day was extremely squally.⁴ It was raining in torrents. So severe was the gale, that out of fourteen sail Pisani was able to manœuvre only nine. Fieschi had originally had ten; but one which strayed from its companions was dashed to pieces, and the two forces were thus equalised.⁵ The engagement was one of the most singular which had ever been fought on the ocean. Even to come into contact was exceedingly difficult, and boarding was all but impossible. At one moment, a Venetian and a Genoese galley might be seen juxtaposed in full action; at the next, the former was lifted like a nutshell to the topmost crest of a mountainous billow, and its late antagonist was buried in a yawning cavity. At the close of a terrible and trying day, however, the advantage remained with Pisani. Five of the enemy's vessels only escaped. The rest and 800 prisoners, among whom was Fieschi himself, became the portion of the conqueror. Of the captives, 400 were shipped to Candia and 400 were sent to Venice,⁶ where the commander and his men were treated with that humanity which was customary among the Venetians, and which of course had in view the contingency of an exchange. The Genoese were lodged at San Biagio and elsewhere;⁷ patricians were their guards, and noble ladies ministered to their wants. The latter caused the wounds of the sufferers to be properly dressed, and superintended the relief of all their necessities; and history has preserved the names of eight of these benevolent personages.⁸

¹ Vincens, ii. 11, 12, 13; Varese, iii. 31, 7.

² Romanin, iii. 263.

³ Caresinus, 444; Sanudo, *Vite*, 680; *Memorie di Pisani*, 71.

⁴ Chinazzo, fol. 714; Sanudo, *ubi supra*; Romanin, *ubi supra*.

⁵ Chinazzo, fol. 714; Redusio, contemp. fol. 759.

⁶ Redusio, fol. 759; Sanudo, *Vite*, 681. "Morirono de' Genovesi 500 persone," says Chinazzo, fol. 714.

⁷ Romanin, iii. 264.

⁸ Anna Faliero, Caterina da Mezzo, Francesca Bragadino, Bertuzza Michieli, Margharita Michieli, Chiara Bono, Marchesina Bembo, Caterina della Preson.

After the fiercely-contested, but triumphant battle of the 30th, Pisani had some thought of carrying his victorious arms into the very heart of the Genoese capital; but the intelligence of the valuable diversion which the Stella Company of Milan was creating in the direction of San Pietro d'Arena, and of the unopposed landing and successful operations of his able lieutenant Carlo Zeno, who had been summoned from Negropont to serve under him, at Porto-Venero,¹ led him to relinquish his half-formed design; and the Captain-General turned his prows toward Dalmatia, where he had some expectation of finding the Genoese fleet, which had left the Riviera under Luciano Doria.

The remainder of 1378 was spent in an extensive cruise among the Illyric Islands and in the waters of the Levant, in the course of which the victor of Porto d'Anzo conducted a series of brilliant enterprises against various points of the Greek and Hungarian littorals. Zara and Trau, the former of which was watched with special vigilance as the medium of communication between Genoa and the Court of Buda, were twice ineffectually bombarded;² the immense strength of their works of defence defied every effort. Cattaro³ and Sebenigo⁴ were sacked (August—October). Arbo submitted without a struggle (November 10).⁵ In the continued search after Doria, the Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmora were explored, and Constantinople itself was menaced.

At the same time, Zeno continued to scour the seas with a separate detachment; and the son of the hero of Smyrna, whose earlier life had been passed in adventures worthy of Sir Bevis of Southampton or Sir Eglamour of Artois, executed his commission with rare daring and skill. Wherever this intrepid officer appeared, his arms were irresistible.⁶

In the course of the year, Pisani was employed to escort Valentina, daughter of Barnabo Visconti,⁷ to the palace of her royal spouse, Peter II. of Cyprus (June—July);⁸ and out of complaisance partly to their ally, the Venetians bombarded Famagusta, and essayed the expulsion of the Genoese from the Cypriot capital. The attempt was gallantly made; but

¹ Stella, *Annales*, 1111; Vincens, ii. 17-8.

² *Memorie di V. Pisani*, p. 85-132.

⁴ Romanin, iii. 265.

⁶ Giacomo Zeno, *Vita Caroli Zeni*: Murat. xix. 295.

⁷ Stella, *Annales*, fol. 1109; Redusio, *Chronicon*, 760.

³ Bonfinius, ii. x. 355.

⁵ Caresinus contemp. 445.

⁸ *Ibid.*

it failed in consequence of inadequate force. As the cold season approached with symptoms of unusual rigour, the captain-general desired the requisite authorisation from his government to winter at Venice. But the Senate, reasonably afraid of leaving the Istrian seaboard unsheltered, and of exposing the subjects of the Republic in that quarter to the vengeance or seductions of the enemy, put a peremptory veto upon such a proposal; and Pisani was constrained against his better judgment to brave the inclemency of the weather.

The operations of Venice on the *terra firma* against the Carrarese and his confederates, especially Gherardo, Lord of Cammino,¹ had been attended by highly flattering results. Upon the recall of Zeno, the command of the land forces, of which the flower was composed of 5000 Turks, was transferred to the Count of Collalto. The Hungarians under the Waiwode of Transylvania had again crossed the Piave on the 24th June 1378; and they reached Padua on the 26th.² On the following day, the united forces of Stephen and Carrara commenced the devastation of the March; and on the 5th July³ they sat down before Mestra, ten Italian miles⁴ north-west of Venice, about 16,000 strong. But the Government, anxious to check the progress of the Allies, determined to defend that position at every cost; and means were found to throw victuals and reinforcements into the place, which already possessed a numerous garrison. The enemy made themselves masters⁵ of the town, of the Borgo of San Lorenzo,⁶ and of the outposts, without much effort; but in the assault upon the citadel they were repulsed with the loss of 400 in killed and 1000 in wounded.⁷ The Venetians facilitated their victory by planting hives of bees on the ramparts which, upon being driven from their cells, flew in a cloud against the foe and disabled them from fighting;⁸ and the Waiwode, discouraged by that serious reverse, of which Carrara appears to have cast the odium on his lieutenant Obizi,⁹ and baffled in his expectation of reducing the fortress by famine, concluded by abandoning his ground, burning his engines, and raising the siege. The defence of Mestra against an overwhelming superiority of

¹ Redusio, fol. 762.

² Chinazzo, fol. 714.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Sanudo, *Itinerario*, 1483. This distance was equal to six English miles.

⁵ Chinazzo, *ubi supra*. This event is noticed by Pancrazio Giustiniani, *De Ven. aristocr. gestis liber*, sign. c. 5.

⁶ Redusio, fol. 764.

⁷ Chinazzo, fol. 715.

⁸ Sanudo, fol. 686.

⁹ Chinazzo, *ubi supra*.

numbers shed the brightest lustre upon the name of the Venetian podesta, Francesco Dolfino. The news was received at Venice with profound gratitude.

The anticipations for the winter of 1378 were only too exact. It set in with extraordinary severity.¹ The frost became intense. The fleet of Pisani suffered to a barely credible extent; and out of nineteen galleys six only retained their proper complements and their seaworthiness. In the beginning of 1379, however, the Venetian commander was joined by twelve others, partly built and equipped at the cost of the private admirers of Pisani,² which had been transmitted to him by order of the Senate; and this timely accession raised his squadron to eighteen sail. On the 23rd February,³ in spite of the energetic efforts of his political rivals to supersede him, Pisani was confirmed in the Captaincy-General by a resolution of the Great Council; and Michele Steno and Carlo Zeno were named his proveditors.

During the entire spring of the new year, he prosecuted his search for Doria with no better success.⁴ It was only in the early part of the summer, when Pisani, having made a fruitless exploration of the Apulian coast, had returned to Pola with a large convoy of grain which he was escorting from Brindisi, that the desired opportunity was at length thrown in his way. It was the 7th May 1379,⁵ when Doria unexpectedly presented himself in the roads of Pola, having under his orders five-and-twenty sail, inclusive of two brigantines. Pisani had just now several reasons for wishing to confine himself to the defensive. His forces were inferior, for he had not more than one-and-twenty vessels;⁶ there happened at this particular juncture to be more than an average amount of sickness among his men; and Carlo Zeno was absent on a separate expedition to the Mediterranean. He therefore expressed an opinion that it would be preferable to content himself with repelling attacks, and to postpone an action till the return of Zeno. But his prudent advice was not seconded by the remaining proveditor, who was⁷ in favour of giving battle, recognising in the circumspection of the commander merely a pusillanimity unbecoming the

¹ Gataro, *Ist. Padovana*, fol. 273; Varese, ii, 322-3.

² *Memorie*, 139-40.

³ Romanin, iii. 266.

⁴ Varese, iii, 320-1-2.

⁵ *Memorie*, 172.

⁶ Stella, *Annales*, fol. 1111.

⁷ *Memorie*, 155-63.

Venetian name. At this scandalous insinuation the fiery Captain-General flew into a paroxysm of rage; he even moved his hand toward the hilt of his sword; and it was with much ado that he restrained himself from drawing upon Steno.¹ Pisani reluctantly gave way, and, addressing the men who were nearest to him, said: "Remember, my brethren, that those who now face you are the same whom you have vanquished with so much glory on the Roman shore; let not the name of Luciano Doria terrify you; it is not the names of commanders that will decide the conflict, but Venetian hearts and Venetian hands!" He then gave the word: *He that loves Saint Mark, let him follow me.*² The attack was opened by the Sopra-Comite Vettore Cappello, who was supported by Pisani himself and Donato Zeno. The first onset was propitious to the Venetians, who behaved with their habitual intrepidity: and the victory was beginning to incline to their side when the Genoese, feigning a retreat, receded two or three miles,⁴ and succeeded by that false movement in throwing their too eager pursuers into irrecoverable confusion. Turning round upon them by a sudden and adroit manœuvre, the enemy renewed the combat with increased vigour and ferocity, and gained a complete triumph. The Captain-General, with Steno and six of the galleys, effected the narrowest escape to Parenzo.⁵ All beside was lost. Between 700 and 800 Venetians perished. 2400 were taken prisoners.⁶ Twelve Sopra-Comiti were drowned or killed; five were captured.⁷ On the other side, the losses were serious;⁸ and Doria himself was among the slain. He had fallen by the hand of Donato Zeno. It was toward the close of the fight, when he felt that victory was within his grasp, that the former raised his visor for a moment, and exclaimed to those about him at the pitch of his voice: *The foe are already vanquished; the battle is all but ours.* Zeno, who had singled out the flagship from the outset, seized the opportunity; a voice behind him, in which he recognised the accents of Pisani, incited him; and propelling his lance,⁹ the

¹ *Memorie*, 163.² *Ibid.* 164.³ Sanudo, fol. 684.⁴ *Memorie*, 167.⁵ *Ibid.* 170.⁶ Stella, *Ann.* fol. 1111.⁷ *Letter of Ambrogio Doria to F. da Carrara*, May 9, 1379; Gatara, 280.⁸ Sanudo, fol. 684. From Doria's letter to Carrara it appears that all the Venetian mercenaries captured were butchered in cold blood.⁹ Stella, *Annales*, fol. 1110.

Sopra-Comite plunged it with all his force into the throat of Doria, who instantaneously expired.¹

Whatever unfavourable presentiments Pisani might have cherished, or whatever fears might have secretly possessed him, he had not neglected throughout to impart to his followers a confidence in which he hardly perhaps participated. It had now become, however, of paramount importance to make the truth generally known, in order that the Republic herself and all her foreign dependencies might be forearmed against the triumphant enemy. The Sopra-Comite Tommaso Mocenigo² was accordingly sent to Venice with the tidings, while a second messenger was dispatched to the Morea and Levant with the same object.

The news of the terrible reverse at Pola, of which Mocenigo was made the bearer, produced a mixed sentiment of amazement and consternation.³ The sole disposable fleet of the Republic was destroyed; the enemy was within a few cannon-shots of the lagoons; and Carlo Zeno was quite out of reach. Pisani was now made to pay dearly for his greatness, his popularity, and his quick temper. All his political antagonists arrayed themselves against him. All rose from their seats in the Councils, of which they were members, and decried his negligence, precipitation, or incapacity. His old and inveterate enemy, Pietro Cornaro, whom he had twice openly insulted: his envious rival, Taddeo Giustiniani, who aspired to the captaincy-general, and who was enormously influential with the Government: the Avogadors of the Commune, who were connected by the ties of marriage or consanguinity with one of the proveditors, who had met his death at Pola: three of the Privy Council, Dolfino, Donato, and Morosini, who had been severe sufferers at Portolongo, and who nourished on that account a traditional animosity to his family: and, lastly, two of the three chiefs of the Forty, Marino Malipiero and Marco Dandolo, who were jealous of his fame, placed themselves in the foremost rank. On the motion of the Avogaria, the Great Council at once decreed the deposition of Pisani from the supreme command and his recall from Parenzo. He was brought to Venice, fettered and manacled.⁴ He was

¹ *Memorie*, 168, may be compared with Gataro, fol. 280.

² *Memorie*, 172-3; Sanudo, *Vite*, 685.

³ Sanudo, *ubi supra*.

⁴ *Memorie*, 179.

taken at his own request to the palace, where he introduced himself to the Signory. But he was immediately silenced in his attempt at self-justification, and remanded to a prison, where he was told to await his trial. On the 7th July, the Great Council having delegated its full powers to the Senate,¹ the Avogaria read before the latter the articles of impeachment, and proceeded, in due form, to move *that the accused shall be beheaded between the Red Columns.*² This proposition was negatived. The Doge himself, in concert with four of the Privy Council, next submitted that Pisani should be simply excluded from all offices and emoluments for five years, and should pay a fine of 2000 ducats.³ To this motion two amendments were suggested, one limiting the punishment to deprivation, and a second, which emanated from one of the remaining Councillors, Simone Michieli, substituting for the pecuniary mulct six months' imprisonment.⁴ Several other modifications were subsequently brought forward; but the proposition of Contarini, as amended by Michieli, was eventually carried by a trifling majority. Steno and the other culprits received their due share of punishment. To Pisani the bitterest of his rivals and foes had imputed want of firmness, not want of courage; but the provveditor Steno was suspected of something worse than indiscretion. Yet his sentence was comparatively lenient, inasmuch as his interest was more powerful, and his reputation was less dangerous.

To the segregation of Austria from the League the Republic made some sacrifices. To the detachment of Hungary herself from that formidable coalition she was prepared to sacrifice even more. With such an object in view, a negotiation was set on foot with the Court of Buda, shortly after the defeat of Pisani. But Louis required the cession of Trieste, the recognition of suzerainty to his crown on the part of the present Doge and all his successors, an annual tribute of 100,000 ducats, and half a million in ready money. His Majesty concluded by suggesting that if the immediate payment of the last sum was inconvenient, he should not object to receive as a surety for its liquidation the Ducal berretta and the other jewels of the State,⁵ and the keys of Treviso, Castelfranco,

¹ *Memorie*, 181; Sanudo, *Vite*, 685-6.

³ *Ibid.* 183.

² *Ibid.* 182.

⁴ *Ibid.* 184.

⁵ Some notion may be formed of their value from the fact that one jewel was sold in 1390 for 40,000 ducats. Sanudo, *Vite*, 777.

Conegliano, Noale, and Mestra. The legation at Buda was instructed to spare no pains in seeking a revision of these terms; but Louis, who had already, at the intercession of his consort, reduced the amount of the indemnity from a million to 500,000 ducats, refused to listen to any farther compromise; and the Senate was puzzled how to act. In the first instance, it decreed the acceptance of the conditions; but the acceptance was, on second consideration, revoked;¹ and it eventually determined, after a waste of three months in nugatory diplomacy, to stake the fortunes of the country on war.

In the tone assumed by the Court of Buda there was everything which could irritate and alarm. The suggestion respecting the hypothecation of the State jewels was a peculiarly stinging affront; and the demand of Trieste was the more ominous, that it was suspected, that in that point Louis had received his inspiration from the Austrians. The more thinking portion of the community, however, had long learned to reconcile themselves to the idea of a contest of life and death; and the Government, while it might still cling with some tenacity to the hope of a separate accommodation with Hungary, had for some time been preparing for the worst. The only question, indeed, was between two evils—a struggle mitigated by a costly and degrading concession to Louis, and one to the death; and it now appeared that the latter was the deliberate and unswerving aim of the Allies.

After their triumph at Pola, the Genoese hastened to neutralise the fruits of Pisani's successes; and finding themselves unchecked in their progress, the enemy coasted along the Venetian littoral, and advanced so far as Pelestrina, which they devastated, and where they destroyed an argosy belonging to Tommaso Mocenigo.² Having arrived in the morning, they spent the day in reconnoitring positions and in taking soundings among the shallows and canals. During the night, they lay at anchor off Brondolo, and at dawn they set sail unmolested for the Dalmatian shore. In less than a week, the authors of this daring and unparalleled aggression re-appeared. But instead of seventeen galleys, as on the preceding occasion, they seemingly had not more than six. This

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, 693.

² Caresinus contemp. 446; Stella, *Ann. Gen.* 1111.

circumstance encouraged the new generalissimo, Taddeo Giustiniani, to place himself at the head of an equal number, and with the concurrence of the Doge to issue from Venice for the purpose of repelling the invaders. He had gained only a short distance, when one of his galleys picked up a Venetian named Hieronimo Sabadia,¹ who had escaped from the enemy, and who was swimming toward Malamocco with all his might, with the startling report that the small detachment which had been seen was merely a decoy, and that the whole Genoese fleet of forty-seven sail² under Pietro Doria, having left Zara on the 2nd of August, and burned Grado (Aug. 3), Omago, Rovigno, and Caorlo (Aug. 4),³ was immediately behind. Hereupon Giustiniani hurriedly returned to port; and he had barely reached shelter when, on the 6th, the enemy hove in sight of Lido. But their approach had been happily anticipated by the foresight of the Government; they found the passage completely dammed up with sunken vessels, palisades, and chains; and they were obliged to fore-sake the notion of forcing that entrance. They then made for Malamocco; but the port was similarly blocked. The sole remaining chance of penetrating the Sand-Girdle, which formed an impassable cincture round the city, was by the narrow aperture at Brondolo, the port of Chioggia. At Brondolo, the timely precaution used at the two more northerly entrances had been unfortunately postponed from a regard to the convenience of trade; the position was easily carried. Little Chioggia was also taken without difficulty; and the Genoese found themselves at the front of the bridge, which conducted to Great Chioggia. But the latter was a conquest which presented a task infinitely more formidable. For this point had been selected by the Venetian strategists as the most eligible for making a stand; and the head of the bridge was strongly defended by bastions and redoubts with cannon. The geographical configuration of the city, and the narrowness of its superficial area, make it easy to imagine the anguish with which the intrusion of a foreign invader on Venetian ground inspired the Senate and the people. Venice was a prey to terror and stupefaction.

¹ *Chroniche Veneziane dall' origine della citta sin al anno 1616*, p. 303, Add. MSS. 8580.

² *Copy of a letter written by a Genoese*, 13th Feb. 1381, Murat. xxii. 726-7.

³ Sanudo, *Vite*, 687-8; see also *ibid.* fol. 743.

The day had been, when a Flemish peer was forced upon the Greeks by the united arms of Venice and France, when the streets of Buda were hedged with the Militia of the Six Wards, sent to uphold the claims of the son of a Morosini, and when the murder of Andrew of Naples was avenged by Hungarian influence. It was not long since, that a Visconti had planted his heel on the neck of Genoa, and that Padua had kneeled as a suppliant at the feet of the Doge Contarini. There was only one soil and one nationality which had never been violated; and Italy and Europe were prepared to witness without much sympathy the apparently forthcoming submission of these proud Islanders of the Adriatic to the common lot.

Meanwhile, a new Hungarian army, having crossed the Piave, overran with comparative ease a Province, from which the Republic had in the imminence of her peril found it necessary to withdraw the bulk of her garrisons and troops. Royal forces successively occupied Cittadella, Bassano, Campo-San-Pietro, Mirano, Moranzano on the Brenta, and the Tower of Bebe. Treviso was hemmed in. Finally, the loss of the Castle of Loredò, which succumbed after a protracted resistance, destroyed the sole remaining resource of the Republic in the direction of the *terra firma* by intercepting the supplies, which the Marquis of Ferrara had heretofore transmitted through that channel.

At the same time, the Carrarese, who was conscious that he was playing his last stake, and that, in the event of failure, no mercy was to be expected at the hands of the Senate, had laboured with desperate force of will and untiring assiduity at the establishment of a new water communication between Padua and Chioggia, the most probable theatre of war, for the purpose of facilitating the transit of troops, munitions, and victuals; and the small flotilla which guarded the contiguous canal was too weak to interrupt these works, or to prevent his correspondence with Doria. In the early part of August, the preparations of Lord Francesco were finished; and on the 11th, the first assault was given to the Bridge of Chioggia.¹ The Allies numbered about 24,000. The garrison of the town, where Pietro Emo, of Trevisan celebrity, officiated as Podesta and Captain, exceeded not 3500.²

¹ Neri di Donato, *Cronica Senese*; Murat. xv. fol. 264.

² Gataro, fol. 298.

The troops of Emo behaved admirably; and during six days they continued to repel their adversaries with undaunted resolution and unrelaxed energy. A tremendous cannonade was kept up on both sides. On the 13th, 14th, and 15th, the roar of the artillery was almost incessant. All was going tolerably well.¹ Reinforcements had been received from Venice. The enemy, whose losses were already large, were beginning to wince under the galling fire which proceeded from the batteries of Emo, when an accident changed the fortune of the day. On the 16th,² an alarm was suddenly spread among the troops of the Podesta, that the bridge behind them was in flames. It was a fire-ship, of which the combustion in the Canal of Santa Caterina had diffused the erroneous impression. The Genoese caught and echoed the cry, and renewed their flagging exertions with fresh ardour. They were mowed down by the guns as they advanced; the carnage was terrific. Still they continued to come up. The Venetians began to lose ground and to fall back upon the bridge. They receded a little and a little more. It was in vain that Emo and fifty chosen men-at-arms disputed the front with desperate tenacity and transcendent heroism, foot to foot and hand to hand. The position was slowly forced. The Allies were upon the bridge. The Venetians quickened their retrograde pace. In their haste, they omitted to destroy the communication; and they entered the gates pell-mell with their pursuers.

Thus Chioggia fell in the forenoon. The flags of Carrara, Genoa, and Hungary were planted at three separate points. About 860 Venetians were killed. Nearly 4000 were taken prisoners.³ The losses of the Allies were more than proportionably heavier: yet they were masters of the situation. The town was abandoned to pillage; but female honour was held sacred. The sum raised by the victors upon ransoms was enormous. Emo himself gave 3000 ducats;⁴ and Taddeo Giustiniani did not probably escape under a smaller amount. An unfortunate man, named Matteo Fasuolo, was obliged to purchase his liberty with 200 ducats, and was robbed in addition of 20,000 *lire*, his entire fortune.⁵

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, 689.

² Copy of a letter written by a Genoese, quoted textually by Sanudo, 726; Pugliola, *Chron. di Bologna*, fol. 521; Stella, *Annales*, fol. 1112.

³ Chinazzo, fol. 726.

⁴ Romanin, iii. 275.

⁵ Romanin, iii. 282. Sanudo, *Vite*, 691, estimates Carrara's share of the booty at 20,000 ducats; see also Gataro, fol. 302.

No description can adequately paint the shock, which the arrival of the disastrous news at Venice about midnight afforded to the public mind. The bell of the Campanile was tolled. There was a rush to St. Mark's, where the woful intelligence was imparted to the assembled multitude. It bred a singularly profound sensation. In some places were heard the sobs and moans of women, who already began to tremble for the safety of their children and their own honour. Elsewhere others were wringing their hands, and tearing their hair. There were found, too, men who yielded to an effeminate and craven fear, and even such as, consulting only their own sordid interests, hastened to secrete their money and trinkets.¹ But more generally the cry was adopted, "that the State cannot be lost while those remain who can man a galley and handle a pike." The Government preserved an exemplarily calm and collected demeanour. The venerable Contarini, who was approaching the completion of his seventy-second² year, was a model of constancy and equanimity. Neither the Great Council nor the Senate allowed that there was yet reason to despond. The resources of the Republic were exceedingly straitened, and the supply of food was painfully scanty; but Venetian devotion felt itself a match for any emergency. A special envoy had long since departed in quest of Carlo Zeno, of whose movements since his separation from Pisani nothing was with certainty known; and his arrival, which was to be expected from day to day, was sufficient to turn the scale. Nevertheless, it was thought expedient, before a levy in mass and other extreme measures were sanctioned, to test for the last time the effect of negotiation. Overtures were addressed, in the first instance, to the Lord of Padua; and that Prince, who had differed from his ally throughout on the point of tactics, and who was beginning to harbour private misgivings as to the final issue of the operations, declared himself not unwilling to treat on certain conditions; but, with characteristic tact he shifted the responsibility and possible odium of an answer upon the shoulders of his ally. Doria, who partly believed that Venice was to be conquered in Chioggia, and that the former was all but in his power, rejected with bitter scorn the idea of a diplomatic settlement.

¹ Romanin, iii. 276.

² Sanudo, 694.

“By God’s faith, my Lords of Venice,”¹ he cried, “ye shall have no peace from the Lord of Padua, nor from our Commune of Genoa, until I have put a bit into the mouths of the horses of your Evangelist Saint Mark. When they have been bridled, you shall then, in sooth, have a good peace; and this is our purpose, and that of our Commune.” Some Genoese prisoners of rank accompanied the embassy: their unconditional release was offered as a bait. “As for these captives my brethren,” resumed he, “take them back; I want them not: for in a few days I am coming to release from your prisons them and the rest.”²

The harsh and supercilious manner in which the Genoese had met her advances, coupled with the failure of the negotiations at Buda, obviously left the Republic no option but a war to the last gasp. The Arrengo bell was rung; the Popular Assembly was called together; and, in the name of the Doge, Pietro Mocenigo depicted the stupendous magnitude of the present peril. He told his hearers without concealment or colouring that it had become incumbent on all to rally round the national standard, and to unite for the protection of their hearths and homes. All were invited to aid the Government with their wisdom and counsel. There was, however, only one opinion and one cry:—“Let us arm ourselves; let us equip and mount what galleys are in the Arsenal; let us go forth; it is better to perish in the defence of our country than to perish here through want.”

An universal conscription was ordered. New taxes were imposed. The salaries of the magistrates and civil functionaries were suspended.³ The transaction of business and the exercise of professions were at an end. Property fell to a fourth of its former value. The crisis was such as had never yet been known.

To meet the unprecedented pressure, the imposts which had been augmented or created were not found adequate. A new loan at five per cent., to which Venetian citizens alone were allowed to contribute, was decreed; and a valuation of the rateable property of the six wards shewed 6,294,040

¹ Chinazzo, fol. 727; *Ad Hist. Cortus., Addit. Secundum*, xii. 985; 17 Aug. 1379.

² *Copy of a letter written by a Genoese*, Feb. 13, 1381; Murat. xxii. 730 *et seq.*; A. Gataro, contemp. fol. 306.

³ Romanin, iii. 277.

*lire*¹ *di piccoli*. Among the principal subscribers were the Doge, 34,000 *lire*, of which 20,000 for the Throne; Federigo Cornaro, 60,000; Federigo Cornaro, the son of Andrea, 40,000; Benedetto Garzoni, 50,000; Giovanni de' Bagni, 50,000; Marino Lioni, 40,000; Giovanni Trevisano, the rich Procurator,² 50,000; Daniello Dolfino, 35,000; Michele Morosini, 38,000; Reniero Morosini, 37,000; Paolo Morosini, and Son, 32,000; Lorenzo Morosini, 25,000; Giovanni Morosini, 25,000; Vettore Pisani, 1000. An apothecary, Marco Cicogna, equipped a ship, presented all his property to the Republic, and entered the ranks as a simple volunteer.

The fortification of the City with earthworks commenced forthwith; the lines of defence were drawn from Lido to Santo Spirito; and two wooden towers were constructed at the former point to guard the pass of San Nicolo.

A new Captain-General was to be elected, and the Government at first made overtures to Sir John Hawkwood,³ who declined the offer, as he had a previous one, on the ground that the Lord of Padua was his friend. The place was then given to Taddeo Giustiniani. But the people refused to serve under any leader but one; and they demanded with clamorous and menacing shouts the enlargement of Vettore Pisani. So dioramic had been the course of events that on Thursday, the 18th August, two days after the loss of Chioggia, the Senate met to deliberate upon this urgent affair; and the Tribunal concluded by submitting to the popular wishes in spite of the disloyal and factious opposition of a certain party. The whole day had been consumed in debate, and it was late in the evening when the Senators deputed by their colleagues, followed by the exulting populace, arrived at the prison to apprise Pisani of the decision, and to inform him that the College desired his immediate presence. The noble captive, of whose sentence hardly the moiety had expired, received the announcement without perceptible emotion; and he placidly replied that, as he should prefer to pass the night where he

¹ Romanin, iii. 280. See also Gallicioli, *Memorie Venete*, ii. 99-183. Sestiero di Castello, 1,300,683 *lire*; San Marco, 1,506,844; Canalreggio, 1,106,600; Dorso-duro, 627,700; Santa Croce, 711,500; San Polo, 1,040,703. But it is clear that the amount was not actually a payment, and was, as above put, a return of the assessable estate, as farther contributions were required in December of the same year. See *infra*.

² Sanudo, fol. 695.

³ Originally an Essex yeoman and a vassal of the seventh Earl of Oxford of the De Vere family. He is the *Falcone in Bosco* of the historian Villani.

was in prayer and reflection, he would wait on the Signory in the morning.¹

In person, Pisani was of middle stature,² strongly built, of a robust constitution, and of a muscular frame. From his earliest boyhood, he had discovered a taste for athletic exercises, in which he was warmly encouraged by his father. Vettore acquired an extraordinary proficiency in rowing, wrestling, archery, and artillery-practice. For the study of letters he displayed small relish.³ His head was large, and his brow was broad and capacious; but his lower features were thin and delicately chiselled. He presents himself in the full-length statue at San Antonio with his hair cropped short under a skull-cap, and his beard flowing. His eyes were dark, lustrous, and quick; and their ordinary expression was mild and agreeable. His countenance was open and cheerful. He was by nature irascible, but forgiving; his manners were frank, even to bluntness. He was the idol of the people, who were fond of calling him their Father;⁴ and by his own class he was viewed with corresponding 'dislike and mistrust. No man, perhaps, had fewer friends among his equals, or more numerous admirers among the community at large.

At daybreak⁵ on Friday, the 19th August,⁶ the Senatorial delegates and the people, accompanied by Michele Steno and the other *Sopra-Comiti*,⁷ to whom grace had also been extended, reappeared at the gates of the dungeon. Pisani, wearing his habitual aspect of hilarity and good humour, soon appeared at the doorway; and having been lifted on the shoulders of some sailors, he was borne in triumph to the Palace amid vociferous cries of *Viva Il Nostro Vettore! Viva Vettore Pisani!* to which he chidingly responded, *Viva San Marco!*⁸ On the staircase he was met by the Doge and the Senators, who graciously and affectionately saluted him. Having heard Mass and received the sacrament in Saint Nicholas's Chapel, Pisani and the College proceeded to business, and remained closeted together for some time. The people stayed outside the building, and continued to shout till their throats were hoarse. From the palace Pisani was

¹ Gataro contemp. folio 312.

³ *Ibid.* 5.

⁵ *Ibid.* 198.

⁷ *Memorie*, 199.

² *Memorie*, 359.

⁴ *Ibid.* 194 and 221.

⁶ Chinazzo, fol. 728.

⁸ Gataro, fol. 312 D.

carried in the same manner to his own residence at San Fantino, of which he had not crossed the threshold since May 1378; during his captivity his father had gone to the grave in obscurity, and he had lost his brother Bertucci; it was a melancholy experience, that of the hero for the few remaining hours of the day, which he spent at home.¹

On the route a singular adventure awaited him. He was passing in his triumphal progress the Campanile of Saint Mark,² when he was suddenly accosted by his old pilot Marino Corbaro, a remarkably able seaman, but an incurable grumbler and a morbid malcontent. Corbaro, who had been implicated to some extent in the Faliero Conspiracy, was full of the traditions of 1355; and it is probable if he had lived in less critical times, his inflammatory doctrines and his revolutionary opinions would have sent him to the Red Columns. This man, whom Pisani humoured in many crotchets and eccentricities, elbowed his way through the crowd, and as he drew near to his patron, cried out in stentorian tones—"Now is the time, compadre, for revenging yourself by seizing the dictatorship of this City. Behold, all are at your service; all are willing at this very instant to proclaim you prince, if you choose!" He had barely finished the sentence, when Pisani dealt the speaker a blow with his clenched fist in the cheek, and burst into a volley of indignant declamation. Then turning to those about him, and raising his voice to a still louder key, he exclaimed³—"Let none who wish me well say, *Viva Pisani!* but, *Viva San Marco!*" But the populace then shouted, *Viva San Marco e Vettore Pisani! Viva il Pisani ch' è nostro padre!* The throng was so dense, that from Saint Mark's to San Fantino it would have been difficult to find an unoccupied spot of earth "large enough to hold a grain of millet."⁴

But it soon transpired that Pisani had been merely appointed Governor of Lido, and that the command of the navy rested with Giustiniani. This evasive compromise excited the wrath of the people, who declared that they reposed confidence in him alone, and would execute his

¹ "Ma come non sono mai le umane consolazioni compite, tristamente passo in casa sua le poche ore di quel dì, che pote dimorarvi nella rimembranza della morte del padre succeduta l' anno scorso nell' oscurità de' suoi ultimi giorni, e della mancanza di Bertuccio Pisani suo fratello."—*Mem.* 208-9.

² *Ibid.* 206.

³ *Ibid.* 207.

⁴ Sanudo, 691.

bidding, and none other. "Good Master," said the spokesman of a deputation of 600 citizens from Torcello, Maggiorbo, and Burano, "we are yours; command us as you will." "Brethren and friends," rejoined the General, "go to the Signory; they will counsel you best what to do." The Government alleged that the services of the popular favourite were more particularly required at Lido; but the petitioners knew their power and used it. As they left the palace, they threw down their banners, and said, with many oaths and threats, that they would rather be cut in pieces than serve under Messer Taddeo. The College was awed into compliance; and Pisani received his commission as Captain-General of all the forces of the Republic by land and by sea (August 20).¹

The fall of Chioggia on the 16th had not been followed up by any important consequences; and it happened, fortunately for the Republic, that differences arose between Doria and the Carrarese in respect to ulterior movements. The latter earnestly represented the folly of delay; but Doria doggedly persisted in his original plan of operations. Sabellico the historian explains for us how this was by saying, that God does not shew everything to one man.

The Genoese commander, however, had gradually pushed forward his outposts to Poveja and Malamocco, on the latter of which he erected a battery. This step brought the enemy within three miles of the capital. On a clear day, the peals of the great bell of Venice were audible at the Malamocchese redoubts; and many stray shots from the enemy's cannon were picked up at Santo Spirito.²

The first efforts of Pisani were directed to a provision for the safety of the metropolis, to the reorganization of the navy, and to the conversion of some thousands of raw recruits into tolerably efficient soldiers and sailors. The skeletons of forty galleys³ were taken from the Arsenal; and the equipment of two-thirds of the number was completed in three days. The city glowed with ardour and enthusiasm. The Chamber of the Armament, where the names of volunteers were registered for the twin services, was crowded to excess.⁴ Pisani, assisted by Steno, often attended in person, and drew

¹ *Croniche Veneziane*, ii. 310, Add. MSS. Brit. Mus. 8580.

² *Memorie*, 213.

³ Romanin, iii. 280.

⁴ Gataro, fol. 314.

up the lists for the most part with his own hand. All classes hastened to enrol themselves. Painters quitted their studios, in order that they might be initiated in the rudiments of naval discipline on the Giudecca; cutlers and apothecaries closed their workshops, and devoted their time to drilling and exercise. Artisans brought their savings; women plucked the jewels from their dresses, and begged the Signory to dispose of them as they would. The two wooden toys which Giustiniani, during his tenure of office, had constructed on either side of the Port of Lido, were pronounced by his successor perfectly useless; they were now demolished; and on their site were marked out the foundations of two tall towers of solid masonry. The destruction of his own work naturally exasperated Giustiniani; and this influential nobleman, secretly tampering with those who were co-operating with the new Captain-General, persuaded them to stand aloof. Pisani, with admirable presence of mind, seized a trowel, and with the words, *He that loves Saint Mark, let him follow me*, laid the first stone with his own hands; and the recusants, blushing at their misconduct, immediately returned to the post of duty. The two fortresses, which were christened the Castles of San Andrea and San Nicolo,¹ were finished in the marvellously short space of four days.² The palisade and earthwork, which Giustiniani had thrown up round the City, were next removed; and in their room two lofty and massive stone walls were built from Lido to Santo Spirito in the course of a fortnight.³ At the same time the best dispositions were made by the Captain-General in regard to the forces which had now become available. Three large men-of-war with guns of the heaviest calibre were confided by Pisani with his characteristic generosity to Giustiniani. The shallops and skiffs, which were designed for surprises and other light service, were consigned to Giovanni Barbarigo. Federigo Cornaro was stationed with a certain number of galleys at Santo Spirito. The defence of the Lazaretto, San Clemente, Sant' Elena, and the neighbourhood, was intrusted to Nicolo Gallicano.⁴ The strand from Lido to Malamocco, behind the inner wall, was occupied by between 7000 and 8000 men⁵

¹ *Memorie*, 226.

³ *Ibid.* fol. 719.

⁵ Sanudo, fol. 703. A return made to the College on the 13th of February shewed 8000.

² Chinazzo, fol. 729.

⁴ *Memorie*, 226-9.

under Jacopo Cavalli, who was still in Venetian pay. In every direction, the points more exposed to the enemy were protected by ponderous bars, which effectually obstructed the passage of vessels through the Canals.

The wisdom of the measures dictated by Pisani, and the execution of which that great man personally superintended to a large extent, speedily became apparent. On the 24th August,¹ a Genoese force under Ambrogio Doria effected a landing a little below San Nicolo, while a similar attack was directed by the lieutenant of the Carrarese on Santo Spirito and Santa Marta. But the aggressors were repulsed at both points with wonderful gallantry; the Venetians maintained their ground with firmness; and an attempt on the part of the Allies to effect a junction, and to open a combined assault on the capital, was frustrated by the wakeful vigilance of Pisani and the activity of Corbaro² who, in his new appointment of Vice-Admiral of Lido, had forgotten the hard knuckles of his chief. The defeat of this bold and well-concerted stratagem, which its projectors had hoped to bring to maturity under cover of the darkness, was of momentous importance. It raised the siege of Venice. The Carrarese, disgusted by the failure, almost immediately withdrew his troops under the pretext, that he had been summoned to Treviso by the lieutenant of Louis; and Doria, imitating his example, relinquished in the early part of October the undertaking in which he had so sanguinely embarked, destroyed all his works at Malamocco, and once more concentrated himself at Chioggia, where he determined to await the reduction of Venice by famine.

The situation of that capital was daily becoming more hopeless and insupportable. So desperate was the posture of affairs that some members of Council even made a motion for emigrating from the lagoons, and seeking a new home in Candia or Negropont. But this wild proposition was instantaneously negatived; and the Venetians declared "that sooner than abandon their city they would bury themselves under her ruins."

The dearth of food—except (we must remember) fish and wildfowl, on which the population could always depend—

¹ *Memorie*, 234.

² *Ibid.* 240-1.

was of course proportionate to its scarcity.¹ But by successful sorties² the supplies sent from Padua and elsewhere to the Genoese camp were occasionally intercepted; and by these means the doom of the Venetians was retarded. But a large proportion of the people were famishing; and even in the houses of the better classes it was far from rare to see the members of a family partaking of the last loaf, not knowing whence the next was to come. The nobility, however, from motives which we shall not too narrowly scrutinise, exhibited on this occasion and amid this distress the most unreserved sympathy with their poorer countrymen, and alleviated their privations to the utmost extent of their power. "Go," said Pietro Mocenigo, in the name of the Doge, to the Popular Assembly—"Go, all who are pressed by hunger, to the dwellings of the patricians; there you will find friends and brethren, who will divide with you their last crust!"³ Thus passed October, November, and a portion of the ensuing month. Carlo Zeno had not yet been signalled. Nevertheless, by some intercepted correspondence, which was fortunately discovered at this juncture, light had at length been thrown on the movements of that officer. It appeared from a letter, which was found among others on the persons of the passengers of a captured vessel,⁴ that Zeno had achieved during the summer and autumn the most splendid triumphs for his country; that the terror of his name was spread from the Riviera to the Golden Horn; that so recently as the 25th October last he had secured a Genoese galleon, valued at 300,000 ducats; and that at the present moment he was lying off Canea. This gratifying and consolatory intelligence enabled the Signory to breathe more freely; and on the 16th November, Luigi Morosini⁵ was dispatched to command the loiterer, under pain of the severest displeasure of his Government, to hasten to the rescue of his fellow-citizens.

Almost concurrently with the accidental receipt of advices respecting Zeno and the Mediterranean squadron, an incident occurred which inspired the desponding population of the Dogado with additional courage. At the head of a considerable number of his small craft, Giovanni Barbarigo, watching

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, 724. See likewise Chinazzo, fol. 732, and Caroldo, folio 122, Harl. MSS. 5020.

² Sanudo, fol. 698.

³ Marco Barbaro, quoted by Romanin, iii. 277.

⁴ Sanudo, fol. 697.

⁵ *Ibid.* 698.

his opportunity, captured three of the enemy's vessels, dragged them into the shallows, and made them prize, killing several Genoese in the conflict, and taking 150 prisoners.¹ This exploit, which won a factitious degree of applause, amounted to a resumption of the offensive; its effect was highly exhilarating; and Pisani, who had already made two or three unsuccessful explorations at Pelestrina and Brondolo with a small reconnoitring force,² recommended³ the Government to follow up the triumph of Barbarigo by concentrating its strength, and essaying the recovery of Chioggia. He allowed that the chances of failure were not slight, and that much blood would be spilled in the attempt. But he remarked that the capital had become all but untenable, that the pressure of hunger and misery was daily on the increase, and that it was only a choice between two evils which remained to them; and he urged that the minor was the adoption of the hazardous and decisive step which he was counselling. From observations and experiments which he had been enabled to make,⁴ he learned that Doria had at least 30,000 men, about fifty galleys, between 700 and 800 light craft, ample supplies, and almost inexhaustible resources of every kind. The superiority of numbers was therefore overwhelming; but, on the other hand, the expectation was warrantable, that before the time had come for forming the siege of Chioggia, Zeno would have arrived. The advice of the Captain-General, which was echoed by Jacopo Cavalli,⁵ was ultimately accepted; and it was resolved to evoke the whole latent energy of the Republic in this final effort, by affording the keenest stimulus to Venetian patriotism. On the 1st December,⁶ the Senate published a decree that of those families of plebeian rank, who should most liberally meet the present exigency by the proffer of their persons and estates, thirty should be summoned after the Peace to the Great Council; that 5000 ducats of gold should be distributed yearly among those who were not elected, and their heirs for ever;⁷ that every foreign merchant who should display peculiar zeal and affection for the Republic

¹ Romanin, iii. 284.

² *Memorie di V. P.* 254. In one of these reconnoitres Pisani lost ten barks and thirty men, and Antonio Gradenigo, the Doge's nephew, perished.

³ *Memorie*, 261.

⁴ *Memorie di V. P.* 261.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Romanin, iii. 280, who quotes *Misti Senato*, p. 85 *all' Archivio*.

⁷ Chinazzo, fol. 733; Caresinus, fol. 466.

should be admitted to the full privileges of citizenship; and that, on the other hand, such Venetians as might absent themselves with the design of eluding a participation in the common burdens and hardships should be held by that act to have forfeited all their civil rights.

This measure, which had been initiated by the War Department, and had been thence introduced into the Pregadi by Zaccaria Contarini,¹ was approved by the Great Council in the early part of the same month. It yielded immediate fruit. A list of seventy-five candidates for hereditary honours was speedily completed. Some offered money, some personal service or the service of their children and relatives; some brought galleys. The Grand Chancellor Caresinus and his brother inscribed their names for 500 ducats of gold.² The two sons of the ex-Chancellor Ravegnani gave an equal amount. Bernardino Garzoni contributed 200 ducats of gold toward a fund for the widows and children of the slain, a month's pay for the arbalisters of the Doge's galley, a fortnight's stipend for the armaments of twenty-five others, two *cocche*, the interest of 50,000 *lire di piccoli*³ and of any other investments into which he might enter between the present date and the close of the war, and the services of his three sons. Bartolomeo Paruta, a furrier, volunteered two galleys and sixty arbalisters, a month's pay for 120 oarsmen, and the services of his brother Zanino with ten men-at-arms. Matteo Fasuolo, who had been reduced to beggary by the loss of Chioggia, presented his two sons, and offered them, as the only treasures which he now boasted, to the Signory. Independently of personal and other service, and the equipment and maintenance of certain men-at-arms, till the Peace, Francesco da Mezzo subscribed a sum of 10,000 *lire di piccoli*.

The Doge, who was just on the verge of seventy-three, but who was in a hale old age, signified his wish to assume the supreme command of the expedition; and he named Pisani his lieutenant, with the title of Admiral and Vice-Captain-General.³ During his absence the College was invested with full powers.⁴ Exclusively of sixty barks and four

¹ Compare Sanudo, fol. 701, with *ibid.* fol. 740 and 744.

² Chinazzo, 733-8; Gataro, fol. 326-32; Caroldo, fol. 111-12, Harl. MSS. 5020.

³ Gataro contemp. 342.

⁴ Consisting of the Privy Council, the three Chiefs of the Ten, the three Chiefs of the Criminal Quarantia, the Avogadors of the Commune, and probably the *Savii alla guerra*.

hundred boats of all builds and dimensions,¹ thirty-four galleys were equipped,² and thirty-four patricians were commissioned as their captains. It was the same number which Sebastiano Ziani had led in 1177 to Salboro. The day for the departure had not yet been definitely fixed, when rumours reached the Signory that grave dissensions had arisen in Chioggia, and that the population was in revolt against the Genoese. Pisani protested under such circumstances against the slightest unnecessary delay,³ and the 23rd December was then named.

On that morning a proclamation issued in the name of the Doge, that all should be in their galleys and at their posts at noon, under pain of death.⁴ The armament was divided into three parts. The van, consisting of fourteen galleys, was confided to Pisani; the Doge, assisted by Cavalli, commanded in the centre; and Federigo Cornaro, *detto* Collostorto, brought up the rear with ten men-of-war.⁵ At the hour of vespers, his Serenity, with certain members of the Government, Pisani, and the other leaders of the enterprise, attended the celebration of an extraordinary mass in the Church of Saint Mark; ⁶ it was not till nearly eight o'clock ⁷ that Contarini mounted his barge, and ordered the great banner of Venice to be unfurled—the same, it was remembered, which had witnessed the triumph of the Signory over Frederic Barbarossa.⁸ The whole process had been conducted rapidly and noiselessly. The night was beautifully bright and calm, a soft and propitious breeze was blowing,⁹ and the weather was much milder than it had been. The squadron weighed anchor at a little after eight from Sopra-Porto; the galleys of Vettore Pisani and Taddeo Giustiniani led the way: while Barbarigo, with some of his lighter craft, was ordered to take the route of the Canal,¹⁰ with a view of cutting off the supplies of Doria from the *terra firma*. The Venetian fleet, however, had barely lost sight of Lido, when it found itself enveloped in a dense black mist:¹¹ and the Doge and his companions began to entertain the most painful misgivings as to the success of their noble and adventurous undertaking.

¹ *Memorie di Pisani*, 268.

² Caresinus contemp. fol. 450; Sanudo, fol. 695

³ *Mem di V. P.* 266-7.

⁴ Sanudo, fol. 698.

⁵ *Mcm.* 268-9.

⁶ Caresinus, fol. 450.

⁷ Sanudo, fol. 699.

⁸ Chinazzo, fol. 733.

⁹ Caresinus, 450.

¹⁰ Caresinus, *loco citato*; Sanudo, fol. 701.

¹¹ Caresinus, *ubi supra*.

But their suspense was brief; the fog speedily disappeared; the atmosphere recovered its clearness; and the expedition arrived without farther hindrance at the Pass of Chioggia, at the southern extremity of Pelestrina. It was ten o'clock.¹

The strategical plan laid down by Pisani, and approved by the Signory, was simple and masterly. Inasmuch as it was to become a question of a small force, which laboured under serious impediments, coping with one superior to it in resources, numbers, and position, his proposal was, instead of plunging precipitately into hostilities, to take advantage of the blind confidence and self-sufficiency of Doria, and to imprison the Genoese in their own lines by the obstruction of the remaining outlets to the open sea by the Straits of Chioggia, Brondolo, and the Canal of Lombardy. This scheme was not less attractive than prudent. If it proved itself successful, it unavoidably involved the enemy in the very fate which they had reserved for the Republic: while it left the Venetians at full liberty to assume the offensive, so soon as Zeno should arrive. The College kept itself in as constant communication as possible with headquarters, and there is a mandate to Giovanni Barbarigo in the course of December to come to the capital to confer with the members of the provisional Executive,² which appears to have been sitting day and night in the presence of the acute crisis.

Since its abandonment by Doria in October, Pelestrina had remained in the hands of the Republic, and Pisani, anxious to be in complete command of the Strait of Chioggia, landed 4800 men, on the morning of the 22nd at dawn, on the Brondolese shore. The weather was again somewhat foggy; but the Genoese, speedily perceiving this movement, and appreciating its object, issued from Chioggia in great force; the troops of Pisani were obliged to re-embark in disorder, leaving behind them no fewer than 600 in killed, drowned, and prisoners; and the bastion, of which they had laid the foundations, was totally destroyed. But

¹ Sanudo, fol. 699.

² " *Consiliarii, Rectores, et Collegium Venetiarum* :

"Mandamus vobis, quatenus vos personaliter cum Ganzarolis vestris statim venire debeatis Venetias et sine morâ, ad loquendum cum Collegio quod stat de nocte in Palatio, tenendo bene vestros homines in Ganzarolis; quia istud quod scribimus est pro bonâ causâ."

in the late manœuvre Pisani had had a double design; and one of these two purposes was perfectly answered. For in the meantime, under that cover, a small naval detachment contrived to plant transversely, on the Pelestrinese side of the channel, a huge hulk; and the Genoese, in hastening to oppose the operation, unconsciously assisted it by setting fire to the *coccha*, the wreck of which disappeared in the water and still more effectually barricaded the passage. The first layer of an artificial dyke was thus formed, upon which the light craft of Barbarigo proceeded to pile stones, marble, and granite; strong girding chains were added; and in the course of the 24th the Strait of Chioggia was entirely choked and dammed both on the Pelestrinese and Brondolese shores.

But this gratifying result had not been achieved without severe sacrifice of life, and the service was unprecedentedly arduous and harassing. The volunteers, who had been almost incessantly under a galling and murderous fire from the enemy's batteries, began at this early stage to repine. They were badly armed and badly fed. They were submitting to hardships from which even the most inured veterans might shrink. In spite of the bitterly cold weather which was prevailing, they were constantly up to their waists in water, and in perpetual danger of being drowned. Their companions were being mowed down on every side like hay. They declared that it was more than flesh and blood could bear; their constitutions were sinking under the fatigue and exposure; and they querulously demanded leave to return home. A serious affray occurred between the German and English volunteers, and the sands at Pelestrina were strown with corpses; and some time elapsed, before the difficulty and danger could be averted,¹ and order and discipline restored. The English division, of which William Gold was constable-general, was particularly vociferous and dissatisfied, although Gold did his best to pacify and control them. Pisani, who was an unshrinking partaker in all the perils and toils of his humbler comrades and fellow-citizens, saw that great firmness would be requisite to check this natural but ill-timed outburst of feeling. He demonstrated to the murmurers the vital importance of the undertaking,

¹ Cal. of State Papers, 1864, 28-9.

contrasting it with the absolute folly of the course which they desired to pursue; and he dexterously silenced them by persuading the Doge to swear on his sword that he, "although he was toward eighty years of age, would never return to Venice, unless Chioggia was regained." It was the day before Christmas.

It was reasonable to presume that the Genoese, when they were awakened to a full sense of their highly critical situation, would make a desperate struggle to extricate themselves; and promptitude was therefore the sole guarantee for success. On the 24th, two hulks were submerged in the port of Brondolo under the eye of Cornaro; they were similarly overlaid and similarly secured with booms. Doria, who had been obstinately clinging to a foregone conclusion that the Venetians would attempt nothing of consequence before the appearance of Zeno, had not till now thoroughly penetrated the motives of Pisani; he immediately dispatched fourteen galleys to crush Cornaro, who had only four. But Pisani forthwith brought up ten others, which offered an invincible front to the enemy; and Cornaro, thus covered by his chief, succeeded admirably in his enterprise in the teeth of the Genoese and in defiance of their artillery at Brondolo.

On the same day, the Venetian engineers began the construction of a fort at Fossone, on the southern shore of the port of Brondolo, and facing the convent which Doria had transformed into a citadel, and had studded with artillery; and notwithstanding the raking volleys of the bombards from the opposite side the work was in an advanced stage toward completion on the 29th. The new castle of Fossone, which was christened the *Lova*, and which was designed as a counterpoise to that of Brondolo, was mounted with cannon of the largest calibre. The *Trevisana* discharged stones of 195 pounds weight; the *Vittoria* was of slightly inferior capacity;¹ but neither was susceptible of being fired more than once in four-and-twenty hours. On the 25th or 26th December, the Canal of Lombardy was likewise rendered impervious; and thus, within a week from the date of his arrival, Chioggia might be pronounced in a state of blockade.

It was a stupendous feat which the defenders had accom-

¹ Formaleoni, *Sulla nautica antica de' Veneziani*, 24.

plished in the face of a resistance which, as their labours proceeded, became more and more strenuous. A severer ordeal for men, untrained to toil and privation, could not easily be imagined. But there was a limit to human endurance. On the 29th, the condition of the Venetian troops reached its climax of misery. They were placed upon half rations; the cold was piercing; and they were obliged to keep continuous watch at the dykes, where they came into deadly collision day by day with the enemy. The officers, the arbalisters, the oarsmen, alike declared that they would brave all consequences, and return to Venice without farther delay. For a moment, the resolution of Pisani himself was shaken; even his iron nerve and tough sinews were beginning to give way. But, suppressing by a powerful effort his own misgivings, he summoned up all his courage and energy, and besought his companions-in-arms to exercise a little more patience. The example of the Doge and the stimulating accents of his lieutenant prevailed; and the voice of complaint was once more hushed. But a pledge was exacted from Pisani, in the name of Contarini and himself, that if Zeno should not be signalled between the present time and the first of January, he would accede to their wishes and raise the blockade of Chioggia. Upon this comparatively slender chance were staked the fortunes, perhaps the existence, of that Republic, which it was his noble ambition to save. In eight-and-forty hours it was to be decided whether a State which, through a perspective of a thousand years, could look back upon the rise and decay of so many empires, should retain or should renounce its independence.

Whatever allowance is to be made for the difference of the notions entertained in that age respecting the extirpation of a great and time-honoured State, it is impossible to doubt that the destiny of the Signory formed a source of curiosity, if not of solicitude, to the more intelligent section of every community in Europe. Whatever might be the true interest of Italy, it was the true interest of civilization that Venice should continue to flourish. By her fall, the former would gain nothing, and the latter would assuredly lose much. The presumption is, that the statesmen of the fourteenth century were either unwilling or unable to foresee the vast and convulsive changes which the project of Louis, as enunciated in

his letters to Carrara, would tend to operate, if it was carried to its distant consequences. It was a safe prediction that it would inaugurate a new era of darkness, that it would throw arts, sciences, literature, and all other humanising influences a century back, and would deluge the Peninsula with the blood of its own people. For, after all, the ulterior question, which might be expected to arise, was not whether Venice should be transformed into an appanage to the crown of Saint Stephen, or should be degraded into a Paduan fishing-station, but if Venice ceased to be, who was to be her successor? Which member of the Coalition was to receive the coveted prize, the most adjacent or the most remote, the most or the least potent? There was Hungary, there was Padua, there was Aquileia. It was natural that the Carrarese, in his violent jealousy of the Venetians, should take part with Louis against them; but it was barely likely that he would view with more complacency, or would treat with greater toleration, than the other Italian Powers the extension of Hungarian sway to both shores of the Adriatic. It was intelligible, seeing the grossness of the fiscal system introduced into that province, that Louis himself should feel inquietude for Dalmatia: but it was hard to divine what advantage would accrue to him if Venice was to be the price of Paduan friendship, and Trieste was to be the price of Austrian perfidy. It was well for the Visconti and the Scaligers to connive at the ruin of the Republic; but they did not perhaps take into account the immense preponderance which such an event would give to Padua over Milan and over Verona. So far as is positively known, however, not a hand, not a voice, was lifted to arrest or retard the catastrophe.

The lot of Venice was thus fearfully trembling in the balance, and all minds were wrought to an agonising pitch of suspense when, the remainder of 1379 having passed without bringing any change for the better, the earliest streaks of daylight on a January morning 1380 revealed at Lido fifteen¹ sail in the offing. The anxiety then became still more intense. It was extremely probable that the vessels, which were still barely visible to the naked eye, were the squadron so long and so ardently expected; but there was a painful possibility that the new-comers might be the reinforcements

¹ Gataro contemp. fol. 338.

which Doria was known to be awaiting. Some light craft were sent forward to reconnoitre. It gave birth to a delirious and frantic joy, when the messengers returned announcing that, on their approach within range of sight, the strangers hoisted a flag, and that that flag had been distinctly recognised as the Lion of Saint Mark. So dear to this people were the gods which their fathers had made!

CARLO ZENO HAD AT LAST ARRIVED.

This remarkable man was one of a numerous family, which Pietro Zeno¹ had by his wife Agnese Dandolo.² He was born in 1334,³ and was therefore the junior of Pisani by ten years. The Emperor Charles IV., between whom and the elder Zeno a personal friendship subsisted, stood for the infant at the font by proxy; and after his imperial sponsor the boy was christened *Carlo*.⁴ Agnese died in childbed; her offspring never knew his mother: and Pietro Zeno perished under the ramparts of Smyrna in October 1344. Carlo, whose expectations were slender, was adopted by his paternal uncle Andrea, who destined him for the Church, hoping to be able to procure for his ward high ecclesiastical preferment. The orphan, who exhibited a precocious genius and an extraordinary aptitude for learning, received his elementary education under a Venetian pedagogue; the *Psalms of David* was one of the earliest books which was put into his hands. On leaving school, he was invited by Clement V. to Avignon, where he remained sixteen months; the Pope bestowed upon him the reversion of a rich prebendal stall at Patras; and uncle Andrea, when the youth, so fortunate in his influential connexions, returned home, determined that he should go at a suitable age to complete his studies at Padua University. On his journey thither Carlo was waylaid by footpads, who robbed him of all he had, and left him for dead. He was restored to consciousness, however, and carried to his destination. Zeno became an accomplished scholar⁵ and dialectician; and he displayed a passionate fondness for music.⁶ But his

¹ *Albero della famiglia Zeno*, presso Caterino Zeno, *Viaggio in Persia*, 44.

² Giacomo Zeno, *Vita Caroli Zeni*, 210.

³ G. Zeno, *ubi supra*; Mutinelli, *Annali*, 185.

⁴ G. Zeno, *ubi supra*.

⁵ *Funebris oratio Leonardi Justiniani pro Carolo Zeno*, Murat. xix. 374.

⁶ *Ibid.* and "Vita del Magnifico M. Carlo Zeno egregio e valoroso Capitano della Illustrissima Republica Vinitiana, composta dal Reverendo G. Feltrense (Giacomo Zeno) et tradotta in volgare da Messer Francesco Quirini": Ven. 1544.

besetting sin was gambling; at play he lost every penny; and he was at length obliged to escape from his creditors by a stealthy flight from the gymnasium. During the next five years, the young Venetian wandered over various parts of the peninsula, soldiering and troubadouring, and eluded all the inquiries of his friends who, for the second time, mourned him as dead. On the expiration of this term, he suddenly made his appearance at uncle Andrea's door, was overwhelmed with caresses, and finally was persuaded to proceed to his prebend.

Patras was at that time beleaguered by the Turks. The prebendary at once placed himself in the foremost rank of her defenders, and behaved like a paladin. But, having been grievously wounded, he was treated as a corpse, wrapped in the winding-sheet, shrouded and coffined; and he was on the point of being nailed down, when he shewed signs of reviving animation. After this strange adventure, he again repaired to his native city (1361). He was now in his twenty-fifth year. The King of Cyprus happened to be making at that moment a short sojourn at Venice; Lorenzo Celsi had just succeeded to the throne. Zeno ingratiated himself with Lusignan, and was employed by this prince on more than one mission of consequence. The erratic Venetian next paid a visit to his godfather the Emperor, travelled through Germany, France, and England, and then once more settled at Patras. He had not long resumed his sacerdotal functions, when he fought a duel,¹ and forfeited his stall. This unpleasant incident left him no alternative but to renounce the clerical profession. He accordingly abjured celibacy and lawn, married a wealthy heiress at Chiarenza, and embarked in commercial life. His wife died shortly after the union; and Carlo contracted a second matrimonial alliance with the daughter of the naval commander Marco Giustiniani. These nuptials, which were the turning-point of Zeno's life, opened a new phase in his stormy and checkered career. He now forsook the paths of commerce, and entered the political arena. In 1377, he was appointed co-proveditor with Michele Steno under Antonio Veniero, Governor of Tenedos; and he speedily enabled his employers to detect his valuable qualities and his sterling merit. He was recalled from Tenedos to take an important military command in the March of Treviso, where the

¹ Mutinelli, *Annali*, 186.

Republic was then at war with the Carrarese. Here the ex-prebendary had a noble opportunity of exhibiting the dazzling fecundity of his genius and the latent powers of a master-mind.¹ His name was victory. Neither paucity of number, nor slenderness of resource, nor disadvantage of situation, deterred him. There was no instance in which he allowed himself to be worsted. He became known as Zeno *the Unconquered*. In April 1378, this distinguished officer received his commission as Bailo and Captain of Negropont; and after a brief interval he exchanged that position, in which he had earned fresh laurels, for a naval command under the new Captain-General Pisani. It is already familiar enough that he detached himself from his chief who, after a short time, altogether lost sight of him; and that it was only by his continued absence that, on the 7th May 1379, Luciano Doria contrived to win the battle of Pola, and that Venice itself was so gravely imperilled.

In personal appearance, Zeno was of ordinary height, square-shouldered, broad-chested, well-knit, erect in his gait, and of a symmetrical figure. His head was manly and handsome; his nose was aquiline; his eyes large, dark, piercingly bright, and wide apart, were over-arched by strongly-marked brows. His air was grave and thoughtful, unlike that of the jocund and buoyant Pisani; but although his temper was more equable, his character was hardly less impulsive. He was at this time about forty-six years of age.

There is every probability that Zeno had already left Candia, when the special envoy of the Doge arrived there in quest of him. But from some other source he there learned for the first time the exact situation of his country. Nevertheless, he appears to have been ignorant of the extreme nature of the dilemma; news travelled in those days slowly enough; and he made, in the first instance, for Lido. But an agent of the Government was in attendance to direct him to waste not a moment in proceeding to Chioggia, where prayers were being offered up to the Almighty for his speedy arrival. For that place he consequently pressed all sail; and on the same day about noon he presented himself.² He

¹ "Ejus virtus semper laudabilia vestigia secuta est felicis memoriæ genitoris sui Athletæ Christi Petri Zeno."—Caresinus, fol. 461.

² A. Gataro contemp. fol. 353.

gave a succinct account of all that had happened; how he had captured nearly seventy Genoese vessels of various kinds; and how he had, by keeping a narrow watch on the Riviera, and closing the Mediterranean against the enemy, aimed a blow at their commerce which they would not promptly retrieve, and precluded the transmission of reinforcements to Pietro Doria. His aim had been with his light and swift-sailing craft to move from point to point, and create a diversion. Finally, he substantiated all the particulars already in circulation respecting the galleon of Nicolo Bechignono,¹ which he brought in tow and of which the dimensions are said to have been as great as the worth of her cargo. On the behaviour of his officers and men throughout he passed the highest encomium. It appeared from his log,² that he left Constantinople on the 9th August; Tenedos, 11th September; Rhodes, 30th October; Candia, 2nd December;³ Parenzo, 14th December. In the summer, he had been at Naples, where he obtained an audience of Queen Joanna; but the battle of Pola⁴ deafened her Majesty to the proposition, which he had ventured to address to her for seceding from the league, and allying herself with the Republic.

To any suggestions for taking repose Zeno refused to listen. He assured the Doge that his comrades and himself were impatient for action. He was desired to choose his post; and he selected the most perilous. He was stationed at Brondolo.

The subsequent story of the War of Chioggia is shortly told. The providential relief, while it had not been an hour too soon, was of course seconded by the commencing relaxation of the energy and curtailment of the resources of the enemy. From that hour, by a rapid change of fortune, the situation of the Genoese became more and more hopeless. Their resistance was considerably prolonged by the remissness of the Venetians in intercepting supplies; but this circumstance merely afforded a respite. The question indeed had resolved itself purely into one of time. The eventual recovery of Chioggia amounted almost to a certainty. By deaths and desertions the ranks of the besieged were greatly

¹ Stella, *Ann.* 1114.

³ Chinazzo, fol. 749-52.

² Gataro, *ubi supra.*

⁴ J. Zenus, *Vita C. Zeni*, 222.

thinned. In the course of as many months they made six sorties, and six several times they were repulsed by Zeno or Pisani. On the 22nd January, Doria was crushed by the fall of part of the wall of Brondolo Castle, which had been battered in by the *Vittoria* bombard. His place was temporarily supplied by Napoleone Grimaldi.

Zeno was a host in himself; but he was desperately rash, and was incessantly exposing himself to fearful risks. His life was in perpetual jeopardy. One winter's evening after dusk, his own vessel, having been accidentally torn from its anchorage in the vicinity of the Lova by the force of the wind and currents, was driven against the enemy's forts; and in an instant the hero became a target for a hundred marksmen. One shaft pierced his throat. Without pausing more than to pluck out the barb, he continued to issue his orders for manœuvring the endangered galley, bad a seaman swim with a tow-rope to the moorings, angrily imposed silence upon those who, beholding themselves in the jaws of death, intreated him to strike his flag, and was not content, until he found himself and his companions again in safety. But a second casualty now befell him. In hurrying about the deck, he tumbled down an open hatchway, and was precipitated into the hold upon his back, speechless and unconscious. In a few moments suffocation would have ensued. With marvellous self-possession and coolness he feebly raised his body from its supine position, and turned upon his face. The wound was thus permitted to bleed copiously; Zeno breathed faintly and opened his eyes; and his life was providentially saved.

The reconquest of Loredo had been the earliest exploit of Zeno after his arrival; and this acquisition restored the communication with Ferrara, whence supplies of men and provisions could be drawn to any extent. Following up his triumph, Zeno, now appointed (February 18¹) general-in-chief of the Land Forces of the Republic, which had been just reinforced by the Star Company of Milan and the Tard Venus of Sir John Hawkwood, beat the enemy from all their positions at Brondolo (February 19²); and on the 20th February he established his headquarters under the ramparts of Great Chioggia, from which point he poured a destructive

¹ Caresinus, fol. 452.

² Stella, *Annales*, fol. 1115.

and uninterrupted fire upon the citadel. The Genoese, many of whom were drowned in the Canal of Santa Caterina by the fall of the bridge under their weight,¹ retreated in complete confusion, leaving behind them an abundant quantity of arms, accoutrements, and war material; and "any one," as it is graphically put by Chinazzo, "who might have wished to have a suit of mail for a few shillings, might have bought at that rate of the spoilers as many as he liked."² "And then," adds the same contemporary author,³ "the common opinion was that the Venetians might have taken Chioggia, if they had chosen. But they deemed the hazard too great. Whereupon those within took courage, and began to strengthen their works, hoping soon to have help from Genoa and Padua. And they sent away the women and children, who were treated by the Doge humanely, and forwarded to Venice; and from them it was gathered how straitened the Genoese were. And they were beginning to deal out allowances of bread and wine and other kinds of nutriment. The Venetians, to hasten the end, closed all the outlets toward Padua." "I recollect," says an eye-witness, the Chancellor Caresinus, writing almost immediately after the occurrences which he describes, "that our galleys were sometimes so close to Chioggia that stones were thrown into them without number; but by Divine providence no one was hurt. The enemy are now so thoroughly blockaded that they can neither leave nor get help from outside." The Signory, having thus hemmed Doria's successor, Gasparo Spinola, completely in, and having drawn a circumvallation of pallisades and forts round Chioggia,⁴ resolved to spare neither labour nor expense in conducting the undertaking to a triumphant issue. The Star Company and the Tard Venus, both of which he had the utmost difficulty, even with the grant of double pay, in keeping in subordination, with the corps of Jacopo Cavalli, represented a total of 20,000 men under Zeno. Barbarigo had 500 barks distributed over several stations. The fleet was composed of fifty-two galleys of the heaviest draught and in an excellent state of efficiency. One moiety under Pisani lay off Chioggia: the other, under

¹ Stella, *ubi supra*.

² P. 756.

³ P. 757.

⁴ Caresinus, fol. 456. See also Agostino Giustiniano, *Annali di Genova*, lib. iv. c. 146, ed. 1537.

the Doge in person, was anchored in front of the Lova. The dykes, which had so admirably answered their object, became on the recovery of Brondolo absolutely useless, and they were destroyed. Of money there was happily no dearth, and provisions were becoming comparatively plentiful. The good old Doge wrote to the Government on the 22nd April 1380, signifying weariness of the position, and pleading the removal of the more pressing danger and his advanced years as a ground for being allowed to return to the capital at once, leaving Pisani and Zeno to bring the affair to a conclusion. But the College politely and skilfully evaded the request in a dispatch replete with eulogy and compliment.¹

One feeble chance was left to Spinola in the arrival of a fleet from Genoa. On the 18th January 1380, the departure of Zeno having raised the blockade of the Riviera, Matteo Maruffo² was dispatched to the relief of Chioggia. But Maruffo, in a spirit of blind folly, took a circuitous route and wasted inestimable moments in exploring the Mediterranean. On the Neapolitan coast, in the neighbourhood of Manfredonia, he fell in (April 20³) with Giustiniani, whom the Doge had sent to Apulia and elsewhere in search of grain⁴ (March 21⁵). Giustiniani, who had not more than five galleys, was, after a gallant defence, enveloped and taken prisoner with his whole squadron; and the elated Maruffo pursued his course toward the Adriatic. On the 14th May, he appeared before the Port of Chioggia, and challenged Pisani to an engagement. But the latter, knowing that the moment of triumph was at hand, and conscious that, if he met with a reverse, the consequences might be fatal, withstood for several days every temptation to fling away the golden opportunity. At length, the outrageous

¹ "Serenissime et Excellentissime Domine, recepimus literas Excellentie Vestrae datas apud Clugiam die 22 Aprilis hora 2 noctis, facientes mentionem, quod provideamus de Serenitate Vestra, quod possit redire ad patriam ex rationibus in dictis literis sapientissime allegatis. Quibus intellectis, vestrae benignitati ad praesens respondemus, quod nos, tota terra, et omnes subditi et fideles nostri, clare et manifeste habemus, quod via Excellentiae vestrae ad partes Clugiae fuit vita, salus, confirmatio, immo affirmatio status nostri, et cum omnibus posteris nostris semper erimus obligati vestrae benignitati et filiis, et descendentibus vestris, et benignitati et gratioso dominio vestro." The epistle is signed "Consiliiarii, Rectores, Collegium Venetorum"; and the superscription is *Serenissimo et Excellentissimo Domino, Andrae Contareno Dei Gratia Venetiarum, etc., Duci incllyto*. Murat. xxii. 731-2. A treaty of reconciliation between the foreign mercenaries had been dated from the quarter-deck of the Doge's galley in the harbour of Chioggia, 4th Feb. 1380. *Cal. of State Papers*, 1864, i. 29.

² Stella, *Annales*, 1115.

³ Caresinus, fol. 454.

⁴ *Ibid.* 455.

⁵ Sanudo, fol. 706.

conduct of Maruffo provoked him to such a point that, on the 25th of the month, he prevailed on the Doge to allow him to accept the defiance.¹ The two forces remained for some time facing each other. Not a blow had been exchanged, not a shot had been fired, when the Genoese, seized by a sudden panic, took to flight. Pisani, desirous of obliterating the recollections of Pola, gave them chase. But, after following in their track several miles, he abandoned the pursuit. It was with ecstasies of delight, that the Genoese in Chioggia had witnessed the first approach of their countrymen; they clomb to the roofs of houses, and waved flags and pennons in sign of joyful recognition. It was with unspeakable pain that they beheld the mysterious retreat of Maruffo on the 26th May. Through the laggard movements of that officer, the Venetians had had time to render themselves masters of all the approaches to Chioggia; and, although within two miles the means had existed of replenishing their magazines, and reinvigorating frames sinking under a spare and nauseous² diet, the Genoese derived no more benefit from the fleet, than if it had been a thousand leagues away. Brondolo was an impassable and fatal barrier. The enemy was closely imprisoned in its own lines.

Spinola was in despair. His supply of fresh water was failing. Hunger was gnawing at the entrails of the soldiers. Want and disease were doing their work; so enfeebled were the physical powers of the Genoese, that they almost wholly ceased, after the first week in June, to ply the guns; and the silence of the bombards was an eloquent omen. Self-preservation was now the ruling instinct; and it was not unusual to observe Venetian and Genoese officers parleying together under those very walls, which had been till lately the theatre of a furious cannonade.

Resort was had to various forlorn expedients. The Genoese endeavoured to escape by cutting a new passage through the centre of Brondolo to the sea; but that scheme of canalisation signally miscarried. They fomented discontent among the troops. They attempted to assassinate Zeno. But the companies were appeased by a promise of a three days' sack of Chioggia and the bonus of a month's pay at the close of the war. All the plans of the enemy proved nugatory.

¹ Caresinus, fol. 455.

² Pugliola, fol. 523.

A proposal for a peace-congress was among them. It ostensibly emanated from the Pope who, seeing that Chioggia was virtually lost, and aroused to a perception of the political complications which would infallibly arise, if Genoa was permanently crushed, volunteered his intercession; and the representatives of Venice, Genoa, Rome, Padua, Hungary, and Aquileia, actually sat at the Lova during a few days in June.¹ But the Signory remembered with bitterness her own recent situation; she remembered that, when she was on the brink of ruin, no Power had come forward to her rescue; and there was no just reason why she should be now robbed of her legitimate triumph. The negotiation silently dropped.

Meanwhile, Maruffo, having procured reinforcements, had reappeared (June 15); and he continued to hover about Chioggia, repeating his former tactics. But the victory of the Republic was too near at hand; and Pisani was immovable. Dispatches reached the provisional government that Barnabo and Galeazzo Visconti of Milan entirely approved of this firm attitude, and thought that the end was near.²

Spinola had played his last stake. A sally, in which the entire garrison was appointed to join, had been secretly concerted with the Carrarese, who prepared to take part in the movement.³ But the correspondence was fortunately intercepted by the vigilance of Zeno; and the General-in-Chief was on his guard. The idea was relinquished. Not the faintest gleam of hope remained. The compulsory inaction of Maruffo, whose manœuvres were watched with breathless anxiety from the house-tops of Chioggia, was a sad and bitter disappointment. There was no longer any alternative but submission. On the 20th June the Doge entered into an undertaking with the troops in the camp under Chioggia, on their capture of that position, and on the following day a deputation, armed with a safe-conduct, waited on the Doge, and on their knees offered to capitulate, if their lives and property were guaranteed. They were informed, that an

¹ Chinazzo, fol. 759; *Copy of a Letter written by a Genoese*, Feb. 13, 1380, O.S.; Gatara, fol. 374.

² "In hanc sententiam concurrebant Magnifici Domini Bernabos et Galeatio Vicecomites Mediolani Colligati nostri, scribentes amicabiliter in hanc formam: Cum res præsentialiter in talibus terminis posita sit, quod Clugiam obtinebitis, non est tutum exponere periculo fortunæ ludum victum. Habeatis obsidionem bene vallatam; non transibunt multi dies, quod victus deficiet."—Caresinus, fol. 456.

³ Caresinus, *ubi supra*.

unconditional surrender alone would be accepted. On the 22nd, the flag of Saint George was hoisted on the Bell-Tower as a signal to the commander of the galleys lying at Fossone; and, the latter having come within a certain distance of Chioggia, Spinola ordered the colours to be struck in token of distress. The commander signalled with smoke to implore a little more patience. But no answer was given; and he returned with a heavy heart to Fossone.¹

On the morning of the 24th June,² the Doge, accompanied by his lieutenant and the General-in-Chief, made his formal entry; and the Lion of Saint Mark was planted on the Campanile. The booty was enormous; and faith was scrupulously kept with the Venturi, who received the stipulated bounty and the licence to pillage. Exclusively of this spoil, William Gold,³ the Constable-General, was honoured by Venetian citizenship under the Doge's golden seal, and received a pension of 500 ducats of good gold a year for life on condition that he should be prepared to serve Venice on demand, wherever he might be at the time, at a fair and suitable rate of remuneration.⁴ The Republic obtained nineteen seaworthy galleys, 4440⁵ prisoners, and a vast assortment of valuable stores in the shape of salt, gunpowder, arms, and naval equipments. It is said that the salt alone was computed at 90,000 crowns.⁶ The captives were emaciated and cadaverous.⁷ All were transmitted to Venice, and were incarcerated in the Magazines of Terranuova,⁸ probably within the precincts of the Arsenal, where many perished daily.⁹

At the same time preparations were being made for the long deferred return of the Doge to Venice; and in anticipation of the event the provisional government, on the 26th June 1380, had sent an order to Giovanni Barbarigo to forward one hundred oarsmen (*remigia*) from the Genoese prize galleys, to man the Bucentaur, and, to prevent any delay or miscarriage, he was, if necessary, to communicate with those departments, which might assist him in carrying out this

¹ Chinazzo, fol. 767; Giustiniano, *Annali di Genova*, lib. iv. c. 146, edit. 1537.

² The author of the *Chronicon Tarvisinum*, fol. 775, states that the Genoese "*sponte restituerunt Civitatem et personas suas.*"—Murat. xv.

³ Romanin, iii. 292.

⁴ Sanudo, fol. 742.

⁵ Genoese, 4102; Paduans, etc., 268=4440. Sanudo, fol. 712. Stella, fol. 1117, says "*ultra quatuor millia.*"

⁶ *Memorie*, 342.

⁷ Romanin, *ubi supra et alii.*

⁸ Sanudo, fol. 712.

⁹ Caresinus, fol. 459, note; Sanudo, fol. 713.

instruction. On the 30th June, having appointed Saraceno Dandolo governor of Chioggia, and Carlo Zeno commander-in-chief there,¹ he set out for the City with Pisani. At San Clemente, the Doge, the Admiral, and their escort of honour were received on board the Bucentaur by the College and some of the Senate; and on the 1st July,² the august party landed at the Piazzetta amid an enthusiasm which bordered on phrenzy. The concourse of people is described by an eyewitness³ as so extraordinary, that it was with the utmost difficulty a path could be cleared for the ducal procession to Saint Mark's, where a mass and thanksgiving were celebrated for the merciful deliverance of the Republic.⁴

Such was the conclusion of the WAR OF CHIOGGIA, by which the Allies sought to compass the extinction of Venetian liberty,—of that intense and (as it were) breathless fight for national life, which had revealed with a distinctness and force surprising even to themselves the miraculous and proud elasticity of a people, already old in traditions, but still young in all the elements of strength. It was the most severe trial which had been made of Venetian fortitude and patriotism, since the invasion of the Islands by the Franks in King Pepin's time. It is almost impossible to believe that the crisis could have been surmounted, had it occurred either at an earlier period or at a later. Notwithstanding almost unceasing calls during the century on her material resources, Venice had in more than a commensurate degree developed and consolidated her power. The Genoese, on their side, had not only no great ally, but were at a considerable distance from their base. Hungary yielded them no assistance. Milan was friendly to Venice. France and England were too remote and too weak to be of any service as friends or of any weight as enemies, and neither was exempt from attack at any moment by antagonists less powerful than Genoa. It was not long since that the Northmen had descended on the English coast and sacked Winchelsea, Portsmouth, and Gravesend. The Florentines and others observed an equivocal neutrality; and Florence itself was just then torn by those almost incessant dissensions which

¹ Chinazzo, fol. 768; and see *Letter of the Doge to the College*, June 26, 1380, in Sanudo, fol. 712, and Gataro, fol. 393-4.

² Caresinus, fol. 459; Chinazzo, fol. 768; Sanudo, fol. 712.

³ Caresinus, *ubi supra*; also Sanudo, fol. 713.

⁴ Caresinus, *loco citato*.

Machiavelli ascribed to the operation of laws enacted, not for the benefit of the community, but of the party in power. It is scarcely an exaggeration to affirm that, whatever the courage and devotion of Venice might have been, in the absence of Pisani and Zeno she could not have been saved.

The war had lasted nearly a full year; and seven months had elapsed, before Contarini was enabled to redeem the oath exacted by Pisani on that memorable Christmas-eve, that he would never set his foot in Venice again till Chioggia was free. Crises are the opportunities of latent greatness; and every crisis has its heroes. But the present contest, which afforded so striking an exemplification of the axiom that, in a struggle between two nations, the one which is prepared to make the largest possible sacrifices to its independent existence, must triumph in the end, was peculiarly prolific of distinguished names. In the centre of that remarkable group of men, upon whom the events of 1379 and 1380 conferred a classic reputation, was seen the illustrious Doge himself, supported on either side by the magnanimous and single-hearted Pisani and by the incomparable Zeno; the former, a person of the most spotless character, of the purest integrity, of the most dauntless courage, and of the most unselfish patriotism: the latter, a soldier devoted to his country, inexhaustible in resources and expedients, without a rival in the extent and variety of his acquirements, a stranger to fear and despair, a patron of virtue and learning.

Venice was once more mistress of her own alluvial dominion, but Genoa was still mistress of the ocean. Two fleets, one under Spinola, the other under Maruffo, kept the seas; and the Signory felt that the moment had arrived for the reclamation of maritime supremacy. On the 23rd July,¹ Pisani, having been confirmed by the Great Council for the fourth time² in the responsible office of Captain-General, started from Chioggia³ with a force of seven-and-forty galleys⁴ for the Istrian coast. On the 30th, he reached Pirano,⁵ where the inhabitants presented a few barks to him as a mark of loyalty.⁶ On the 31st⁷ he stood off Capo d'Istria, which had been appropriated by the Patriarch of Aquileia; and on the 1st August⁸ that place was taken and

¹ Caresinus, fol. 760.

³ Sanudo, fol. 714.

⁵ Sanudo, *ubi supra*.

⁷ Chinazzo, fol. 770.

² *Memorie*, 343.

⁴ Caresinus, *ubi supra*.

⁶ Caresinus, *ubi supra*.

⁸ Caresinus, *loco citato*

sacked.¹ On the following day,² the Captain-General proceeded to Trieste, and every preparation had been made for a formal siege, when reports arrived that a Genoese fleet of thirty sail had been seen in the immediate vicinage of Arbo.³ Impatient to bring the enemy to an action, Pisani, promptly abandoning Trieste, made all sail for the island in question. He reached the point, however, only in time to learn from some Genoese deserters that Gasparo Spinola, at the head of twelve galleys, had just left Zara, and was on his way to Manfredonia in quest of corn.⁴ Toward Manfredonia therefore the Venetians bent their course, eager in the pursuit; on the 10th they put into Rhodes for water;⁵ and on the 12th the desired destination was reached. The weather had been hazy, and the nights were moonless; but the two squadrons were at one time so close to each other that they exchanged shots; and many were wounded on both sides, and a few met their death.⁶ The Genoese at length, favoured by the darkness, succeeded in eluding observation,⁷ and on the morning of the 12th August they were nowhere to be found.

On several occasions lately the Captain-General had been heard to complain of indisposition. The continuous toil and harass, which he had undergone from August 1379 to June 1380, had left their trace upon his constitution. Those ten months were so many years snatched from his life. There were whole weeks during which he had scarcely enjoyed an hour's repose; night and day he worked and watched; and while the mothers and daughters of Venice slept, he kept his vigils. At the terrible dykes, there was no hardship from which he shrank, however severe, and no labour, however mean, of which he did not partake. No artisan was freer from arrogance and false pride: for it was his sole ambition to become the saviour of his country.

Symptoms of fever had already manifested themselves, while the fleet was passing Zara;⁸ as Pisani approached Manfredonia, the malady gradually assumed an acute form; and those about him began to entertain apprehensions for his safety. But he affected to treat his illness lightly, and bad all be of good cheer. Nevertheless he continued to grow more

¹ Chinazzo, *ubi supra*.

² *Ibid.*

³ Caresinus, *ubi supra*.

⁷ Caresinus, fol. 460.

² Caresinus, *ubi supra*.

⁴ Caresinus, 460; Sanudo, 714-15; Marin, vi. 207.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

and more languid, and he was soon obliged to keep his bed. On the morning of the 13th August he desired his attendants to summon Corbaro, now commissioned as Admiral of the Squadron.¹ He told his old companion he had heard that some of the enemy were in sight; he wished him to take eight of the galleys, and to follow them. The order was implicitly obeyed. But Pisani, with that restlessness of temperament which belonged to his nature, soon became nervous about the result of the undertaking, and conceived an irresistible longing to see with his own eyes how the matter stood. All advice and expostulation were vain: he rose from his sick couch, attired himself, ascended to the deck, directed the sails to be set, and proceeded in the wake of the detachment. The enterprise did not answer its object; Corbaro was killed: Pisani himself was slightly wounded; and at dusk the fleet regained the port, sadly depressed in spirits. His wound and the dampness of the night-air had aggravated the disorder of the Captain-General; the fate of Corbaro had given him a shock; and he felt excessively faint and ill. He now suffered himself to be removed to the house of the commandant of Manfredonia, Guido da Fojan, with whom he was intimate,² and who procured for him the best medical treatment. It was quite dark outside; but in the room of the invalid an oil-lamp was glimmering. Pisani requested that a clerk might be sent to him with writing materials. He then dictated a long letter,³ in which he communicated to the Senate all that had occurred since the dispatch of the 2nd, in which he made known the reduction of Capo d'Istria on the 1st,⁴ and added that, so soon as he was able, he purposed to repair to the Riviera,⁵ and to make Genoa rue the day when she entered upon the War of Chioggia. The epistle was dated "Manfredonia, August 13, 1380." When it was finished and folded, the Captain-General, feeling his throat husky, and his lips parched with fever, asked for some water, which he swallowed with relish and avidity; and then, as if the liquid had left some disagreeable flavour upon his palate, he begged a crust of bread. Of this he ravenously ate a morsel or two; but he was immediately seen to change colour, to gasp for breath, and to sink back upon his pillow. Pisani was no more.⁶

¹ *Memorie*, 351.⁴ Chinazzo, fol. 770.² *Ibid.*⁵ *Memorie*, 354.³ *Ibid.*, 353.⁶ *Ibid.*

Concerning the cause of death various hypotheses were formed. Some surmised¹ that he was poisoned, and that the water or the bread, or both, were drugged; but the more common opinion was that his frame, debilitated by the fever, succumbed to the weakening effect of the wound and the highly deleterious influence of the nocturnal dews.

Pisani was only in his fifty-sixth year.² His loss was profoundly mourned; and many a frozen heart was melted, and the tears trickled down many a weather-beaten cheek when the sailors were told of the melancholy and sudden end of their Father and best friend. It was impossible to witness without emotion the passage of the embalmed remains of the adored Pisani through a dense multitude of sobbing and sorrowing spectators to the quay, where the flagship was waiting to transport them with those of the excellent and faithful Corbaro³ to Venice.

A public funeral of the most splendid and sumptuous character was decreed by the Senate to the Great Citizen, and the obsequies were appointed to take place in the Church of San Antonio di Castello,⁴ where the ashes of his father Nicolo and his brother Bertucci already reposed. The Doge, the Signory, with few exceptions the entire nobility, the religious orders, the clergy, the Arts,⁵ and the people in mass, followed the hero to the grave; and on that day Venice⁶ was so wrapped in grief, and her streets were so deserted, that "if the smallest Genoese fleet had made a descent at that conjuncture, the country would have stood in the utmost peril." The procession was preparing to start from the parochial church of San Fantino,⁷ where the coffin upon its arrival on the 22nd August⁸ had been provisionally deposited, when a popular clamour was raised, that the Deliverer of the Republic ought to be entombed nowhere but in the Ducal Chapel itself.⁹ The cry was being adopted, and a tumult was threatened, when a mariner, who had perhaps been officially inspired, put his shoulder to the bier, and exclaimed— "We, his children, are carrying this

¹ Sanudo, fol. 715.

² *Memorie*, 354. The exploits of Pisani have been celebrated in two poems:

1. *Vettor Pisani, Canti Tre di L. A. Baruffaldi*, Ven. 1844, 8vo.

2. *Vettor Pisani, Carme di G. Prati*, Ven. 1846, 8vo.

³ *Memorie*, 355.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 356.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Sanudo, fol. 716.

⁷ *Memorie, ubi supra*.

⁸ Sanudo, fol. 715; Caroldo, *Hist.*, fol. 120, Harl. MSS. 5020.

⁹ *Memorie*, 356-7.

brave Captain to our father Saint Anthony!" Thus the incipient commotion was adroitly appeased, and the funeral train began to move. It traversed nearly the whole extent of the capital, but it was of such a length that, while the pall-bearers, who occupied the centre of the cavalcade, were entering Saint Anthony's, many hundred mourners had not yet quitted San Fantino.¹

A magnificent mausoleum was erected over the ancestral vault at San Antonio,² upon which was reared a pedestrian statue of Pisani, habited in the uniform of Captain-General, grasping in his right hand an ensign with two streamers, surmounted by a cross; the Capture of Cattaro in August 1379 was contributed at a later epoch by the hand of Vicentino to the decorations of the Sala dello Scrutinio.³

Pisani thus outlived the accomplishment of his noble task, and the redemption of the Doge's vow, only seven weeks. When the question arose of supplying his place, all eyes were turned upon one candidate. On the 28th August⁴ Venice beheld with unmingled satisfaction the delivery of the commission of Captain-General and the presentation of the great gonfalon of Saint Mark to Carlo Zeno.⁵

The operations of Pisani's worthy successor during the autumn of 1380 were limited to the fruitless siege of Marano, which the Genoese had rendered all but impregnable; he took the responsibility upon himself of returning to Venice for the winter. The Senate was extremely indignant and wrathful at this liberty, and commanded him to retrace his steps. Zeno declined. On presenting himself to the Body, he was coldly received; and the explanation which he proffered of his conduct was not accepted. The dispute was increasing in warmth; some of the Senators suggested that he should be arrested for contumacy. But the Captain-General, perceiving his danger, prudently withdrew, and retired to his own house. He found that the populace, apprised of the jeopardy in which their favourite was placed, had already begun to congregate round the Palace, with the manifest design of overawing the Assembly. Ultimately a compromise was effected, by which Zeno re-embarked for Marano, not with the

¹ *Memorie*, 357-8.

³ Cigogna, *Iscrizioni*, i. 182.

⁵ Caroldo, *Historia*, fol. 120, Harl. MSS. 5020.

² *Ibid.*

⁴ Chinazzo, fol. 772.

squadron which he had so recently brought into port, but with a flotilla of small barks. He met, however, with no better success than before; and in an assault upon the place he received a severe wound. Upon his second return, not a whisper was raised against him.

The naval campaign of 1381 was hardly more eventful than its predecessor. The Republic indeed regained her ascendancy on the ocean, and by menacing the Riviera Zeno constrained the Genoese commander to evacuate the Adriatic and to hasten to the succour of his country. But no decisive action was fought: for Spinola uniformly avoided battle or eluded pursuit. Both parties were naturally weary of such an idle and unprofitable contest.

Meanwhile the Republic was continuing to lose ground on the *terra firma* which, since the beginning of hostilities, had necessarily become her weakest point; and her domination in that quarter was now a cipher. Venice detested Austria much, but she detested the Carrarese infinitely more. The former was, perhaps, the more powerful; but Austria was farther than Padua from Treviso. In the early part of 1381, the Signory resolved to effect what she regarded as a master-stroke. By a secret understanding with Leopold, Treviso was delivered to his troops on the 2nd May on condition that the Duke should hold against the Lord of Padua the remainder of the Province and Ceneda. The bargain certainly appeared not dear; for the Marches were already out of the Venetian grasp; and the city itself was no longer tenable.

The general state of the Peninsula was at this period supremely miserable; it was not Venice alone which had suffered or was suffering. Rome was torn by the French and Italian factions. Florence was distracted by the feuds of the Guelphs and Ghibellines. Genoa was a prey to internal spasms. At Naples, a Revolution hurled the guilty Joan from a bloodstained throne, which was offered to the nephew of the King of Hungary, Charles of Durazzo.

The Neapolitan Revolution of 1381 had the effect of diverting the attention of Louis of Hungary from the affairs of Northern Italy. The moment therefore seemed propitious for terminating the sterile conflict between Venice and Genoa; and the Count of Savoy, at the instigation of the Florentines, hastened to volunteer his intercession. The friendly offices

of the *Green Count*, Amadeus VI. of Savoy, the master of a small but rising Principality, were accepted; and the representatives of the Powers which had previously sat at the Lova in June 1380, reassembled, with the addition of Florence and Ancona, at Turin. At the outset, a controversy arose between the Venetian and Genoese Delegates on the point of precedence; but one of the Venetians at once silenced the syndics of Genoa by rising from his seat, and observing in an emphatic tone—"It is not as conquered, but as conquerors, that we come to demand peace!"¹ This sentiment was applauded; and after a fair share of difficulty the treaty was prepared for signature on the 8th August 1381.² Under its leading articles, the Republic purchased with an annual payment of 7000 ducats the cessation of the Hungarian salt manufacture, the abandonment by Louis of Pago in the Gulf of Fiume, the suppression of privateering in the Dalmatian ports, and freedom of navigation on the Adriatic. 2. She obtained from Francesco da Carrara Moranzano and Cavarzero, the surrender of his pretensions to the City and March of Treviso and to Ceneda; the demolition of all the new works of defence which he had constructed in the direction of her lagoons; and an adoption of the boundary lines of 1373. 3. She agreed to transfer the possession of Tenedos to the Count of Savoy, who was pledged to dismantle the fortifications, and to abstain, in common with Genoa, from trading³ at Sudak till the expiration of two years. 4. She ceded Trieste to Duke Leopold. 5. She returned to her former relations with Aquileia, to whom she transferred Muco. 6. She formally relinquished Dalmatia. 7. She was reinstated in her commercial privileges at Constantinople. 8. She assented to an exchange of prisoners without ransom.⁴ The execution of the last clause involved the most frightful revelations. It transpired that nearly 4000⁵ human beings had perished between June 1380 and September 1381, in the Terranuova, not so much from any neglect which they had experienced as from the utterly exhausted condition in which they were found on

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, 720.

² Caresinus, fol. 466; *Chronicon Regiense*, Murat. xviii. 87; *Cronica Ripaltæ*, Murat. xvii. 322; Varese, iii. 363.

³ *Dichiarazione di documenti di storia Piemontese*, 1285-1617; *Arch. stor. Ital.* xiii. 115, 119.

⁴ Chinazzo, fol. 778-81; Sanudo, fol. 721; Marin, vi. 215-21; Romanin, iii. 296-8.

⁵ Caresinus, *loco citato*; Sanudo, 721.

the recovery of Chioggia. On the other side, it was discovered that many hundred Venetians of the better class had died in the prisons of Genoa through sheer maltreatment. It appeared that these victims were allowed neither beds nor mattresses, and that the sole nutriment which they received had been twelve ounces of bread a day and a little water.¹ On the enlargement of the Genoese prisoners, many of whom had languished in their cells since the victory of Porto d'Anzo in 1378, the Venetian ladies² collected a fund to furnish them with clothes and necessaries, sent them viands from their own tables, and paid their passage home. It is stated that there were as many as 1500.

Such was the treaty of Turin, which put an end to the war, and to which it will be remarked that Austria was not a contracting party.³ Its terms were very different from those which Louis had dictated at Buda in 1378: nor were they exactly such as the Signory would have framed for herself. Yet on the whole they were not unfavourable.⁴ The restoration of the Venetian establishments at Constantinople was more than an equivalent for the withdrawal of the Venetian garrison from Tenedos. The footing on which they left the Republic with the Carrarese was tolerably satisfactory. The exclusion from Azoph was a two-edged measure. The tribute to Hungary was a certain humiliation; but the advantages which it carried with it were considerable. So many changes had supervened in Italy in the course of a short space, that it was impossible to predict the longevity even of the treaty of 1381.

In the ensuing month (4th September 1381⁵), thirty of the contributors to the patriotic movement of the 1st December 1379, were solemnly called by the Great Council to take their seats on its benches. The Grand Chancellor Caresinus was among the number; but he was permitted to retain the seals.⁶ The remaining twenty-nine⁷ were:—Marco Storlodo, Marco Orso, Nicolo Lerigo, Nicolo Tagliapietra, Pietro Penzino, Nicolo Reniero, Donato Porto, Francesco da Mezzo,

¹ Chinazzo, fol. 784.

² Vincens, ii. 52.

³ *Copy of Letter of the Doge of Genoa, Nicolo Guarco, to Andrea Contarini*, dated Genoa, Sept. 3, 1381, and endorsed: "Magnifico et Potenti Domino Andreae Contarino, Dei gratia Venetiarum Ducis, Consilio, et Communitati Venetiarum, fratri et amicis nostris carissimis."—Murat. xxii. 745. See also *ibid.*, 721.

⁴ *Chronicon Regiense*, contemp. Murat. xviii. 81.

⁵ Caresinus contemp. fol. 465.

⁶ Sansovino, *Chronico*, 40.

⁷ Caresinus, fol. 467, who gives the extract from the books of the Pregadi.

artisans; Marco Cicogna, apothecary; Bartolomeo Paruta, dealer in peltry; Georgius Calergi and Jacobus Pizzamanos, patricians of Candia; Paolo and Jacopo Trevisano, Francesco Girardo, Marco Pasqualigo, Nicolo Polo, Pietro Lippomano, and Andrea Giusto, *cittadini*; Antonio Arduino, wine merchant; Pietro Zaccaria, Giovanni Negro, and Paolo Nani, druggists; Jacopo Condolmiero, trader; Andrea Vendramino, banker; Nicolo Garzoni, Luigi della Fornace, and Giovanni Arduino, undescribed.¹ The election was conducted in the Pregadi; and the balloting process occupied the whole of the 4th till a late hour in the night. Each person present had the power of proposing a name. Of course many were unsuccessful; and Leonardo d'Agnella, of the contrada Maria Mater Domini, barley-factor, died of chagrin on this account; he had offered his country his own services, those of a servant, and a month's pay for fifty oarsmen. The 5th September was a day of ovation; the elect and their friends went in procession to the Basilica, each of the newly-made Nobles carrying a lighted taper in his hand; and tournaments, regattas, and banquets were held in honour of the happy occasion. Some of these bourgeois in the persons of their descendants acquired high political and literary distinction. The apothecary Cicogna was the ancestor of a Doge.

On the 5th June following, Venice parted with the man who had stood at the helm during the mortal Chioggian struggle (1382²). The Doge formed the central figure in that noble and stern phalanx which had rallied round the national colours, when Venice was so nearly lost. It was his example which had animated so many breasts, and which had instilled new courage into so many drooping hearts. It was the presence of that chivalrous personage, which had helped to ward off the dreaded catastrophe. Those were, indeed, days of tribulation and trial, when Andrea Contarini reigned; and the next generation listened with drawn breath to veterans who had fought in their youth at the Lova or at the Dykes under the egregious Pisani, as they recited the legend of *The Syrian Dervish and the Venetian Merchant*, or narrated anecdotes of the famous War of Chioggia. In its reply to the ducal request to return to Venice in April

Caresinus, fol. 467; Romanin, iii. 301.

² Caresinus, fol. 469.

1380, the provisional dictatorship had gracefully pointed out, how the resolution of his Excellency to put himself at the head of the defending force had been the Life, Salvation, and Sustenance of the State, and how the Republic to all time would feel the heavy debt of gratitude to the Doge, his family, and his descendants.¹

The successor of Contarini was Michele Morosini of Santa Maria Formosa, Procurator of Saint Mark, and one of the negotiators of Turin (June 10, 1382²). All the contemporary and early historians pronounce a warm eulogium on this nobleman; and Caresinus³ does not appear to have thought any terms of panegyric too extravagant. Morosini was remarkable for the ardour of his patriotism, the affluence of his circumstances,⁴ and his administrative abilities. In his charities he was so profuse, that he was popularly called the Father of the Poor. His eloquence, his sagacity, his love of peace and justice were proverbial. He was elected by the College of Forty-one in preference to two other candidates of established fame, the Cavaliere Leonardo Dandolo⁵ and Carlo Zeno, Captain-General,⁶ to the latter of whom it had been more validly than fairly objected that his services in his present capacity were absolutely indispensable.⁷

To the forced loan of 1379 Morosini had necessarily been one of the leading contributors; his return was 38,000 ducats.⁸ Moreover, at a moment when the very existence of the Republic was a grave problem, and when, real property being almost valueless, money was correspondingly precious, he assisted the Government by purchasing certain houses belonging to the Commune for 25,000 ducats, a sum which the stagnation of business rendered equal to 100,000 or upward. His friends came to the conclusion that he was mad, and said among themselves:—"We are in danger of losing Venice, and Morosini is buying tenements!" "Michele!" exclaimed some, when they met him after the transaction, "what a simple man you must be; you had much better have kept your

¹ Caresinus, fol. 469. The funeral oration was pronounced by his kinsman Antonio Contarini, Archbishop of Candia. See Agostini, *Notizie degli scrittori Viniziani*, prefaz. xlii.; and Apostolo Zeno, *Lettere*, v. 416.

² Caresinus, fol. 466; Sanudo, fol. 746; Letter of Morosini to the Commune of Perugia notifying his election, dated June 16, 1382.

³ *Ubi supra*.

⁵ Romanin, iii. 307.

⁷ Romanin, ii. 307.

⁴ Sanudo, *ubi supra*.

⁶ J. Zenus, *Vita C. Zeni*, 293.

⁸ Galliccioli, ii. 97.

ducats!" But he rejoined:—"If this Land come to ill, money is nothing to me!"¹ For that answer he was much admired; "when," says an historian, "the Forty-one wished to make him Doge, this, among many encomiums which were passed upon him, was the chief."²

Morosini, however, did not long enjoy his honours. He died in the same autumn (Oct. 15³) of the plague, one of 19,000 persons⁴ who are reported to have been swept away by its ravages. He left a son Giovanni,⁵ who probably inherited his vast property, and lived to see the day when the little investment, which his father had made in houses, had quadrupled in value.⁶ To recruit the population the Government conceived the project of endowing the orphan daughters of the poor.⁷

This Prince was replaced (October 21⁸) by Antonio Veniero, Governor of Candia, and formerly Governor of Tenedos. Veniero did not arrive at Lido to enter upon the discharge of his functions till the 13th January 1383.⁹

The Venieri or Venerii were a family, which is found settled at Chioggia in the first half of the eleventh century; in 1031 Johannes, son of Venerio Bolli sold to Martino Bianco and Orsane Nadal a plot of ground there for four denari, and thenceforward the family continued to rise in political consideration and influence.¹⁰

¹ "Se questa terra stava mal, io no voglio aver bene."—Romanin, iii. 309.

² Sivos, quoted by Romanin, iii. 309.

³ Caresinus, fol. 466-7.

⁴ Sanudo, fol. 748.

⁵ *Ibid.*, fol. 743.

⁶ Romanin, iii. 309.

⁷ Caroldo, fol. 123, Harl. MSS. 5020.

⁸ Caresinus, fol. 468.

⁹ Caresinus, fol. 468; Sanudo, fol. 750; Caroldo, fol. 122.

¹⁰ Molmenti, *Sebastiano Veniero e la battaglia di Lepanto*, 1899, p. 3.

CHAPTER XXVII

A.D. 1383-1413

Rally of the Republic from the War of Chioggia—Decline of Genoa—Attitude of Affairs in Hungary, Naples, and Friuli—Death of Louis of Hungary (Sept. 11, 1382)—Intrigues of Carrara at Venice—Alliance between Venice and Verona against Padua (1385)—Defeat of Antonio de la Scala—Coalition between Padua and Milan against Verona (1387)—Partition of the Veronese Territory—Treachery of Giovanni-Galeazzo Visconti—Coalition between Venice and Milan against Padua (1388)—Abdication of Carrara in favour of his son Novello—Partition of the Paduan Territory—Occupation of Treviso by the Republic (Dec. 14)—Recovery of Padua by Novello, aided by Venice, Florence, and Bavaria (1390)—Hostilities between Milan and Florence—Famous Retreat of Sir John Hawkwood—Peace of Genoa (1392)—Investiture of Visconti with the Dukedom of Milan (1395)—Defeat of the Milanese at Governolo (Aug. 1397)—League against Milan between Florence, Mantua, Ferrara, and Padua—Truce—General Peace of 1400—Progress of the Ottoman Power—Venetian Acquisitions of Argos, Nauplia, Scutari, Durazzo, Alessio, and Corfu (1386-1402)—Mediation of Venice between the Christians and the Turks—Battle of Nicopolis (1396)—Acceptance of a French Yoke by the Genoese (Oct. 1396)—Increasing Power and Prosperity of Venice—Death of Antonio Veniero (Nov. 24, 1400)—Anecdote of his Son Luigi—Accession of Michele Steno (Dec. 1, 1400)—His Installation (Jan. 9, 1401)—Festival—*Compagnia della Calza*—Rupture of the Republic with the French Government of Genoa (1403)—Defeat of the French and Genoese at Zonchio by Carlo Zeno (Oct. 9, 1403)—Peace (March 1404)—Death of Giovanni-Galeazzo Visconti (Sept. 3, 1402)—Partition of his Dominions among his Sons—War between Venice and Francesco Novello—Occupation of Vicenza by the Republic—Submission of Colonia—Mutual Preparations—Secession of Ferrara from its Alliance with Padua (March 1405)—Occupation of Verona by the Signory (July 16, 1405)—Capture of Jacopo da Carrara, one of the Sons of Novello (July 25)—His Transmission to Venice (July 31)—Duplicity of Novello—Gradual Exhaustion of his Resources—Fall of Padua (Nov. 22, 1405)—Incarceration of Novello and his Son Francesco (Nov. 23)—Revelations of a Great Conspiracy against Venice—Strangulation of Novello and his two Sons (Jan. 17, 1406)—Implication of Carlo Zeno in the Carrara Affair—Formal Submission of Verona (July 12)—And of Padua (Jan. 4, 1407)—Liberal and Enlightened Policy of Venice—Her large Territorial Acquisitions—Troubles of the Church (1406-11)—Election of the Venetian Angelo Corraro to the Papal Chair as Gregory XII. (Dec. 19, 1406)—Council of Pisa (March 1409)—Neutrality of the Republic—Fresh War with Hungary (1411)—Successes of the Venetian Troops—Financial Embarrassments at Venice—Appointment of an Extraordinary Council of War (July 4, 1412)—Defeat of the Hungarians near Motta (Aug. 24)—Truce for Five Years (April 17, 1413)—Conspiracy of Francesco Baldovino and Bartolomeo

D'Anselmo (March 1413)—Execution of the former—New Territorial Acquisitions (1409-12)—Death of Michele Steno (Dec. 26, 1413)—Plague at Venice—Anecdote of Steno's Reign.

IN a very short time after the Treaty of Turin, the Republic had retrieved the disaster of Chioggia; and in 1383 that town was rebuilt. Trade revived. The choicest productions of all countries were once more poured into the lap of Venice. Fresh mercantile treaties were concluded. The commercial intercourse with India and China was improved by the establishment of a consulate in Siam.¹ The money-market and the exchange resumed their buoyancy; and the State, rallying from the shock which it had experienced, soon afforded a new proof of its indestructible vitality.

The sacrifices which Genoa had made to the late war, though prodigious, were even less great than those of her rival. But the latter bled from no inward wounds; while she boasted the most compact Government which the world had ever seen. At Genoa the power of recoil was wanting. The political system was decentralized by faction. Genoa was hopelessly prostrated.² Her resources and credit were at the lowest ebb; her trade was stagnant; her strength was paralysed. In four years (1390-94) she was shaken by ten thronal revolutions.³

The death of the Doge Michele Morosini in October 1382, had been preceded by that of Louis of Hungary, who expired in the previous September after a reign of upward of forty years.⁴ This great monarch having left no male issue, the succession was contested between his eldest surviving⁵ daughter Mary, affianced to Sigismund, Margraf of Brandenburg, brother of the Emperor Wenceslaus, and Charles III. of Durazzo, King of Naples, the nephew of Louis. The Venetians, who perceived where their true interests lay, espoused the feebler side in this dynastic quarrel; supported by the arms and counsels of the Republic, Mary triumphed; her nuptials with the Margraf were solemnized; and Charles was, in February 1386,⁶ assassinated by their satellites. The Signory aided the child of Louis, so far as the bare upholding of Mary's rights was concerned; but she did not hesitate the more to connive

¹ Romanin, iii. 335.

² Varese, iii. lib. 9; Vincens, ii. 83-84.

³ Sismondi, vii. ch. 55, p. 369; edit. 1809.

⁴ Ibid. vii. 252.

⁵ Bonfinius, *Res Ungar.* iii. 1.

⁶ Sismondi, vii. 254.

at the diminution of Mary's power by the embodiment of Rascia and the Dalmatian littoral with the Bosnian possessions of Tuartko, Ban of Croatia. By that step Hungary acquired a dangerous neighbour, and Venice lost one of the most troublesome of her foes. The fear of a coalition headed by the wearer of Saint Stephen's crown was, it seemed, for ever at an end.

The negotiations with Sigismund were conducted on the part of the Republic by Pantaleone Barbo, accompanied by Lorenzo de Monacis the historian, to whom we are presumably indebted for the interesting narrative of the interview with the King on Easter Day, 1386, in his garden, where he was attended by his minister and court. He spoke a few gracious words to the envoys, and then added that, as he was no orator, he must leave the rest to others. The main point was that he desired the maritime assistance of Venice in a projected war with his rebellious subjects in Illyria, where his mother and future wife were hemmed in by the enemy. The Republic met his wishes by dispatching Giovanni Barbarigo with a man-of-war to cruise in the Dalmatian waters, and rescue the imperilled princesses; and the nuptials were duly celebrated. At the same time a complimentary legation arrived at Buda to congratulate Sigismund on his accession and marriage, and the new queen wrote a letter, thanking the Doge, and a second to the Government commending Barbarigo.¹

Coeval with the decline of Genoa and the dismemberment of Hungary were the convulsions of Naples and the troubles of Friuli. The throne of Charles III. was claimed, to the exclusion of his widow Margaret, by Louis of the House of Anjou. Upon the death of Marquardo, Patriarch of Aquileia, in 1381,² the Holy Father (Urban VI.) endeavoured to impose on the people of Udine Philip d'Alençon; and a war was the consequence. The Venetians astutely fomented this struggle by seconding the cause of the oppressed with arms and money; a league was framed by Udine and the other Friulan communes, under their auspices, against the Pontiff and his partisan, the Lord of Padua, who was aiming at the extension of his patrimony in that direction (January 20, 1386); and hostilities were prosecuted with various success. These differ-

¹ Romanin, iii. 312.

² *Vita Patriarch. Aquilejens.* fol. 60, Murat. xvi.

ences derived a large share of their importance from Venetian intrigue; through the same agency they were studiously prolonged.

This chain of circumstances was eminently favourable to Venice, and promoted in an admirable manner her retributive projects against Francesco da Carrara, whom she had already thwarted in his efforts to obtain permanent footing in Friuli, and in a fresh endeavour to procure instruments for his ambitious designs among the confidential members of her Government. From the revelations of Vettore Morosini, one of the Avogadors of the Commune, made in April 1385, to the Decemvirs, it transpired that his colleague, Pietro Giustiniani, was in the frequent habit of receiving bribes from Lord Francesco. On one occasion Morosini related that he was standing at his casement, when he saw some men pass with a heavy basket of grapes; he became curious to learn their destination, and his suspicions were awakened when he perceived that they entered the door of the dwelling of Giustiniani. Giustiniani was summoned to the presence of the Council. "This morning, my lord," said one of the Ten to him, "we understand that you have received a handsome gift?" The guilty functionary repudiated all knowledge of the circumstance; but, upon being put to the question, he retracted his denial, and owned that the fruit had been sent to him by Antonio Meneghino of Chioggia, agent of the Carrarese. The latter was forthwith arrested; and sentence of death was pronounced against both. On the 9th May, they were beheaded between the Red Columns,¹ and on the 31st August following, one of the Quarantia, Stefano Manolesso, having been convicted of complicity, was also sent to the scaffold.² This was the Decemviral method of dealing with emergencies; perhaps they found it answer the best; but so this tribunal maintained its integrity and loyalty, when all others failed.

The Lord of Padua, thus foiled at two points, now stood indeed quite alone. His great patron Louis and his Aquileian ally were dead. The Genoese connection had ceased to be of any utility. In Italy he was environed by enemies, who were either plotting his destruction, or who were prepared to insult him in his fall.

¹ Sanudo, fol. 768; Navagiero, fol. 1070.

² Sanudo, fol. 760.

One of the objects at least, contemplated in the cession of Treviso to Austria in 1381, was to raise a new enemy against the Lord of Padua. The Signory piqued herself upon her dexterity; but it unfortunately happened that, what she had treated as a masterly stroke, proved a miscalculation. Leopold was indigent and venal; and Carrara, by temporising, negotiating, cajoling, and bribing the Austrian officers, gained time to collect 80,000 ducats, for which sum he persuaded the Duke to sell his interest in Treviso and the Marches. At such a totally untoward turn of affairs, the Signory was severely irritated. But it soon armed itself with a second expedient.

In 1381, Antonio de la Scala, a natural son of Cane de la Scala, had become, by the murder of his brother Bartolomeo and his family, sole ruler of Verona and Vicenza. The crime, by which he raised himself to undivided power, was universally decried; but none was more bitter in his comments or more unsparing in his reproaches than the Lord of Padua. A mortal enmity had thus been engendered between the two neighbours; and the Scaliger thirsted for an opportunity of marking his resentment. That occasion was now thrown in his way by the Signory, who concluded with him (1385) a treaty of partition, and engaged to grant him a monthly subsidy of 25,000 ducats on condition that he should declare war against Padua. The offer was too tempting to be rejected; and the Duke of Verona, whose funds were excessively low, determined to raise some money for his new purposes, in addition to the pecuniary assistance furnished him by his confederate, on the security of certain jewelry, which he transmitted to Venice for valuation. The trinkets were estimated by their owner at 21,500 ducats; and two Jew bankers agreed to lend 19,000 ducats upon the property.¹

But the arms of La Scala were not triumphant. On the 25th June, 1386,² he was totally defeated at the Brentella by Cortesia da Sarego, the general of Carrara, with a loss of 800 in killed and 8000 in prisoners. The latter, according to usage, were merely stripped of their arms, equipments, and horses, and were sent back without ransom; and the Republic consoled Antonio for his disappointment with a present of 60,000 ducats. Assured by an astrologer that he would

¹ Sanudo, fol. 780-81.

² *Ad Hist. Cortus., Addit. Sec.* fol. 987.

soon retrieve his fortune, he spurned all propositions of peace, and resolved to embark in a second campaign. On the 11th March following (1387), the two armies met at Castagnaro near Castelbaldo on the Adige,¹ and the Veronese troops sustained a second defeat at the hands of Giovanni D'Azzo and Sir John Hawkwood, successors of Sarego, Hawkwood carrying desolation to the very walls of Verona and Vicenza. La Scala was in the utmost despondency; but the Ducal government soothed him by a farther donative of 10,000 ducats for the purchase of new arms and war material.

Carrara had been victorious; but at the same time he was sinking into a condition bordering upon bankruptcy. All his money was in the pockets of Hawkwood and the Tard Venus, and he was left without any adequate resources. La Scala was beaten indeed; but his purse had been punctually replenished; and he was seconded by the wealthiest Power in Christendom. Under such circumstances, the ultimate issue of the war undertaken at Venetian instigation and conducted with Venetian gold was hardly dubious.

But a new actor now appeared on the scene. It was Giovanni-Galeazzo Visconti who, by the death of his father Galeazzo in 1378 and the assassination of his uncle Barnabo in 1385, had acquired the sovereignty of Lombardy.² Insatiably ambitious, cold-hearted, profoundly artful, this prince who, from a small Champagnese fief of Vertus, held in right of his wife Elizabeth, a daughter of John of France, the prisoner of Poitiers, was often called *the Count of Vertus*,³ had watched with secret complacency the progress of the internecine struggle between Verona and Padua; and it was his aim to turn to the best advantage the quarrel of these petty potentates. On more than one occasion, Giovanni-Galeazzo had already proffered his assistance to the Scaliger against the Carrarese, and to the Carrarese against the Scaliger. But both naturally looked askance at such a dangerous alliance; and his insidious advances were not met. After the Battle of Castagnaro, he resumed his solicitations; but at first they were not more successful than before. At length, La Scala, changing his mind, and reconciling himself to an idea previously so repulsive,

¹ Sanudo, *Itinerario*, 38.

² Froissart, *Chroniques*, xiii. 338; Cagnola, *Stor. di Milano*, 21; *Arch. stor. Ital.* iv.

³ Froissart, 337; Candido, *Vita Philippi Mariæ Vicecomitis*, Murat. xx. 987.

responded in an affirmative sense ; but he found to his surprise and chagrin, that he had been forestalled. On the 19th April 1387,¹ a partitive treaty was signed between Padua and Milan, by which Visconti was to receive Verona, while Vicenza fell to the share of Francesco.

This compact was carried into effect with extraordinary rapidity. The Veronese district was overrun ; Antonio was robbed of his entire patrimony ; and, seeking safety in flight, the unfortunate prince, with his wife and children, threw himself into a boat on the Adige, and escaped to Venice, where the Scaliger was comforted by a presentation of citizenship² and an annuity of 1200 ducats (January 13, 1386–87).³ The long arm of the Count of Vertus, however, reached him shortly afterward in the mountains of Friuli, to which he had retired. On the 5th August 1387,⁴ poison completed the work which the sword had begun ; and the discontinuance of his pension reduced his family to beggary. Meanwhile, in egregious contravention of the treaty of April, Visconti proceeded to claim Verona in his own right *and Vicenza by right of his wife*. All protest against the gross and barefaced fraud was ineffectual ; and the subtle Carrara saw himself thoroughly outwitted and entrapped.

This political metamorphosis left two courses open to the Signory, to ally herself with the dupe or with the deceiver. It became a delicate question, whether it was desirable to check the cupidity of Visconti, or whether it was safe to accelerate and complete the ruin of Carrara. Both anxiously courted her friendship. The latter, appealing to the interest of Venice in the preservation of a barrier against the Count of Vertus, asked her to join him in vindicating his wrong, and in averting a common danger. The former invited her to concur in the spoliation of the Carrarese. In the beginning of the same year, Visconti had paid a flattering compliment to the Republic, by conferring the post of podesta of Milan on Carlo Zeno with the approbation of his Government ; and, only a few weeks before, leave was accorded to the Duchess of Milan to invest 100,000 ducats in the Venetian funds.

The aggrandizement of Giovanni-Galeazzo, and the exten-

¹ Sismondi, vii. 267 ; Romanin, iii. 620.

² Sanudo, 431, 767.

³ *Ibid.* fol. 778.

⁴ *Annales Forolivienses*, fol. 195, Murat. xxii ; Platina, *Hist. Mantuana*, lib. iii. 753, Murat. xx.

sion of his frontier toward the Lagoon, were entirely at variance with the views of the Republic. But the Signory conceived that it was competent for her to make use of that Prince as an instrument for wreaking her vengeance on her nearer neighbour. If the Count of Vertus proved himself troublesome, she calculated that she had always the means of turning the scale against him; and on the 29th May 1388, a second partitive treaty was ratified between Venice and Milan, by which the Padovano was allotted to Visconti, and the Trevisano and Cenedese to his new ally, with the fortress of Curano and the district of San Ilario. It was stipulated, that the future possessor of the Carrara patrimony should not construct any fresh fortifications in the direction of the Lagoons, and that such of those already in existence as might be obnoxious to the Signory should be destroyed. The latter consented to allow Giovanni-Galeazzo 100,000 ducats of gold for the expenses of the first year, and for those of the second and succeeding years at the rate of 8000 a month.¹ From the former amount was to be deducted a sum sufficient to defray the cost of the small Venetian contingent of 2900 or 3000 men. At the suggestion of the Venetian Government, Mantua, Ferrara, and Udine were admitted into the alliance.

Carrara, commonly called Francesco *Vecchio*, in contradistinction to his son Francesco *Novello*, was thus reduced to a lamentable strait. Before any length of time had elapsed sufficient to obtain succour from distant quarters, he knew that he would be attacked almost simultaneously at least on three sides. A Venetian army of 2900 strong was on the point of debouching into the Padovano by Mestra; a Venetian flotilla was about to ascend the Brenta; and Jacopo del Verme, the nephew of Petrarch's friend, was bringing the Milanese battalions through Noale.

There was a cruel struggle in the bosom of Francesco Vecchio between many conflicting emotions. But indeed, when the question was at all calmly viewed in all its bearings, it was palpably evident that no choice of policy was left to him, and that a great sacrifice of personal ambition was demanded at his hands. As a parting measure, he vented his anger on certain of his subjects, whom he charged with plotting against him; Albertino de Perago was beheaded; the rest were strangled or

¹ Sanudo, fol. 758.

crucified in the precincts of the palace. Then, on the 29th June, precisely a month after the formation of the League, the old Lord of Padua abdicated in favour of Novello,¹ the same whom Petrarch had accompanied to Venice in 1373; and on the following day, he set out for Treviso,² of which he had reserved the principality. He too readily flattered himself that the decisive step which he had adopted would disarm or mollify a resentment directed against him rather than against his Commune or his House; and he wrote under the influence of this feeling to the Signory at the moment of his renunciation, acquainting it with the change in the government, and begging that it would deign to vouchsafe to the son the friendship which it had withdrawn from the father.

This final appeal was left unanswered; and hostilities began in July. The Venetian flotilla closed the passage of the Brenta and the Adige; Del Verme hastened to establish a blockade on the side of the mainland. But the defence was conducted by the younger Carrarese with surprising energy and skill: the canals, which intersected the Trevisano and Padovano, formed so many strategical lines which his general gallantly and firmly disputed with Del Verme; and he managed, in spite of the pressure of superior numbers and of the insubordination of his troops, with which the enemy had tampered, and of the seditious clamours of the people, to maintain his position through the entire summer and autumn of 1388. He was unable, however, to prolong his resistance till the spring, when there was more than a possibility that he might have been relieved. On the 24th November he obtained a safe-conduct from Del Verme; and on the same day the latter occupied Padua in the name of Giovanni-Galeazzo. It was not till the 14th December³ that Treviso was similarly consigned by the people to the Republic⁴ amid cries of "Death to the Scaliger!" "Long live the people of Treviso!" "Long live our blessed Venetian Evangelist Saint Mark!" and the promptitude and audacious self-possession of her proveditors alone frustrated the designed repetition of the trick which Visconti had so effectively played at Vicenza in the preceding year.

¹ Redusio, *Chron. Tarvisinum* contemp. 789.

² Gataro, *ubi infra*.

³ Gataro, *Ist. Padov.* contemp. 789; Mur. 17; Redusio, *Chron. Tarv.* 790; Mur. 19; Sanudo, fol. 779.

⁴ Platina, *Hist. Mantuana*, iii. 753; Murat. xx.

Both the Carrarese had been armed with safe-conducts. Neither of these passes was respected. Novello and his father were arrested by the agents of the Count of Vertus at Verona. The son was relegated to a castle near Asti, where he was surrounded by spies and guards. The father was closely incarcerated at Monza.

Such were the first and second phases of the war in the Lombard marches in 1387 and 1388. Seldom had so great and so momentous a revolution been consummated in so dioramic a manner and with such astonishing facility. The proud House of Carrara was in exile—in captivity. The only male representative of Antonio de la Scala was a child of tender years. The keys of Treviso, Ceneda, Castelfranco, Bassano, Feltre, and Motta were in the possession of the Doge. Those of Padua, Verona, and Vicenza hung at the girdle of Giovanni-Galeazzo.

The recovery of Treviso and her other dependencies cost the Republic in indemnities and other trifling outlays between 22,000 and 23,000 ducats. The author of the *Chronicle of Treviso* was among those employed to convey the treasure to its various destinations; and "I carried," writes Redusio, "6000 ducats at my own saddle-bows!"¹ On the 28th November 1388, Guglielmo Quirini was appointed vice-governor of Treviso at four ducats a day.

The ambitious dreams of Visconti seemed to be approaching their realisation. The Milanese dominion was brought within a few miles of the Lagoons, and the Viper Standard floated almost in sight of the Campanile of Saint Mark. Only one Power of any importance stood between the Count of Vertus and the Iron Crown; and when the Paduan syndics came to throw themselves at his feet and to implore his clemency, he dismissed them with the comforting assurance that (please God) before five years had passed over his head, he would leave them no ground to be jealous of their Venetian neighbours.

The rise of the Visconti had been somewhat rapid. In 1325, Marino Sanudo Torsello, writing to the Archbishop of Capua, says: "It is not very long since Galeazzo² Visconti was

¹ Redusio, *Chronicon Tarvisinum*, fol. 814.

² The allusion of Sanudo is to Galeazzo, the son of Matteo Visconti, who, after being in exile six years, recovered, says Cagnola, *St. di Mil.* 15-16, his patrimony in 1324.

here with his wife, humble and abject enough, to whom the Venetians out of charity allowed 100 *lire di grossi*."

From his confinement at Asti, Novello had found means to open a correspondence with Padua and Venice. He had no difficulty in feeling the temper of the Signory, or in learning her views. He discovered that she was satisfied, for the present at least, with the castigation which he had suffered, and the revenge which she had exacted. The truth was that the master of one city had become a preferable neighbour in her eyes to the master of one-and-twenty cities; and it was unequivocally intimated to him that, if he meditated the recovery of his original patrimony, he might rely at least upon her collusion.

A hint from such a quarter was readily appreciable. With the connivance of the Governor the prisoner left the Castle of Asti in the weeds of a palmer, under the pretext of visiting the shrine of Saint Antoine de Vienne in Dauphiny. Having, in fact, accomplished, or pretended to accomplish, that pilgrimage to save appearances, he proceeded through Avignon and Marseilles to Italy. Genoa and Pisa extended to him every mark of sympathy; but the menaces of Giovanni-Galeazzo deterred them from affording him any active succour or overt countenance. Tuscany looked askance at the expatriated wanderer. Adversity, however, developing the sterling qualities of his mind, armed him with invincible courage and constancy. With unswerving continuity of purpose and steadfast singleness of aim he pursued the task of winning back the sceptre which had been wrested from his family; all the obstacles which beset his path were heroically overcome; and after a series of untold hardships in which, for the most part, a pregnant wife was a partner, he finally enlisted in his cause the Duke of Bavaria, son-in-law of the murdered Barnabo Visconti, and the Florentine and Bolognese Republics, which were scarcely less interested than Venice in the repression of Milanese ambition. The former engaged to supply troops, the latter to find subsidies. The Carrarese elicited, moreover, promises of assistance or pledges of neutrality from several petty princes in Croatia, Carinthia, and Friuli. Above all, he knew that he could reckon on the Republic herself, which was already his secret pecuniary support.

Upward of a year and a half was consumed by the illustrious refugee in these negotiations; and it was only at the close of the dreadful winter of 1390,¹ that he was able to utilise the resources which he had been so indefatigably collecting, and that the Bavarian troops began to march. But the halting pace of the Germans soon excited his impatience, and Novello was encouraged by the rumours which had reached him of a revulsion of popular feeling at Padua to hasten with a few hundred lances in advance of the army. In the course of June he unexpectedly appeared in the Padovano, and dispatched a summons to the Milanese governor to surrender. The latter charged a trumpeter to tell him in answer "that he must be an uncommon fool who, having made his exit through the gates, imagines that he can re-enter over the walls!"² This jeering response obliged the Carrarese to resort to a different expedient. He happened to be aware, that the Brenta there was not above two and a half or three feet deep, and that a wooden fence constituted the sole barrier on that side; and this topographical knowledge enabled him to hazard a daring stratagem. On the night of the 19th June,³ his companions and himself stealthily descended into the bed of the stream, waded noiselessly through the water which barely wetted their knees, clomb with ease over the palisade, and amid joyous and triumphal cries of *Carro! Carro!* threw themselves into the City. The storming of the citadel was not essayed, however, till the arrival of the Germans, who were 6600 strong; its fall, on the 27th August,⁴ reinstated Francesco Novello in his ancestral honours. The sufferings of the young prince had been intense, and the recompense was well earned. He lost no time in communicating his good fortune to Venice, Florence, Bologna, and Ferrara;⁵ and toward the Republic herself he was prodigal of his vows of friendship and devotion. He had accomplished the feat not so long since alleged to be impossible.

The Paduan revolution of 1390 answered, in a certain measure, the anticipations of Florence and Bologna. Giovanni-Galeazzo was compelled by that event to recall a portion of his troops from the Tuscan frontier;⁶ while Novello, penetrat-

¹ *Annales Forolivienses*, fol. 196.

² Sismondi, vii. 314.

³ *Annales Forolivienses*, fol. 196, may be compared with *Hist. Cortus., Addit. Sec. 988.*

⁴ *Hist. Cortus., Addit. Sec. 988.*

⁵ Romanin, iii. 327.

⁶ Sismondi, vii. 321.

ing into the Ferrarese territory, obliged the Marquis of Ferrara to renounce his intimate alliance with Visconti, and to afford him a free passage through his estates. The war, nevertheless, was prosecuted with unslackened vigour.

The influence of the divisions in the Roman Church, springing out of the translation of the Apostolic See to Avignon in the beginning of the century, was traceable in the recent rise in France of two great parties, of which one, headed by the Transmontane Pontiff, favoured the aggrandisement of Milan, while its rival, composed of Jean, Comte d'Armagnac, and other distinguished personages, embraced the Tuscan cause. This political agency, primarily arising out of disunion in the Italian Church at home, was instrumental in producing results to the States of the Peninsula, and eventually also to Sicily, to an infinite extent more far-reaching and more disastrous than any one at the outset was probably able to foresee; the French occupation of Genoa in 1396 was the first visible fruit of the unhappy conditions, seeming to necessitate and justify foreign intervention; then came intermarriages and other complications; and the final result is a matter of history, unfolding itself, as we advance.

The Florentines and their confederates, under Sir John Hawkwood, were now joined by a small French force, commanded by Armagnac. The Allies advanced so far as the Adda, where their progress was arrested by the Milanese under Del Verme. It was the desire of Hawkwood to act with extreme circumspection, and to defer any engagement, until the forces of the enemy had been accurately reconnoitred. But his impulsive and self-opinionated colleague spurned all argument or admonition, pushed forward alone with a detachment of lances, and was enveloped and overwhelmed.¹ The vanquished, agreeably to the custom of the times, were stripped of everything but their habiliments, and were reduced by the boyish temerity of the Count to the miserable necessity of begging their way back to France. The rout of Armagnac placed Hawkwood himself in the most serious dilemma, and exposed him single-handed to the attack of an enemy flushed with success and superior in numbers. His best, if not his sole course, appeared to be to shun a collision, and to fall back upon Florence by cautious counter-

¹ Cagnola, 21; *Arch. stor. Ital.* iii.

marches. The genius of the Englishman now shone with unapproachable splendour; and with masterly coolness and intrepidity he conducted his army in its retrograde course across the Mincio, the Oglio, and the Adige, under the very eyes of his pursuers.

On the banks of the Oglio, Hawkwood halted, laid out an encampment with studied formality, intrenched himself in his position, allured the enemy by a feint of inaction and distress, fell upon them with electric rapidity and unerring skill, gained a brilliant advantage, and before they had rallied from their disorder, effected the passage in safety. The General had thus outstripped his pursuers, and the Mincio was crossed without impediment. But, owing to the force and swiftness of the current, the Adige presented far greater difficulties; and he encamped on its banks with the intention of repeating the manœuvre, which had answered so well in the passage of the Oglio. But Hawkwood was mistaken in his calculations. Del Verme was not to be overreached a second time. Instead of exposing himself once more to probable discomfiture, the latter desisted from the chase, and cut the dykes of the river. The whole Veronese valley was converted into a sheet of water, and the Florentine army was insulated in its intrenchments. The Milanese commander now became so sanguine of success, that he sent word to the Count of Vertus, desiring Giovanni-Galeazzo to apprise him in what form he would wish his prisoners to be delivered to him; and at the same time he symbolically advised the Englishman to lay down his arms, by forwarding to him through a trumpeter a caged fox. Sir John chose to treat the insolent suggestion in a jocular light, and bad the messenger tell his master, "that so far as he can see, his fox is in excellent spirits, and that beyond doubt he is conversant with some sure method of egress unguessed by them."¹

Hawkwood indeed, skirting the Adige, traversed the whole valley, and marched day and night through water which often reached to the bellies of his horses, until he reached, in a state of great exhaustion, the fortress of Castelbaldo, seven miles lower down the stream, near which he had defeated the Veronese in 1387. This fortress belonged to Novello, and there consequently he gave his troops rest. A con-

¹ Sismondi, vii. 331-6. See *Poggiana*, 1720, ii. 262.

siderable number of the infantry had missed their footing in the trackless path, and had perished; and a large portion of the horses were drowned. Still the bulk of the Florentine army was saved. Its arrival at Florence, where it had been mourned as lost, was a source of mingled congratulation and amazement; and many and many a year afterward the favourite topic of discourse among Italians themselves, and in all countries which Italians frequented, was the famous retreat from the Adda to the Arno of the English condottiero, John o' the Needle.¹

The military resources of Visconti were far superior to those of his adversaries. But, fortunately for the latter, he committed the egregious blunder of spreading his troops over too wide a line; and it followed that their operations were limited to skirmishes and equally resultless conflicts. That species of warfare was peculiarly sterile and fatiguing. In point of outlay it was even more onerous than the most decisive campaigns, and no commensurate fruits were gained; while both parties began to sicken of the languid hostilities. Several States had already volunteered their mediatorial offices: the propitious moment was now seized by the Genoese government. The triumphant retreat of Hawkwood, and the absolutely barren nature of the subsequent contest, inspired Giovanni-Galeazzo himself with a disposition to listen to terms; and Padua and the Tuscan Republics were persuaded to concur in the reference of their respective grievances to a congress assembling at Genoa.

The Grand Master of Rhodes had been asked to preside as the representative of a strictly neutral Power; but the articles of the Peace were framed by Genoa in the capacity of arbitrator. After a protracted discussion, it was agreed that there should be a general amnesty; that, in consideration of a tribute of half a million florins to Milan by fifty annual instalments, Novello should retain the Padovano, excepting Bassano and two fortresses; that the Count of Vertus should not meddle for the future in the affairs of Tuscany, nor Tuscany in those of the Count of Vertus; that there should

¹ In satirical allusion to his father's alleged calling. The Strada Aguta in the vicinity of Faenza is supposed to have been constructed by him or under his orders in connection with the papal fiefs of Bagnacavallo, Cotignolo, and Gazolo, bestowed on him by Pope Gregory XI. in 1376. He married a Visconti in 1377. See *Cal. of St. Papers*, 1864, i, 26.

be a reciprocal adjustment of territory between Florence and Sienna; that Lucca should be included in the present Peace; and that, while Ferrara, Bologna, and Padua were admitted as the allies of Florence, Mantua, Lucca and Perugia should be similarly admitted as the allies of Giovanni-Galeazzo. These conditions were signed on the 28th January 1392; but, in consequence of some ulterior differences and disputes, their publication was postponed till the 18th February ensuing.¹

Francesco Novello, thus reinstated by Venetian influence² and his own force of character in the most valuable portion of his hereditary possessions, hastened to consolidate his position by cementing his relations with the Signory. On the 5th March 1393, he presented himself at Venice, accompanied by his eldest son, and obtained a public audience of the Doge. Casting himself on his knees before Veniero, he reiterated his declarations of gratitude and affection, and averred that his own services and those of his family were ever henceforth to be commanded by his Serenity. The Doge graciously bad the Lord of Padua to rise, embraced him, and assured him of the friendship of the Republic. He returned in the highest spirits to his capital, summoned his wife and children from Florence, and entered into a negotiation with the Count of Vertus for the liberation of his father from Monza. But the afflicting intelligence was returned that the elder Carrara had died on the 6th October of that year; and Giovanni-Galeazzo transmitted to Padua a stiffened corpse, which the filial piety of Novello honoured with splendid rites of sepulture. The condolence of the Signory was expressed through her local Podesta; and she sought to assuage in some measure the grief of her late visitor by the admission of the House of Carrara to civic freedom (November 24, 1393).

It might be predicated of any peace to which Giovanni-Galeazzo was a principal party, that it possessed the strongest element of instability. That of Genoa was precisely so ephemeral; and, before any length of time had elapsed, it became a dead letter. In 1395 (May 1), the Emperor

¹ Sismondi, vii. 338-9; Romanin, iii. 398.

² Poggio Bracciolini, *Hist. Florentina*, lib. 3; Murat. xx. 257, C. note 7; P. G. Cagnola, 22; *Arch. stor. Ital.* iii.

Wenceslaus, whose vices and imbecility sullied the diadem of Frederic II., sold to the Count of Vertus for 100,000 florins the peculiar privileges of an imperial foffeee and the Ducal title.¹ By this accession of rank and grandeur Giovanni-Galeazzo was immoderately dazzled and inflated; his ostentation and arrogance exceeded all bounds; and the parchment of 1392 was soon crumpled up in his hand. The intrigues of the new Duke of Milan at Pisa and Perugia, and an attempt to establish himself in the heart of Tuscany by the acquisition of San Miniato, midway between Pisa and Florence, contributed their share to the resuscitation of the expiring flame; but the revival of hostilities was more proximately due to an aggression upon the dominions of the House of Gonzaga and by the advance of a Milanese army to the walls of Mantua. That audacious infraction of the most solemn pledges raised an outcry of alarm and indignation throughout Lombardy and Tuscany; a league was formed against the Count of Vertus between Mantua, Florence, Ferrara, and Padua; and Carlo Malatesta, Lord of Rimini, accepted the post of Captain-General. The Republic herself declined to bear any personal share in the approaching movements; but she secretly lent her aid to Novello. The campaign which followed was severely detrimental to Milanese glory and ascendancy. In a battle which was fought at Governolo, ten miles south-east of Mantua, and on the Mincio near its confluence with the Po, the army of Giovanni-Galeazzo, led by Del Verme, suffered a crushing defeat (August 28, 1397).²

The growth of Venetian influence in Italy since the War of Chioggia had been rapidly progressive, and her wealth and expansive resources enabled her to command the respect of Europe. The Hungarian dynasty at Naples cultivated her alliance; the Este dynasty at Ferrara was changed by her instrumentality. From the legitimate son of the Marquis Alberto the sceptre was transferred to Nicolo, a bastard of the same house; to support his pretensions, 50,000 gold ducats were advanced to him for five years on the security of the Polesine of Rovigo (March—April 1395);³ and his

¹ Cagnola, 23.

² Sismondi, vii. 392.

³ Jacobus de Delayto, *Annales Estenses*, fol. 922; Mur. xviii.

rival Azzo was thrown into prison, first at Venice itself,¹ and subsequently in Candia (August 1400-4).² The Signory, however, had heretofore studiously refrained from intervention in Milanese affairs; but she resolved at last to espouse the stronger side, and to co-operate in repressing the too powerful Visconti. Shortly after the signal triumph of the confederates at Governolo, her representatives signed with them a defensive alliance for ten years (March 21, 1398);³ and steps were taken within a fortnight (April 3)⁴ to procure the adhesion of Austria.

The Count of Vertus was not undismayed by this attitude of calm defiance and methodical preparation; and he speedily discovered a spirit of tractability. At his express desire, a negotiation was set on foot; and an armistice was arranged on the 11th May, which within two years was superseded by a general pacification (March 21, 1400), conducted under Venetian auspices and superintendence.

The new treaty was strictly in unison and harmony with the trimming policy, which the Government of the Doge had been pursuing throughout since the Peace of Turin. The Signory had subsidised the Scaliger and the Visconti to weaken the Carrarese; and she had employed the Carrarese, in his turn, as an instrument for weakening the Visconti. In both these efforts she admirably succeeded. It might be urged that she had shown less than her customary circumspection in allowing the master of Milan and Verona to become the master of Padua; but it was to be recollected that she held the balance in her own hands, and that she practically reserved to herself the faculty of making the elder Carrara or his son the hero of a counter-revolution. By the restoration of Novello Milan lost Padua, but Venice did not lose Treviso.⁵

The author of *The Prince* thought and said that Venice erred in allying herself with Milan in 1388. But, instead of impugning Venetian foresight, Nicolo Machiavelli might have directed his scrutiny with larger profit to other points, where more solid ground existed for animadversion. At

¹ Joh. Bembus, Murat. xii. 516.

² Ibid.

³ Joh. Bembus, 515; Jacobus de Delayto, *Annales Estenses* contemp.; Murat. xviii. 947-8.

⁴ J. de Delayto, *ubi supra*; Romanin, iii. 329.

⁵ Joh. Bembus, 515.

Milan, a Visconti espousing a French princess: at his own Florence, an unstable and tremulous Executive beseeching French protection: at Genoa, a factious aristocracy accepting a French yoke: presented spectacles indeed full of portent and ignominy. Italy already lay under the heavy curse of a profligate military organisation¹ and of a hybrid constitutional system. But from Transmontane intermarriages and protectorates she was destined to experience even a greater bane, and to perpetuate her subjection to foreign rulers. Had Venice and Genoa, with some of the intervening States, knit themselves together in a loyal and firm alliance, instead of committing political suicide by intestine wars, Italy might have become a prosperous Federation, and the League of Cambrai might have been rendered impossible. But the Genoese really led the way by inviting Charles VI. of France to assume a suzerainty over them in 1396; they proved themselves truly the Gate through which the French and Germans, when the old imperial system had come to an end with the death of Frederic II. in 1250, poured into the peninsula and ruined it.

Meanwhile, the Ottoman Empire had been making sensible progress; and the moribund dominion of Greece was hastening to its final collapse. The total incapacity of the Byzantine Court to defend a wide littoral, or to protect its subjects, was transparently evident; and several of the more exposed dependencies of that crown, shuddering at the prospect of falling under Turkish sway, were beginning to turn their eyes toward the Republic.

Maria, daughter and heiress of Guido d'Engino, Lord of Argos and Napoli di Romania² (Nauplia), had been united to Pietro, son of Federigo Cornaro of San Luca,³ one of the heroes of the War of Chioggia. Pietro Cornaro died quite in early life; and his widow, not entering into second nuptials, now sold her seigniorial rights to the Venetians (1388) for an hereditary pension.

The example was followed by Giorgio Strazimero, Lord of Scutari in Albania (1395),⁴ and by Giorgio Topia, Lord of Durazzo (1399),⁵ and almost simultaneously, Alessio, on the

¹ Machiavelli, *Il Principe*, c. 12.

³ Sanudo, fol. 760.

⁵ *Ibid.*; Romanin, iii. 316.

² Caresinus contemp. fol. 428.

⁴ *Ibid.*, fol. 762.

same line of coast, was committed by some of its Nobles¹ to a Venetian protectorate.

But a more valuable and important acquisition had been made in Corfu,² which was originally assigned to Venice in fief after the fall of Constantinople in 1204, and which, having been at a subsequent date (1221) appropriated by the Despot of Epirus, passed in dowry (1258) to the Neapolitan branch of the Hohenstaufen. So far back as 1382, the perturbed state of Naples incited the Signory to address overtures to that court, and to the Corfiots themselves, for the transfer of an island, which she viewed as more than an equivalent for Tenedos. The diplomatic correspondence, however, was tedious and protracted.³ It was not till 1386⁴ that the principal inhabitants of Corfu could be persuaded to embrace the proposal: nor was the King of Naples prepared to complete the bargain, until 30,000 gold ducats had been offered to him as a bribe.⁵ This negotiation lingered from 1382 to 1402.

At the same time, the Signory was knitting more closely her connection with Greece and the Morea by compacts and matrimonial alliances; the trading charter with Constantinople was twice renewed (1383-92); Petronilla Felicita,⁶ widow of Giovanni Crispo, Duke of the Archipelago, was united to Nicolo Veniero, one of the sons of the Doge; and a daughter of his Serenity⁷ was betrothed to a stripling of ten years,⁸ son of Frangulo Crispo, the Duke's kinsman.

The present occupant of the throne of the Osmanli was Bajazet I. The development, which had been already imparted to the Mussulman power, was portentous; and the insatiable ambition of the new Sultan precluded the possibility of any limit being assigned to its advance and expansion. It was a rolling tide of aggressive barbarism, which seemed to be sweeping away the bulwarks of European civilisation. The empire of the Palæologi was sinking into inanition. The successor of Louis of Hungary was trembling on his throne. Wallachia was a Turkish tributary. Bulgaria was all but

¹ "Copia delli Patti firmati pel nobil huomo Z. Miani, Capitano del Golfo, con alcuni nobili al Castello di Alessio."—MS. cited by Daru, ii. 185.

² Caresinus, fol. 472-3.

⁴ Sanudo, fol. 760.

⁶ Cigogna, *Iscrizioni*, ii. 92.

⁸ Sanudo, *loco citato*.

³ Romanin, iii. 315.

⁵ Romanin, iii. 316.

⁷ Sanudo, fol. 779.

a Turkish province. Serbia was at the feet of Bajazet; and her prince, Stephen, who had solicited the protection of Venice, merely obtained admission to civic honours (June 1391).¹

On the first intimation, however, of the accession of Bajazet (1389) the Senate, true to the pliant and accommodating policy which naturally belonged to a commercial people, lost no time in accrediting Francesco Quirini, loaded with rich donatives, to his court (October 17, 1390);² and the Ambassador contrived to elicit from the Sultan a renewal of the charter already existing in favour of his countrymen. This step did not prevent the Senate from directing explicit instructions (April 27, 1392) to be sent to Tommaso Mocenigo, the new Captain-General, to keep a vigilant watch on the foreign possessions and dependencies of the Signory, particularly Candia and Negropont, or from tendering its counsel to the Byzantine Court touching the best means of stemming the forthcoming crisis.

In 1391, Emmanuel Palæologos succeeded to a tottering throne. While he remained Valet of Constantinople, this prince had been employed in invoking on behalf of his father Johannes the charity and support of Europe. But his mendicant peregrinations were not productive of any substantial fruit. The Powers of Christendom restricted themselves to professions or messages of condolence. England and France were too perturbed, Arragon, Castile and Portugal were too feeble to engage in any costly schemes of Oriental enterprise. Genoa had no money; Hungary had no ships; and even the Republic was too much absorbed at present by the concerns of the Peninsula to go beyond sympathy and advice.

At the same time, its Eastern policy constituted a question, on which the Senate was gravely divided. Some were of opinion, that the College should write to the Bailo of Constantinople, instructing him to persuade the Emperor to remain firm in his capital, "of which his departure would be the certain ruin," exhorting him to trust in God and in the succour of the Christian Princes, and recommending Palæologos to communicate with the Pope on the subject of a General League. Others, pleading the imperfect state of their know-

¹ Romanin, iii. 331.

² Ibid., *ubi supra*.

ledge on the Oriental question, urged the propriety of waiting with patience, until the advices from Constantinople and Turkey were completed and verified. A third and more influential section proposed a mediation between the Sultan and the Byzantine Court; and the embassy to Bajazet had been actually commissioned (February 1396¹), when the matter assumed a phase, which led the Signory to alter her views. The arrival of official reports from Buda and Constantinople shewed, that all the arts of persuasion had been fruitlessly exhausted upon the Sultan, and that the King of Hungary and the Emperor saw no course before them but war.

The alarming preponderance of Bajazet had already constrained the Republic to enjoin on the part of Mocenigo the exercise of the utmost vigilance and activity, and to confer for the third time the peculiarly responsible and arduous appointment of Bailo of Negropont upon Carlo Zeno (January 1396²), who had just returned from a visit to the English Court, where it is said by his biographer that he succeeded in enlisting the good will and sympathy of Richard II. on the side of his country. Richard, forsooth, had little or nothing else to offer to the illustrious Venetian. But the improved complexion of Italian politics since the peace of 1392 induced the Government eventually to quit its attitude of neutrality, and to declare itself openly favourable to the proposed Crusade.

In France, the Duke of Burgundy, uncle of Charles VI., his son Jean de Bourgogne, Count of Nevers,³ the Count of Eu, constable of the kingdom, the Sire de Coucy, the Maréchal de Boucicault, and others, obeyed the call. Several thousand Hungarians under Sigismund in person were in the field. England was represented by 1000 lances under Bolingbroke. The Count of Hainault expressed an earnest desire to take part in the expedition. But his father wisely counselled him to let others do as they pleased, and to go into Friesland and rather reduce his own subjects to obedience, in which he was prepared to aid the Count.⁴

The French penetrated into Turkey through Transylvania

¹ Romanin, iii. 332.

² *Ibid.*, iii. 335.

³ Froissart, *Chroniques*, ch. 47-8.

⁴ *Chronicles of Froissart, translated by Sir John Bourchier Lord Berners, 1523, cap. 206.*

and Wallachia; the Magyars followed the route of Servia: while the Venetian squadron under Mocenigo, reinforced by a few galleys from Rhodes and the Ionian Isles, proceeded to station itself at the confluence of the Otzuma and Danube in Bulgaria. The forces of Bajazet were concentrated near Nicopolis on the right bank of the river, 300 miles in a north-westerly direction from Constantinople; and the two armies confronted each other on the 28th September 1396.¹ The Christians numbered fully 100,000.² But the valour of the French was more than neutralised by their foolhardihood; Sigismund, who was alone conversant with the Turkish system of strategy, was strenuous in his exertions to curb the mercurial impetuosity of his allies; the latter dashed forward with tremendous vehemence, and broke the first and second lines of the enemy, who designedly gave way. Their strength was expended, when they found themselves face to face with the main body under the Sultan himself, who had taken up a strong position at the foot of a hill; and the tide of war was at once rolled back. The confederates were rapidly enveloped by the dense masses of the Mussulmen, who assailed them in front and rear; and they were routed with horrible carnage. The day was irrecoverably lost; Sigismund made nugatory efforts to restore order, and to retrieve the misfortune; and the discomfiture of the French prepared the way to that of the Hungarians.³ The humane and sensible usage, which had been introduced within the last half-century into the canons of European warfare, was repugnant to the proselytising spirit of Bajazet or to his bloodthirstiness; and all the prisoners who declined to renounce the faith of their fathers were decapitated on the field. The successor of the great Louis of Hungary and the Duke of Burgundy escaped by flight, and were received on board the galleys of Mocenigo, to whom Sigismund presented a handsome recompense, duly surrendered by the Admiral to his Government; while by a stretch of clemency the Count of Nevers and twenty-four of his compeers were admitted to ransom. The Count obtained his freedom with great difficulty through the offices of certain foreign merchants, with whom his father, the Duke

¹ Romanin, iii. 333.

² Froissart, xiii. 330; edit. Buchon.

³ Froissart, 402-3.

of Burgundy, was advised by a Turkish trader at Paris to communicate.

The prostration of the combined forces of France and Hungary on or near the site of the more famous Actium cruelly extinguished the hope of relief from those quarters, which Christendom, and the Byzantine Court especially, had permitted themselves, perhaps too easily, to nourish, and opened to Bajazet the gates of Constantinople and the road to Vienna.

It was in less than a month subsequently to the battle of Nicopolis that an event occurred, which France had been for some time anticipating, and which more than indemnified her for the reverses which she had suffered in the East. On the 25th October 1396,¹ after numberless procrastinations and interruptions, a treaty was signed between Charles VI. and the Republic of Genoa, by which the latter surrendered her political freedom and her national independence, under the guarantee that her civil rights and judicial institutions should be preserved in their full integrity. The Genoese elected the King of France their perpetual sovereign, and accepted the lieutenant nominated by his Majesty, the Count of Saint Pol, who arrived at the seat of his government with an escort of 200 French lances.

The most factious of Italian commonwealths had thus at length proclaimed itself no longer capable of liberty. Her historians report that it had been the wish of Genoa to give herself to Milan, to which she had temporarily attached herself, rather than to France, and that a correspondence, which occupied several months, was maintained between the Doge Antoniotto Adorno and the Count of Vertus. But Giovanni-Galeazzo cajoled, trifled and temporised, until the opportunity was lost; and he found that by a refinement of subtlety he had overreached himself. The nation which was seeking a master appears to have finally considered that the humiliation of a French yoke was less pointed and galling than that of a Milanese, and that the former was more susceptible of being shaken off; and although a more advantageous offer was brought by the courier of Visconti, before the October treaty had been signed, Adorno and his countrymen persevered in their resolution,

¹ Stella, *Annales*, lib. iii., Mur. xvii. 1151.

and threw themselves by preference into the arms of Charles.

As the Genoese Revolution of 1396 necessarily gave preponderance to Venetian maritime power, and weakened the Genoese influence at Constantinople and in the Mediterranean, this conclusion of the affair afforded the Republic immeasurable relief; for in a second amalgamation between Milan and Genoa she had dreaded a measure, which might not improbably prepare the way to a second Italian League and to a repetition of the horrors of 1379. The remoteness of the suzerain whom her rival had chosen, and the rancorous animosity which subsisted between Charles and the Count of Vertus,¹ formed in the eyes of Venice an amply sufficient pledge against any such contingency. Upon the earliest intimation of the stunning disaster at Nicopolis, the Signory instructed her Captain-General to protect the Venetian mercantile marine, and to the extent of his ability to provide for the safety of the Greek capital.

Excepting in a diplomatic sense, however, the Republic remained from 1396 to 1400 a stranger to the troubles of the Peninsula. While the banner of Saint George was sullied by a French escutcheon, Venice advanced with wonderful rapidity in her great career. The national prosperity was unexampled. Food was abundant. A prodigious impulse was given to trade and commercial speculation. The argosies of the Morosini, the Cornari, and the Mocenigi traversed every arm of the ocean, and visited every port and inlet. It was an illustration of the elasticity which was felt,² that the long credit heretofore enjoyed by the wine merchants was discontinued by the Board of Customs, and that they were required to pay the duty on their wines within two months after their arrival in port; and the returns of the census were so satisfactory, that a check was imposed in 1383 on the too rapid increase of naturalized subjects by an abolition of the low standard tolerated in a period of pestilence and war, and a relapse to the qualification adopted in the preceding century of fifteen years' residence.³

Such was the flourishing aspect of Venice, when the lengthened reign of Antonio Veniero was terminated by his

¹ *Froissart*, by Berners, 1523, cap. 210.

² *Sanudo*, fol. 767.

³ *Ibid.*, 777.

death, after a short indisposition, on the 21st November 1400.¹ His administration of eighteen years had been remarkable for the quick reaction which was experienced from the political and commercial crisis of 1380, and for the marvellous extension of Venetian influence in all parts of the world. The weight of the Republic in the Councils of Italy itself was such as had never before been known; and all the European Powers respected the liberties and rights of Venetian subjects.

Veniero was not more renowned for his urbane and gracious manners² than for his severe morality. It happened in the summer of 1388, that one of his three sons, named Luigi, indulged, in concert with another young patrician, Marco Loredano, in a curious freak by fixing to the entrance of the house of Giovanni de Boccolis, a person of high respectability, built on the bridge of the Holy Trinity, one night in May, a bunch of coral of phallic significance, surmounted by horns. The indignant husband lodged an information of this outrage with the Criminal Court of the Forty, and prayed for redress.³ The delinquents were identified; their guilt was established beyond denial; and each of them was condemned to a fine of 100 ducats and two months' imprisonment in the *Carceri di Sotto* or the lower dungeons (June 11, 1388). In the solitude of his confinement, Luigi Veniero arrived at an acute sense of his degraded and compromised position; and after a while the young man caused a letter to be put into the hands of his parent, in which he described himself as sinking, and implored the exertion of his influence in the mitigation of the cruel sentence. But the Doge considered that it was a duty which he owed to his country to set a terrible example; and, stifling the instincts of parental love, he allowed the law to keep its course. In a short time the prisoner was a corpse. Such were the reasoning and practice of a Venetian noble of the fourteenth century. Such, at least, were those of the Doge Veniero. It was possibly to this austerity of character that he owed the dislike of which the historian Sanudo speaks as having grown up against him latterly among the nobility. He carried his love of justice too far perhaps to please many. He certainly carried

¹ Dolfino, *Annali*, p. 111, King's MSS. 149.

² *Ibid.*, p. 102.

³ The process is preserved in Sanudo, fol. 772.

it too far in the case of his unhappy son, if he neglected to intercede for him.

In the septuagenarian who was elected (December 1, 1400) to replace Veniero, it was not altogether easy to recognise that Michele Steno who, as a hot-blooded young man of four-and-twenty, had danced at the Doge's ball on Carnival Thursday, 1355, and had afterward thrown society into an unexampled ferment by the pasquinade on Faliero and his nephew. The blood of Steno was not quite at fever-heat; he was at present sixty-nine; and in the uninterrupted discharge of a variety of important public functions it had been his apparent endeavour to efface the dark stain which his indiscretion cast upon his name, and to assuage in some measure his remorse for the inexpiable wrong which he had contributed to inflict five-and-forty years ago, under the influence of severe exasperation, on the family of Marino Faliero.¹

Steno had been indisposed at the time of his election, and the ceremony of the installation was deferred till the 19th of the month. It was unusually pompous. The inaugurative speech was delivered on the occasion by Leonardo Dolfino, Bishop of Castello,² and it was followed by a series of festivities and spectacles, to which all the Arts and Schools contributed their share. These pageants, which were exceedingly magnificent, spread over the twelvemonth.³ They probably partook to some extent of the nature of an ovation for the general peace of March 1400. The *Veluderi* or Velvet-Dressers prepared for distribution through the neighbouring cities a Circular, advertising the entertainments which they were purposing to give. A portion of the necessarily large outlay was borne by the Compagnia della Calza.

The French government of Genoa was not slow to embroil itself with the Republic. The Count of Saint Pol had been succeeded in his vicarious functions by the Maréchal de Boucicault, a member of the ill-starred crusade of 1396,⁴ and a brave, but bluff and headstrong soldier. Boucicault proceeded to signalize his regency by the prosecution of the crusade against the Mohammedans; a Genoese fleet of eleven

¹ Johannes Bembus, fol. 516, Murat. xii.; Dolfino, *Annali*, p. 111, King's MSS. 149.

² Agostini, *Notizie degli scrittori Viniziani*, prefaz. xlii.

³ Joh. Bembus, fol. 516; Dolfino, p. 111, King's MSS. 149.

⁴ Froissart, *Chroniques*, c. 47-8, 52, 1825.

sail, under his personal orders, scoured the Mediterranean, and in feigned ignorance inflicted incalculable damage upon the Venetian establishments at Rhodes, Famagusta, and Beyrout.¹ It was upon his return from this enterprise, that the marshal somewhat unexpectedly encountered, between Modon and Zonchio on the coast of the Morea, a Venetian squadron of fifteen galleys under the renowned Zeno. It was the 7th October 1403. A battle was unavoidable, and a fierce contest ensued. It terminated, after four hours' hard fighting, in favour of the Venetians, who captured three galleys, and took several prisoners of rank. On the following day, the conqueror repaired to Modon, where he placed the wounded under medical treatment; and on the 9th he addressed the ensuing letter to the Doge² :—

“Most Serene Prince, I beg to apprise your Ducal lordship how, being here with eleven galleys, and two besides of Romania, about noon on the 6th of this month, I was signalled by the guardship at Sapienza. Whereupon I proceeded thither, and found three ships, one from Canea, the other two from the vicinage of Coron; and asking them if they had seen any armed vessels, I was answered in the negative. I then repaired to Portolongo, while it was still daylight. But a little while afterward came the Loredano galley, which I had sent on a mission to Modon. This was about sunset; and Loredano stated that he had seen nine galleys pass Capo di Gallo, and make for Giaglo. I immediately quitted the harbour, as I was unwilling to remain there, from fear of being surprised; and I sailed to the Scoglio di San Nicolo near the Caurere, and summoned thither the Captain-General of Romania and all the masters of ships, to advise with them what it was best to do, seeing that the galleys (of the enemy) were already in the neighbourhood, and were eleven in number, with their lights hoisted. They came at last to Sapienza and cast anchor, and remained there the whole night. I agreed with the Captain (of Romania) and the masters to stay where we were that night and to

¹ Copy of a Letter sent by Ser Bernardo Morosini, Bailo of Cyprus, to the Government of Crete, dated 21st August 1403: received Sept. 19th, 1403. Murat. xxii. 800-1.

² Copy of a Letter sent by Ser Carlo Zeno, Captain (General) of our Signory, to Messer Lo Doge Michele Steno, dated Modon, 9th Oct. 1403, Murat. xxii. 801. See also Georgius Stella, *Ann. Genuenses*, 1200, Murat. xvii.; and Jacobus Zenus, *Vita C. Zeni*, lib. viii., Murat. xix.

get in readiness, and in the morning (October 7) to come to Modon, and recover the two great galleys (which we had left there), and afterward to hasten to meet the said galleys of the Genoese; and so we did. The Genoese stood all the night (of the 6th) at Sapienza, with their lights aloft burning; and they were so haughty and self-sufficient that they took no notice whatever of us, which I ascertained from a small bark sent to me here by Messer Almoro Lombardo. In the morning, according to the orders given, we started for Modon; and on our way we descried those galleys (of the Genoese) which had left a little while before without giving me any notice, or communicating with me at all. This seemed to every one a token of ill-will and animosity to your Signory on their part, in respect to the damage and spoliation at Beyrout. For if they had been of good intention, they would have shown a desire to come to a parley with me or with the Castellan (of Modon?) on the subject. Seeing, however, that they had gone, I took the two great galleys, and followed them, using the oars. They had now distanced Modon eight miles, and were on the mouth of Zonchio; and when they observed that we were giving them chase, they wheeled round, and advanced toward us. When I saw them do this, I certainly imagined that Messer Boucicault intended to send a galley to me (as he had on a former occasion, when I received it amicably), because then we might have come to some friendly settlement respecting the affair of Beyrout. I immediately hoisted my flag; but such was the arrogance of the enemy, that they proceeded toward me without farther ado in order of battle; and the fight commenced on both sides with great vigour and severity, lasting nearly four hours. At the end, by the mercy of God and the Evangelist Saint Mark, we discomfited his galleys, and eight (only) escaped in sorry plight;¹ and of wounded and killed there were enough. If all our men had done their duty, not a single galley would have been saved by them. Wherefore, if God vouchsafes me a return to Venice, I beseech your Lordship that you will cause such as have been

¹ Joh. Bembus, fol. 517, estimates the loss of the enemy at 800, that of the Venetians at 153. "There were taken," says Jacopo de Delayto (*Annales Estenses* contemp.; Murat. xviii. 988), "with the three galleys, many Frenchmen of note, whom Carlo Zeno sent with the other prisoners to Venice, where they were treated kindly, and were maintained for some time at the public expense." See also Redusio, *Chron Tarv.*, 808; and Muratori, *Annali*, ix. 15.

the means of preventing me from reaping a full triumph to be prosecuted by your Avogadors of the Commune. . . .

"Of my own achievements I care not to speak, since every man saw how I invested the galley of Messer Boucicault, in which were from 280 to 300 combatants, and should have mastered it, had not two other galleys come up to its relief; and after an hour's fighting, I was obliged to relax my hold. My Admiral fought like a lion; but none came to assist us, save Messer Leonardo Mocenigo, who was the means of forcing Messer Boucicault to retire. . . . I thank God for His aid. I made a most strenuous attack and defence; and if there had been none but Genoese, they would have been worsted at the first encounter. I declare to you, most serene Prince, that I have stated the facts to your Serenity exactly as they stand. God forgive those who have been wanting in their duty! The prisoners of whom I should make mention are: Messer Pietro and Messer Cosmo de' Grimaldi, Messer Leonardo Sauli, and Messer Cassano Doria, and others not worth enumerating. But of galeots and foot soldiers there are at least 400. Given at Modon,¹ the 9th October 1403.—'CARLO ZENO, Procuratore² Capitano.'"

This triumph was celebrated by a jubilee. Tournaments and other athletic sports were prepared. The capital was illuminated at various points. On the Campanile a large bonfire was lighted, as a signal of joy to surrounding cities; and the heat which it emitted was so intense, that it liquefied a portion of the leaden roof, and occasioned a serious amount of damage.

The loss of the Battle of Zonchio was exceedingly galling to Boucicault, and that officer, who had never been remarkable for his equanimity, now completely lost his head. He proceeded to commit every sort of mischievous and silly extravagance. Without the slightest authorisation from headquarters, he declared war against the Signory. He directed Genoese cruisers to attack and make prize Venetian merchantmen wherever they met with them. He wrote a letter³ to Michele Steno, in which he gave the Captain-General the lie, and

¹ This letter is likewise found in Dolfino, *Annali*, p. 122-3, King's MSS. 149.

² Among the letters of Vergerius, Murat. xvi., is one (No. 10) to Zeno, complimenting him on his exploit at Zonchio. It bears date Nov. 22, 1403.

³ Stella, *Annales*, fol. 1203-4. It began, "I Jean de Meingle, called Boucicault, Marshal of France, signify to you," etc.

challenged the Doge or Zeno, or both, to single combat. As for the choice of weapons he was profoundly indifferent; and that and every point of detail were left to them. He did not object, upon consideration, to fight *any six Venetians*, or to take any odds which might be offered, ten against twelve, fifteen against eighteen, five-and-twenty against thirty, or, varying the character of the duel altogether, to measure his strength with them galley to galley.¹ This rhodomontade was treated with the silent contempt which it deserved; and the marshal had the chagrin of seeing his herald return without an answer.² At the same time, the College, sensible of the harm which might arise from the dissemination of falsehoods respecting the late affair, addressed a circular to all the Italian Powers, and a letter to the French King, in which the facts of the matter were temperately and lucidly rehearsed in vindication of the conduct of Zeno.

In France itself, however, a strong feeling of indignant resentment was excited by the intelligence of the defeat of Maréchal Boucicault; and at Montpellier, among several other places, Venetian property was seized in reprisal to the value of 30,000 ducats or upward.³ But a report had also arrived of the vigorous preparations which Venice was making for war. The French prisoners, in their letters to their friends at the court of Charles VI., besought them not to prolong their captivity by any violent counsels; and the King, influenced by these considerations, sent a peremptory mandate to Boucicault to desist from hostilities, and to seek an accommodation on the footing of restitution and indemnity. The Governor of Genoa found that the Venetian Government had already taken bail for its more distinguished prisoners, who were liberated on parole;⁴ and a compensatory treaty was signed on the 22nd March 1404, by which the damages sustained by Venetian subjects at Beyrout, Rhodes, and Cyprus were assessed at 180,000 ducats.

By this pacification the captives were released on both sides. It came to the ears of the College that a Frenchman, who was among the number of those set at liberty, had boasted, subsequently to his enlargement, that he would wash his hands yet in Venetian blood. He was arrested on this

¹ Vincens, ii. 120.

³ Sanudo, fol. 805.

² Stella, *Ann.* fol. 1204.

⁴ Romanin, iv. 10.

charge, brought back to Venice, and sentenced to be hanged. On his way to execution, he continually protested his innocence, exclaiming: *God forgive me, if I ever uttered the words!* The populace, having learned the cause of his punishment, was peculiarly bitter against him; and as the miserable wretch dangled from the gibbet between the Red Columns, some of the mob brutally slashed the soles of his feet with knives, saying: *Let the Frenchman's blood flow, who vaunted that he would spill ours!*¹

The feebleness of the German Empire was now apparently approaching its climax. To the despicable Wenceslaus had succeeded in 1401 the almost equally despicable Robert, Count Palatine of the Rhine. Invited by Padua and some of the Tuscan Communes to take part with them against the overgrown power of Visconti, and enticed by the promise of subsidies and arms, Robert entered Italy in the summer of that year, and having obtained leave from the Signory to cross the Trevisano, proceeded direct to Padua, where he concerted with Novello the military plan of the intended campaign. Before his arrival in the Peninsula, the new Cæsar notified his exaltation to the Signory, soliciting her friendship, her counsel, and her succour. On the 27th September (1401) it was resolved in the Pregadi, that he should be told in reply, "that his Majesty had so much discernment, and was surrounded by such able advisers, that any external suggestions could only be supererogatory; that the Republic would, upon his coming into Italy, send her ambassadors to congratulate him; that she did not object to place at his disposal the two barks which he had demanded; that it was with regret that she declined to gratify his wishes in respect to an honorific deputation; and that, so far as her assistance was concerned, she would take an early opportunity of ascertaining with greater precision the desires and intentions of his Majesty."

The preparations of the Count of Vertus for the struggle which was awaiting him were on a scale which distanced all competition. The most famous captains of the age, and the best troops which were procurable, were drawn into Milanese pay. The prodigality of Giovanni-Galeazzo was bounded only by his immense pecuniary resources. His adversaries were inferior in number, in discipline, in strategy. Carlo Malatesta,

¹ Joh. Bembus, fol. 518.

the hero of Governolo, was on his staff of Generals. The Venetians exhibited a tendency to remain strictly neutral. In every respect he was the master of the situation. Nevertheless, the Imperialists, encouraged by a few trifling successes at the outset, marched upon the Brescian territory. But they were speedily met by Jacopo del Verme and the Milanese; and on the 21st October 1401, the army of the league was exposed to a humiliating and disheartening rout.¹ The Emperor had not participated to any material extent in the military movements; he now furnished a conclusive proof of his pusillanimity by breaking faith with Novello and the Tuscans, and withdrawing from the war. He loitered away his time between Venice² and Padua till the spring of 1402, when he escaped from the scorn and sneers of the Italians by returning home.

It is difficult to surmise, how far the splendid success achieved by Del Verme for the Viper Standard might have been detrimental to Tuscany, if its consequences had not been averted by the opportune appearance of the Republic in the character of an arbitress, and by the sudden decease of Giovanni-Galeazzo himself in the following September.³ By his will, the Duke apportioned his dominions among three sons. The eldest, Giovanni-Maria, received Milan, Cremona, Como, Lodi, Piacenza, Parma, Reggio, Bergamo, Brescia, Siena, Perugia, and Bologna. The second, Filippo-Maria, was invested with the title of Count of Pavia, and with the sovereignty of Pavia, Novara, Vercelli, Tortona, Alessandria, Verona, Vicenza, Feltre, Belluno, and the Riviera of Trento.⁴ To Gabriello-Maria, a bastard, he bequeathed Pisa and Crema.⁵ The funeral of the Count of Vertus, of which an eye-witness has left a minute narrative, was one of the most magnificent spectacles which had ever been seen in Italy; it took place at Milan on the 20th October 1402.⁶

All the Italian States contemplated this partition with ill-suppressed ecstasy, and the event was viewed by the Republic herself with unqualified satisfaction. Even Giovanni-Maria Visconti had not yet reached his fourteenth year. A

¹ Cagnola, 24; *Arch. stor. Ital.* iii.

² Joh. Bembo, fol. 517; A. Gataro, *Ist. Padov.* contemp. fol. 845.

³ Muratori, *Annali*, ix. 10.

⁴ *Ibid.* ix. 11.

⁵ Joh. Ser Cambius contemp. *Cronica di Lucca*, Mur. xiii. 841.

⁶ Muratori, *Ann.* ix. 11.

regency was consequently appointed; and, agreeably to the instructions of the testator, his consort Catherine was placed at its head. The situation of the Milanese dominion, deprived of the talents of the Count of Vertus, and environed by so many enemies, was already critical enough. But its weakness and its peril were soon much increased by the follies and crimes of the Regency.

The Lombard annals of the first decade of the fifteenth century are mainly occupied by a recital of the war waged against the Duchess of Milan by a league formed under the auspices of Francesco Novello. The object of that struggle was redistributive. It aimed at the spoliation and dismemberment of the colossal empire which it cost the most ambitious, the most faithless, and the most fortunate member of a dynasty, not proverbial for tenderness of conscience, five-and-twenty years to found and consolidate; and the task was one to which Novello, animated by the hope of extending his dominion in the direction of Vicenza or Verona, lent himself with peculiar alacrity and zest. The analogy of her own Genoese experiences was perhaps of service to the Republic in assisting her to appreciate the inherent proclivity of her continental neighbours to weaken each other. The ultimate consequences of such an internecine policy were patent enough; and during the earlier stages of the new war in the Marches she preserved the neutrality, which she had warily maintained since the Treaty of 1398.

The political changes at Milan wrought a¹ complete metamorphosis in the attitude of affairs in the Peninsula, and appeared to yield fresh scope to the vaulting ambition of Novello.² The Venetians exerted their influence in the interest of peace, and prevailed on the Regent to offer to the Lord of Padua the cession of Feltre, Belluno, and Cividale. But their pacific efforts were unexpectedly thwarted by the intrigues of Jacopo del Verme and the other Milanese condottieri, who were at present on half-pay, and who were consequently impatient to be placed on a war-footing. The negotiations merely served to afford Novello time to mature his projects and to form more soaring views; and on the 27th March 1404, a league was framed by that Prince with Guglielmo, an illegitimate scion of the Scaligers, and his

¹ Cagnola, 23; *Arch. stor. Ital.* iii.

² Joh. Bembus, fol. 518.

own son-in-law,¹ Nicolo Marquis of Ferrara, by which the Carrarese was to receive Vicenza and the Sette Comuni; La Scala, Verona, and Este the Polesine of Rovigo. Catherine, alarmed at this step, made new advances to the Signory; and the latter consented, after much hesitation, to pay the Duchess a sum of 200,000 ducats for the right of protection over Feltre, Belluno,² Verona, Vicenza, and Bassano.³

The league of March was an audacious defiance thrown in the teeth of Venice, which had held the Polesine since 1395 for an unsatisfied debt of 50,000 ducats,⁴ contracted by her creature Nicolo; and Vicenza and the Communes immediately complicated the difficulty by a spontaneous cession to the Republic.⁵ The Vicentines had previously represented to the Duchess of Milan their critical position, situated between Padua and Verona, and had asked her advice as to what course they should pursue. "We have only two Allies," said their ambassadors, "against the Carrarese, the Duke of Austria and the Venetians." "You will find," returned the Regent, "the government of Venice the more just and the more humane; the Germans may more powerfully protect you."⁶

The Government at once communicated to Novello, by a Trumpet,⁷ the character of the negotiation with Milan, as well as the subsequent offer from Vicenza which it had determined to accept, and admonished him to waive his claims. Novello cropp'd the ears and slit the nostrils of the messenger, saying facetiously, "*Out of this trumpet let us make a lion of Saint Mark,*"⁸ and sent him back in that mutilated condition without a reply. The demand was speedily reiterated (May 1404), with a complaint of the damages which his troops had committed in the Vicentino; but Novello declined to yield, unless he was indemnified with Bassano. The Government then proceeded to recapitulate the obligations under which he lay to the Venetians, and to protest that he had no right

¹ P. Morosini, *Memoria intorno alla Repubblica di Venezia*, p. 9.

² *Notizie istoriche di Belluno*, p. 23; Belluno, 1780.

³ Joh. Ser Cambius contemp., *Chr. di Lucca*, fol. 841; Caroldo, *Historia*, fol. 129, Harl. MSS. 5020.

⁴ Jac. de Delayto, *Ann. Estenses* contemp. fol. 922.

⁵ Redusio, *Chr. Tarvisinum* contemp. fol. 813.

⁶ Paolo Morosini, *Memoria intorno alla Repubblica di Venezia*, p. 11, edit. 1796.

⁷ Cagnola, p. 25.

⁸ J. Bembo, fol. 518.

whatever on his side, inasmuch as Vicenza had voluntarily given itself to the Signory, and that he might rest assured that the latter would uphold her pretensions at every cost and hazard. The answer of Carrara was,¹ that he wondered much at the rashness of the Venetians who, although they have no rights on the Continent, insist on dictating laws to those who legitimately rule there; that he should certainly take possession of all the places which belonged to him, and would wage war against any who flang obstacles in his path; and that he would make the Venetians smart some day, if his life was spared, for the injuries which they had inflicted on his family. "Let them go," he finished, "and content themselves with their estuaries and swamps, and leave the empire of the land to those to whom it properly pertains."² Such was the language which the Lord of Padua thought fit to employ toward the Power which had been principally instrumental in restoring him to his patrimony, and which deserved on the whole to be considered his best ally.

The example of Vicenza had been imitated by Colonia,³ twenty miles from Verona; but the Carrarese, in a strange spirit of infatuation, took possession of it, and suggested that he should be permitted to hold it in fief, and should come to Venice to treat of the conditions in person. Independently, however, of any other point, the Doge and the Senate were unwilling to comply with this proposal, inasmuch as Novello possessed several influential friends among the nobility, and it was feared that he might employ corrupt means to gain his ends.⁴ To the remonstrance of the College he replied, that he would restore Colonia within a month, and would give one of his sons in the interim as a material guarantee. But "no negotiation can begin," was the ultimatum, "until the Vicentine territory is utterly evacuated"; and it was added: "the acceptance of the proposed guarantee is thought to be consistent neither with the honour of the Republic nor with your own."⁵

War, indeed, became inevitable; and the Signory prepared for it with her wonted energy. The intercession of Florence

¹ Platina, *Hist. Mant.* iv. 793.

² Platina, *ubi supra*.

³ Sanudo, *Itinerario*, 105.

⁴ Joh. Bembus, 521; Verci, *St. della Marca Trivigiana e Veronese*, x. 136. The family of Novello had intermarried with that of Contarini.

⁵ Romanin, iv. 17.

and Ferrara was rejected: for it was now too late. Pandolfo Malatesta, Lord of Pesaro, brother of the Lord of Rimini, was invited to enter the Venetian service, and was appointed (June 25, 1404)¹ Captain-General, Carlo Zeno and Pietro Emo being named his Proveditors.² The mouths of the Brenta and the Adige were fortified. Lines of palisades were constructed at Cavarzero. An embassy was accredited (June 26) to the court of Germany, to contradict officially the scandal which the Lord of Padua had spread through the country, "that every soul who came thence to Venice would be cast into gaol." Armed with a just ground of resentment against Nicolo d'Este, the Signory recalled his rival Azzo from Candia,³ and promised to aid him in recovering his possessions. The Great Council was convoked; and, all such as had landed interests in the Padovano having, agreeably to the law of 1290,⁴ been excluded, it was solemnly and irrevocably decreed, to some extent at the instigation of Francesco Foscari, one of the Chiefs of the Forty,⁵ that war should be waged against the Carrarese *to the very utmost power and possibility*⁶ of the Commune of Venice. At the same time, an official and statistical return was demanded (June 28) of all citizens who were feoffees of Novello *in capite* or of his subjects; all commerce with the enemy was suspended (August 7); and, as a precaution against the occurrence of any plot analogous to the Gobba conspiracy, a proclamation was published (August 8) that all householders were prohibited until farther notice from harbouring any strangers whomsoever without giving previous notice to the Chief of the Ward, who was enjoined to institute in his turn a searching inquiry into the character of the new-comer, and to satisfy himself that the motive of his visit or presence was legitimate.⁷

On his part, Novello hastened to deliver to the Signory a letter, accompanied by a challenge, in the former of which he announced that, although he had ever proved himself a dutiful son of the Republic, the latter had studiously thwarted all his projects. He lamented the course which he was at present constrained to pursue: for the Venetians, sagacious

¹ J. Bembus, fol. 518.

² J. Bembus, fol. 519.

³ Berlan, *I due Foscari*, 1852, p. 200.

⁴ Delayto, *Ann. Estenses* contemp. fol. 1006.

⁵ Romanin, *ubi supra*, et seq.

⁶ Sanudo, fol. 807.

⁷ Romanin, iv. 18.

and prudent as they were, could not but know that out of wars spring sometimes things that men wot not of!¹

The herald of the Carrarese who, on his entry into the capital would have been infallibly mobbed,² had he not been rescued by some Nobles who observed his danger, was benignly received by the Doge and the Senate. "I challenge you," he cried, as he flung down the glove, "on the part of my lord, the Lord of Padua!" "You are welcome," returned his Serenity; "we have accepted the challenge with gratification, hoping that the Almighty, who abases the proud and confounds the wicked counsels of princes, will smite him on that account, if He does not hurl him down into hell."³ The functionary, having accomplished his commission, was clothed in a new suit, honourably dismissed, and safely escorted to Padua; and "a lucky fellow he was," exclaims a contemporary,⁴ "to find enemies more generous than the master whom he had served twenty years!" "He had not imagined," adds the author of the *Chronicle of Treviso*, referring to Novello, "that matters would come to this pass."

The preparations of the Republic were conceived in a princely spirit, and were on an unusually large scale. Independently of 30,000⁵ men, who under the Lord of Pesaro penetrated into the Paduan territory itself, a second force, commanded by the Lord of Mantua, invaded the Veronese frontier;⁶ while Azzo d'Este, at the head of 200 arbalisters and 250 archers from Crete,⁷ marched upon Ferrara. After a few trifling reverses at the outset, the Venetian arms remained triumphant. At one moment indeed the forces of the Republic under the Lord of Pesaro became entangled in a swamp, and were in imminent danger of being cooped up in that situation by Novello, and thus taken at a great disadvantage. It happened that Malatesta was absent on leave at this conjuncture, and that Carlo Zeno was officiating as commander-in-chief. By his surpassing courage and indomitable strength of will alone Zeno saved the army. That extraordinary man, who was verging on seventy, tested in person the practicability of throwing an artificial causeway across the

¹ Gataro contemp. p. 845-46.

² P. Morosini, *Memoria*, p. 13.

³ Reclusio, *Chron.* contemp. 814; P. Morosini, *Memoria*, 13.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ J. Bembo, fol. 518.

⁶ *Ibid.* fol. 519; Delayto contemp. fol. 1006.

⁷ Sanudo, fol. 811.

morass by wading through it *at night where the water ascended to his shoulders*; a dyke was constructed with astonishing rapidity; and the Venetians and their heroic leader began their retreat. The enemy came up to oppose them; but they were severely repulsed, and the Carrarese himself was wounded and narrowly escaped capture. From this prodigious exploit the splendid reputation of Zeno derived new lustre.¹

Vicenza had been already occupied by Jacopo Suriano in the name of the Signory.² On the 27th of December 1404, a bounty of 10,000 ducats of gold, with an annuity of 1000 ducats, was offered to whomsoever should deliver Francesco Novello into her hands.³ On the 14th March 1405, Nicolo d'Este, who had been occupying the Polesine of Rovigo since September,⁴ was compelled to desert his father-in-law,⁵ and to make peace upon humiliating conditions. It is said that the Doge, who had held Nicolo at the baptismal font, was personally instrumental in persuading his godson to adopt the important step.⁶ On the 16th of the following July, Verona, partly at the persuasion of the Vicentines,⁷ likewise succumbed, and was occupied by Venetian proveditors, who observed toward the people the mildest and most conciliatory conduct. The security of their persons and property was guaranteed; their municipal privileges were respected. Novello, having long since poisoned his confederate Guglielmo de la Scala, who was a favourite at Venice,⁸ had replaced him by his own son Jacopo. The latter, after the fall of the city, attempted to effect his escape in disguise. But he was unfortunately recognised by some rustics, as he was crossing the Po⁹ between Verona and Vicenza, and betrayed (July 25); and on the 31st he found himself an inmate of the Orba¹⁰ prison at Venice.

Padua was already reduced to frightful distress. The horrors of war were aggravated by pestilence, famine, and drought. The supply of fresh water was cut off by a Florentine engineer in the Venetian service. The rate of mortality had risen from 300 to 500 a day, and the atmosphere was

¹ Romanin, iv. 20.

³ Romanin, iv. 20.

⁵ Redusio contemp. fol. 815.

⁷ J. Bembus, fol. 520.

⁸ Ibid. fol. 518; Morosini, *Memoria*, p. 10.

⁹ J. Bembus, fol. 520; Platina, *Hist. Mant.* v. 795; Cambius, *Chron. di Lucca*, 850.

² J. Bembus, fol. 520.

⁴ Sanudo, fol. 810.

⁶ Ibid. fol. 816.

¹⁰ Cambius, *loco citato*.

tainted by the stench of unburied and putrefying corpses. The desperate condition of the city, coupled with the capitulation of Verona and the subsequent capture of his son, inspired Novello with an inclination to treat (July 31, 1405);¹ and the Signory, through a certain Gasparino, a friend of the Lord of Ravenna, offered 50,000 or even 60,000 ducats² for the free evacuation of Padua. The parley, however, dropped, the Lord of Padua asking 100,000 ducats as his price;³ and the Venetians resumed the offensive. But the attitude of affairs in the city only grew worse and worse; and on September 4 Zeno tendered his offices as a medium for renewing the negotiation. The terms proposed by the Carrarese were accepted by the proveditor, and that acceptance was indorsed by the Senate. They were—1. That the Republic shall pay 50,000 ducats, of which 10,000 payable in cash at Padua itself, 5000 in bills of exchange on Florence, so soon as the place is actually delivered, the remainder being secured under good guarantee; 2. That Carrara shall have a safe conduct to Florence; 3. That his sons and himself shall settle neither in the vicinage of Padua, nor in Ferrara, nor in Friuli; 4. That the city shall be exempt from sack, that Carrara shall be allowed to remove all his personal property, and that whatever sales may be effected in his name, or whatever donatives he may make, shall be recognised; 5. That his servants and dependents may continue to live in the Padovana, so long as they behave peaceably; 6. That Jacopo da Carrara and Paolo Leoni shall be released from confinement, and shall be permitted to rejoin him; 7. That the Venetians shall give 5000 ducats for the ransom of Obizzo da Polenta, Lord of Ravenna, and other prisoners; 8. That the soldiers of Carrara shall be unmolested and at liberty to remove all their property from Monselice, save their weapons; that the safety of the Podesta and other members of the Paduan Executive shall be secured, and that they shall not be required to render any account of their administration to the Signory.

Peace was upon the point of being concluded on this equitable basis, when the Lord of Padua received intelligence, which encouraged the hope of speedy relief from Florence. He immediately shifted his ground, and not only presented to Zeno an entirely new prospectus, raising difficulties as to how and

¹ Romanin, iv. 24.

² J. Bembus, fol. 520.

³ Sanudo, fol. 821.

where the money was to be found, but made a sortie in the direction of Bassanello, routed some Venetian troops stationed there, who were off their guard, and took a few colours. The Government was naturally incensed at this treacherous proceeding. On the 8th September, the College wrote to Zeno and his co-proveditor: "The Republic plainly perceives that the proposals of Carrara are merely so many subterfuges for gaining time, and if the latter does not give his adhesion to the treaty of the 4th without delay, the diplomatic relations must be considered as broken off." But the Government appears to have afforded the Carrarese every possible facility. It even now agreed to give 15,000 ducats on the cession of the fortress of Padua, and the remaining 15,000 when the strong places in the provinces were transferred; or 2000 in Padua and 28,000 where he pleased.

The proveditors communicated their instructions; but no answer came. Novello was perplexed and silent. Procrastination, however, though perfectly intelligible on his part, was fatal to him on every account. The offer of the Government had already fallen from 50,000 to 30,000 ducats, and the ransom-money for Polenta sank from 5000 to 3500 ducats. On the 25th September, his son Jacopo, who had previously experienced the most gentle treatment at the Orba, was committed to the lower dungeons, thrown into irons, and placed upon a diet of bread and water, expressly in consequence of the stubborn refusal of his father to liberate the Lord of Ravenna.

The severe pressure thus put upon a parent, and the critical extremity to which Novello was reduced by the ravages of disease and the failure of water and supplies, procured at length the enlargement of Polenta. The object of this step was partly to employ the prisoner as a channel, through which he might address fresh overtures to the Signory. But he was told (October 21):¹ "that nothing short of an unconditional surrender would now be accepted; and that, in regard to the amount which should be assigned to him for the maintenance of his family, he must be content to rely on the generosity of the Government."

The possession of Padua was a point, upon which the Signory had at last set her heart. The spoliation of Novello

¹ Romanin, iv. 26.

had not, at the same time, been originally contemplated. It was Novello who had wrought his own ruin. Never imagining that the other Italian Powers would tamely witness his destruction, or that Florence would so cruelly mislead and delude him by promises which she was unable to fulfil, the Lord of Padua had the folly to treat the straightforward advances of Venice with shuffling duplicity and falsehood, by heaping outrageous insults upon her Government, and by mutilating and assassinating her envoys. He played the hypocrite when he could no longer play the bully. "This I can assert," writes an impartial contemporary,¹ "that if the Lord of Padua had been inclined to make peace with the Commune of Venice, he might have had every good condition, so that he and his sons might have always continued to do well." The Carrarese had gradually expended all the arts of corruption and intrigue. Between the months of April and September 1405, several plots, the sources of which were traced to Padua, were disconcerted by the vigilance of the Council of Ten. It transpired that a physician, named Giovanni di Pavia, had been hired by Novello, at a salary of 800 ducats a year, for infamous purposes;² and the life of the medical practitioner paid forfeit. In July, a deep-rooted conspiracy against the Government and the nobility was discovered, at the head of which were Nicolo Buono and certain other priests; these scoundrels were hanged with gags in their mouths;³ and the Signory obtained formal absolution for the act from the Holy See. Several other schemes, of which the origin was unequivocal, were revealed from time to time, and numerous arrests took place. But some of the suspected persons, in consequence of insufficient evidence of their criminality, were subsequently acquitted by the Decemvirs.⁴ All these base and flagitious projects tended only to destroy altogether that favourable bias which had once been general toward Novello among the upper classes in the Republic.⁵

The Lord of Pesaro had not retained for any length of time the post of Generalissimo. It was transferred at an early stage of operations to Paolo Savelli, one of the two field-m Marshals under the late commander-in-chief, with a salary of

¹ Joh. Cambius contemp. fol. 876.

² J. Bembus, fol. 520.

³ Sabellico, part i. p. 255: edit. 1718.

⁴ J. Bembus, fol. 520; Romanin, iv. 29.

⁵ Bembus, fol. 521.

100 ducats a month; Zeno and Emo remained Proveditors.¹ Savelli, who was a native of Rome, though not sufficiently vigilant, and somewhat too fond of chess, rendered great services to the Republic during his tenure of office. He at last fell a victim to malaria (October 3, 1405²). Venetian gratitude accorded to the departed splendid obsequies. The Doge Steno, the Senate, and all the Members of the Administration, clad in deep mourning, honoured the ceremony with their presence. Chargers, sumptuously caparisoned in black, and led by the bridle, formed part of the funeral procession, and followed their late master to the grave.³ The remains of the general were deposited in the vaults of Santa⁴ Maria dei Frari. His successor in the command was Galeazzo Cataneo of Mantua,⁵ to whom Francesco Bembo was named Proveditor.

The chances of Novello had become excessively meagre. In the beginning of November, he expressed a desire to come to a parley at All Saints' Gate⁶ with the Proveditor Bembo. He stated that he wished to surrender the city, and to come to Venice with his son. Bembo applied to his Government for instructions. On the 13th, the question having been laid before the Senate for decision, a member of that Body moved, "that the favour be granted, but that the interview take place immediately, and that no farther grace be shown." But upon reference to the ballot this proposal was quashed; and it was resolved that, "the demand being merely a temporising trick, the proveditor leave it unanswered."⁷ Four days later (Nov. 17), by the connivance of the defenders of the borgo of Santa-Croce,⁸ an entry was gained into that quarter; and on the 19th November, the Commune of Padua, sensible of its forlorn position, sent a deputation to tender its submission to Venice. "For the people," says a contemporary,⁹ "were dying like dogs."

The Lord of Padua felt that the crisis was at hand. As an ultimate resource, he begged a safe-conduct to the Venetian camp at Terranigra¹⁰ and the privilege of a personal parley with the Generalissimo. This empty boon was conceded.

¹ Sanudo, fol. 809, 814.

² Ibid. fol. 826; Cambius contemp. 875.

³ Bembus, 520.

⁴ Sanudo, fol. 826.

⁵ Bembus, fol. 521.

⁶ Sanudo, *Itinerario*, p. 26.

⁷ Romanin, iv. 29.

⁸ Sanudo, *Itinerario*, pp. 24-5.

⁹ Redusio, *Chronicon*, contemp. 817.

¹⁰ Sabellico, dec. 2, lib. viii. Sabellico the Historiographer, according to the "Life" prefixed to the edition of 1718 by Apostolo Zeno, was born about 1436.

Novello conversed for some time with Cataneo and with the new provveditors Tommaso Mocenigo and Giovanni Barbarigo. But diplomacy was now out of place; and without having been able to obtain any advantage, he returned in the most depressed spirits to the City. The last stake was played. The last glimmer of hope was extinguished. On the 22nd, Cataneo entered Padua, and took military possession. The Venetians were hailed with transports of joy by the people, who naturally welcomed any relief from their cruel and prolonged sufferings. They were treated with the same clemency and gentleness¹ as the Veronese. The poll-tax and other extraordinary imposts, which had been levied by the Carrarese, were repealed. Civil rights, the privileges of trade, and the charter of the University, were confirmed.

Jacopo da Carrara had been the prisoner of the Signory since July. A similar fate was at present reserved for his father and his brother Francesco.² They were conducted to Venice, under an order from the Senate, on the 23rd November.³ As they entered the city, they were greeted by popular shouts of "*Crucify, crucify!*"⁴ and it was thought prudent to withdraw them from the immediate observation of the common people, by lodging them at San Giorgio Maggiore.⁵ On the following day, they were brought through a secret passage into the Palace, and admitted to an audience of the Doge.⁶ Prostrating himself before Steno, the father acknowledged his guilt, and besought forgiveness. "I have offended, my Lord," he said, "have pity on me!"⁷ His Serenity held out his hand to assist him to rise, and begged him to seat himself at his side, saying, "You shall have that justice which you deserve." He upbraided him with his ungrateful and perfidious conduct, but not with any particular stress or at much length. Novello replied not a word in justification.⁸ He merely observed, as he was taking leave, "It is not meet for the servant to answer his master."⁹ After the audience, the prisoners were remanded to San Giorgio, where their own servants were allowed to wait upon them, and where they

¹ A. Gataro contemp. fol. 938.

² J. Bembus, fol. 521.

³ Romanin, iv. 31.

⁴ A. Gataro contemp. fol. 938.

⁵ Caroldo, *ubi infra*.

⁶ Sanudo, fol. 830; Caroldo, *ubi infra*.

⁷ Sanudo, fol. 830; Caroldo, *Historia*, fol. 134; Harl. MSS. 5020; *Chroniche Veneziane*, p. 373, Add. MSS. B.M. 8580.

⁸ Gataro, *ubi supra*.

⁹ *Chron. Venez.* p. 373, Add. MSS. 8580.

remained a whole week, with no other interruption than a message from the Signory (Nov. 27¹), "that they could furnish no better proof of the sincerity of their professions, than by summoning to Venice Ubertino and Marsilio da Carrara, who were plotting against her in various directions."

For the acquisition of Padua the Republic offered a solemn thanksgiving on the 29th November.² It was resolved by the Senate that in honour of the occasion all the Venetian poor should receive donations varying from four to ten ducats, and that every person imprisoned for debt, or other offence not capital, should be presented with a free pardon.³ To Galeazzo Cataneo, late Captain-General, the Government granted civic honours and a pension for his own life of 1000 ducats (November 25).⁴

Meanwhile, the Government had been indefatigable in its researches. The most startling disclosures were made from day to day. On the 30th November, an order came from the Ten, "that the two Carrara should be removed from San Giorgio by night⁵ to the Gheba, and should be separated."⁶ But, as the Gheba was found to be out of repair, they were provisionally accommodated at the Orba. On the 1st December, some Paduan agents were arrested at Noale in the Venetian territory. A large sum of money was found upon their persons; and a safe-conduct of the Captain-General, which they presented, was more than suspected to be a forgery.⁷

On the second and following days, several fresh arrests were made. Among others were those of Brodeto, a pensioner of Novello, who promised to divulge the names of those who had kept his patron informed of the proceedings of the Ten, and of a certain Armano, who had been at Venice during the war of Chioggia. The former, in order that nobody might tamper with him, was committed to the Catolda prison in solitary confinement. The particulars which were elicited from Armano were accounted so important, that the Council demanded on the 10th the co-operation of a Giunta of six extraordinary members. It was ascertained among other points, that Novello had been in the habit of keeping an alphabetical register, with the initials of all persons to whom

¹ Romanin, iv. 32.

² Ibid. fol. 830.

³ Joh. Bembus, fol. 521; Sabellico, part i. 457.

⁴ J. Bembus, *ubi supra*.

⁵ Sanudo, fol. 831.

⁶ Ibid. fol. 431, 836.

⁷ Romanin, iv. 33.

he paid bribes and annuities, and in which were entered, besides, many miscellaneous confidential matters. Means were forthwith taken to secure this volume. The revelations which ensued were portentous. The book afforded a direct clue to recent conspiracies and machinations of every sort against the Signory; and a large number of new warrants were signed. On the 23rd December, the elder Carrara was consigned to the *Careeri forti*, where his son Jacopo already seems to have been immured. Francesco the younger, however, still remained at the Orba, and was suffered to retain the services of an attendant.

On the 26th December, in a vessel laden with silk lying off an hostelry at San Basso, were discovered some papers of the most damning character. The Decemvirs desired an amplification of the Giunta; and a reward of 1000 *lire di piccoli* was proclaimed to any one who would denounce the author of those anonymous documents, or, if the offender was also the informant, a free pardon.¹

The Ten and the Giunta now sat day and night. The revelations and commitments were unceasing. On the 7th January 1406, a warrant was granted for the apprehension of Jacopo Gradenigo and Pietro Pisani,² the former ex-Podesta of Padua and a gentleman of some literary repute,³ who had been incriminated by the confessions of Armano and others. The latter was charged with having, at his own house at Santa Chiara, presided at a secret conversation which *three individuals from Padua* had held with Michele Rabata and Arrigo Galeto, agents of the Carrarese. Pisani was interrogated on three points. 1. The topics discussed at the conference at Santa Chiara; if any other Venetian but himself was present; and why Rabata and Galeto, instead of presenting themselves to the Signory to whom they had been previously sent by Carrara, *returned immediately to Padua?* 2. If he had on any prior occasion spoken to any emissary or agent of Carrara, and if so, when, and where, and why? 3. If after such interview he had continued to maintain relations with the Lord of Padua, and if so, at what dates, and on what subjects?

Pisani replied by a flat denial of the whole accusation.

¹ Romanin, iv. cap. 1-2, and *Documenti*, No. 1.

² Stella, *Annales*, fol. 1210.

³ Agostini, *Notizie*, i. 278 *et seq.*

But on the night of the 8th, one Antonio Rizzo, who had actually carried a letter for him to Padua, having been found and questioned, it was resolved to examine the accused more searchingly; and a committee was named for the purpose, with liberty at need to use torture. Pisani was ultimately condemned to five years' imprisonment, the sacrifice of all his honours and emoluments, and, if he attempted to effect his escape, the confiscation of his property. The sentence of Gradenigo, whose complicity was held to be of a more venial kind, was three years' exclusion from employment. The sons of both were disabled from sitting as judges in any cause affecting the existing members of the Council of Ten.

This accumulation of facts, coupled with additional statements made before the Committee on the 8th January, persuaded them to come to the resolution that "it being of the highest essentiality to the welfare of this city, Francesco da Carrara (the younger), who must necessarily be cognisant of all the foregoing matters, be placed under examination, and that at need he be put to the question." At the same time, Ser Pietro Leoni, Ser Bernardo Castelbaldo, and Nasembeni Colza, factor of Carrara, were summoned to Venice: and the podesta of Padua was directed to transmit all books and papers in the municipal archives, which might help to elucidate the subject in hand.

Their subsequent discoveries left no doubt on the mind of the Government that a terrible conspiracy with numberless ramifications had been *recently* concerted at Padua. Capital punishment was then decreed. The sentence is not found registered¹ among the transactions of the Councils; but Sanudo² writes, that "at the hour of vespers on the 17th January 1406, a rumour was generally current in the Capital that Francesco da Carrara (the elder) had been strangled in prison by command of the Ten after a stout resistance, even to the employment of his prison-stool as a weapon of defence; and that, on the following day, his two sons suffered a similar doom"; and he adds that (perhaps in order that the ordinary rites of sepulture might be accorded to them without scandal or infringement of usage) "countenance was afforded to

¹ Romanin, iv. 38.

² Sanudo, fol. 832. "Dissemi," says the author of the *Chronicle of Bologna*, Murat. xx. 590, "che la Signoria di Venezia aveaglio fatto stringere la gola con uno pannicello in prigione da uno Schiavone."

a belief that they had died of catarrh." Among the lower classes it soon became a common saying: *Uomo morto, vera (guerra) finia!* or *Dead men make no wars!*¹ The body of Novello, enveloped in a suit of Alexandrian velvet, with the spurs at his heels, and a sword of splendid workmanship buckled round his waist, was interred without any inscription in the church of Santo Stefano, near the grave of a merchant named Paolo Nicolo Tinti, whose initials, carved in capital letters on his tomb, long continued to be mistaken for the words: PRO NORMA TYRANNORUM, and to indicate the sepulchre of the Lord of Padua.² Where his two sons were laid is less certain; but Cigogna is favourable to the opinion that their bones were deposited at San Giorgio Maggiore.³

In person,⁴ the late Francesco Novello was of somewhat low stature and thick-set, but not ill-formed, of a swarthy complexion, of a haughty expression of face, yet when he chose, winning and gracious in his manner. His son Francesco,⁵ who was at this time in his thirty-first year, was a larger man than his father, powerfully and symmetrically built, and, like Novello, dark-featured. But he stooped in his gait, and squinted with the right eye. He was from the latter circumstance nicknamed *Guercio*. He was of a revengeful temper, and of a frigid, cruel disposition. In every respect he was a remarkable contrast to his brother Jacopo, who was five years his junior. The latter was fair like his mother,⁶ tall and handsome. In his voice and manner there was an irresistible fascination. He was warm-hearted, kind, considerate, gentle, and virtuous. His air possessed an angelical and unconquerable sweetness. "Nor," writes a contemporary,⁷ "was he less brave and intrepid than he was amiable and good. If he had been spared, he would have been a second Scipio Africanus."

The policy of the Council of Ten has been grievously misunderstood, and the long inaccessibility of accurate information has thrown back historians on presumptive proofs and conjectural inferences. It is possible that the trial of

¹ Romanin, iv. 40.

² Caroldo, fol. 134, Harl. MSS. 5020.

³ *Iscrizioni*, iv. 618. See also *Chroniche Veneziane*, p. 373, Add. MSS. 8580.

⁴ Gataro contemp. fol. 940.

⁵ *Ibid.* fol. 941.

⁶ Taddea, daughter of Nicolo *il Zoppo*, a former Marquis of Ferrara. She was married to Novello in 1376.—Galeazzo Gataro, fol. 219; Murat. xvii.

⁷ Gataro, *loco citato*.

the Carrarese was not conducted on principles of criminal law analogous to those which have been introduced into practice in recent times. But it was conducted on such principles as the law recognised in those days. The Decemviral constitution was adapted to the spirit of the age as well as to the wants of Venice; and it was a source of unqualified admiration to the Tuscans and the Lombards, who vainly sought to copy¹ or transplant what was the fruit of a peculiar soil and the result of peculiar conditions. At the court of the Visconti the Carrarese would have been poisoned. At the court of the Scaliger they would have been assassinated. At Venice they were tried. There was the decency of a judicial process. It is always easier to vituperate than to examine; it is easy to stigmatise that judicial process as a judicial murder. But the tendency of documentary evidence is to prove such a criticism superficial and such a charge at least precipitate.

Venice enjoyed an exemption from the horrors of the Feudal system and the Forest laws. She was free from the dynastic troubles and crimes of Milan, Naples, and Hungary—from the Palace revolutions of Paris and Constantinople—from the popular tumults which shook Florence and Lucca—from the family assassinations by which the thrones of Russia and Poland, as well as of the Scaligers, were polluted and disgraced—and from the twenty factions which rent the Genoese Republic. This internal tranquillity and constitutional equilibrium were not obtained without a price. That price was her political liberty.

At Venice, in common with other Powers in an imperfect state of civilization, the security of the person was subordinate to the security of the constitution and the security of property. A member of the Executive, who was guilty of a breach of confidence, and a man who stole a certain quantity

¹ In the following verses, written in 1426 by an intelligent Florentine, the allusion is to his countrymen:—

“E quando fornirete la rubrica
Dell'ordinanze delle vostre leggi
Non vi rincresca di trarve fatica
Di farle in modo tal, che appareggi
A quelle della donna Vineziana,
Che sai mill'anni stati ne' lor seggi.”

“Versi fatti da Niccolo da Uzzano, l'anno 1426.”

Archivio stor. Ital. iv. 297-300.

See also the remarks of the Editor at p. 288.

of cotton or taffeta, were equally sent to the gallows. One, on the other hand, who drowned a kinsman in a well, or ran a sword through the body of an acquaintance, was at the utmost punished with exile.

The line of conduct, which the Signory observed toward Novello and his sons, was neither insidious nor wantonly degrading. They had been thrown into her hands by a caprice of fortune, not by the infringement of a safe-conduct. They were prisoners of war, not the victims of a fraud. The evidence of a contemporary writer, the author of the *Chronicle of Treviso*, demonstrates that there was much diversity of opinion in regard to their treatment; he insinuates, whether truly or not, that the only person in the Great Council who recommended death was Jacopo del Verme of Verona; and it is capable of proof that the fate of the Carrarese was not proximately due to their ambitious projects or their resistance to the Venetian arms, but to ulterior revelations of the existence of a plot, which would have thrown the Gobba conspiracy into the shade. The form of execution, again, was the least ignominious which could have been devised. They were not publicly beheaded, like the avogador Giustiniani. They were not poisoned, as Novello had poisoned his ally Guglielmo de la Scala. They were not left to die in torments, like the unhappy men whom Novello's father had formerly suspected of conspiring against him. They were strangled in prison,¹ like Lentulus, the accomplice of Catiline and the progenitor of the Cornari.

It soon appeared that Pietro Pisani and Jacopo Gradenigo were not the only patricians implicated in the recent transactions. On the night of the 19th January 1406, the Ten, still prosecuting their researches, and still nourishing their fears, resolved to desire the presence at their table of the noble gentleman, Carlo Zeno, Procurator of Saint Mark, and to question him on three heads, resorting at need to torture:—(1) If he had ever received anything from the Carrarese, and if so, on what ground; (2) If he had had conversations with his ambassadors and emissaries, who were in the habit of coming to Venice; (3) If he had at any time written letters

¹ Sabellico, part i. p. 457. "La clemenza Veneta inclinava a lasciar loro la vita."—Muratori, *Ann.* ix. 32. *Chroniche Veneziane*, p. 373, Add MSS. B.M. 5880; and Dolfini, *Annali*, p. 149-50, King's MSS. 149.

to that Prince, or received letters from him, and if so, what were the contents of such letters? The charges are alleged to have been based on a paper found among Carrara's accounts, when Padua fell. It was a memorandum of 400 ducats paid to Zeno. The latter explained that it was nothing beyond the repayment of a sum lent to Carrara, while he was a prisoner at Asti in the hands of the Duke of Milan, and destitute of any means of providing himself with necessaries. Carrara reimbursed Zeno on his liberation.¹

On the following day, the detention of Zeno and the formation of a Committee of Special Inquiry were decreed. At the close of the examination, which discredited his pleas and fully criminated the accused, it was put to the committee in the usual manner: *Does it appear to you from what you have heard and read, that it is expedient to proceed?* and it was carried affirmatively by fourteen suffrages. Whatever disposition might exist to spare the feelings of such a man, it was impossible to doubt that Zeno had been guilty of a heinous and aggravated fault in maintaining a correspondence, though very probably from no sinister motive, with an enemy during actual hostilities, and during his tenure of the peculiarly responsible office of Proveditor of the Army; and to acquit him would have been an act of the most flagrant injustice to Pietro Pisani, who was condemned to five years' imprisonment for an analogous offence.

On the night of the 21st January, the Commissioners assembled to deliberate upon the sentence. There were four opinions. The first was, that the prisoner should simply be required to refund the money which he had accepted from Novello, in contravention of the law of the 27th December last; it obtained seven votes. The second was, that he should be deprived of every office and dignity, and relegated for two years to Istria; it obtained no more than two. The third proposed that he should be similarly deprived, and in addition should be banished for five years to Capo d'Istria; it found only five advocates. The final motion was, that Carlo Zeno should be stripped of all his honours, and be condemned to a twelvemonth's imprisonment in the lower dungeons; and it was adopted by fourteen suffrages; but the sentence appears to have been modified, probably in view of

¹ Goodwin's Commonplace Book, 1790, MS.

Zeno's age and services, by committal to the Orba prison, where the hero might be at comparative ease, and receive visitors.

In the abstract, a penal verdict which committed to a degrading confinement at the age of threescore and ten one of the greatest of Venetians, was assuredly barbarous: yet the sentence is only such as might be expected, when the severe maxims which governed that political system are taken into account, and when we look at the atrocious cruelty which all ranks of life, often without distinction of blood, found habitual in the old governments of Europe,—a relic of one of the less favourable aspects of Roman procedure.

The Republic had been in military possession of Verona since July, and of Padua since November, 1405; but a sufficiently long period elapsed before she completely established her civil jurisdiction over those places. Her earliest care was to extinguish all trace of the former dominations. On the 17th February (1406), the College offered to grant Ubertino and Marsilio da Carrara an annuity for their lives of 2000 ducats, provided that they should settle in some distant locality. This overture having been rejected, a price was set upon their heads.

At length, on the 10th July 1406, the Veronese deputies, one-and-twenty in number, made their appearance at Venice in magnificent array; and on the 12th they did homage. A platform had been erected in front of Saint Mark's, where the Doge, the College, and the Senate sat to receive the Delegates. The latter, attired in white,¹ and mounted on horses with white trappings, rode through the principal thoroughfares of the City, and then approached within a certain distance of the grand stand. They then quitted the stirrup, formed themselves into triple file, and advanced on foot toward the Doge and the august company, who were dressed in the same colour. Those who composed the central file carried the ensigns of submission. The first held in his hand the credentials; the second, a sheet of pure vellum. The third rank bore a truncheon, to which were attached three silver keys belonging to the three gates of Verona—Saint George's, the Bishop's, and the Porta de' Calzari. The next presented a long white staff without any ornament, which symbolled the Government

¹ Paolo Morosini, *Historia*, lib. xvii.

of Verona—pure, guileless, eternal. The sixth supported a square banner, that of the People, with a gold cross on field azure, emblematic of the sun and the firmament. The seventh and last brought the banner of the Commune, of which the device was a silver cross on field rouge, the type of purity and love. The train was accompanied by a band of musicians; and a great many Venetian citizens followed behind. The Doge accepted with suitable expressions the tokens of fealty, saying: *The people that walked in darkness, have seen a great light; upon them hath light shined.*¹ Jacopo de' Fabri, Grand Chancellor, then opened a Missal, and tendered to the ambassadors the oath of allegiance, which they took; he closed the volume, exclaiming: *My soul doth magnify the Lord.* The Doge concluded this picturesque and imposing spectacle by delivering to his visitors the colours of Venice. Those of Verona were afterward placed on either side of the principal altar in Saint Mark's.

There is the tradition that when the Republic originally took possession of the city, her troops had been forestalled by those of Milan and Mantua; but the latter obtained no support from the people, and passed out at one gate as the Venetians entered by the other amid cries of *Marco! Marco!*²

Four days later, the Statutes of Verona were approved by the Signory. They substantially differed from those which had been in force during the rule of the Scaligers. The Republic respected the civil rights of her new subjects, and gave the strongest stimulus to their educational system. In suits, appeals, and litigations, laymen and churchmen were placed upon an equal footing. Schools of instruction in humanity, canon-law, the arts, and medicine, were instituted or sanctioned, and a seminary was established, where arithmetic might be gratuitously taught to those destined to a commercial desk at the charge of the Trading Gilds. Every professor at the University, who occupied a chair endowed by the Commune, was bound to deliver a series of lectures during the winter evenings; and these gentlemen, as well as their pupils and medical men, were permitted to enjoy a partial exemption from the payment of taxes and from the performance of military service. On physicians it was made

¹ Paolo Morosini, *Historia*, p. 377.

² Cal. of St. Papers, Venetian Series, ii. 311.

incumbent, whenever they were summoned to attend a patient attacked by any serious disorder, to exhort the invalid to dictate his will to a clerk, and to shrive himself; this provision was directed against the growing evil of intestacy or of ill-considered testaments. The Republic reserved to herself merely the faculty of appointing a Governor, whose office was annual, and his staff. The salary of the former was fixed at 2400 ducats; and it was defrayed by the Ducal Fisc.

The submission of Padua was received with nearly similar formalities on the 4th January 1407.¹ The deputation, which was composed of representatives of the four classes of Paduan society, the Knights, the Doctors, the Silk-Merchants, and the Esquires (*milites*),² was headed by Francesco Zabarella.³ The members were clothed in scarlet, and they were followed by their servants, clad in green liveries, and by a brass-band. Zabarella himself was the bearer of the credentials and of the great gonfalon of Padua. Three of the other syndics presented to his Serenity the sceptre, the keys, and the silver seal of the Commune. The Doge who, with a brilliant retinue of councillors and senators, robed in scarlet in compliment to their visitors, was seated on an elevated dais, employed the same scriptural quotations as before; and the ambassadors were similarly sworn by the Chancellor. A splendid tournament and banquet, at which a large number of the Venetian aristocracy of both sexes were present, were subsequently given in honour of the occasion. On their departure, Zabarella and his colleagues received a banner of crimson taffeta, upon which the effigy of the Patron Evangelist was embroidered in gold.⁴

In the Statutes of Padua the Republic equally exhibited her warm zeal in the cause of commerce, education, and social advancement. The utmost protection was afforded by prohibitive measures to the Paduan wine-growers and manufacturers. The proceeds of the wheel-tax were appropriated to the maintenance of the roads and the public palace, where the seat of government lay, and when the latter was subsequently burned down, the Republic defrayed the entire cost of rebuilding it. The Venetians limited their interference to

¹ A. Gataro contemp. fol. 939.

² A. Gataro, *ubi supra*.

³ Afterward a Cardinal, and a very noted man.

⁴ Gataro contemp. 939.

the nomination of the Executive and to the exaction of a moiety of the salary of the Podesta. The remaining moiety was allowed to devolve on the Signory, which also provided for the Militia, and contributed handsomely to the support of the *Studio* or University, allowing 4000 ducats a year for the stipend of the Doctors and Professors, among whom were gradually numbered some of the most eminent scholars of Italy and Europe. It was germane to Venetian humanity, that, after the war, large quantities of seed were distributed among the Paduan peasantry to assist them in renewing their agricultural operations. On the 3rd September 1408, a decree of the Senate called into existence a species of *Casino*, where the citizens of Venice and Padua might meet and form the acquaintance of each other.¹

The liberal and enlightened treatment which Venice had shewn toward Verona and Padua, was extended to her other acquisitions. In the dispositions which were thus made, it was the professed object of the new Government to leave as much as possible to local control, and to arrange everything so as to win the hearts and affections of the governed (*quod habeamus cor et amorem civium et subditorum nostrorum*). Those, who passed in these times from the sway of others under that of the Republic, soon learned to discriminate. The Seven Communes, more especially, which were included in the Vicentine territory, were conciliated by peculiar privileges in agreement with their Cimbrian traditions. These Communes possessed a population of hardy and robust mountaineers, thickly spread over a sterile and hilly tract of country, ignorant of agriculture or industrial economy, but superb soldiers. The district therefore promised to form a perpetual nursery for the armies and even maritime forces of the Republic; and another immediate fruit of the acquisition of a broad footing on the mainland was the additional security which it afforded against famine in the event of any disasters at sea, or of a blockade of the islands by a hostile fleet, as had occurred in 1379 with all but fatal consequences.

If Venice, from her insular situation, was not the first Italian State which detected the vicious character of the mercenary system, she was at least foremost in recognising the necessity of rooting out from her military organization

¹ Romanin, iv. 50.

that false and destructive element; and in the wars which she had occasion to wage in the later decades of the fifteenth century, her levies were invariably composed, so far as was found practicable, of troops raised on her own territories. Sometimes indeed she even endeavoured to disenthral herself from the baleful influence of foreign condottieri, upon whom she looked as an institution not less odious than necessary, and entrusted the Gonfalon of Saint Mark to a Pisani or a Zeno.

Such was the issue of a War, which cost the Signory 2,000,000 gold ducats,¹ which ruined the two great Houses of Carrara and Scaliger, and by which the Venetians built up on the mainland of Italy an empire, of which the smallest section equalled in area their ancient alluvial domain. It is a homily on the instability of human greatness, when we hear that the last male heir of Cane Grande (or the Elder) de la Scala, the Marchese Giuseppe Massimo, died many years ago at Verona itself in poverty, having pursued the trade of a cobbler, where his ancestors were long independent and powerful princes, and where their superb monuments might confront him from day to day! But the fall of the family was by no means recent. The possession of authority and dignity did not outlive the 14th century. That of the house of Da Carrara was equally ephemeral. Those were days of violent dioramic changes. Only a solid force, the result of slow and thoughtful formation, maintained its ground; and such was Venice.

Meanwhile, the arduous labours of the Decemvirs and their coadjutors were drawing to a close. On the 1st September (1406) Marco Giustiniani, chief of the Ten, and Giovanni Lore-dano, Inquisitor, proceeded to Padua to subject to a final scrutiny all the records of the municipality; but no farther disclosures were made. About the same time, a letter accidentally came into the hands of the Government, which threw additional light on the movements of Ubertino and Marsilio da Carrara and the two Scaligers, and shewed that the exiles were fomenting in every quarter a spirit of disaffection to Venice. It was collected from that and other sources, that

¹ Joh. Bembus, fol. 520. According to Paolo Morosini, *Memoria*, p. 15, a bounty of 50,000 ducats was given to the victorious troops, and an offer on the part of the latter to conquer for the same Power the whole of Lombardy, if the Signory consented to pay them 100,000 ducats, was rejected only by the moderation of the Venetians, who preferred to give the moiety as a bonus.

they had many accomplices and correspondents in the very heart of Padua.¹

The year 1406 auspiciously closed, nevertheless, with fêtes in honour of the accession of the Cardinal Angelo Corrarò, a subject of the Republic, to the chair of Saint Peter, under the title of Gregory XII.² (December 19). Corrarò was the first Venetian who had worn the tiara. The Republic accredited to him eight instead of four ambassadors; and his Holiness conferred hats on Pietro Morosini and on Giovanni Barbarigo, Bishop of Verona.

Inland States are commonly found endeavouring to obtain a coast-line and a port; but Venice, admirably situated in this respect, more especially after the acquisition of the Dalmatian and Croatian littorals, was obliged to number among political considerations and requirements the insecurity and inconvenience arising, or apt to arise, from having those portions of the Italian continent abutting on her own territory in other hands. A strong grip on the immediately contiguous States might have sufficed, and was perhaps all that was originally designed; but ambition is of stealthy development, and one conquest not only led to another conquest, but actually seemed to necessitate it.

We are of course to guard ourselves, in considering these and other territorial acquisitions, against the misleading idea, that the Venetian dominion over the *terra firma* of Lombardy was ever thoroughly consolidated or perfected in all minor administrative details. Among modern nationalities, at a time when the science of government is better understood, the assimilation of a group of States or of isolated possessions under a new and uniform rule constitutes a very slow and gradual process, and it is hardly to be supposed that the Republic ever acquired thorough control over the vast continental area, which once acknowledged her sway and suzerainty. Her jurisdiction was somewhat of the same semi-feudal character as that of the modern Turks over provinces, which they hold by the power of the sword and the moral force of treaties.

The discord in the Apostolic See had preserved all its violence and all its bitterness. The pretensions of Gregory

¹ Joh. Bembus, fol. 523.

² Aretini, *Rerum suo tempore* (1378-1440) *Italiâ gestarum Commentarius*, Murat. xix. 925; Leodrini Cribelli *Vita Sfortiæ Vice-Comitis*, *ibid.* 647.

XII. were contested by Benedict XIII., the nominee of the opposite faction. A protracted and angry correspondence ensued between Corraro and his competitor. An ineffectual attempt was made to reconcile the rival claims. At length, in March 1409,¹ a General Council assembled at Pisa, which deposed both the claimants, and elected in their room another Venetian subject, Pietro Filargi of Candia, Archbishop of Milan. Corraro had already quitted Rome in the autumn of 1407, and had successively proceeded to Viterbo, Siena (September 4),² where he remained for some time, Rimini, and Udine, where he purposed temporarily to fix his residence. He had written from Rimini to the Signory, praying leave on his way to Friuli to pass through Venice. But, from a fear that some party spirit might be unadvisedly kindled, permission was refused by the Ten;³ and as to the pecuniary assistance which he required, he was told "that the Republic has already expended 30,000 ducats in embassies to various courts in the interest of peace, and that she can, therefore, give no more!"⁴ His Holiness was fêted, however, at Chioggia and Torcello, and large numbers flocked from the Capital to do honour to the Venetian Pope. It will appear, as we proceed, that the Italian republics keenly competed for the advantage and distinction of furnishing a new pontiff. It was a moral leverage, which in the event of a troublesome war or even negotiations often proved of essential value; and the Republic at least reciprocated by rendering friendly offices to the Holy See within certain limits.

The sole fruit of the Council of Pisa was the addition of a third to the two existing successors of Saint Peter. Benedict continued to receive the support of Arragon and Sicily. Gregory was still countenanced by the Emperor, Naples, and Malatesta of Rimini. The cause of Filargi, who assumed the title of Alexander V., was espoused by France, Burgundy, and England; and the Alexandrines importuned the Republic to take the same side in the controversy (August, 1409).⁵ The Venetian Executive, which had equally denied Corraro the authority which he solicited to transfer his residence to Padua or Treviso,⁶ determined to shift the responsi-

¹ Muratori, *Annali*, ix. 48.

³ Sanudo, fol. 842.

⁵ *Ibid.*, fol. 842.

² *Annali Sanesi*; Mur. xix 421.

⁴ *Ibid.* fol. 847.

⁶ *Ibid.* fol. 847.

bility of an answer upon the Pregadi; and the question was agitated with great warmth in that Body during several days (August 18–22).¹ The Doge, who is said to have borne Corraro a grudge for declining, on the valid ground of unfitness, to make his nephew a Bishop,² was favourable to the overtures of England and her party; and he concluded by moving that, “for the sake of the welfare and repose of Christendom, the Signory declare herself for Alexander.” On his withdrawal from the Council, in conformity with etiquette, the motion of Steno was put to the ballot; and in a House of 130 members, it was carried by 69 against 48; 13 abstained from voting.³ The thwarted minority loudly inveighed against the course of policy thus prefigured; and some even went so far as to vent their spite and rage in personalities against his Serenity. A *Ducal*, however, was published, announcing the result of the ballot, and ordering all recusants to quit the Venetian dominions within three days.⁴

At the same time, the Republic was feeling small relish for polemics, and was little disposed to become the champion of any particular section in the Church. The novel and somewhat embarrassing position, in which she was placed by recent events, obliged her statesmen to occupy themselves with a widely different class of considerations; and the establishment of sound alliances with those Powers which still retained their independence, was a task which she had infinitely nearer at heart. In the course of 1407, fresh treaties were concluded with Frederic, Duke of Austria (June 2), with Nicolo, now Marquis of Ferrara (July 1), and with Pandolfo Malatesta, Lord of Pesaro and Brescia. At Ravenna, Obizzo da Polenta placed himself under Venetian protection, received a Venetian Podesta, and, in the event of failure of male issue, bequeathed his property to Venice. In the East, the charter with Constantinople was renewed for the usual term (1406–11); from India, the reigning Prester-John transmitted to the Doge a present of rich aromatic drugs and four leopards;⁵ and in 1403, letters had been received from

¹ Sanudo, fol. 843.

² F. Cornaro, quoted by Romanin.

³ Sanudo, fol. 843.

⁴ Romanin, iv. 55.

⁵ *Ibid.*, iv. 55. In the sonnets of San Geminiano, written about 1260, this potentate is described as “Presto Giovan, Re di Babilonia.” But Prester-John was a generic title.

Candia and elsewhere,¹ communicating the defeat of Bajazet at the Battle of Angora by the Tartars under the redoubtable Timour, who advanced against the Turks at the instigation of some Genoese and Venetian merchants. This success was treated as a timely counterpoise to the disastrous Battle of Nicopolis.

The four leopards arrived at Venice in the summer of 1402. His Serenity was a little puzzled what to do with them. He ultimately sent two to Milan as a compliment to Giovanni-Galeazzo, then still living, and two in a similar manner as a gift to William and Albert, reigning Dukes of Austria.

The follies and vices of her neighbours had enabled the Republic to aggrandize herself in the Peninsula. The troubles of Hungary soon enabled her to aggrandize herself in another direction. The contest for the crown of Saint Stephen was still maintained by Ladislaus, son of the ill-fated Charles of Durazzo, against Sigismund, whose unconstitutional excesses had rendered him obnoxious to his subjects. But the resources of the former eventually compelled him to confine himself to a narrower sphere of action; and by an instrument, dated the 9th of June 1409,² the King of Naples sold to Venice for 100,000 florins all his rights and pretensions over Dalmatia. The Signory entered into possession of Zara (August 17), after experiencing some resistance from the officers of Ladislaus, who disputed the transfer; a Venetian garrison superseded the Neapolitan garrison;³ and, at a distance of half a century, the Republic thus achieved an object, over which she had been secretly brooding since the treaty of 1358. Sanudo states, that this was the eighth time the Signory obtained Zara, and that hence arose the adage:—

Zara Zaratini
E compra nostri Schiavolini.⁴

But the surrender of Dalmatia was to be something more than a mere pecuniary transaction. The prospect, which

¹ Relation of Gherardo Sagredo, Oct. 2, 1402; Copy of a letter of Pasqualino Veniero, Castellan of Micone and Tino; Copy of a Letter of Marco Grimani, Sopra-Comite, written to the Duke of Crete, "Chio, Aug. 9, 1402"; Copy of a Letter of Ser Tommaso de Molino, written to Ser Piero Cornaro, Mur. xxii. 795-800.

² Romanin, iv. 55.

³ Ibid.; and Navagiero, fol. 1079.

⁴ Sanudo, fol. 841.

Ladislaus possessed of uniting the two crowns in his own person, was sufficiently faint, and his want of money was sufficiently urgent, to induce that prince to accept a generous offer. His rival, however, was less poor, less venal, and less sordid; his interest in the province was of a higher and more tangible character; and the ratification of the treaty of 1409 involved the Venetians in a dispute with the successor of their old enemy Louis, which had slight chance of a pacific settlement.

The resolution of the King of Hungary was strengthened and even accelerated by the intrigues of the remaining representatives of the houses of Scaliger and Carrara. Since 1406 Pietro-Brunoro de la Scala and Marsilio da Carrara had been constantly occupying themselves with plots and cabals against the Signory at the court of Buda and elsewhere. Their virulent animosity against Venice formed an excellent introduction to the Marechal de Boucicault; and at Genoa they had for some time found an asylum. The giddy impetuosity of the marshal, however, and his wild schemes prepared the way to the fall of the French domination (September 1409);¹ and the exiles were obliged to seek shelter and sympathy elsewhere. They repaired to the court of Buda, whence they proceeded to scatter the seeds of rebellion amongst the Paduans and Veronese. But their efforts were rendered uniformly nugatory by the vigilance and alertness of the Venetian government; and the latter at length resented these dangerous machinations by setting a price on the heads of the two Scaligers, as it had already done on those of the two Carrarese.

The Steno Ministry exerted all its powers of persuasion to turn the King of Hungary from his hostile purpose (March 1410). It reminded him of the debt of gratitude which he owed to Venice for the assistance, which she had rendered to him and his consort during the contest for the succession in 1382. It represented that the Republic had purchased Zara of Ladislaus in order that so important a place *might not fall into the hands of strangers*, independently of the fact that the Zaratines had been Venetian subjects since the tenth century; and it concluded by observing that she paid a good price for

¹ Stella, *Ann. Gen.* 1222; B. de S. Giorgio, *Historia Montisferrati*, Murat. xxiii. 678.

Dalmatia in the systematic suppression of privateering on that coast. But Sigismund replied "that they should have no peace, until the province was absolutely evacuated." The Signory made a farther effort. She offered to hold Dalmatia by the tribute of a white horse and a robe of cloth of gold (June 1, 1410).¹ But his Majesty merely reiterated his former declaration; and the two Powers thus drifted into war.

Toward the close of that year, two circumstances occurred which might have appeared to prognosticate misfortune. On the evening of the 10th August,² a furious W.S.W.³ wind, accompanied by a deluge of rain and hail,⁴ swept over Venice, and committed incalculable damage. Houses were thrown down; ships were torn down from their anchorage, and dashed against the quays; men were lifted from their feet by the force of the hurricane, and blown into the sea. Several boats returning from the fair at Mestra⁵ were lost in the gale. On the following day, a great many corpses were picked up in various places; and there were no fewer than forty-five, which were too severely bruised and mangled to be identified. In the second place, on the 15th October,⁶ intelligence arrived that "on the 12th August 1409, a foraging party of 1800 Tartar horse, armed with bows and scimitars, broke during the night into Sudah, massacred all the Venetians in the place, with the exception of the consul and a few others, who contrived to escape in their shirts, and pillaged or destroyed property valued at 100,000 ducats."⁷

Friuli became the new seat of hostilities; and fortified lines were drawn along ten⁸ miles of the frontier by Venetian engineers under proveditorial superintendence. Alliances were contracted with several of the petty feudatories of the province. At Udine Tristano Savorgnano engaged to lend every support to the Signory. In this instance, the forces of the Republic, which did not exceed 15,000, were largely, if not wholly, composed of troops raised on her new territories. Vicenza offered to maintain at her own charge 1000 foot and 600 horse. Padua gave 100 lances. A fair proportion of the subordinate commands were judiciously distributed among

¹ Romanin, iv. 59.³ Filiasi, *Ricerche*, 59.⁵ Sanudo, *ubi supra*.⁸ Poggio, *Vita di Filippo Scolari detto Spano*; *Arch. stor. Ital.* iv.² Sanudo, fol. 853.⁴ Sabellico, dec. ii. lib. ix.⁶ *Ibid.*, fol. 854.⁷ *Ibid.*

Paduans, Vicentines, and Veronese. The post of Generalissimo was at first entrusted to Taddeo, nephew of Luchino del Verme;¹ but that officer, who does not seem to have inherited the genius of some of his relatives, proved himself inefficient, and he was superseded in the beginning of December (1410) by Malatesta of Rimini. The extraordinary expenditure was expected to reach 60,000 ducats a month.

No operations of moment took place till the spring of 1411. On the 20th April, 12,000 Hungarian cavalry and 8000 foot² crossed the Tagliamento under Filippo Scolari, more usually called Pippo Spano. Pippo, who was by birth a Florentine, pierced all the defiles and gorges of the mountains, and, profiting by the dissensions between the Friulan landowners and the Patriarch of Aquileia, overran the district almost unopposed. The agricultural population which, from that tendency on the part of a commercial State to favour the cities, cherished an animosity to the Signory, welcomed the new-comers, officiated as their guides through the passes, and facilitated in numerous ways their progress. On the 22nd April, the enemy presented themselves in front of the Venetian lines, which the dilatoriness of Malatesta, combined with the rawness of his troops, enabled them to carry and traverse. "The Venetian commander," observes a contemporary,³ "depended in this enterprise upon his former reputation more than upon his present exertions. The General came to Treviso, where he arranged the preliminaries much at his leisure, and completed his grand dispositions. What do you think? Certainly the earth quaked, and

' — nascitur ridiculus mus.'

At length, that magnificent captain moved from Treviso; but it was with a foot of lead!"

In person, Pippo was of middle height, with dark, lustrous eyes, a fair complexion, and a radiant countenance. His frame was spare, but well-knit. His face wore a perpetual smile. He was passionately fond of smart clothes; and he usually appeared dressed in a long silk mantle trailing on

¹ Litta in voce *Del Verme*.

² Poggio, *Vita di Scolari*; *Arch. stor. Ital.* iv.; Romanin, iv. 58.

³ Redusio, *Chronicon* contemp. fol. 836.

the ground and a military hat with lappets which reached to his shoulders. As an orator, he was remarkably accomplished; and he spoke the Hungarian, Polish, German, and Bohemian dialects with as much fluency as his own language. In his habits he was severely abstemious.¹

At Prata, the Hungarian and Venetians encountered each other for the first time; and the former were beaten. But they did not cease to advance; and under the influence of treachery, rather than force, Feltre and Belluno opened their gates. At Motta, a second battle took place, Malatesta having allowed himself to be surprised; and after a hard fight, in which Pippo had the advantage at the outset, the enemy were still more signally worsted, with a loss of more than 1000 men in killed.² But the Lord of Rimini remained so badly wounded,³ that it was necessary to transfer the command to his brother the Lord of Brescia.

The winter of 1411 suspended hostilities; and the Hungarians, retiring beyond the Venetian frontier, occupied and ravaged Friuli. Scolari himself was at this juncture attacked by an alarming fit of illness,⁴ and, obtaining temporary leave of absence, he was carried to Buda in a litter⁵ by easy stages (Feb. 1412). On his restoration to convalescence, Pippo proposed to return to his post, and to bring reinforcements. The army of Sigismund was already superior to that of the Republic in number and discipline: yet so far from having made head against the latter, they had been twice sorely discomfited.

During the momentary inaction, the Government busied itself with preparations for the new campaign, and concurrently sought to obtain peace through Apostolic intervention. The desire to procure a pacification arose from the increasing gravity of the struggle. On the 11th September 1411,⁶ dispatches had been received, announcing that, in the room of the feeble Robert, Sigismund had been elected by the Diet King of the Romans; ⁷ and this circumstance, which one of the Venetian writers calls a "dolorous piece of news,"⁸ added vast weight to the Hungarian power. On the 28th March 1412,⁹ a message arrived from the Venetian Legation

¹ Poggio, *Vita di Scolari*, 176.

² Redusio contemp. *Chr.* fol. 837.

³ Cavalcanti contemp. *Storie Fiorentine*, Appendice.

⁴ Poggio, *Vita*, p. 177.

⁵ Sanudo, fol. 861.

⁶ *Ibid.* fol. 854.

⁷ Muratori, *Annali*, ix. 57.

⁸ Sanudo, fol. 854.

⁹ *Ibid.* fol. 863.

at Rome, stating "that the King is willing to listen to terms, on condition that the Signory indemnifies him for the losses which he has suffered in Dalmatia, and becomes answerable for the expenses of the war, which his Majesty fixes at between 500,000 and 600,000 ducats!"¹ This proposition was not accepted

Pippo returned with fresh soldiers, but without better fortune. His troops were obliged to carry their foraging excursions on a singularly wide range: for the Venetian commander had taken the precaution to strip the country adjoining the seat of war many miles round of its crops and grass. On the night of the 10th June 1412, a party of foragers presented themselves unexpectedly at Lido, in skiffs and barks which they had contrived to collect at some point of the mainland. The alarm was promptly given; the tocsin was sounded; the citizens resorted to a levy in mass; and the aggressors withdrew.

The Republic now recognised more fully than ever the necessity of bringing the contest, which had lasted two years, to some speedy and satisfactory issue. The pressure was becoming daily more sensible. A series of loans and imposts was grinding the people. The duty on corn had been augmented, and the poorer classes were forced to make their bread of millet-flour. The members of the civil service were sorely grumbling at the tax on their salaries. The Funds had fallen from 59 to 38.² Such was the attitude of affairs when, on the 4th July (1412),³ the Great Council resolved that a committee of a hundred persons, clothed with unlimited powers, should be appointed for the management of the war. Into this body were admitted the Doge, the Privy Councillors, the Decemvirs; but the Quarantia was excluded from its sittings. A fee of a *lira di soldi* was paid for each attendance; and defaulters incurred a penalty of 100 *lire*.

The measure of the 4th July instilled more vigour into the movements of the army. On the 24th August, the Lord of Brescia advanced to dispute with Scolari the passage of the Livenza, near Motta, the scene of the last action; and a general engagement succeeded. The Hungarians behaved with uncommon gallantry; and fortune was beginning to incline toward

¹ Sanudo, fol. 863.

² Ibid. fol. 867; Gallicioli, *Memorie*, lib. i. c. 13.

³ Sanudo, fol. 868.

them, when Malatesta, seconded by Pietro Loredano, one of his proveditors, gave the rallying cry, restored confidence to his wavering ranks, persuaded the Venetians to resume the combat, and gained a signal victory. Pippo lost several standards,¹ and exclusively of those who were left dead on the field, a considerable number in prisoners.

Since July, several Powers had proffered their mediatorial services without effect. The result of the second battle of Motta was more influential than any arguments in persuading Sigismund to follow the advice, which his ministers had been offering to him during some time, and to come to terms. At length, on the 17th of April 1413,² a truce for five years, with exchange of prisoners, was negotiated at Castelletto in Friuli. The allies of both the belligerents were included in the stipulations of this armistice.

One of the conditions of the instrument was, that the Republic should furnish the King with a passage to Rome, on the understanding that the object of his Majesty in proceeding to that point was purely pacific; but she was also bound by the treaty with Ladislaus, of June 1409, to lend no naval support to his rival in any war which he might thereafter undertake against Naples. When therefore Sigismund demanded with no slight effrontery certain galleys at her hands for a purpose avowedly hostile and aggressive, her Government absolutely refused to comply with his desire; and the master of a hundred legions was powerless before the sovereign of the Adriatic. At the same time, the Signory scrupulously fulfilled her diplomatic engagements. Sigismund crossed over in a Venetian ship to Italy; and, having met at Lodi the Pontiff John XXIII., arranged with him the preliminaries of the General Council which was about to assemble at Constance, with a view to an adjustment of the pending differences in the Church; and the King was also confronted at Lodi by a Venetian legation, which carried instructions from its Government touching the conclusion of a definitive peace. The Florentines exerted themselves in a similar interest; and during the months of June and July their ambassadors had two audiences of his Majesty at Trento.

¹ Sanudo, fol. 871.

² Romanin, iv. 62. Caroldo, *Historia*, fol. 129, Harl. MSS. 5020, gives a day later.

But the King confined himself to generalities, and no progress was made.¹

The services of Pandolfo Malatesta were magnificently requited. He reached Venice on the 30th May. The Doge and a select suite went a certain distance to meet him, and offer their congratulations. On the 31st, the Great Council decreed the Lord of Brescia a Venetian citizen. An annuity of 1000 ducats of gold, with a yearly allowance or retaining fee of 400, were granted to him. A house, for which the Procurators of Saint Mark were authorised to give 6000 ducats, was purchased for the General on the Canal Grande; and he was presented with trinkets, dresses, and other compliments to the value of 600. The Signory proposed to make him Governor of Candia; but he declined the responsibility. The officers who had served under Malatesta, and who were reported to have meritoriously acquitted themselves, received liberal recompenses.²

A short time before the important events of April 1413, an accidental occurrence had shown, that Venetian society was not yet quite reconciled to the fundamental changes in the Government, and that in the lower strata of the system still lurked some volcanic remains. Francesco Baldovino was a gentleman in affluent circumstances, of a handsome person, and of engaging manners. His domestic establishment was princely.³ He had a large sum in the Funds. In short, every adventitious advantage, which fortune brings, was within his reach, excepting one; Baldovino was not a noble. At the period of the War of Chioggia, he desired to become, among the rest, a candidate for a seat in the Great Council. But, his paternal⁴ ancestor having taken a leading part in the Bocconio conspiracy of 1300, the family laboured under a certain obloquy, and Baldovino was a disappointed man. Among his numerous acquaintance was one Bartolomeo D'Anselmo, also a *cittadino* of great wealth, and also an unsatisfied expectant of nobility. It happened on Friday, the 4th March 1413,⁵ that Baldovino and D'Anselmo met at the Minorites, and began to discuss their common grievance.

¹ *Istruzione data dai Dieci della Balia di Firenze a Gino di Neri Capponi, Ambasciadore a Venezia*, Cavalcanti, *Storie Fiorentine*, Documenti, No. 1: 1839; G Canestrini, *Discorso sulle Relazioni di Fiorenza coll' Ungheria*; *Arch. stor. Ital.* iv. 195.

² Sanudo, fol. 880.

³ *Ibid.* fol. 862.

⁴ Sandi, lib. v. c. 2.

⁵ Sanudo, *ubi supra*.

"We," cried Baldovino, at once launching into diatribe, "pay taxes enough forsooth; yet those of the Council enjoy the emoluments of office." "True," returned his companion, "and indeed we ought to make it our business to see if we cannot get for ourselves a share in the administration. Devise some plan in which I may co-operate." "The way would be," whispered Baldovino, "to collect a company of our following, and to massacre them as they are leaving the Council, particularly the College, the Decemvirs, and the Avogadors." D'Anselmo said, "That is an excellent plan. How then do you purpose to find your men?" "I intend," the other continued, "to seek a good many trusty fellows, who will be at my elbow to compass this matter for us on Sunday that is coming." "I, too," rejoined D'Anselmo, "will bring some." So they parted.

Bartolomeo D'Anselmo was not a bad man; but he was a man of no steady principle and of an exceedingly nervous temperament. He had hardly bidden farewell to Baldovino, when the treasonable dialogue which had passed between them began to haunt his imagination. He found himself a prey to a variety of unwholesome and chimerical fancies. The echoes of his own words grated on his ears. The sound of his own voice threw him into a cold sweat. He conceived it more than possible that they might have been overheard, and that they were betrayed. He pictured himself arrested, dragged before the Ten and into the chamber of torture, put to the question, condemned to an infamous and horrid punishment. If there had been eavesdroppers, he was pretty sure that this would be his destiny; and he knew that there was only one method of escaping from the danger. He was base enough to pursue that method; D'Anselmo turned evidence on the same day against his friend. The informer was pardoned and ennobled. The man, whom with such vile and pitiful cowardice he had denounced, was taken into custody, examined under the cord, and on Saturday morning the 5th, at eight o'clock, was executed between the Red Columns, where he was left hanging three days as a warning to traitors.¹

Whatever influence a prolongation of hostilities might, from an imperfect knowledge of political economy, rather than from an absence of pecuniary resources, have exercised on her

¹ Sanudo, fol. 862.

finances, the Republic emerged with high credit from her arduous struggle against the Emperor. Zara, Sebenigo, and other cities along the Dalmatian littoral were recovered. In the only engagements by which the late war had been signalised, her arms were triumphant.

At the same time, faithful to the traditions of the Veniero Administration, Venice was silently persevering in her policy of territorial expansion in various quarters. In 1409, Ottobuono Terzo, Lord of Parma and Reggio, a monster of cruelty and vice, was slain in the course of a war with Ferrara and the Malatesti. The Republic became a party to that contest on the side of the latter by taking into pay 600 Lances; and she somewhat unceremoniously reimbursed herself for the outlay and requited herself for the service by entering into possession of the territories of the fallen tyrant. Venetian governors were sent to the two cities. An advantageous exchange, however, was subsequently negotiated with the Marquis of Ferrara, to whom Venice ceded her acquisitions, obtaining as an equivalent four important castles on the Po—Brescello, Guastalla, Casal-Maggiore, and Colorno.¹

In 1411, Mugia, on the Istrian coast, ten miles from Justinople,² tendered its submission, which was accepted; but a similar offer on the part of Ancona was rejected. Cephalonia and Patrasso ranged themselves under the Venetian flag. In the Veronese, several feudatories, dying without heirs, bequeathed their estates to the Signory.

The Doge, who had occupied the throne since the beginning of the century, did not long survive the close of the Hungarian war. He expired on the 26th December 1413, at the advanced age of 84. The career of Michele Steno was very singular; he was one of the few remaining links between the past and the present generation. Steno was already forty-five when, in 1354, Andrea Dandolo died in the flower of manhood of a broken heart. He was a man of seven-and-thirty, when Marino Faliero, by gaining the battle of Luca (1346), established his military reputation; and he had just passed his five-and-fortieth year, when Faliero was led to the block. He was a contemporary of the events which culminated in the Treaty of 1358: he witnessed the severance of Dalmatia from the dominion of the Signory; and he was

¹ Muratori, *Ann.* ix. 54.

² Sanudo, *Itinerario*, 129.

sitting on the throne when, at a distance of fifty-one years, that province was at length restored to her rule. In the momentous incidents, which filled the last two decades of the fourteenth century, he was an active mover. He had seen the day, when the independent existence of his country appeared to be a question of hours; and it was his fortune to live into an epoch, when Genoa possessed in the councils of Italy scarcely more weight than Pisa or Perugia, and when the Venetian Republic was aspiring to render herself the greatest Power in Europe.

The latter days of Steno were saddened by a visitation of the plague, which carried off between 32,000 and 33,000 souls,¹ and by many personal afflictions. He was a martyr to stone, and had grown at last perfectly deaf.² Yet he preserved to the end the vigour of his understanding and even some share of his youthful fire. It seems assuredly at variance with the ideas, which one has learned to imbibe about Venice, that the Doge's stables were said to be the finest in Italy. But herein he only shared the taste of his predecessor Celsi.

A curious illustration of the unimpaired state of his mental faculties is furnished by a scene, which had taken place in the Great Council a few years back. On the 2nd June 1410, a meeting of the Council was held after dinner at the prayer of the Advocates of the Commune, who desired to procure the annulment of a resolution formerly put by Ser Donato Michieli, and carried; and they moved to that effect at the commencement of the sitting. The old Doge, who was at this time in his eighty-first year, immediately rose from his chair, and declared himself of opinion "that the Avogadors had no jurisdiction in the matter." The Avogadors contended, in their turn, that Messer lo Dose was out of order, having no right to interfere without the concurrence of a certain portion of the College; and in support of such a view they quoted at length the 60th clause of the Promission. Two of the Privy Councillors and a chief of the Forty, acting in the same capacity, adopted this view, and taking up the discussion, one of them said: "May it please your Serenity to sit down and hold your tongue."

¹ Sanudo, fol. 883. "In Venezia, 32,000; Chioggia, 800.

² Ibid. fol. 884.

Steno, however, paid no heed to the injunction, and continued to talk, until he had exhausted his argument. The Avogadors formally pronounced him guilty of a misdemeanour, and liable to a penalty of 1000 lire. The meeting separated; but the controversy did not drop. On the 7th September, the Doge petitioned the Great Council, "that the Avogadors should either cite him before it, or rescind their sentence." This bold step on the part of so old a public servant solved the difficulty. The Avogaria yielded, and apologised in writing (October 29, 1410).¹

¹ All these proceedings are given *in extenso* by Sanudo, fol. 850-2.

CHAPTER XXVIII

A.D. 1414-1431

Tommaso Mocenigo, Doge (Jan. 7, 1414)—Anecdote of Paolo Giuliani—Pacific Policy of Venice—Council of Constance—Election of Martin V. (Nov. 1417)—Anecdote of his Holiness—War with Turkey (1416)—Battle of Gallipoli—Peace with the Sultan (Aug. 8, 1416)—Situation of Italy—Ambition of Filippo-Maria Visconti—Amicable Relations between Venice, Florence, and Naples—Death of Carlo Zeno (May 8, 1418)—Fresh Rupture with Sigismund—Connivance of the Decemvirs at an attempt to Assassinate him (July 3, 1415)—Success of the Venetian Arms—Acquisition of Friuli, Istria, and Dalmatia (1418-20)—And of a portion of Albania—Recovery of Scutari and other points—Acquisition of Corinth (1422)—The Count of Goritz becomes the Vassal of the Republic (1424)—Negotiations between Venice and Florence—Rejection by the former of the proposed Alliance against Filippo-Maria Visconti—Financial Statements of Mocenigo—His last Words—Death of the Doge (April 4, 1423)—Virtual Extinction of the Popular Assembly and other Constitutional Changes—Election of Francesco Foscari (April 15)—Festivities—Anecdote of Mocenigo—Acquisition of Thessalonica (Saloniki)—The Lazaretto and Board of Health.

THE constitutional point agitated for the first time in 1410 in respect to the relations under certain circumstances between the Crown and the Avogaria, and conceded from deference to his great age, his sad infirmities and his extraordinary services, in favour of Steno, was soon permanently set at rest by the insertion of a declaratory clause in the Promission, which restrained his successors from following a course which had been allowed as an indulgence in a particular instance. The new Doge, elected on the 7th January 1414, was Tommaso Mocenigo, Procurator of Saint Mark, and one of the diplomatists at Castelletto. His brother Leonardo and himself were the two sons of Pietro Mocenigo, a respectable senator, who also attained in his time the procuratorial dignity. It was Leonardo Mocenigo, of whom Carlo Zeno spoke so highly in his Modon dispatch of October 1403. So far back as 1379, Tommaso, then the Sopra-Comite of a galley, was employed by Vettore Pisani to convey to the Government of the day the disastrous result of the Battle of Pola. At the period

of his election, Mocenigo and two other orators (as they were termed) were at Cremona on an embassy to the Emperor, and the courier, who brought the sealed dispatches from Venice, announcing the fact, is said to have exceeded his commission so far as to say, before the letters could be opened, "Uno di voi tre è stato fatto doge." Mocenigo himself immediately started for the capital; at Verona twelve delegates, accompanied by a secretary, were in attendance to invite him to Venice, where he arrived on the 27th of the month in the Bucentaur, which had been sent as far as Malghera to receive him. Proceeding to St. Mark's, he received the Sacrament, raised both his hands, swearing to respect the national rights, and was presented with the gonfalon of the Republic; and on entering the palace he said: "Pax huic domui."

So much as eleven days elapsed between the decease of Steno and the nomination of his successor; and it appears that this unusual delay arose from a somewhat droll incident. At first the Forty-one had been inclined to another candidate, Paolo Giuliani, one of themselves, and a grave and experienced personage, who had recently declined the Procuratorship; and this gentleman received a certain proportion of votes. But it was objected to Giuliani that he was no speaker, and the objection having been put in writing was handed to him, that he might say what he chose in his defence. "Thank God! my lords," cried the Elector, "that you have nothing more to lay to my charge than this. Now, Messer Antonio Veniero, when he became Doge, was even less of an orator than myself. But when they made him Doge, he learned to talk; if you make me Doge, so will I!" The conclave, however, hesitated on consideration to try the experiment, and Mocenigo obtained six-and-twenty suffrages.¹

The festivities in honour of the accession, which were postponed till April, were of several days' duration, and the Marquises of Ferrara and Mantua, and a vast number of other visitors, who had come to attend the approaching Sensa, took part in them. The Gild of Goldsmiths and Jewellers opened the proceedings with a *balordo* or revel; they were all on horseback in scarlet cloaks, their steeds housd with lace; and each horse had cost three ducats for the hire. The mounted suites of the two marquises, hundreds in number,

¹ Sanudo, fol. 887.

were splendidly accoutred. The tournament, which took place on Sunday, the 28th of April, lasted several hours, and the victors received handsome prizes in the form of helmets and jewelled necklaces. 50,000 or 60,000 persons are computed to have attended this celebration.

Venice now seemed content to repose on her conquests; and the accession of Mocenigo promised, so far as Italian affairs were concerned, to inaugurate a neutral policy. The war, indeed, had left its traces behind it. The finances were in a totally disordered state. The comparatively meagre resources, which a faulty method of taxation placed at the disposal of the Executive, were exhausted. It was to remedy these evils, that a committee was organized almost immediately after the truce of April 1413, to alleviate the pressure imposed on the people by the extraordinary duties on many of the necessaries of life, and to balance the public accounts.¹

There were no fewer than three professed successors of St. Peter in the field: Benedict XIII., Gregory XII., and Alexander V. Christianity had rarely beheld so grave a scandal. Alexander, who was said to have been formerly a beggar, did not long continue, however, to wear the tiara: in 1410 he was replaced by John XXIII., a friend of Leonardo Aretino, and a man of energetic character, but who in earlier life had been a pirate.² After his elevation to the Papal Chair, John drew still closer to Aretino, whose advice he was fond of asking on all weighty matters,³ and he was frequently in consultation with him whole hours together.

In concert with John, Sigismund, elected a few months later⁴ to the Imperial throne at Frankfort-on-the-Maine, applied himself to the laudable scheme of healing the wounds of the Church; and a Second Council was appointed to meet at Constance in the winter of 1414. To that convocation were accredited the three Venetian Cardinals, Giovanni Barbarigo, Antonio Condolmiero, and Pietro Morosini; and the Republic pledged herself to abide religiously by its judgment. Gregory sent one of his Cardinals and Giovanni Contarini, a Venetian and Patriarch of Constantinople. Benedict was also represented. An English Carmelite, Thomas of Saffron Walden,

¹ Romanin, iv. 63.

² See, respecting this Pontiff, *Arch. stor. Ital.* iv. 433.

³ Aretini, *Rerum suo temp. gest.*, Murat. xix. 928.

⁴ Muratori, *Annali*, ix. 57.

is recorded to have been present, and to have displayed great eloquence in vindicating Romanism against the Wicklifites and Hussites. John XXIII. attended in person. On his passage of the Vorarlberg, the carriage was overturned by the badness of the roads, and John swore like a trooper, which he was said once to have been. When he reached Constance, he cried: "A trap to catch foxes!" He soon conceived a notion that his life was in peril, and fled. The proceedings were opened on the 5th November; and they were of the most boisterous and unseemly character. Words having risen between the Archbishop of Milan and the Archbishop of Pisa, those two dignitaries sprang from their seats, closed like wild beasts, and nearly throttled each other.¹ The confusion was disgraceful; and many, trembling for their lives, actually jumped out of window. The end was, that Gregory resigned, and that after a lengthened delay Benedict and John were formally deposed. It was not till November 1417, that the votes of the College of Cardinals centred in Ottone Colonna, who chose to style himself Martin V.²

Martin V. directed his exertions with unparalleled zeal and success to the extinction of the schism; and he shewed himself a man of superior courage and abilities to the majority of his predecessors. Nevertheless he had his enemies, and none more bitter than Braccio di Montone, Lord of Perugia. On one occasion,³ his Holiness was at Florence when Braccio happened to pay a visit to that City; and the following of the Lord of Perugia exhibited their rancour and ingenuity by composing ballads or rhymes in praise of their master, and in disparagement of the Pontiff, which were sung by the boys in the streets. One of the ballads began:—

" Braccio valente
Che vince ogni gente :
Papa Martino
Non vale un quattrino." ⁴

¹ Sanudo, fol. 911.

² Muratori, *Ann.* ix. 841; Della Robbia, *Vita di Bartolommeo Valori*; *Arch. stor. Ital.* iv. 263.

³ Muratori, ix. 103.

⁴ See also J. A. Campanus, *Vita Brachii Perusini*, Murat. xix. 566. Campanus gives two of the lines in a Latin version of his own, as I suspect:—

" Brachius invictus omnem debellat gentem ;
Papa Martinus non valet quadrantem."

Della Robbia, *Vita di Bartolommeo Valori*; *Arch. stor. Ital.* iv. 266, and Aretini, *Rerum suo tempore* (1378–1440) *gestarum Commentarius*, Murat. xix. 931.

The Signory was not suffered to preserve for any length of time her pacific attitude. The constant collisions between her Mediterranean feudatories and the Turks, in which the former, from an intemperate and intolerant zeal, were as often the aggressors as otherwise, compelled her reluctantly to measure her strength for the first time with the naval forces of the Sultan, with whom indeed she was at peace. In the early part of 1416, a powerful, though small fleet was fitted out with this view. It was considered, that the war had arisen from the indiscreet ardour of the Colonies, and that the Colonies might therefore be fairly asked to contribute to its expenses. Venice herself gave five galleys: the remainder were furnished by Candia, Negropont, Andros, Corfu; and the command of the squadron, reaching in the aggregate fifteen sail, was confided to Pietro Loredano, an officer of great promise, with the title of Captain-General and with a staff of four proveditors. The instructions of Loredano were to avoid an encounter, until he had come to a parley with the Turk, and had endeavoured to arrange the difficulty in an amicable manner.¹ The fleet was detained at Tenedos by contrary winds till the 24th May 1416. On the 26th, it reached the Dardanelles, and on the following day the Captain-General found himself within ten miles of Gallipoli. On the morning of the 28th, at sunrise, he was proceeding to reconnoitre that place, when thirty-two vessels debouched from the port. A conference between the two commanders succeeded, and the negotiation was progressing favourably, when the chase of a Genoese galley, which the Turks mistook for one of their own, by a Venetian, brought it to an abrupt close (May 29). The Turkish admiral had the advantage of numbers, and he therefore gave battle with confidence. The conflict occupied several hours. The Mohammedans, with whom were many Catalans, Sicilians, Provençals, and Candiots, fought with desperate resolution. But they were thoroughly beaten, and sustained a heavy loss. The Venetian returns were 340 more or less severely wounded, and twelve killed. "By the galley of my brother, Ser Giorgio Loredano," writes the Captain in a Report which he addresses to the Doge from Tenedos, under date of the 2nd June, "were captured four galleys of twenty-two banks, of oars, and two of twenty only. By Ser Jacopo Bar-

¹ *Letter of P. Loredano to the Doge, June 2, 1416, Murat. xxii. 901-909.*

barigo were taken two, one of twenty-three, the other nineteen banks, in all of which were Catalans, Sicilians, and other renegades, of whom the greater part had been already cut to pieces in the battle. The residue I have treated similarly, and the Comiti also I put to the sword, so that the Turks have no more captains; and among them was Georgius Calergi of Candia, a rebel, whom I caused to be cut to pieces on the poop of my galley, which punishment will be a warning to these caitiff Christians not to take pay from these infidels!" Loredano, who was himself severely wounded, inclosed in his dispatch a letter from the Sultan, which he had ordered to be translated from Greek into Latin, and he begged his Serenity to send him money to pay his men, as well as gunpowder and bomb-stones, of all of which he was sadly in want.

The vessel which conveyed the report of Loredano started from Tencodos on the 2nd June,¹ reached Modon on the 19th, and arrived at its destination on the 30th, after a passage of eight-and-twenty days. The intelligence was of momentous interest. The check which had thus been given to the arms of the Crescent was the second, which they had received since the beginning of the century; and the Venetian Government wrote to all the leading European Powers, apprising them of the glorious victory of Gallipoli. A public ovation and thanksgiving were held at Venice on Sunday the 5th of July.

On the 8th August following, the first preliminaries of peace between Turkey and the Signory were arranged; but the conclusion of a definite treaty was an operation which lingered over several years.² The final result was extremely advantageous to the Venetians. The interests of their commerce were greatly promoted. Additional guarantees for its security were conceded by the Sultan. The Republic was left at liberty to clear the Dardanelles and the Archipelago of the Turkish corsairs, who infested those waters. The prisoners were exchanged (1416-19).

At the same time, the condition of Italy was becoming more and more favourable to any ulterior projects of annexation or territorial extension, which Venice might entertain. Various in their character, but all terrible, were the revolutions, which shook the Peninsula from one extremity to the other; and a principle of absorption was again in active operation,

¹ Sanudo, fol. 901.

² Romanin, iv. 74-5.

fatal to the independent existence of those petty States to which the death of the Count of Vertus in 1402 or other causes had afforded a transient enjoyment of freedom and importance. Of so many boroughs and municipalities, which had flourished in the preceding century, four only retained their glory and their power—Venice, Milan, Florence, and Naples.

The fortunes of the House of Visconti were now watched with deep interest and anxiety by Italy and the world. Of the three children of Giovanni-Galeazzo, one alone, Filippo-Maria, now remained. Gabriello sold Pisa to the Florentines in 1406,¹ and perished at Genoa in 1408. In 1412, Giovanni-Maria, the eldest, was assassinated by Filippo. The latter, who thus succeeded to the whole patrimony, joined less than his father's astuteness and force of character to all his callousness, all his dread of the touch of cold steel or the sight of a red coat, and all his ambition. The object, which the Duke of Milan proposed to himself, was the recovery of the various cities, which had been wrested from his family during the regency, and the restoration of the Milanese empire to its pristine grandeur. At Cesena, at Rimini, at Pesaro, at Bergamo, at Brescia, Filippo-Maria beheld a Malatesta wielding the sovereignty. Parma, Reggio, and Modena were incorporated with the estates of the House of Este. Florence had annexed Pisa, and menaced the Lucchese. Bologna alternately belonged to the Church and to the great house of Bentivoglio. Siena acknowledged no yoke. The master of Crema was a Benzoni, of Lodi, a Vignate,² of Cremona, a Fondulo. The Arcelli were Lords of Piacenza; Andrea Braccio di Montone was Lord of Perugia. Lastly, Padua, Verona, Vicenza, Feltre, Belluno, belonged to Venice. To win back gradually these dismembered possessions, was the aim of the Duke; and his insatiable thirst for power and dominion soon renewed the apprehensions, which at the death of his father had momentarily subsided.

The narrow jealousy reigning among the numerous towns, which had thus secured for themselves an ephemeral independence, was admirably favourable to the gigantic projects of Filippo-Maria, whose agents studiously fomented their dissen-

¹ *Sei Capitoli dell' Acquisto di Pisa dai Fiorentini nel 1406: Arch. stor. Ital.* vi. part 2; *Matthæi Palmerii Florentini de Captivitate Pisarum, seu de Bello contra Pisas a Florentinis gesto anno 1406, Commentarius*, Murat. xix.

² *Il Conte Francesco di Carmagnola, Memorie storico-critiche, con documenti inediti, da Francesco Berlan Veneziano, Torino, 1855; Cagnola, Storia di Milano; Arch. stor. Ital.* iii. 23.

sions. Another cause, which contributed to a similar result, lay in the enterprising character and military genius of the Lord of Perugia. By continual aggressions upon his neighbours and by ceaseless quarrels with the Malatesti Braccio weakened both himself and his neighbours, and played into the hands of an enemy far more formidable.

Happily for the Malatesti and other minor States of analogous origin, a Power greater than Milan was at present interested in their preservation. Conscious of the dangerous character of the Duke on the one hand, and aware of the hostile intentions of Sigismund on the other, the Venetians addressed themselves with energy to the creation of a barrier against the former, who was, at all events, the less pressing; and in December, 1414, an alliance was negotiated, under their auspices and guarantee, between Filippo-Maria and the petty Lombard Princes. With Florence the Signory was on sufficiently amicable terms; and in July 1416, a defensive treaty was concluded by the Doge with Joan II. of Naples. These measures left Venice in an infinitely better position to cope with Sigismund, and to carry out the ambitious designs which, notwithstanding the earnest dissuasion of a certain party in her Councils, she still persisted in cherishing.

Several efforts had been made during some years passed without result to induce Sigismund to listen to a compromise; and the Republic even undertook to hold Dalmatia by a nominal tribute of 7000 ducats. It appears that in July 1415, a proposition was conveyed to the Ten, by whom the diplomatic arrangements were being superintended, on the part of some fellow whose name has not survived, to dispatch the Emperor and the two Scaligers by poison, and that the Council had the baseness, not uncommon in those days, nor unknown to later times, to countenance the attempt. But the attempt did not succeed.¹ Peace became impossible.

The Republic, continually menaced by Sigismund, and compelled to number among contingencies a new war in Friuli, had long felt an ardent desire to strengthen herself on the threatened points. With such an object in view, she had been negotiating with the Captain of Trento and the Court of Austria itself, which was at present on cool terms with his Majesty, since the summer of 1415, for the cession, among

¹ Romanin, iv. 77.

other places, of Roveredo, a stronghold on the east side of the Adige, ten miles south of Trento. The Lord of Roveredo, Aldrighetto di Lizana, had been formerly under Venetian protection; but, subsequently espousing the cause of Sigismund, he had afforded shelter to the outlawed or rebel subjects of the Signory, had impeded the navigation of the river, which flowed through his lands, by the levy of arbitrary dues, and had perpetrated other alleged infractions of international right. Reprisal was at length made on the offender by the sack of portions of his territory (1416); he was finally obliged to seek the intercession of the Duke of Austria; and through that channel an arrangement was concluded, by which the Castle was consigned, during a certain period, to the Venetians as a material guarantee. Lizana, however, broke faith shortly afterward by intriguing with the Emperor against Venice; and the Government of the Doge, armed with this ample pretext, at once entered into complete possession of the fortress, and (August 23, 1418¹) set a price upon his head.

Meanwhile, an occurrence of a very different complexion threw the capital into mourning, and saddened the heart of every one who bore the Venetian name throughout the world. On the 8th May 1418, in his 84th year, died one of the most illustrious men whom the Republic had yet produced. Outliving by eight-and-thirty years Pisani, his companion in arms and partner in glory, CARLO ZENO survived to witness the resurrection of Venetian freedom and the apparent approach to its zenith of Venetian greatness. His exequies, like those of Pisani, were attended by the Doge, the Privy Council, the Ten, and all the other great officers of State; and the weather-beaten veterans, who had fought under him in a hundred battles, and who had bled with him at Zonchio, were the carriers of his bier. For when the ecclesiastics proposed as usual to officiate, all Venetians bled to the sea raised their voices, and claimed their right to pay this last solemn tribute to their beloved commander. All Venice poured forth to behold with moistened eyes the committal to the earth of the perishable remains of the great soldier, of that poor human tenement, where many an arrow and bullet had left their trace in forty scars; and a declamatory but eloquent oration was pronounced over the grave of Zeno by his friend Leonardo

¹ Romanin, iv. 73.

Giustiniani. The resting-place lay near the Arsenal, and the ground was eventually absorbed by the call for enlarged space. The bones of Zeno underlie the spot with which he was so closely associated; but they have long been beyond identification. There may have been many on that day, who could recall the time—thirty-eight years since—when the independence of Venice seemed to hang upon this man, and when the most fervent prayer in the Church was the prayer for his arrival, and when, the tidings of the long desired fleet being at length in sight having been received, and the flagship recognised, the national joy was all but too deep and too full for speech.

Since his release from confinement in 1407, Zeno had passed his time chiefly at Venice in contemplative seclusion and the society of learned persons. The relish which this gifted and admirable man had imbibed in his boyhood for the pursuits of literature, his conversance with the classics, both Latin and Greek, and his proficiency in several branches of science, were exceeded only by his transcendent genius as a general, as a naval commander, and as a diplomatist. He was one of those spirits, rare in any age, especially rare in one when liberal knowledge was sparsely diffused, and in a profession from which such knowledge was too often accounted alien, who aimed at something beyond the mastery of mathematics and trigonometry. It is alleged by his descendant, Pier Angelo Zeno, that the hero left behind him a collection of his speeches on various occasions.¹ His nephew and biographer, the Bishop of Feltre and Belluno, says that his ancestor preserved his eyesight to the last day of his life, and never wore spectacles. Zeno was a fair and conspicuous example of that versatility of aptitude, which the government of Venice sagaciously fostered in its public servants of the higher grades. In lieu of the narrow intelligence and special training to which Englishmen are accustomed, the great Venetian official possessed a width and variety of information and experience, which made him transferrible from the head of one department to that of another without prejudice to his own credit or his country's. Even for a Venetian, the career of Zeno had been singularly erratic and diversified. He had been curé, prebendary, lawyer, ambassador, Procurator of

¹ *Memorie*, 1662, 12mo, *in voce* Zeno.

Saint Mark, Podesta, Captain-General, Civil Proveditor. He had been within a few votes of the throne, and owed his rejection to a feeling that his services elsewhere could not be spared. No one with such unflinching honour and success had played so many parts. A life, which was one of national value, had closed for ever.

In the same year in which Zeno died, a new Hungarian army entered Friuli. Two distinct political parties now divided that Province. One, headed by Tristano Savorgnano of Udine, favoured the Venetians. The other, led by the Patriarch of Aquileia, a German, supported the Imperial cause. It was the aim of the Signory to localise the war, and by the rapidity of her movements to preclude the enemy from advancing into the Trevisano. In this object she succeeded; and the Aquileian territory was violated indeed, before the five years' truce of April 1413 had quite expired. The Venetian forces were again intrusted to Pandolfo Malatesta, under whom served Savorgnano, Filippo Arcelli of Piacenza, and several other officers of distinction and rank.

It was difficult, after all, to know how the Republic could have embarked in her fresh struggle against the Emperor at a more fortunate moment or under brighter auspices. Sigismund was thrown completely out of his calculations. His attention was unexpectedly diverted from Italian affairs to those of Germany. The Hussites were convulsing Bohemia. The Turks were invading the Hungarian frontier. He was obliged to employ in those two provinces the troops, which he had hoped to be able to concentrate in Friuli; and the path which lay before the Signory was consequently smooth enough. The rebellion of the Bohemian heretics and the difficulties in Hungary were concurrent circumstances of a sufficiently striking character to justify a suspicion that some secret collusion existed between the Sultan and the government of Mocenigo, and that some broad pieces of Venetian coinage found their way to Prague.

The embarrassment of Sigismund was so unequivocal that that Prince even now evinced a disposition to treat; and the Signory renewed (October—November 1418) her offer of 7000 ducats a year as a tribute for Dalmatia. But his Majesty, embittered perhaps against the Venetians by the recollections of 1415, and instigated by his minion De Teck,

the German patriarch of Aquileia, remained stubbornly impracticable; and Malatesta opened hostilities without farther delay.

A series of triumphs such as she had never yet known was in store for the Republic. The resistance of Louis de Teck, whom the Court of Vienna had elected patriarch of Aquileia in 1408 to the prejudice of Antonio Panciera,¹ a churchman of Venetian sympathies, was promptly crushed. Sacile surrendered. The example was imitated by Cividale, Prata, Portogruaro, and other places. Arcelli rendered himself master (April—May 1420) of Feltre and Belluno, beating the troops of Sigismund from all their positions. On the 19th June, Udine capitulated; and this important event prepared the way to other conquests. On the 5th August, Aquileia succumbed, and De Teck was bitterly humiliated. It was in vain that the Holy See attempted to intercede for the fallen Churchman. The Venetian Senate replied, "that if the expenses of the war were paid by the Patriarch, the Province should be restored." De Teck was ultimately constrained to accept an annuity of 3500 ducats, with a limited jurisdiction over the City of Aquileia and the small domains of San Daniello and San Vito;² and the district was saved from pillage by the payment of a blackmail of 30,000 ducats.

In the wake of these achievements followed the recovery of Istria and Dalmatia. On the 12th May 1420,³ the hero of Gallipoli, Pietro Loredano, again commissioned as Captain-General, sailed from Venice with a squadron of fifteen galleys, and received the submission of Almissa, Brassa, Lesina, Curzola, Spalato, and Budua (May—September 1420). Cattaro also tendered its allegiance, on the understanding that its transfer by the Republic to any other Power would be tantamount to a dissolution of the mutual tie.⁴ At Trau, a vigorous defence was offered by the Hungarian garrison, but that place was finally reduced on the 27th June, a week later than the cession of Udine.

¹ *Dei buoni uffizi della Repubblica di Venezia a favore del Cardinale Antonio Panciera, Patriarca d' Aquileia, Studio storico sopra documenti inediti, di Eugenio Bono, Venezia, 1857, 8vo.*

² Muratori, *Annali*, ix. 107. See also Sanudo, fol. 933 and 939.

³ Romanin, iv. 85.

⁴ Dupré, *Essai historique et commercial sur les bouches de Cattaro*, quoted by Daru, ii. 278.

At the same time, the Signory carried her¹ unconquerable and paralysing arms into Albania, and regained Scutari, Drivasto, Dulcigno, Antivari, and other points along that littoral, which the Emperor vainly sought to wrest from her grasp.² In 1422, Centurion Zaccaria, Lord of Corinth, ceded that beautiful city and highly valuable position to Venice. Since the seventh century before Christ it had been regarded as the link of communication between the Eastern and Western trades. Lastly, in 1424, the Count of Goritz, overawed by the prodigious result of the war, consented to become the vassal of the Republic. The two delegates who came to Venice to tender the submission and allegiance of Scutari, brought with them a feudal tribute of five falcons and five goshawks, of the latter of which one was a rare white variety; and these representatives carried back rich presents and the desired ratifications. The birds were distributed as gifts among some of the neighbouring princes, who had greater leisure for sport than the Doge of these latter days. The Government sent a proveditor to Scutari, of whose presence there are numismatic memorials from 1436 to 1442 with the Lion of St. Mark on the reverses. It was a very strong and desirable acquisition, whose commanding castle still exists, and was probably the seat of administration, if not the source of the limited local coinage under Venetian rule.

Thus hardly half a century had passed since the Treaty of Turin, and the Venetians found themselves, by what might almost seem a caprice of fortune, or the fruit of their acquisitive cupidity, yet which was to a large extent the force of their over-mastering energy, advanced civilization, and what may perhaps be described as their purchasing power, the rulers of Padua, Verona, Vicenza and its adjuncts, Treviso, Cadore, Friuli, Istria, Dalmatia, a portion of Albania, some of the Ionian Islands, and Candia.

The constitution of Friuli, which was already composed of three distinct estates—the City of Udine, the Parliament, and the *Contadinanza*³—and which appeared sufficiently well adapted to the wants of the Province, did not suffer any change under the Venetian sway beyond that which the

¹ Sanudo, fol. 938.

² Muratori, *Ann.* ix. 107

³ Sandi, *Storia*, lib. vi. cap. 5. The *Constitutioni del Patria de Friule*, Udine, 1484, 4to, is said to have been the first book printed in the province.

Statutes of Verona and the other Lombard conquests had undergone. The Republic confirmed the Statutes, left all civil jurisdiction to her new subjects, and preserved in its full integrity their administrative system, so far as it affected details of fiscal economy. To herself she reserved the faculty of appointing a lieutenant, control over the prosecutions in criminal cases, and appellate power in the last resort.

The proceedings relative to the appointment of a Lieutenant of Friuli took place in the Pregadi on the 20th June 1420.¹ It was proposed by Giovanni Navagiero, one of the Privy Council, that the new functionary should be elected by four hands, that his salary should be 1500 ducats, that he should have a deputy at 100 a month, and should be required to keep twelve servants and twelve horses. The motion of Navagiero was carried without amendment; but two unsuccessful offers were made by the Doge, before he found any one willing to accept a post which seemed to involve great responsibility without corresponding emolument.²

In Udine itself, the nobles and the people formed two Councils, the *Greater Council* and the *Convocation*, which managed conjointly all internal affairs, nominated to all subordinate posts under Government, and deliberated on concerns coming within their cognizance.

The Greater Council consisted of 154 nobles and eighty commoners (*popolani*), who sat on separate benches and balloted separately; the Councillors held their seats for life; no family was permitted to send more than one representative; and members were not qualified, until they had reached their thirtieth year, and unless they were residents of Udine.

The Convocation or *Minor Council* counted fifteen nobles and two popolani; and its functions were executive. Subsequently to the embodiment of Friuli with the Venetian dominions, its weight was greatly increased by the presence of the Lieutenant, who became its President, and took the chair at every sitting.

The Parliament was the general legislative body for the whole province. Upon its benches sat the Archbishops, Bishops, and other clerical dignitaries representing the Church, the Castellans in the feudal interest, and the Delegates of the Cities. The Parliament was viewed as the High Court of

¹ Sanudo, fol. 934.

² Sandi, lib. vi. cap. 5.

Judicature both in civil and criminal pleas. But an appeal lay from its decisions to the Lieutenant, and from the Lieutenant in certain cases to the Signory.

Thirdly, the *contadinanza* (*corpo villatico*) represented all the towns, which contributed to the central exchequer of Udine. It was composed of eight syndics, who were elected by the urban deputies in the presence of the Venetian governor of each district.¹ In short, it is easy to perceive how, under the semblance of extreme moderation, the latter grasped with an extremely firm and tight hand the reins of government.

During all this time Filippo-Maria Visconti had been recovering by rapid strides the vast dominions of his father. His prodigality and the genius of his general, Francesco Bussone,² carried all before them. Monza, Como, Lodi, Trezzo, Martenengo, and many other places,³ fell successively into his hands. Piacenza was bought for 7000 ducats, Brescia for 30,000. By his marriage with Beatrice Tenda, widow and heiress of Facino Cane, he acquired Alessandria, Pavia, and Novara.⁴

In a gallant defence which he made at Piacenza, Filippo Arcelli had sought or accepted the assistance of the Genoese. Than this circumstance Visconti could desire no better pretext for directing his arms against that Power, newly released from the tyranny of Boucicault; Bussone marched upon Genoa; and after a spasm of liberty, the Republic relapsed into servitude on the 2nd November 1421. The doge or governor, Tommaso Campo-Fregoso, who had connived at the project, was suffered for the present to retain the petty sovereignty of Sarzana, and received 30,000 florins for his services. At the same time, the Duke purchased of his brother Spineta Fregoso for a moiety of the amount the City of Savona.⁵

In the late war, the Republic had employed during some time the services of Arcelli. His death was deeply regretted. He was a brave soldier, and a master of his profession. But he is said to have been an ill-liver and a hard swearer. When Piacenza was taken by the Lieutenant of the Duke of Milan, Arcelli, finding himself unable to make any farther

¹ Sandi, lib. vi. cap. 5.

² *Memorie storico-critiche di Carmagnola*, p. 9.

³ Muratori, *Ann.* ix. 82, 127.

⁴ *Ibid.* *Annali*, ix. 19, 27, 61.

⁵ *Ibid.* *Annali*, ix. 107.

resistance, fled to Padua, where he was seized by illness. Imagining that he was on the point of death, he exclaimed on one occasion—"Alas me! I bequeath my body to the Venetians, my property to my children, and my soul to the devil of hell."¹ The story is in perfect unison with the traditions, which have descended to us of these great Italian lords of feudal days; they were not possibly such religious desperados as Arcelli is depicted, but they were ferocious and profligate almost beyond modern credibility.

Of all the great Italian States, Florence had the clearest and strongest ground for dreading this reflux of Milanese conquest. Naples, rent by the contest for the succession between the rival Houses of Arragon and Anjou, was too much occupied by her own affairs to take any deep or useful interest in Italian politics. Venice herself, although she was equally distrustful of the Duke, entertained no immediate apprehensions from that source, and resisted all the efforts which were made to induce her to come to an open rupture with him. The Republic was at present indeed more solicitous of courting his alliance against Sigismund than of converting him into an enemy who might coalesce with the Emperor against herself; and in the February of 1422, Visconti having yielded to the Signory certain points on which she insisted, a defensive alliance for ten years² was concluded between the Powers. At the same time the Republic put a term to the long-continued and wholesale depredations on Venetian merchantmen of a Genoese corsair, Gian-Ambrogio Spinola, by sending a naval force to Gaëta, where Spinola perished, but robbed the victors of their expected spoils by burning his ships.

But whatever his ulterior plans might be, Filippo-Maria was not yet prepared to make any overt attack on the liberties of Tuscany. His Lombard schemes were engrossing his attention; and it suited his convenience to disguise the cordial grudge, which he nourished toward the country of the Medici for the purchase of Leghorn from the Genoese.³ So lately as 1420 (February 8⁴), the Florentines, cajoled by his specious professions of justice, amity, and moderation, had

¹ Cagnola, *Storia di Milano*, lib. ii.

² Romanin, iv. 88.

³ Diedo, *Stor. di Venezia*, lib. ix.

⁴ *Istorie di Firenze anonime*, 1406-38, Murat. xix. 65.

become parties to a time-serving treaty with that consummate tactician.

The acquisition of Genoa and Savona in 1421 and of Forli in 1422, soon awakened the Florentines, however, from their momentary dream of security. They demanded of the Duke by letter an explanation of his purpose; but nothing beyond shuffling protests of friendship, and a vague offer to submit to the arbitration of the Pope and the Signory, could be elicited from a dissembler, in comparison with whom the Count of Vertus was an upright and unsophisticated politician. The effort was renewed. An embassy, consisting of Bartolommeo Valori and Nello da San Geminiano, both citizens of high standing, the former Gonfaloniere during portions of 1402-8-20, and a wealthy banker, was sent to Milan. But, from a report that the pestilence had manifested itself in the locality from which they came, permission was denied to Valori and his colleagues to enter; and the delegates consequently returned home, having declined, out of regard to the dignity of their City,¹ to transact business with the Secretary, whom the Duke had dispatched to meet them with that object. At the same time the Government of Florence conceived the situation of affairs to be so critical, that it secretly requested the Marquis of Mantua to intimate to the Doge on its behalf its desire to enter into a defensive league with the Signory (May 17, 1422). His Serenity replied that the matter was assuredly of the utmost gravity, and that he would lay the papers before the Senate. But the Florentines, observing no progress made toward a decision, solicited an answer. Mocenigo thereupon stated that if they were really desirous of adopting such a step, he would accredit some person clothed with suitable powers to treat.

A second pause ensued. At last, on the 30th March 1423, a dispatch arrived, of which the substance was that, as the Florentines understood the confederacy of February 1422, between Venice and Milan to have had principally in view the hostile attitude of the Emperor, they might tender their mediation, and thus supersede the necessity for the alliance.

The question was carried to the Pregadi; and the Doge, though severely indisposed, harangued that Body at some

¹ Della Robbia, *Vita di Valori*: *Arch. stor. Ital.* iv. 272.

length in the interest of peace. His chief opponent and the leading advocate of the Florentine proposition was Francesco Foscari, Procurator of Saint Mark, and a distinguished diplomatist. It was against Foscari that Mocenigo directed a portion of his argument; and the address has the air of a rejoinder to a speech from the former, of which we do not apparently possess even a traditional text.

“Young Procurator,” began his Serenity, addressing Foscari, whose years he was apt, as one who remembered him as a child, to overlook, “what happened to Troy, will happen to Florence, and will happen to you. By wars the Trojans were weakened and enslaved; by wars Florence is destroying herself, and we shall do the like, if we take counsel with our young Procurator. It is to the arts of peace that our City owes all her prosperity; it is to them that she is indebted for her riches, the increase of her population, and her houses. Pisa aggrandized herself by similar means and by her good government. She plunged into war, impoverished herself, was lost. So it will be with us, if we listen to our young Procurator. Let me recommend you, Ser Francesco, not to come to hasty conclusions on this matter. Remember that Florence is not the Port of Venice either by land or water: for her sea is removed from our boundaries five days’ journey. Our Passes are the Veronese. The Duke of Milan is the Prince whose territory is contiguous to our own; and he must be kept in check, since it is scarcely a day’s march to his City of Brescia, which lies close to Verona and Cremona. Genoa, again, has sufficient maritime power under the Ducal rule to do us harm; with her we should endeavour to stand well; and if the Genoese are guilty of any excesses, we shall have justice on our side, and we can defend ourselves with fairness, both against them and the Duke. The mountains of the Veronese¹ are our barrier against Visconti.

“If the Duke should get Florence, the Florentines, who are accustomed to Republican institutions, will evacuate their City doubtless, will emigrate hither, and will bring with them their trade in silk and wool, so that that country will remain destitute of industrial resources: while Venice, on the

¹ “The low range of hills near Somma Campagna, which separates the Veronese from the Lago di Garda.”—H. F. Brown, *Historical Sketch*, 1895, p. 281.

contrary, will multiply and thrive just as it happened in the case of Lucca, when that citizen (Castruccio) made himself master there. The trade of Lucca and her wealth were transferred to Venice, and Lucca became poor and thinly populated. Therefore preserve peace.

“Ser Francesco, I pray you resolve me this. Suppose you had a garden, which was furnishing sustenance to 500 persons and to spare, and which cost you nothing; and suppose again, that robbers were to threaten this garden, and you in its defence were obliged to hire so many men with the gold which you had collected in your coffers! Is not our case, then, parallel? By virtue of a resolution passed in Council, we have ascertained the extent of our commerce at the present period:—

	Ducats.
Every week we receive from Milan, for our goods, between 17,000 and 18,000 ducats, which amount by the year to	900,000
From Monza 1,000	52,000
„ Como 2,000	104,000
„ Alessandria 1,000	52,000
„ Tortona and Novara 2,000	104,000
„ Pavia 2,000	104,000
„ Cremona 2,000	104,000
„ Bergamo 1,500	78,000
„ Parma 2,000	104,000
„ Piacenza 1,000	52,000
	<hr/>
	1,654,000

Our bankers report that, on the whole, the Milanese pay us annually 1,612,000 ducats. Prythee, tell me, if you do not think that this is a fine and noble garden, which costs Venice nothing!

“Again:—

	Ducats.
Tortona and Novara employ every year 6,000 pieces of our cloth, at 15 ducats the piece, which make	90,000
Pavia 3,000 pieces at 15 ducats	45,000
Milan 4,000 „ 30 „	120,000
Como 12,000 „ 15 „	180,000
Monza 6,000 „ 15 „	90,000
Brescia 5,000 „ 15 „	75,000
Bergamo 10,000 „ 7 „	70,000
Cremona 4,000 „ 4 $\frac{1}{4}$ „	17,000
Parma 4,000 „ 15 „	60,000
	<hr/>
90,000	900,000

“ In the aggregate, the commerce with Lombardy alone is worth 28,000,000 ducats a year. Tell me, if you do not think that Venice has here a very fine garden indeed !

	Ducats.
Moreover, the <i>Canepins</i> ¹ represent	100,000
Cottons	280,000
French and Catalan wools	240,000
Cloths of gold and silk	250,000
Pepper	300,000
Sugar-cane	64,000
Sugar	95,000
Ginger	8,000
Green ginger	—
Other miscellaneous articles	30,000
Brazil-wood	120,000
Cochineal and <i>Endachi</i> ²	50,000
Soap	250,000
Slaves	30,000
Freights, etc., at 2½ and 3 per cent.	600,000
	2,571,000

“ Such is the produce of your garden. Shall we destroy it ? By no means.

Every year Verona buys of cloths of gold, silver or silk, 200 pieces.	
Vicenza	120
Padua	200
Treviso	120
Friuli	50
Feltre and Civaldi di Belluno	12
	702

“ In our time, we have seen Giovanni-Galeazzo, Duke of Milan, who conquered all Lombardy, save Florence, the Romagna, and the Campagna di Roma, reduced to such straits by his expenses that he was obliged to remain quiet during five years; and it was with much ado then that he paid his troops. So it happens to all. If you preserve peace, you will amass so much money, that all the world will hold you in awe. My Lords, you see how, year by year, in consequence of the troubles of Italy, families migrate hither, and help to swell our population. If the Florentines give

¹ Lengths of hemp for cordage. See Ducange *in voce* Canebrinus. The ordinary Italian word *canapo* became in the Venetian dialect *canvo*.

² A species of logwood.

themselves to the Duke, so much the worse for them who interfere! Justice is with us. They have spent everything, and are in debt. We have a capital of 10,000,000, on which we gain 4,000,000. Live in peace, fear nothing, and trust not the Florentines! Your College has desired to be informed of the revenue, which we derive from the territory between Verona and Mestre; it is 464,000 ducats. On the other hand, it has desired to know the expenditure. But with the best peace in the world the expenditure must go far to swallow up the receipts. My Lords, I am not saying these things to glorify myself. But in truth you hear our Captains at Aiguesmortes and in Flanders, our Ambassadors, our Consuls, our merchants, telling you with one accord: 'My Lords of Venice, you have a virtuous and good prince, who has kept you in tranquillity; you are the only Power which traverses the sea and the land; you are the fountain of trade and the purveyors of the world; you are welcome everywhere!' On the contrary, around you is nought but war, flame, tribulation. Italy, France, Spain, Catalonia, England, Burgundy, Persia, Russia, Hungary, all are at war. We wage battle against the Infidels only; and great are the praise and glory which we reap. So long as I live, my Lords, I will maintain those principles which I have hitherto followed, and which consist in living at peace!"

The statement, which is explicitly said in the exordium to have been prepared in pursuance of a resolution passed in one of the Councils, was delivered under circumstances, with which we are clearly not very well acquainted. But even assuming the extreme case, that this and the following oration by the Doge have undergone interpolation by a later hand, their statistical value remains very great nevertheless, inasmuch as in respect to no other country in the world are such elaborate and minute figures extant for so early a period of history. The mention in the speech which succeeds of the silver ducat, which numismatists do not trace back beyond the middle of the sixteenth century, is highly suspicious, of course, and altogether the fact may be, that we have a text before us, with which some one has tampered, or which has suffered from periodical transcription and the disappearance of the original manuscript. But to whatever extent the statistics which are here given were actually of contemporary

origin, the argument of the Doge admirably answered its object.

The Signory was authorised "to thank the Florentine Executive for its offers, and to regret that its friendly offices could not be accepted, inasmuch as several fruitless efforts of the same kind had already been made, and the federation with the Duke was concluded from an anxious regard to the common safety of Italy."¹

A day or two only after these proceedings in the Pregadi, the Doge, who was now in his 80th year, felt the presentiment strengthening in his mind of his approaching end; and summoning to his bedside the principal senators and ministers, he tendered to them, in the following terms, the advice of a dying man:—

"My Lords, from the infirm state in which I find myself, I judge that I am drawing near the close of my career; and the obligations under which I lie to a country, which has not only bred me, but has permitted me to attain such lofty prominence, and has showered upon me so many honours, have prompted me to call you together around me, in order that I may commend to your care this Christian City, and persuade you to live in concord with your neighbours, and to preserve this City, as I have done to the best of my ability. In my time 4,000,000 of the Public Debt have been paid off, though 6,000,000 more remain, the latter of which were contracted for the war of Padua, Vicenza, and Verona. We have regularly paid the half-yearly interest on the Funds and the salaries of the Public Offices. Our City at present sends abroad for purposes of trade in various parts of the world 10,000,000 ducats a year, of which the interest is not less than 2,000,000.¹ In this City there are 3000 vessels of smaller burden, which carry 17,000 seamen; 300 large ships, carrying 8000 seamen; five-and-forty galleys and dromons constantly in commission for the protection of commerce, which employ 11,000 seamen, 3000 carpenters, 3000 caulkers. Of silk-cloth workers there are 3000; of manufacturers of fustian, 16,000. The Rent-Roll is estimated at 7,050,000

¹ Romanin, iv. 92, 93. The oration and particulars comprised in it have the air of a State paper drawn up by the Executive and perhaps, on account of his great age, read in the name of Mocenigo to the Assembly.

² Twenty per cent.

ducats. The income arising from let houses is 150,000. We find 1000 gentlemen with means varying between 700 and 4000 ducats a year. If you continue to prosper in this manner, you will become masters of all the gold in Christendom. But I beseech you, keep your fingers from your neighbours, as you would keep them out of the fire, and engage in no unjust wars: for in such errors God will not support princes! Everybody knows that the Turkish War has rendered you expert and brave in maritime enterprises. You have six able Captains, competent to command large fleets. You have many persons well versed in diplomacy and in the government of Cities, who are ambassadors of perfect experience. You have numerous Doctors in different sciences, and especially in the Law, who enjoy high credit for their learning among strangers. Your Mint coins annually 1,000,000 ducats of gold and 200,000 ducats of silver, of minor pieces, 800,000. Of this sum, 500,000 go to Syria, 100,000 to the *terra firma*, 100,000,¹ to various other places, 100,000 to England. The remainder is used at home. You are aware that the Florentines send here every year 16,000 pieces of fine cloth, of which we dispose in Barbary, Egypt, Syria, Cyprus, Rhodes, Romania, the Morea and Istria, and that they bring to our City monthly 60,000 (70,000 ?) ducats' worth of merchandise, amounting annually to 840,000 or more, and in exchange purchase our goods to our great advantage. Therefore, it behoves you to beware, lest this City decline. It behoves you to exercise extreme caution in the choice of my successor, IN WHOSE POWER IT WILL BE, TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT, TO GOVERN THE REPUBLIC FOR GOOD OR FOR EVIL. Many of you lean to Messer Marino Caravello, who is a worthy man, and deserves that position from his eminent qualities. Messer Francesco Bembo is a good man. So is Messer Giacomo Trevisano, and likewise Messer Piero Loredano. Messer Antonio Contarini, M. Fantino Michieli, M. Albano Badoer, all these have recommendations. Many, again, are inclined to Messer Francesco Foscari, and do not, I apprehend, sufficiently know his impetuous character, and proud, supercilious disposition. *Abbrazia molto e poco stringe*. If he is made Doge, you will be at war continually. Those who now possess 10,000 ducats, will have only 1000. Those who

¹ Sanudo, fol. 960.

possess ten houses will be proprietors of one, and those who own ten coats will be reduced to a single coat!¹ You will lose your money and your reputation. You will be at the mercy of a soldiery! I have found it impossible to forbear expressing to you thus my opinion. May God help you to make the wisest choice! May He rule your hearts to preserve peace!”

Such were the last words of a great and prophetic statesman. They soon acquired a testamentary force. On the 4th April² 1423, Tommaso Mocenigo expired, leaving his country more prosperous and opulent than she had ever yet been. Her treasury was full, although the outlay for the public service had been unprecedented, more particularly in the way of metropolitan improvements. Her debt was considerably reduced. The statistics of her taxation and expenditure exhibited a surplus of a million a year. Her home and foreign trade was flourishing beyond any precedent. No European Power was more highly respected, and the alliance of none was more eagerly sought and cultivated. The remains of the venerable and illustrious Doge were laid at SS. Giovanni e Paolo, and in 1424 a splendid altar-tomb, executed by two sculptors, Pietro di Nicolò of Florence and Giovanni di Nicolò of Fiesole, was erected over the spot. To the account in the *Stones of Venice*, only the regret that we do not possess as vivid a resemblance of such a man as we do of some of his successors can be added.

The foregoing details afford a vivid picture of the commerce of Venice in the first half of the fifteenth century; the official return of the taxation and expenditure of the Republic at the same epoch is subjoined in detail;³ and it has to be affirmed of the entire body of statistics already presented that, even allowing for the possibility of the actual delivery of the figures by the aged Doge himself being apocryphal, the fact remains that there has descended to us an unique body of information, of which, regarding the tendency of the Government to preserve the most trivial particulars from the remotest times, there is no reason to doubt the substantial genuineness:—

¹ Sanudo, fol. 959.

² Sanudo, fol. 968; *Chroniche Veneziane*, ii. 399, Add. MSS. 8579.

³ Sanudo, *Vite*, 964. Feltre, Belluno, Istria and Dalmatia are not here included. No statistics respecting them for this period are known.

	Receipts.	Deduction for Collecting, &c.	Net Income.
	Ducats.	Ducats.	Ducats.
Friuli	7,500	6,330	1,170
Treviso and its District	40,000	10,100	29,900
Padua	65,500	14,000	51,500
Vicenza	34,500	7,600	26,900
Verona	52,500	18,000	34,500
Venice :—			
Salt Department 165,000	698,000	99,780	598,720
Profits of the Loan			
Chamber 150,000			
Other Receipts 383,000			
Colonial Taxes	180,000	...	180,000
Other extraordinary Receipts	25,000	6,000	19,000
Loans on Demand	15,000	7,500	7,500
Property out of the Dogado (Houses, etc.)	5,000	...	5,000
The Clergy	22,000	2,000	20,000
The Jews	600	...	600
Commercial Tenths	16,000	6,000	10,000
Freights, etc.	6,000	4,000	2,000
Exchange (Duty)	20,000	12,000	8,000
Total	1,187,600	193,310	996,290

The passage alluding to the migration of the Florentine and Lucchese manufacturers to Venice is prototypical of the gain to London and England from the revocation of the Edict of Nantes.

The practical arguments of Mocenigo in favour of peace had proved themselves for the moment at least irresistible; but his counsel touching the appointment of a successor did not carry like weight. In anticipation of the event which had now taken place, Ser Francesco had during some time passed been actively engaged in propitiating by various means those whom he conceived to be the most probable arbiters of the forthcoming election; his uncle Francesco or Franzi, the Senior Privy Councillor: Albano Badoer, one of the Chiefs of the Ten: several members of the noble Houses of Nani, Priuli, Giustiniani, Donato, Ruzzini, with whom his own family had intermarried, were in his confidence and interest; and from a manifest wish to curry favour with a certain class, he had in his capacity as one of the Procurators of Saint Mark.

distributed 30,000 ducats of the public money in judicious dowers and charities.¹

Francesco was born in 1373, one of the three sons of Nicolo Foscari, a brother of Paolo, Bishop of Venice, who had earned an unenviable and damaging notoriety in the preceding century by his difference with the Government of Andrea Contarini on the subject of mortuaries. Bishop Paolo not only lost his cause, but sadly impoverished his family; Nicolo was a sufferer among the rest; and this gentleman fell into so much odium, and became so reduced in circumstances, that he spent a good deal of the later portion of his life abroad.² As far back as 1372 we find Giovanni Foscari, the future Doge's grandfather, threatened with exile unless he prevailed on his son, subsequently the bishop, to return from Rome.

The fortunes of the family, however, were retrieved by Francesco, who at an unusually early age discovered abilities of the highest order, and rose to deserved eminence as a Minister of State and diplomatist. In 1401 he was a Chief of the Forty, and in that capacity he became one of the warmest advocates of the war against Francesco Novello. He had filled several embassies between 1405 and 1420. He had been three several times a Chief of the Ten. In 1410, 1412, 1415, 1417, and 1418, he is found officiating as Avogador of the Commune. In September 1413, and in August 1415, he served for a short time as a special Inquisitor. The family residence of the Foscari had long been at S. Simone Profeta, to which parish and church the future Doge was a liberal benefactor.


Some of the candidates for the vacant dignity had already been indicated by Mocenigo. They were no fewer than six: Marino Caravello, Procurator; the Cavaliere Bembo; Antonio Contarini, Procurator; Leonardo Mocenigo, Procurator, the brother of Tommaso; Pietro Loredano, Procurator; and Francesco Foscari, the youngest of the number. Foscari was born in 1373, and was consequently fifty-one.

The Forty-one assembled on the 10th April. There was none of the competitors, to whom some exception was not

¹ Sanudo, fol. 968.

² Litta, *Celebri famiglie Italiane in voce Foscari*. The pedigree of the Doge, corrected by Berlan, follows on p. 849.

PEDIGREE OF THE DOGE FOSCARI.



taken. Caravello was superannuated.¹ Bembo limped in his gait, and was otherwise ill-qualified. Mocenigo was the brother of the late Most Serene Tommaso. Contarini had too many children. To Loredano it was not equally easy to raise a valid objection; but Badoer, the friend of Foscari, brought forward the feeble plea, that his services as Captain-General were indispensable to the Republic, and that "he was young enough to wait!" This quibble, which had been partly used years before against the great Zeno, was more than the hot-headed naval officer could bear. He started to his feet, and vindicated his claim with a warmth which made his case only worse, to the inexpressible glee of Foscari.

The turn of the latter came next; and he was challenged by Pietro Orio, a supporter of Loredano. Orio declared, that the candidate for office was still young, had married a second time,² had a large and increasing family, his wife bringing him a child every year, and possessed a scanty fortune. At the same time, he reiterated the warning of Tommaso Mocenigo that, "if he was made Doge, Venice would be perpetually at war." On the other hand, he was defended by Bulgaro Vitturi, who denied that he was a poor man, as his estate was worth 150,000 ducats. Bernardo Pisani and Paolo Cornaro also spoke in his favour. Foscari himself made an able speech.

The Conclave sat five days. There were eight scrutinies. At the eighth Loredano still had the largest number of votes; there were only eleven for Foscari. The ninth examination of the ballot-box gave Foscari *seventeen*; but his opponent had even now slightly the advantage. A tenth was demanded; Foscari was announced to have *twenty-six*; and Loredano was beaten. The fact was that in order to throw the supporters of Loredano out of their reckoning, a certain proportion of the opposite party forbore to declare themselves till the last moment, and that just when the chances appeared to be eminently favourable to Loredano, the nine

¹ Sanudo, fol. 967.

² His first wife was Maria, daughter of Andrea Priuli Del Banco. By this lady—whom he married in 1395—he had had several sons, of whom only three survived, and five daughters, all of whom were married. His second nuptials were with Maria, daughter of Bartolomeo Nani, in 1415.

voters in reserve recorded their suffrages, and thus procured a majority.

It was already late on the evening of the 15th April, when the College, after one of the most closely-contested elections which had ever been known, arrived at a decision; and the announcement was therefore deferred till the next day. The ancient formula which came into fashion in 1173—*This is your Doge, if it be agreeable to you*—had remained in use down to the present date. But, in the course of the labours of the Correctors of the Ducal Promission, some one remarked, “And if it should NOT be agreeable to them, what then?” The suggestion was forcible; the qualifying and subjunctive clause was omitted; and Albano Badoer, the eldest of the Forty-one, made known to the Arrengo in Saint Mark’s Church on the morning of the 16th April the issue of their deliberations in the unconditional sentence—*This is your Doge!* The successful candidate, having made his entry on the same day into the Palace, harangued the assembly outside from one of the balconies in a well-worded speech; and at the close of the discourse his Serenity was greeted on all sides by cries of *Sia! Sia!*¹

By such means, then, the political friends of the Procurator Foscari obtained his elevation to power; and under such circumstances it was that the old National Convention designated the *Arrengo* was not only virtually, but constitutionally and specifically abolished. On the 7th April, during the interregnum, the Correctors inserted in the Oath, submitted to their revision, a paragraph which declared: “all and every such resolutions as shall have been taken heretofore in the Great Council, in which it is found recited that they are put *in Arrengo*, likewise such as shall have been taken during this vacancy of the Crown, shall upon their adoption by the Great Council acquire the same force and validity as if they had been published in *Arrengo*.” Farthermore it was added: “these resolutions shall not again at any future time be published in *Arrengo*, and the *Arrengo* shall not be convoked, save at the election of our lord the Doge, when it shall be summoned, and the said selection be promulgated according to practice.”²

¹ Sanudo, fol. 969.

² Romanin, iv. 97.

The remaining innovations were of a less important and essential description.¹ They referred to the prompt and unbiassed dispensation of justice without respect of persons. They prescribed, that the Doge should be required to fund all his property with a reserve of 20,000 ducats' worth of silver plate, that his servants should receive at his expense two new liveries a year, and that the ceremony hitherto observed at Ducal obsequies of carrying the shield of Saint Mark reversed should be discontinued, as derogatory to the Patron Evangelist. A similar prohibition was extended to any object whatever, which bore his effigy.

The slightly morbid craving of the Venetian lower classes for pomp and pageantry was abundantly and even cloyingly gratified at the solemn investiture of Francesco Foscari and the triumphal progress to the Palace of his Dogaressa, the Signora Maria; and the organic and radical change, artfully wrought in the practice of the Ducal elections, was speedily committed to oblivion amid a splendid series of festivities. Like the public entertainments of 1401, the tournaments and other spectacles celebrated in 1423 spread not undesignedly over the greater part of a twelvemonth.

It is related of the illustrious Mocenigo as a characteristic trait, that the new Great Council Chamber and Palace being on the eve of completion, and the Council, loth to incur any farther expense at present, having forbidden under pain of a fine of a thousand ducats the proposal of such a matter, the Doge, anxious to see the ducal residence and some of the offices connected with it rebuilt, offered to lay down the money, and introduced the measure, which was adopted.² The *Sala Nuova*, or the New Saloon, was now at length completed; and it was inaugurated on the 23rd April (1423³), when the new Doge made his first appearance; and on the same day the Marquis of Mantua, having been introduced, was sworn a Venetian citizen, and took his seat on the benches. The House being counted, 911 members⁴ were returned as present.

A fresh acquisition of some consequence marked the commencement of the Foscari Administration. It was that of Thessalonica or Saloniki, at one period the heritage of the

¹ Sanudo, fol. 968.

³ Sanudo, fol. 968.

² Sabellico, dec. ii. lib. ix.

⁴ Sanudo, *ubi supra*.

House of Monteferrato. The inhabitants dreading the vicinity of the Turks, who were occupying portions of Albania and the Morea, and were again threatening Constantinople, renounced their allegiance to their despot Andronicos Palæologos, brother of the Emperor Johannes, and offered their city and themselves to Venice. The proposal was accepted; but the step involved two disastrous consequences. The cession of Saloniki, on which the Sultan Amurath had been casting a longing eye, threw Venice into hostile collision with Turkey; and her ambassador, Nicolo Giorgio, who was sent to accommodate the matter, found himself the inmate of a dungeon. At the same time, the communication with the East brought the seeds of pestilence to the shores of the Adriatic, and the ravages of the epidemic swept away between 15,000 and 16,000 persons. The lesson, however, was not lost upon the Republic. To guard against a recurrence of such an evil, the Government established at Santa Maria di Nazaret the famous Lazaretto or Pest-House; it was the first institution of the kind which had been seen in Europe. Some years later, the Board of Health, or *Magistrato alla Sanita*, which originated in 1459, still farther evinced the anxiety of a highly civilized Power to protect that population, which it regarded as one of the sources of its industrial wealth, and to diminish by precautionary measures the periodical sacrifice of precious human life.

The complex ramifications, which the expansion of Venice entailed, presented an infinite variety of forms, which naturally differed in importance and character. The Doge or the Republic was ever equal to the occasion. In 1425 it was the sovereign of the most potent monarchy in Northern Europe who sought his Serenity as a godfather for his newly-born son; and Foscarini had to inform the King of Poland that he was precluded from attending in person, but would send representatives, including a bishop who might hold the infant at the font.

The acquisition of Saloniki was not diplomatically completed till the month of April 1426.¹ The government was confided to two Proveditors, and Venetian courts of civil and criminal procedure were established. To mollify so far as possible the anger of Amurath, permission was given to his

¹ Romanin, *Stor. doc.* iv. 100.

subjects to erect an independent tribunal, which might take cognizance of suits for debt and other pecuniary transactions among themselves; Turkish merchants and caravans were suffered to trade at the port under the same conditions as heretofore; and the allowance of 10,000 *aspri* a year out of the Revenue, made by the late despot to the Sultan, was not at present discontinued.

CHAPTER XXIX

A.D. 1423-1431

Renewed Appeal of Florence—Its Rejection—Successive Defeats of Florentines by the Milanese—Fresh Appeal to the Signory—FRANCESCO DI CARMAGNOLA, his Birth and Fortunes—He enters the Venetian Service—Negotiations with Milan on behalf of the Florentines—Growing Tendency to War—Speech of the Doge Foscari—League between Florence and the Republic (1425)—Attempt of Visconti to avert the Danger—Fall of Brescia—Operations on the Po—Liberal Offer of the Senate to Carmagnola—Peace, and Cession of Brescia and its territory to the Republic (1426)—Suspicious Conduct of Carmagnola—Second War against Milan (1427)—Misbehaviour of Carmagnola—Battle of Macalo—Peace (1428)—Cession of Bergamo, the Bergamasque, and a Portion of the Cremonese to Venice—Generosity of the Senate to Carmagnola—Venetian Government of Bergamo—Anecdote of Leonardo Giustiniani—Revolutions of Bologna (1270-1428)—Venice declines successively Bologna and Lucca—Violations of the Treaty of 1423, and Third War against Milan (1431)—Costly Preparations of Venice.

THE accession of the Doge Foscari naturally gave new hope to the Tuscans, whom the aggressive projects and unprincipled cupidity of the Duke of Milan were inspiring with the greatest inquietude. Surpassing in the magnitude of his schemes even his father the Count of Vertus, Filippo-Maria, having made himself master of Genoa and Brescia, carried his arms into the Romagna, to which Giovanni-Galeazzo had never extended his conquests, and seized Imola and Faenza. The Florentines now conceived that they could no longer, consistently with their own safety, delay to draw the sword; on the 24th November 1423, the Council of War (*Dieci della Balìa*) was organized;¹ prompt measures were taken to obtain troops from the Riviera of Genoa and elsewhere; and Rinaldo degli Albizzi was dispatched to Venice to beg that Government to reconsider its determination, and to make common cause with the Tuscans. Admitted to the bar of the Senate, Albizzi represented² in fulfilment of his instructions that, the Duke being manifestly bent upon crushing the freedom of Florence,

¹ Della Robbia, *Vita di Bartolomeo Valori*; *Arch. Stor. Ital.* iv. 277. Valori was one of the *Dieci*.

² Romanin, iv. 101.

the latter had resolved to run the hazard of war in defence of Italy and for her own security. He besought the Republic to open her eyes, and, as the principal Power in the Peninsula, to co-operate in providing for the general safeguard. He pointed out, that the arms of Florence, properly seconded, could impose a curb on the ambition of Visconti. He exhorted the Signory at least to exhibit a favourable leaning to the just cause by closing against the Milanese the Passes of the Po; and the Ambassador concluded by declaring that his countrymen, rather than tolerate any longer the arrogance of the Duke, would call to their aid all the Powers of the world.

The answer of the Senate was delivered on the 13th May 1424.¹ That Body "regrets profoundly the fresh disagreements which have arisen to disturb the peace of the Peninsula; on its part it desires nothing so ardently as repose, and in that interest the Republic has invariably exerted herself. There are excellent reasons which preclude Venice from acceding to the proposal for a League. In regard to the Passes of the Po, the Florentines ought to be aware that the Senate is in no position to close them; but the Republic is prepared to deny the Milanese any passage through Ferrara." "Besides" (continued the Senate), "such is the wisdom and dexterity of the Florentines, that it entertains no doubt that they will concert among themselves the measures most conducive to their welfare and greatness: to speak frankly, the Venetians, having failed in repeated efforts to make peace with the King of the Romans (Sigismund), have been under the necessity of contracting an offensive and defensive alliance with the Duke;² and the consequence is that if the King is invited (by Florence) into Italy, we are bound to unite against his Majesty with Filippo-Maria."

This second rebuff was supremely vexatious and perplexing. But, whatever scruples the Florentines might have conceived on the score of prudence, they were conscious that they had now gone too far to draw back; Carlo Malatesta and his brother Pandolfo were already in the Romagna with 10,000 men; and a collision with the Milanese was almost

¹ Romanin, *ubi supra*.

² In 1421, for ten years. Bisticci, *Vita di Lorenzo Ridolfi*; *Arch. Stor. Ital.* iv. 317-8.

daily to be expected. The only course which remained open was to seek other external support; and notwithstanding the implied menace of the Signory, letters were written to the Emperor, the Duke of Savoy, and the Swiss, in a supplicatory tone. Sigismund, more particularly, was implored to hasten into Italy "to confound the enemies and rebels of his Crown, and to help his devoted servants."

The two forces met at Zagnonara,¹ in the Faenzan territory, on the 27th July 1424, and the Tuscans were deplorably beaten. In her despair, the discomfited Power made a fresh appeal to the Republic.² An embassy, consisting of Palla Strozzi and Giovanni de' Medici, the latter a member of the Florentine Company of Venice, waited on the Doge in the first week of October. But the attempt met with no better success than its predecessors; and although Foscarei, from vanity perhaps as much as from conviction, was personally inclined to the course which he had so warmly advocated before his accession, the Senate and the Ten were equally averse from committing the country to a policy, of which they found themselves unable to foresee with sufficient clearness the bearings and issue. At this stage, the Holy See having interposed, the Florentine ambassadors officially intimated to the Senate that it was the desire and aim of the Pontiff Martin to make peace between their Government and Filippo-Maria, and to frame a defensive alliance among the Italian States against the Emperor. The Senate replied:—"We rejoice to receive this intelligence. The Republic will be very glad to give her adhesion to any Confederacy of the kind indicated, and Cardinal Lando, our Ambassador at Rome, has been instructed to support the measure so far as lies in his power."³ But the proposed Italian League with the Pope at its head eventually fell to the ground; and the Government of the Doge contented itself with sending Andrea Mocenigo to Milan in December (1424), to pray the Duke to refrain from molesting the Lord of Ferrara, whom the Venetians had taken under their protection. "Your Signory," caustically observed Visconti to Mocenigo, "*prays* me indeed, but her prayers are ever commands!"⁴

¹ Paolo Morosini, lib. xix. p. 407.

² P. Morosini, *Memoria intorno alla Repubblica di Venezia*, xxii.

³ Romanin, iv. 103.

⁴ Navagiero, *Storia*, 1086.

A second reverse, which soon befell the Tuscans at Val di Lamona, slightly shook, however, the composure of the Republic; and on the 17th February 1425, a secretary, Francesco della Sega, was ordered to set out for Milan, to endeavour to open some negotiation, and to lay before Visconti at the same time certain demands preferred by Venice on her own account. The Ducal Government prayed that the Lord of Ravenna, whom it had also taken under its protection, might be indemnified for the sacrifices to which he had been put during the last war; that the Venetian subjects at Casalmaggiore, Brescella, and Torricella might be left undisturbed; that the Genoese might not be debarred from remitting to the Signory the compensatory payments due for former losses; and that the tolls, illegally exacted from the Venetian citizen, Bettino da Uberti, by the Milan Custom-house, might be reimbursed. It was only five days after the delivery of his commission to Secretary della Sega, that an unexpected occurrence gave a new complexion to the question.

Francesco Bussone was a native of the small village of Carmagnola, in the district of Turin. He was born about 1390; his father was named Bartolommeo.¹ The race from which the boy sprang was extremely humble and obscure: the elder Bussone is reported to have been a poor rustic; and it is said, that in his younger days Francesco was accustomed to tend sheep. His military tastes and talents were developed, however, at a precocious age; and his crook was, at any rate, soon exchanged for a sword. His first patron was Facino Cane, one of the most powerful princes in Italy and the greatest general of his time. At the death of Cane in 1412, Filippo-Maria Visconti, then in the beginning of his career and master of Pavia only, married his widow Beatrice Tenda, and extended his patronage to FRANCESCO DI CARMAGNOLA; upon this point the destiny of Carmagnola and his employer equally turned; and the History of Lombardy may be read for some time in the Fasti of a Turinese hind. Having by a happy recognition of rare merit promoted the young soldier of Cane from the ranks to the head of his army, Filippo-Maria succeeded in the course of ten years not only in recovering, but in amplifying, the Dukedom of Milan; Carmagnola himself amassed a fortune of between 70,000 and 80,000 ducats,

¹ Berlan, *Il Conte Carmagnola*, 1855, p. 9, *et seq.*

of which he had the prudence to invest 30,000 in the Venetian Funds; ¹ his services were speedily requited with the Countship of Castelnuovo (1415) and with the hand of a daughter of the House of Visconti (1417 ²); and, that he might have a residence suitable to his position and dignity, he laid the foundations of the beautiful Palace of Broletto-Nuovo at Milan. In 1421 and 1422, the exploits of the hero culminated in the successive conquest of Brescia, Genoa, and Forli; and in the latter year he was made Governor of Genoa. In person, the Count of Castelnuovo was square-set, powerfully built, and robust; his frame was symmetrical; his complexion was ruddy; and his hair and eyes were of the same chestnut-brown tint.³

It was impossible that so brilliant a reputation should long remain unenvied or unslandered. The Court of Milan was as rich as any other in mediocrity of talent, and Carmagnola counted numerous rivals who, enraged at finding themselves eclipsed and superseded by an alien interloper, breathed into the ear of Visconti suspicions of the ulterior plans of his favourite captain. The astrologers, a singularly powerful body in those days, were on their side; and the selfish pusillanimity of the Duke was not inaccessible to the whispers of calumny. Filippo-Maria became more and more distrustful of the Governor of Genoa, and he secretly meditated his ruin at the earliest opportunity. This change of feeling came to the knowledge of Carmagnola in due course, and he hastened from his seat of government to confront himself with his accusers, and to refute their insinuations. The Duke, however, dreading the possibility that his intended victim might have penetrated his design, denied him an audience, and even instructed the guards to stop him, as he proceeded to cross the drawbridge; and the injured man, quite aware of the easy doctrine of his employer on the removal of political obstacles, consulted his personal safety by a sudden and rapid flight from the Castle of Abbiate-grasso or Biagrasso, in the province of Pavia, fourteen miles from Milan, where Filippo was then staying. Milanese troopers were instantly put upon his track; but he outstripped all his

¹ The requisite permission was only given on a second application by the special authority of the Great Council, May 21, 1421.

² Berliani, p. 9.

³ *Ibid.*

pursuers, and reached without impediment the Savoyard frontier. The baffled Visconti vented his wrath by sequestrating all the property possessed by the fugitive within his reach, amounting to 40,000 ducats, and by committing his wife and children, who had been instructed to follow him, to close custody.

Amadeus, Duke of Savoy, received his distinguished visitor with urbane kindness, and extended to him all the offices of hospitality. But he naturally shrank from acceding to the warlike projects against Milan which the General sketched out, and politely declined to become a tool in the hands of the Count of Castelnuovo for wreaking his vengeance on his enemies.

Carmagnola did not yet despond. He knew, that there was one Power greater than Milan and greater than Savoy, to which he might appeal with some prospect of success. In 1421, he had been permitted, as a high mark of favour, to invest a part of his fortune in the Venetian Chamber of Loans; it was all that remained to him; and he determined, after the failure of his overtures to Amadeus, to repair to the Lagoon, and to offer his services to the Republic. The Count arrived at his new destination, accompanied by eighty men-at-arms, on the 23rd February 1425, in the same week in which Secretary della Sega had departed for Milan with his weighty budget of demands.

Among other personages of note who hastened to pay their respects to the noble stranger, was a certain Andrea Contarini, who appeared to throw himself a good deal in his way, and to cultivate his acquaintance with unusual assiduity. To Contarini the Government had secretly confided the task of sounding Carmagnola; and it was not the object of Carmagnola to be mysterious. The General unfolded his views frankly and without constraint; he disclosed many points of Milanese policy not generally known, and he finished by conveying to his questioner a desire to be employed by the Signory. Contarini reported to the Government all the facts which he had collected; an audience of the Doge was arranged; and on the 2nd of March, a week only after his arrival, his services were secured at a liberal scale of remuneration, but without any specific commission. Until he was absolutely required to take command in the field, it was

intimated to him that he might retire to Treviso, and there await orders.

It was during the stay of Carmagnola at Treviso, and in the month of August 1425, that two persons, named Gherardo da Rubiera and Giovanni degli Aliprandi, were arrested by the local government, on suspicion of being concerned in an attempt upon his life.¹ It transpired in the confessions of Rubiera and Aliprandi under torture that they had been hired by Visconti for the express purpose of dispatching the General by poison or otherwise, that they had several accomplices, and that it formed part of their plan to excite on the spot a spirit of disaffection to the Signory. The two principals were summarily executed; in regard to the treatment of their accessories, the Senate thought proper to lodge a discretionary power in the podesta and captain of Treviso, Nicolo Priuli. But, in a letter which was addressed to Priuli on the subject, that body, earnestly solicitous to postpone any collision with Filippo-Maria, at all events until a better opportunity, added this passage: "You will be careful, in the legal documents and in the proceedings taken in connexion with the present affair, to avoid all personal allusion to the Duke, and we recommend you to state on paper simply that the intended assassins came from Milan." Aliprandi was a distant connexion of the Visconti, and, on being required to leave Milan for some political reason, had been living at Treviso on terms of intimacy with his intended victim.

The mission of della Sega was, so far as the Florentines were concerned, entirely ineffectual. The Duke announced that, if he treated with Florence, it would be without the mediation of the Holy See, the Signory, or any third Power; nor had the subsequent embassy of Paolo Corraro a happier result. On the return of the latter, Lorenzo Ridolfi, the Tuscan ambassador, urged the Senate more warmly and importunately than ever to embrace the cause of his countrymen (May 1425). But that circumspect and wary Assembly was still inclined to temporise. It alleged that, although Visconti had declined her intercession, he had expressed the utmost reverence for the Republic and his readiness to reconsider the question. On such an errand della Sega was once more employed; but the friendly offices of Venice remained un-

¹ *Andræ Billii Historia*, lib. v.

appreciated. Ridolfi and his colleague, Palla Strozzi, were in absolute despair; at the close of an audience, which had been accorded to them by the Senate, the latter¹ exclaimed with passionate emotion: "My Lords of Venice, it appears to me that you wish to see Filippo King of Lombardy. If you make him King, we, who have withstood his ambition hitherto, will make him Emperor! You shall judge!"

The pithy and sententious declaration of Strozzi, which in all probability had not been hastily uttered, slightly deranged Venetian equanimity. A little while afterward, a member of the Government took an opportunity of speaking to him on the subject. "The fact is," he was told, "our Navy is dispersed in sundry directions; the winter is at hand; and there are several reasons which render it undesirable to launch out into hostilities. But, at the same time, we beg you to accept an assurance, that Venice will never view with indifference or apathy any serious encroachment on Italian liberties!" It was not, however, that the Senate alone was loth to engage in war on behalf of Florence. The Doge, who perhaps still recollected the warning voice of his predecessor, also leaned toward neutrality.

The sally of the Florentine Envoy was indeed a good deal more than a mere rhetorical commonplace. The withdrawal of Carmagnola from the service of Filippo-Maria had not ameliorated the prospects of the other belligerent. The Tuscan arms were exposed to a series of humiliating reverses at the hands of the new lieutenants of Visconti, Nicolo Piccinino and Francesco Attendolo, *detto* Sforza; and the situation of Florence was becoming critical. The triumphal progress of the Duke, with the occurrences at Treviso in the summer, which furnished an ample source of irritation, operated more potently than any other agency in persuading Venice to relent; and the consecutive defeats of the Florentines in the course of a single week (Oct. 9-17, 1425) at Anghiari and Faggiuolo warned the Signory that the time was at hand for throwing her own mighty sword into the scale against Visconti. This warlike tendency was strengthened and fostered by a voice from the throne. In the course of November 1425, an address which, as it has come down to us, offers a potent contrast to those of his predecessor, was

¹ Redusio de Quero contemp., *Chronicon Trevisanum*, 854, Murat. xix.

delivered in the Senate by the Doge himself, now apparently in course of conversion to a modified policy; and it seems that no one, apart from his exalted rank, carried greater weight from his persuasive manner, his eloquent style, and his particularly fine voice:—

“Many resolutions have been proposed, Conscript Fathers, which, being of a contradictory kind, breed confusion, and tend to mislead our judgment. *Decipimur specie recti*. There are two things, which in this our Republic are thought exceedingly pleasant, but which nevertheless have involved States oftentimes in troubles: they are, peace and frugality. While men too fondly cling to repose, and shew themselves too greedy of gain, grave perils beset their path. Of this we have examples numerous enough in ancient and in modern days. Have we not one under our own eyes? Behold the fate of the Florentines who, having neglected to bridle the power of Filippo-Maria, while it was still insignificant, are now in imminent danger of falling under a Milanese yoke! But what am I saying? Is it not our place to help the distressed and jeopardised Power? Shall we suffer Filippo to lay a finger on the liberties of Florence? That insensate tyrant (if he be not checked) will be pursuing his conquests unmolested, until he has overrun the whole Peninsula; and when he has got Florence, HE WILL ATTACK US NEXT.¹ That is the grand object of his machinations; that is his sole thought. Therefore I have wondered much when I have heard it said, that it is not for us to interfere in this matter. Really, most excellent Fathers, I am of decided opinion that our interest and duty lie in that very direction; I am of opinion that the Dominion ought not to remain a passive spectator of the present contest. I must remind you that the Florentines, though weakened indeed, are not so utterly exhausted that they cannot furnish their share of troops. By Carmagnola we have been assured that ‘the power of the Duke is not so great as it is reputed to be’; and under such a leader who, even in our age so prolific in military talent, has no equal, we may sanguinely look for a prosperous result and for an extension of frontier. All these considerations are calculated to induce us to engage in the war—a necessary war, I must call it—against the common foe who, contemning all laws, human and divine, appropriates

¹ See Bisticci, *Vita di L. Ridolfi*: *Arch. Stor. Ital.* iv. 318.

by fraudulent and nefarious arts the possessions of his neighbours, and who is aspiring to the Italian throne. For such reasons, I repeat, let us undertake the struggle with good courage; and in crushing this enemy, let us secure for the Peninsula the blessing of tranquillity!"

The Ducal address, supported by more than one collateral circumstance, influenced Venice in favour of the propositions brought by Ridolfi and Strozzi. On the 23rd November, the Senate decreed the acceptance of the League with Florence; and from that point the conduct of the whole affair, with the management of all details, was allowed to devolve on the Ten. The treaty was signed on the 3rd December, and it was to have a duration of five years from this date.

The stipulations were: 1. That each of the contracting parties shall send into the field 8000 horse and 3000 foot. 2. That a naval squadron for the protection of the Po shall be raised at the common expense. 3. That it shall be competent for the Republic to control absolutely the movements of the combined armies, to conclude peace at her pleasure, and to make any incidental arrangements which she thinks beneficial to the mutual interest. 4. That the conquests of the League in Tuscany and Romagna shall belong to Florence, those in Lombardy to Venice, and Lucca and Parma to Ferrara. 5. That Genoa shall be restored to independence. 6. That either party shall be at liberty to include in the present Treaty its allies and adherents, provided that they are Italian. 7. That the confederacy shall be regarded as framed against Austria, Hungary, Germany, or any other Power whom the Duke of Milan may enlist in his cause, and that the faculty of disposing of the Malatesta estates, if that family espouse the side of Visconti, shall remain in the hands of the Venetians.

The Republic at once endeavoured to procure the adhesion of Martin V.; and overtures were addressed to Switzerland and Savoy for the purpose of creating a favourable diversion in those quarters. On the 21st December, the number of the Pregadi was carried to 100;¹ and that Council was constituted a tribunal for the management of the War. On the 13th January 1420, the Cavaliere Bembo was named Captain of the Po; and on the 21st the League was published. But

¹ Navagiero, fol. 1087; Paolo Morosini, lib. xix. p. 412.

it was not till the 19th February that the commission of Captain-General of all the land forces was delivered to Carmagnola.

On the first report of the existence of a Coalition, Filippo-Maria had dispatched an ambassador, Franchino da Castiglione, to Venice to expostulate with that Government in a friendly spirit; and it happened, that Castiglione arrived on the same day, on which the important instrument was proclaimed (January 21). He intimated to the Signory, that his master had received the last news with a feeling of intense astonishment; he spoke of the excellent terms on which the Venetians had always stood with the Visconti; and he averred that the latter, having ever proved himself, and wishing to be still, "a dutiful son of the Republic," was quite at a loss to understand how Venice could have been led to range herself among his enemies. To this flimsy protest a categorical answer was given. The Doge confessed, that the most affectionate relations had subsisted between his country and the Dukes of Milan; "and," he said, "it is on that very ground, that we have learned with peculiar pain the differences of Milan and Florence. We have, it is well known, spared no labour to re-establish peace. We have watched with patience and solicitude the efforts made by the Marquis of Ferrara and by the Florentine Ambassador at Milan toward the settlement of the difficulty; and we at length volunteered our own mediatorial offices. But every attempt has failed. Our pacific sentiments and desires have found no reciprocity on the part of the Duke. We deny that by the proposed federation with Tuscany the Republic violates the Treaty of 1421, or absolves Filippo-Maria from any obligations in respect to it. For that treaty aimed simply and purely at providing a common safeguard against the Emperor. Even granting it to be true, that the Republic has been guilty of such a breach of faith, the Duke ought to be reminded that he took the initiative by attacking the Malateste, who are under our protection, and by contracting alliances with several States contrary to his engagements, thus in strictness nullifying the compact in question. Your master mentions guarantees. The best guarantee which Venice can have is peace; but that does not appear to be contemplated by the Duke!" "The truth is," concluded his Serenity, "that we have

determined to adhere to the League for ten years. If Filippo-Maria choose even now to propose the mediation of Ferrara or Mantua, we are content: only, if Florence be attacked, we shall help her. On the other hand, should the Duke come to terms, he may join the League with us against other enemies, if he thinks proper to do so."

Nothing farther was heard of Castiglione; and it was suspected that the Milanese astrologers were persuading their master that it would not, after all, be quite a hopeless task to grapple with these Venetians, whose aggrandizement in the last century at his father's expense and his own deeply rankled in his bosom.¹ "There was between the Duke and Venice," explicitly states the biographer of Acciaiuolo, "a natural hatred on account of his lands, which are occupied by the Republic." "Filippo," he adds, in another place, "refused an audience to the Venetian ambassador, because he detested the parade and circumlocution, which the Venetians employ, who are excessively ceremonious and verbose!"²

Nicolo Contarini had been sent to Florence to concert a plan of operations with the Dieci della Balia;³ and hostilities were opened forthwith. At the end of the month, the Venetians and Tuscans entered the Milanese territory from opposite points; and on the 3rd March, the Allies, 7000 or 8000 strong, were in front of Brescia. The acquisition of the Guelph and other Quarters, into which the city was divided,⁴ was achieved with comparative ease. By collusion between Carmagnola and the Avogadri and other Guelph families,⁵ with whom he was intimate, the gates were thrown open to the Confederates on the night⁶ of the 7th; and the Milanese troops, who were few in number and ill-victualled, retired without opposition into the citadels. The latter, known as the *Castello Vecchio* and the *Castello Nuovo*, were situated on the brow of a hill commanding the city, with which they communicated by a high and massive wall running the whole length of the sloping elevation into the plain on which Brescia is built.⁷ The bombardment of the Old and New Castles was an undertaking of a far more arduous kind; and the

¹ Bisticci, *Vita di Agnolo Acciaiuolo*; *Arch. Stor. Ital.* iv. 348.

² Bisticci, *ubi supra*.

³ Navagiero, fol. 1087.

⁴ Galibert, ch. vi.

⁵ Sabellico, dec. ii. lib. x.; Muratori, *Annali*, 1426.

⁶ Andrea Billii *Historia*, lib. v.

⁷ Diedo, *Storia*, lib. ix.

difficulties, with which it was fraught, allowed the generals of Filippo-Maria time to improve and increase their resources. On the other hand, the arrival of Nicolo da Tolentino, the Florentine commander, placed at the disposal of Carmagnola the talents of the most celebrated engineer of the day; and the siege was immediately formed. The enemy had not yet come up.

The Tusco-Venetian Alliance soon produced important results of a collateral kind. In May 1426, a truce was negotiated by the Florentines between Venice and the Emperor, on condition that the Signory should lend maritime aid to Sigismund in his Turkish war; and in July following¹ the Duke of Savoy, yielding to Venetian pressure, came to the resolution of acceding to the League, and was guaranteed in the possession of all the conquests hereafter to be made beyond the Ticino toward Piedmont and the German Alps, together with Asti, Tortona, Voghera, Vercelli, Novara, and Milan itself. Alessandria was likewise appointed to fall to the share of Amadeus, unless the Marquis of Monteferrato became, within a reasonable space of time, a member of the Coalition, in which case that city and its environs were to be allotted to him.

The execution of that clause of the Treaty of December last, which referred to Genoa, was confided to the author of the *Trevisan Chronicle*. It had been understood that Florence should arm at her own cost 1600 horse and 2000 foot in the cause of Genoese independence. "I was sent," Redusio himself tells us,² "to the Florentines in the neighbourhood of Genoa, and, among others, to Tommaso Campo-Fregoso, late Doge and Governor of the City, who was now Lord of Sarzana, and to Giovanni-Luigi da Fieschi, residing at Pontremolo, by both of whom I was warmly welcomed. Nevertheless, the Florentines did not perform their engagements."

One contingency, for which Venice provided in the December Treaty, was speedily realised. Carlo Malatesta elected in the new contest to take part with Filippo-Maria, whose generosity after the battle of San Egidio in 1416 had completely captivated his heart; and in the early part of April he was consequently proscribed by the Hundred. On the 17th of the

¹ *Istoria di Firenze*, Murat. xix. 973.

² Murat. xix. 854.

month, Malatesta addressed an epistle to that Council, couched in terms of surprise and remonstrance, and demanding to know "whether the report which had reached his ears was correct?" The answer was prompt and pointed: it bore date the 19th April. "We have received your letter of the 17th," wrote the Hundred, "and we beg to inform you, that it is quite true that we have published such a proclamation as that to which you allude; and a copy is herewith inclosed to your Magnificence. It is equally true, that your magnificent progenitors have rendered to us the services which you specify, and many more indeed; and that is precisely the reason why we extended our friendship and kindness to your Magnificence and to your brothers, and why we made you our captain, pensioned you, and conferred citizenship upon you. But your Magnificence and your brothers, deviating from the path of your forefathers, and forgetful of benefits received, have leagued yourselves with our foes, and have paid no heed to our protests and remonstrances. Whether your conduct has been honourable and fair, we must leave you to judge. We, at any rate, considering the course which you have so unworthily pursued toward our Republic, have issued the present proscription; and what we have begun, we mean to carry through."¹

Meanwhile, the operations before Brescia were progressing favourably, though slowly. Under the superintendence of Tolentino, trenches and other siege works had been constructed on a large scale; both citadels were invested; and provisions were already running short in the garrison. In August, Carmagnola made himself master of the Pilo Gate of the Old Castle, and a few weeks afterward, the Garzetta Gate, in the Borgo of San Alessandro,² fell into his hands. On the 16th September, the Proveditors, Pietro Loredano and Fantino Michieli, wrote to the Hundred from the Camp as follows:—"The troops of the Duke, to the number of 7000, having presented themselves here and offered battle; the Venetians, with 5000 horse and 1000 foot, formed in excellent order, and came to an engagement with the enemy. The fighting lasted three hours, when the Milanese were compelled to retire with the provisions they had brought to relieve the fortresses; and the Venetians then entered the Old Castle. The New still holds out; but,

¹ Berlan, cap. 27.

² Ibid. cap. 41.

with the Divine aid, we look for its speedy submission. The bombards are already planted against the walls."

The defenders of the New Castle, however, continued to make a resolute stand, until the pressure of hunger was no longer endurable. On the 10th November, the Milanese commander capitulated, subject to an understanding that, if relief arrived within ten days,¹ the instrument should be annulled; but the 20th came without bringing any reinforcement or hope; and on that day therefore the keys were delivered, and the confederates gained absolute possession of Brescia.

At the same time, the Captain of the Po,² having, in pursuance of his instructions (May 1426), ascended that river so far as Cremona, sailed into the Adda, took two forts along its banks, and penetrated to the very walls of Pavia, which he treated with insulting defiance. Filippo-Maria, exasperated to the highest pitch by the blow inflicted on his arms and fortunes, now had recourse to all sorts of expedients for weakening and distracting his new antagonist. At his instigation, the Hungarians created a diversion in Friuli; and in July the Republic was obliged to dispatch a body of troops to that coast under the Proveditor Marco Miani. A wretch, named Arrigo di Brabante,³ was employed by the Duke almost simultaneously to set fire to the Venetian Arsenal; but the iniquitous scheme was happily revealed prior to its execution, and the intended incendiary, sentenced to be quartered alive, died amid excruciating torments.

From an intelligible reluctance to augment the national burdens and to injure commercial interests, the Signory had paused, before she finally committed herself to war; but her policy was now unalterable. On her own material resources she had reason to place the fullest reliance; and Carmagnola was honoured by the manifestation on her part of unbounded confidence in his integrity no less than in his genius. On the 7th May,⁴ civic honours had been accorded to him, and the Great Council had enrolled him among its members. A few days later (May 11⁵), the Senate signified to him its readiness to form a State for his family on which side of the Adda he might prefer, so soon as his efforts were crowned by

¹ Diedo, *Storia*, lib. ix.

³ Sanudo, fol. 987.

⁵ Romanin, iv. cap. 5.

² *Ibid.* lib. ix.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 433.

victory. On the 28th of the same month, pacific overtures having been initiated by Filippo-Maria through two esquires of the body to Carmagnola, who had been taken prisoners,¹ the Signory declared that she was willing to intrust the negotiation to the Captain-General, "who could fight and treat at the same time"; and Carmagnola was "recommended" by his employers to treat with Filippo "in such honourable and dexterous manner as may seem to his Magnificence most meet."² But he was earnestly exhorted not to allow mere empty phrases to interfere with the active prosecution of the war. The Venetians wished to avoid in future at least the reproach of verbosity.

Almost from the outset, to say the truth, the Count of Castelnuovo had rendered himself somewhat troublesome and suspected; and a party had long existed, which viewed his movements with solicitude and mistrust. So far back as the beginning of April, he begged leave, as a means of recruiting his health which was not particularly good, to quit the camp for a certain term, and to proceed to the baths of Abano. The Hundred, having taken the opinion of the highest medical authorities at Venice and Padua,³ offered no direct opposition to his wishes: but he was begged not to absent himself at present, unless it was absolutely necessary, and the Council recommended him to try an aperient. The hint was not appreciated; the visit to the baths was paid; and the command-in-chief was provisionally conferred upon the Lord of Mantua. The request, to which the Government had thus yielded, was repeated, however, at intervals; and the Proveditors had the utmost difficulty in keeping him at his post. At length, in the middle of October,⁴ while the conquest of Brescia was still imperfect, his importunacy was triumphant, and he started on a second trip: nor did he return till the 14th November, four days after the signature of the capitulating articles. The conduct of Carmagnola was fairly open to animadversion and blame. His employers had every reason to view such behaviour with displeasure; and he was scarcely entitled to complain, if it excited some degree of suspicion.

The fall of Brescia on the 20th November, the threaten-

¹ Berlan, cap. 41.

³ Ibid. cap. 21.

² Ibid. cap. 41.

⁴ Ibid. cap. 45.

ing posture of Savoy, Switzerland and Arragon,¹ and the undisguised tendency of many of the Lombard States to side with the victorious League, gravely puzzled Visconti. The cold season was now at hand, and it was tolerably certain that the activity of his opponents would be suspended during the winter. The Duke, who was bitterly disappointed by the rout before Brescia of the troops expressly summoned from the Romagna to its relief,² saw no alternative but to seize the present opportunity; and the Pontiff Martin, whom he had propitiated by the recent cession of Forli and Imola to the Church, was persuaded to intercede for him with the Venetians. The Government informed the Nuncio who was sent on this business to Venice, "that the Signory is far fonder of peace than of war, and that she accepts with pleasure the mediatorial offices of His Holiness." The initiative having been thus taken, and, the Republic having an undoubted right, under the Treaty of December 1425, to terminate hostilities,³ certain preliminaries were arranged; a safe-conduct was granted to the plenipotentiaries of the Duke; and after a delay, which the nature of the conditions makes intelligible, a treaty was signed between Milan and the League on the 30th December in the ancient monastery of San Giorgio Maggiore.⁴ No conquests had hitherto been effected in the direction of Tuscany or Piedmont, and consequently neither Florence nor Savoy was a gainer in point of territory. But the latter acquired important commercial advantages in being placed on the same footing in the capital of the Republic with the German Gild:⁵ while the Florentines were allowed to export English and French goods from Genoa in their own instead of in Genoese bottoms.⁶ To Venice Brescia and the Bresciano,⁷ with Casalmaggiore, Valcamonica, and a portion of the Cremonese,⁸ were reluctantly surrendered. The fortress of Montecchio was transferred to Ferrara. The House of Malatesta was emancipated from its obligations to Visconti. The release of the wife and children of Carmagnola, and the restitution of his property, were guaranteed at Venetian

¹ Redusio, *Chronicon Tarvisinum*, 855.

² *Ibid.* 856.

³ See also Navagiero, 1093.

⁴ Romanin, iv. cap. v.

⁵ Sanudo, p. 992.

⁶ Napier, lib. i. c. 30.

⁷ Andreæ Billii *Historia*, lib. v.; Aretini *Suorum Temporum Commentarius*; Murat. xix. 934.

⁸ Berliani, cap. 47.

dietation.¹ Several other points of minor consequence were adjusted.

The Brescians had no cause to regret their change of rulers. Their Constitution, which was assimilated, with some difference in the details, to that introduced into Verona, Vicenza, Treviso, Padua, and the other Provinces of the *terra firma*, was framed in a liberal spirit and on wisely moderate principles. The taxes underwent little or no alteration. The courts of law were improved;² and the administration of justice was rendered prompter and more effective. The acquisition, at the same time, was more advantageous to the Signory, in a financial point of view, than any other of her conquests, Padua not excepted: for, while the expenditure was calculated at 16,000 ducats a year only, the revenues of the Bresciano were found to reach³ 75,500, a surplus thus remaining of nearly 60,000.

The first Podesta of Brescia was Fantino Dandolo, son of the Doge Andrea, and a man of equal piety and erudition; and the appointment of Captain of the City was bestowed upon Nicolo Malipiero. The post of Castellan of one of the citadels devolved upon the author of the celebrated *Chronicle of Treviso*, a subject and tried servant of the Republic. "While the cession of the place (Brescia) was still pending," this writer observes,⁴ "the Senate of Venice sent for me, Andrea Redusio of Quero, Citizen and Chancellor of the Commune of Treviso, and told me, that I must go as Castellan to Casale-Majus with a proper garrison; and my pay was to be 200 gold ducats a year. So I proceeded in compliance with this bidding; and I entered upon my duties on the 10th January 1427."

It soon became convincingly apparent, that the new treaty was no more than an armistice of the most ephemeral character; the lieutenants of the Duke in the Bresciano refused, for the most part, to fulfil the agreement by delivering the keys of the fortresses to the Venetian delegates; and so early as the 3rd February 1427, the Captain-General was invited to repair to the capital, in order that he might assist the Government in laying down the plan of a fresh campaign.

¹ Poggio Bracciolini, *Historia*, lib. v.; Murat. xx. 353; Romanin, *ubi supra*.

² Sandi, *Storia Civile Veneziana*, lib. vii. c. 1.

³ Sanudo, p. 965.

⁴ Murat. xix. 858.

On the 24th March, the Countess Carmagnola-Visconti, who had been liberated in pursuance of one of the articles of December, joined her husband; and she experienced at the hands of the Signory a gorgeous reception. Neither trouble nor cost was spared in doing honour to that favoured individual, to whom a great people were content, so long as he was true to their interest and to his own, to commit their fortunes in trust; and under such auspices, while the personal prospects of Carmagnola became enviably brilliant, his employers were at liberty to promise themselves the realisation of their proudest dreams.

The Florentine connexion had proved itself almost throughout of very little utility; and a portion only of the stipulated contingents had ever been forthcoming. The Tuscan Commonwealth speedily discovered, that it had committed itself to a contest, which was calculated to try too severely its resources.¹ Although, at the moment when it embraced the Venetian alliance, the question of aggrandizement was kept quite out of sight by the more vital one of independent existence, a few months sufficed to change Florentine views; that Power began to think, that the results obtained hardly warranted an outlay of 2,500,000 florins, which it was alleged at least to have incurred;² and the Republic foresaw pretty clearly that, in the second stage of the struggle which was impending, she would be obliged to fight almost single-handed. Her levies and preparations were of commensurate magnitude. 36,000 men, of whom 8000 only³ were mercenaries, were received into her pay; and although 4,000,000 ducats had already been added to the national debt since the beginning of the reign, Venice returned to the field with energy and cheerfulness. She had been the last to draw the sword; it now seemed probable that she would be the last to sheathe it; and the integrity of the Florentine constitution was perhaps not the only problem, which was to be worked out by Carmagnola.

Their recent humiliation was not without the effect of stinging the pride of the Milanese aristocracy, and of awakening in their breast a powerful impulse of patriotism. The Duke was implored not tamely to submit to the dismemberment of his possessions in the loss of one of the most

¹ Napier, iii. 87.

² Ibid.

³ Diedo, *Storia*, lib. ix.

important dependencies of his Crown. The utmost devotion was manifested. As the price of a few privileges, of a little liberty, the Nobles of Milan declared themselves ready to make any sacrifices. Visconti acted in this instance with the egregious duplicity and falsehood which belonged to him. With outspread hands he received the contributions offered on all sides to his acceptance; and he dismissed the deluded petitioners for reform with valueless professions.

The first blow was struck by the Duke, whose troops under Nicolo Piccinino and Angelo della Pergola, after taking Torricelli in the Parmesan territory, and overrunning the Bresciano, formally assaulted Casalmaggiore. The Venetian Commandant, Fanito Pisani, defended his trust with great intrepidity, until succour, for which he had promptly applied to Venice, to the new Captain of the Po, Stefano Contarini, and to Carmagnola himself, could arrive. The naval forces of Filippo-Maria, which were stationed in the immediate neighbourhood of Pavia under Eustachio Paccino, were vastly superior to those at the disposal of Contarini; they consisted of not fewer than one-and-forty sail; and the Captain validly pleaded his inability to respond to the appeal. The Captain-General, whose headquarters were near Casalsecco, sent only lame and shallow excuses. The Hundred desired him, intreated him, to hasten to the relief of Pisani; but he did not stir an inch. On the 27th April, he wrote: "My horses are without forage, and I can do nothing." The answer of the Hundred was: "To raise your camp, change your positions, and plant yourself elsewhere, is not the work of a moment, and before you stand in need of it, the grass will have had time to grow!"¹ Next he was short of money, and begged a remittance; he was told that a remittance was on its way. Still he did not move, and when an explanation was asked, he had the portentous effrontery to allege, "that he was too weak to hazard a rescue," although it was an ascertained fact that he had with him 16,000 cavalry.² Under these circumstances, Casalmaggiore succumbed on the 1st May 1427. Piccinino and his colleague, emboldened by their success, pushed forward to Brescello, which had been already blockaded by Paccino.³ Nevertheless, so soon as the distress of Brescello

¹ Berlan, cap. 48.

² Ibid.

³ Andreae Billii *Historia*, lib. vi.

was made known to the Ducal Government, two men-of-war, from the poops of which were seen to float the united colours of Venice, Florence, and Savoy,¹ were dispatched, until more effectual relief was at hand, to create a diversion, and, if it was found possible, to cover the place.

At the same time, explicit instructions were received by the Cavaliere Bembo, commissioned, during the temporary absence of Contarini, as Lieutenant of the Po, to raise the blockade of Brescello on the riverside by bringing Paccino to action. Bembo, who had under him, inclusive of present reinforcements, between thirty and five-and-thirty vessels, mounting 10,000 men,² hastened accordingly to complete his dispositions; and his opponent, confident enough in his own strength, did not scruple to abandon Brescello for the purpose of courting the engagement.³ It was also the object of Paccino, in so promptly shifting his ground, to take the enemy by surprise, and to manœuvre in such a manner as to envelop the opposed squadron. But Bembo⁴ was thoroughly cool and collected; and after a furious combat the Milanese flotilla, though assisted by Piccinino, who opened a heavy fire upon the Venetians from the shore, was repulsed with great slaughter and hopelessly scattered.⁵ It was the 21st May 1427.⁶ Bembo, seeking to pursue his advantage, ascended the river, passed Brescello now partially relieved, pierced two consecutive lines of palisades drawn from bank to bank, and at length appeared in sight of Pavia. It was only the want of a proper force to effect a landing, which deterred the victor from carrying the terror of his arms into the ancient capital of Lombardy.

Meanwhile, the Captain-General, yielding to the reiterated appeals of the War Department, advanced at a leisurely pace against Piccinino with at least the ostensible design of completing the undertaking, to which Bembo had already contributed so important a share. But Carmagnola, even before he reached Gottelengo, fell on Ascension-day⁷ into an ambuscade

¹ Romanin, iv. cap. 5.

² Sabellico, dec. ii. lib. x.; Diedo, *Storia*, lib. ix.

³ Diedo, *ubi supra*.

⁴ Andrea Billii *Historia*, lib. vi.; Redusio, *Chronicon*, 859, Murat. xix.

⁵ Petrus Candidus Decembrius, *Vita di Nicolo Piccinino*, Murat. xx. 1055. See as to this writer, Ellis's *Letters of Eminent Literary Men*, p. 337.

⁶ Muratori, *Annali*, ix. 131; Billius and Sabellico, *locis supra citatis*.

⁷ Berlan, cap. 49.

prepared by Piccinino, and did not extricate himself without incurring severe loss in horses. The Signory immediately wrote him a letter (June 20¹), in which his exertions *were warmly applauded*. But no stress was laid on the late misadventure; and in compliance with his request 1000 ducats of gold were privately remitted to his Magnificence for distribution among such of his cavalry as had been dismounted, with a suggestion that "as compensation of this kind is not usual, you will deal out the money as if it came from your private purse, and will refrain from mentioning that it is given by the Republic." His Magnificence was once more urged, however, to disregard the hollow and deceitful proposals of Visconti and his creatures, to cross the Adda, and invade the Milanese.² He was begged, above everything, to beware of one Henri de Colombiers, a renegade Savoyard, who was reported to be always at his elbow with some new programme, "and whose astuteness and cunning," said the Signory, "render him of as much use to his master the Duke as any 500 lances in his pay!"³ This exhortation was not altogether lost upon Carmagnola; and having shifted his quarters, he found himself in the early days of July at Casalsecco. The enemy, under Piccinino and Francesco Sforza, were at no great distance; and a collision was therefore shortly to be expected. The Venetian position at Casalsecco was not intrenched; but it was protected by a ditch and by a strong palisade; and the military carts and waggons were drawn up in a line round the encampment, in the Roman fashion, as an additional defence.⁴

But the generalissimo, having perfunctorily executed the desire of the Republic, almost instantly relapsed into that lethargic indifference, which seemed to have become a part of his nature; and it was a sheer impossibility to rouse him to activity. He did not appear to be labouring under any illness. Of unjust or distrustful treatment he had not an atom of right to complain. For from the middle of May⁵ the proveditors had been under a strict injunction "to abstain from meddling unduly or unnecessarily with his Magnificence."

¹ Berlan, cap. 49.

³ *Ibid. ubi supra*.

⁵ Berlan, cap. 48.

² *Ibid.* cap. 50.

⁴ Diedo, *Storia*, lib. ix.

It was now the height of summer. The weather was exceedingly sultry, and in the open country the dust was blinding. It was hard to distinguish even near objects. On the 12th July,¹ the enemy seized the opportunity, crossed the moat, broke through the palisade and the line of waggons, and surprised the camp. There was indescribable confusion. There was a rush to arms and to horse. Friends and foes were mistaken for each other. The General himself was violently pitched from his saddle, and was nearly killed. Gonzaga of Mantua, who was serving under him, was discovered in the midst of the Milanese; Sforza, misled by the whirlwind of dust ploughed up by the hoofs of the horses, plunged into the thick of the hostile encampment; and both had the narrowest escape from being made prisoners. Ultimately the aggressors beat a retreat; and no advantage remained with either side. After this discreditable affair, the Captain-General, possibly a little ashamed of himself, shewed some symptoms of reviving energy. Taking advantage of the disunion understood to prevail in the Milanese camp, and of the valuable diversion created by other members of the League in the direction of Monteferrato, Savoy, and Switzerland,² Carmagnola proceeded to occupy Binate³ and San Giovanni-à-Croce; and, finally, he recovered Casalmaggiore.

It soon appeared that Carmagnola had pledged himself, without consulting his employers, to restore the prisoners taken at Casalmaggiore. The Hundred pointed out to him, in their dispatch, that the Venetians who had fallen into the hands of the Duke were still detained, and that his own should therefore have been kept back with a view to an exchange; "but," concluded the Council, "as you have made the engagement in our name, you must fulfil it." The Signory was perfectly aware, that its general merely followed the habitual practice of condottiero warfare, which so excellently tended to prolong operations and pay. At the same time, he was emphatically urged not to relax in his efforts, to persevere in his enterprise, and to cross the Adda. Two nobles of illustrious name, Leonardo Mocenigo and Fantino Michieli, were even appointed to wait upon his Magnificence on the part of the

¹ Muratori, *Annali*, ix. 131.

² *Ibid.* 132.

³ Sabellico, dec. ii. lib. x.

Doge, to inculcate for the third or fourth time the importance "of doing something decisive, and at once": while Giacomo Contarini was sent to Florence for the purpose of stimulating that Power to the prosecution of her plans for emancipating Genoa from Milanese thralldom. For it was the fear of Venice, that the maritime strength of her old rival might otherwise be reorganized by Visconti, and that the Republic might thus find it necessary to commence naval armaments upon a grand and costly scale at a moment when the monthly expenditure upon the Army alone was not less than 60,000 ducats.

The pace of operations remained, notwithstanding, provokingly languid; and about the middle of August the posture of affairs was so stagnant, that several members of the Hundred openly complained from their seats of the slow progress of the War, and suggested the propriety of intimating to his Magnificence in some stronger terms than heretofore the repeatedly declared wishes of the Signory. But the hope was not yet forsaken that affairs might soon improve, and the motion consequently dropped.¹ Toward the end of September indeed headquarters were shifted to the neighbourhood of the Lago d' Iseo, and siege was laid to Montechiaro. But no result of any consequence attended the change. At the same time, Carmagnola was not insensible to the ill-disguised sneers and disparaging strictures of those about him, more especially of the proveditors of Brescia; the censure and ridicule were too just not to be excessively galling; and in the beginning of October he addressed to the Doge a letter couched in the most indignant and resentful language. He denounced with bitter emphasis all meddling and self-sufficient civilians who, quitting their counting-houses, came to teach war to the Child of War; and he threw out a hint of no ambiguous sort about unappreciated services and more discerning employers. The tone which he used excited some alarm. His genius was at present indispensable; his anger was not to be treated with levity; and, stifling its instinctive desire of counter-remonstrance, the Government acted upon the necessity of meeting the Condottiero in a conciliatory spirit. On the 6th of the month, Andrea Morosini was charged by the Doge to proceed with all possible dispatch to headquarters, to intimate

¹ Berlan, cap. 51.

the sorrow of the Republic at the discord and bad feeling which seemed to reign in the camp, to remind him that the mildness of Venetian institutions permitted a liberty of speech to which he was perhaps unaccustomed, to suggest that the idle rumours which were constantly circulating abroad ought to be beneath his notice, to afford the strongest assurance of unabated and cordial friendship, and to pray him to display the utmost activity in the execution of the high task confided to his talents. Morosini was farther instructed to reprimand the proveditors at Brescia; and those indiscreet functionaries were accordingly summoned to his presence. "Have you," the Ducal Envoy inquired, "in public or otherwise spoken disrespectfully of the Captain-General?" "If you have," he continued, "the Government greatly wonders that personages so wise should not have foreseen the pernicious operation of such a proceeding on the mind of his Magnificence. Even if you had perfect reason, you ought not to have done so. *For he has our State in his power.*"¹ It may be judged that the circumstances were deemed cogent, which persuaded the Doge to whisper into the ears even of his confidential ministers a confession so startling, though it might partake of the nature of a hyperbole.

Nevertheless, the animadversions of which he had become the object were not without the salutary effect of awakening Carmagnola from his apathy; and, having left Montechiaro, which he had taken after a month's siege,² in his rear, he pushed forward³ to Macalo,⁴ near the Oglio, about seven miles from Cremona, and not more than three from the Milanese quarters. The voice of detraction and satire appeared to be now exercising an influence so long desired by moving his Magnificence to increased exertions. By the suggestion of a doubt of his abilities, and even of his courage, the inmost nature of the man was touched. His old spirit lived in him again. Upon his arrival at Macalo,⁵ he hastened to reconnoitre positions, and to measure distances. He went over the ground with minute care, exhibiting an anxiety to make himself acquainted with every curve and slope; and the smallest details were not too small to receive his personal super-

¹ Berlan, cap. 56.

³ Sabellico, dec. ii. lib. x.

⁵ Redusio, Murat. xix. 863.

² Redusio, *Chron. Tarv.* 863.

⁴ Known at a later period as *Maclodio*.

intendence. It was clear that some great design was in his thoughts; and Venice had reason to believe that that turn in the war was at hand, of which she had been content hitherto, though not without a hard trial of patience and temper, to content herself with the bare expectation.

The Milanese army had, down to the present time, suffered materially from the absence of a Captain-General; the divisions among its numerous leaders formed a source of weakness and confusion; and Filippo-Maria, observing how ill his affairs prospered, at length came to the resolution of conferring the post of Generalissimo on Carlo Malatesta.¹ The fame of the young Lord of Pesaro had been within the last few years tarnished by more than one military blunder, and he was naturally impatient to redeem his character by some striking and brilliant exploit. Malatesta possessed considerable abilities; but he was rash, and he was also unfortunate. The two forces were separated by a swamp, which was traversed by a narrow causeway; the country abounded in brakes and thickets. Malatesta, eager to engage his adversary, crossed the bog, and found himself in close contact with the Allies, who were drawn up in admirable order to receive him, and who did not give him time to commence the attack. It was the 11th October 1427.² Carmagnola had made his dispositions with great care; he had directed Nicolo Tolentino, with 2000 horse,³ to plant himself behind some adjacent coppices, and at the appointed signal to take the enemy in rear, while the main body assailed them in front. Malatesta fell into the snare prepared for him. He was unexpectedly hemmed in on both sides. The movements of his cavalry were cramped by the nature of the ground, on which they had incautiously allowed themselves to be forced; the feet of his horses became entangled in the underwood, and the bellies of the animals were stung by the briars. The strength of the Allies lay in their centre, and its onset was perfectly irresistible. Malatesta, whose impetuosity was threatened with a sadly disastrous issue, soon despaired of success, and yielded up his sword to Gonzaga of Mantua, his brother-in-law.⁴ The day was lost to the Duke of Milan; 8000 cuirassiers, all the baggage, and

¹ Candidus Decembrius, *Vita di N. Piccinino*, Murat. xx. 1056.

² Muratori, *Annali*, ix. 132.

³ Diedo, *Storia*, lib. ix.

⁴ Andreæ Billii *Historia*, lib. vi.

an immense booty were secured by Carmagnola¹ after the victory of Macalo.

This splendid achievement thoroughly retrieved the reputation of the commander-in-chief; and on the arrival of the news at Venice on the 16th² a feeling of exuberant satisfaction was produced. A letter, superscribed by the Doge, was written to him on the following day, full of the warmest eulogy and the most flattering protestations. From a politic wish to convince him that old impressions were forgotten, the Signory lavished upon the hero the most elaborate compliments and the most munificent rewards. A house in the capital at San Eustachio, which Venetian gratitude had once awarded to Pandolfo Malatesta,³ with the fief of Castenedolo in the Bresciano for himself and his heirs, was assigned to the successful General. Giorgio Cornaro and Santo Veniero were deputed to present to him the thanks of the Republic. He was exhorted to look upon Macalo as the first of a series of triumphs equally splendid and equally within his reach. The Hundred signified an opinion that the moment had come for passing the Adda, and for putting an end to the war by a glorious victory and an honourable peace.⁴ Such was the *éclat* of the General, that the young Venetian patricians ordered caps *à la Carmagnola*.

There was a common feeling in Italy, that it was now quite open to Carmagnola, by bridging the Adda and marching rapidly on Milan, to shatter at a single blow the power of Filippo-Maria, and to hoist the lion of Saint Mark upon the ramparts of his Capital. But his Magnificence, who did not conceive it to be his interest that his former employer should be totally crushed, instead of responding to the appeal of the Signory, frittered away the remainder of the year in insignificant achievements, and then demanded permission to go to the Baths. The Proveditors used their best efforts to divert him from his purpose, and for the moment their representations prevailed. Of these idle subterfuges the Republic was growing a little weary; and even if her doubt of his good faith began just now to strengthen, it was hardly wonderful.⁵ For it was notorious that his opponents were no match

¹ Poggio Bracciolini, *Historia Florentina*, lib. v.

² Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 997.

⁴ *Ibid.* cap. 59.

³ Berlan, cap. 58.

⁵ Navagiero, *Storia*, 1092-3.

for him, either in ability or in material force; and the common supposition in the Milanese camp was that his inaction proceeded rather from a contemptuous confidence than from any other motive.¹

The Duke, however, had during some time been seriously revolving in his mind the expediency of procuring at least a suspension of hostilities. The progress of his old lieutenant, though to a certain extent neutralised by causes of which he was possibly not altogether ignorant, excited his fears, and rendered him anxious to witness the return of peace. With this object his invaluable ally, the Pontiff Martin, was again required to furnish a proof of his love of concord and devotion to the House of Visconti; and so early as September the Cardinal of Santa-Croce began to feel the temper of the Ducal Government.² The Battle of Macalo naturally gave a potent spur to such a movement; and after a delay, which partly arose from the presence of the plague at Venice, and partly from an accident which befell one of the Venetian ambassadors on the road,³ a Congress met at Ferrara on the 3rd November. The grand obstacle to any settlement lay in the lofty pretensions of Venice.⁴ In addition to Brescia and its territory already ceded, the Republic claimed the City and Province of Bergamo, Palazzolo, Martinengo, and Iseo. The Duke made a vigorous attempt to obtain a modification; but the Hundred, familiar with his embarrassed and helpless condition, shewed themselves inexorable; and it was only at the earnest desire of the Florentines that the immediate restoration of Genoa to freedom, on which the Venetians had at first insisted, was waived.⁵ Visconti neglected no expedient for improving his situation and for gaining time: for he was aware that the war had also reduced his opponents to serious financial straits; and Florence alone was represented to have spent 3,500,000 florins. He intrigued and dallied with Carmagnola. He adroitly detached Savoy from the League by marrying the sister of Amadeus. The Congress was deluded and duped with propositions and counter-propositions, till the

¹ Decembrio, *Vita di N. Piccinino*, 1056.

² Decembrio, *Vita Philippi-Mariae*, Murat. xx. 991.

³ *Letters of Palla Strozzi to the Dieci di Balìa at Florence*; Cavalcanti, *Istorie Fiorentine*, ii. Documenti.

⁴ *Letter of Strozzi*, Dec. 29, 1427, *loco citato*.

⁵ *Strozzi's Letters*, January 6, and April 5, 1428.

spring had fairly set in, and Venetian patience was utterly exhausted. The Signory then recommended Carmagnola to resume the offensive; but this mysterious trifler sent back word that his health was delicate, and that he wished to recruit his strength at Abano. The Government replied: "We are really very much surprised at such a request on the part of your Magnificence at this season of the year, when it has become of such consequence to take the field"; but nevertheless Pietro Loredano, the bearer of the answer, was secretly instructed to yield, if the General insisted, and to assume the command-in-chief during his absence. On the 13th March, the Count duly made his appearance, and was received by the Doge and the other members of the Executive with ceremonious pomp. After a short stay in the capital, and a few conferences with the Signory, he left for the Baths. But the commission of Vice-Captain-General, given to Loredano (February 23), who had earned a classic reputation by his feats of arms at Motta and Gallipoli, afforded a convincing proof that, whatever might be the cost, the Republic was prepared to maintain an uncompromising struggle; and, after a painful conflict with his pride and ambition, the Duke, at the instance of the Papal legate Santa-Croce, elected to acquiesce in the terms dictated by Venice. On this basis, peace was signed at Ferrara on the 19th April 1428; and it was published on the 16th of the following month.¹ The enormous aggrandizement, which the new Treaty brought to the Signory, powerfully contrasted with the meagre advantages derived by Florence. A clause, seeming to bear a covert meaning, but partly declaratory of one in that of 1425, was inserted at the desire of the Venetians, by which the House of Malatesta was withdrawn from Milanese jurisdiction or protection; both the contracting parties pledged themselves to abstain from interference in the affairs of Romagna, Bologna, and Tuscany; a few minor points were submitted to Papal arbitration; and fresh guarantees were exacted by Venice in favour of the undeserving but indispensable Carmagnola,² who made a triumphant entry into Venice, and whom the Doge and a distinguished suite honoured by a visit to his own house, where the guests were nobly entertained.

¹ *Istorie di Firenze*, 973; Murat. xix.

² *Strozzi's Letter*, March 10, 1428; Cavalcanti, *Documenti*.

One inducement to arrange a settlement was, perhaps, the marriage of Visconti; and the Doge and Signory were invited to the ceremony and accompanying festivities. The official reply was that, the plague being in Venice, it was not thought expedient for so many persons to travel, with the risk of bringing infection, but that Messer Giorgio Cornaro should be sent to represent the Doge. The proposal had the appearance of having been a trap; possibly it was so interpreted by those addressed and affected.

Bergamo, after much demur, was consigned to the Venetian Proveditors on the 8th May. The Duke announced at the last moment that he would rather give up Cremona; but the Signory declined to make the exchange. The government of the new district differed in some respects from that established in the other dominions of Venice on the mainland; and the citizens and provincial population had the best reason to congratulate themselves on their transfer from the atrocious despotism of Visconti to the more enlightened institutions of the Republic. At the head of the administration, as elsewhere, was a Podesta, who held office for a year, and who, upon entering on his functions, swore before the Arts, representatives of the people, to observe the laws and the privileges of the municipality, and to rule uprightly and impartially. The popular representatives composed the Lower House of Parliament; the Upper House consisted of the Nobles; and it was called *the Great Council*.¹ Every year in December, this assembly, in concert with the Podesta, chose out of its own ranks a body of seventy-two persons, who were denominated *the Ancients*, and of whom a conclave of twelve sat once a week in bi-monthly rotation to represent and watch the communal interests. At these conclaves the Podesta was entitled to preside. The Bench formed in itself a separate and distinct jurisdiction, termed the College of Judges; and it was before this tribunal that all appeals were brought, as well as pleas and criminal informations. The balance of revenue and expenditure in Bergamo and the Bergamasque yielded a yearly surplus of 16,000 ducats. The income was 25,500: while the expenses of administration did not exceed 9500.² The first Podesta was Leonardo Giustiniani,³ a noble-

¹ Sandi, lib. vii. cap. 1; Romanin, iv. 227.

² Sanudo, *Vite*, 963.

³ Sandi, *ubi supra*; Diedo, *Storia*, lib. ix.

man of ancient family and an ornament of contemporary literature. He was one of the sons of Bernardo Giustiniani, the historian. Visconti cordially hated him. "That fellow," the Duke used to say, "has made more war upon me with his head than any 10,000 horse of the Signory"; and Pietro Avogadro of Brescia once observed: "If the Signory had such a man in her other cities, all Lombardy might soon be hers!"¹

The Republic had emerged with glory and advantage from her contest against the Duke of Milan; and she was now left in the enjoyment of repose. The ambition and cupidity of Turkey kept her cruisers constantly on the alert, and exposed her trade to heavy losses at intervals; but there was no European Power with whom she was actually at war; and she was at last in a position to lay down her arms, and to bestow closer attention on her commercial interests. Venice was thankful for this rest, even if it was not to be a very lengthened one; she was glad to be spared for a moment the costly necessity of conquering. For, in the present state of Italy, no combination was apparently possible, which could withstand the genius of Carmagnola, seconded by the prudence of the Republic, her heroism, and her gold.

In the revolutionary annals of the Peninsula few more remarkable episodes are to be found than the vicissitudes of Bologna. Originally governed by its own Dukes, that city hastened, at the era of the Lombard League, to embrace republican institutions; and in the following century it found itself engaged in a losing contest with the Venetians on the question of the Gulf-Dues. In 1402, after several revolutions, the Bolognese were incorporated with the Dukedom of Milan. After the death of Giovanni-Galeazzo Visconti, they became the subjects of the Church, and tolerated the odious tyranny of the Pope till 1411, when they rebelled against his government, and returned to a short enjoyment of freedom, succeeded by an interval of seigniorial oppression under the house of Bentivoglio. In 1412, by the connivance of some of the Nobles, the Pontifical yoke was riveted with stronger links to their necks; and between that and the present time, although several violent and convulsive changes were wrought in the Bolognese constitution, the city lay, for the most part, under Papal sway.

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 1002.

At length, on the 1st August 1428,¹ the cry of *Long live the Arts and Liberty!* which had not been heard since 1411, rose once more in the streets; a large number of Nobles assembled on the Piazza; the doors of the Palace were wrenched from their hinges; the Cardinal-Legate was obliged to flee; and the old constitution, with its Standard-Bearer and its *Council of Ancients*, was triumphantly proclaimed. The Holy See, however, was too fond of its temporalities to surrender tamely so important a possession. It was known that the Legate was already engaged in collecting a powerful force to assert the authority of his master; from the vengeance of such a Government everything was to be dreaded; and the Ancients, alarmed by the prospect of a bloody retribution and aggravated servitude, sought the offices of the Signory as an intercessor, determining, if that expedient failed, to implore her mighty protection. The treaty just concluded between the Republic and Visconti was a manifestation of Venetian power which might be fairly expected to produce collateral fruits; and this appeal from Bologna was one of them.

The answer of the Senate to the Envoys of the distressed Commune was delivered on the 27th August; it was as follows:²—"The Republic has always valued the friendship of the Bolognese, and has wished them well. They may rely upon the exertion of her utmost influence with the Apostolic See; but she is precluded by recent treaties³ from direct or active interference. At the same time, we pray that the Bolognese Condottiero Sanseverino, whose services we have engaged, and who has been paid in advance, may be desired to proceed to his destination without delay."

But the situation of Bologna grew from day to day more critical. Menaced by the troops of Lucca and Rome, the city renewed its appeal to the Venetians, and volunteered to place itself entirely at their disposal; but the opinion of the Senate underwent no change; that Body contented itself with reiterating its previous declaration, accompanied by an expression "of sorrow for the dilemma in which the Bolognese were placed." Apart from other motives, the behaviour of the Duke of Milan rendered Venice reluctant to take any course,

¹ Muratori, *Annali*, ix. 6-134; Pugliola, *Cronica di Bologna*, Murat. xviii.

² Romanin, iv. cap. 5.

³ *Letters of Strozzi*, No. 22, April 3, 1428.

which was apt to involve her in a serious dispute with the Vatican.

The treaty of 1428 proved a *pace volpina*. Before any considerable interval had elapsed, its provisions were infringed by attacks on the princes, of whose estates that compact expressly guaranteed the integrity and freedom from spoliation.¹ On the 25th October 1428, Giorgio Cornaro was sent to Milan to lay these grounds of complaint before Filippo-Maria. But no satisfaction was afforded; and on the 12th of the following January (1429²) the Signory wrote to Fantino Dandolo, her ambassador at Florence: "Filippo continues to be quite the same as ever, molesting the Fregosi (of Genoa) and their allies, the Marquis of Monteferrato, (Orlando) Pallavicini, the sons of Arcelli, fortifying boundaries and collecting troops; and therefore the League must be persevered in."

Two days before (January 10), a letter had arrived from Carmagnola, in which he tendered his resignation of the post of Captain-General: it was not accepted. His employers, however, knowing the desire of the Duke to regain his former lieutenant, resolved to thwart the intrigue, which was more than suspected to be in progress, by outbidding him; and, in the middle of February, a fresh arrangement was concluded with the generalissimo, framed on a scale of unprecedented liberality. The supreme and exclusive command of all the armies of the Republic in Lombardy was conferred upon the Count. It was agreed that, whether Venice went to war or remained at peace, he should be paid at the uniform rate of 1000 ducats a month; and during actual hostilities all ransoms and other prize-money, to whatever amount, were to be allotted to him.

The anxiety of the Signory to secure him, even at so dear a rate, soon became intelligible enough. The Milanese difficulty was acquiring from day to day additional complication. The Florentines, emboldened by the unwarlike character of Paolo Guinigi, Lord of Lucca, whose patrimony had at one time formed part of their own dominions, declared war against that State in the course of December 1429;³ and the victims of this unprincipled aggression, having first made a manful

¹ *Letters of Strozzi*, No. 21, March 23, 1428.

² Romanin, iv. 135, *note*.

³ Muratori, *Annali*, ix. 138.

stand against the invaders, followed the example set by Bologna, and sought to throw themselves into the arms of Venice.¹ To the present offer an objection existed in the eyes of the Senate analogous to that raised against its predecessor; and that august Body returned a substantially similar reply. It thanked Lucca and her Lord for the flattering proposal, and regretted that the alliance between Florence and the Republic was of such a nature as to preclude acceptance.² The treaty of 1428 equally debarred the Duke of Milan from meddling in the affairs of Tuscany; but that prince, who contemplated a rich prize in the perspective, derided all delicate scruples. His powerful assistance was lent to Lucca, and the sword of his general, Francesco Sforza, speedily turned the scale. The Lucchese beheld themselves liberated for a moment from their ambitious neighbours;³ but they were by no means out of danger.⁴ Florence, having been a slight gainer from the Venetian alliance, appeared to be possessed by a resolution to conquer something for herself; and, on the other hand, the appetite of Visconti for dominion was already whetted.

The countrymen of Guinigi thus stood between two formidable enemies. Their sole hope lay in the renewal of the war between the Duke and the League; and for such a hope there was only too good a foundation. At the same time, the unequal contest, which the Florentines were maintaining with Lucca, was not without the effect of kindling a strong spirit of animosity against the former throughout Tuscany, especially at Siena; and in the instructions⁵ given to its ambassador at Perugia that Government was singularly outspoken. "It is very clear to us," were its words, "that the Florentines meditate by some means or other to absorb this poor Tuscan soil, and to swallow up all their neighbours!" Even some Venetian statesmen, addressing the Florentine Envoy, had been heard to exclaim in a moment of excitement: "You Florentines want your own Pope; you want your own Council; you want Lucca; the whole world would not satisfy you!" But the Sieneſe were hardly less bitter against Venice herself. "It is

¹ Instructions given to the Sieneſe Ambassador at Florence, Dec. 6 (1429): Commission of the Sieneſe Ambassador sent to Venice, Dec. 24, Cavalcanti, ii. *Documenti*.

² Romanin, iv. 136-7.

³ Muratori, *Annali*, ix. 139-40-1.

⁴ Cavalcanti, *Istorie Fiorentine*, lib. xi.

⁵ *Ibid.* *Documenti*.

necessary for us," they wrote to the Perugians, "to look after our own interests: for it is tolerably manifest that the Venetians do not care much what becomes of us, and would tacitly permit our humiliation!"¹ So far as Florence was concerned, it is a question whether the engagement in external hostilities might not have been viewed by some politicians as a method of healing civil discord, which survived in the Tuscan State as a chronic incidence so much longer and later than at Venice, where the constitution secured in an exceptional degree order and stability.

The path of the Republic, however, was beset by two impediments of no ordinary kind: the faithless variability of the Duke, who secretly exulted at the idea of being able to beat the Venetians, while the affairs of Lucca were engrossing the attention of their allies,² and the collusive inaction of Carmagnola. The dishonesty of the latter was becoming daily more and more palpable: yet the Signory, furnished with no convicting proofs, was reluctant to compromise the Count and herself by a hasty step; and not a breath of suspicion was allowed to transpire. In July 1429, his Magnificence incidentally remarked, in a letter to the Government: "Filippo has indirectly intimated to me that I am mistrusted and watched." In reply, the Senate said: "We are excessively surprised at any such insinuation, since we have furnished no motive whatever for any notion of the kind; and we exhort you once more to beware of the plausible and mendacious character of Filippo, and ever 'to go buckler on arm.'" Still the General persisted in corresponding with the Duke; and the Duke stated that he was prepared to leave everything in respect to a negotiation to Carmagnola, "in whose judgment I have implicit confidence."

During all this time, Visconti was not ceasing to display his thorough contempt for the treaty of 1428 in every possible way. Those articles, which acknowledged the title of the League to take under its protection the Marquis of Monteferrato, Orlando Palavicini, the Arcelli, and several other princes, were unblushingly set at nought. The Venetian possessions in the Veronese and Bresciano were occupied by Piccinino. The Customs' tariff on the Po was altered and

¹ Cavalcanti, *Documenti, ubi supra.*

² Cavalcanti, lib. xi. c. 2.

augmented in the most outrageous manner.¹ Every opportunity was seized of embittering and annoying the Republic. Her motives were misconstrued; her acts were distorted; her couriers were arrested by the Milanese authorities without a shadow of reason or right. No contrivance was omitted for exhausting the forbearance of Venice, and drawing her into war.

In January 1430, Andrea Contarini had been sent to Milan to make a final effort in the direction of peace. In one of his earliest dispatches to his Government, Contarini stated: "Between the copy of the protocol delivered to me by the Ducal Chancellor and the original, I have discovered that important discrepancies exist, and *both differ* from the oral declaration of the Milanese ambassadors."² In the event of the failure of other expedients, the Venetian Envoy was authorised to announce that his country, in its unwillingness to disturb the harmony of relations, did not object to accept even the Pontiff himself (the particular ally of Filippo) as an umpire in the question of the territory unfairly occupied by Milanese troops, and would religiously abide by the award of his Holiness. This concession was to be the ultimatum; and, the Duke failing to respond to it, Contarini, in obedience to his instructions, took his leave. War was now the alternative.

On the 17th August, Carmagnola was summoned to the capital to concert arrangements for resuming the offensive as soon as possible. He met with a friendly and even cordial reception. Meeting the Doge, as his Serenity left the Council, after a protracted sitting verging on daybreak, he saluted him; and Foscari's countenance bore a genial expression (*fronte allegra*) as he said, "We have been talking about you a good deal to-day," and then he changed the conversation, lest he might have gone too far, and passed on. And many councillors in their red robes followed, to whom, as to men whom he personally knew, he addressed himself jauntily, asking, "Shall it be good-even or good-morrow, illustrious Signori, who keep watch over Venice, while the rest of the world is asleep?" His good acquaintances offered their salutations, and disappeared in the twilight.

The Republic had been availing herself of the temporary suspension of arms to recruit her finances, which had neces-

¹ Cavalcanti, *Istorie*, lib. xi.

² Romanin, iv. lib. v.

sarily suffered from an extraordinary monthly expenditure of 60,000 or 70,000 ducats;¹ and it was her present determination to return to the struggle in earnest.

Pietro Loredano was again named Captain-General of the forces on the sea, consisting of two-and-twenty sail,² and Stefano Contarini had the first offer of the Captaincy of the Po, where a new fleet, organized at an outlay of 300,000 ducats or upward, was in course of being launched. But Contarini, who had been badly wounded in the last war, excused himself, and the appointment was given to Nicolo Trevisano. The flotilla on the Po was composed of thirty-seven galleys and forty-eight smaller craft,³ mounting 10,000 men, exclusively of rowers. In order to isolate the Duke, and to simplify the contest, Marco Zeno was accredited to the Court of Savoy, to detail the reasons which had led to a revival of the quarrel, and to solicit the neutrality of Amadeus; and on the 23rd February 1431, directions were transmitted to the Captain-General to negotiate the cession of the Valtelline. As a reward of victory, an entire city was promised to Carmagnola (September 1, 1430);⁴ while the importance was inculcated upon him more forcibly and emphatically than ever of spurning all insidious overtures and of declining to receive any more Milanese emissaries. "If the Duke," the Hundred told him, "has anything to say, we shall be glad enough to listen; but his course will be to put it in writing, and to forward it for our consideration."⁵

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, p. 1015.

² Navagiero, *Storia*, p. 1096.

³ Sanudo, and Diedo, lib. x.

⁴ Romanin, iv. lib. v.

⁵ All the political and military movements in Italy and elsewhere at this juncture were watched with interest by intelligent observers, who had a stake in the course of events, and the contemporary weekly newsletters (which, in a printed shape, dated back only to about 1620), without entering into much detail, provided summaries of all occurrences throughout Europe, Turkey included. These Corantos or Courants were compiled from dispatches received by merchants and others in Holland, England, &c., and were independent of diplomatic correspondence between Governments and their representatives.

CHAPTER XXX

A.D. 1431-1441

Story of Francesco Carmagnola—His Treachery, his Arrest, and his Execution (May 1432)—Favourable Results of the Change in the Pontifical Government (1431)—Peace between Venice and Milan (1433)—Story of Giorgio Cornaro—The Doge Foscari tenders his Resignation, which is not Accepted (1433)—The Republic Supports Eugenius IV.—Cosmo de' Medici at Venice—Source of the Venetian Power—Venice addresses a Protest to Europe against the Patriarch of Aquileia—Fourth War against Visconti (1434)—Fall of the Last of the Carrara (1435)—Investiture of the Doge with the Provinces of *terra firma* (1437)—Difficult Situation of the Republic—Mantuan Duplicity Chastised—The Retreat of Gattamelata—Story of the Siege and Defence of Brescia—Francesco Sforza becomes Captain-General of the Venetian Forces (1439)—His Successes (1440)—Peace of 1441—Its Advantageous Character—Marriage of Jacopo Foscari, the Doge's Son, with Lucrezia Contarini (January 1441)—The January Fêtes—Marriage of Sforza with Bianca Visconti—Venice acquires Riva di Lago, Lonato, Valleggio, Asola, and Peschiera—Embodiment of Ravenna and the Ravennate with the Venetian Dominions, and Extinction of the House of Polenta (1441)—Festivities at Venice on the Return of Peace—Sforza and his Bride are invited to the Capital.

TRUE to her maxims, to her professions, and to her real interests, the Republic had hitherto earnestly laboured to induce Filippo-Maria to respect the treaty of Ferrara. The neglect and consequent damage, which trade had suffered during the protracted struggle against the Duke of Milan, and the desolating inroads of the Turks on her establishments both in Europe and Asia, in defiance of the most elaborate and costly precautions,¹ rendered her rulers strongly desirous of procuring as long a respite as possible from Italian wars. It was not more than eight years since the Doge Mocenigo had foretold on his deathbed that, if his country adopted an aggressive policy, that commerce, which he likened to a garden bringing forth spontaneous fruits, would decline, "and she would place herself at the mercy of a soldiery." These words seemed to be speedily approaching fulfilment. The destinies of Venice were, for good or for evil, all but in the hands of one whose

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, 1008.

father was a poor shepherd and an ignorant villager, and who himself was reputed to have begun life as a herd-boy.

But, all their efforts in the direction of peace having failed, the Venetians prepared to resume the offensive with the utmost vigour and promptitude, and to place at the disposal of Carmagnola such resources as might insure an honourable and glorious termination of the contest. 12,454¹ men were now under the Generalissimo in the field, and 10,000 were on the Po under Trevisano. To these forces the army of Piccinino and Sforza, with the squadron of Eustachio Paccino of Pavia and his colleague, Giovanni Grimaldi, Signore of Monaco, who had placed his great naval abilities at the Duke's service, was fully equal in point of number and discipline. In the present struggle Pisa, Volterra, Siena, Lucca, Genoa, and Piombino, favoured the Duke; while the exertions of the League were seconded more or less powerfully, and more or less heartily, by Mantua, Ferrara, Monteferrato, the Pallavicini, and the Arcelli.

There was an event of recent occurrence which gave peculiar courage to the Venetians. It was the decease, quite in the beginning² of 1431, of Martin V., the ally of the House of Visconti, and the succession of a Venetian, the Cardinal Gabriello Condolmiero, to the Papal Chair under the appellation of Eugenius IV. The moral weight, which the support and goodwill of the Head of the Church lent to the cause of his countrymen, was highly valuable and highly opportune, and it afforded corresponding gratification. "On the 7th March," writes Sanudo,³ "three couriers arrived one after the other, bringing letters from Rome to state how the Cardinals in conclave have created as Supreme Pontiff a Venetian Cardinal, called Messer Gabriello Condolmiero. So, in the course of eight-and-twenty years, there have been three Venetian Popes—Pope Gregory, of the House of Corraro, Pope Alexander, a Minorite of Candia, and this one of the House of Condolmiero. . . . On the 9th, the Pregadi resolved that eight solemn ambassadors shall be sent to offer the congratulations of the Signory, who may be furnished with one mantle of crimson velvet bordered with miniver apiece, and among them may have one hundred and twenty horses."

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, 1015-16.

² Muratori, *Annali*, ix. 142.

³ *Vite*, p. 1012.

Still success depended largely upon the behaviour of Carmagnola, and it remained at present to see how far the latitude and indulgence given to that adventurer would have the desired effect of imparting a stimulus to his zeal.

It was to little purpose, however, that Venice had striven to secure by concessions a change for the better in the General-in-Chief. The misconduct of the Count became as outrageous as before, and his neglect as glaring; the Senate is soon found again employing the language of expostulation; and we must listen to the same remonstrances and entreaties on the part of his employers, with the same evasive responses on the part of Carmagnola. "The Emperor is coming into Italy," he announced to the Government in the first week of June (1431), "and had I not better break up the camp?" "Have no fear," answered the Senate (June 13), "the Emperor is in Germany, where the Hussites are affording him plenty to do. If you have heard otherwise, believe that it is a false rumour; and be assured that on the unceasing watchfulness of this Government you may always rely!" Besides the cost of preparations, the current expenditure upon the Army was enormous; the terms granted to the Count were so ample, that they created universal astonishment; and the results realised had absolutely amounted to nothing. In an endeavour to surprise Soncino, Carmagnola was sharply repulsed. An attempt against Lodi was a failure. Yet, as it appeared, by the report of the Podesta of Brescia, that in the latter case the Count was not altogether in fault, the Senate wrote to him, warmly eulogising his zeal, and wishing him and the Republic happier fortune next time. But the next enterprise directed against Cremona by Cavalcabo, one of his subordinates, miscarried in consequence of the disgraceful remissness of the Generalissimo. The Senate observed silence; but its indignation was bitter and deep. Toward the close of May 1431, the Milanese Commanders on the Po, Paccino and Grimaldi, forced Nicolo Trevisano to a battle at a point on the river about three miles from Cremona. The action, which lasted with intermissions two whole days (May 22-23), is described by an eye-witness² as one of the most terrible and bloody ever fought in that locality. Trevisano made an heroic defence. But the enemy, though not

¹ Romanin, iv. 142.

² Pugliola, *Cronica di Bologna*, Murat. xviii.

superior in number, were superior in position. The army under Piccinino and Sforza lined the banks, and importantly aided the movements of Paccino and his colleague. Trevisano sent letter after letter to the Captain-General, beseeching him to come up and create a diversion;¹ but Carmagnola alleged that he was afraid to leave the camp, and bantered Trevisano on his pusillanimity. The consequence was that the latter, unable to make head against two overwhelming forces, was crushed.² The Captain of the Po and his fellow-officers were for this supposed misconduct arrested and imprisoned. In one of his dispatches to the Government the Count exonerated himself from any charge of negligence. The Senate replied: "We are quite persuaded of your innocence, knowing well with whom the blame rests"; and that Body took the opportunity to repeat its former exhortations (June 28-30, 1431).³ Visconti, on his part, was much elated by the extraordinary success of his arms, and in terms of pride and satisfaction communicated to the Emperor Sigismund his perhaps unexpected good fortune. The Commander-in-Chief, however, with strange and deplorable fatuity, still remained motionless. June, July, August, September, passed away; and no news of consequence came from the Camp. But the arrival of letters from the Mediterranean, announcing a great naval victory at Rapallo over the Genoese by the illustrious Loredano (August 27), brought a little comfort to the Republic.⁴

At length, on the 13th October, a member of the Senate rose from his seat, and proposed, "As we cannot continue any longer in this course of fruitless exertion and expense,⁵ that steps be taken forthwith for treating secretly of the Carmagnola affair": but on a counter proposition from another Senator, "that all deliberation on this point be deferred," the first motion was negatived. On the 2nd November, it was decided that the effect should be tried of removing the Count so far as possible beyond the range of improper influences by employing him provisionally in Friuli, where

¹ Muratori, *Annali*, ix. 145.

² Candido, *Vita di Piccinino*, 1060; Cagnola, *Stor. di Milano*, 40-1. P. Morosini, lib. xix.

³ Romanin, iv. 141.

⁴ *Letter of Loredano to the Doge*, Murat. xxii. 1024-5; and of *Giorgio Dolfino at Venice to his brother Giovanni at Treviso*, Sept. 5, Murat. xxii. 1019-21-22.

⁵ Romanin, iv. 145-6.

Sigismund, at the instigation of Visconti, was again seeking to create a military diversion. Apposite instructions were forwarded to Carmagnola. The General, instead of yielding compliance, wrote back: "*Another messenger from Filippo has just made his appearance, bringing assurances of the goodwill and integrity of his master. The Duke reminds us that he is an Italian, and desires to prove himself such; that, as it is credibly reported that the King of the Romans (Sigismund) is coming here, he wishes to make common cause against him with you and the Florentines; and he begs me to arrange the preliminaries of a League.*"¹ The Senate informed his Magnificence (November 9) as follows: "After all the idle and insincere professions of Filippo, it is no longer compatible with our dignity to hearken to his lies. If the Duke be really solicitous to treat, he can communicate directly with the Signory. But we command you to join without farther delay the Army of Friuli."

The letter of the 9th November had a certain effect. Carmagnola started for his new destination; and his triumphant success, more damning to his character than the worst defeats, proved that it was only when his sword was drawn against one individual, that his unconquerable spirit forsook him. The enemy fled before him like sheep. They were discomfited and scattered at all points. At Rosazzo the Hungarian army was all but destroyed. After these noble exploits, the Count begged and obtained leave to pay a visit to Venice; during his stay, he had more than one interview with the Government; and in the middle of December he returned to his old quarters at Brescia.

The gratifying operations in Friuli, combined with the miscarriage of an attempt to dispatch the Duke by poison, made by a person named Micheletto Muazzo, and countenanced by the Ten (October 10²), who first tested an experiment made upon two pigs, induced the Senate to resort to different methods. On the 28th December, it was moved that "the Lordship of Milan be offered to his Magnificence upon the contingency of the total destruction of Filippo's power"; but an amendment was brought forward "that this be reserved as a final resource"; and the latter was carried. On the following

¹ Romanin, iv. 146.

² Ibid. 146-7. Muazzo was to have had 25,000 ducats, had he succeeded.

day, however, it was resolved that, "as it is of high moment to have somebody of trust at all times near the person of his Magnificence, the noble Giorgio Cornaro do proceed to the Camp immediately as provveditor-general with instructions to promise a liberal scale of recompense to the condottieri, to urge the prompt passage of the Adda—the Governor of Bergamo having written to say 'that matters are in excellent train at Lodi and Crema,' and to distribute the pay to the heads of companies, so soon as the Camp is shifted." But Carmagnola was superior to persuasion; and about the middle of January¹ (1432) the unpleasant news was brought to Venice, that her ally, the Marquis of Monteferrato, pressed by the Savoyards, had effected a reconciliation with the Duke of Milan.

The Government entertained a reasonable expectation that, at least as the spring approached, the Commander-in-Chief would submit for its approval some scheme for the campaign of 1432. But the General with audacious assurance continued to transmit accounts of his correspondence with the Duke. On the 21st February (1432), the Senate (with the Pregadi) addressed to him the following letter:—

"Francesco Foscari, by the grace of God, &c.

"We have seen and read your letter with its inclosures, sent to you by Cristoforo Gilino.² We reply to your Magnificence that, considering the small fruit which has been hitherto derived from the visits of this Cristoforo and so many others, continually accredited to you by the Duke on different pretences, it does not appear to us expedient, and we do not choose, that either he or any other emissary whosoever shall be received henceforth, being perfectly convinced that there is nothing in the proposals which they bring but the wonted tricks and deceptions of the Duke."

Notwithstanding this studiously temperate but suggestive message, worded by the Government, and formally super-scribed by the Doge, the attitude of affairs remained absolutely stationary, until Venetian patience was fairly worn out. On the 28th March, Foscari, in concert with all the members of the Privy Council, proposed, at a meeting of the College, "that the Pregadi be dissolved, and that the Ten do take the matter

¹ Romanin, iv. 148.

² His agent.

into their own hands." The three Chiefs of the Ten¹ proposed as an amendment, that "this Body be not dissolved until the present business be out of hand." But, on a division, the first motion was carried by a majority of two; and the Decemvirs resolved to deal with the matter before them "circumspectly, but vigorously." In consideration of the gravity of the question, the tribunal demanded the assistance of a Giunta of twenty Senators; and these supplemental members, with the Doge and the Privy Council, raised the number to seven-and-thirty.² The Senate was charged, upon pain of forfeiture of goods and heads, to abstain from divulging any of these transactions, and to keep the decemviral decree of the 28th a profound secret,³ and this injunction was held sacred.

On the following day, Giovanni da Impero, Secretary of the Ten, a person of discreet character, and, according to the historian Sanudo,⁴ "with a face as pale as a ghost," was furnished with the ensuing written instructions:⁵—

"GIOVANNI: ⁶—

"We, Marco Barbarigo, Lorenzo Cappello, and Lorenzo Donato, Chiefs of the Council of Ten, and Tommaso Michieli and Francesco Loredano, Avogadors of the Commune, with our Council of Ten, command thee to repair forthwith to Brescia to Count Carmagnola, our Captain-General, to whom, after the customary salutations, you will say that, it being now full time that something should be done for the honour and glory of our State, various plans have suggested themselves to us for a summer campaign.⁷ Much difference of opinion existing, and the Count enjoying peculiarly intimate conversance with Lombardy on either side of the Po, we recommend and pray him to come here so soon as may be, to consult with us and the Lord of Mantua; and if he consent to come accordingly, you will ascertain and apprise us on what day he may be expected. But should he decline to comply, you will with the utmost secrecy communicate to our captains at Brescia and to our proveditor-general our resolution to have the said Count Carmagnola arrested; and you will concert with them

¹ Romanin, iv. cap. 6.

² Paolo Morosini, *Historia*, lib. xix. p. 439.

³ Romanin, *ubi supra*.

⁴ *Vite*, p. 1028.

⁵ See *Historia Veneta Secreta*, p. 172, Add. MSS. Br. Mus. 8580.

⁶ Romanin, iv. 6

⁷ See *Historia Secreta*, Add. MSS. Br. Mus. 8580.

the best means for carrying out this our will, and for securing his person in our fortress of Brescia. We also desire that, when the Count himself shall have been safely lodged, the Countess his wife be similarly detained, and that all documents, money, and other property, be seized, and an inventory thereof taken. Above all, we wish and charge thee, before seeking an interview with the Count, to disclose confidentially to the authorities at Brescia and to the proveditor-general the nature of these presents (since we ourselves have not communicated with them), enjoining them, under pain of their goods and heads, in case the Count be contumacious, to execute our directions."

On the 30th, in consequence of an afterthought that Carmagnola might penetrate the plans of the Signory, and endeavour to escape, the necessary orders were forwarded to the governors and captains of the Republic to second Da Impero, and if the General fled to any spot within their jurisdiction, to detain him till farther notice; and a circular, superscribed by the Doge, was sent to all the officers serving immediately under Carmagnola, bidding them not be surprised at these proceedings, assuring them of the earnest goodwill of the Government, and soliciting their implicit obedience to the instructions which they might receive through the authorities at Brescia and the proveditor-general.

Having arrived at his destination, Secretary Da Impero closeted himself in the first instance with the podesta of Brescia and the proveditor, and afterward proceeded to the quarters of the Count at or near Tercera,¹ where he presented his credentials, which were as follow :—

To the Magnificent Count Carmagnola, Captain-General.

"The prudent and circumspect person Giovanni da Impero, our Secretary, has been charged by us [*i.e.* the Ten] to speak about certain matters to your Magnificence, wherefore be pleased to repose in him the faith you would give to ourselves."²

Carmagnola, too glad to have an excuse for quitting Camp,

¹ *Chroniche Veneziane*, p. 426, Add. MSS. 8579.

² Romanin, iv. 155.

blindly fell into the snare, and immediately started with the Secretary of the Ten and the Marquis of Mantua, whose presence was desired partly as a stratagem to mislead Carmagnola, for Venice. At Padua, he was received with military honours by the local authorities; and he passed one night there, sharing the bed of Federigo Contarini, Captain of Padua, "his very good friend."¹ On the 7th April, he reached the Capital. A deputation of eight nobles was in waiting to receive him. At the entrance of the palace, Da Impero vanished, and the personal followers of the Count were turned back with an announcement that "their master will dine with the Doge, and will come home after dinner." But his other companions remained, and ushered him into the Hall of Saint Mark's. As he passed through, the General observed that the doors closed behind him. He at once inquired where the Doge was, declaring his wish to have an audience, "as he had much to say to his Serenity." Leonardo Mocenigo, one of the Sages of the Council, stepped up to him, and told him that Foscari, having had an accident in descending the staircase, was confined to his room, and could not receive him till tomorrow. Carmagnola then turned with a gesture of impatience on his heel, and prepared to retrace his steps, remarking: "The hour is late, and it is time for me to go home."² When he arrived at the Sala delle Quattro Porte, however, one of those in attendance gently arrested his progress with, "This way, my Lord," indicating the corridor which led to the Orba prison.³ "But that is not the right way," retorted the Count hurriedly. "Yes, yes, it is perfectly so," was the answer given. At this moment, guards appeared, surrounded Carmagnola, and pushed him into the corridor. The last words which he was heard to utter were: "I am lost!" and, as he spoke, a deep-drawn sigh escaped from him.⁴ During two days he refused to take any kind of nourishment.⁵ He is reported to have said, when some one tried to reassure him, "but birds, which are to be set at liberty, are not put into cages"—a construable reference to the Gheba or Gabbia prison.

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, 1028; *Chron. Venez.*, *ubi supra*. It was a common practice for the most exalted personages to become bedfellows. We find Charles VIII. of France and the Duke of Orleans so resting together. See my *Faiths and Folklore*, 1905, i. 38, and the references.

² *Chroniche Veneziane*, 426, Add. MSS. 8579; Paolo Morosini, *Historia*, lib. xx.

³ *Chron. Venez.*, *ubi supra*.

⁴ Sanudo, *Vite*, 1028.

⁵ *Chron. Venez.*, *ubi supra*.

The Trial began on the 9th April with all the forms recognised and required in criminal procedure by the constitution; the examination was conducted by a special committee of nine persons—Luca Mocenigo, Privy Councillor; Antonio Barbarigo, Bartolomeo Morosini, and Marino Lando, Chiefs of the Ten; Daniele Vetturi, Marco Barbarigo, and Luigi Veniero, Inquisitors of the Ten; and Faustino Viaro and Francesco Loredano, Avogadors of the Commune.¹ On the 11th, the accused, having declined to make any answers,² was put to the question. It happened that one of his arms had been fractured in the service of the Republic; and the committee consequently forbore the use of the estrapade. But a confession was wrung from him by the application of the brazier.³ During Lent, the process was suspended. At its recommencement, on the 23rd of April, a mass of documents was submitted for investigation; and numerous witnesses were summoned. Independently of the confession, damning evidences of treasonable connivance with Visconti were adduced. On the propriety of conviction there was perfect unanimity; but in regard to the nature of the sentence opinions were divided. The Doge himself and three of the Privy Council proposed perpetual imprisonment. The three Chiefs of the Ten and the Avogadors of the Commune were, under all the circumstances of aggravated guilt, in favour of capital punishment. A resort was had to the ballot; and of seven-and-twenty persons entitled to vote nineteen voted for death. On the 5th May 1432, Francesco di Carmagnola was led as a public traitor to the common place of execution. He wore a scarlet vest with trimmed sleeves, leggings of the same colour, a crimson jerkin, and a velvet cap *alla Carmagnola*; a gag was in his mouth; his hands were pinioned behind him according to usage; and there between the Red Columns, in the sight of all Venice, his head was severed from his body at the third stroke of the axe.⁴ It is highly characteristic of Italian ideas, that there was a general murmur among the dense crowd of “Sventura! sventura!” as much as to say, it was a case of a man who had played for high stakes, and lost.

Thus fell, in the prime of life, the victim of his own blind and perverse folly, a man of the first order of talents, and

¹ Romanin, iv. 158.

³ Paolo Morosini, lib. xx.

² *Chron. Venez., ubi supra.*

⁴ Sanudo, *Vite*, 1029.

within whose reach the most superb opportunities had so recently been. The Government had tolerated his errors, until his criminality was beyond a doubt. When his death was decreed, his corruption and treason were already sufficiently substantiated by letters admittedly bearing his signature, and by what is expressly termed "domestic testimony." Yet there were subsequent discoveries, which made his case infinitely worse, and which procured an instant mitigation of the penalty against Nicolo Trevisano and the other officers concerned in the loss of the Battle of the Po; and some justice, however tardy and inadequate, was rendered to the sufferers by the open declaration of a member of the Signory in the Great Council "that, if the Government had at the time been in possession of that exact information which was now in its hands, its treatment of Trevisano and his comrades would have been very different."¹ In fact, the two capital charges against the prisoner were his abandonment of the Captain of the Po and his collusion with Visconti in regard to Cremona. It is well put by a modern writer,² that "Carmagnola seems to have acted in so equivocal a manner as would have made him amenable to any court-martial with little chance of absolution."

The remains of Carmagnola were conveyed by four-and twenty bearers to the Church of San Francesco della Vigna. But when the burial-service had already commenced, the friar, who had shriven the departed, made his appearance to state, that the Count had, in his last moments, expressed a desire to lie at Santa Maria Gloriosa dei Frari; and the wishes of the dead were respected. The bones were eventually transported to the Church of San Francesco Grande at Milan.

On the 7th May, two days after the tragedy, a Chief of the Ten and an Avogador of the Commune waited on the Countess Carmagnola, to make known to her the fate of her husband, and to offer their condolences. Upon the Countess was settled an annual pension, and upon her two daughters a dowry of 5000 ducats each, conditionally upon residing within the Venetian frontier; but such of the property of the traitor, as remained after the liquidation of his large encumbrances, reverted to the Power, which had formerly lavished it upon him with its proverbial munificence; and all his titles

¹ Romanin, iv. 161-2.

² Napier, *Florentine History*, iii. 191.

and dignities suffered attainder. The family settled for a short time at Treviso, but afterward crossed the frontier, and forfeited the bounty of the Republic by breaking their parole.

In the course of April and May, dispatches were forwarded to all the leading Italian States, to the Podestas of Treviso and Vicenza, the Lieutenant of Friuli, and other Governors of Provinces, and to the Legation at Ferrara, apprising them of the steps taken in regard to Carmagnola, and detailing the causes which justified the Signory in proceeding to extremities. Already, on the 8th of the former month, Marco Dandolo and Giorgio Cornaro had been sent to headquarters to assume till farther orders joint command of the Army.

It becomes important to remember, in studying the details of the Carmagnola business, that we enjoy at this distance of time the opportunity of watching the progress of the case in all its stages through the conversion of the agenda of secret tribunals into archives accessible to all. Those who were outside the councils knew absolutely nothing of these momentous deliberations, extending over months, until they culminated, as we are aware that they did. An even more remarkable—indeed an unique—fact, is that during the whole interval at least two hundred persons were privy to all that occurred and was said, and that not a hint transpired. To divulge the proceedings was forfeiture of life and goods.¹ But, so far as we know, the complete records were preserved for future reference, though not for ours.

The devolution of the Pontifical tiara, in March 1431, upon a Venetian was fraught with the best results. Eugenius IV. at once espoused with ardour the cause of his countrymen, and Visconti lost his most valuable ally. Under the new auspices, the Venetian army, commanded by Dandolo and Cornaro, conquered successively Bordellano, Romanengo, Fontanella, Soncino; and it was on the point of penetrating into the Valtelline when, in a severe defeat by Piccinino, which cost the Republic about 1200 troops,² Cornaro had the misfortune to be taken prisoner.³ He was sent to Milan (November 27, 1432). The Proveditor was a nephew of the Doge Marco

¹ Napoleon, in his instructions to General Mortier in 1812, when he nominated him Governor of Moscow, said to him: "Point de pillage; vous m'en répondez sur votre tête."

² Sanudo, *Vite*, 1031-2.

³ Candido, *Vita di N. Piccinino*, Murat. xxi. 1062-3; Diedo, *Storia*, lib. x.

Cornaro, and was a person of considerable weight and influence in the councils of the Signory. Upon receipt of notice of his capture, the Government hastened to supply the vacancy created by the death of Carmagnola; and in the beginning of the new year the post of Captain-General was conferred upon Giovanni-Francesco Gonzaga, Marquis of Mantua. The troops confided to Gonzaga amounted, according to official returns, to 12,000 horse, 8000 foot, and 11,000 *Cernide*; and a promise was given to the Generalissimo that, if his exertions were attended by fair success, the Doge would grant him investiture of Guastalla, Mirandola, Crema and the Cremasque, Caravaggio, and Triviglio.

The operations of the Lord of Mantua afforded the highest satisfaction. In a short time, he rendered himself master of the Valtelline and of Valcamonica; and the Duke was awed by his triumphant progress into taking the initiative in demanding peace. The Florentines, who had aggrandized themselves to a much larger extent than they could have expected in Tuscany, insisted at first (March 20, 1433) upon a continuation of the war, until the province of Pisa was entirely in their hands. But the Signory overruled this objection; and peace was signed on the 26th April 1433, the Marquises of Ferrara and Saluzzo mediating. The new treaty gave the whole of Pisa, excepting the disputed ground of Pontremolo, to Florence. Venice herself, whom the triumphs of Gonzaga had placed in a position to dictate conditions, was left in possession of Bergamo and all her other acquisitions on the *terra firma*. Lucca, whose antipathy to the Florentines was frantically violent,¹ recovered her freedom. The Dukes of Milan and Savoy were pledged to the restitution of all the territory which they had usurped in Monteferrato and elsewhere. A complete exchange of prisoners was appointed to take place, and an amnesty was proclaimed.

The execution of the clause affecting the reciprocal adjustment of territory led to an angry correspondence between Venice and Savoy,² the latter demurring in the first instance to the restoration of certain lands belonging to Monteferrato; and the article touching the exchange of prisoners occasioned

¹ Cavalcanti, *Istorie Fiorentine*, lib. xi.

² The Doge's letter to the Duke of Savoy will be found printed in the *Arch. Stor. Ital.*

a painful revelation. When the Government demanded in due course the release of Giorgio Cornaro, one of the Proveditors placed in command of the troops after the arrest of Carmagnola, the Duke sent word to say that he was dead; and his family accordingly went into mourning.¹ The statement of Filippo-Maria, however, was an audacious falsehood: for the Proveditor was still alive, and in one of the dungeons at Monza. It had been correctly supposed by the Duke, that an officer, who had filled such a variety of confidential stations, could not be otherwise than well-informed on the affair of Carmagnola, in whose fate Visconti discovered a lively and suspicious interest; and no labour was spared to elicit from the prisoner all the facts of a transaction still imperfectly known at Milan. He was asked: "Who were the accusers of the General? Who were his judges? Who are advocates of war at Venice? What are the ulterior views of the Republic? What are her resources?" In the attempt to obtain answers to these interrogatories, the creatures of Filippo-Maria subjected the Venetian to the most brutal torments. When they desired him to denounce the members of the war-party, Cornaro, in a moment of excruciating agony, muttered a few names, which rose mechanically to his lips; but they gave no clue. At another time he said: "I am not aware that any particular person accused Carmagnola; the latter, by his egregious dereliction of duty, exposed himself to universal censure and distrust, especially when the letter had come from Brescia,² shewing how he neglected to occupy Soncino, although he might have done so with the utmost facility. So far as I know, there was no betrayal, no conspiracy. Venice loves peace; but when she is driven into war, she deems no sacrifices too great. If hereafter she be assailed in her lagoons, she will make the assailant rue his act." Such are the words which appear in the personal narrative left by Cornaro. The unhappy man was detained at Monza, notwithstanding all the protests of the Republic, several years; and when he at length returned home, in October 1439, he was no longer himself. His frame was emaciated and disfigured; his face was haggard; his eyes were sunken; and his beard was long and matted. His constitution was hopelessly shattered. In less than three months, he pined away, and he died, in the December of that

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, 1032.

² Romanin, iv. 166.

year, a miserable wreck. All Venice followed his remains to SS. Apostoli.

Exactly a decade had passed away, since Francesco Foscari ascended the throne of Venice: and in that interval many events had occurred which were calculated to shed lustre upon the position. At the same time, there was more than one circumstance which tended to sour his spirit and to cast a gloom over his life. In 1430, a noble, Andrea Contarini of SS. Apostoli,¹ probably the same whom Carmagnola had met on his first coming to Venice in 1425, was unsuccessful in his application for the vacant post of Captain of the Gulf, for which he was declared scarcely competent; in thwarting him in the favourite object of his ambition, Contarini chose to conceive that the Doge himself was principally instrumental;² and at one of the public receptions (March 11) he thrust himself in the way of Foscari, and made a plunge in the direction of his nose³ with a dagger. The blow had been dealt somewhat at random; and the wound which the weapon inflicted was happily very slight. The assassin was arrested. His friends pleaded in extenuation his insanity. But no adequate proofs of aberration or weakness of intellect were found; and, after examination before a Special Committee, the unfortunate man was sentenced to lose his right hand, and afterward to be hanged between the Red Columns.

In 1432, Foscari was not a little mortified by the departure of the Ten from his wishes in regard to Carmagnola, of whose death the Doge, in common with seven or eight other members of the Government, was anxious, under every circumstance of provocation, to spare the Republic the odium. In the beginning of the following year, thirty-seven Nobles were denounced by name to the Decemvirs as concerned in a nefarious scheme for balloting to each other by collusion the more lucrative offices under Government; and the offenders were condemned to various terms of imprisonment or exile. Among the number was Pietro Ruzzini, a connexion of the Doge by marriage; Ruzzini was excluded for three years from the Great Council. In addition to these sources of vexation, many domestic troubles had fallen to his share. Since 1423, all his sons, excepting Domenigo and Jacopo, had died. On several questions of home and foreign policy he differed from

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, 1007.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

his advisers; and the rejection of his views severely tried his proud temper. The pecuniary difficulties arising from a prolonged series of costly wars, to which he had lent his sanction, harassed his mind. He was haunted by the prospect absolutely agonising to so true a patriot, of a future full of embarrassment, possibly not free from disgrace.

All these considerations made the post of Foscarei peculiarly irksome to him, and inspired him with a distaste for that power, in the attainment of which the young Procurator of 1413 had not hesitated to employ artifice. At length, the feeling of lassitude and repugnance became so strong that, without consulting any one, he took a decisive step. On the 27th June 1433, a month after the conclusion of peace, the Doge told his Privy Council that he desired to resign, and that it would be better for them to see about the appointment of a successor.¹ But the Privy Council, having asked time to consider, at length informed his Serenity "that they were unable to come to any accord, but that the State could not dispense with his valuable services"; and so² the matter dropped in the absence of the statutory majority without reference to the Great Council.³

The consequences of the change of 1431 in the Pontifical Government had been hitherto felt only to a partial extent. The accession of Eugenius to the Papal Chair much altered the relations of the Italian Powers, and induced Venice herself to enter upon an entirely new line of foreign policy. The Florentine connexion was at present of equivocal utility. Florence, absorbed by her Tuscan projects, and offended by the support which the Signory had lent to Lucca, began to shew symptoms of coolness; both Venice and Florence, the latter strongly biassed by the Medici party, wanted to obtain the greatest advantages with the least risk, if not cost; and the Government of the Doge hailed with satisfaction the advent of a steadfast ally in the Head of the Church.

In the July following the election of Eugenius, a new General Council met at Basle with his concurrence to seek the accomplishment of the grand aim, in which that of Pisa in 1409, and that of Constance in 1414, had successively failed. The Republic was represented by her own Ambassadors, and

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, 1032.

² *Ubi supra*.

³ Paolo Morosini, *Istoria*, lib. xx.

delegates were sent from all quarters to be present at the deliberations. In sanctioning the choice of a German city as the seat of the Conference, the Pope discovered, when it was too late, that he had committed a grave blunder. The Assembly, removed beyond the range of his influence, proved unruly and contumacious. His Holiness was in a perfect phrenzy. He inveighed against its insolence. He hesitated not to declare his resolution to dissolve it; and it was with the utmost difficulty, that Venice restrained him from setting out for Basle and leaving Rome at the mercy of the opposite faction. The imperious and violent character of Condolmiero bred a good deal of ill-will, and created him many enemies. But his own countrymen espoused his pretensions with undiminished warmth, and Venice alone was powerful enough to protect him. Andrea Mocenigo, ambassador at the Court of Prague, was instructed (if he judged fit) to make known to his Majesty that the Signory treated Eugenius as the only true Supreme Pontiff, and gave him its hearty support.

All the moral weight, which the favour and friendship of the Vatican carried with them, was now transferred to Venice. But the Republic had also improved the state of her relations with the Emperor Sigismund. By a treaty concluded in 1428, and recently renewed (June 14, 1432), all apprehensions on the side of Dalmatia and Friuli were at all events postponed, and Venice derived from the successful mediation of the Pope a prodigious accession of confidence and strength. The treaty of 1432 contained one provision which did not occur in its predecessors, and which accorded to Sigismund free liberty to make war upon his enemies in the Peninsula, always excepting Ferrara, Mantua, Monteferrato, and Ravenna, "which enjoyed the special protection of the Signory." In diplomatic language, the Venetians intimated that, the defensive League between the Duke of Milan and their own Government having expired in February twelvemonth, they should not feel themselves at all pledged to interfere, whenever it might suit the convenience and taste of his Majesty to attack Filippo-Maria Visconti. After his coronation by the Pontiff at Rome, Sigismund proceeded to Basle, carrying with him 10,000 gold ducats, which the Republic had given to him at his own desire to enable him to advocate the cause of Eugenius.¹

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, 1033.

“The Emperor,” comments Leonardo Aretino,¹ “came into Italy with every prepossession in favour of Visconti, and he leaves it with every prepossession in favour of the Venetians.”

His Holiness, however, was so far from being out of danger, that his troubles could not be said to have yet fairly begun. The Duke, incensed at a turn of fortune which so much weakened his own power, and more than proportionately strengthened his opponents, indulged his anger and spleen by pouring a large body of troops under Francesco Sforza and Nicolo Fortebraccio into the Ecclesiastical States. The Pope tried to divide his enemies by offering to invest Sforza with the March of Ancona. But the Duke retaliated by inciting the Romans to revolt; and his Holiness, besieged in the Castle of San Giovanni Grisogono, escaped with difficulty from the hands of the insurgents. His track was happily undiscovered. The fugitive reached Leghorn in safety on the 12th June; and on the 22nd he arrived at Florence, where he met a joyous reception.²

After the lengthened maintenance of a neutral attitude toward the Church, Venice again found herself assuming the old character of its champion. Into this policy the chivalric element perhaps more or less entered: yet none was more excellently calculated to advance the views which the Republic was known to entertain on the mainland; and the present situation of Condolmiero therefore engaged the gravest attention and most anxious thoughts of the Signory. It had become clear, that the outbreak of a fresh war with Milan was merely a question of time; and, although there might be every disposition on the part of the Venetians to postpone hostilities, circumstances were daily arising which rendered such a course by no means easy. As a temporary measure, an ambassador was sent to Bologna to exhort that City to preserve its allegiance to Rome, while a second proceeded to Florence with instructions to suggest the immediate levy of 3000 men (of whom the Signory offered to contribute two-thirds), to shield the Holy Father from his persecutors, and to maintain in its integrity the Patrimony of Saint Peter. The affairs of the Church were in this distressing posture, when the struggle for political supremacy between the Florentine Houses

¹ *Suorum Temporum Commentarius*, Murat. xviii. 936.

² *Istorie di Firenze*, Murat. xix. 975.

of Medici and Albizzi terminated in the defeat and banishment of Cosmo de' Medici to Padua. The wealthiest man in his own great city, and the head of one of the principal banking firms in Europe, Medici counted many friends in the influential circles of Venice. The Signory, having little faith in the stability of the Albizzi administration, instructed her ministers on the *terra firma* to receive the exile with full honours; and at her intercession the Florentine Government was even induced to sanction the residence of Cosmo and his family in any part of the Venetian Empire. The banker himself, who was well known to the Venetians, and whose father had been a member of the Florentine Association at Venice, fixed his abode in the capital, where he was the guest of the patrician Jacopo Donato. He was a man of a refined mind and liberal tastes; and during his stay he spent large sums in refounding, under the supervision of the Florentine architect Michelozzo, who accompanied him to his temporary residence, the old library of San Giorgio Maggiore, and in enriching the institution with books and other works of art. The great Florentine statesman was charmed by the reception which was accorded to him; he had had no idea, he said himself, that he would experience such flattering attention and such loving sympathy. The Republic discerned in him the coming man on the banks of the Arno.

While the licentious element, which had imperceptibly crept into the freedom of the majority of Italian cities in the first half of the fifteenth century, was corrupting its character and sapping its foundations, the new principles of government and the new constitutional maxims, upon which the Venetian administration was conducted, carried with them an overmastering force. While other States were the dupes of wretched superstitions or the victims of an abject tyranny, to behold a Power maintaining religious tolerance and equality of civil rights, was a novelty in Europe; and herein, even more than in her commercial prosperity, lay the cause of the greatness which Venice had attained, and of the malevolence with which she was regarded. The Republic was doomed henceforward to be perpetually at war with one Power or the other: with Milan, with France, or with Germany; with Europeans or with Asiatics. The motto of her Empire was Peace; but its upholder was the sword. To her ambition she had sacrificed

for ever her repose. Her interests were identified and bound up to an extent which she perfectly appreciated with those of Tuscany and Naples; and her quarrels were Italian quarrels. On the other hand, the Dukedom of Milan was dangerous and detrimental to her; the power of Visconti was antagonistic to her power; his ambition was as insatiable as her own; and she therefore observed with pleasure any tendency on the part of the Emperor to attempt the destruction of the Milanese dominion.

The condition of the Peninsula remained so ominously unsettled, that it was impossible to foretell how far the influence of circumstances, if no other agency, might constrain her to return to that policy, which pointed as its ultimate object to nothing less than the absorption of Lombardy. The side, which Venice and Milan were taking in the religious contention of the day, was so opposite, that the relations between the two Powers necessarily assumed a very precarious aspect; and the prospect was rendered still less tranquil by the intrigues and troublesome conduct of the Patriarch of Aquileia, Louis de Teck, the creature of Sigismund. Before the Council of Basle, which deposed the Venetian pontiff Eugenius IV., De Teck laid a formal complaint of the usurpation of Friuli by the Signory. The Venetian delegates, in accordance with their instructions, proposed that their country should hold the Province as a material guarantee, "until the expenses of the Friulan war were paid," as originally stipulated, and that if, when the pecuniary claim was satisfied, the Republic considered the cession at variance with her interest, the question should be submitted to arbitration. The Patriarch, however, not only spurned the suggestion, but launched a monitory against Venice. That strong measure necessitated the transmission of fresh directions to Basle; and on the 13th October 1434, the Senate met to deliberate. It was resolved¹ that "our orators be desired, in omitting no opportunity of coming to terms, to seek in no wise any relaxation of the monitory, since 'the more unjust it is, the less weight it will carry'; that, if it be found impossible to accommodate matters, they shall leave Basle, and, preparatory to doing so, call upon the representatives of all the Powers there assembled, to explain clearly how the case stands—how formerly, the Patriarch declining

¹ Romanin, *Stor. Documentata*, iv. 177, *et seqq.*

the friendship of the Signory, and stirring up enemies against her, the latter had recourse to Martin V. ; how his Holiness, having vainly prayed the Patriarch to desist, at last consented to the war waged in Friuli (1420-1), a war undertaken in her own defence and for her own security ; a war welcomed by the population, to which the despotism of the Patriarch had become insupportable. In what manner, they shall inquire, can Venice be justly called a despoiler of the Church ? They shall point out how a number of petty tyrants have usurped lands belonging to their country, and have enjoyed them unmolested ; but they shall urge warmly, that against the Venetians, who never usurped the property of any, but who only studied the welfare of their subjects, a charge of wrongful occupation is surely unfair !”

The Government of the Doge subsequently (January 1435) aimed at improving its position by taking the opinion of the University of Padua on the point of territorial right. The views of the Doctors were favourable, as might have been anticipated ; and copies of the report made to the Signory on the subject were transmitted to all the European Powers, with which Venice had relations. There appears to have been a serious apprehension at the present point of time of a crisis, and it may be taken to have been in connexion with such a prospect, that Sir Walter of England (as he is styled) was engaged to bring 100 bowmen into the field, two mounted, the rest on foot, all to be English or subjects of the English king.

The Council of Basle, among other fruits, brought many illustrious visitors to Venice, who took the city on their way, or availed themselves of the opportunity of a friendly conference with the Government. But the reasons or motives were manifold. The Doge customarily acted the part of *ciccone*, and where the rank of the guest was equal to his own, his Serenity met him at a certain distance from the capital in the Bucentaur, and conducted him back with full honours. A few years later the Council of Ferrara furnished a second occasion for similar visits, and we hear of the Greek Emperor and his brother, Despot of the Morea, being splendidly received and entertained, the Doge taking his place on the left hand of the Emperor (Johannes Palæologos), when he ascended his Majesty's barge. On one occasion the Doge excused himself, when Frederic III. and his consort, Eleonora of

Portugal, who stayed a fortnight at Venice, were received by the Dogaressa, on the plea that her consort was indisposed; it was, in fact, the commencement of certain private troubles, not long after the marriage of Jacopo Foscarei in 1441 to Lucrezia Contarini.

At the same time, the threatening complexion of Italian affairs persuaded the Republic to draw nearer to Naples and the Emperor. Already in the beginning of the year (1434), the ambassador at the Court of Joan II. had been instructed to solicit the Queen to join in protecting the Papal States, and to sound her Majesty touching a Venetian alliance; and efforts were almost simultaneously made to convert the existing truce with Sigismund into an offensive and defensive League. The friendship of Venice was just now of more value to the Emperor than that of any other Power; and the Signory consequently thought herself strong enough to stipulate on her own behalf for the boundary of the Adda, leaving her ally at liberty to appropriate all the territory on the Milanese side of that river, while she demanded at the Imperial hands formal investiture with her acquisitions on the *terra firma*.

The Venetians had been sagaciously prodigal of their homage to the distinguished man, to whom they had afforded an asylum, and their calculations respecting a revulsion of feeling at Florence were speedily verified by the recall of Cosmo de' Medici and his restoration to office; and the nearly concurrent death of Joan II. in February 1435, led, after a severe contest between the French and Spanish claimants, to the union in the person of Alfonso V. of the crowns of Arragon and Naples.

Meanwhile, the war in Lombardy was recommencing with the seizure of Imola by a Milanese force in contravention of the treaty of 1433. But the progress of hostilities was remarkably languid, victory inclining rather to Visconti. The Republic, however, laboured under great disadvantages. Her alliance with the Emperor, which had bred such hopeful expectations, did not add a soldier to the League. Florence, still fostering her old Lucchese recollections, and more bent on pushing her own fortunes in Tuscany than on fulfilling her contract, lent the Venetians no hearty or continuous support. Eugenius, intimidated by the menaces of Visconti, went over to his side. The successor of Carmagnola, Gonzaga of Mantua,

began to follow his example, and to grow indolent and listless. Under such circumstances, the tide of war exhibited frightful fluctuations. In the course of these years, the Republic preserved with difficulty the Bresciano, the Bergamasque and the Veronese. Verona itself was lost and recovered. The enemy beleaguered Brescia. But the Government did not relax its activity for a moment. On the 17th March 1436, a project was communicated by the authorities at Padua to the Ten for introducing Marsilio, the only surviving son of Francesco Novello, into that City in the disguise of a merchant.¹ The dexterity and closeness, with which the plans of Visconti and his minion were laid, were such that the conspiracy was only discovered when it was almost matured. The informant of the local Government was a peasant; the man stated that the execution was fixed for the 19th. Marsilio was arrested in the territory of Trento on his way to Padua. Conducted to Venice, he was brought before the Decemvirs, to whom he disclosed under torture all the details of the scheme;² and on the 20th March, he was beheaded between the Columns.³ All his accomplices, whose guilt could be established, were sent to the scaffold.

The league with Sigismund, although it did not yield those practical advantages which had been so sanguinely anticipated, was not altogether without its use. One of the conditions had been, that the Emperor should grant the Doge formal investiture of the provinces added more or less recently to the Venetian dominion; and that interesting ceremony, perfectly consonant with the feudal theories which the Republic then found in force, took place at length, on the 16th August 1437, on the Great Square at Prague. Marco Dandolo represented the Signory. A platform was erected on the open space, surmounted by a dais, on which sat the Emperor, surrounded by his peers and councillors. An enormous crowd filled the square. So soon as Dandolo approached, two hundred gentlemen, magnificently habited, advanced to meet him, and conducted him with every mark of honour to the platform. The ambassador, who appeared in a splendid suit of cloth-of-gold, walked in front of his retinue to the foot of the throne, and then sank on his knees. The Emperor instantly begged

¹ Navagiero, *Storia*, 1099; and Romanin, iv. 179.

² Sanudo, *Vite*, 1040.

³ Paolo Morosini, lib. xx. 445.

him to rise, and desired to be acquainted with the nature of his commission. Dandolo replied: "I am charged by the Venetian Republic to obtain investiture of the States which belong to her on the *terra firma*": whereupon he displayed his credentials. Sigismund signified his complaisance; and in imitation of his example, all rose, and proceeded in order to the Cathedral, where mass was performed. On the return to the Square, the diploma was read, by which Francesco Foscari was declared "Doge of Treviso, Feltre, Belluno, Ceneda, Padua, Brescia, Bergamo, Casalmaggiore, Soncino, Platina, San-Giovanni-a-Croce, and all the Castles and places in the Cremonese territory and in the rest of Lombardy on this (the Venetian) side of the Adda." At the conclusion, Dandolo took an oath of fealty, and engaged, that all the successors of Foscari should repeat the ceremony, and should transmit a yearly tribute of 1000 sequins in the shape of a cloak of cloth-of-gold or otherwise, as his Majesty might be pleased to direct. Sigismund brought the proceedings to a close by conferring the honour of knighthood upon the ambassador, and by pronouncing in his presence a glowing panegyric on the Republic. The diploma was dated the 20th July 1437; and it was proclaimed by Ducal manifesto at Venice on the 20th November following.¹ Both the tribute and the investiture were part of the mediæval system of feudal tenure, under which service gave title, and eventually, in many cases, the latter was not invalidated by the discontinuance of the original equivalent.

Thus the title which the Visconti, captains and archbishops of Milan, had borne in the preceding century, was allowed to devolve upon Francesco Foscari. Foscari became Doge of Venice and a moiety of Lombardy, and *Imperial Vicar*. The diploma of 1437 had its moral utility in legitimising the Italian conquests of Venice, and in lending an approved sanction to her territorial claims. The long survival of the imperial prerogative was so far from being peculiar to Venice and the other more westerly Powers, that, centuries after the absolute independence of the Republic of such suzerainty, we find the Czars of Russia under the disability of conferring titles of honour on their own subjects, till Peter the Great broke the tradition, and created certain personages belonging to the Government or Court peers on his own authority.

¹ Romanin, iv. 187.

Venice had seldom been in more urgent need of all the courage and strength, which it was in the power of collateral incidents to afford her. The Republic, in the prosecution of her war against Visconti, still laboured under numerous drawbacks. Above all, the Treasury was deeply embarrassed by the expenses of a struggle, which had lasted with few interruptions since 1424; and a pernicious anomaly had crept into practice, by which a portion of the revenue was collected in advance. The consequences of the systematic adoption of such a principle were speedily felt; in less than twelve years 7,000,000 of fresh debt had accumulated. The Funds which, at the death of the Doge Mocenigo, amounted only to 6,000,000 ducats, had already reached 13,000,000. Francesco Sforza and his Free Lances were no longer in the pay of the Duke; but the Florentines monopolised their services, and Florence continued to aggrandize herself in Tuscany, and to resent the Lucchese policy of Venice by estrangement.¹ Cosmo de' Medici himself tried to prevail on Venice to act with greater cordiality and energy in promoting the views of his own countrymen, and paid a personal visit to the city for the furtherance of the matter. He was received with politeness, yet not with that effusive attention, which he had experienced as an exile. The Republic virtually said to him, that it did not object to the Florentines taking Lucca, but that it would not spend its money in helping them to do so. He proceeded to Ferrara, and saw the Pope; but his mission was not productive of any immediate fruit, and on his way home he again appealed to the Republic, and was almost repulsed.

The troops in the Venetian pay were insufficient to cope with the Milanese, even if the Signory had been more than commonly fortunate in her Captain-General, while the reverse was the truth. The Marquis of Mantua manifested all the sluggishness and all the caprice of Carmagnola without any marked indications of Carmagnola's genius; and his blunders and shortcomings became at last so flagrant, that his employers conceived a suspicion of his honesty.² The Polesine of Rovigo remained in the hands of Venice ostensibly in pledge for the payment of an old debt due to her from Ferrara; and the Marquis, disgusted by the retention of his province, and em-

¹ Cavalcanti, *Istorie Fiorentine*, lib. xii. cap. 1.

² Soldo, *Memorie delle Guerre contro la Signoria di Venezia*, Murat. xxi. 789.

boldened by the firm attitude of the Milanese under Piccinino, began to listen to the proposals of the Duke, and to waver in his friendship for the Republic. Thus the Florentine connexion continued to be excessively precarious; neither Mantua nor Ferrara was to be trusted; and the Government of the Doge was expecting from week to week to be apprised of the reconciliation of the Duke of Milan with his intended son-in-law over the joined hands of Bianca Visconti, natural daughter of the Duke by Agnese del Maino, and Francesco Sforza.

Surrounded by these difficulties, added to her financial embarrassment, Venice felt that she had no easy part to play; and it was with a sensation akin to relief that she viewed the resignation of Gonzaga in November 1437. "On the 26th (Nov.)," Sanudo reports, "the Pregadi held a meeting, because the Lord of Mantua had sent the Signory word, that after the end of the month he did not wish to retain the command, but desired to return home. Wherefore it was decided that Gattamelata should be made Governor of the Army." It was the latter, whose talents, energy and devotion had more than once saved the cause which he was serving from ruin; and the hope was cherished that under his immediate auspices the exertions of the troops would develop important and happy results. The name was one of those playful designations so common in Italy, and pointed to the stealthy, cat-like astuteness of the bearer, who was popularly recognised by no other, and himself adopted it.

Gonzaga had no sooner quitted the service, than he unmasked himself, and went over to the Duke, with whom he secretly planned a partition of the Venetian dominions on the *terra firma*, Verona and Vicenza falling to the share of Mantua,¹ Brescia and Bergamo to that of Milan. His conduct, which had during some time been exciting mistrust, was now at once explained. His duplicity and its tardy detection enraged beyond measure his former employers; and reprisal was made by seizing the persons and property of the Mantuan residents at Venice, and by inflicting every possible damage on the commerce and territory of the traitor. His successor did not disappoint the proud expectations which had been formed of his genius and capabilities. The new General-in-Chief threw into the work before him an honest heart and splendid

¹ Simoneta, *Vita Francisci Sfortiæ*, lib. vi.; Soldo, *Memorie*, 809.

faculties; and all that it was humanly possible to do with the limited force at his disposal, Gattamelata performed with equal courage, fidelity and zeal.

Gattamelata had not only to contend against superior numbers, but he had to deal with a master-spirit. The Duke still employed the great soldier Nicolo Piccinino, the most distinguished disciple of the school of strategy, founded in Italy by Andrea Braccio of Montone. Piccinino carried all before him.¹ The Veronese, Vicentino, Bresciano, and Bergamasque, with the important exception of Montechiaro, the Orzi, Palazzolo and some other first-class fortresses,² were overrun by the Milanese. The fortune of war threatened to wrest those valuable provinces altogether from the Republic.

The latter neglected no precaution for preserving its possessions and for protecting its subjects. The veteran Loredano was sent with a strong flotilla to the Po, to create a diversion in the direction of Mantua, and to compel Gonzaga to provide for the defence of his own estates.³ By opportunely relaxing her grasp of Rovigo, over which she claimed no permanent jurisdiction, the Signory removed a lurking sense of wrong from the breast of the Marquis of Ferrara, and secured a free passage for her troops through the Ferrarese territory. A renewed attempt was made to obtain the services of Sforza, still detained by Florence, with a view to his coalition with Gattamelata.

Piccinino, having made himself master of Casalmaggiore, crossed the Oglio, carried his arms into the Bresciano, and, marching in the direction of the Lago di Garda, took Rivoltella, Chiari, Pontoglio and Soncino; and, notwithstanding a severe check from the Venetian Commander at Rosata, he advanced upon Brescia itself. That stronghold which, in the earlier part of the century, had actually connived at its reduction to the Venetian rule, evinced its predilection for the mildest and most constitutional of mediæval governments by a noble and grand defence. A militia of 6000 citizens formed the garrison; and the entire population, banishing, at the summons of the Commandant Francesco Barbaro, all party differences, united in the common cause.

¹ *Annales Bonincontri*, 148, Murat. xx.; Soldo, *Memorie*, 789-90-1; Simoneta, *Vita Sfortiæ*, lib. v.; Cavalcanti, *Istorie Fiorentine*, lib. x.

² Soldo, 794.

³ Platina, *Historia Mantuana*, Murat. xviii. 817.

The General-in-Chief had marched with a little too much boldness into the Bresciano. He soon found that Piccinino's superiority of force threatened him, if he continued to advance, with the loss of his communications with Venice, and that such a course was calculated to expose the Republic to danger; and Gattamelata, who had only 3000 horse and 2000 foot under him,¹ was obliged to reconcile himself to the idea of falling back on the Veronese. In September 1438, he began his retreat. The snow already mantled the Alpine peaks and ridges; the mountain-streams were swollen by the heavy autumnal rains; the roads were terribly out of repair; almost all the bridges had been washed away; and scarcely a ford was available. The Army was exceedingly short of provisions; and the rear was harassed by the troops of the Bishop of Trento, an ally of Milan. Everything depended on the exercise of unanimity, discipline and fortitude. But the men and their officers were devoted to Gattamelata; and the retrograde movement was conducted by the Captain-General, in such circumstances, with admirable skill and coolness. The torrents, gullies and ravines were bridged. The roads were levelled and repaired, or, where they were too bad, new causeways were constructed; and at the end of the month, after indescribable trials and hardships and an unbroken series of forced marches, the Venetians debouched through Val-Caprino into the wide plain, on which Verona stands.² The Milanese were thus baffled in their more than suspected design of throwing themselves between Venice and her little army, and of penetrating through the march of Padua into the Dogado. The retreat of Gattamelata was deservedly regarded by the tacticians of his day as a masterpiece; but that retreat, while it saved the Venetians from the ultimate ignominy of a surrender, necessarily reduced the Brescians to great straits. The inhabitants displayed in the presence of such a crisis immense heroism.³ Every sacrifice and privation were cheerfully borne.⁴ The conduct of Barbaro exacted applause from his enemies themselves.⁵ The two leading families, the Martinengri and the Avogadri, forgot their rivalry, and fought side by side. The garrison behaved with

¹ Platina, *Historia Mantuana*, Murat. xviii. 816; Cavalcanti, lib. xii. c. 1.

² Navagiero, *Storia*, 1102.

³ Candido, *Vita di Piccinino*, 1074.

⁴ Id. *Vita Philippi-Mariae Visconti*, 991.

⁵ Platina, 816; Candido, *Vita di Piccinino*, 1073.

a gallantry which filled the besiegers with wonder and respect. Of the population generally such was the enthusiastic loyalty, such was the fervent affection for Venice and detestation of Milanese sway, that not only women but children were seen to join in repelling assaults and in working at the breaches. The execution of the enemy's guns, of which the smaller threw 300-lb. stones, was frightful. One shot blew to pieces seven men, and scattered their limbs so confusedly, that it was impossible to collect them for burial.¹

The venerable Loredano, Captain of the Po, after an entertainment given to the Milanese and Venetian officers in compliment to a fifteen days' truce arranged between Gonzaga and himself, was seized by symptoms so grave, that on the 29th October 1438, he hurriedly returned home, where he died in great suffering on the 11th November following. He was buried at Santa Elena, by his own desire, without any public demonstration.² The death was variously explained; but poison was the likeliest solution; and it cannot fail to appear a strange and suspicious coincidence that, shortly after, his brother Marco, sent by the Ten to Legnago to investigate charges against Andrea Donato, the Doge's son-in-law, and governor of the place, was also taken suddenly ill, and succumbed. He had found affairs so unsatisfactory, that he arrested Donato, and sent him under escort to Venice. The Doge has been accused of having instigated both these fatalities; but there is no evidence of his complicity, nor is it too much to affirm, that fairly conclusive evidence would be indispensable. The facts were so imperfectly known, that contemporary gossip-mongers differed in their accounts; and Giorgio Dolfino, in narrating the first casualty, does not even suggest foul play. It appears more likely that Loredano was broken down by hard work and disappointment.

The Milanese main body, 20,000 strong, with between eighty and one hundred guns of the largest bore, was now concentrated before Brescia, the possession of which Visconti particularly coveted. At the same time, detachments of the enemy were penetrating to the banks of the Adige: while the

¹ Candido, *Vita di Piccinino*, 1073-4.

² Poisoning was a practice not only not peculiar to Venice, but not so to Italy and the rest of the Continent. It was widely prevalent in England, and was, no doubt, the result of the progress of medical knowledge. See Wright, *Domestic Manners in England during the Middle Ages*, 1862, p. 279.

Veronese March was swept and laid under contributions by the Marquis of Mantua.¹ For these evils there was, under existing circumstances and until the arrival of Sforza, no apparent remedy. But there was one object, which seemed to be in the power of the Ducal Government, and which it determined to accomplish at every cost and hazard; and this object was the relief of the faithful and suffering Brescians. The eastern shore of the Lago di Garda, by which the City is approached, was still open to the Republic; but on that lake she unfortunately did not possess a single raft. In such a dilemma, the Senate entertained a proposal, which had been submitted to the Government some time since by two foreign engineers, Blasio de Arboribus² and Nicolo Sorbolo, for conveying a flotilla across the Tyrolese Alps on carriages drawn by men and oxen into the Lago di San Andrea,³ and from the latter across Monte-Baldo into the Lago di Garda itself. The distance to be traversed was about 200 miles, and the outlay was computed at 15,000 ducats or upward. It was mid-winter, and a deep snow overspread the ground. Still the Signory, "who," to borrow the expression of a contemporary memoir-writer,⁴ "could not sleep until Brescia had been relieved," did not shrink from the undertaking. For it was confidently calculated that it would develop one of two contingencies. By leaving the movement unopposed, the Milanese would enable the Republic to victual the place; by opposing it in force, they would leave the road from Brescia to Verona sufficiently unguarded to facilitate the transmission of supplies from that quarter. Immediate steps were therefore taken to carry out the scheme.

The flotilla consisted of five-and-twenty barks and six galleys; it was under the care of Pietro Zeno. Zeno proceeded by water from the mouth of the Adige up to Roveredo; from that point the passage to the summit of Monte-Baldo, over an artificial causeway of boughs, stones and other rough materials, running along the bed of a precipitous fall, furnished a spectacle which none could witness and forget. Yet the greatest difficulty even then remained to be overcome. The descent from Monte-Baldo was a perfect prodigy of mechanical

¹ Platina, *Hist. Mant.* 816-17; Candido, 1071.

² Romanin, iv. 196.

³ *Historia Veneta Secreta*, 27, Add. MSS. 8580.

⁴ Soldo, *Memorie*, 808.

skill. The whole process, which demanded an iron will and unflinching nerve on the part of those engaged in its execution, was conducted through the medium of huge cables securely fastened to each vessel, before it was launched from the almost perpendicular declivity on the other side. The galleys and barks, thus guided and checked, were allowed to slide down the mountain; and the ropes were slackened little and little by pulleys and windlasses, until the ship reached the bottom. From the foot of Monte-Baldo to Torbole, the nearest point of the lake, was between twelve and fifteen miles; and after stupendous toil, and amid almost insurmountable obstacles, the Fleet was at last set afloat on the Lago di Garda, the theatre in former times of some of the military triumphs of Claudius Gothicus, in the course of February 1439.¹

This overland transport from the Adige, accomplished by a process of which modern history furnished no second example,² and in comparison with which the celebrated Passage of Hannibal dwindles into insignificance, was after all something like a waste of time and money. On their arrival at Torbole, where they were obliged to construct a haven³ with such materials as they could command within the shortest possible time, Zeno and his companions found themselves confronted with a greatly superior naval force under Vitaliano and Giovanni Gonzaga.⁴ Piccinino had collected their purpose, and had forestalled them; and the Venetian commander, after reconnoitring the enemy, had no alternative but to retire upon Torbole, and to throw out lines of palisades to save his little squadron from destruction.

The triumphs, which had down to the present time attended the Milanese arms, were undoubtedly owing in some measure to the masterly dispositions and unwearied activity of Piccinino; but they proceeded even to a larger extent from the faulty tactics of the Allies themselves. While the Lieutenant of Visconti had wisely concentrated his strength on the Venetian Provinces of the *terra firma* with the evident design and expectation of beating his adversaries in detail, the forces of the League were foolishly divided between Tuscany

¹ Candido, *Vita di N. Piccinino*, 1076-7.

² See Platina, *Historia Mantuana*, Murat. xx. 823; Cavalcanti, *Istorie Fiorentine*, lib. xii. cap. 6.

³ Soldo contemp. *Memorie*, 808; Murat. xxi.

⁴ Platina, *ubi supra*.

and the Marches; and it was a circumstance of a highly suspicious character that, although the interests of the Coalition no longer required the presence of any large body of men on the Tuscan frontier, where a separate peace between Milan and the Medici Government had temporarily suspended hostilities,¹ the bulk of the confederated army under Sforza was still retained by the Florentines, and Lombardy, the principal, if not the only seat of war, was almost denuded of troops. The Venetian Government, haunted by misgivings of the integrity of Cosmo de' Medici and his countrymen, and deeply anxious on financial grounds to witness the return of peace, now made an earnest and emphatic appeal to Sforza in person;² and at length, in the latter half of June 1439, that general appeared on the plains of Lombardy. The Signory was delighted at his arrival. On the 23rd, the united colours of Venice, Florence and Genoa were forwarded to him as an emblem of his mission. We have seen this eminent man come to the front by steady degrees, and we are to hear more of him. Like Carmagnola and other successful soldiers of fortune, he was of humble origin. His grandfather is said to have been a poor woodcutter. It was his lot to serve many masters and often to change sides, before his position was assured and his aims were accomplished.

The motive of the Marquis of Ancona in taking part with the Republics against the father of Bianca Visconti was sufficiently transparent. None understood better than Sforza the fickle and pusillanimous character of the man with whom he had to deal, and the cowardly heart which was masked by those hardened lineaments; and he had begun to persuade himself that, if his dearest wish was to be accomplished at all, its accomplishment was to be procured by intimidation more surely than by any other method. On repeated occasions, Filippo-Maria had behaved to his future son-in-law with the most flagrant bad faith. In one instance, the marriage was actually fixed, and the guests were even invited,³ when, on some frivolous pretext, the ceremony was indefinitely postponed. During the somewhat lengthened stay of Sforza in the Florentine service, the preponderance of Piccinino had increased to a dangerous extent, and the new Captain-General of the

¹ Simoneta, *Vita Francisci Sfortia*, lib. v.

² Platina, *Hist. Mant.* 325.

³ Simoneta, lib. v.

League secretly exulted in the prospect of making himself of importance in the eyes of the Duke, as well as in those of the Signory, by damaging the reputation and influence of his great military rival.

Venice and Sforza had thus become necessary to each other. By the fresh compact, dated so far back as the 19th February 1439,¹ into which the General had entered with the two Powers, the salary payable to him and his companies (in equal proportions) reached the exorbitant sum of 18,000 ducats a month; and the Republic herself, elated by the satisfactory aspect of affairs, is found repeating the alluring proposals which she had formerly addressed to Carmagnola. "So soon as you become master of the territory of Gonzaga," the Senate writes on the 30th July, "we will recognise you as Lord of Mantua; if you do not happen to succeed in this object, we will consent to your occupation of Cremona and the Cremonese. But if you cross the Adda, the Dukedom of Milan itself shall, to the exclusion of the actual holder, be your reward; and we will acknowledge your title."²

The junction so long and fondly desired between Sforza and Gattamelata, now second in command, having been effected at the end of June, the Captain-General found, by a return taken at Montagnano on the 25th, that he had 14,000 horse under his orders, with the best part of the year before him;³ and he soon shewed a determination to make the fullest use of his time. The Vicentino had been so incompletely conquered by Piccinino, that in a few days it was completely recovered by the Allies; and the enemy, apprehensive of being taken in rear, repassed the Adda.⁴ The theatre of war was now transferred to the vicinity of the Lago di Garda, and the Commander-in-Chief was urged by the Signory to apply himself without delay to the object which she continued to have most at heart—the relief of Brescia. The march of the army across the Alps in the footsteps of Zeno began in August, and the process occupied considerably more than two months. It was not till the second week in November, that Sforza arrived at the defiles conducting to the Fortress of Tenna; and here he found the Milanese and

¹ This agreement will be found *in extenso* in *Arch. Stor. Ital.* xv. 146.

² Romanin, iv. 198.

³ Navagiero, *Storia*, 1102.

⁴ Candido, *Vita di N. Piccinino*, 1077, Murat. xxi.

Mantuans under Piccinino in person drawn up in readiness to dispute the passage. With the aid of the Brescians, a large body of whom suddenly appeared on the heights and rolled down huge crags on the enemy in the gorge beneath, the Captain-General gained the day (November 9), and the position was triumphantly carried. A special messenger was dispatched on that very evening from the field of battle with a note indorsed:¹ "To the Most Serene and Excellent Prince and Lord our Singular Good Lord, Lord Francesco, Doge of Venice."

"Most Serene Prince—

"This is to apprise your most illustrious Lordship that Nicolo Piccinino, being in force here to contest certain of the Passes of Tenna, we hastened to give the order to carry the said Passes. We sent for troops from Brescia; we charged the enemy, and scattered them. My Lord Carlo, son of the Lord of Mantua, has been taken; Nicolo Piccinino escaped. Our men are still in pursuit. We believe that a great many cavalry and also foot are in our hands. We write this to you in order that you may be in possession of the facts as soon as possible. We will shortly communicate with the most illustrious Signory more in full.

"From your most auspicious camp at Arco, November 9, 1439.—Your Serenity's servants,

"FRANCESCO SFORZA, COUNT.

"GATTAMELATA DE' NARNI."

At the moment when he wrote or dictated these hurried lines, Count Francesco was not aware of the manner in which Piccinino had slipped through his hands. The latter, when he saw that affairs were quite desperate, threw himself in the first instance into Tenna; but from an impression that he would be unable to maintain that position, he almost immediately afterward quitted the stronghold, tied up in a sack half filled with rags, and was carried through the hostile camp to Riva di Lago on the shoulders of one of his orderlies, a brawny Teuton of gigantic stature.² The feat amounted to a miracle: for Piccinino himself was a tall, burly man; and even to the huge, stalwart fellow whose back he turned to such good

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, 1082.

² Soldo, *Memorie*, 814-15.

purpose, the load was a severe strain of muscle and sinew. A belief prevailed at the time in some quarters that the Venetian Proveditor knew thoroughly well the contents of the sack, and connived at the trick. But this was so far from being the truth, that the Venetian Government offered a reward of 4000 ducats to any one who should bring Piccinino dead or alive.¹

No news came of him during a few days,² and Sforza proceeded to sit down before Tenna. But the astounding intelligence was soon brought that the Milanese General had surprised Verona, and was already master of the principal portion of the fortress. Sforza raised forthwith the siege of Tenna, and hastened to the relief of a place, the safety of which was of infinitely superior consequence to that of Brescia itself. For there was room to believe that the enemy designed to follow up the reduction of Verona by an invasion of the March of Padua.³

The position of Brescia was so bad that it could hardly be worse. The pressure of the siege was momentarily removed; but the distress was becoming perfectly insupportable; and deliverance once more postponed, at the very moment when it had been thought to be indeed at hand, by the diversion into the Veronese, was to many patient and longing hearts, in the most loyal of cities, a blow too bitter and heavy to bear. "Every day," records an eye-witness, "we have letters here, saying that Count Francesco has arrived, now in the Padovano, now in the Veronese; now telling us that he has beaten Piccinino; then that he has driven him beyond the Adige. In these reports there is a good deal that is true enough, and a good deal that is not. One thing is certain: the League has been renewed. Disease and hunger are at their height here. It seems to me, that people are getting quite weary of life. Such is their sad condition, that it is only because they dread coming again under the rule of *that Duke of Milan*, that they hold out."⁴ "Affairs," the author of the same *Memorials* tells us in August 1439, "have nearly reached a climax. The pestilence is most terrible, the scarcity hardly less so. Between forty-five and fifty are perishing daily: yet, under the hope that Count Francesco will soon be crossing the Mincio, we forget

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, 1083.

³ Candido, *Vita di N. Piccinino*, 1077.

² Muratori, *Annali*, ix. 183.

⁴ Soldo, *Memorie*, 809.

our troubles in the absorbing idea of the arrival of the Count." ¹

In the ensuing month, a frightful calamity befell the Republic and her faithful subjects. The flotilla on the Lago di Garda under Pietro Zeno, having left its tolerably secure anchorage at Torbole, was surprised by the enemy on the 26th September,² and was absolutely annihilated. But Venice did not allow herself to be disheartened by the loss; the Senate directed the organization on the spot of one far more numerous and powerful; and of the feverish anxiety with which each vessel was watched in its progress toward completion a graphic and animated picture survives.³

Some sort of help, however, was approaching at length. Sforza, having recovered Verona,⁴ and having thwarted his adversary in his plan for carrying the War into the Padovano by compelling him to retreat,⁵ retraced his steps by a series of rapid countermarches, and succeeded, in spite of Piccinino, in throwing victuals and reinforcements into Brescia. But the season was now very advanced; the weather began to grow excessively cold and inclement; and the Captain-General had scarcely afforded the sufferers this partial relief, when he found it necessary to withdraw into winter quarters. His example was imitated by the Lieutenant of Visconti; and thus ended the year 1439, in which Venice had completely won back her Provinces of Vicenza and Verona.

The supplies brought by Sforza to the Brescians furnished only a respite. Under date of the 10th April 1440, we have the following:—"Bread is frightfully dear: people are living on grass, snails, horseflesh, rats, mice, dogs, and other loathsome food. You may see, day after day, three hundred, four hundred, yea more, children on the Piazza, crying aloud:—'Bread, bread, for the love of God!' There is no born creature so cruel that it would not melt his heart to witness such a spectacle. I believe that, unless Divine Providence were watching over us, we should, before this, have surrendered, or every soul of us must have died."⁶

Till the arrival of Sforza in the summer of 1439, and his assumption of the Captaincy-General, both the military and

¹ Soldo, *Memorie*, 812.

² *Ibid.* 813.

³ *Ibid.* 815-16.

⁴ Candido, *Vita Philippi-Mariae Vicecomitis*, Murat. xx. 993; Antonio de Ripalta contemp. *Annales Placentini*, Murat. xx. 876.

⁵ Candido, *Vita di N. Piccinino*, 1077.

⁶ Soldo, 820.

naval operations of the Republic had prospered exceedingly ill; even the fleet on the Po was obliged by a diversion of the river from its natural channel to return home without striking a blow. The campaign of 1439 exhibited a favourable turn, and was on the whole as productive as could have been expected: yet the loss of the Lago di Garda squadron was a severe misfortune, while the fate of the Bresciano and the Bergamasque still trembled in the balance.

In the campaign of 1440, already near at hand, the Duke of Milan was recommended by Rinaldo degli Albizzi, leader of the Anti-Medicean faction at Florence, and by Piccinino himself, to attempt, in the difficult circumstances in which he was placed, the diversion of Sforza from Lombardy by carrying the war into La Marca, and thence by the Maradi route into Tuscany. By this plan it was reckoned that Count Francesco, on the one hand, would be forced to provide for the safety of Ancona; while the Florentines, on their part, reduced to the necessity of watching their own separate interests, would throw the Republic on her own resources, and leave the provinces of the *terra firma* at the mercy of Filippo-Maria. The Duke therefore accepted the strategical programme drawn out for him, and his lieutenant quitted his winter quarters in February at the head of 6000 horse. On the 4th March,¹ the Milanese reached Bologna;² Piccinino, having been reinforced by Polenta of Ravenna, Malatesta of Rimini, and others, who gave their adhesion to Filippo under stress of intimidation, successively overcame the resistance of Oriolo, Modigliana, and Maradi; and, from the last point pursuing his course, he crossed the Tuscan frontier, and occupied Bibbiena and Romena.³ But Astorre, Lord of Faenza, father-in-law of Polenta, whom he had expected to join him with a powerful contingent, failed to make his appearance.

So far back as February 1440, Florence, viewing with well-founded uneasiness the mysterious policy and fathomless ambition of Visconti, who had so long been a standing menace to Italy, sent Neri da Capponi the historian and another citizen to Venice, with the object of concerting measures with the Republic for the common security; and on that occasion

¹ Pugliola, *Cronica di Bologna*, 664; Murat. xviii.

² Muratori, *Annali*, ix. 286.

³ Cavalcanti, lib. xiv. caps. 2 and 8.

the Foscari Ministry had afforded the warmest assurances of friendship and support, even asserting "that the Republic would do her best that Florence should receive no harm!" The seizure of Maradi, which was shamefully deserted¹ by its defenders, and the violation of their frontier in the same summer, inspired the Florentines with renewed and increased anxiety; and a requisition was made, on the plea of cogent and momentous necessity, for Sforza and his Companies. The Captain-General, whose personal aim was rather to weaken and terrify the Duke than to destroy him, seconded the demand. "The Count," says Capponi,² "comes to Venice in person, and at great length demonstrates that his going into Tuscany will be useful to the League, alleging that Nicolo Piccinino has no one to resist him either in La Marca or in Tuscany, and that if he be not opposed he will make himself Lord of La Marca and Perugia, and will increase in fame and strength. The Florentines, he states, have no means of withstanding the enemy; unless help arrive soon, one of two things will happen: they must come to terms, or be crushed!"

But the Signory knew better. "The Doge," pursues the commentator, "assures Sforza in answer, and proves it to him very clearly, that if he (the Captain-General) crosses the Po, the Venetian provinces of *terra firma* are lost. His Serenity declares that the Duke, once conquered in Lombardy, is *conquered elsewhere*; and he protests that, if the Count has absolutely determined to go, they (the Venetians) have determined to *abandon the terra firma and to spend no more money!*"³

Nevertheless, Sforza took his leave for the time. He was just now in a wavering mood, and professed to be disinclined to move north of the Po. The nobleman, whose house Cosmo de' Medici had made his home during his year of banishment, was shortly sent by the Signory to use his influence with his illustrious guest. Medici and his friends made difficulties; and there were many in the city who would have refused to return to the coalition, pleading the indifferent loyalty of Venice on former occasions. But in the end it was thought wiser to give way, and Sforza was persuaded to resume the offensive in the allied cause. Neri da Capponi again presented himself to complete the necessary arrangements, and experi-

¹ Napier, *Florentine History*, iii. 255.

² *Commentarii*, Murat. xviii. 1192.

³ Capponi, as above.

enced an enthusiastic welcome. He wrote home to say that the trouble of the Venetians was changed into joy, that they had doffed their black robes, and given themselves up to pleasure, and that the Funds had risen several ducats per cent.

So long as he remained out of commission or in other pay, Sforza had not been reticent in his expressions about Venice, to which he owed so much, and had taken some pains to dwell in his correspondence on its desperate position. "Her State stands as if in water up to the throat, and is almost ruined," and, again, "the troops of Venice are as if they were not, so little do the Milanese esteem them." Yet this same Venice was to outlive all the Sforze, and all the Visconti, and all the Medici.

The Signory promised the General, after some demur, 81,000 ducats to enable him to keep such a force in the field as would compel the Duke to recall his lieutenant; and under such a stimulus the result was that his genius and perseverance soon won fresh and more splendid triumphs for the cause, which it just now suited him to serve. On the 10th April, Stefano Contarini, Captain of the new flotilla on the Lago di Garda, inaugurated the campaign by shattering that of the enemy; and Sforza hastened to turn that brilliant advantage to the best account. On the 3rd of June, the Captain-General made the passage of the Mincio; Rivoltella, Lonato, Salò and other places, submitted to him; and he continued to advance until, on the 14th of the month, he encountered Piccinino between the Orzi-Nuovi and Soncino. A battle took place, in which the Milanese were utterly beaten; and thus Brescia, after a three years' siege and the endurance of incredible hardships, was finally relieved. Sforza made a triumphal entry, accompanied by his lieutenant Bartolommeo Coleoni, whose fortune it had been to serve under a succession of commanders, of whom Carmagnola seems to have been the first. The loss of life on either side was very trifling; but Piccinino was once more nearly captured. The old General contrived to elude pursuit, and, collecting a portion of his scattered troops, he marched with his usual rapidity against the Florentine position at Anghiari¹ on the Tiber, four miles from Borgo San-Sepolcro. It was his hope that he might thus retrieve his

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, 1098-9.

fortune, and at the same time preclude the intended junction of the Allies.

The Milanese, however, harassed by excessive fatigue, and obliged to fight with a blinding dust in their faces, experienced (June 29) a second defeat; and their commander had another hair's-breadth escape from becoming a prisoner of war.¹ These successes spurred the Count to additional exertions; and the perfidy of Gonzaga of Mantua was punished by the loss of Valeggio, Asola, and Peschiera. "I have seen written with a piece of charcoal in the hand of Count Francesco," writes one,² who visited the spot about forty years after the event, "behind the gate of that Rock (Peschiera) these words: *On the . . . day of August, 1440, I, Count Francesco, entered this Rock in the name of the Signory of Venice.*" The Marquis of Ferrara, who had long been a trimmer, now knit himself once more in close alliance with Venice; Rimini³ and Ravenna,⁴ abandoning the Duke, again came over to the other side; and the year 1440 beheld the Lion of Saint Mark floating over the greater part of the fortresses of the Vicentino, Veronese, Bresciano, and Bergamasque. Trevi, Caravaggio, Soncino, Orci-Nuovi and Vecchii, Chiaro and Monte-Chiaro, and many other points, were in the hands of Sforza. Opposite Milan, he halted, and signified an inclination, perhaps a feigned one, to cross the Adda, and occupy the Capital itself.⁵

Piccino retraced his steps, discouraged and moody. Taking advantage of the unprepared state of the Allies at the outset, he had made a few trifling conquests; but, with those exceptions, the result of the campaign had been singularly unpropitious to him; and "owing," as Cavalcanti will have it,⁶ "to the bestial contumacy and stubbornness of Astorre of Faenza, his good fortune had turned to an evil one." The word *bestial* is one on which the Florentine historian literally doats. The Lord of Faenza is bestial. Filippo-Maria is bestial. In one or two places, Sforza is bestial. On the "bestiality" of this or that proceeding the writer insists with amusing emphasis, and dwells with evident relish.

The brilliant, though somewhat short, campaign of 1440 was virtually brought to an end by the setting-in of the heavy

¹ Soldo, *Memorie*, 823.

³ Capponi, 1197.

⁵ Capponi, as above.

² Sanudo, *Vita*, 1100.

⁴ Romanin, iv. 203.

⁶ *Istorie Fiorentine*, lib. xiv. cap. 2.

autumnal rains; all the real fighting had been done between April and July. Sforza looked upon his achievements with pardonable complacency: for he had not merely gained precious triumphs for the Republic, and surrounded with glory the flag of Saint Mark, but he had improved in a wonderful measure his own private prospects by making the Duke quake on his very throne.

The two consecutive checks given to Piccinino seriously frightened his master, and the thoughts of the latter began to stray once more in the direction of peace. For this purpose the Marquis of Ferrara exerted his rare eloquence and address.¹ A coaxing message was conveyed to the General in strict confidence. "His darling wish shall be gratified now without delay; Bianca shall be his; they shall be married directly; Cremona is to be her dower. But, *per contra*, a treaty must be arranged; Francesco shall have the management of the whole thing; Francesco shall mediate!" The Venetian Government, on its own part, entertained no sort of objection to peace on a satisfactory basis, and a negotiation commenced accordingly, which lingered through the winter months, and came after all to nothing. Perhaps the Signory was too exacting.² Perhaps it is that Count Francesco, not feeling any strong confidence in the man who has so often duped him before, has not the matter much at heart, and prefers to kill the idle hours with the bewitching pleasures of the Venetian capital. "Count Francesco," notes Soldo in his *Diary*, "is spending his time at feasts and dances, while Piccinino is spending it in slumber!" Some excuse, however, is to be found for Sforza. When he was at Venice, the city was extraordinarily gay and seductive. In January 1441, Jacopo Foscari, the Doge's only surviving son by Maria Priuli del Banco, his first wife, married Lucrezia, daughter of the patrician Leonardo Contarini.³ The ceremony was privately performed at the Palace in the presence of his Serenity, the Dogaressa, and a few relatives and intimate friends. Speaking of the subsequent rejoicings, Giacomo Contarini, the bride's brother, writes under date of Tuesday the 29th January to brother Andrea at Constantinople:—"This morning all assembled at Marangona—there were eighteen of us, dressed uniformly—at the house of the Master of the Feast.

¹ Muratori, *Annali*, ix. 191.

² *Ibid.*

³ Sanudo, *Vite*, 1099.

We wore the stocking of the Company (Della Calza), mantles of Alexandrian velvet brocaded with silver, doublets of crimson velvet with open sleeves, zones of the same colour, and squirrel-fur linings, on our heads caps *alla Sforzesca*.¹ We had two servants apiece in our own livery, and four in the livery of the Company; everybody was provided with a charger caparisoned in green velvet and silver; and, mounted on our beautiful and stately beasts, we looked as grand as any cavalry. Besides our grooms, we had other attendants dressed in silk, and men-at-arms, too, so that altogether there were not fewer than two hundred and fifty horses. I must tell you that the Master was attired very much like ourselves, excepting that his vest was a train, and that his cap was of crimson velvet. His lordship had twenty horses, and Messer Giacomo (*i.e.* himself) twenty-five. We started from the house in this order. In front marched some of the trumpets and fifes; then the youngsters in silk. Next came our horses covered with their trappings, followed by half the Company of the Stocking; then the rest of the trumpeters and fifers; then 'My Lord of the Feast'; then the other Companions of the Stocking; finally, all our remaining servants."

The procession, having made the circuit of the Piazza and of the Palace-Court, proceeded from San Samuele² over a bridge of boats thrown across the Grand Canal to Saint Barnabas, where the bride resided. The Lady Lucrezia came out of the Palazzo Contarini to meet it, walking between two Procurators of Saint Mark, and attended by sixty maids of honour; and all went to Saint Barnabas', close by, and heard mass. After mass, an oration was delivered on the open and densely crowded space in front of the sacred building, and in the presence of the Doge and the Court, commemorative of the virtues of the fair Contarini and of the great actions of her progenitors. Upon its termination, Lucrezia re-entered her father's house, while the Companions of the Stocking, again taking horse, rode through the various quarters of the City, gallantly curvetting and prancing over the Campo di San Luca, the Campo di Santa Maria Formosa, and the Piazza itself, and occasionally indulging in mock-battles and playful

¹ Morelli, *Delle Solennità e Pompe Nuziali*, 1793. It had been the fashion to wear things *à la Carmagnola* prior to that general's fall.

² Sanudo, *Vite*, 1099.

skirmishes. In the afternoon, a splendid banquet was given at the Palace, after which one hundred and fifty ladies, sumptuously attired, mounted the Bucentaur, and again repaired, accompanied by numberless boats and by a band of musicians, to the Palazzo Contarini. Here Lucrezia was in readiness with one hundred other ladies to join them; and from the mansion of the Senator Leonardo the huge barge moved forward in the direction of the Palazzo Sforza, where the whole party landed. The bride entered the building between Count Francesco and the Florentine Ambassador. The visit was one of the stiffest formality; the procession soon re-embarked, and returned to the Ducal residence. On the Piazza, Lucrezia was met by the Doge, for whom room was found between his daughter-in-law and Count Sforza; and on the staircase of Saint Mark's the Dogaressa, with a train of fifty superbly habited ladies, was prepared to welcome her. Dancing commenced almost immediately after the arrival of the guests; in the course of the evening, a princely collation was served on the tables; and after supper the ball was continued to a late hour.

The fêtes commenced on Monday, the 30th January. The principal event of that day was a tourney among forty persons for a prize given by Count Sforza of a piece of cloth-of-gold valued at 120 ducats; and the claims of two of the candidates, Taliano Furlano, an officer in the Milanese army, and of a soldier in Sforza's companies, were so equal that the meed of valour was divided between them. A grand ball was announced at the Palace in the evening, and the Companions of the Stocking provided a supper.

The next day was very wet in the earlier part of the morning; but at a later hour the weather improved, and in the afternoon a regatta was held. On Wednesday, the jousts recommenced; and during a week or ten days, Venice continued to present a scene of revel and ovation. All the shops and merchants' offices were closed, and upward of 30,000 persons regularly congregated on the Piazza to witness the sports and pastimes. The same general routine was observed throughout, with some variations in the details.¹ The day was occupied with tournaments and every other sort of diversion. At night came the balls, masques and serenades;

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, 1100-1; and Morelli, *ubi supra*.

and after dusk the Piazza was lighted with white wax torches. The whole capital whirled with excitement. Count Sforza joined with hearty zest and glee in everything. His mornings were spent in the lists and his evenings in the saloons. Such was the pomp which attended the nuptials of the fair Contarini with the Doge's son; it is said to have afforded a spectacle to which Italy had never beheld anything at all approaching in magnificence and costliness.

Referring to the bride, her brother says:—"And in truth the maiden conducted herself, and does behave, so well, beyond everything which might have been anticipated; I believe," her brother declares, "that she was inspired by God, and may He grant, that she may for ever go on improving. We gave her a portion of 16,000 ducats and 1000 more on loan, and her things, on which, seeing that she was marrying into the Ducal family, we could not well spend less than 600 ducats. Moreover, after all, she had only what Paula had, except that, in place of a gown for the house, there was made for her one of gold brocade with short sleeves, costing altogether 125 ducats." Her trousseau is described with considerable minuteness by the evidently very affectionate and proud brother:—"You must know that so far there have been prepared four dresses, a dress of gold and crimson, for which, that it might be as rich as possible, we gave 18 ducats by the ell, with open sleeves, and a squirrel-fur lining, and a tail an ell and a half long: another of cloth-of-gold ground and peacock blue, costing 12 ducats the ell, the sleeves lined with ermine, otherwise like the first: a third of gold brocade with open sleeves, which were lined with squirrel, and trailed on the ground, as did the dress itself, and this one cost 7 ducats the ell: and then the fourth was of damask worked in gold, the sleeves lined with ermine, and the price 6 ducats the ell. These four cost nearly 2000 ducats. She had, too, a beautiful jewel for her hair (*formacetto di drezza*); a ruby, an emerald, a valuable diamond, a shoulder-clasp with a diamond, a pearl, and a Balas-ruby worth 3500 ducats. There were also, the necklace, which had been worn by the Queen of Cyprus, estimated at 2000 ducats, and many rings, among which were four large rubies worth 2000 ducats more."

The writer proceeds to narrate, how his sister had everything supplied to her, fit for a great queen, and had no need

to look to Monsignor il Doge for any assistance in that sort of way; and he lets us know that there were three feasts altogether in the great hall, and 120 torches, and there was nothing on the tables meaner than capons, partridges, peacocks, oysters, and sweetmeats, whereof there was an abundance. The rejoicings appear to have extended over at least five days, for on the Thursday we are permitted to understand that there was a reception at the Casa Contarini, and a grand banquet, at which the Dogaressa was not present, because her youngest son Domenigo had just recently died; and the letter of the preceding Sunday states that the bride will probably represent her.

This account may be read to some extent side by side with the report made by a Venetian ambassador of the fifteenth century in relation to matrimonial arrangements in England about the same period, which the writer seems to have judged to be purely matters of business and of bargain and sale without any regard to the sentiments of the parties. The comparison must of course be qualified by the wide and essential discrepancy between the two States in political and social organization. Yet the Italian observer was evidently of opinion that the English were more calculating and mercenary in this respect and at this time than his own compatriots.

During all this time, Piccinino was very quiet, but not quite so fast asleep as some supposed. At all events, before December 1440 was far advanced, he had been awake and astir; and during that and the ensuing month he was busily engaged in preparations for the seemingly unavoidable renewal of the struggle. He took the field so early as February; Count Sforza was nowhere visible; and his opponent seized the occasion to spread a report, "that he had perished in a mysterious manner at Venice."¹ The truth was, that the Contarini affair and other attractions of the capital possessed for him an irresistible charm; and the Count was still to be seen tilting and pirouetting, while his troops were anxiously awaiting his presence, until they were obliged at last to relinquish the field, and to fall back on their fortresses.

The Venetian commander was superior in point of number to his adversary; but it did not answer the purpose of the Captain-General to press Piccinino too closely or to damage

¹ Sanudo, *Vite*, 1101.

the Milanese power to any irretrievable extent. It was not till June, that Sforza joined headquarters; and even then nothing of consequence was undertaken. On the other hand, however, Filippo-Maria, growing disgusted and alarmed at the preposterous demands of his captains, who wished him, in the absence of direct or even legitimate heirs, to apportion his dominions among them, like a second Alexander, had been, during some time, in constant communication with Sforza, through his private secretary and other confidential agents, at one moment hinting at some arrangement for the re-establishment of peace: while at another he darkly insinuated, "that a fate similar to that of Carmagnola was in store for his successor, and that the Milanese service was safer and more remunerative." Sforza, if he estimated the innuendos of the Duke and his creatures at their true value, was in a position to enjoy a laugh at their expense: yet the admonition perhaps was not without its use and profit. It taught him to be discreet and ingenuous; it seasonably impressed him with the folly and danger of employing a shuffling policy, or of behaving toward the Government with the same dishonesty, which had cost Carmagnola his head; and at each successive stage of the negotiation the precise attitude of affairs with the exact progress made toward the desired result was faithfully and minutely reported to the Signory. At length, Sforza forwarded for approval a protocol, which he was authorised by a decree of the Senate (August 6¹) to accept; and, having signed on his own responsibility² an armistice for a fortnight, he proceeded to Venice to receive certain necessary instructions. It had been, in the first instance, the wish of the Republic, that the representatives should assemble at her own capital; but the Duke declared his preference for some neutral ground, and the point was waived in favour of Cavriana in the Cremonese. To this place came, in the latter half of September,³ the plenipotentiaries of the Doge; the Venetians were content to relinquish the right of choosing the seat of the conference, so long as they were left at liberty to dictate the terms; and the nature of those terms makes it an allowable hypothesis that they were, to a large extent, of their own authorship. Count Sforza, familiar with the slippery character

¹ Romanin, iv. 201.

² Navagiero, *Storia*, 1107.

³ Romanin, *ubi supra*.

of his intended father-in-law, insisted upon being invested with the sovereignty of Cremona, and upon being united to Bianca, preparatory to the definitive signature of the treaty; this step, to which the Signory did not think it worth while to raise any objection, involved great delay; and the Treaty of Cavriana was not published till the 20th November 1441.¹

By the new instrument, the boundary of the Adda was restored as the frontier-line between the territories of Milan and Venice. The clauses in regard to exchange of prisoners and other details of a like kind, found in the Treaty of 1433, were reproduced without alteration. Riva di Lago was transferred from the Duke to the Signory; and the former also lost Imola and Bologna, which returned under pontifical rule, and Genoa, which regained her independence. The Marquis of Mantua relaxed his grasp of Porto, Legnago, and other Venetian possessions, which he had seized in the course of the war: while he ceded to the Republic Lonato, Valeggio, Asola, and Peschiera.² The rights of Venice over Ravenna, which had been in her occupation since February of the present year, were confirmed; and Cremona had already become the marriage-portion of Bianca-Sforza-Visconti.

A fair statement of the chain of circumstances, under which the ancient House of Polenta was deprived of its patrimony in Ravenna, is calculated perhaps to exonerate the Republic from a charge of direct usurpation. So far back as 1406, Obizzo da Polenta, then master of this principality, finding himself reduced by the ambition of his brother-in-law the Lord of Faenza, the Lord of Forli, and other neighbours to a position of grave peril, solicited and secured the protection of Venice. A Venetian podesta was sent to Ravenna to superintend the government: but the Polenta family still retained the sovereignty in its own hands, although the limit indicating where the authority of the podesta ceased, and where that of Obizzo began, was not perhaps very accurately defined. The conquests of Venice on the *terra firma* at that period, her wars with Hungary from 1410 to 1416, and her acquisitions in Istria, Dalmatia, Friuli, Greece, Albania, and elsewhere between 1416 and 1424 absorbed the attention of her rulers; and affairs at Ravenna remained with little or no alteration till 1430, when Obizzo died, naming the Republic

¹ Navagiero, *Storia*, 1107-8; Romanin, *ubi supra*.

² Romanin, iv. 205.

the executrix of his will, the guardian of his son Ostasio, a minor, and, if that son died childless, Ostasio's successor. Upon the attainment of his majority, Ostasio exhibited a tyrannical and overbearing character; and by his excesses, which Venetian organs probably did not omit to exaggerate, he incurred great odium, and made many enemies among the better classes of society at Ravenna. In the fourth war between the Signory and Filippo-Maria Visconti, Polenta, who happened to be residing at Treviso at that juncture, thought proper¹ to desert the cause of the Republic, and to go over to the Duke; but, after the successes of the Army of the League under Sforza (1440), he forsook the Milanese connexion, and a Proveditor was sent to concert with him and his wife "the best means of preserving the devotion of Ravenna to the Republic." A crisis was at hand: yet Ostasio was blind to its approach. On the 24th October 1440, a letter is written in the name of the Doge Foscari to Captain Jacopo-Antonio Marcello, stationed in the garrison, as follows: "Advices have been received here, which give the Government to understand, that Messer Sigismondo Malatesta (Lord of Rimini) came to the Legate, in company with two citizens of Ravenna, and told him that the inhabitants do not choose to remain any longer under the sway of the Polenta, who governs them despotically. As the Republic holds this city sufficiently dear, and cannot suffer it to fall into the hands of others, we desire you to proceed thither with troops, which you can procure from the Condottiero Michele Cotignola; the Proveditor Giovanni Leoni may act provisionally as Podesta, and preside over the administration of justice; and you yourself will take charge of the gates. It must be ascertained whether it is really true, that the people are hostile to Polenta; and, if so, the facts can be represented to his lordship, who may then be invited to pay a visit to Venice, until matters are smoother. On the other hand, if the presence of Polenta be not thought prejudicial, he may be allowed to remain where he is."

In pursuance of these instructions, Marcello marches upon Ravenna, at the head of 2000 foot; and Ostasio, abandoning his patrimony, repairs of his own accord to the Lagoons. It is Saint Matthew's day when the Venetian officer arrives at his destination. The citizens and the people rise in arms

¹ Rossi, *Historia Ravenn.* lib. vii.

against their oppressors, and with joyous shouts proclaim *Saint Mark and the Venetian Senate*.¹ An embassy is sent to Venice, to make known the wishes of the inhabitants; and on the 21st February 1441, the Senate decrees "that the submission of Ravenna may be accepted," and proper steps be taken to suppress any revolutionary movements on the part of the Polenta faction. Ostasio, his wife, and his child are relegated to Candia, where the two latter die in the course of the same year.² The archiepiscopal see is preserved; but the salterns in the neighbourhood, which are said to be injurious to the health of the locality, are destroyed.³

The conclusion of peace was welcomed at Venice with processions, joy-bells, and thanksgivings. Count Sforza and his bride were invited to the capital; and Bianca was, upon her disembarkation, received with all imaginable pomp in the Merceria. Accompanied by the Doge, she paid visits to the Arsenal and other public establishments, and was very much delighted with everything, especially when his Serenity takes her into Saint Mark's Treasury, and selects a gem worth 1000 ducats of gold, which he presents to this charming young lady of seventeen years¹ next birthday, as a slight token of regard on the part of the Republic. Bianca is the illegitimate daughter of a prince who nourishes toward the Venetians a deep-rooted and deadly hatred; and she has not improbably been educated in the belief that Venice is the high-place of wickedness, and a nest of assassins in figured velvet and embroidered lace. Perhaps this visit will help to disabuse her mind of such an impression, and will make her think nothing the worse of the people, whose hospitality her husband and herself are enjoying for a little time. As she peers, on the morning after her arrival, out of the window-casement of the palace, the Countess beholds a scene pretty similar to that which delighted and astonished Petrarch nearly one hundred years before her time, and on which the eyes of Dante had previously rested: ships, as tall as houses, riding proudly on the calm surface of the Grand Canal, manned by oak-hearted and iron-thewed sailors who have visited every part of the world: crowded wharves and busy quays, where all the

¹ Rossi, *Historia Ravenn.* lib. vii.; Simonetta, *Vita Sfortiæ*, lib. v.

² Rossi, *ubi supra*.

³ Id.

⁴ Cagnola, *Storia di Milano*, 57; *Arch. Stor. Ital.* iii.

languages of Europe are spoken, and where every variety of dress is observable. In the forenoon, Bianca becomes a spectatress in the Lists on the Piazza, on the Campo di San Luca or di San Polo, where Venetian gentlemen vie in knightly prowess and equestrian skill with the finest lances and horsemen of the Continent. At a later hour, the saloons of the Ducal Palace throw open to her a spectacle to which no other City in the world can furnish a counterpart: three hundred ladies, regally appavelled, behaving with a grace rivalled only by their decorum, and in whose veins flows blood far older than that of Plantagenet or Courtenay; and when she withdraws to her own apartments, she hears not the screech of the owl or the baying of the hounds, to which she has been familiar from her childhood in the cheerless palace at Milan; but all is quiet, except when the still air is broken for a moment by some church-clock close by, striking another hour.

CHAPTER XXXI

A.D. 1441-1457

Venetian Affairs from 1441 to 1447—Venetian Policy during that Period—Death of Filippo-Maria (Aug. 1447)—His Person and Character—His Four Wills—War of the Succession—Sforza's Fortunes—Sforza, Duke of Milan (March 1450)—League between Venice and Naples against Sforza and Florence (1452)—Desultory Nature of operations—Attempt on the Life of the Duke under the Sanction of the Ten—Treaty of Lodi (April 1454)—Conquest of Constantinople by the Turks (1453)—Treaty between Venice and Mohammed II. (April 1454)—Great Italian League of 1455—Review of Venetian Progress and Civilization—Story of the Two Foscari (1445-56)—Deposition and Death of the Doge (Oct.-Nov. 1457)—Foscari and his Times.

FROM the date of the conclusion of the Fourth War against Filippo-Maria Visconti, which had borne some resemblance to an extended duel between the two commanders, till 1447, Italian politics continued to present a precarious and fluctuating aspect. The governing aim of Visconti in these later years of his life was to alienate Sforza from his employers by alternate threats and caresses, by insinuations against Venetian honour and magnificent proposals. Such a purpose, if realised, was infallibly fraught with extreme peril, and the Republic energetically strove to thwart it. Venice, while she judiciously refrained from hurrying into a war in the absence of any serious aggression upon Italian liberty, gave the Bolognese and Florentines assurances of her intention to support them in case of necessity; and in the autumn of 1443, when the condottiero Coleoni went over to the side of Visconti, who had lavished on him the most flattering and friendly attentions, a defensive league against Milan for five years was subscribed by Florence, Genoa, Bologna, and the Signory, the last Power offering to place 2000 horse at the disposal of Count Francesco, should he be attacked. In 1445, by a treaty between the Ducal Government and the Patriarch of Aquileia, the Venetian difficulties in that quarter were amicably solved, and all apprehension on the side of Friuli was temporarily removed. The arms of Visconti, who had now (1444) lost the services

of Nicolo Piccinino, and who under some obscure pretext deprived himself of those of Coleoni by throwing him into prison at Monza, suffered constant reverses; but his secret negotiations with his son-in-law were more successful. Sforza, placed between two patrons, was during all this time in a state of sore perplexity. On the one hand, the Duke was for ever importuning him to espouse his cause; and his wife probably teased him to give way, and go to Milan. On the other side, the Venetians, who had laid him under obligations of gratitude, shewed themselves anxious to retain his services and his friendship. Thus two lines of conduct seemed open to the husband of Bianca, either of which he might perhaps have adopted without much hazard or injury to his character. But he chose to take a middle course, and to temporise with the Signory, while he was in treaty with Milan. The Venetian Government, seeing through his duplicity, was emphatic in its expression of resentment. Pasquale Malipiero, one of the Procurators of Saint Mark, was sent to expostulate with the Count on his behaviour; and the rebuke of Malipiero was hearty and outspoken.¹ In April 1447, the Senate² decreed the stoppage of his pay, the confiscation of the residence which the gratitude of the Republic had bestowed upon him, and his proclamation as a rebel; and troops were sent from Florence and Venice to close against Sforza all the passes of Lombardy. The alliance between the Pope and Alfonso of Naples had already had the effect of restoring La Marca to the former;³ Jesi alone remained in the hands of Count Francesco;⁴ and the Count was already beginning to feel himself in a critical dilemma, when the Duke, terrified by the ill-success of his military enterprises, disgusted at the mediocrity of Francesco Piccinino, a son of Nicolo, and distrustful of many of his other captains, sent a private secretary to headquarters, urgently soliciting his son-in-law to come with his wife to Milan. Alfonso and his ally, rejoicing at the prospect of getting rid of Sforza and of obtaining Jesi, proposed at the same time to pay 35,000 florins of gold in consideration of his complete surrender to the Church of all rights over La Marca; and Sforza, "only anxious," as he said, "to study

¹ Cavalcanti contemp. *Istorie Fiorentine*, lib. xiv. c. 56.

² Navagiero, *Storia*, 1111.

³ Bisticci, *Vita del Re Alfonso*; *Arch. Stor. Ital.* iv. 398.

⁴ Cagnola, *Stor. di Milano*; *A.S.I.* iii. 72-3.

and obey the wishes of his father," took the money, and set out with Bianca and his companions on the 9th August. He had only reached Cotignola, his native village, however, where he was halting to give his men rest, when the news came, that the Duke was no more. Filippo, after six days' indisposition, had breathed his last at the Castle of Porta-Zobbia¹ on the 13th of the month. It was characteristic of him, that his physicians were strictly forbidden to allow the least suspicion of his danger to transpire; and when his decease was at length announced, the greatest surprise was felt in Milanese circles as well as throughout Italy. Visconti carried with him to the grave the reputation of having been the most astute and wily prince of his time.

It is somewhat monotonous to follow all the intricacies and subtleties of the negotiations, which had been conducted during many years past by the representatives of the Duke himself and the other Powers in the intervals between operations in the field. The statesman, the diplomatist, the soldier of fortune, are seen to move from one side of the stage to the other, and to throw their weight into the scale now in one direction, now in another, without misgiving or loss of prestige; and the course of events from 1440 to 1447 is barely capable of lucid and exhaustive treatment from the rapidity and inconsequentiality of changes of sentiment and party. The political decentralization of Northern Italy outside the extensive Venetian Dominion and the readiness even of independent potentates to offer themselves and their mercenary followers for hire in the field to the best paymaster or the strongest ally tended during centuries to impart a sort of melodramatic complexion to Italian warfare, with the sanguinary pretences of melodrama transferred to actual life, not of course without periodical spasms of tempestuous violence and ferocity belonging to the southern blood, and notwithstanding the circumstance that on the same soil relations with neighbours and compatriots, as well as with the foreigner, were habitually conducted with the laboured circumspection and reserve, accompanied and disguised by infinite urbanity and bonhomie, which made the Lombard a type, a model, and a school far beyond his own mountains and his own seaboard.

¹ Muratori, *Annali*, ix. 219.

All these Italian chamber-strategists prided themselves on their dexterity in fence and finesse, and in reproducing their favourite game of chess in actual life. Each thought that he penetrated the craft and duplicity of the others, and was even at liberty, in private conversation at any rate, to stigmatise their conduct as deceitful. Whatever estimate may be formed of Cosmo de' Medici, for example, no one can surely deny that he was engaged throughout his whole life in those arts, by which men or States are played one against the other, yet he chafed at the absence of candour on the part of the Venetians, and asked a friend whether he ever knew such unblushing liars, because he suspected them of masking a political step under a false motive. But Machiavelli himself shrewdly animadverts on the injured innocence of his own countrymen, when they were thwarted in appropriating what belonged to others.

The character of Filippo-Maria was altogether one of the most singular, which has appeared in any age or country. Even to those who conceived they knew him best, he was an enigma. For genius and disposition he stood quite alone. He had never been handsome or winning in his appearance; and he could never be persuaded to have his portrait painted; but a contemporary¹ has preserved a graphic picture of his person, his character, and his manners. In stature, he was considerably above the common height, though, from his habit of stooping, he seldom looked tall. As a boy, his figure was remembered to have been singularly lank and ungainly, his frame then being spare almost to emaciation:² but gross indulgence and unrestrained sensuality soon destroyed every trace of symmetry or comeliness; and long before the Duke reached middle life he grew monstrously corpulent. From a deformity in his feet, his legs had always been weak; and in later years the feebleness of his lower extremities increased so deplorably that he was obliged to support himself, whenever he rose from his seat, on a stout cane, or to lean on the shoulder of a page; but his biographer relates that, throughout his reign, he was never seen to stir abroad alone. Large, rolling eyes of a fierce, wandering expression, with pupils of a yellowish tint; projecting brows;

¹ Petrus Candidus, *Vita Philippi-Mariæ Vicecomitis*, Murat. xxi.

² Candidus, cap. 56.

a snub nose; a receding chin, on which the razor seldom intruded; high cheek-bones; a head which could only be described as an oblong; black hair, worn off the face, and combed and brushed as rarely as possible; a bull neck, on which the fat literally lay in folds; and short hands with dumpy fingers, made a by no means fascinating physiognomy. Accident has communicated to this portrait somewhat minuter touches than in the case of one who belonged to a generation so remote, and has left no resemblance of himself, as he was, breathing on the canvas, are commonly possible. But even here we miss the tones of the voice, the gesture, the grimace, the rapid fluctuations of expression, which make the difference between a reality and the most vivid description of it.

Before his death, his eyesight had so entirely failed him, that he was nearly stone-blind. On this point he was so sensitive that the utmost care was taken to keep strangers in ignorance of the affliction, by warning him of their approach. The favourite diet of the Duke was quails, liver, and turnips. Occasionally, he woke in the middle of the night, ordered a calf's liver to be dressed, and until the meal was ready, paced the room with his attendants. His slumber was generally very broken and feverish; he often changed his couch as many as three times in a night; and he invariably slept in his clothes, and lay across the bed, instead of lengthwise, "which is a fashion," remarks his biographer, "I have never noted in anybody else." In his walks, it was his custom to mumble his prayers uninterruptedly, and to count his devotions on his fingers. His physicians were in constant attendance; and such was his dread of death, that he followed the most absurd prescriptions in the minutest particular.

There was no one who had been instrumental in the destruction of so many of his fellow-creatures as Visconti: yet it was more than any one dared to mention the word death, or to broach the subject in his presence; and the sight of a naked blade was enough to make him scream with terror. Though loathsomely filthy in his person, he was fond of gay clothes to a weakness: yet he strictly prohibited those about him from appearing in any but the plainest and most sombre attire. During a reign of more than thirty years, he was perpetually engaged in wars: yet he had never been present at a single battle, or seen a single siege; and he

probably knew no difference between a trench and a counter-scarp. When he was not sleeping or eating, or if no business was before him, he occupied himself with a book (his favourite authors were Livy, Dante, and Petrarch), or with muttering paternosters and aves, or with a puppet-show, which he kept in his bedroom, and for which he had given several hundred florins.

Visconti was of a saturnine and gloomy temperament; in his dealings with the members of his own household his manners were morose; and in himself he was supremely unhappy. Nobody enjoyed his confidence or his friendship; and hardly anything afforded him amusement. Yet, almost down to the last, he had discovered a certain lingering interest in his old passion for horses, hawks and dogs; and in or about 1422 the Doge had made him a present of some rare goshawks, part of a consignment sent from Scutari as a homage to the Signory.¹ His stud and kennel were by far the finest in Italy. On these pet subjects his memory never strayed; he knew all the animals which were at any time in his possession; and, before he was seized with blindness, he was able to tell at a glance the breed of a puppy or a foal.

His ancestor Galeazzo Visconti also had, in common with most of the great folks of that day, a strong liking for falconry. In a letter written by Galeazzo to Edward III. of England about 1370, he engages to send him a falcon to replace the *Cyprian* which he had presented before, but which had died.² The late Duke was also fond of cards, and the pack, which was painted for him, is said to have cost 1500 pieces of gold. These cards appear to have contained figures of the mythological divinities and of birds. It is reported by Candidus that his secretary executed a considerable proportion.³ Like the majority of his contemporaries the Duke was a firm believer in astrology and divination and a fatalist; and the latter circumstance helps to explain the

¹ Sanudo says that one of the goshawks was white and beautiful to look upon, and a rarity. Five falcons and five goshawks altogether came; the rest were distributed between Ferrara, Mantua, and Ravenna.

² Ellis's *Original Letters*, 3rd series, i. 43. A fondness for sport and its incidence was a common characteristic of the Italian rulers and aristocracy at this period, and had been so in fact during centuries. See Pasolini; *Catherine Sforza*, transl. by Sylvester, 1898, p. 63. Several illustrations of the taste occur in the present work.

³ Chatto's *Facts and Speculations on Playing Cards*, 1848, p. 230.

recklessness which sometimes marked his public conduct. To a more sceptical generation some of his superstitious foibles cannot fail to present a ludicrous and contemptible aspect.¹ He was terribly afraid of lightning; and the room in which he slept had a double wall, to exclude the electric discharges. When it thundered, he used to creep into a corner of his bed beneath the clothes, and desire his servants to surround him that he might be hidden. He viewed it as a circumstance of sinister omen, if his right foot was accidentally put into his left shoe. On Fridays, he shrank from contact with a bird, or with a person who had forgotten to shave himself! On the Feast of Saint John the Baptist, he could not be persuaded to get on horseback; and it was a part of his religion to wear no colour but green on the 1st May.

Filippo had been through life in perpetual dread of the dagger and the poison-cup; he was painfully aware, how universally he was an object of hatred and fear; and he always remained secluded and inaccessible. Even the Emperor Sigismund, whom he had expressly invited to Milan in 1433 to assume the Iron Crown, was denied an audience. For, at the last moment, the Duke changed his mind, and shut himself up in his private apartments; to induce him to see his visitor was perfectly impossible; and, to the infinite satisfaction of the Venetians, a breach was thus created between the two Princes, which was never closed. Yet to such few as were fortunate enough to win his good opinion, and to gain admittance to his person, no one could be more affable, gracious, and kind, and while he treated his nearest relations with a barbarity which exposed him to universal execration, he observed toward his prisoners of war with few exceptions a treatment which many better and more merciful men ridiculed as childishly generous. Alfonso of Arragon, whom the chances of war once threw into his hands, was received in a manner so considerate and liberal, that he was overpowered by astonishment; and the clemency of the Duke to Carlo Malatesta, after the fatal battle of San Egidio, belongs to the romance of history, and lives on the canvas of Uccello. If he had not been by nature morbidly timid, it might have been imagined that his idiosyncrasy proceeded from a keen consciousness of his ill-favoured exterior, and from a desire to

¹ Candidus, cap. 67.

contradict the first impression of a stranger, that he beheld before him the ugliest man in Europe. But if there was any point in which this unhappy Prince was less variable and inconstant than another, it was in his fidelity to his early friends and to his old servants.

Filippo left behind him four wills, made at different periods and under various influences. By the first in date he named his cousin Antonio, by the second, a distant relative, Jacopo Visconti, his successor. The third left Bianca sole heiress: while the last, drawn up shortly before his decease, at the moment when Sforza was led by the behaviour and professions of the testator to believe himself in the highest favour, and signed by a dying man, annulled all its predecessors, and bequeathed the Dukedom of Milan to Alfonso, King of Arragon and the Two Sicilies.

The Republic which, apart from her well-founded resentment against Sforza, had no desire to witness a new dynasty established on the vacant throne, and which saw that, at all events, it was essential to oppose the pretensions of Alfonso, dispatched on receipt of intelligence of the Duke's death (August 17) the Secretary Bertucci Nigro, to offer Milan her support in its return to popular institutions, and to convince the Milanese that, in waging war against them, she had been solely actuated by a sense of the necessity of curbing the ambition of their late ruler. Conformably with these counsels, the subjects of the Duke, boldly taking advantage of the uncertainty and confusion in which his testamentary dispositions had involved his affairs, came to the resolution of ignoring all the instruments; and a Republic was proclaimed at Milan itself, Como, Alessandria, and Novara, with a new coinage of correspondent type.

Had not Visconti made a fourth will, the extreme probability is that his son-in-law would have succeeded without any dispute to his possessions, and that all the Italian Powers would have hastened to recognise him, and court his alliance, even the Signory, perhaps, not excepted. As the case stood, the Count felt that he had never been in so trying a situation; he seemed to have arrived at that point of his career, on which his future destiny must turn. La Marca was in the hands of the Church, with which he was at variance. Bologna and many other places had returned to independence. Lodi

and Piacenza had spontaneously accepted Venetian governors. Venice viewed him with any but friendly sentiments. Florence had neither the inclination nor the ability to serve him. In Naples, he had a competitor whose cupidity was equal to his own, and whose title was superior. Moreover, Frederic III. claimed Milan as a fief of the Empire: while another pretender appeared in the person of Charles, Duke of Orleans, son and representative of Valentina Visconti.

From motives of the clearest prudence, Venice objected almost in equal measure to Sforza and Alfonso. It was her desire to see Filippo-Maria without an heir, and Milan self-governed under her auspices. But Milan was too weak to protect itself without external support, and too proud to listen to the somewhat hard terms offered to its acceptance by the Signory. The Venetians, if they aided the Commune in the recovery of Pavia and the remainder of the old territory belonging to it, demanded for themselves "Crema and the Cremasque, Cremona and the Cremonese, with the city of Lodi." To such a proposal no disposition was evinced to accede; and the Milanese, on the contrary, insisted on the restitution of Lodi and Ghiaradda (September 25, 1447). The Ducal Government pointed out, that these towns had voluntarily placed themselves under its protection; and Milan was required to deliver an ultimatum before a specified day. That decision being in the negative, the Republic wrote to several Powers, justifying the approaching suspension of her relations with the municipality, and invited Charles of Orleans to advance his pretensions, with the promise of her countenance and help (May 1448¹).

Venice was perfectly at liberty to dispose on paper of the Visconti inheritance; but there was a person, who conceived not improperly that he had some right to be consulted on such a question; and that person was Sforza. It was not to be expected that a soldier of fortune, no stranger to the darker side of life, and who in his time had suffered every species of vicissitude, would tamely submit to the loss of so rich a prize. The Count was sensible that he was surrounded by difficulties of a formidable kind; but his genius rose with the occasion; and while others were negotiating, he prepared to fight. After all, the point at issue was not whether Milan should accept or

¹ Romanin, iv. 215.

decline a yoke, but whether that yoke was to be an Italian, a Spanish, or a French one. Again, even if Charles of Orleans and the King of Naples had not been claimants, there was the certainty that some other adventurer—a Piccinino or a Coleoni—would come forward as a rival; and the only course, therefore, which remained to the husband of Bianca was to clear a path for himself with his sword.

An impression had now for some time been gaining ground at Venice itself, that the Milanese revolution could not possibly be accomplished without bloodshed, and might be attended by immediate danger to the Republic. Peace was manifestly a condition of things, on the duration of which it was delusive and hazardous to reckon; and the Foscari Government appreciated the necessity, while it was treating with Milan, of forearming itself against Sforza. The pestilence had again made its appearance in the capital, and had committed horrible ravages; but amid all their distress householders and tax-payers cheerfully responded to the call for new aids; and a considerable sum was collected in voluntary contributions alone.¹ An attempt was also commenced to reduce the National Debt, and to place the finances on a satisfactory footing. A large draft of troops was sent to garrison "our city of Ravenna." Every soldier who could be spared from the tranquil provinces of *terra firma* was forwarded to the headquarters of the new commander-in-chief, Michele Attendolo, a kinsman of the Lord of La Marca, but an officer of very inferior capacity. A powerful flotilla under Andrea Quirini was stationed in the Po.

All eyes were now turned upon one object. Circumstances had changed, and with them had changed the interests and views of Count Sforza. That great man was no longer a suitor in suspense and an heir robbed of his rights. In 1440, the Count had fought with wonderful results beneath the Flag of Saint Mark; in 1447 he found himself directing all the force of his talents against the Republic; and he even sent his secretary and eventual biographer, Angelo Simonetta, to Venice, nominally to arrange his business affairs, but in reality to intrigue with the councils. Simonetta was arrested and transported to Candia.

Meeting with no opponent capable of resisting his arms,

¹ Diedo, *Storia*, lib. x.

Sforza added conquest to conquest. The Orleanists were worsted at Bosco, in the territory of Alessandria. Piacenza was taken and sacked. The Bresciano and Bergamasque (1448) were once more overrun by hostile legionaries; and in July the Captain of the Po, attacked simultaneously by the Milanese army and flotilla, and unsupported by Attendolo, was obliged to save his squadron by committing the vessels to the flames.¹ Quirini, who had retired with his crews and men into Casalmaggiore on the night of the surprise, returned to Venice, where he was punished for his imprudence.

The successful movements of the enemy induced the Senate to test the result of shifting its ground, and abandoning the Milanese republicans; and on the 16th August that Body resolved "that Sforza be offered the lordship of Milan, upon the cession of Cremona only to the Republic." The Count replied by fresh progresses and fresh triumphs; at Caravaggio, on September 15, the Venetians under Attendolo, with whom Bartolommeo Coleoni, once more changing sides, served with a force of about 1500 men, were severely discomfited with heavy loss; and the victor prepared to march upon Brescia.

Since the rejection of the terms offered by the Senate in August, the Republic, displaying that wonderful fortitude which belonged to her, had been straining every nerve to check the ambition of Sforza. The Captain of the Lago di Garda, Maffeo Contarini *il Guercio*² was reinforced. Attendolo was put under arrest, and closely confined at Conegliano, on a charge of gross dereliction of duty. We do not hear whether any direct blame was attached to Coleoni; but he was not chosen to take the place of his chief. For Pasquale Malipiero, Procurator of Saint Mark, and Jacopo Antonio Marcello proceeded to Caravaggio to reorganize the Army. Venice was unable just at this moment to command the services of a Gattamelata, who had died at Padua in 1443;³ but she was proudly conscious of the possession of boundless resources, of indomitable courage, and of an iron will.

Sforza was slightly awed by the new preparations and by the resolute temper of the Signory. He promptly released the prisoners taken on the field of Caravaggio as a conciliatory

¹ Romanin, iv. 216.

² Ibid. 218.

³ His equestrian statue in bronze by Donatello was erected in front of the church of San Antonio there ten years later.

measure, and in the course of September, Angelo Simonetta, who had found means to rejoin his employer, with his knowledge and concurrence availed himself of a momentary estrangement between Sforza and the republican party in Milan to open proposals to the Proveditor Malipiero; and those proposals ripened into the outline of a treaty (October 18, 1448), by which the Venetians consented to aid with 4000 horse under Coleoni and 2000 infantry the adopted son of the late Duke to acquire the sovereignty of Milan, and to pay him till the completion of the arrangement *thirteen thousand gold ducats a month*, provided that Crema and Ghiaradda were ceded to them, in addition to the territory guaranteed under the treaty of 1441. A fortnight after the conclusion of this convention at Rivoltella, an envoy arrived from Milan with enlarged powers, and, as it was believed, ampler concessions to the Republic. To his surprise, he was informed (November 3): "The Senate is no longer in a position to receive you, as it has already made terms with Francesco Sforza."

It seems rather doubtful, whether the treaty of Rivoltella was even put into writing. The new understanding, however, between Sforza and Venice served as a temptation to the former, coerced by the clamours of his mercenaries, to march upon Milan, and to essay the reduction of the capital by famine. The inhabitants determined to exert every effort to withstand, if not to repel, him. All the Free-Lances, whose services happened to be disengaged, were enlisted in their pay. Francesco Piccinino, a member of the family most bitterly at variance with the Attendoli, was appointed Generalissimo. The charge of the garrison was confided to Carlo Gonzaga, son of the Marquis of Mantua. Letters were written to the King of Naples, the Duke of Savoy, Charles VII. of France, the Dauphin, and the Duke of Burgundy, imploring succour.

There was an influential and somewhat large class at Milan, comprising the Ghibellines and certain other Nobles, who were secretly favourable to the pretensions of Bianca and her husband; and a correspondence was at an early stage opened between the Count and his partisans on the subject of a surrender. But unluckily some of the papers connected with this treasonable transaction fell into the hands of Gonzaga; and the latter, from a desire to make himself popular, revealed the plot. The Guelphs, and the people generally,

were furious. Their antipathy to Sforza increased tenfold. "Rather," they cried, "than have him, we will send for the Grand Signior or for the Devil of Hell!"

The attitude of the citizens of Milan was doubly damaging to the Count. Whilst the impediments, which he was experiencing, injured his military fame, and disappointed his financial calculations, an important change became observable in the tone and temper of the Republic; and the Senate, seeing the unexpected course of events, began to regret its premature generosity. The present exigencies of the Count, and his passed successes, which had given severe umbrage to Venice, coupled with the risk which the Signory incurred, by espousing his cause, of involving herself in hostilities with Naples, were coincidences claiming attention; and the Senate thought itself at liberty to reconsider its decision. The subsidy from Venice gradually ceased; the Government very fairly put it that it did not pay those, who did not serve the Republic. The pecuniary aid which Florence had hitherto afforded was, manifestly at Venetian instigation, withdrawn. It was known that a Milanese emissary had been admitted to an audience of the Ducal Government. These were sufficient indications, that a change was impending in the policy of the Signory; and all the facts quickly transpired. In the beginning of October (1449), at the moment when victory was within his grasp, and the enemy was reduced to the last stage of misery, the Proveditor Malipiero, accompanied by Orsatto Giustiniani, waited upon Sforza at headquarters, and signified to his Magnificence: "That the Republic, on account of the heavy outlay arising from a long series of wars, and of the prejudice, which the declaration of war received (July 8) from Naples, brought to her commercial interests, was obliged, *on the 24th of last month*, to effect a reconciliation with Milan"; and they cordially invited his Magnificence to vouchsafe his adhesion. The newest of new arrangements gave Crema and the Cremasque to Venice: to the *Ambrosian Republic* (as it was to be called) Lodi and Como, with their respective territory; while Cremona, Pavia, Piacenza and Parma were assigned to Sforza, as well as all his possessions beyond the Po and the Ticino, subject to the condition that, within six days, he should send in his ultimatum, and that within three weeks the lands

belonging to the Milanese should be evacuated. The Count was, besides, to be indemnified for the expenses he had incurred in acquiring those places, which he would now be under an obligation to cede; and it was stipulated that any differences, which might hereafter arise between the Milanese and himself, should be submitted to Venetian arbitration.

Sforza announced his readiness to acquiesce; and his brother Alessandro actually proceeded to Venice to conduct the Treaty. But, the twenty days' grace having expired, and the evacuation of the Milanese not having commenced, the Venetian commander, Sigismondo Malatesta, had orders to march upon Milan, and to attempt its relief. This plan not having succeeded from the strictness of the blockade, Malatesta directed Coleoni to endeavour to open the Passes by crossing the Adda, and advancing on Como. At that point Coleoni effected a junction with Giacomo Piccinino.

Meanwhile Milan presented an awful spectacle of anarchy and disorder. The garrison and the population were famishing. Accents of distress were audible in every thoroughfare. A crisis was unmistakably approaching. It was the 25th February 1450, when a variety of discordant cries was heard in the streets. Some were declaring that they would have the Venetians: some were for the Duke of Savoy, some for the King of Naples. Others shouted the names of Charles of Orleans or of the Pope. Such was the state of feeling, when Gasparo of Vimercate, an old gossip and companion-in-arms of Count Francesco, spoke a few words well and wisely for his friend. "All those you mention," cried Vimercate, in a public address, "are too distant, or, if not too distant, are too weak to help you. Your only means of extricating yourselves from famine and war is to submit to Sforza. In him you will find every good quality. He is just, merciful and kind. The best thing you can do is to recognise the son-in-law and adopted child of the late Duke as the legitimate successor of Filippo!" This advice, adroitly delivered when everybody was in a condition of total bewilderment, and on the brink of starvation, was applauded and embraced. In the first week of March, a deputation waited upon his Magnificence, preparatory to his admission into the City, with a constitutional Capitulary, which he signed; and on the 25th, the Count made his solemn entry into the capital, and was

borne in triumph to the Church of Our Lady, where a thanksgiving was celebrated for the happy event. A distribution of bread took place on the same day. On the 26th, Francesco, having presented himself in the principal square, was proclaimed with the customary forms PRINCE AND DUKE OF MILAN.¹

The Milanese hastened to drown the remembrance of passed griefs and hardships in every species of rejoicing; and congratulatory addresses were offered to their new ruler by all the Italian Powers, except Venice and Naples. The Florentines hailed with delight an occurrence calculated to bridle Venetian ambition; no State, perhaps, was so prodigal of its compliments and eulogy; and the breach, already existing between the Government of Cosmo de' Medici and that of the Doge, perceptibly grew wider. The Republic was naturally indignant at the pusillanimity and equivocal honesty of the Guelphs in succumbing to Sforza, when succour and deliverance were so near; and the Milanese Revolution of 1450, which unavoidably produced an organic change in Italian politics, and created a variety of new interests, had the effect of drawing two Powers, hitherto estranged by a coolness amounting to hostility, closer to each other. It was possible, that the Venetians had neither the desire nor the intention of promoting Neapolitan projects of aggrandizement; but they were aware of no better, or rather of no other, instrument for carrying out their resentment against Sforza. The Signory very probably cherished an idea that, with the assistance of Alfonso, the partition of the dominions of Filippo-Maria might be accomplished, instead of their dangerous reunion in the person of his representative. Under the influence of such considerations, the Government of Francesco Foscari entered, at the beginning of 1452, into an offensive and defensive league for ten years with the Neapolitan prince against Florence and Milan. All Florentine subjects were ordered to quit the Republic (May 16) and the Kingdom (June 11); and a war, in which Venice, Naples, Monteferrato and Siena, found themselves arrayed against the Milanese and Florentines, commenced late in the same summer.

The Holy See, weighing considerations and contingencies, and seeing the substantial position of its friends on the

¹ Romanin. iv. 222.

Adriatic, judged it desirable to have, in the presence of existing troubles, at least one strong support, on which it could lean, and in 1451, Nicholas V. forwarded to the Doge through the Venetian Ambassador at Rome, Nicolo da Canale, the sword and cap of maintenance and the umbrella.¹

The League, which the Signory had organized, and of which she had placed herself at the head, soon proved itself no contemptible combination. The Venetian army was divided into two sections, of which one under Gentili de Lionessa, after seizing the enemy's camp at Isola, crossed the Adda, and occupied Soncino and other points of the Milanese: while the second portion, led by Carlo Fortebraccio, a son of the famous Braccio di Montone, penetrated into the Lodesano. At the same time, the Marquis of Monteferrato, having ravaged the districts of Alessandria, Tortona, and Pavia, advanced unopposed to the very precincts of Milan; and Alfonso threatened Florence. The most curious circumstance was, that the troops of Sforza did not encounter those of the Confederacy in a single instance. In the early days of November, the Venetians and Sforzescans were once for a short period in presence on the plain of Monte-Chiaro. But an impenetrable fog enveloped both forces; and even when the weather improved, the two commanders were so forcibly impressed by the magnitude of the interests at stake, that they separated without striking a blow. The heavy expense incidental to a campaign which had been totally without result, added to the mingled dread and detestation in which the present Duke of Milan was now held at Venice, tempted the Council of Ten to assent to a scheme of assassination laid before it by some person unnamed. But the project was either abandoned at the last moment, or it was carried out, and did not answer expectations. The Decemvirs had probably bound over their anonymous correspondent to secrecy; and the Duke remained till his dying day, perhaps, in ignorance of the danger which had at one moment hung over him. In estimating the Italian civilization of the fifteenth century, it has to be considered what relation the morality of the Venice of Francesco Foscarei had to the morality of Florence under its Balia and of Milan under its Dukes. Venice was surrounded on all sides by neighbours jealous of

¹ Romanin, v. 349.

her power and her grandeur; and those neighbours freely taunted her with her pride and her ambition, as if she alone had been proud or ambitious. But none soberly pretended, that her political principles were abnormally lax, or that her statesmen allowed themselves to be guided in their public conduct by doctrines revolting to the delicacy of such men as Cosmo de' Medici and Filippo-Maria himself. But it is easy to understand how a small conclave of men, acting under severe provocation, reconciled themselves to a proceeding, upon which they were taught to look as little more than the removal of a nuisance and an obstacle.

The Duke of Milan, destitute of money and allies, and harassed by the concurrent attacks of so many enemies, was already inclining to peace, when the final collapse of the Greek Empire, and the Conquest of Constantinople by Mohammed II. (1453), struck all Christendom with dismay. That catastrophe, which had been foreshadowed during many years passed, taught Italy, at least for the moment, a lesson of concord and union. The Republic herself, though triumphant down to this point, was reluctant to prosecute a contest in which, looking at the pecuniary resources of her confederates, there was full ground for believing that she would be left at no distant date single-handed; and the proffered intercession of the Patriarch of Venice, Lorenzo Giustiniani, was accepted no less readily by his own countrymen than by the enemy. The negotiations, however, dragged so slowly along, and acquired so strong a resemblance to a temporising manœuvre, that the Senate wrote (December 11, 1453) to Francesco Veniero, resident ambassador at Turin, and desired him to seek once more the aid of France against the Duke, promising Venetian favour and support to Charles of Orleans in any conquests which his Excellency may attempt beyond the Po and Ticino, and on the Milanese side of the Adda."¹ It is hard to guess what the consequences might have been of a coalition between Venice and France for the partition of Lombardy, if such a plan had been actually accomplished. But the distinguished philosopher, Fra Simone da Camerino, who had devoted the best part of a life to the acquisition of knowledge, and whose learning and virtue procured him great influence over Sforza, succeeded, with the assistance of Paolo Barbo the Venetian

¹ Romanin, iv. 225.

Commissioner, after many journeys from Venice to Milan, in prevailing on the Duke to disarm the resentment of the Signory by assenting to an immediate pacification; and the consequence was that, on the 9th April 1454, the Treaty of Lodi was signed. Under its provisions the Republic retained all her conquests on the *terra firma*, and acquired in addition Crema and the Cremasque, with Caravaggio, Vailate, Brignano, and Rivolta. The Duke engaged to refrain from imposing any tolls on the navigation of the Adda at its confluence with the Serio, to demolish the fortress of Cereti, and to exchange his prisoners. Naples, Florence, Savoy, Monteferrato, Siena, and Mantua were included in the operation of the compact; and Genoa was left at liberty to give her adhesion.

Although the King of Naples was included in the treaty, the treaty had been signed entirely without his knowledge; and his Majesty was deeply hurt and exceedingly wrathful. The Venetian ambassador, however, smoothed away the difficulty with great adroitness, assuring the King that there had been no wish to offend or insult him; and after a good deal of demur and parade Alfonso suffered himself to be mollified (Jan. 26, 1455).

The peace was welcome enough everywhere. All the Italian States were weary of war and its burdens, and Florence groaned under its heavy and arbitrary system of taxation, where even the smallest incomes were made liable to assessment. The Republic studied in its fiscal system the popular prejudices, and under its constitution the class, which aspired to rule, also largely contributed to pay. To the excellent negotiator Fra Simone, to whom the happy issue was so largely due, the Senate granted as a reward the islet of San Cristoforo, on which he successively founded an Augustinian hermitage and a church, and the locality and its buildings were thenceforth known as San Cristoforo della Pace.

The House of Sforza, which long enjoyed supreme power not only at Milan, but, in the person of Caterina Sforza-Visconti, at Forli and Imola, is one of those which more or less strongly influenced the policy and fortunes of Venice at the point of time when the latter State had attained the summit of its power and territorial importance. It was a family of soldiers, and even the Lady of Forli distinguished herself as greatly by her martial prowess as by her energy as a correspondent

and her address as a needlewoman. Books with the Sforza arms occasionally present themselves. It would be interesting to have the means of ascertaining more about the literary possessions of a family once so conspicuous and so accomplished.

Venice was the only Power, which had exerted itself with any strenuousness to avert the Byzantine Revolution of 1453, and the Pontiff Nicholas V. was importunate in his appeal to the Signory to avert the intrusion into Europe of so much graver a danger on every account than the heresy of Photius; and Venetian resistance, partly owing to the distraction of Western affairs and the responsibilities of the Signory on the Italian *terra firma*, was exclusively maritime and wholly inadequate.¹ To have rendered intervention permanently effectual would have entailed on the Republic a vast and continuous expense. The Sultan himself was a young man of one or two-and-twenty; and the Turks had been preoccupied, down even to 1451, by the victories of the Tartars and Hungarians, as well as of the Republic at Gallipoli in 1416; and the ultimate catastrophe was thus sensibly retarded. The Venetian marine was in excellent order, and the reigning Greek emperor, Constantine XI., was a prince whose high and patriotic qualities were deserving of a better fortune. The Venetians, however, although they made common cause to a limited extent with the Genoese in assisting the Greeks, could not fail to appreciate the impossibility of defending Constantinople, with its miles of dilapidated fortifications, against the Turkish artillery, or, if the City was saved for the moment, of maintaining either the Greeks or themselves permanently there, especially since it was useless to count on a succession of Constantines. There was no want of desire to act. It was a case, however, where there was on calm reflection absolutely no alternative. The neglect of the Greek Government to take timely precautions, where the danger had impended nearly half a century, and where the crisis was only postponed by the reverses of the Turks in other directions, was fatal to the Christian cause and a far more serious blow to Venice than was immediately apparent. For European statesmen had yet to learn the organizing faculty and energy of the Osmanlis, whose forces, brought to bear on the Greek capital, were computed at

¹ *Riposta al Legato papale venuto per cccitare contro il Turco*, 18 Luglio, 1453; Romanin, iv. Doc. No. 6.

300,000 men and 375 vessels of all sail. Montaigne the Essayist in the next century expresses his admiration for them, and advises the young gentlemen of his own country to go to Turkey to learn the art of war.

But the transfer of the seat of Mohammed's Empire did not immediately disturb the normal diplomatic relations between the two Governments. The Republic would have sacrificed much to protect Constantinople from the Osmanlis; and the actual crisis may well have brought back to recollection the project canvassed in 1220-1 for transplanting the seat of Government to Constantinople, and practically abandoning the home and *patria* on the Adriatic; but in the interval vast political changes had been accomplished in the map of Europe and in the relations of Venice; but when the catastrophe was accomplished with the same remorseless atrocities as had distinguished the capture of the city by the Crusaders in 1204, a sense of commercial interest prompted her to be¹ foremost in ingratiating herself with the new master of the Golden Horn; and on the 18th April 1454, the Sultan, harassed by a Venetian fleet under Jacopo Loredano,² which was in Greek waters for the safeguard of Venetian interests, accorded to the Signory a charter for the security of her subjects and the protection of her trade. The change of government, dynasty, and religious faith did not disturb altogether the internal relations of Venice with the capital. Her Bailo and Patriarch, directly appointed by the Signory, still continued to discharge their respective functions, and even succeeded in maintaining amicable relations with the newcomers.

While the Venetians, yielding to the force of events, were thus fulfilling a political maxim, that they were in the first place Venetians and in the second place Christians, they did not enter with less warmth and avidity into a proposal emanating from the Duke of Milan, and seconded by the Medici of Florence and others, for a great Italian Confederation against Germany and France. The ambition of foreigners had always presented a source of danger and alarm to the Free Governments of the Peninsula; and both the danger and the

¹ *Trattato di Pace con Mohammed II.*, 18th April 1454, Rom. iv. Doc. 7.

² *Commissione a Jacopo Loredano di operare contro i Turchi*, Feb. 22, 1454; Romanin, iv. Doc. 5.

alarm had increased tenfold, since a Spanish prince took possession of the throne of the Two Sicilies, and established a claim to that of Milan. It was impossible to view without terror the prospect of a War of Succession in the Kingdom between France and Spain, and of a second in the Milanese between Spain and the Emperor. The death of Alfonso was capable of kindling the one, the death of Sforza the other. To meet such a contingency it was that, on the 30th August 1455, a little more than a twelvemonth after the Treaty of Lodi, a defensive league for five-and-twenty years was made between the Duke of Milan, the Florentines, and the Signory, against any Power or Powers which might hereafter attempt to disturb the tranquillity of Italy. The League of 1455, which Genoa and Modena were left at liberty to join, if they thought fit,¹ deserves to be regarded as a landmark in the history of those troubled times and of that unhappy country. It was a glorious bond of strength, union, and peace.

The policy of Venice had long become, however, systematically encroaching and absorptive. To swallow up all the petty States of the Peninsula was an aim on her part which, notwithstanding repeated disavowals, it was impossible to disguise. The path, which she trod, was not always perhaps of her own creation or of her own choice. She often found herself under the irresistible influence of external agencies, sometimes even an involuntary assailant in self-defence. She yielded to the course of events, when she gratified the dictates of ambition. It is commonly alleged that, in setting foot on the *terra firma*, the Republic took a false step; but, whether false or otherwise, the step was taken, and it was unavoidable. The appearance of Venice on the mainland in the character of a conqueror was to be accepted as a political necessity. The aggrandizement of Milan left her scarcely any option. If she had been less grasping, none would have gained by her moderation. It would have cost herself greater sacrifices, and what was actually a struggle for glory or honour, would have grown in a few years into a struggle for existence. The storms, which were perpetually rising in Italy, would have burst over her with tenfold violence. Not a single drop of blood, not a single ducat, would have been saved: while the invectives and reproaches, which envious neighbours were fond

¹ Romanin, iv. 226.

of showering on her, and which have been too frequently mistaken for History, would have fallen equally to her lot.

The eleven Provinces,¹ which formed the Venetian Empire on the *terra firma*, exclusively of the possessions of the Republic in Istria, Dalmatia, Servia, Austria, Albania, Greece, Syria, and the Mediterranean, represented the accumulations of fifty years (1404-54). The Patriarch of Aquileia had been dispossessed of Friuli. Roveredo had been wrested from Austria. Hungary had been compelled to abandon Zara and the other Colonies on that coast. The Counts of Goritz had numbered themselves since 1424 among the vassals of the Signory. The daring and successful genius of Sforza alone prevented the fulfilment of a scheme, which had more than once betrayed itself, for annexing Milan and the Milanese to the Dogado; and that scheme was postponed, not forsaken.

A city, European in situation, Oriental in nearly everything else, even in its unique national cathedral, was being impelled by inevitable destiny, with an assessable rent-roll of about four million ducats only and a limited population, to occupy a rank among Powers second only to Germany and France, and to maintain itself in readiness at any moment from year to year to send into the field or to put to sea military or naval forces, or both, to meet concurrent attacks from different quarters not on the islands, but on the vast continental and colonial possessions in Lombardy, Dalmatia, Friuli, and the Levant,² the Morea, Candia and Cyprus, and the Ionian Isles, inclusive; while policy and dignity required an enormous expenditure on ceremonial and complimentary entertainments and oblations, and wealth and prosperity had brought with them a passionate, despotic taste for luxury and show truly Eastern and compatible only with unfailling sources of supply.

Venice had left behind her in the distance her old antagonists: the pirates of the Illyrian sea, the Patriarch of Aquileia, the Genoese and the Pisans; and she was at present confronted with others, who, with the single exception of Genoa, were immeasurably more formidable and more permanently dangerous. The hostile force susceptible at any

¹ Padua, Ravenna, Verona, Treviso, Vicenza and the Seven Communes, Brescia, Bergamo, Feltre, Belluno, Crema, and Friuli.

² The large folded pocket map, based on one published in 1662, exhibits (with its inset) the territories in Europe and Asia which constituted the Venetian Empire or *Dominio Veneto* in its fullest amplitude.

moment of being arrayed against her in various sorts and measures of combination now comprehended not merely the whole of Western Europe, but the military and naval resources of Turkey, infinitely elastic and recuperative, and the lawless inroads of Mohammedan buccaneers more troublesome than those of Narenta. The latter in the anterior centuries had played toward Venice in a more limited measure the part taken by the Saxon, Jute, and Danish rovers, who so long desolated England, before they finally subjugated it. The Northmen, during the years occupied by the energetic rule of Alfred the Great and his immediate successors in England, had turned their attention elsewhere—to France, Spain, and Italy; but the growing maritime power of some of the Italian republics saved the Peninsula to a large extent from the evils experienced by those countries, whose naval resources were yet imperfectly developed.

The establishment of a Lombardo-Venetian Empire was a dream, which had gained ground since the accession of Foscari in 1423. The Republic had persuaded itself that the acquisition of a footing on the *terra firma* was essential to its security in many ways; but one conquest unfortunately seemed to necessitate and justify others. It became a question of ever setting back the frontier; and there was the concurrent difficulty, both a strategical and a financial one, involved in the maintenance and defence of the Eastern possessions. There was no organization of a permanent nature adequate to the support of such a double and divided burden. But the Venetians, when they changed their City into a State, exposed themselves to a lifelong choice of evils. Inaction on the Italian side grew impossible; if they observed neutrality, some other dominant Power would extend its landmarks within gunshot of the lagoons; if they played the part of conquerors, they incurred heavy expenditure, and could promise themselves no finality; and whether they were successful or otherwise, the same fatal contingency was to be feared: foreign intervention in some shape from one or another quarter.

The Republic had acquitted herself with high credit of her Thirty Years' War (1425-54) against the Duke of Milan and his Allies, in spite of a few reverses almost inseparable from a struggle maintained, often at great odds and under

grave disadvantages, with professedly military States; and she now occupied indisputably the first rank among Italian, if not among European, Powers. Her Empire was the most extensive, and promised to be the most durable, which had been formed on any constitutional principles since the days of the Romans. Her Senate was the most august assembly in the world. Her Navy was the finest which Europe had ever seen. During war, Venice employed, even at an exorbitant stipend, the best troops to be procured and the ablest generals of the age; and among her captains of companies it was not unusual to find sovereign princes. Her patricians, so far from being purely political in their education, or sordid in their tastes, prided themselves on the extent and versatility of their acquirements. They excelled in all manly exercises and in all enlightened pursuits. Not content with reading contemporary history, with mastering the intricacies of diplomacy, or with attaining the highest honours in the military profession, they studied the language which Cicero spoke, the language of the *Anabasis*, and the language of Holy Writ. They applied themselves to the liberal, mechanical, and occult sciences, and to the Fine Arts. They became diligent scholiasts. They searched for MSS. with an avidity eclipsing that of De Bure. They formed libraries, some of which were far larger than the Public Collections at Oxford or Paris. Some gave gratuitous instruction in the *Elements of Euclid*; others lectured on Ethics or Metaphysics. A Trevisano devoted ten years to the composition of a single treatise, which he never lived to finish. A Giorgio naturalised among his countrymen the literature of the Troubadours and the songs of Provence. To a Polo scientific men were indebted for the first Book of Travels in China, Kamtschatka, and Japan.¹ In a Dandolo, who was the idol of his countrymen and their Doge in his adolescence, we admire, looking back through a vista of five hundred years, the jurist and historian, and the friend and correspondent of Petrarch and Boccaccio.

Over such a State and such a people it had been the fortune of Francesco Foscari to preside during one-and-thirty years. But the splendour of rank and power did not in Foscari's case confer happiness or content; and the lot of the Doge was far from being an enviable one. The young

¹ The last the Zipangu or Nippon of the traveller.

Procurator of 1423 was now bending beneath the weight of fourscore years: yet the infirmities of age lay much more lightly on his head than the domestic afflictions, which had beset his path, and embittered his later days. Jacopo, the Doge's only surviving son, was wanting in none of the accomplishments which belonged to his station. His manners were elegant. He was well versed in classical literature, a distinguished and ardent Hellenist,¹ and, moreover, a discerning collector of MSS., pictures, and other objects of art and antiquity. One of his acquaintances, Lauro Quirini, described him as "doctrinà atque optimarum literarum studiis eruditus." But he was unhappily a person of weak character and loose principles; and his unsteadiness of conduct formed a continual source of pain and anxiety to his connexions. The conspicuous position, in which the husband of Lucrezia Contarini stood, rendered the slightest departure from propriety a theme for grave scandal; but the faults of Jacopo were not always confined to venial levities. From vanity, and partly perhaps from the pecuniary consequences of reckless extravagance, Foscarini at length permitted himself to become the vehicle for political corruption; and in the beginning of 1445 it came to light, that he had accepted bribes from certain placemen for the favourable exertion of his influence over the Doge. A denunciation was carried by some one—a Florentine exile, it is said—to the Advocates of the Commune, who in their turn laid the charge before the Ten. On the 17th February, the latter, finding the matter within their own cognizance, and judging it to be of high moment, procured in conformity with usage a Giunta of ten Nobles, and imposed on all an oath of inviolable secrecy. On the same day, a German, named Gaspar, one of Foscarini's servants, and several others, were taken into custody, on suspicion of being concerned in the charges preferred against their master. But the business, whether intentionally or not, was so clumsily performed, that Jacopo received warning of his danger; and when the order for his arrest was signed on the 18th, he was nowhere to be seen. It was not yet known that, on the earliest alarm, the culprit had filled his pockets with all the ready money at his command, and had

¹ *Correspondence of Francesco Barbaro and Poggio Bracciolini with J. F.* (Berlan, pp. 131-5).

escaped to Trieste; and the fear, lest he might take refuge in some foreign country,¹ led the Ten to issue directions next day (February 19), that the fugitive should be captured wherever he was found. They also decreed, "that neither the Doge nor his kindred shall be allowed to preside judicially now or hereafter in any case affecting those who constitute part of the Council itself or the Giunta, and that for the future, when it happens that this affair is in process of discussion, his Serenity and all other members of the family shall be peremptorily excluded from the sitting, 'in order that all may speak their mind without constraint.'" These measures, which indicated the importance attached to the subject in hand, were followed on the 20th by the grant of licences to wear arms to all members of the Committee of Inquiry. On that day (February 20), Giovanni Memo and Ermolao or Almore Donato, two of the three Chiefs of the Ten, moved as follows:—

"Considering the base, disgraceful and abominable excesses committed by Jacopo Foscari, son of our lord the Doge, against the honour and dignity of our State and Government, be it resolved that proceedings be opened against him (by default), in accordance with what has been said and read."

The resolution was carried; and numerous witnesses were examined in consequence. At a later hour, it was proposed by the remaining Chief, Francesco Loredano, "that the College be doubled, and that resort be had to torture to extract the truth more fully from the parties implicated"; but such conclusive proofs of criminality were thought already to exist, that the amendment fell to the ground, receiving only half-a-dozen votes;² and the sentence, that the accused should be banished for life to Nauplia, obtained an overwhelming majority of suffrages. All the accomplices of Jacopo were tried and convicted. The decision on his own case was read in the Great Council for the general information; the Dogaressa, who preferred her request through his Serenity, was refused permission to proceed to Trieste, and take a last farewell of the exile.

The sentence pronounced against Jacopo Foscari was marked by a severity proportionate to the declared heinousness of his offence; but no disposition was manifested by the Ten to enforce that sentence with rigour, or to lay themselves

¹ Berlan, *I Due Foscari: Memorie Storico-Critiche*, p. 69.

² *Ibid.* p. 72.

open to any charge of malignant persecution. On the contrary, this Body behaved toward the noble culprit with a tenderness, which positively amounted to a mockery of justice. Marco¹ Trevisano, the captain of the galley, which had been sent on the 25th February to transport the exile to his destination, wrote to his employers almost immediately after his arrival at Trieste, stating: "I have seen my lord Jacopo, and my lord treats the Ducal warrant with contemptuous levity, and declines to accompany me." In the decemviral decree on the 20th, death had been made the penalty of disobedience: yet the Ten, unwilling to insist upon this cruel alternative, contented themselves with sending a temperately worded message to his Serenity (March 11), in which "he was prayed to persuade his son to respect the law, and to spare the Republic the scandal of a resistance to their commands." All representations and intreaties, however, were lost upon the younger Foscari; and he was accordingly treated as a rebel. On the 7th April, his goods were *declared* confiscated;² the sentence upon him was solemnly confirmed; and it was decreed "that no one shall at any time under any pretence seek to obtain grace for the recusant."

Still the same delicacy remained apparent on the part of the Decemvirs in pushing the matter to extremities, and the same reluctance to exhibit unnecessary harshness toward the representative of the Most Serene Prince. The tribunal treated the offender with studied forbearance, and refrained under every provocation from chastising his insolent conduct, looking upon him rather as a spoiled and refractory child than as a contumacious citizen. Months slipped away, and Jacopo still lingered at Trieste, where he spent his time as pleasantly as his somewhat ailing health would permit. Nothing shook or roused the ostensible apathy of the Ten in this respect. Constant revelations of fresh delinquencies on the part of the Doge's son wrought no change. On one occasion (June 22, 1446) a Decemvir, scandalised and irritated by the languid indifference of his colleagues, laid on the table a motion complaining that "although so many propositions have been submitted to this Council, at present nothing whatever has been done, to the discredit assuredly of the said Council"; and a Select Committee was then appointed to report on the subject.

¹ Berlan, p. 77.

² *Ibid.* pp. 88-9.

But no practical results followed. Another term of five months elapsed; Trevisano died; and Foscari himself fell so seriously ill, that he kept his bed.¹ Both these circumstances were taken by the Great Council into merciful consideration; and in a House of nine hundred and eight members, a resolution passed (November 25, 1446) authorising the Ten, in concert with the Giunta and the Privy Council, "to deliberate and decide on the propriety of mitigating *or remitting* the sentence of Ser Jacopo Foscari." On the 28th, accordingly, at the motion of the six Privy Councillors, it was resolved by the Ten, considering the infirm state of health of Jacopo Foscari, and the death of Marco Trevisano, who was charged to convey him to his place of banishment, that, "all laws, all equity, justice and humanity requiring that, in extraordinary and unforeseen cases, against which it is impossible to guard, allowances shall be made for every one: it not being our desire to gainsay the Divine Will: and Providence being more potent than any laws: the excuses of the said Jacopo Foscari be accepted in the name of Jesus Christ, and the cause which prevents him from proceeding to his destination, be treated as legitimate, sufficient, and honourable." A Privy Councillor, Marino Soranzo,² proposed that the words "in the name of Jesus Christ" be omitted, and the phrase "by grace" be put instead; but the amendment, not receiving more than two votes,³ was negatived; and the original motion passed with fifteen suffrages. On the same day, the place of exile was changed from Nauplia to the Trevisano; and Jacopo obtained the privilege of an invalid, in being allowed to reside at his own house in the country, so long as he refrained from infringing his parol.

Shortly after the transfer of Foscari to one of the suburbs of Treviso, an accident led to the discovery in one of the closets at Saint Mark's of a chest containing 2040 ducats or thereabout; and from the statement of Simonetta, Secretary to Sforza,⁴ it was at once ascertained that the money had been sent by his master as a present to Ser Jacopo. Upon this disclosure, made April 5, 1447, Andrea Quirini, one of the Chiefs of the Ten, Giovanni Malipiero, Inquisitor, and Giovanni Giustiniani were commissioned to repair to the Palace, and to claim the box, the contents of which were forfeited to the

¹ Berlan, pp. 85-7.² *Ibid.* p. 85.³ *Ibid.* p. 87.⁴ *Ibid.* p. 89.

Government by virtue of the inexorable rule that neither the Doge nor his family should receive gifts of value from any one, least of all from foreign Powers. But so little did a spirit of vindictiveness really enter into the prosecution, that the Council with consistent indulgence neglected to attach any penal consequences to the equally illegal and unconstitutional act. On the contrary, hardly more than five months had passed since the revelations respecting the secret-service money, when the old Doge, having addressed a supplicatory and touching appeal to the Ten, succeeded in obtaining at their hands a full pardon for his unhappy child. On the 13th September (1447), the very day on which the Ducal petition was presented, it was moved as follows:—

“Chiefs: Marco Longo; Matteo Vetturi; Vettore Cappello.

“Whereas our most serene Lord the Doge hath caused a petition to be made to this Council that grace be shown to his son Jacopo, confined at Treviso, as is set forth in the memorial laid before the Council, and (whereas), considering the condition of the times and the grave matters which occupy our State, it is necessary to have a Prince whose mind is easy and free from suffering, which cannot happen so long as his only son remains in exile, unsound in body and mind, as is familiar to all; and (whereas) it is an act of piety to exhibit toward our Lord the Doge himself, in this case of his son, that humanity and grace which this Government has been wont to use toward its other Nobles and subjects, in the times in which Our Lord God has vouchsafed to extend and amplify the dominion of this City; taking into account likewise, that the deserts of the Lord Doge demand a gracious hearing, and that it is his only son, for whom he pleads; be it resolved and ordered that, for all and every the reasons and respects aforesaid, the said Jacopo may freely return to Venice.” The motion was almost unanimously carried; and Jacopo was restored to his family.

For upward of three years neither the Archives nor the Chronicles bear any allusion to the hero of the foregoing story. Sobered a little by bitter experience and by the increased delicacy of his health, Jacopo was probably during all that time in the tranquil enjoyment of conjugal happiness. But fresh and greater troubles were in store for the Ducal family.

On the evening of the 5th November 1450, the patrician

Ermolao Donato, as he was leaving the Palace, after attendance at a sitting of the Pregadi, on his return to his own residence at Santa-Maria-Formosa, was stabbed by an unseen hand; the blow did not prove immediately fatal; and Donato, having been carried home, survived till the 7th. The murdered man had filled at different periods some of the highest offices in the State; and during the months of January and February 1445, when the crimes of Foscari were first divulged, Francesco Loredano, Giovanni Memo and himself were the three Chiefs of the Ten.¹ On the following morning the Decemvirs met, at the summons of their Chiefs, Ermolao Valaresso, Giovanni Giustiniani, and Andrea Marcello, to inquire into "the horrible violence and detestable iniquity committed last night on the person of the noble Ermolao Donato, our citizen"; and a Giunta of ten Nobles was formed as in the previous case. The mystery, which hung over the authorship of the tragedy, remained, however, unsolved. Exorbitant rewards were proclaimed to tempt those, who might be in possession of the secret; but no information transpired. On the 27th, one Luchino Zeno was arrested on suspicion; but his innocence was satisfactorily established, and after a short incarceration he was set at liberty. On the 9th December, a new proclamation was published, and fresh inquisition was made. But no clue could be obtained. At length, on the 2nd January 1451, on the information of Antonio Veniero, a Noble, an order was signed for the arrest of Jacopo Foscari and of several others, his accomplices. The members of the Council of the Giunta were forbidden under pain of death to communicate to any one the informer Veniero's name.

Veniero alleged rather lamely, in support of his denunciation, that on the 6th November last Olivero Sguri, one of Foscari's servants, happened to meet Benedetto Gritti at Mestra, a few miles out of Venice, and gave him full particulars of the murder which had been perpetrated near Saint Mark's the night before. The deponent also asserted that on the 5th, at the hour when the Pregadi usually dispersed, Sguri had been seen hovering about the corridor leading to the Pregadi Saloon, as though he was waiting for somebody. The testimony of Veniero was not very lucid or convincing. There was no reason why the intelligence, which Sguri had imparted

¹ Berlan, p. 67, *et seqq.*; Romanin, iv. 273.

to Gritti of Mestra the day after the occurrence, might not have been imparted by any other traveller from the Capital ; and unless it was to be shown that the object of Sguri and his employer was to throw the Government off its guard, it was obvious that silence would in such a case have been a surer indication of guilt than the apparently uninvited reference of Olivero to Donato's tragical end. At the same time, several points were adduced which, taken together, represented something approaching a connected chain of indirect evidence. Although Donato had explicitly declared on his deathbed, that he did not *know* who was his murderer, it was established that a personal enmity of the most violent description had subsisted between the younger Foscari and his supposed victim since February 1445, when, as one of the Chiefs of the Ten, it became Donato's duty to pronounce the sentence of the 20th ; and, arguing by a negative process, it was exceedingly natural to identify Jacopo's confidential servant—the only person who was observed loitering about the scene of the murder at the moment—as the author of the crime. The proposition of Luca da Legge, Privy Councillor (February 6, 1451), and also one of the Giunta, “that the proceedings shall be suspended and the charge dismissed, on the ground that the conduct of Veniero springs from the most mercenary motives, and that his denunciation is a piece of glaring perjury,” was therefore negatived with some reason as at any rate too hasty ; and a motion was substituted, directing the College, to whom the Ten had delegated the task of investigation, to prosecute their labours with all possible diligence. The members of this Special Committee were—Luca da Legge, Privy Councillor ; Paolo Barbo, one of the Chiefs of the Ten ; Dolfino Veniero, Avogador of the Commune ; Paolo Trono, Procurator of Saint Mark, and three more. It appears, in support of a reluctance to accept the denunciation of Veniero, that the character of the latter was, according to the historian Sanudo, far from immaculate, and that his motive was the expectation of some public bounty ; and a strange rumour, to which, however, no official credit seems to have been attached, was in circulation, just about this time, that on his deathbed one Nicolo Erizzo confessed himself the assassin of Donato, who had, in his capacity as an Avogador, charged him before the Forty as a thief.

The Committee sat during the remainder of February and through the greater part of March. Andrea Donato, brother of the deceased, was asked to state "whether Ser Ermolao had let any expression drop *in articulo mortis*, which tended to criminate Jacopo Foscari?" But Andrea could merely say that his kinsman in his last moments emphatically declared "that he freely forgave his *unknown* assassin." Several other witnesses were called. Numerous documents and oral affidavits were received and submitted to consideration. Sguri and Jacopo himself were examined under torture. From Foscari's lips no confession was obtained; for he merely muttered a few unintelligible sentences between his teeth, while his limbs were wrenched by the cord; and it is characteristic that these incoherent sounds were taken to be some form of magical incantation. On the whole, the result was not very satisfactory; and the proceedings still exhibited a very faint prospect of termination, when, on the 26th March, it was resolved:—"That it is necessary to bring to a close this trial, which has during so protracted a period been engaging the *undivided* attention of the Council."¹

It was then proposed to the Ten by two of the Chiefs, Carlo Marin and Paolo Barbo, that sentence should be entered on the Minutes as follows:²—"Whereas, on the 3rd January last (1451), on account of the violent death of Ser Ermolao Donato, Jacopo Foscari was detained and examined, and whereas by the evidence, oral and written, which has appeared against him, it is shown that he is *clearly* guilty of the aforesaid crime, although he obstinately refuses to confess it, be it resolved that, for the aforesaid reason, the said Jacopo be relegated to the City of Canea, in our island of Candia, in such manner as to the Chiefs of this Council shall seem good, and shall be obliged to present himself once a day to the Government of Candia, not breaking his parol; and if he escape, and should at any time hereafter fall into the hands of our Government, his head shall be severed from his shoulders, and all his property sequestrated." This was carried by a large majority, as were also the ensuing resolutions:—

"That Jacopo Foscari be treated as a private citizen, and not as the son of the Doge; that the sentence be published at the next meeting of the Great Council, for the information of

¹ Romanin, iv. 279.

² Berlan, pp. 106-7.

all ; and that dispatches be sent to the Podesta of Canea and to the three Governments of Candia, Rettimo, and Sitia, apprising them of the fact, and desiring them to proclaim the decree throughout their respective jurisdictions.

“That the Chiefs of the Council shall repair immediately to the presence of the Most Serene Prince, to notify to him the sentence pronounced against Jacopo his son, and to exhort him to exercise good patience ; and that this Council shall not separate, until the Chiefs return.

“That the obligation of preserving silence in respect to this affair be removed, excepting as regards the names of the informers and other third parties (*tertiorum*).”

Both the original resolution and the supplements thus became law. At the same time on Sguri, the servant and presumed accomplice of the Doge’s son, a sentence of perpetual exile from the Venetian dominions was pronounced.

On the 29th of the month, the Signori di Notte repaired to the Palace at night, and received their prisoner ; and on the following morning at three o’clock they conducted him to the ship of Mistro Luca Mantello, which was employed to forward him to his destination ; and in Mantello’s hands their lordships placed the following warrant :—

“We Francesco Foscari, by the Grace of God, Doge of Venice, Treviso, etc.

“Luca :

“We intrust to thy ship Jacopo Foscari Our son, who will be consigned to thee by the noble gentlemen Our Lords of the Night ; and We, with Our Council of Ten and the Giunta, do charge thee to keep close ward over the same Jacopo, and to deliver him to our Government of Candia, together with the letter which We have caused to be given into thy hands, directed to the said Government, according to thy own discretion. And so soon as the said Jacopo shall have embarked, We, with the said Council, command thee on no account to permit the said Jacopo to quit thy ship, but to watch him vigilantly, and at thy speedy departure hence to pursue with all diligence and care thy voyage into Candia.

“Given on the 29th March 1451.”¹

¹ Berlan (p. 112). The superscription of this letter was the only portion really written by the Doge. The body of the composition was framed by the Ten.

There was the strongest presumption of guilt against Jacopo Foscari. In the decree of the 26th March his criminality was even said to have been clearly established! Yet of direct or circumstantial evidence there was absolutely none; and the Decemvirs, not feeling justified in proceeding to the harsher measures, which a second offence of so black a dye might have otherwise required, contented themselves, in concert with the Giunta and the Privy Council, with banishing the accused to a spot, where the climate was delightful, the society excellent, where no restraint was to be placed on his movements, provided that he observed his parol, or on his correspondence. There was an almost universal conviction that Jacopo was fairly punished; but there was simultaneously every desire to believe him innocent. By the terms of their decree the Ten laid themselves under a disability from proposing at any future date a repeal or even a mitigation of the penalty imposed: yet it was no sooner intimated (1st August 1453), that somebody was prepared to deliver certain depositions, helping to shed new light on the unhappy affair, than the Chiefs of the Council had leave to entertain the matter by special motion. No revelations, however, followed of any great relevance, or at least of a kind which might have thrown a doubt into the scale on the side of mercy; and Foscari accordingly continued to reside at his villa in Canea in the enjoyment of personal liberty and of many indulgences, but removed some hundred leagues from those most dear to him, and nominally, at least, obliged to report himself to the Governor every day. To the son of the Doge of Venice, to a husband and a father, who could say that this bereavement was not sufficiently cruel, or that that humiliation was not sufficiently keen? Still the temper of the Government did not cease to lean in the direction of clemency; and there was the utmost probability that grace would have been extended to him, so soon as the flagitious nature of the crime brought home to him rendered his recall expedient, when his prospects were damaged to an almost irretrievable extent by his own desperate recklessness.

It is on the 4th June 1456, that dispatches unexpectedly arrive from the Government of Canea respecting Jacopo Foscari. On the 7th, these papers are laid before the Ten; and they are declared to be of such gravity and moment, that the

Council demands the association of a Giunta of twenty nobles. The closest secrecy is prescribed; but members of the new Committee are allowed to speak to each other unreservedly on the subject in hand. It is collected from the parcel of documents, of which some are in cypher, that Foscari has been urging the Duke of Milan (Sforza) to intercede on his behalf with the Signory, and that, not even satisfied with this misdemeanour, he had actually addressed a letter to the Sultan, in which he implores him to send a vessel to Candia, and to convey him secretly from the Island. To the letters in cypher, which the courier delivers, the key is missing, and the worst suspicions as to *their* contents are aroused. It is stated that the intrigue with the Turkish Court has been conducted through the medium of one Jacopo Giustiniani, and of a certain Battista, both Genoese, and the latter of whom was asked to put the addresses on Foscari's letters to Constantinople. Giustiniani and Battista are able, it is imagined, to furnish a good deal of information concerning the correspondence. Upon this suggestion, the Ten determine to act; and on the 12th June, the following dispatch is sent by that tribunal, in the Doge's name, to the Governor of Canea:—

“ We Francesco Foscari, etc.

“ On the 4th inst., we are in receipt from Luigi Bocchetta *detto* Ballottino of your letter, and of notes of the proceedings initiated by you on the declarations of Giovanni Rosso of Treviso, with the result of the examination of the said Luigi, and a copy of the letter in the handwriting of Jacopo Foscari received by him. On the day after (June 5), we had your other letter, through your messenger Giovanni Musso, on the same subject, together with the authentic letter in Jacopo's hand, and the leaves in cypher. We commend you for what you have done, and for the judicious manner in which you have made us acquainted with everything. Among other points, we observe that, within the last month, some Genoese escaped from shipwreck, landing at a place called Chisamo, repaired to the house of Ser Jacopo Giustiniani, a Genoese resident of Canea; and one of them was a certain Battista, with whom Jacopo Foscari contracted a close intimacy, conversing with him daily, and giving him an account of his own

affairs. Among other things, he begged him to address a certain letter, which he desired to send to the Emperor of the Turks, with the object of removing him from Canea, and of withdrawing him in such manner from his exile. All which facts must be familiar to the said Jacopo Giustiniani, since they were settled in his own house; and you also inform us that the letter in question was positively consigned to the said Battista, who undertook to deliver it safely, and to get an answer. We wish, then, and with our Council of Ten and the Giunta, we command you to summon to your presence the said Jacopo, and to call upon him to say on oath whatever he knows on the subject; whether Foscari *had* a reply from Turkey; and, if so, whether he had it through Battista; and all other details explanatory of the steps adopted by him to violate his parol against the honour of our Government, and to the prejudice of our State. You will transmit the depositions of this Ser Jacopo with your own dispatches under seal to our Council of Ten.

“Given on the 12th June 1456.”

Notwithstanding the treasonably unconstitutional nature of the charges against Foscari, two of the Privy Council, desiring that his “thoughtless and giddy” disposition should be suffered to plead in his behalf, had already, in their capacity as members of the Committee, moved (June 8¹):—

“That it seems to this Council, that instructions should be sent to the Governor of Canea to send for Jacopo, to administer to him a stern rebuke, and to signify to him that, if the offence be repeated, he will have reason to be sorry for it.” But so mild an expedient did not meet with general approval, and it was ruled instead:—“That he shall be brought under suitable escort from Candia, and shall be put upon his trial on the high misdemeanours, of which he is arraigned.”

The instructions delivered to Lorenzo Giustiniani, a Chief of the Ten, who was charged with the duty of reconducting Foscari to Venice, were of the most stringent and circumspect complexion. He was to pursue his voyage to Canea without interruption, unless some unavoidable exigency arose; on the

¹ All these statements are founded on the documents printed by Berlan in *I Due Foscari*, 1852, carefully collated with Romanin.

arrival of the galley at Lido, all on board were to surrender their papers to the commander, who was to detain them till his return home, and then hand them over to the Ten. When he reached Canea, the vessel was to lie at anchor outside the port, and Loredano alone was to land, in order to carry the ducal warrant to the Governor, and demand the person of Jacopo Foscari, with all his servants and papers. He was thereupon to bring back his prisoner to the ship, place him under guard, and see that his meals were served by some trustworthy hand. Loredano was enjoined to touch, on the return voyage, at no intermediate station, and when he was ready to disembark at Venice, no one save his prisoner and himself was to leave the vessel, and no one was to be permitted to approach the point where they landed. The gravity of the case is corroborated by the committal of this task to so exalted a functionary.

The articles of impeachment were framed by a Special and Select Committee, appointed on the 14th July, and consisting of Zaccaria Valaresso, Privy Councillor; Marco Cornaro, Chief of the Ten; and Zaccaria Trevisano, Advocate of the Commune, Doctor of Laws, and an eminent literary man. Foscari arrived on the 21st. He avowed the whole affair unreservedly; and the process was so much simplified by this confession, that the discussion on the sentence began on the next day, when the Committee was in full attendance. The Body was composed of the Privy Council, the Ten, the Giunta (twenty), and the Avogadors (two). Opinions were various. Five of the six Privy Councillors, including Lorenzo Loredano, one of the Chiefs of the Ten, and the Avogadors, joined in thinking that the ends of justice would be served by remanding Foscari to his place of banishment, with a warning that "on the next conviction, he would be imprisoned for life." Valaresso, the remaining Councillor, added a twelve-month's confinement at Canea. Cornaro, another Chief of the Ten, was in favour of sending back the exile without any additional penalties. On the other hand, Jacopo Loredano, the third Chief, considering the grave importance of the charge, voted for capital punishment. These several propositions were successively balloted, and the result was, that the original proposal, as amended by Valaresso, was carried (July 24).

Between the 24th July, the day of the condemnation, and the 29th, the day on which the Ducal commission¹ was handed to Captain Maffeo Lioni, master of the galley selected to carry the exile back to Candia, Foscari was lodged in one of the airy and commodious chambers of the Torricella State-Prison at the Palace itself; and there he was permitted to receive visits from all the members of his family and others, who were shocked by the scars produced on his person by the thirty strokes of the lash which he had endured. The spectacle was highly affecting. The agonised countenances, the tears, the sobs, the last embraces, were absolutely melting; and the final meeting between the father and son in an ante-chamber (*Camera del cavaliere del Doge*) is described by Giorgio Dolfino,² a kinsman of his Serenity and an eye-witness, as having been sublimely pathetic. "Father," cried Jacopo, "I beseech thee to procure me leave to return to my house!" "Jacopo," rejoined the other, "go, obey the will of the land (*La terra*), and seek nothing beyond." But the painful exertion, which it had cost the old Doge to command his feelings, had a quick reaction. So soon as Jacopo had left the *bussola* or ante-chamber, his parent sank faintly back on the nearest chair, and, the inflection of his voice betraying his intense anguish, faltered out, "O pietà grande!"

After the departure of his beloved offspring on the 29th July, 1456, Foscari neglected no opportunity of advocating his cause, and applied all the family influence to this cherished object. Vettore Cappello, one of the Privy Council, Paolo Barbo and Orsatto Giustiniani, two of the Chiefs of the Ten, and many others, sympathised with his grief, and strenuously interested themselves on his behalf; and the canvass among the leading members of the Executive was progressing favourably,³ when the news came that death had done its work, and that the unfortunate man was no more. A marginal note is found to one of the Decemviral Minutes of the 24th July; it is to the following purport:—

"He (Jacopo) died on the 12th January 1456 (*i.e.* 1457), as appears by a letter of the Government of Canca."⁴ The

¹ Preserved entire in Berlan (p. 130).

² Cronica MS. in the Marcian Museum, quoted by Romanin.

³ F. Cornaro, *Quatuor Opuscula*, 1755.

⁴ Berlan, p. 127.

deceased by his wife Lucrezia Contarini left a son Nicolo and two daughters.

This stunning blow paralysed all the remaining energy of the Doge. Surrendering himself to sorrow, he remained secluded in his own suite of apartments, absented himself from every Council, and not only declined to take any part in public affairs, but refused to see any one on business. Such a determination was calculated of course to throw the whole machinery of the Government into disorder, and to lead to the most serious inconvenience. There were cases in which constitutional usage rendered the Doge's presence or his signature indispensable; and the complete withdrawal of Foscarini from his duties therefore became a source of almost daily embarrassment. On the 18th June 1457, the Decemvirs assembled to discuss the question. The Privy Councillors were also invited to be present; but, as the meeting was of a strictly confidential character, they were enjoined not to reveal the subject of the debate, at the peril of their life, to anybody whomsoever; and the Doge himself naturally refrained from attending. The Council separated, however, after all, without arriving at any definitive resolution; the age and services of the Doge rendered the treatment of his case very difficult and delicate; and the matter was not again broached till late in the autumn. On the 19th October, the assent of the tribunal was obtained to the peculiar gravity of the circumstances, and to the propriety of sanctioning the formation of a Giunta or *Additio* of five-and-twenty Nobles, to deliberate upon the course of action most fitting to be pursued. On the same day, the exclusion of Leonardo Contarini, a member of the Ten, and of David Contarini, Privy Councillor, both relations of the Ducal family by marriage, was decreed; and on the 21st, in the presence of the Ten, the Privy Council, and the Giunta, making an aggregate of forty persons, the ensuing motion was submitted for approval:—

“There is no one,¹ who does not thoroughly comprehend, how useful and altogether how essential to our State and to our affairs is the presence of a Prince, without which, as becomes manifest from the results, the greatest inconvenience and detriment are apt to arise to our State which, since it

¹ Berlan, p. 185.

has, by the infinite clemency of our Creator, been bequeathed to us by our forefathers hereditary and fair to look upon, we are bound to preserve with all our power, and to hold dearer to us than our very life; and although this our City is furnished with holy laws and ordinances, it is of little avail and profit if they be not executed, if the observance of the same be relaxed. The presence of the Prince, besides, in the Councils, at audiences, in the transaction of affairs of State, how desirable it is, how glorious it is, it would be superfluous to point out. All are aware that our most illustrious Prince has vacated his dignity for a great length of time; and from his advanced age it is not at all to be expected that he will be able to return to the exercise of the functions appertaining thereto. How pernicious his absence and incompetence are is more easily understood than explained. Wherefore: It is proposed that, by the authority of this most excellent Council with the Giunta (*cum Additione*), the resolution be agreed to, that the Privy Councillors and the Chiefs of this Council shall repair to the presence of the most illustrious Prince, and declare to him our opinion, 'that the government of our City and State (which, as his Highness knows very well, is excessively arduous), cannot be carried on without the constant presence and co-operation of a Prince; also, considering how long his Excellency has, for personal reasons, renounced all share in this government, and that there is no hope that he will be able at any time hereafter to discharge his duties according to the exigencies of this State; and (considering) that his absence is threatening to involve consequences such as we are assured, from his affectionate patriotism, he can never desire to witness:—on these grounds, which his Excellency, in his supreme wisdom, will readily appreciate, we (*i.e.* the Privy Council), with the aforesaid Council of Ten and the Giunta, have decided upon exhorting and requesting his Serenity, for the evident and necessary welfare of our State—his native land—freely and spontaneously to abdicate, which on many accounts he ought to do, as a good Prince and a true father of his country, and especially as we provide, that he shall have for his support and proper maintenance from our Office of Salt 1500 gold ducats a year for life, as well as the residue of his salary due to the present day. Also, that if it happen that the same most illustrious Prince, on this declara-

tion being made known to him, shall demand time to consider, he may be told, that we are content to wait for such answer till to-morrow at the hour of tierce."

This determination was adopted nearly without a dissentient voice, and the Chiefs and the Councillors proceeded accordingly to present themselves to Foscari. Jacopo Loredano, being the most eloquent, spoke for the rest, and delivered the message of which they were the bearers. Loredano employed those expressions, which were least apt to give umbrage. He declared that the very great age of his Serenity was the sole motive for objecting to his continuance in office; his Highness's passed life, he said, had been an honour to his country; and he concluded¹ by asking pardon of the Doge for the liberty which he had taken. Foscari, addressing himself to Loredano, replied at considerable length, justifying his conduct, complaining of such harsh treatment at his time of life after such services, and, intimating that the course adopted was at variance with the Constitution, which required in a similar case the concurrence of the Great Council; he finished by saying: "I will not decide yea or nay, but will reserve my freedom of action."

The constitutional question raised by the Doge was by no means without its importance in the eyes of the Ten. On the 22nd, the point was formally put to the ballot; but after three scrutinies it was decided to make no change. The Capi and the Privy Councillors paid therefore on that day a second visit to the Doge; but Foscari merely recapitulated what he had already said. The Chiefs and their companions then retraced their steps, and laid before the Committee, still sitting, a report of their continued ill-success. An animated controversy ensued. There was much diversity of sentiment on the course which it might be best to pursue. Hieronimo Barbarigo, one of the Capi,² represented the serious evils which were produced by the absence of his Serenity from the Councils. "It is notorious," remarked Barbarigo, "that Messer lo Doxe for four years passed has not only kept away from the College and from the Councils, but has refused admittance to the Privy Councillors and the Sages of Council, who came to consult him in his own apartments." On the

¹ Giorgio Dolfino contemp., quoted by Romanin, iv. 290.

² Berlan, p. 157.

contrary, Andrea Bernardo, one of the Giunta, spoke warmly and with striking eloquence on the Doge's behalf; and many others imitated his example, pleading for those white hairs and for those matchless services. But Barbarigo was ultimately permitted to carry a motion, "that his Serenity shall be required to retire within eight days upon the stipulated pension, with an intimation that by disobedience he will only incur in addition the penalty of forfeiture." Before the labours of the Ten and the Giunta were brought to a close, it was already eight o'clock in the evening; and his Serenity, whose frame was no longer equal to much fatigue,¹ was announced to have already retired. It consequently became necessary to defer till the 23rd any communication with him on the subject. On Sunday morning, the former deputation sought an audience; the Grand Chancellor read the resolution, at which the Council had arrived on the previous night; the Doge's comment was: "a trouble foreseen is somewhat less grievous to bear"; and he intimated his decision to obey, while he pointed out that, ever since his accession, he had exerted himself to preserve and enlarge the State, to maintain peace and goodwill, and refrained at present from being the cause of any disturbance, leaving himself and the sentence in the hands of God. He drew the Ducal ring from his finger, and saw it broken in his presence; and he was afterward uncrowned. As the deputies left the room, Foscarei observed that Jacopo Memo, a Chief of the Forty, and acting Privy Councillor, lingered behind the others, and gazed fixedly at him with an air of respectful compassion. The Doge beckoned him to his side, and, as they touched hands, inquired of him—"Whose son art thou?" The Minister said—"I am the son of Messer Marino Memo." To whom, again, the Doge: "*E mio caro compagno*," with a slight smile of gratification: "tell him from me that I shall take it dearly if he will come and visit me, so that he may go with me in the gondola for solace; we will visit the monasteries together."² The venerable person who uttered these words was verging on eighty-five; and during the greater portion of that period he had been a public man.³ Among his contemporaries he

¹ In addition to his great age, Foscarei was suffering from cancer.

² Dolfino, quoted by Romanin, iv. 294.

³ So far back as 1401 he had been a Chief of the Quarantia.

counted, indeed, many distinguished in all the paths of life, who had filled the highest embassies and most conspicuous commands, who had discharged the most important trusts, and achieved by land and by sea triumphs which made their names famous throughout the civilized globe; but there was none who could point to such a career as his own.

On the 27th October, Foscari prepared, in deference to a stern necessity, to quit the palatial abode which had been during the third part of a century his home, and where he had transacted a leading share in so many scenes of lofty and sometimes painful interest. He was attended by his brother Marco, one of the Ten, his old friend Marino Memo, and a few other connexions. He wore the Ducal bonnet divested of the horn and the gold fringe, and over his shoulders a scarlet hood and cloak which, when he was made Doge, he had desired his wife to reserve for him. He declined any support but the walking-stick on which he leaned. He was directing his steps toward the staircase to descend into the court below, when Marco said, "Serenissimo, were it not well to go to our gondola by the other stairs, which are covered?" Francesco sharply replied, "I desire to return by that staircase by which I mounted to the throne!"¹ And he embarked accordingly near the Ponte della Paglia, and so returned to his own house, where he received visits from several of his private friends. There is a tradition that, as he set foot in the boat, he muttered: "The malice of others has driven me from the height, to which my own deserts had raised me." But he named no one. It would have been something to have seen that party, as it passed along the Canal through the traffic, almost unobserved, to the landing stairs at San Pantaleone on the Grand Canal. Whatever judgment may be formed of his political career, the common voice of those on the spot agrees in the view that the deposed Doge enjoyed an exceptionally large measure of confidence and respect at the close of a term of office so peculiarly trying to his character and temper.

The Foscari had, several years before, abandoned the ancestral mansion at S. Simone Profeta, and purchased, when a favourable occasion presented itself, a more splendid one here of the Government. While the new owner was on the throne,

¹ G. Dolfino, as above.

and until the house was unexpectedly required for habitation, it had been left unfurnished, and the windows unglazed, so that arrangements were necessary to prepare the place for the deposed Doge, before he could occupy it, and to remove the personal effects, bedding inclusive, from the Palace. The noble edifice at San Pantaleone abounded in historical associations, having been the temporary residence assigned to successive personages, whom the Signory desired to honour. The reference of Marco Foscari was, no doubt, to the water-gate abutting on the Rio di Palazzo, adjacent to the existing one, if not on the same site ; but the Doge preferred the open stairs, which the young Procurator of 1423 ascended to take possession of the throne vacated by Mocenigo. There was no Giants' Staircase in those days, no Bridge of Sighs, no Rialto one : all these were to come.

The Electoral Chamber, which had met to deliberate upon the succession, arrived at no decision till Sunday, the last day but one of October ; and in the intervening time, Orio Pasqualigo, Senior Privy Councillor, officiated as Vicegerent. On the afternoon of the 30th, at half-past three, Pasquale Malipiero, one of the Procurators of Saint Mark and a public servant of tried capacity in many departments, was pronounced the fortunate candidate, the right to assume the Ducal insignia being reserved, from respect to Foscari, till his decease. Malipiero took possession of the Palace on the same evening at ten o'clock. When Foscari learned the news, he declared his approval of the selection, and his satisfaction "That the choice of the Forty-one had fallen on so worthy a nobleman." The 31st October passed without any fresh incident. On the 1st of the new month, "the Doge Malipiero," says Giorgio Dolfino, "was attending mass in the Cathedral, when Andrea Donato came up to him, and told him that Foscari had expired at one o'clock on All Saints' morning."¹ It was supposed that the immediate cause of death was a sudden and violent hemorrhage from a cancer formed on the tongue.² Malipiero and those with him were struck mute ; they seemed to have been deprived of all power of speech ; and their looks indicated remorse for the harshness, with which the old man had been treated. His Serenity at once returned to the Palace, and the Council of Ten was convoked for the forenoon. It was ordered

¹ G. Dolfino, as above.

² Berlan.

“that the lying-in-state and rites of sepulture shall be performed in the same manner as if the departed had died in office”; the bells of St. Mark’s gave out nine peals, and the deceased, preparatory to the obsequies, was deposited in the chamber of the Signore di Notte, covered with a golden mantle, the Ducal bonnet on his head, golden spurs on his feet, and the sword of gold at his side. Round the bier stood twenty gentlemen attired in scarlet as a guard of honour, representing the Signory. The Dogaressa Marina Nani-Foscari, who at first demurred, saying, “this was a tardy atonement for passed wrongs, and that she had determined to bury her husband at her own expense, even if she should sell a portion of her dower to defray the cost,” was obliged to submit, and to surrender the body. On the 3rd November, it was followed to its resting-place at the Frari through the Merceria by the Doge Malipiero in senatorial habit, by all the public Bodies, the Clergy, the four leading Arts, the Weepers (*piagnitori*), and a vast throng of curious spectators, with an immense number of wax candles and flambeaux. The bier was supported by mariners under a canopy of cloth-of-gold; and the funeral oration was delivered by Bernardo Giustiniani the Historian, who did not omit to declare how reluctant the late Serenissimo had been to embark in the war with Milan. The spectacle of a ducal interment, where the Doge in office followed his predecessor to the grave, was one without a precedent.

The public feeling manifested, when the consummation had arrived, was so general and so marked, that the Council of Ten thought it worth while to intimate their perfect concurrence with all that had been decided and done, and to forbid any farther discussion on the subject. There was evidently a fear that the danger of a popular demonstration was imminent; and doubtless ample precautions, of which we hear nothing, were taken to meet such a contingency. When a contemporary (Giorgio Dolfino already cited) assures us, that the city was moved to the very foundations by the event, we form our own conclusion as to the necessity for being on the alert.

The magnificent mausoleum by Pietro and Antonio Rizzi, subsequently erected to Foscari in the Church of the Frari,¹

¹ This monument is copied in Litta in voce *Foscari*.

still remains; we have, too, the likeness by Vivarini in the Museo Correr, the bust at the Ducal Palace, founded on the cast of the face taken after death, and the medal¹ with the portrait in ducal costume and the proud legend on the reverse: VENETIA MAGNA, surrounding trophies; but of the group from the chisel of Bartolomeo Buono of Bergamo, in which the Doge is represented praying before the Lion of Saint Mark, a fragment only,² the head and shoulders of the principal figure, outlived the French Revolution.

The Doge Foscari belonged to a family which was among the poorest as well as the most ancient in Venice. The

Superscription of Francesco Foscari to an Official Document.

successor of Mocenigo had raised himself by his own merits from comparative obscurity to the throne; and during five-and-thirty years it was his destiny to remain First Magistrate of the First Commonwealth in the world. Circumstances unhappily rendered that distinction scarcely one to be greatly coveted. The Republic was doomed to experience in his time every species of calamity. The pacific policy which she had previously pursued was in an evil hour abandoned; and her prosperity suffered an instantaneous and continual decline. Trade languished; great firms collapsed; celebrated banks broke. Among other commercial disasters, Andrea Priuli the banker, his Serenity's father-in-law, failed for 24,000 ducats. The funds which, at the commencement of the Milanese War, stood at 59 or 60, had sunk before its conclusion to 18½. In 1453, Constantinople had been taken by Mohammed II., and Venice was a loser to the extent of 300,000 ducats. The domestic troubles of Foscari and the sad end of all his sons, especially of Jacopo in 1457, brought his misery almost to a climax. This bereavement, coupled with the

¹ Engraved in Papadopoli, *Monete di Venezia*, 1893.

² In the Marciano. The representatives of the Doge were living not many years since in Venice in almost absolute indigence.

painful circumstances attending his abdication, probably produced the hemorrhage, which proved fatal on that November morning.

Yet he left his country wonderfully great. Was Venice ever to be greater?

END OF VOL. I

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